Palafox, et al., v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al. GR No.

L-10659
January 31, 1958

TOPIC: Liability of the State; Articles 2180 of the NCC.

Facts:
SabasTorralba was employed as a truck driver of the provincial
government of Ilocos Norte. While driving his truck in the course of his
work at the construction of a road, he ran over Proceto Palafox,
resulting to the latter’s death. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide
through reckless imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of
Palafox instituted a civil case againstTorralba, together with the
Province of Ilocos Norte, District Engineer, Provincial Treasurer and
SabasTorralba. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte may be held liable
for the negligent act of its employee under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code.

RULING: NO.
The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint for damages held that the province could not be made
liable because its employee was in the performance of a
governmental function — the construction and maintenance of roads
— and however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox
imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary consideration.
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JUAN
CABILING,Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was charged in the court below with the murder
of Clarence T. Allen on the 22d of November, 1905. He was convicted
of that crime and sentenced to life imprisonment. From this judgment
he appealed.
Juan Cabiling, was a student of the Government school at
Ormoc, and the deceased was the principal of said school. On the
morning of November 22, 1905, a normal school was opened at
Ormoc for the training of teachers from the various towns on the
western coast of Leyte. Mr. Allen was authorized to select from the
students those who were to be promoted to said school. Cabiling was
one of those who desired to attend said school, and inquired of Mrs.
Allen if he was not going to be in said normal class, and upon being
answered 'no' he stated that he was not satisfied. Mrs. Allen then said
that she would go to talk with Mr. Allen and have him settle the matter.
Thereafter, Mr. Allen said to defendant: "What is the matter
with you this morning, Juan? If you are not satisfied here you may go
away." The defendant upon hearing these words,stabbed him in the
stomach; the deceased pushed him back then the defendant gave
deceased a second blow in the same place, whereupon the deceased
caught the defendant by the right hand wherein he had the knife, and
by the neck. At this stage of the struggle the lieutenant of the
municipal police arrived and pointing his revolver at the defendant,
separated them and took the knife away from the defendant.
The Attorney-General is of the opinion that in order to raise the
guilt of a person to the grade of murder it is necessary that there is
treachery, which the Attorney General stated that there is none in this
case.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime committed was that of homicide or murder.
RULING:
With this conclusion we cannot agree. Among the circumstances
which qualify the act, there is mentioned in article 403 "treachery" (
alevosia). The killing was done with a pocketknife. It is very apparent
that Allen did not know that the defendant had this knife in his
possession; in fact, Mrs. Allen, who was standing near her husband,
testified that she did not see the knife until the second blow was
struck.
However, in the case at bar it was proven that at the time of
the offense, Cabiling was 17. The penalty above mentioned for the
crime of murder is, by the terms of the Penal Code, inflicted only upon
those persons who are more than 18 years old. By the provisions of
article 85 of the said code, if the defendant is more that 15 years and
less than 18 years of age, the penalty provided in article 403 cannot
be inflicted, but in its place there must be inflicted the penalty
immediately inferior to the one indicated by that article.
As to the aggravating circumstance, we agree with the
Attorney-General that circumstance 20 of article 10 was proven which
provide that:
“When the act is committed with insult or in disregard for the
respect which may be due the aggrieved party on account of his rank,
age, or sex, or when it is committed in his dwelling, if he has not given
provocation.”
It is applicable to this case because the person attacked was
the teacher and the person attacking was the pupil. There being one
aggravating circumstance and no extenuating circumstance, the
penalty must according to the law, be imposed in the maximum
degree.
The judgment of the court below is modified by imposing
instead of life imprisonment the penalty of fourteen years eight
months and one day of cadena temporal, and the payment of 1,000
pesos to the heirs of the deceased as indemnity.
MARCELA M. BAGAJO vs.THE HONORABLE GERONIMO R.
MARAVE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, Branch 11, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (1978)
Facts: Petitioner who was a teacher, left her classroom to go to the
principal's office. Complainant Wilma Alcantara tripped her classmate
while petitioner is out of the classroom. At that precise moment,
petitioner was entering the room. She asked Wilma what happened
but the latter denied having anything to do with what had just taken
place. Petitioner thereupon became angry and, with a piece of
"bamboo stick" which she was using as a pointer whipped Wilma
behind her legs and her thigh, thereby causing the bruises to her legs.
CFI: Petitioner is liable for the crime of slight physical
injuries.Petitioner maintains that as the teacher, she was just trying to
discipline her pupil Wilma for tripping her classmate and for denying
that she did so. She contends she was not actuated by any criminal
intent.
Issue: Whether Bagajo is liable for the crime of slight physical injuries.
Held: No. Petitioner is hereby acquitted, without prejudice to her being
dealt with administratively or in a civil case for damages not resulting
ex delicto.
In the school premises and during school activities and affairs,
the teacher exercises substitute parental authority over the students.
(Article 349, Civil Code.) More specifically, according to Article 352,
"The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are
fixed by government regulations and those of each school or
institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced.
The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the
heart and mind of the pupil or student." And pursuant to this provision,
Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual enjoins:
The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or
pushing pupils about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as
penalty, meting out cruel and unusual punishments of any nature,
reducing scholarship rating for bad conduct, holding up a pupil to
unnecessary ridicule, the use of epithets and expressions tending to
destroy the pupil's self-respect, and the permanent confiscation of
personal effects of pupils are forbidden.
In other words, under the foregoing Civil Code and
administrative injunctions, no teacher may impose corporal
punishment upon any student in any case. But we are not concerned
in this appeal with the possible administrative liability of petitioner.
Neither are we called upon here to pass on her civil liability other than
what could be ex-delicto, arising from her conviction, if that should be
the outcome hereof.
The sole question for Our resolution in this appeal relates
exclusively to her criminal responsibility for the alleged crime of slight
physical injuries as defined in Article 266, paragraph 2, of the Revised
Penal Code, pursuant to which she was prosecuted and convicted in
the courts below.
In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and so We Hold
that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for
her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer, in
the circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or
administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to have
incurred by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that she did
not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to
punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be
true, but We are convinced that the means she actually used was
moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any
malevolent intent. The nature of the injuries actually suffered by
Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches long and ¼ cm. wide)
and the fact that petitioner whipped her only behind the legs and
thigh, show, to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to
discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be
discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner
to commit any criminal offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea.Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions
generally the use of corporal punishment by teachers on their pupils.
All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the
instant case before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable
doubt, in the evidence before the trial court, that petitioner was
actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by
complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What
appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a teacher
exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis, she was
within her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of
discipline.
Felina Rosaldes v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
FACTS: Seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1
pupil, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally
bumped the knee of his teacher, herein petitioner, who was then
asleep on a bamboo sofa. Petitioner asked Michael to apologize, the
latter, however, proceeded instead to his seat. Petitioner then pinched
Michael on his thigh, held him up by his armpits and pushed him to
the floor causing him to hit a desk and, consequently, losing his
consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael by his ears and
repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.
The petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the
physical injuries suffered by Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him in
a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She
characterizes her maltreatment as an act of discipline that she as a
school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of the
child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in
loco parentis (in the place of the parent; refers to the legal
responsibility of a person or organization to take on some of the
functions and responsibilities of a parent.).
ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioner guilty of the crime of child abuse punishable
under RA 7610
2. Whether damages may be awarded to the plaintiff.
HELD:
1. YES, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of violation of RA 7610. Although
the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan
as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was
unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the
violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she
acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment
of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code,
which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishmentby a
school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority
shall have the same authority over the person of the child as
the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority
inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly:
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual
or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival,
such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured
child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the
maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA
concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael
Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard
Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits
and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the
desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a
sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by
his ears and pushed him down on the floor." On her part, the trial
judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to
school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents
to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such
established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human
being.

2. YES. It is imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties

when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be
imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the
action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery. The
explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission of damages
was misplaced, because even without proof of the actual expenses, or
testimony on the victim’s feelings, the lower courts still had the
authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense and
the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on
Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral injury.
It cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his
treatment.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May

11, 2005, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the
maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales
P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P20,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of
6% per annum on each item of the civil liability reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall
pay the costs of suit.
GEORGE BONGALON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2013) accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances
in his favor.
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the
crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to
Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to seven days of medical attention,19 the petitioner was liable for slight
be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. The
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation was also
punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised appreciated. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or
Penal Code. obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and
intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan
Facts: Jayson Dela Cruz, a Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute suffered had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had
acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment from the petitioner by burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating
striking said Dela Cruz with his palm hitting the latter at his back and circumstance of passion.
by slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory
remarks to the latter’s family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo
kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all
strangers here. Bring your father here), which acts of the accused are
prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the said child as a human being. These facts
were the aftermath of the hurling of stones between the petitioner’s
daughters and the Dela Cruz brothers (one of which was Jayson).

Ruling: Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and
the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with
his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their
holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the
above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been
intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a
human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or
embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on
Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger,
indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for
the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered
harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-
control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so
essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine

of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the
JOSEPH SALUDAGA vs. FEU and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS
(President of FEU) (2008)
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of
(FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security
guards on duty at the school premises. Petitioner was rushed to FEU
Hospital due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete was
brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was
accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal
complaint was filed against him.
Saludaga thereafter filed with RTC Manila a complaint for
damages against respondents on the ground that they breached
their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure
environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning.
Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy
Dvpt and Mgt Corp. (Galaxy), the agency contracted by FEU to
provide security services within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial
(Imperial), Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever would
be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and to pay attorney's fees
and cost of the suit. On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a
Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General Insurance.
Trial court ruled in favor of Saludaga:
1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his capacity as president of FEU to
pay jointly and severally Joseph Saludaga the amount of P35,298.25
for actual damages with 12% interest per annum from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; moral damages xxx, exemplary damages xx,
attorney's fees xx and cost of the suit;
2. Galaxy Corp. and its president, Col. Mariano Imperial to indemnify
jointly and severally 3rd party plaintiffs (FEU and Edilberto de Jesus in
his capacity as President of FEU) for the above-mentioned amounts;
3. And the 4th party complaint (against the insurance company) is
dismissed for lack of cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
Respondents appealed to the CA which ruled in its favor, reversing
the RTC decision, dismissing the complaint, and also denying
Saludaga’s subsequent MR.
ISSUES:
1. WON Saludaga may claim damages from FEU for breach of
student-school contract for a safe learning environment
2. Whether FEU’s liability is based on quasi-delict or on contract
3. From what source of obligation did the other claims arose?
HELD:
1) Yes.
2) FEU’s liability is based on contract, not quasi-delict.
3) Quasi-delict – vicarious liability between Galaxy Agency and
security guard Rosete
Quasi-delict – but SC held that there is no vicarious liability
between FEU and Rosete
Quasi-delict – damage to FEU due to the negligence of Galaxy
Agency in supplying FEU with an unqualified guard (Imperial, the
president of Galaxy is solidarily liable with the agency)
Breach of Contract
It is undisputed that Saludaga was enrolled as a sophomore law
student in FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation
between the two parties. On Saludaga's part, he was obliged to
comply with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other
hand, FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart knowledge
and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure
and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the
campus.
 It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the instant case when
Saludaga was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard
who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a
prima facie showing that FEU failed to comply with its obligation to
provide a safe and secure environment to its students.
In order to avoid liability, however, FEU alleged that the
shooting incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have
reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as
he was not their employee; and that they complied with their
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by
having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of
Galaxy.
After a thorough review of the records, the SC found that FEU
failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due
diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students.
They failed to prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the
campus met the requirements stipulated in the Security Service
Agreement. Certain documents about Galaxy were presented during
trial; however, no evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a
security guard for the university was offered. FEU also failed to show
that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security
guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required
in the Security Service Agreement.
Consequently, FEU's defense of force majeure must fail. In
order for force majeure to be considered, FEU must show that no
negligence or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned
the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who
has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. When the effect is found to be partly the
result of a person's participation - whether by active intervention,
neglect or failure to act - the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in
the performance of their obligations are liable for damages.
Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in
providing a safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to
petitioner for damages.
President of FEU (De Jesus) is not liable
SC noted that the trial court held respondent De Jesus solidarily liable
with respondent FEU. In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol, SC
held that:
... Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along
(although not necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach,
as a rule, only when - (1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the
corporation, or when he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in
directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in
damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (2) he
consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who, having
knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary
his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally
and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a
specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate
action.
None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case;
hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with
respondent FEU.
Cause of Action of FEU: Quasi Delict
Incidentally, although the main cause of action in the instant case is
the breach of the school-student contract, petitioner, in the alternative,
also holds respondents vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. However, respondents cannot be held liable for damages
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents are not the
employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The
instructions issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and
its security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly
envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a
security agency.
As to the Third Party Claim against Galaxy, evidence duly
supports that Galaxy is negligent not only in the selection of its
employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative
sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident;
moreover, he was even allowed to go on leave of absence which led
eventually to his disappearance. Galaxy also failed to monitor
petitioner's condition or extend the necessary assistance. For these
acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an
unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach of
obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent
FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts
awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily
liable with Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of
the security agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that his
medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but said
representations were not fulfilled.
a. respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) is ORDERED to pay
petitioner actual damages in the amount of P35,298.25, plus 6%
interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until the finality of
this Decision.After this decision becomes final and executory, the
applicable rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its
satisfaction;
b. respondent FEU is also ORDERED to pay petitioner temperate
damages in the amount of P20,000.00; moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00; and attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the
amount of P50,000.00;
c. the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
The Complaint against respondent Edilberto C. De Jesus is
DISMISSED. The counterclaims of respondents are likewise
DISMISSED.
Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy) and its
president, Mariano D. Imperial are ORDERED to jointly and severally
pay respondent FEU damages equivalent to the above-mentioned
amounts awarded to petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2007

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87050 nullifying
the Decision of the trial court and dismissing the complaint as well as
the August 23, 2007 Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 98-
89483 finding respondent FEU liable for damages for breach of its
obligation to provide students with a safe and secure learning
atmosphere, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
Capili v. Sps. Cardana, G.R. No. 157906, Novermber 2, 2006.
Facts: On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the
perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch
of a caimito tree within the school premises fell on her, causing her
instantaneous death. Her parents - Dominador and Rosalita
Cardaña(respondents) - filed a case for damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC).
Respondents alleged that as early as December 15, 1992, a resident
of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible danger the
tree posed to passersby. The said tree stood near the principal’s
(Capili) office. Respondents averred that petitioner’s gross negligence
and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
TheRTC dismissed the complaint for failure to establish negligence on
the part of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
decision and found petitioner liable for Jasmin’s death.
Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent since she had assigned
her next-in-rank to see to its disposal; that despite inspection, there
was no indication that the tree was already rotten, nor did any of her
15 teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten.
On the other hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the
tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have done in the
same situation.
Issue: WON petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin
Cardaña.
Ruling: YES.
A negligent act is an inadvertent act. A negligent act is one from
which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position, in the
same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an
appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the
act or to do it in a more careful manner.
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could
fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As
the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children
within the school and its premises. She is expected to be aware of
the condition of the school grounds.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff
has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or
some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and
the damages incurred. (DAMAGES-NEGLIGENCE-CAUSAL
CONNECTION)
The fact that Jasmin died as a result of the dead and rotting tree
shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone
passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa
loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of
such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a
presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of
the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’
daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge
of the school.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, negligence is presumed
once the requisites for the doctrine to apply are established.
Then, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption
or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such
as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.
 As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within
the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state
of the tree calls for an explanation on her part as to why she failed to
be vigilant.

Petitioner cannot escape liability by claiming that nobody told

her about the condition of the tree, nor did she find anything wrong
upon inspection of the grounds. As school principal, petitioner is
expected to oversee the safety of the school’s premises.The fact
that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead
and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility
demanded by her position.

Even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to

another teacher, she exercises supervision over her
assignee. More than a month had lapsed since petitioner gave
instruction to her assistant Palaña, to the time the incident occurred.
Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by
the rotting tree had been removed.

However, under the circumstances, petitioner was not

motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis-à-vis respondents’ daughter’s
death. The award of moral damages is therefore not proper.

In line with applicable jurisprudence, the award by the Court of

Appeals of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of
Jasmin, and P15,010 as reimbursement of her burial expenses is
affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October

18, 2002 and the Resolution dated March 20, 2003, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION such that the award of moral damages is hereby
deleted.
CIRIACO L. MERCADO vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL
QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL. (1960)
Facts: Augusto Mercado (son of the petitioner) and Manuel
Quisumbing were classmates who quarrelled over a “pitogo” (empty
nutshell used by children as a piggy bank). Augusto started the
aggression. Undeniably, the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto Mercado
but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to
Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the "pitogo" belonged to
Augusto, because right after Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran
away to get a basket ball with which they could play. Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the "pitogo" belonged to
Augusto. He thought it was the "pitogo" of Benedicto P. Lim, so that
when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from Renato, Manuel, Jr.
told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain
into the holes of the "pitogo". However, Augusto resented Manuel,
Jr.'s remark and he aggresively pushed the latter. The fight started
then. After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and the
latter was clutching his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto's
anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut
him on the right check with a piece of razor.
Respondents filed a suit for damages against the petitioner, praying
for P5,000.00 covering the moral damages they allegedly suffered
due to their son's being wounded; and the sum of P3,000.00 as
attorney's fees. Counsel for petitioner argues that since the incident of
the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic
School (during recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner
herein, the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible
instead of the latter.
Issues:
1) WON the respondents are entitled to moral damages.
2) WON the school is liable pursuant to Art. 2180 CC.
Ruling:
1) NO. The facts of record do not warrant the granting of moral
damages to plaintiffs-appellants Manuel Quisumbing and Ana Pineda.
"In law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule, to such mental pain or
suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as
distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the
accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering of which
arises from a contemplation of wrong committed on the person of
another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover
for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the other's
suffering. Nor can a parent recover for mental distress and anxiety on
account of physical injury sustained by a child or for anxiety for the
safety of his child placed in peril by the negligence of another." (15
Am. Jur. 597). Plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to attorney's fees, it
not appearing that defendant-appellee had wantonly disregarded their
claim for damages.
2) NO.
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in
their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence
on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances
the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil
would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would
the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils
appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their
homes with their parents after school is over. The situation
contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor
does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The
claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must,
therefore, be held to be without merit.
We next come to the claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed
at P2,000 are excessive. We note that the wound caused to
respondent was inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common fight
between boys in a grade school. The Court of Appeals fixed the
medical expenses incurred in treating and curing the wound at P50.
Said court stated that the wound did not even require hospitalization.
Neither was Mercado found guilty of any offense nor the scar in
Quisumbing's face pronounced to have caused a deformity, unlike the
case of Araneta, et al. vs. Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil., 529; 55 Off.
Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner's counsel argues that if death call for P3,000
to P6,000, certainly the incised wound could cause mental pain and
suffering to the tune of P2,000.
In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court pronounces that the
child Quisumbing suffered moral damages "by reason of the wound
inflicted by Augusto Mercado." While moral damages included
physical suffering, which must have been caused to the wounded boy
Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil Code), the decision of the court below
does not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended
or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible circumstance in
the case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable would be if a
criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed.
when it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court
indicate that Augusto's resentment, which motivated the assault, was
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or
interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato."
This is, according to the decision appealed from, the reason why
Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who, in turn, also
pushed Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate
cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's
own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while
trying to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we
find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to
have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not
justified.
For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and the petitioner is declared exempt or free from the
payment of moral damages. The award of P50 for medical expenses,
however, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was
ever presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years
old and it does not appear that he had acted with discernment
when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing,
Jr.

It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto

Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical
injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we
assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC,
vs. ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON,
owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades,
known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute"
(M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE,
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son,
Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the
Manila Technical Institute, Manila, filed the action below for damages
arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student,
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said
Institute.
FACTS:
The deceased DominadorPalisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon
were classmates. Together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz,
they were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor.
Facts according to the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness
to the incident:
It was recess time, and Desiderio and Virgilio were working on a
machine while Dominador was merely looking on at them. Virgilio
made a remark to the effect that Dominador was acting like a
foreman. Because of this remark Dominador slapped slightly Virgilio
on the face. Virgilio, in retaliation, gave Dominador a strong flat blow
on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach.
Dominador retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Virgilio
followed him and both exchanged blows until Dominador stumbled on
an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Dominador
became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he
was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never
regained consciousness; and he died.
Issue: Whether the lower court err in absolving the school officials on
the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil
Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school"?
Ruling: YES.
As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as
(the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or
student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta
in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now
be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. .
Defendants president and teacher-in-charge of the school must
therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of
their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of
his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate
death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could
have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty
of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in
the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at
the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law
holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability,
in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code,
by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage." But the defendants failed to prove
such exemption from liability.
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA
JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA,
PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN
JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DAMASO JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON
thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR
GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents. (1988)
On April 13, 1972, while in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos (School), Alfredo Amadora (Alfredo) was killed when his
classmate, Pablito Daffon (Pablito), fired a gun.
Pablito was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.
Petitioners herein, as the victim’s parents, filed a civil action for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the school, its
rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Pablito and two other students, through their
respective parents.
The complaint against the student was later dropped.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private respondents.
The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the
school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that
he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already
ended.
The petitioners then raised an earlier incident which they claim
underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the
private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April
7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose
Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without
making a report to the principal or taking any further action . As
Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired
the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the
same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their
son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso.
The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was
the same firearm that killed Alfredo. (PRIOR INCIDENT; GUN WAS
NOT CONFISCATED; AS A RESULT, THE SAME GUN WAS USED
TO KILL ALFREDO)
The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of Php 294,984.00 -
representing: death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of
litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.The case decision of the CFI was appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision, and absolved all the
defendants.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Alfredo is still considered in the custody of the
school notwithstanding that the classes had formally ended
2. Whether or not the rector, the high school principal, the dean of
boys, and Celestino Dicon, should be liable
3. Whether or not the school should be liable
RULING:
1. Yes. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in
the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important
is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed,
even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises
of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him
in the custody of the school authorities.
2. No. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-
charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a
general authority over the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes
or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline.
The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-
charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics
report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent
Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon
or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the
school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the
tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was
not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it
is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the
teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the
tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by
his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary,
the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline. (BURDEN TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE
WAS NOT MET)
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys
who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence
that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the
students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary
action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was
clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from
the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador
as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was
the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
3. No. The Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly
liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice (COMPARE THIS WITH
SALUDAGA v. FEU – THE SCHOOL THERE WAS MADE LIABLE
BECAUSE THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BREACH OF CONTRACT).
Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the
other private respondents for none of them has been found to have
been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
Note: The Court discussed three previous cases
Exconde v. Capuno, which exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a
party to the case) on the ground that it was not a “school of arts and trades”
Mercado v. Court of Appeals, (which reiterated the Exconde Case) whichexculpated
the school once more and declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not
been sued that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts
and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such
that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents.”
Palisoc v. Brillantes, which declared that the head of the school and the teacher-in-
charged be held solidarily liable with the wrongdoer - despite of the fact that he was
already of age, and was not boarding in the school.
The Palisoc case abandoned the pronouncement that the phrase “so long as they
remain in their custody” in Article 2180, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within
the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-
terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the
close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period
of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. The student is in the custody of the school authorities
as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
This very case, on the other hand, abandoned the pronouncements in Exconde and
Mercado, that the last paragraph of Article 2180 applies to all school. There is really
no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools
insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance
is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.
REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father PEDRO PASCO vs. WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA.
MARIA and ARANETA UNIVERSITY, G.R. No. L-54357 April 25,
1988

Facts: At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together with

two companions, while walking inside the campus of the private
respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said
university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students
led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were
also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently
stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was hospitalized at the
Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent
surgery to save his life.

On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco,

filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein
private respondent Gregorio Araneta University. Said school was
impleaded as a party defendant based Art. 2180 Civil Code.

Respondents filed a MTD based on the following grounds:

a. Article 2180 of the New Civil Code under which it was sued applies only to
vocational schools and not to academic institutions;

b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the civil liability in this case arises from a criminal
action which the defendant university has not committed;

c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by the plaintiff, hence,
it would be premature to bring an action for damages against defendant University.

Trial court granted the MTD.

Held: We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article

to educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades)
for the issue in this petition is actually whether or not, under the
article, the school or the university itself (as distinguished from the
teachers or heads) is liable. We find the answer in the negative, for
surely the provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads."
FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners, vs.
EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents (1988)
In 1963, Mariano Soriano (Soriano) was the principal of the Gabaldon
Primary School, a public educational institution located in Tayug,
Pangasinan. Edgardo Aquino (Aquino) was a teacher therein. At that
time, the school was fittered with several concrete blocks which were
remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II.
Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, another teacher started burying them one by one as
early as 1962. Deciding to help his colleague, Aquino initially gathered
18 of his male pupils, aged 10 to 11, after class dismissal and ordered
them to dig a hole beside the concrete block where the stone can be
buried. The following day, four of these 18 students, including the son
of the petitioner, Novelito Ylarde, continued digging upon Aquino’s
orders. When the depth was right enough (1 meter and 40
centimeters deep), Aquino left the four students to get some rope for
the concrete block. Three of the four students, including Novelito
Ylarde playfully jump into the pit and the fourth student jumped on top
of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening.
Two of the three students in the pit were able to scramble out of the
excavation on time, unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block
caught him before he could get out. He died three days later.
RTC: Ylarde's parents filed a suit for damages against both Aquino
and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their
course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde
was due to his own reckless imprudence.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the lower
court.
Petitioners base their action against private respondent Aquino on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code for his alleged negligence that caused
their son's death while the complaint against respondent Soriano as
the head of school is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not both Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
As regards the principal, Soriano, he cannot be made
responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head
of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades.
This is in line with the Court’s ruling in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals, wherein the Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not
the head of an academic school who should be answerable for
torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in
a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who
can be held liable. In the same case, the Court explained:
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has
come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to
all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility
for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is
the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is
the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general
shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and
'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."
 Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, Soriano, as
principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads
is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides,
as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent
Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
As regards, Aquino, it can be easily seen that he can be
held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-
charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over
them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any
injury on their persons. However, as earlier pointed out, petitioners
base the alleged liability of Aquino on Article 2176 which is separate
and distinct from that provided for in Article 2180.
With this in mind, the question that needs to be answered is:
Were there acts and omissions on the part of private respondent
Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal
relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? The Court’s answer is in the
affirmative. He is liable for damages.
It is very clear that Aquino acted with fault and gross
negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult
manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to
make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew
to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside
the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge
block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by
any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered
them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent
that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place
where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5)
left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive
nuisance.
The negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous
site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde.
Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around.
Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves
with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous
instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them
jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since
the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it
was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole
beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy
weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect
of the negligent acts of Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde
would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by
Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real
danger.
The contention that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person is certainly without cogent basis. A reasonably
prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an
excavation site and more so, leaving them there all by themselves,
may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not
assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to
cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent
to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher
who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that
the children are protected from all harm in his company.
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES
FOUNDATION, petitioners, vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B.
CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and
RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents. G.R. No. 70458 October 5,
1988
FACTS:Jimmy B. Abon is the AFP-appointed armorer of petitioner
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) ROTC Unit. Not being an
employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP,as
well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of
the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant
of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP.
Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
Abon shot on BCF’s parking space Napoleon Castro, a student of the
University of Baguio, with an unlicensed firearm which he took from
the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Castro died and
Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by
Military Commission No. 30, AFP.
The respondents Heirs of Castro sued for damages, impleading Abon,
BCF and its officers, including petitioner Benjamin Salvosa, President
and Chairman of the Board of BCF. The CFI of Tarlac held Salvosa,
BCF and its officers solidarily liable with Abon, ordering them jointly
and severally to pay the Heirs of Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death
of Napoleon Castro, (b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, (c) P5,000.00 as moral damages,
(d) P6,000.00 as actual damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees, plus costs.
On appeal the IAC affirmed with modification the CFI ruling. The
modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of
temperate damages, and increasing the indemnity for the death of
Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a
consequence of the tortious act of Abon.
HELD: NO.
Under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the
student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a
certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon
to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
[student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the
students) remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was still in the
protective and supervisory custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation
when he shot Napoleon Castro, the respondent Court ruled that:
it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at
the time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the
evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and
property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been
attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just
about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is
safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and
envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. (Emphasis supplied)
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is
embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to
leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity
is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include
dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the
school, as contemplated in the law.

Upon the foregoing considerations, Abon cannot be considered to

have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of
BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, be held
solidarity liable Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Ungos
ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Abon "not to leave the
office and [to keep the armory] well guarded." Apart from negating a
finding that Abon was under the custody of the school when he
committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held
liable, this circumstance shows that Abon was supposed tobe working
in the armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.

(Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code, a school which offers both academic and technical/vocational
courses cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a student
enrolled only in its academic program; however, considering that
Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon
Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such other
issue.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in

so far as it holds petitionerssolidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his
tortious act in the killing of Napoleon Castro. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS.
FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN
ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO
AND PATRIA CADIZ vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA
CADIZ (1991)
FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis
High School, wanted to join a school picnic. His parents, respondents
spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short
notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring
food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go
back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the
teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the
picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of
the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the
process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent
spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some of their
teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint
against the school.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.
RULING: Petition granted.
RATIO: NO. The school and the teachers are not liable.
On the part of the school
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article
2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the
death of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
(TAKE NOTE: The provision in Art. 2180 …. Lastly, teachers or heads
of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody., is not applicable because the student is not in
the premises of the school. The case at bar is purely private affair)
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held
liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an
employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual
performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within
the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while
the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a
picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while
some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were
having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the
school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is
not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-
curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by
petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students
and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show
acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application
therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it
supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of
respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed to
the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the
misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission
he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.

On the part of the teachers

No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to

warrant the award of damages to the respondents-
spouses.Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the
section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident
or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.

In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito

Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have
knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even
respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants
(petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the
defendants in case of emergency." The records also show that both
petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save
the child.

With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be

awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not
fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D.
LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R.
BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
Facts: Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student of PSBA, was
stabbed to death while on the second-floor premises of the school.
The assailants were not members of the schools’ academic
community but were elements from outside the school. The parents of
Carlitos filed a civil action against the school authorities, alleging them
negligent, reckless and with failure to take security precautions,
means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed,
alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated
article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention
and denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was similarly dealt with. Petitioners then assailed the
trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in
a decision affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the
respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
The respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the
law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the
case based on Article 2180 (in loco parentis).
Held: YES.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180
cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of
Exconde vs. Capuno and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; hence, the
ruling in the Palisoc case that it should apply to all kinds of
educational institutions, academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff
liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the
last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the
diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the
merits of the case.
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to
dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should
be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of
the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule of loco parentis. This Court discussed this
doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and,
more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In all such cases, it
had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of
the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material
facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not
necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply
with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student
with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide
by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics
or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other
sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to
life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps
are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on
quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard
the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to
the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising
from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S.
Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this
Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
(38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of
contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability
to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor
may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source
of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened
the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to
cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to
the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment
caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of
Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the
foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a
contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there
is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there
is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and
Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the
same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs
only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school against the petitioners.
would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence
becomes material only because of the contractual relation SO ORDERED.
between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual
relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability (had
there been no contract, the school is not liable because the
assailants are not it’s students?). The negligence of the school
cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21
of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the

obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like
a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all
risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the
so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported
several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious
deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case,
the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its
contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence,
here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to
the circumstances of persons, time and place.

As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of

the private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the
material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make
such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is

DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered
MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial guardian
VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN vs. HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON,
Presiding Judge of Branch LXI, Regional Trial Court of Region III,
Angeles City, and the REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES,
represented by its President (1992)
Facts: Plaintiff Maximino was in the campus ground and premises of
the REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is still a
regular enrolled student of said school taking his morning classes.
The defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON is a duly appointed security
guard under the employment, supervision and control of his employer-
defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin
Serrano. SOLOMON without any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill, attack,
assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38
Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound
sustained would have caused plaintiff's death were it not for the timely
medical assistance given to him. The plaintiff was treated and
confined at Angeles Medical Center and as per doctor's opinion, the
plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be
incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of
from three to four months before his wounds would be completely
healed.
Petitioner filed a civil complaint for damages against private
respondent Republic Central, the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and
Solomon. Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that it was not the
employer of the security guard charged and hence was not
responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private respondent
school further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil
Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy
Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
The RTC granted the MTD.
Issue: WON the School is liable under Art. 2180.
Held:
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by
one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or
omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law
responsible. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of
another person are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
xxx xxx xxx
The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding the
Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy
B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private respondent
school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of
Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school
was the client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is settled
that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns
the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the
employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful
acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer
agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency.
As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no
hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards
cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client
whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The
fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the
security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and
liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or
directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged
in the contract for services entered into with the security agency.
There being no employer-employee relationship between the
Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose
vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security
guard Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil
or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an
employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-
quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not
available for imposing liability upon the Republic Central
Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by
petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental
authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and
student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school
or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced.
The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the
heart and mind of the pupil or student.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, invoked by petitioner, the Court held the
owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the
"Manila Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila, responsible in
damages for the death of Dominador Palisoc, a student of Institute,
which resulted from fist blows delivered by Virgilio L. Daffon, another
student of the Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc
v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article
2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the
facts existing in the instant case.
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible
for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject
to such substitute parental authority. In the instant case, as already
noted, Jimmy Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts
resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no
substitute parental authority over Solomon.
Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the
petitioner's claim as one based wholly and exclusively on Article 2180
of the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial judge was correct.
Does it follow, however, that respondent Colleges could not be
held liable upon any other basis in law, for or in respect of the
injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle respondent school
to dismissal of petitioner's complaint in respect of itself?
(CAUSE OF ACTION IS BREACH OF CONTRACT) The very recent
case of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
v. Court of Appeals, requires us to give a negative answer to that
question.
XXXX

In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to
dismiss the complaint against it, and both the Court of Appeals and
this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the
court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondent
Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action
was based, and could have been based, only on Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious
or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute
breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent
trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner
could have no cause of action other than one based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have
granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the
interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting
breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of
respondent Colleges.

In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court, and
in order to avoid a possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and
putting aside technical considerations, we consider that respondent
trial judge committed serious error correctible by this Court in the
instant case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE COURSE to the

Petition, to TREAT the comment of respondent Colleges as its
answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated 29
November 1983. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
further proceedings consistent with this Resolution.
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or SR.
CRISPINA A. TOLENTINO, S.Sp.S., vs. CORAZON P. TAGUIAM
(2008)
Facts: Respondent Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-
Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City.
The class president, wrote a letter to the grade school principal
requesting permission to hold a year-end celebration at the school
grounds. The principal authorized the activity and allowed the pupils
to use the swimming pool. In this connection, respondent distributed
the parents/guardians permit forms to the pupils.
Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federicos permit form was
unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed
by her mother to join the activity since her mother personally brought
her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. Before the
activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how
to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were
swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to
verify where they were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned
(shed died).
Petitioner school administratively charged the respondent and was
eventually dismissed on the ground of gross negligence resulting to
loss of trust and confidence.
Meanwhile, Chiara Mae’s parents filed a P7 Million damage suit
against petitioners and respondent, among others. They also filed
against respondent a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
Respondent in turn filed a complaint against the school and/or Sr.
Crispina Tolentino for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for reinstatement
with full backwages and other money claims, damages and attorneys
fees.
Issue: WON Taguiam is liable under Art. 2180 (loco parentis).
Held: YES.
Dismissal is proper
Respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that
Chiara Maes permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her
to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Maes mother
has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with
her packed lunch and swimsuit.
The purpose of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the parents
have allowed their child to join the school activity involved.
Respondent cannot simply ignore this by resorting to assumptions.
Respondent admitted that she was around when Chiara Mae and her
mother arrived. She could have requested the mother to sign the
permit form before she left the school or at least called her up to
obtain her conformity.
Second, it was respondents responsibility as Class Adviser to
supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school.[18] Thus,
she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper
safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel,
were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of
the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible
for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.
As it turned out, since respondent was the only adult present, majority
of the pupils were left unsupervised when she followed the two pupils
who sneaked out. In the light of the odds involved, respondent should
have considered that those who sneaked out could not have left the
school premises since there were guards manning the gates. The
guards would not have allowed them to go out in their swimsuits and
without any adult accompanying them. But those who stayed at the
pool were put at greater risk, when she left them unattended by an
adult.
Notably, respondents negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In
view of the considerable resultant damage, however, we are in
agreement that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.

Xxx

Loco Parentis – Art. 2180

As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent

should have made sure that the children were protected from all harm
while in her company. Respondent should have known that leaving
the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in
an accident. A simple reminder not to go to the deepest part of the
pool was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the
situation presented to the children, especially when respondent knew
that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally, respondent created an
unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to
real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and
confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the
school itself.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated June 7, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81480
is SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated September 20, 2002 of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-
02 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and
ROSALINDA TABUGO,
Petitioners v. JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father,
RODOLFO S. MIRANDA, Respondent
G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010
Facts:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St.
Joseph College’s (SJC’s) premises, the class to which Jayson Val
Miranda, a twelve year-old student, belonged was conducting a
science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings
under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject
teacher and employee of SJC.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment. In the middle
of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the
class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the
test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one
of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of
Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out
and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts
of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof,
Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for
which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication.
On December 6, 1994, the parents of Jayson, through counsel, wrote
SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical
expenses of Jayson that had been incurred and will be incurred
further arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. In
a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented
by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot
accede to the demand because “the accident occurred by reason of
[Jayson’s] failure to comply with the written procedure for the
experiment and his teacher’s repeated warnings and instruction that
no student must face, much less look into, the opening of the test tube
until the heated compound has cooled.
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo Miranda, Jayson’s
father, sued for damages Jayson’s behalf.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment awarding actual
damages, moral damages and attorney’s fees in favor of Jayson.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.
Thus, SJC Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Rosalinda Tabugo
(petitioners) filed the instant case to the Supreme Court.
Issue : WON the petitioners shall be held liable for the injury suffered
by the respondent?
Held:
YES. The petitioners shall be held liable.
The Supreme Court found no reason to depart from the uniform
rulings of the lower courts that petitioners were “negligent since they
all failed to exercise the required reasonable care, prudence, caution
and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students.”
Petitioners claim that the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was his
own negligence in disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo prior
to the experiment and peeking into the test tube did not convince the
Supreme Court.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury
was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment.
All of the petitioners are equally at fault and are liable for negligence
because all of them are responsible for exercising the required
reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid
injuries to the students. The individual petitioners are persons charged
with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the
supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Sr. Josephini Ambatali is
likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility
because the other individual petitioners were under her direct control
and supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual petitioners
were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, bestows special parental authority on the following persons
with the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
of dangerous science experiments conducted by the students during
class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the
students who conduct experiments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices,
specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and
dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time
her class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident
involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the class—fifty
(50) students— conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.
However, [Jayson] is partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise
bear the consequences of his own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore,
should be held liable only for the damages actually caused by their
negligence.
Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts
award of actual and moral damages, and grant of attorneys fees. The
denial of petitioners counterclaim is also in order.

As we have held in St. Marys, for petitioner [St. Marys Academy] to be

liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.

Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of

care and caution is demonstrated by the following:

1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage

and injury to its students although it had full information on the nature
AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIAS.
INTON, on their behalf and on behalf of their minor child, JOSE
LUIS INTON, and SR. MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP,
G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011
Facts: Jose Luis was a grade three student at Aquinas School
(Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a
religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June 1998,
taught Jose Luis grade three religion class. While Yamyamin was
writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went
over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin
noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose
Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time,
unable to tolerate the child’s behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose
Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and
shoved his head on the classmate’s seat. Finally, she told the child to
stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the
notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton
(the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose
Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the RTC. The Intons also
filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act
7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to
recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys
fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The
RTC dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis favor,
holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00,
exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of P10,000.00
plus the costs of suit.
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA). They asked the CA to increase the award of damages and hold
Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-
employee relation existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA
found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined to
increase the award of damages. Jose Luis moved for partial
reconsideration but this was denied. Aquinas, for its part, appealed
directly to this Court from the CA decision through a petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas
solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
Ruling:
The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a)
selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power
to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the most
crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the
employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work
of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he
accomplishes the same.
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an
agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill
its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas
to provide catechesis to its students.Aquinas insists that it was not the
school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the
task of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the
way bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in
public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that
Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The
Intons had not refuted the school directress testimony in this
regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas
solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure
that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young
students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps
to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by SO ORDERED.
their religion teacher.

First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas

showed that she was qualified to teach religion.

Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin

came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that,
given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she
would behave properly towards the students.

Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative

Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students. It
also required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was
allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998.

Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to
teach to ensure that she was really catechizing the students.

And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to

classroom evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was new and it was
just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient
opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to
relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the
incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.

Regarding the Intons’ plea for an award of greater amounts of

damages, the Court finds no justification for this since they did not
appeal from the decision of the CA. The Intons prayed for the
increase only in their comment to the petition. They thus cannot obtain
from this Court any affirmative relief other than those that the CA
already granted them in its decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August
4, 2008, and HOLDS petitioner Aquinas School not liable in damages
to respondent Jose Luis Inton.
 FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine
Military Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA,
who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF
THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
February 24, 2015
Remedial Law – Mandamus – Ministrant vs Discretionary Function
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s
class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR)
subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query
to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her.
Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class
(English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR
class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to
look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that
their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said
she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with
demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about
it. Not content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be
appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer
(STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control
because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English
class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record,
and based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR
teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the
English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA
rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is
dismissed from said class and may be excused to leave the
classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm;
that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late
because again, on that day in the OR class, each student was
dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not
dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to
stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the
teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to
the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia
at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be
considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that instead
of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The
STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC)
for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his
written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence,
as a result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of
behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a
ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC,
which is composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation.
After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and
with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the
members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia
guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a
dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also
have a practice of chambering where the members, particularly the
dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the
“tyranny of the minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter was
convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he
changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was
immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied.
Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal
of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to
various military officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was
their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by
the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred
to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham”
investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and
privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed
by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in
favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory.
Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said
petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of
policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military
matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its
findings.
HELD:
I.
Mandamus is not proper
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA
should be compelled to reinstate him as well as to give him his
supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the
Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of
restoring Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his
awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed against
an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further, such act
which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMA’s
academic freedom as an educational institution – and such
performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is
whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the
Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual
controversies and to determine whether or not a government
branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military
affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that
judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they
enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of their civil and
political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and punished
by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less,
question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a
PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate
his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational
institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a
student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing
dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at stake (life,
liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and
integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can be deprived of
such without due process of law and the PMA, even as a military
academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia
questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed from
the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.
(Author’s note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as
contemplated by the Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a
cadet yet, as can be seen in the below discussion, PMA presented
evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)
II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide
whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the institution.
Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this
case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed
the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He
was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then
given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was
informed about his options and the entire process that the case
would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed
after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its
completion, the investigating team submitted a written report
together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the
honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was
assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him
and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain
his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence
in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting
members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the
Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge
Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA
Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by
the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of
the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the
case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-
Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB
members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity
to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb
the findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty
finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or
recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor
Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the
attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor
System (manner which PMA conducts investigation of Honor Code
violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a
law, the PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss
erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1)
authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the
President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may
exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its
academic freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of
schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its
academic freedom. If it determines that a cadet violates it, then it
has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its
findings, Cudia lied – which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA
really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a
minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It does not have a gradation
of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to what
penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed
to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while
the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and
not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also
considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.

The United States (of America) vs Guillermo Maza; G.R. No.
2436. November 22, 1905, Johnson, J,;
TOPIC: Liability of Joint Tortfeasors
The evidence adduced during the trial shows the following facts:
First. That this Defendant was sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Batangas on the 6th day of
December, 1902, to be imprisoned for the period of eight years
and one day of presidio mayor with the accessory penalties
mentioned in the decision in that cause.
Second. From this decision the Defendant appealed to the
Supreme Court on the 9th day of December of the same year.
Third. That on the 18th day of April, 1903, the Supreme Court
affirmed the above sentence of the inferior court.
Fourth. That during the time of the said appeal was pending in the
Supreme Court the said accused was detained as a prisoner in
the provincial jail in the Province of Batangas.
Fifth. That on the afternoon of the 15th of December, 1902,
while the Defendant was thus detained as a prisoner in the
provincial jail, he, together with other prisoners, attempted to
escape from said jail.
Sixth. That in the attempt of the Defendant, together with his
companions, to escape from said jail, he inflicted wounds
upon one Baltazar Ramirez, by means of a revolver which he
then and there took from the possession of one of the guards
in said jail, from which wounds the said Ramirez died.
Seventh. That in the attempt of the Defendant with his companions
to escape from said jail, they did, by force and violence, take from
the guards in the said jail, with the intent of appropriating the same
to their own use, one revolver, two shotguns, and one rifle, the
property of the Insular police.
Eighth. That the Defendant, with his companions, in their
attempt to escape from said carcel, inflicted wounds upon the
alcalde of said carcel, from the effects of which the said
alcalde did not recover until a period of seventeen days had
elapsed.
This Defendant was charged with the crimes of assassination,
robbery, assault, and lesionesmenos graves, was tried by the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas, found guilty of
the crimes charged in said complaint, and sentenced to life
imprisonment (cadenaperpetua) with the accessory penalties
mentioned in article 54 of the Penal Code and to pay the costs.
From this decision the Defendant appealed to this court.
No objection was made by the Defendant in the court below to the
fact that the complaint filed in said cause contained more than one
offense. Therefore this defect in the complaint will not be
considered here.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or Not Maza was properly convicted of the crime of
Assassination (now Murder)
2. Whether or Not there is Maza is jointly liable with his co-
defendants and for what crime/s
RULING:

1. No. The evidence adduced during the trial shows beyond DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
peradventure of doubt that the Defendant and his companions
inflicted wounds upon Baltazar Ramirez, from which the said
Ramirez died a few hours later. The evidence fails to disclose, It is the judgment of this court, therefore, that the DEFENDANT BE
however, any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in IMPRISONED FOR A PERIOD OF SEVENTEEN YEARS FOUR
article 403 of the Penal Code. This act, therefore, cannot be MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, to suffer
qualified as assassination, but must be the subsidiary penalties mentioned in article 59 of the Penal Code,
qualified as the crime of homicide. to indemnify the heirs of the said Ramirez in the sum of P1,000, to
pay the said alcalde the sum of P17, and to pay the costs. SO
2. Yes, for Homicide. The general doctrine, both by the ORDERED.
supreme court of Spain and the courts of the United States, is
that "where two or more persons act together in the
commission of a crime, whether they act through the *Note: This was an unpublished decision of the SC.
physical volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the
wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same
as though the act or crime done or committed was by
himself alone."

"If two or more persons combine in an intent to perform a

criminal act jointly, the guilt of each is the same as if he had
acted alone; and the result is the same if the act is divided
into parts and each person proceeds with his part unaided."

While the evidence shows beyond peradventure of doubt that the

Defendant and his companions were also guilty of the crime of
robbery, as well as that of inflicting wounds yet, by virtue of the
provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code, it is the duty of the court
to impose the penalty corresponding to the more serious crime
which in this case is that of homicide.
Filipinas Broadcasting vs. Ago Medical Center
GRN 141994 January 17, 2005
Carpio, J.:
FACTS:
Rima & Alegre were host of FBNI radio program “Expose”.
Respondent Ago was the owner of the Medical & Educational
center, subject of the radio program “Expose”. AMEC claimed that
the broadcasts were defamatory and owner Ago and school AMEC
claimed for damages. The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a
reputable learning institution. With the supposed expose, FBNI,
Rima and Alegre “transmitted malicious imputations and as such,
destroyed plaintiff’s reputation. FBNI was included as defendant for
allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The trial court found Rima’s
statements to be within the bounds of freedom of speech and ruled
that the broadcast was libelous. It ordered the defendants Alegre
and FBNI to pay AMEC 300k for moral damages.”
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
2. Whether or not FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegrefor
moral damages, attorneys feesand costs of suit.
RULING:
1. A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages
because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical
suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish or moral shock. Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim, or
moral damages fall under item 7 of Art – 2219 of the NCC.
This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages
in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Art 2219
(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical
person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can
validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim
for moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per
se, the law implied damages. In such a case, evidence of an
honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party
libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. In this case, the
broadcasts are libelous per se. thus, AMEC is entitled to moral
damages. However, we find the award P500,000 moral damages
unreasonable. The record shows that even though the broadcasts
were libelous, per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or
material damage to its reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award
of moral damages to P150k.
2. Yes FBNI is solidarily liable as it was a joint tortfeasor.
FBNI contends that it is not solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre
for the payment of damages and attorneys fees because it
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI maintains that its
broadcasters, including Rima and Alegre, undergo a very
regimented process before they are allowed to go on air. Those
who apply for broadcaster are subjected to interviews,
examinations and an apprenticeship program.
FBNI further argues that Alegres age and lack of training are
irrelevant to his competence as a broadcaster. FBNI points out that
the minor deficiencies in the KBP accreditation of Rima and Alegre
do not in any way prove that FBNI did not exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family in selecting and supervising them. Rimas
accreditation lapsed due to his non-payment of the KBP annual
fees while Alegres accreditation card was delayed allegedly for
reasons attributable to the KBP Manila Office. FBNI claims that
membership in the KBP is merely voluntary and not required by
any law or government regulation.
FBNIs arguments do not persuade us.
The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are jointly
and severally liable for the tort which they commit.[52] Joint tort
feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit.[53] Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNIs regimented process of
action against FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and Alegre had
deficiencies in their KBP accreditation,[56] which is one of FBNIs
As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI requirements before it hires a broadcaster. Significantly,
is solidarily liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous membership in the KBP, while voluntary, indicates the
broadcasts. As stated by the Court of Appeals, recovery for broadcasters strong commitment to observe the broadcast
defamatory statements published by radio or television may be had industrys rules and regulations. Clearly, these circumstances show
from the owner of the station, a licensee, the operator of the FBNIs lack of diligence in selecting and supervising Rima and
station, or a person who procures, or participates in, the making of Alegre. Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages together
the defamatory statements.[54] An employer and employee are with Rima and Alegre.
solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within
the course and scope of his or her employment, at least when the
employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation.[55] In this case,
Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as
hosts of FBNIs radio program Expos when they aired the
broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre
went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was
likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the
defamatory broadcasts.

Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI

exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that
it exercised diligence in the selection of its broadcasters without
introducing any evidence to prove that it observed the same
diligence in the supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not
show how it exercised diligence in supervising its broadcasters.
FBNIs alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to observe
truth, fairness and objectivity and to refrain from using libelous and
indecent language is not enough to prove due diligence in the
supervision of its broadcasters. Adequate training of the
broadcasters on the industrys code of conduct, sufficient
information on libel laws, and continuous evaluation of the
broadcasters performance are but a few of the many ways of
showing diligence in the supervision of broadcasters.

FBNI claims that it has taken all the precaution in the selection of
Rima and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their
qualifications. However, no clear and convincing evidence shows
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPELAS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,
respondents.G.R. No. 130068. October 1, 1998 and MANILA
PILOTS ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY and FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY,
respondents.G.R. No. 130150. October 1, 1998
(CONSOLIDATED)
FACTS:
On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship
of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver,
British Columbia,Canada. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the
Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Capt. Roberto
Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority (PPA) to
supervise the berthing of the vessel whileCapt. SenenGavino was
assigned by the Manila Pilots Association (MPA) to conduct
docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel.
Gavino boarded the vessel and stationed himself besideVictor
Kabankov, the master of the vessel. After a briefing of Gavino by
Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel
lifted anchor and proceeded to the Manila International Port. When
the vessel reached one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet
from the pier, he ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed
the orders to the crew of the vessel. The left anchors, with two (2)
shackles were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken causing
commotion between the crew members. A brief conference ensued
between Kavankov and the crew members and when Gavino
inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured
Gavino that there was nothing of it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered
the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron,
noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.Kavankov
likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino
thereafter gave the full-astern code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel
rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to
the pier as well as to the vessel.
On January 10, 1983, the PPA through the Solicitor General, filed
before the RTC Manila a complaint for a sum of money against
FESC, Gavino and MPA, praying that the defendants be held
jointly and severally liable to pay for actual and exemplary
damages caused by the shipping mishap. In its decision, the trial
court ordered the petitioners jointly and severally to pay the PPA
the amount of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the
cost of suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
In its argument, FESC contended that Gavino and MPA should be
held solely responsible for the damages caused to the pier. It avers
that since the vessel was under compulsory pilotage at the time
with Capt. Gavino in command and having exclusive control of the
vessel during the docking maneuvers, then the latter should be
responsible for damages caused to the pier.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the pilot, in compulsory pilotage, is solely
liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier.
2. Whether the owner of the vessel shall also be liable by
reason of the damage caused by the concurrent negligence of the
master of the vessel and the pilot under compulsory pilotage
HELD:
1. YES.
Under English and American authorities, generally speaking, the
pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters
connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac
vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping
and reversing, anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed
pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his
duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline
to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does
not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the
adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the
navigation even on localities where pilotage is compulsory
It is quite common for states and localities to provide for
compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring
vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on
board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these
laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the
harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect
life and property from the dangers of navigation.
Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is
held to the universally accepted high standards of care and
diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and
knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over
which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than
that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of
skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and
care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an
expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot
must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed
to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence
required of pilots in the performance of their duties.
2. YES.
The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident but Capt.
Kabankov is no less responsible for the allision. His unconcerned
lethargy as master of the ship in the face of troublousexigence
constitutes negligence.While it is indubitable that in exercising his
functions, a pilot-is in sole command of the shipand supersedes
the master for the time being in the command and navigation of a
ship and that he becomes master pro hac vice of a vessel piloted
by him,there is overwhelming authority to the effect that the master
does not surrender his vessel to the pilot and the pilot is not the
master. The master is still in command of the vessel
notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. There are occasions when
the master may and should interfere and even displace the pilot,
as when the pilot is obviously incompetent or intoxicated and the
circumstances may require the master to displace a compulsory
pilot because of incompetency or physical incapacity. If, however,
the master does not observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent
or physically incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the
pilot, but not blindly.
The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on
board his vessel, and may advise with or offer suggestions to him.
He is still in command of the vessel, except so far as her
navigation is concerned, and must cause the ordinary work of the
vessel to be properly carried on and the usual precaution taken.
Thus, in particular, he is bound to see that there is sufficient watch
on deck, and that the men are attentive to their duties, also that
engines are stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors clear and
ready to go at the pilot's order.A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's
testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of
his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking
procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance
over this risky maneuver.
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master
being required to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes
that the pilot is incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the
duty of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such
reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the
pilot, but not blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a
situation arose where the master, exercising that reasonable
vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise, observed, or
should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating the vessel
that she was going, or was likely to go into danger, and there was
in the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for
the master to intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the
master should have acted accordingly.The master of a vessel must
exercise a degree of vigilance commensurate with the
circumstances.
A pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his own
negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to third
parties for damages sustained in a collision. Such negligence of
the pilot in the performance of duty constitutes a maritime tort. At
common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted
exclusively by the negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel
compulsorily. The exemption from liability for such negligence shall
apply if the pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since, a
pilot is responsible only for his own personal negligence, he cannot
be held accountable for damages proximately caused by the
default of others, or, if there be anything which concurred with the
fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel master and
owners are liable.
owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it
does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts
were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is
solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where
the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to
the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to
a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarity liable
for the resulting damage under Article 2194of the Civil Code.

It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render

a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is
sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient
causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a
person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for
only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such
cause is not attributable to the person injured.

It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury

would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the
negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each
is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes
and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible
persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may
appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty
Worcester v. Ocampo, February 27, 1912
FACTS:Dean Worcester filed an action to recover damages
resulting from an alleged libelous publication againstMartin
Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes,
Faustino Aguilar, et al, as the owners, directors,writers, editors and
administrators of the daily newspaper “El Renacimiento” (Spanish
version) and “MulingPagsilang” (tagalong version). Worcester
alleged that the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and
attacking him in the newspapers for a long time and they published
an editorial entitled “Birds of Prey” with the malicious intent of
injuring Worcester, both as a private person and as a government
official as the editorial obviously referred to him. Worcester alleged
that he was likened to “birds of prey” in the following manner:
“Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time
an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself
on the dead andputrid meats, an owl who affects a petulant
omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the
victim until he leaves it bloodless.”
TC:In favor of Worcester; Defendants jointly and severallyliable for
the P60k total damages.
ISSUE: WON the defendants’ individual properties can be made
jointly and severally liable for the damages under the civil and
commercial codes,
HELD: Yes. TC modified. Damages reduced, Santos absolved.The
present action is a tort.
Universal doctrine:
each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in
which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors.If
several persons commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has
his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly,or one of them
separately,because the TORT IS IN ITS NATURE A SEPARATE
ACT OF EACH INDIVIDUAL
It is not necessary that cooperation should be a direct, corporal
act- e.g. assault and battery committed by various persons, under
the common law, they are all principals.Under common law, he
who aided or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime,
was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the
actual tort.
General Rule:Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise,countenance, cooperate in,
aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to
the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed
the wrongful act themselves. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and
severally liable for the tort which they commit. Joint tortfeasors are
not liable pro rata
The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except among
themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the
purpose of each paying an aliquot part.
They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.
A payment in full of the damage done by one tortfeasor satisfies
any claim which might exist against the others. The release of one
of the joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates to
discharge all.The court however may make findings as to which of
the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and which are not, even if
they are charged jointly and severally.
G.R. No. L-20145 November 15, 1923
VICENTE VERZOSA and RUIZ, REMENTERIA Y CIA., S. en C.,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
SILVINO LIM and SIY CONG BIENG and COMPANY, INC.,
defendants-appellants.
Ramon Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Gabriel La O for defendants-appellants.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of first Instance of the City of
Manila by Vicente Versoza and Ruiz, Rementeria y Compania, as
owners of the coastwise vessel Perla, against Silvino Lim and Siy
Cong Bieng & Company, Inc., as owner and agent, respectively, of
the vessel Ban Yek, for the purpose of recovering a sum of money
alleged to be the damages resulting to the plaintiffs from a collision
which occurred on March 9, 1921, between the two vessels
mentioned, it being alleged that said collision was due to the
experience, carelessness and lack of skill on the part of the captain
of the Ban Yek and to his failure to observe the rules of navigation
appropriate to the case. The defendants answered with a general
denial, and by way of special defense asserted, among other
things, that the collision was due exclusively to the inexperience
and carelessness of the captain and officers of the steamship
Perla; for which reason the defendants in turn, by way of
counterclaim, prayed judgment for the damages suffered by the
Ban Yek from the same collision. At the hearing the trial judge
absolved the defendants from the complaint and likewise absolved
the plaintiffs from the defendants' counterclaim. From this
judgment both parties appealed.
It appears in evidence that at about five o'clock in the afternoon of
March 9, 1921, the coastwise steamer Ban Yek left the port of
Naga on the Bicol River, in the Province of Camarines Sur, with
destination to the City of Manila. At the time of her departure from
said port the sea was approaching to high tide but the current was
still running in through the Bicol River, with the result that the Ban
Yek had the current against her. As the ship approached the
Malbong bend of the Bicol River, in the municipality of Gainza,
another vessel, the Perla, was sighted coming up the river on the
way to Naga. While the boats were yet more than a kilometer
apart, the Ban Yek gave two blasts with her whistle, thus indicating
an intention to pass on the left, or to her own port side. In reply to
this signal the Perla gave a single blast, thereby indicating that she
disagreed with the signal given by the Ban Yek and would maintain
her position on the right, that is, would keep to the starboard. The
Ban Yek made no reply to this signal. As the Perla was navigating
with the current, then running in from the sea, this vessel, under
paragraph 163 of Customs Marine Circular No. 53, had the right of
way over the Ban Yek, and the officers of the Perla interpreted the
action of the Ban Yek in not replying to the Perla's signal as an
indication of acquiescene of the officers of the Ban Yek in the
determination of the Perla to keep to the starboard.
The river at this point is about two hundred and fifty feet wide, and
the courses thus being respectively pursued by the two vessels
necessarily tended to bring them into a head-on collision. When
the danger of such an occurrence became imminent, Captain
Garrido of the Perla, seeing that he was shut off by the Ban Yek
from passing to the right, put his vessel to port, intending to avoid
collision or minimize its impact by getting farther out into the
stream. An additional reason for this maneuver, as stated by
Captain Carrido, is that the captain of the Ban Yek waived his hand
to Garrido, indicating that the latter should turn his vessel towards
the middle of the stream. At about the same time that the Perla
was thus deflected from her course the engine on the Ban Yek was
reversed and three blasts were given by this vessel to indicate that
she was backing.
Now, it appears that when the engine is reversed, a vessel swings
to the right or left in accordance with the direction in which the
blades of the propeller are set; and as the Ban Yek began to back,
her bow was thrown out into the stream, a movement which was
assisted by the current of the river. By this means the Ban Yek was
brought to occupy an oblique position across the stream at the
moment the Perla was passing; and the bow of the Ban Yek
crashed into the starboard bumpers of the Perla, carrying away
external parts of the ship and inflicting material damage on the hull.
To effect the repairs thus made necessary to the Perla cost her
owners the sum of P17,827, including expenses of survey.
The first legal point presented in the case has reference to the
sufficiency of the protest. In this connection it appears that within
twenty-four hours after the arrival of the Perla at the port of Naga,
Captain Garrido appeared before Vicente Rodi, the auxiliary justice
of the peace of the municipality of Naga, and made before that
officer the sworn protest which is in evidence as Exhibit B. This
protest is sufficient in our opinion to answer all the requirements of
article 835 of the Code of Commerce. A regular justice of the
peace would without doubt be competent to take a marine protest,
and the same authority must be conceded to the auxiliary justice in
the absence of any showing in the record to the effect that the
justice of the peace himself was acting at the time in the
municipality (Adm. Code, sec. 211; sec. 334, Code of Civ. Proc.,
subsecs. 14, 15). We note that in his certificate to this protest
Vicente Rodi added to the appellation of auxiliary justice of the
peace, following his name, the additional designation "notary public
ex-officio." However, under subsection (c) of section 242 of the
Administrative Code, it is plain that an auxiliary justice of the peace
is not an ex-officio notary public. It results that the taking of this
protest must be ascribed to the officer in his character as auxiliary
justice of the peace and not in the character of notary public ex-
officio. It is hardly necessary to add that this court takes judicial
notice of the fact that Naga is not a port of entry and that no
customs official of rank is there stationed who could have taken
cognizance of this protest.
Upon the point of responsibility for the collision we have no
hesitancy in finding that the fault is to be attributed exclusively to
the negligence and inattention of the captain and pilot in charge of
the Ban Yek. The Perla undoubtedly had the right of way, since
this vessel was navigating with the current, and the officers in
charge of the Perla were correct in assuming, from the failure of
the Ban Yek to respond to the single blast of the Perla, that the
officers in charge of the Ban Yek recognized that the Perla had a
right of way and acquiesced in her resolution to keep to the right.
The excuse urged for the Ban Yek is that this vessel is somewhat
larger than the Perla and that it was desirable for the Ban Yek to
keep on the side of the long arc of the curve of the river; and in this
connection it is suggested that the river is deeper on the outer
edge of the bend than on the inner edge. It is also stated that on a
certain previous occasion the Ban Yek on coming out from this port
had gotten stuck in the mud in this bend by keeping too far to the
right. Moreover, it is said to be the practice of ships in navigating
this stream to keep nearer the outside than to the inside of the
bend. These suggestions are by no means convincing. It appears
in evidence that the river bottom here is composed of mud and silt,
and as the tide at the time of this incident was nearly at its flood,
there was ample depth of water to have accommodated the Ban
Yek if she had kept to that part of the stream which it was proper
for her to occupy. We may further observe that the disparity in the
size of the vessels was not such as to dominate the situation and
deprive the Perla of the right of way under the conditions stated.
Blame for the collision must therefore, as already stated, be
attributed to the Ban Yek.
On the other hand no fault can be attributed to the officers
navigating the Perla either in maintaining the course which had
been determined upon for that vessel in conformity with the marine
regulations applicable to the case or in deflecting the vessel
towards the middle of the stream after the danger of collision
became imminent. The trial judge suggests in his opinion that
when Captain Garrido saw that the Ban Yek was holding her
course to the left, he (Garrido) should have changed the course of
the Perla to port more promptly. The validity of this criticism cannot
be admitted. Among rules applicable to navigation none is better
founded on reason and experience than that which requires the
navigating officers of any vessel to assume that an approaching
vessel will observe the regulations prescribed for navigation (G.
Urrutia & Co. vs. Baco River Plantation Co., 26 Phil., 632, 637).
Any other rule would introduce guess work into the control of ships
and produce uncertainty in the operation of the regulations.
Our conclusion is that his Honor, the trial judge, was in error in not
awarding damages to the Perla; but no error was committed in
absolving the plaintiffs from the defendants' cross-complaint.
The sum of P17,827 in our opinion represents the limit of the
plaintiffs' right of recovery. In the original complaint recovery is
sought for an additional amount of P18,000, most of which consists
of damages supposed to have been incurred from the inability of
the Perla to maintain her regular schedule while laid up in the dock
undergoing repairs. The damages thus claimed, in addition to
being somewhat of a speculative nature, are in our opinion not
sufficiently proved to warrant the court in allowing the same.
lawphil.net
Having determined the amount which the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover, it becomes necessary to consider the person, or persons,
who must respond for these damages. Upon this point we note that
Silvino Lim is impleaded as owner; and Siy Cong Bieng & Co. is
impleaded as the shipping agent (casa naviera), or person in
responsible control of the Ban Yek at the time of the accident. We
note further that in article 826 of the Code of Commerce it is
declared that the owner of any vessel shall be liable for the
indemnity due to any other vessel injured by the fault, negligence,
or lack of skill of the captain of the first. We say "owner," which is
the word used in the current translation of this article in the
Spanish Code of Commerce. It is to be observed, however, that
the Spanish text itself uses the word naviero; and there is some
ambiguity in the use of said word in this article, owing to the fact
that naviero in Spanish has several meanings. The author of the
article which appears under the word naviero in the Enciclopedia
Juridica Española tells us that in Spanish it may mean either
owner, outfitter, charterer, or agent, though he says that the
fundamental and correct meaning of the word is that of "owner."
That naviero, as used in the Spanish text of article 826, means
owner is further to be inferred from article 837, which limits the civil
liability expressed in article 826 to the value of the vessel with all
her appurtenances and all the freight earned during the voyage.
There would have been no propriety in limiting liability to the value
of the vessel unless the owner were understood to be the person
liable. It is therefore clear that by special provision of the Code of
Commerce the owner is made responsible for the damage caused
by an accident of the kind under consideration in this case; and in
more than one case this court has held the owner liable, when
sued alone (Philippine Shipping Co. vs. Garcia Vergara, 6 Phil.,
281; G. Urrutia & Co. vs. Baco River Plantation Co., 26 Phil., 632).
But while it is thus demonstrated that Silvino Lim is liable for these
damages in the character of owner, it does not necessarily follows
that Siy Cong Bieng & Co., as character or agent (casa naviera), is
exempt from liability; and we are of the opinion that both the owner
and agent can be held responsible where both are impleaded
together. In Philippine Shipping Co., vs. Garcia Vergara (6 Phil.,
281), it seems to have been accepted as a matter of course that
both owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the
damage done; and this must, we think, be true. The liability of the
naviero, in the sense of charterer or agent, if not expressed in
article 826 of the Code of Commerce, is clearly deducible from the
general doctrine of jurisprudence stated in article 1902 of the Civil
Code, and it is also recognized, but more especially as regards
contractual obligations, in article 586 of the Code of Commerce.
Moreover, we are of the opinion that both the owner and agent
(naviero) should be declared to be jointly and severally liable, since
the obligation which is the subject of this action had its origin in a
tortious act and did not arise from contract. Article 1137 of the Civil
Code, declaring that joint obligations shall be apportionable unless
otherwise provided, has no application to obligation arising from
tort.
For the reasons stated the judgment appealed from will be affirmed
in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the defendants' cross-
complaint but will be reversed in so far as it absolves the
defendants from the plaintiffs' complaint; and judgment will be
entered for the plaintiffs to recover jointly and severally from the
defendants Silvino Lim and Siy Cong Bieng & Co. the sum of
seventeen thousand eight hundred and twenty-seven pesos
(P17,827), with interest from the date of the institution of the action,
without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 92594 March 4, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, ROSENDO D. BONDOC, CESAR
ANCHETA, JAIME C. LAYA, PLACIDO MAPA,
and CESAR C. ZALAMEA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Belo, Abiera & Associates for respondent Laya.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent Laya.
De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices for C.C. Zalamea.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ongpin.
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
MARCOS, IMELDA R.
E. A. VIRATA, RUBEN
JR., ROBERTO ONGPIN
Directors was then composed of private respondents, Rosendo D. Bondoc,
Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr.,
Roberto Ongpin, and Cezar Zalamea. Congressman de Venecia's group of
companies was unable to seasonably service these foreign loans and this
compelled PHILGUARANTEE to assume its obligation as guarantor.
The EDSA revolution in February 1986 swept the Marcoses out of power.
One of the first official acts of then President Corazon C. Aquino was the
creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
under E.O No. 1. It was given the difficult task of recovering the illegal wealth
of the Marcoses, their family, subordinates and close associates. In due time,
the Marcoses and their cronies had to face a flurry of cases, both civil and
criminal, all designed to recover the Republic's wealth allegedly plundered by
them while in power. Case No. 0020 for Reconveyance, Reversion,
Accounting, Restitution and Damages was one of these cases. It was filed by
the petitioner Republic against Jose de Venecia, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta,
Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar C. Zalamea.
We quote its relevant allegations:

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for respondents C.E.A. Virata IV
and P. Mapa, Jr.
GENERAL AVERMENTS
Mario V. Andres and Vicente F. Ruaro for R. Ancheta. OF
DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS

8. From the early years of his presidency, Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos

PUNO, J.:
An enduring touchstone of a republican form of government is its guarantee
of equal protection of law. To the powerless, it is the promise of parity of
treatment with the powerful when they are similarly situated. This promise
must be matched with performance, and to the extent that the resolutions of
the respondent court dated November 29, 1989 and March 9, 1990 accord
fidelity to this constitutional precept, we affirm them.
Less the fat of legalesse, the facts are few and uncontroverted. Before 1986,
the Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman Jose
de Venecia, Jr., was able to obtain foreign loans syndicated by various banks
aggregating approximately one hundred twenty million US dollars ($120 M).
These foreign loans were guaranteed by PHILGUARANTEE, whose Board of
took undue advantage of his powers as President. All throughout the period
from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986, he gravely abused his
powers under martial law and ruled as Dictator under the 1973 Marcos
promulgated Constitution. Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with
other Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with
one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations
as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in
brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines embarked
upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth. Among others, in
furtherance of said plan and acting in unlawful concert with one another and
with gross abuse of power and authority, Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos:
(a) awarded contracts with the Government to their relatives, business
associates, dummies, nominees, agents or persons who were beholden to
said Defendants, under terms and conditions grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government;
(b) misappropriated, embezzled and/or converted to their own use funds of
Government financial institutions;
(c) engaged in other illegal and improper acts and practices designed to
defraud Plaintiffs and the Filipino people, or otherwise misappropriated and
converted to their own use, benefit and enrichment the lawful patrimony and
revenues of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
9. Among the assets acquired by Defendants in the manner above-described
and discovered by the Commission in the exercise of its official
responsibilities are funds and other property listed in Annex "A" hereof and
made an integral part of this Complaint.
10. Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with
one another, for the purpose of preventing disclosure and avoiding discovery
of their unmitigated plunder of the National Treasury and of their other illegal
acts, and employing the services of prominent lawyers, accountants, financial
experts, businessman [sic] and other persons, deposited, kept and invested
funds, securities and other assets in various banks, financial institutions, trust
or investment companies and with persons here and abroad.
V
SPECIFIC AVERMENTS OF
DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS
11. Defendant Jose de Venecia, Jr. taking undue advantage of his
relationship, influence and connection with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, acting by himself and/or in active collaboration with
the other Defendants, embarked upon devices, schemes and strategems to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people,
among others:
(a) Organized and headed the Land Oil Group, a big business conglomerate
engaged in a wide range of economic activity, such as petroleum exploration
and engineering, port management and operation, and other services. The
Land Oil Group, more particularly, the Land Oil Resources Corporation, its
parent company, and its major subsidiaries, the Philippine-Singapore Ports
Corporation, the Greater Manila Land Corporation, Construction Consortium,
Inc. and the Philippine Hospitals and Health Services, had operations in the
Philippines and abroad, particularly, in the Middle East;
(b) To finance his huge domestic and overseas operations, Defendant Jose
de Venecia, acting through the Land Oil Group, borrowed enormous amounts
in foreign currency denominated loans from several syndicates of
international banks, such as, but not limited to, Arab Banking Corporation,
Ahli Bank of Kuwait, Credit Suisse, First of Boston's, Saudi Cairo Bank,
Mellon Bank and the Bank of Montreal. In view of the magnitude of the loans
and the project risks involved, the banks required that their loans be fully
covered by the absolute and unconditional guarantee of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines;
(c) Accordingly, Defendant Jose de Venecia applied for Philippine
Government guarantee from the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee), a government-owned and controlled
corporation organized to provide Philippine Government guarantees, and,
with the active collaboration of Defendants Rosendo D. Bondoc, who was
then the President of Philguarantee and the members of its Board of
Directors, Defendants Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya,
Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar C. Zalamea was granted full
Philippine Government guarantee coverage;
(d) Defendant Jose de Venecia misused the proceeds of the loans by
diverting them to other uses and/or appropriation, then for his own personal
benefit using for this purpose a string of local and overseas banks, such as,
but not limited to, PNB (New York), PNB (Buendia Branch), PCTB (Makati
Branch), Swiss Banking Corp. of Hongkong, and the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corp. in Hongkong, and in an effort to hide his complicity
in the diversion, refused to submit regular accounting and reports, all in
violation of the provisions of the loan and guarantee agreements;
(e) Notwithstanding the aforesaid repeated violations Philguarantee, with the
active collaboration of Defendants Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata,
Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and
Cesar C. Zalamea, continued to provide financial assistance to the
companies owned and controlled by Defendant Jose de Venecia;
(f) As a result of gross mismanagement and wanton diversion of the loans,
the major operations of the Land Oil Group collapsed, Land Oil defaulted in
the payment of its maturing principal and interests amortization and, like the
man holding the proverbial empty bag, Philguarantee had to advance on its
guarantee using for this purpose multi-millions of pesos in scarce
government and taxpayers' money, resulting in grave and irreparable
damage to Plaintiff and to the entire Filipino people.
12. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert
with one another, constitute gross abuse of official position and authority,
flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right
and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people.
VI
CAUSE OF ACTION
13. First Cause of Action: ABUSE OF RIGHT AND POWER — (a)
Defendants, in perpetrating the unlawful acts described above, committed
abuse of right and power which caused untold misery, suffering and damage
to Plaintiff. Defendants violated, among others, Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines;
(b) As a result of the foregoing acts, Defendants acquired title to and
beneficial interests in funds and other property and concealed such title,
funds and interests through the use of relatives, business associates,
nominees, agents or dummies. Defendants are, therefore, jointly and
severally, liable to Plaintiff to return and reconvey all such funds and other
property unlawfully acquired; or alternatively, to pay Plaintiff, jointly and
severally, by way of indemnity, the damage cause to Plaintiff equivalent to
the amount of such funds and the value of other property not returned or
restored to Plaintiff, plus interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition
until full payment.
14. Second Cause of Action: UNJUST ENRICHMENT — Defendants illegally
accumulated funds and other property in violation of the laws of the
Philippines and in breach of their official functions and fiduciary obligations.
Defendants, therefore, have unjustly enriched themselves to the grave and
irreparable damage and prejudice of Plaintiff. Defendants have an obligation
at law, independently of breach of trust and abuse of right and power and; as
an alternative, to jointly and severally return to Plaintiff such funds and other
property with which Defendants, in gross and evident bad faith, have unjustly
enriched themselves or, in default thereof, restore to Plaintiff the amount of
such funds and the value of the other property including those which may
have been wasted, and/or lost, with interest thereon from the date of unlawful
acquisition until full payment.
15. Third Cause of Action: BREACH OF TRUST — A public office is a public
trust. By committing all the acts described above, Defendants repeatedly
breached public trust and the law, making them jointly and severally liable to
Plaintiff. The funds and other property acquired by Defendants as a result of
their breach of public trust are deemed to have been acquired for the Benefit
of Plaintiff and are, therefore, impressed with constructive trust in favor of
Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
16. Fourth Cause of Action: ACCOUNTING — The Commission, acting
pursuant to the provisions of applicable law, respectfully maintains that
Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one
another, acquired funds, assets and property during the incumbency of
Defendant public officers, or while acting in unlawful concert with public
officers, manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, to their other lawful
income and income from legitimately acquired property. Consequently, they
are required to show to the satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they
have lawfully acquired all such funds, assets and property which are in
excess of their legal net income, and for this Honorable Court to decree that
the Defendants are under obligation to account to Plaintiff with respect to all
legal or beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets of whatever kind
and wherever located in excess of their lawful earnings.
17. Fifth Cause of Action: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES — (a) By reason of the
unlawful acts set forth above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people have suffered
actual damages in an amount representing the pecuniary loss sustained by
the latter as a result of Defendants' unlawful acts, the approximate value and
interest on which, from the time of their wrongful acquisition, plus expenses
which Plaintiff has been compelled to incur and shall continue to incur in its
effort to recover Defendants' ill-gotten wealth all over the world. Defendants
are, therefore, jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for actual damages and
for expenses incurred in the recovery of Defendants' ill-gotten wealth.
(b) As a result of Defendants' unlawful, malicious, immoral and wanton acts
described above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people had painfully endured and
suffered for more than twenty long years, and still continue to endure and
suffer anguish, fright, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and moral shock, as well as besmirched reputation and social humiliation
before the international community, for which Defendants are jointly and
severally liable to Plaintiff and the Filipino people for moral damages.
(c) In addition, Plaintiff and the Filipino people are entitled to temperate
damages for their suffering which, by their very nature, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation, but which this Honorable Court may determine in the
exercise of its sound discretion.
(d) Defendants, by reason of the above described unlawful acts, have
violated and invaded the inalienable right of Plaintiff and the Filipino people
to a fair and decent way of life befitting a Nation with rich natural and human
resources. This basic, and fundamental right of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people should be recognized and vindicated by awarding nominal damages
in an amount to be determined by the Honorable Court in the exercise of its
sound discretion.
(e) By way of example and correction for the public good and in order to
ensure that Defendants' unlawful, malicious, immoral and wanton acts are
not repeated, said Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for
exemplary damages.
Needless to state, the de Venecia group of companies and
PHILGUARANTEE were sequestered by the petitioner, through the PCGG.
The filing of Case No. 0020 notwithstanding, an investigation was conducted
to determine the veracity of the above allegations. The investigation
culminated in the signing of a Deed of Assignment between the petitioner
and de Venecia, Jr., representing seven (7) of the eighteen (18) companies
of the Land Oil Group. The Deed was premised on the following facts found
by the petitioner after its investigation, and recited in its whereas clauses, viz:
. . . . As a result of such investigation Philguarantee has satisfied itself (i) that
such guarantee facility was obtained in the ordinary and regular course of
business, and that no favor was accorded to the Landoil officers, in the grant
of such guarantee facility; and (ii) that the business reversals experienced by
the Landoil Group in connection with its various construction and other
projects in the Middle East and elsewhere were due, firstly, to the inability of
the Landoil Group to collect its contract receivables from such projects due to
the reasons specified in the sixth "whereas" clause, and, secondly, due to the
non-payment of its insurance claim under the insurance policy referred to in
the succeeding (ninth), "whereas" clause.
Certain obligations were then assumed by de Venecia, Jr., and his
group, viz:
1.1 Upon the request of the Assignee (referring to petitioner), the Assignors
(being the above-named companies making up Landoil Group) shall
immediately cause to be transferred to the Assignee (or its nominee/s) all the
shares of the capital stock of Landoil (up to 45% of the total outstanding
issued and subscribed capital stock of Landoil) which have or may hereafter
be identified as belonging to Marcos (whether standing in his name or the
name [of] any of his nominee/s). . . .
1.2 Upon the effectiveness of this Agreement, the Assignors shall cause to
be paid to the Assignee, through PCGG, the amount of P13 million, which
amount represents a portion of Landoil's recovery from an arbitration
proceeding which Landoil had caused to be instituted in London against the
Lloyd's Syndicate of Insurance Underwriters;
1.3 Effective immediately, the Assignors hereby assign, transfer and convey
to the PCGG: (a) the entire proceeds of the Assignors' claims in the New
York case which Landoil has instituted against the insurance brokers,
namely, the firm of Alexander and Alexander, and (b) the entire proceeds of
the Assignors' contract receivables from all the Assignors' construction and
other projects in the Middle East and elsewhere, net of any amount required
for the settlement of any compulsory statutory liens for unpaid wages or
salaries and ordinary administrative overhead and costs, and attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation.
xxx xxx xxx
1.5 The Assignors, and or their respective officers, hereby undertake to fully
cooperate with the Philippine Government, acting through the PCGG or any
other governmental agency, in the prosecution of any case which the
Philippine Government may cause to be filed against former President
Marcos and his cronies, either by furnishing testimony in any such case, or
by providing information in any investigation undertaken in the Philippines or
elsewhere, as may be required or directed by the PCGG, or by other
appropriate governmental agency from time to time.
In reciprocity, petitioner agreed to cause the dismissal without prejudice of
the complaint in Civil Case No. 0020 against de Venecia and his group of co-
signors.
Pursuant to this Deed of Assignment, de Venecia, Jr., with the express
conformity of PCGG, moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 0020 against him. On
September 8, 1989, the respondent court granted the motion to dismiss. The
dismissal became final and executory. The other private respondents
followed suit with their respective motions to dismiss. The motions were
opposed by the petitioner. Nonetheless, on December 4, 1989, the
respondent court dismissed the Expanded Complaint against herein private
respondents. The dismissal was based on two (2) grounds: (1) removal of an
indispensable party in the person of de Venecia, Jr., from the Expanded
Complaint; and (2) lack of cause of action in view of the facts established and
admitted by the petitioner in the Deed of Assignment. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and its Supplement were denied by the respondent court on
March 9, 1990. Petitioner then filed the petition at bar, where it is contended:
16. The respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the case against defendant de
Venecia's co-defendants, on the following grounds:
a) The Deed of Assignment executed on July 19, 1989 by Landoil in favor of
the petitioner should not be made to benefit de Venecia's co-defendant;
b) Defendant de Venecia is not an indispensable party in the prosecution of
the case against his co-defendants;
c) The liabilities of de Venecia's co-defendants arose not only from their
alleged conspiracy with defendant de Venecia but also by virtue of their
individual or collective actions done in unlawful concert with one another;
d) The causes of action against defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos have nothing to do with the Deed of Assignment executed by
Landoil in favor of the petitioner; and
e) The parties manifestly intended to exclude defendant de Venecia's co-
defendants from the benefit of the Deed of Assignment in question.
We find partial merit in the petition.
The threshold question is whether the subject Deed of Assignment justifies
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 0020 against, first, private respondents
Bondoc, Virata, Ancheta, Laya, Mapa, Jr., Ongpin, Zalamea, and second,
against the private respondents, Ferdinand and Imelda R. Marcos.
We shall first determine the effect of the Deed of Assignment on the cause of
action of petitioner against the first group of private respondents —
Bondoc, et al. Petitioner submits that the execution of the Deed need not
result in the dismissal of Expanded Complaint against Bondoc, et al. It cites
two (2) reasons: (1) Bondoc, et al. were not parties to the Deed, and (2)
petitioner did not receive any consideration or benefit from Bondoc, et al.,
when it executed the said Deed.
Petitioner's submission misses the rationale of the ruling of the respondent
court. The respondent court ordered the dismissal of the Expanded
Complaint because the Deed contained averments which nullified petitioner's
cause of action. More specifically, the Deed averred ". . . as a result of such
investigation Philguarantee has satisfied itself (1) that such guarantee facility
was obtained in the ordinary and regular course of business, and that no
favor was accorded to the Landoil officers, in the grant of such guarantee
facility; . . ." If after investigation, petitioner has satisfied itself that the
guaranty facility was obtained in the ordinary and regular course of business,
it follows that it can no longer insist it has a cause of action against Bondoc
and company. This admission of lack of cause of action constitutes an
admission against interest. It binds the petitioner as it is not alleged that it
was given due to fraud, mistake or inadvertence. The adverse effects of the
admission bind petitioner and it is not material that respondents Bondoc and
company were not parties to the Deed or that in executing the said Deed,
petitioner did not receive any consideration from respondents Bondoc and
company. An admission against interest is a voluntary act and its effects do
not depend on the concurrence of any other party or consideration of any
kind.
Petitioner next contends that the respondent court erred in ruling that it has
only one cause of action against the respondents Bondoc and company —
i.e., that as members of the Board of Directors of PHILGUARANTEE, they
continuously extended and maintained unwarranted guarantees to cover the
foreign loans of de Venecia's Land Oil Group of Companies, cronies of the
Marcoses. Petitioner's submission is shared by our brethren who dissented
from the majority. They are of the view that petitioner pleaded several causes
of action. They then point to the introductory part of par. 11 of the Expanded
Complaint which used the phrase "among others," viz:
11. Defendant Jose de Venecia, Jr., taking undue advantage of his
relationship, influence and connection with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, acting by himself and/or in active collaboration with
the other Defendants, embarked upon devices, schemes and strategems to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino
People, among others. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also cite par. 8 which used the same phrase "among others," viz:
. . . Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with other Defendants, acting
singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant
breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with
gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth. Among others, in furtherance of said plan and
acting in unlawful concert with one another and with gross abuse of power
and authority, . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
They also refer to par. 9 which also used the word "among," viz:
Among the assets acquired by Defendants in the manner above-described
and discovered by the Commission in the exercise of its official
responsibilities are funds and other property listed in Annex "A" hereof and
made an integral part of this Complaint. (Emphasis supplied.)
They then cite paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and of the Expanded Complaint
which allegedly enumerated five (5) causes of action.
This stand cannot be sustained. Par 8 of the Expanded Complaint merely
laid down the "General Averments of Defendants' Illegal Acts."
The specific allegations of the acts and omissions committed by respondents
Bondoc and company and constitutive of petitioner's cause of action are
recited in par. 11 of the Expanded Complaint. It is for this reason that par. 11
bears the descriptive title "Specific Averments of Defendants' Illegal Acts."
Needless to stress, the cause of action of the petitioner against the said
respondents is spelled out in par. 11 (a) to (f). A perusal of par. 11 will yield
no other conclusion than that there is but one cause of action against these
respondents -- that with conspiracy, they allegedly extended unwarranted
guarantees to enable the de Venecia group of companies, all cronies of the
Marcoses, to obtain foreign loans. The use of the phrase "among others" in
the Expanded Complaint does not in any manner mean that petitioner
has other concealed causes of action against these respondents. Smart
pleaders resort to said artful phrase only to gain more leeway in presenting
their evidence. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can it be
maintained that the opaque phrase "among others" can confer a cause of
action. Such a ruling cannot be reconciled with substantive due process
which bars roaming generalities in any kind of complaint, whether civil or
criminal. It is for this reason that section 1 of rule 8 of the Rules of Court
requires that "every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a
plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be . . ." A
transgression of this rule is fatal. Upon the other hand, paragraphs 13 to 17
of the Expanded Complaint contain mere general averments and do not
allege petitioner's specific cause of action against these respondents. They
speak for themselves and they need not undergo the scalpel of judicial
scrutiny.
Petitioner and the dissent further forward the thesis: The averments earlier
mentioned and the deed of assignment, juxtaposed with Annex "A",
show prima facie that (a) the petitioner did not intend to enter into any
amicable settlement with the remaining eleven (11) corporations or regarding
the frozen assets listed in said Annex "A", and (b) the assets of the
defendants in the said eleven (11) corporations were not
necessarily obtained through or as a consequence of the acts or transactions
described in subparagraphs (a) to (f), paragraph 11 of the Expanded
Complaint, but probably through "the other devices, schemes or strategems."
Again, we find the thesis untenable. We need not agonize in search for the
subjective intent of the petitioner in concluding the Deed of Assignment only
with the seven (7) corporations of the de Venecia group of companies.
Speculations on intent can be endless for it is the nature of unmanifested
intent to be fugitive. But the effort is superfluous for we need not engage in
this difficult intellectual jujitsu. For, whether or not it was petitioner's furtive
intent to settle amicably with all the corporations of de Venecia and the
respondents Bondoc and company, is not decisive of the case at bar. What is
determinative is that in the Deed of Assignment, petitioner itself admitted that
it has no cause of action against these respondents in Civil Case No. 0020.
The admission was made when, after conducting its own investigation, it
found out that (1) de Venecia, Jr., was not a crony but a victim of the
Marcoses; (2) the guarantees extended by the private respondents as
members of the Board of Director of PHILGUARANTEE were given in "the
ordinary and regular course of business and that no favor was accorded to
the Landoil officers in the grant of such guarantee facility," and (3) that the
business reversals experienced by the Landoil Group in connection with its
various construction and other projects in the Middle East and elsewhere
were due, firstly, to the inability of the Landoil Group to collect its contract
receivables from such projects due to the reasons specified in the sixth
"whereas" clause, and, secondly, due to the non-payment of its insurance
claim. In light of these specific admissions, there is no need to speculate why
the other corporations of de Venecia were not made parties to the Deed of
Assignment.
The dissent likewise posits the highly stretched submission that there is
a prima facie showing that the "assets of the defendants in the said eleven
(11) corporations were not necessarily obtained through or as a
consequence of the acts or transactions described in subparagraphs (a) to
(f), par. 11 of the Expanded Complaint but probably through "the other
devices, schemes or strategems." This submission of a prima facie showing
self-destructs for the factual basis given for its support is a mere guesswork
— i.e., that probably the aforementioned assets were obtained through other
devices, schemes or strategems. Moreover, we are dealing with a petition
for certiorari, where it may not be proper for this Court, concededly not a trier
of fact, to rule about the existence of a prima facie case. To be sure, the facts
of the case were not fully developed, for petitioner's Expanded Complaint
was dismissed on the basis of private respondents' motion to dismiss.
Additionally, the dissent urges that the petitioner's admissions ". . . do not by
themselves clear the Board of Directors or the officers of the Philguarantee
from any liability which could have arisen from the grant of the guaranty
facility." The given reason is that "private respondents were not sued as
directors or officers of a private corporation, but as government officials who
under the Constitution were obliged to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and to remain accountable to
the people." With due deference this view that respondents Bondoc and
company were not sued as members of the Board of PHILGUARANTEE but
as public officials is simply irreconcilable with the allegations in the Expanded
Complaint of the petitioner, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Defendants ROSENDO D. BONDOC was the President of the Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee) while
Defendants CESAR E. A. VIRATA, RUBEN ANCHETA, JAIME C. LAYA,
PLACIDO MAPA, JR., ROBERTO ONGPIN, and CESAR C. ZALAMEA were
the members of its Board of Directors.
xxx xxx xxx
V There cannot be any iota of doubt that said respondents were sued as
SPECIFIC AVERMENTS
OF DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL ACTS
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To finance his huge domestic and overseas operations, Defendant Jose
de Venecia, acting through the Land Oil Group, borrowed enormous amounts
in foreign currency denominated loans from several syndicates of
international banks, such as, but not limited to, Arab Banking Corporation,
Ahli Bank of Kuwait, Credit Swisse First of Boston, Saudi Cairo Bank, Mellon
Bank and the Bank of Montreal. In view of the magnitude of the loans and the
project risks involved, the banks required that their loans be fully covered by
the absolute and unconditional guarantee of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines.
(c) Accordingly, Defendant Jose de Venecia applied for Philippine
Government guarantee from the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee), a government-owned and controlled
corporation organized to provide Philippine Government guarantees, and,
with the active collaboration of Defendants Rosendo D. Bondoc, who was
then the President of the Philguarantee and the members of its Board of
Directors, Defendants Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya,
Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar C. Zalamea was granted full
Philippine government guarantee coverage;
(d) Defendant Jose de Venecia misused the proceeds of the loans by
diverting them to other uses and/or appropriation, then for his own personal
benefit using for this purpose a string of local and overseas banks, such as,
but not limited to, PNB (New York), PNB (Buendia Branch), PCTB (Makati
Branch), Swiss Banking Corp. of Hongkong, and the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corp. in Hongkong, and in an effect to hide his complicity
in the diversion, refused to submit regular accounting and reports, all in
violation of the provisions of the loan and guarantee agreements;
(e) Notwithstanding the aforesaid repeated violations, Philguarantee, with the
active collaboration of Defendants Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata,
Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and
Cesar C. Zalamea, continued to provide financial assistance to the
companies and controlled by Defendant Jose de Venecia. (Emphasis
supplied).
members of the Board of PHILGUARANTEE and not as public officials.
Indeed, if they were able to guaranty the foreign loans of petitioner it was
because they were members of the Board of PHILGUARANTEE and for no
other reason. But even granting arguendo that these respondents were sued
as public officials, we cannot perceive how they could be charged with
betrayal of their trust considering again petitioner's admission that the
guarantee facilities were extended in the "ordinary and regular course of
business."
Petitioner further contends that the emerging rule in the United States is that
the release of one tortfeasor does not automatically result in the release of
the other tortfeasors, hence, the case against the private respondents should
not be dismissed even if it had consented to the dismissal of the case against
de Venecia, Jr. We fail to see how the principles of tort can apply to the case
at bench. Civil Case No. 0020 can hardly be classified as a tort case for, as
petitioner itself labels its complaint, it is one for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages. Petitioner has never taken the stance
that its cause of action is predicated on tort.
But even if we apply the principles of tort to the case at bench, we still affirm
the ruling of the respondent court that the complaint against private
respondents as former directors of PHILGUARANTEE should be dismissed.
It is true that in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 US 321,
91 S. Ct. 795, the US Supreme Court held that "a party releases only those
other parties whom he intends to release." Nonetheless, the ruling should be
interpreted in light of the text of the release document executed
by Zenith, viz:
To All To Whom These Presents Shall Come Or May Concern, Greeting:
Know ye, That Zenith Radio Corporation and The Rauland Corporation, each
a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
State of Illinois, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00)
lawful money of the United States of America and other good and valuable
consideration, to them in hand paid by . . . the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, have each remised, released and forever discharged, and by
these presents does each for itself and its respective subsidiaries,
successors and assigns remise, release and forever discharge the said . . .
and its subsidiaries and their respective successors and assigns of and from
all, and all manner of action and actions, cause and causes of action, suits,
debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, reckoning, bonds, bills, specialties,
covenants, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, variances,
trespasses, damages, judgments, extents, executions, claims and demands
whatsoever, in law, in admiralty, or in equity, which against
said . . ., its subsidiaries and their respective successors and assigns, said
Zenith Radio Corporation and the Rauland Corporation and each of them
ever had, now has or which each of them and their respective subsidiaries,
successors and assigns, hereafter can, shall or may have for, upon or by
reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the
world to the day of the date of these presents, not including however, claims,
if any, for unpaid balances on any goods sold and delivered.
"Insert
"Radio Corporation of America", or
"General Electric Company," or
"Western Electric Company."
"This release may not be changed orally." 1
It is clear from the text of this release document in Zenith that the release
was made in exchange for a valuable consideration, thus, in satisfaction of
Zenith's claim. In the case at bench, petitioner released de Venecia, Jr. and
some of his companies not because its claim has already been satisfied by a
sufficient consideration, but because of the fact that it could not establish its
cause of action against them. Petitioner's investigation showed that de
Venecia, Jr., was not a crony of former President Marcos and that he
obtained the guarantees to his foreign loans in the regular and ordinary
course of business. In plain language, petitioner was convinced that de
Venecia, Jr., and company did not commit any actionable wrong, including
any tortious act. It ought to follow that the complaint against the respondents
Bondoc and company for extending the said guarantees in favor of de
Venecia, Jr., cannot also be pursued any further. The complaint against de
Venecia, Jr., and these respondents are inseparable, especially because
petitioner relied on the theory of conspiracy. In any event, the rule with
respect to the effect of release of one tortfeasor on other tortfeasors is still in
a state of fluctuation even in the United States. Thus, the 2nd Restatement of
the Law on Torts states:
Statutes. About half of the states have now passed statutes covering the
matter. They change the early common law with varying positions, but a
substantial number provide that neither a release nor a covenant not to sue
discharges the other tortfeasor unless its terms so provide. This is the
provision in both the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
Present status. States may now be classed as follows:
(1) A release amounts to a complete discharge, no matter what language is
used.
(2) An instrument in the form of a release discharges all tortfeasors; a
covenant not to sue does not.
(3) The intent is controlling, irrespective of the language — sometimes with a
rebuttable presumption either for or against discharge of the other tortfeasor.
(4) A release of one tortfeasor does not discharge the other unless it so
provides. There is frequent change in the alignment of the states, usually in
the direction toward classification.
Next, petitioner argues that the respondent court gravely abused its
discretion when it held that de Venecia, Jr., was an indispensable party;
hence, his exclusion in the Expanded Complaint ought to result in the
dismissal of the same Complaint against the private respondents. The
argument has merit considering that the case can be decided without
impleading de Venecia, Jr. Be that as it may, this ruling is not enough reason
to completely reverse the respondent court. As discussed above, the
petitioner dropped its cause of action in its Expanded Complaint by signing
the said Deed of Assignment. It has precluded itself from further pursuing its
complaint not only against de Venecia, Jr., but also against respondents Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.,
Bondoc and company who served as former directors of PHILGUARANTEE. concur.

We now come to the submission of petitioner that the dismissal of the Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Romero and Quiason, JJ., took no part.
complaint against the respondents Marcoses ordered by the respondent
court is a grave abuse of discretion. We agree that the Marcoses should be
treated differently from de Venecia, Jr., and the respondents Bondoc and
company. For in the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, the petitioner only
recognized the lack of culpability of de Venecia, Jr., and by necessary
inference, the respondents Bondoc and company. In contrast, however, the
said Deed did not exculpate the Marcoses, but on the contrary, inculpated
them. More specifically, the Deed alleged that former President Marcos "by
himself and/or through his designated nominees or cronies, owns
approximately 45% of the outstanding capital stock of Landoil, and through
Landoil, a proportionate portion of the outstanding capital stock of each of the
other companies of the Landoil Group". According to the same Deed, the
former President and his cronies "coveted the Landoil groups and caused the
same to betaken over by his (referring the Marcos) agents and business
associates . . .". It was for this reason that in the same Deed, de Venecia, Jr.,
agreed to surrender to petitioner all the Marcoses' shares in the Landoil
group of companies and to cooperate in the prosecution of any case to be
filed against the Marcoses. In fine, the Deed of Assignment leaves it crystal
clear that petitioner has not surrendered its cause of action against the
Marcoses as it did with respect to the respondents Bondoc and company.

One final point. The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company
is compelled by the equal protection clause of the Constitution. De Venecia,
Jr., and the respondents Bondoc and company are similarly situated.
Respondent Bondoc, et al. were included in the Complaint only because they
allegedly gave unwarranted favors to de Venecia, Jr., in guaranteeing the
latter's foreign loans. When petitioner admitted that no undue favor was
granted to de Venecia, Jr. in the grant of such guaranty facilities and
dismissed its complaint against him, petitioner cannot avoid its duty of
dismissing its complaint against respondents Bondoc and company. To give
a more favored treatment to de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally
situated is to indulge in invidious discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolutions dated November 29, 1989 and March
9, 1990 of the respondent court are affirmed with the modification that the
Expanded Complaint against the respondents Marcoses in Civil Case
No. 0020 is reinstated and ordered to be remanded to the respondent court
for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.