Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO
GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA,
ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES
LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
ALAMPAY, J.:
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte,
which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the
Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on
December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of
stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite
which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for
January 3, 1986. Said law provides:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the
municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the
northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from
the province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern
limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto
and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of
the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and
east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or
less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City
of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new
province which are the areas affected within a period of one hundred
and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification
of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of
the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines
shall appoint the first officials of the province.
SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise
the plebiscite herein provided, the expenses for which shall be
charged to local funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-
24)
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is
unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local
Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it
is expressly mandated that—
See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must
exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these
requisites are:
SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it
has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square
kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons,
an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of
Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three
consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population
and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands.
The average estimated annual income shall include the income
alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of
trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6)
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during
which the Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a
supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein
that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as
scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting
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the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should properly be
passed upon and resolved by this Court.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del
N•rte, namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don
Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the
province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the prayer of their
petition "to the end that the constitutional issues which they have raised in the
action will be ventilated and given final resolution.'"At the same time, they asked
that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until the
Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on the very fundamental and far-
reaching questions that petitioners have brought out.
Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered
moot the prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3,
1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that-
... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent
Commission on Elections to desist from issuing official
proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January 3,
1986.
Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the
Province of Negros Occidental other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte to be not in
accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of mandamus be
issued, directed to the respondent Commission on Elections, to
schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified
voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing
shall participate, at the same time making pronouncement that the
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect, being a patent
legal nullity;
And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the
respondent Provincial Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release
of any local funds to answer for expenses incurred in the holding of
such plebiscite until ordered by the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-10).
Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in
abeyance the issuance of any official proclamation of the results of
the aforestated plebiscite.
During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus
curiae in this case (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on January
2, 1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said motion was
granted in Our resolution of January 2, 1986.
Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining order, the Court, on January 7,
1986 resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require respondents to
comment, not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public
respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986,
filed their Comment, arguing therein that the challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa
885, should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said law
is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and
undeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution.
Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the assailed
law is beyond question. They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe
the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been
complied with. Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become moot and
academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of
Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte,
de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as
referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents
maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution, invoking
and citing the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive
Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 61),
particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:
1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the
Court is allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of
ambiguity in the use of the expression 'unit or units affected'. It is
plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain Barangays
are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the
voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive, however, to
contend as respondents do that the acceptable construction is for
those voters, who are not from the barangays to be separated,
should be excluded in the plebiscite.
2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that
between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of
unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former
is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy,
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commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all
these years is one of validity. ...
3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that
when there are indications that the inhabitants of several barangays
are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be
allowed to do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in
a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who
shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed.
New burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will
come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice-their choice.
They should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow
other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their
will. They may even frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote
against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That
is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the Constitution to
promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To
rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of
constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a
particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the
framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari
materia.
Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with force
in the case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local
Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte
have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that
the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local
Government Code for a new province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners
insist that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte,
would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser
than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this
regard, point out and stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said
new province plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte
comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.
As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot
and academic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted on January
3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of canvass indicated
that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the
creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative
votes cast represented a majority of the total votes cast in said plebiscite, the
Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall be
known as "Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents stress the fact that following the
proclamation of Negros del Norte province, the appointments of the officials of said
province created were announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that
this case should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the
creation of the new province is now a "fait accompli."
In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear
to be agreed to by the parties herein or stand unchallenged.
Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of
Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds
in connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the
Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros
Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer of the
petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court to desist from
ordering the release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should not
longer deserve further consideration.
Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it
expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the following:
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern
limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto
and the City of San Carlos on the South and the natural boundaries
of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North
and East, containing an area of 285,656 hectares more or less.
(Emphasis supplied).
However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del Norte were
defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as follows:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the
municipalities of Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the
northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from
the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into a new
province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern
limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto
and the City of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of
the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and
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East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or
less.
Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by
Provincial Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated
July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of
Negros Occidental have the land area as indicated hereunder based
on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines 1980, Population, Land
Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National Census
and Statistics Office, Manila.
Land Area
(Sq. Km.)
1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8
2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3
3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9
4. Manapla......................................................................112.9
5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5
6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6
7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0
8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4
9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5
10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3
11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)
This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan
for whatever purpose it may serve him.
(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ
Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).
Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new
municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact
that the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the component units of
the new province, was derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality
of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added thereto was a portion of about one-fourth
the land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the
uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the total land area of the entire
municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D",
Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the
portions derived from the land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos
City (Negros Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers.
This area of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers,
representing the total land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and the
Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and
Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers
using as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and
Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila
(see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90).
No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of
petitioners that the original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No.
3644, reads:
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within
a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this
Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros
del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the
President shall appoint the first officials of the new province.
However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant
change in the above provision. The statute, as modified, provides that the requisite
plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas
affected."
It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and
towns which would comprise the new province that is assailed by the petitioners as
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violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit that Sec. 3, ART XI
thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected by
the creation of the new province as a result of the consequent division of and
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the existing province. In this instance,
the voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should have
been allowed to participate in the questioned plebiscite.
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance
with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new
province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be
viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born,
deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to
its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for
perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that,
as there has been fait accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede
to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant
petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court
decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and
should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power
to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the
boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this
Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage
to bring about a fait accompli.
In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to
the unusually rapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly
scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and discourage the
commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done
by whatever branch of our government. This Court gives notice that it will not look
with favor upon those who may be hereafter inclined to ram through all sorts of
legislative measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if such
acts would violate the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land. It is
illogical to ask that this Tribunal be blind and deaf to protests on the ground that
what is already done is done. To such untenable argument the reply would be that,
be this so, the Court, nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify
the wrong brought to its attention.
On the merits of the case.
Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of
Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves
around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section
3 of the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created,
divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative
that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in
the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and
there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude
that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily
be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there
can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic
will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be
the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the
area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of
Negros del Norte.
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said
constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two
component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion
of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of
the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed
to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The
alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what
our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must
first be observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay
homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote
autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and
disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof.
Respondents would be no different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but
then spits at the Idol therein.
We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be
dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged
by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and
motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper
subject of judicial inquiry.
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Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885
to say the least, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court
cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the unexplained
changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and
approval of said law; the abrupt scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news
articles regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite held on January 3,
1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the decisive matters which should
be reckoned in the resolution of this case.
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support
to respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by
this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive
Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In
said case relating to a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality
from existing barangays, this Court upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was
participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would constitute the
new municipality.
This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is,
however, highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating that said
case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable
leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression
unit or units affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed
prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not
resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be
correctly interpreted.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary,
et al. (supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is
acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when
certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all
the voters therein are affected."
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes vs.
Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the
strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of
this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it
means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to
be divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or
more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the
Constitutional provision.
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the— forerunner of the
ruling which We now consider applicable to the case at bar, In the analogous case
of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May
31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he
therein assailed as suffering from a constitutional infirmity a referendum which did
not include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was intended
to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up some of their towns
to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in the
instant case.
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the
present Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein
were formerly considered acceptable because of the views then taken that local
autonomy would be better promoted However, even this consideration no longer
retains persuasive value.
The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject matter
under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious
complicated problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a
barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code.
Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. In the case at bar, creation
of a new province relates to the largest political unit contemplated in Section 3, Art.
XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than
three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of
Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square
kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be
consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent
effects cf the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living
in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del
Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will
be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case,
either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the
unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be
included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision
that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be
gleaned from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which
proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof
that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one
hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." As this draft legislation
speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to
participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would
be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the
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parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth
in the Constitution.
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary
Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided
in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new
province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere
legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be
diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities
comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other
people necessarily affected.
In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have
entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new
proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a
possible strong challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore,
deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving phrase that the new province
constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose
for the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of
the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the
boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the other adverse economic effects
it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.
Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del
Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established
Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No
controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the
Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it
will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole
province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing
territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned
and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with
the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a
separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates,
a substantial alteration of boundary.
As contended by petitioners,—
Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used
in the constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situation
isolated from the mutually exclusive to each other. A Province
maybe created where an existing province is divided or two
provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit
or units abolished and definitely the boundary being substantially
altered.
It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political
unit is divided or its boundary substantially altered, as the
Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in the whole
unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its
boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true.
It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of
this case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise,
nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.
It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive
pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive
Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now state that the
ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging
to an existing political unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from
participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the
formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners
that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission on
Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified
voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate
and that this Court make a pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3,
1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null
and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The
Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because
We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject
Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of
Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province
which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.
Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the
new province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials thereof,
must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be
announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to
settle the complications currently attending to its creation. As has been manifested,
the parent province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded as the defendant in a
suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional Trial Court of
7
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation,
distribution and transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in an
amount claimed to be at least P10,000,000.00.
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the
province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does
not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local
Government Code, as earlier discussed.
It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits
submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new
province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion
is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new
province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would,
at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into account government
statistics relative to the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros
del Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local Government Code
speaks of the territory of the province to be created and requires that such territory
be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area
but also the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and
control. It is even the submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal
sea within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the
territory of the new province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and
fallacious.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated
therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The
use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code
and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used,
has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the
political unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means
(a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or
adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when
employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes
physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning
of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated
with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138
A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be
"contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no
need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term
"territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely
concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to
be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute
should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The
sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton
Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).
The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an
artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the
statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an
entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning
in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A
construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony
of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p.
909).
It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area
but which has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can
be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or
Benguet) whose land area manifestly exceeds the province first mentioned.
Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was marred
by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in
secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve "pure and simple
gerrymandering; "that recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far
from guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of a
local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).
It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits
of this case can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom
in the making of the questioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also
be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess
the motives or wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of improper
or unwise actions taken by tools of a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent
events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant people.
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the
Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the
patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the
continued existence of their historic province. They were inspired undoubtedly by
their faithful commitment to our Constitution which they wish to be respected and
obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the hardships which petitioners aver confronted
them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy destiny for
our Nation is assured as long as among our people there would be exemplary citizens
such as the petitioners herein.
8
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of
the officials thereof are also declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-59180 January 29, 1987
CLEMENTINO TORRALBA and RESOLUTION L. RUGAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR and ITS
MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Challenged in the instant Petition, as violative of Section 3, Article XI of the 1973
Constitution, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 56, enacted on 1 February 1980, creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. The pertinent provisions of BP
56 read:
Sec. 1. The barangays of Ilihan, Sinai, Sibagat, El Rio, Afga, Tabontabon, Perez,
Magsaysay, Santa Cruz, Santa Maria, San Isidro, Villangit, Del Rosario, Anahauan
Mahayahay, and San Vicente, all in the Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan
del Sur, are hereby separated from said municipality to form and constitute an
independent Municipality of Sibagat without affecting in any manner the legal
existence of the mother Municipality of Bayugan.
Sec. 2. The boundaries of the new Municipality of Sibagat will be: Beginning at the
point of intersection of the Cabadbaran-Old Bayugan and Surigao del Sur
boundaries; thence in a southernly direction following the Old Bayugan and
Cabadbaran, Old Bayugan and Butuan City, Old Bayugan and Las Nieves
boundaries, until it reaches the point of intersection of Old Bayugan, Esperanza and
the Municipality of Las Nieves; ...
Sec. 3. The seat of government of the newly created municipality shall be in Barangay
Sibagat.
Sec. 4. Except as herein provided, all provisions of laws, now or hereafter applicable
to regular municipalities shall be applicable to the new Municipality of Sibagat.
Sec. 5. After ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be
conducted in the area or areas affected within a period of ninety (90) days after the
approval of this Act, the President (Prime Minister) shall appoint the Mayor and other
Officials of the new Municipality of Sibagat.
Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino
Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City.
Respondent municipal officers are the local public officials of the new Municipality.
Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, said to have been infringed, is
reproduced hereunder:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
The thrust of petitioners' argument is that under the aforequoted provision, the Local
Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province,
city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet
been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly
complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is
null and void.
It is a fact that the Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February
1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the code was not yet in existence. The
evidence likewise discloses that a plebiscite had been conducted among the people
of the unit/units affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who expressed
approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created Municipality had been
appointed and had assumed their respective positions as such.
We find no trace of invalidity of BP 56. The absence of the Local Government Code
at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative
competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973
Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and
political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It
contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua
non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a
new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code.
What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the
creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with
the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such Code,
the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local
government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called
for the purpose.
9
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A
plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and
approved the creation of the new local government unit (parag. 5, Petition; p. 7,
Memorandum).lwphl@itç In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned
herein. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of
office and are performing their functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.
It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is
essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations a
legislative body may Create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., 509).
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative
power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
We are not unmindful of the case of Tan vs. COMELEC (142 SCRA 727 [1986]),
striking down as unconstitutional BP Blg. 885 creating a new province in the Island
of Negros known as the Province of Negros del Norte, and declaring the plebiscite
held in connection therewith as illegal There are significant differences, however, in
the two cases among which may be mentioned the following. in the Tan case, the
Local Government Code already existed at the time that the challenged statute was
enacted on 3 December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP Blg. 885 in
the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion
of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate
and of the Local Government Code that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or
units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the area
or areas affected." In fact, as previously stated, no question is raised herein as to the
legality of the plebiscite conducted. Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area
for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885. No such
issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly,
"indecent haste" attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the
plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of legislation, and the
plebiscite was held within the period specified in that law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur on the assumption that the required plebiscite, although not questioned
here, nevertheless complied with Article XI, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, and
was duly held "in the unit or units affected," i.e. not only in the proposed
municipality but also in the mother municipality, in line with Tan v. Commission on
Elections (142 SCRA 727), reversing Paredes v. Executive Secretary (128 SCRA 6)
and Lopez v. Metro Manila Commission (136 SCRA 633) insofar as these cases held
that the plebiscite could be confined only to the political unit proposed to be created.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur on the assumption that the required plebiscite, although not questioned
here, nevertheless complied with Article XI, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, and
was duly held "in the unit or units affected," i.e. not only in the proposed
municipality but also in the mother municipality, in line with Tan v. Commission on
Elections (142 SCRA 727), reversing Paredes v. Executive Secretary (128 SCRA 6)
and Lopez v. Metro Manila Commission (136 SCRA 633) insofar as these cases held
that the plebiscite could be confined only to the political unit proposed to be created.
G.R. No. L-56022 May 31, 1985
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., for himself and all other interested parties similarly
situated in Metropolitan Manila, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-56124 May 31, 1985
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR. and REYNALDO B. ARALAR, for themselves and all
other interested parties similarly situated as themselves in Metropolitan
Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE METROPOLITAN MANILA COMMISSION, respondent.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
Presidential Decree No. 824 1 was a response to a felt need for a "central government
to establish and administer program and provide services common to" the cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities 2 in the
surrounding area. It is worth noting that such a problem was by no means unique
and confined to the Philippines. Recent decades have witnessed a growing erosion
in public confidence in the ability of local government units as traditionally organized
to fulfill their responsibilities and discharge their functions effectively, efficiently,
and satisfactorily. 3 The growth in population in Manila, the three other cities, and
the adjacent municipalities has been unchecked since the end of World War II. There
10
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
was of course the bright promise of a better fife especially so with the proliferation
of commercial firms and the establishment of industries. The lure has thus proved
irresistible. The result has been the ever increasing inability of the separate local
governments to cope with the ensuing serious problems. A public corporation was
thus created "to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and
attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be sued,
acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and such
other powers as are necessary to carry out its purposes." 4 It is administered by a
Commission. 5
Petitioners 6 in the second of the above cases 7 assail the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 824. They rely on this provision: "No province, city,
municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected." 8 The Local Government Code was not
enacted until 1983. 9
For reasons to be set forth, it will be made apparent that such a challenge is far from
formidable. It does not suffice to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Moreover, the last vestige of doubt has been removed by the present constitutional
provision adopted in the plebiscite on January 27, 1984. Thus in the Article on
Batasang Pambansa it is expressly provided: "The Batasang Pambansa which shall
be composed of not more than 200 Members unless otherwise provided by law, shall
include representatives elected from the different provinces with their component
cities, highly urbanized cities as may be declared by or pursuant to law, and districts
in Metropolitan Manila, those elected or selected from the various sectors as may be
provided by law, and those chosen by the President from Members of the Cabinet.
Each district in Metropolitan Manila shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. The elective representatives shall be
apportioned by law among the provinces with their component cities, highly
urbanized cities, and the districts of Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, but the provinces with component cities and highly urbanized cities shall have
at least one representative each. The provinces and cities shall have at least the
same total number of representatives as under the 1935 Constitution." 10
The recognition of the existence to Metropolitan Manila cannot be expressed any
clearer. There can be no legal justification then for a declaration of
unconstitutionality. Presidential Decree No. 824 is not tainted with constitutional
infirmity.
1. In Presidential Decree No 824 reference was made to "the referendum held on
February 27, 1975 [wherein] the residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the
President to restructure the local governments of the four cities and 13
municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of
government," with the terms and conditions being left to the discretion of the
President. 11 It was then pointed out that "the rapid growth of population and the
corresponding increase of social and economic requirements in the contiguous
communities referred to above has brought into being a large area that calls for
[development both] simultaneous and unified." 12For "many public services [then]
rendered by local governments separately for themselves [ought to] be ad. ministered
more efficiently and more economically, to the common benefit of the cities and
municipalities in the area, if they are integrated and harmonized, under a system of
central planning [treating as a common problem the] separate municipal needs." 13 It
"is Vital to the survival and growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that
a workable and effective system be established for the coordination, integration and
unified management of such local government services or functions" 14 therein,
There is necessity for "the unified metropolitan services or functions [to] be planned,
administered, and operated [based on] the highest professional technical
standards." 15 The foregoing constitutes the justification for and the objective of such
Presidential Decree.
2. There is relevance to this opening paragraph in the recent case of Paredes v.
Executive Secretary: 16 "The constitutional question raised in this declaratory relief
proceeding treated as a special civil action for prohibition, one of first impression,
arose from the issuance of a proclamation by the President, directing that a
plebiscite be conducted in certain barangays, all within the municipality of Mayoyao,
Province of Ifugao, segregated under a Batas Pambansa, "to determine whether the
said barangays shall become a new municipality be known as the Municipality of
Aguinaldo, Province of Ifugao." In such proclamation, respondent Commission on
Elections was charged with the duty of supervising the conduct of such plebiscite
and empowered to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
proclamation. It is alleged that Batas Pambansa Blg. 86 is unconstitutional for being
violative of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution. The basis for such contention is
that the statute excluded from the plebiscite the voters from the poblacion and other
barangays of the Municipality of Mayoyao except those mentioned in the Act." 17 The
proclamation was issued on November 11, 1980, at least three years before the
enactment of the local government code. The petition based on Article XI, Section 3
of the Constitution, the very same provision relied upon in this case, was dismissed.
There were twelve (12) votes in favor of such dismissal, two of the Justices 18 voting
to dismiss the petition on the ground that it had become moot and academic, the
plebiscite having been duly held and the certificate of canvass and proclamation
disclosing that out of the 2,409 total votes being cast in the plebiscite, 2,368 were
cast in favor of the creation of the new municipality. 19 Justice Abad Santos
dissented on the ground that the people in the barangay of the municipality of
Aguinaldo should likewise have voted in the plebiscite, not only those of the
barangays that constituted the new municipality. The Court did take note of the
plausibility of such an approach but came to the conclusion that the constitutional
11
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
provision on the need for a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or
units affected would be satisfied even if "those voters who are not from the barangay
to be separated [were] excluded in the plebiscite." 20 It cannot be argued therefore
that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila,
having manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners
has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in
February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.
3. Nor is there any question as to the Presidential authority to issue Presidential
Decree No. 824 creating Metropolitan Manila in 1975. There was at the time
no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the President who was then entrusted with
such responsibility. So it was held in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 21 decided in January of 1975. The ponencia of Justice Makasiar dispelled
"all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President during
the period of Martial Law, * * *." 22 As the opinion went on to state: "The entire
paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of
such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period
of Martial Law." 23
4. The sole petitioner in the other case 24 is likewise now Assemblyman Gemiliano C
Lopez, Jr, of Metropolitan Manila. It is a mandamus petition to require respondent
Commission on Elections to order the elections for members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the four cities and thirteen towns of
Metropolitan Manila. As was ,stated in the Memorandum of the Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, the fact that it is a suit for mandamus is an admission of the
validity of Presidential Decree No. 824. 25 Nor would mandamus lie, it being provided
therein that "the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay
captains as may be determined and chosen by the Commission, and such number
of representatives from other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the
President upon recommendation of the Commission." 26 The Solicitor General can,
therefore plausibly assert: "This demonstrates that the petition's charge, that there
is no duly constituted Sangguniang Bayan, in Metro Manila Area is untrue, and that
the citizenry therein do have a voice in decision-making, through the respective
Sangguniang Bayans of each of the political units therein." 27 The Decree itself thus
supplies the refutation to the contention of petitioner.
5. The point has been raised, however, that unless Presidential Decree No. 824 be
construed in such a way that along with the rest of the other cities and
municipalities, there should be elections for the Sangguniang Bayan, then there is
a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution. The point is not well-
taken. In a recent decision, 28 this Court reiterated the concept of equal protection
in these words: "The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial
of this constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the police
power or the power of eminent domain is to demonstrate "that the government act
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on
all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the priveleges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For
the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon
in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on
the rest." That same formulation applies as well to taxation measures. The equal
protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of approximating the
Ideal of the law's benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being by the
serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea of law. There
is, however, wisdom, as well as realism, in these words of Justice Frankfurther: "The
equality at which the "equal protection" clause aims is not a disembodied equality.
The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins "the equal protection of the laws, and the laws
are not abstract propositions. They do not relate to abstract units A, B and C, but
are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, addressed to the
attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution does
not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
they were the same." 29 It is clear that under the equal protection clause,
classification is not forbidden. As was so well put by Justice Laurel as ponente in
the leading case People v. Vera: 30 "Class legislation discriminating against some and
favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made
arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. * * * The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class." 31 All such
elements are present. There is no need to set forth anew the compelling reasons that
called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is quite obvious that under the
conditions then existing — still present and, with the continued growth of
population, attended with more complexity — what was done a response to a great
public need. The government was called upon to act. Presidential Decree No. 824
was the result. It is not a condition for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans
provided for in the four cities and the thirteen municipalities that the membership
be Identical with those of other cities or municipalities. There is ample justification
for such a distinction. It does not by any means come under the category of what
Professor Gunther calls suspect classification. 32 There is thus no warrant for the
view that the equal protection guarantee was violated.
6 Reference was made earlier to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution where
there is express recognition of the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila.
Such express constutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls,
as earlier noted, for the dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal justification
for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it
12
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the creation of Manila.
Thus according to the Election Code of 1978, "there shall be 160 regional
representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa apportioned among the thirteen
regions of the nation in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" with Region IV. with 19
representatives comprising "Metro Manila as follows: Cities of Manila, Quezon,
Caloocan, and Pasay; and the municipalities of Valenzuela, Malabon, Navotas,
Makati, Paranaque, Las Pinas, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Muntinlupa,
Marikina, Pateros, and Taguig." 33 Then there is this provision found in Presidential
Decree No. 1396 creating the Ministry of Human Settlements" "SEC. 3.
Establishment of the National Capital Region — In view of the critical importance of
the Metropolitan Manila Region in human settlement development. it is hereby
declared and established as the National Capital Region of the Republic of the
Philippines, and its administration as such is hereby vested in the Secretary of
Human Settlements. The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 824,
creating the Metropolitan Manila Commission, are hereby accordingly
amended." 34 The fact of such regional representation was once again made clear in
the April 7, 1981 amendments to the Constitution. Thus: "SEC. 2. The Batasang
Pambansa which shall be composed of not more than 200 members unless provided
by law, shall include representatives elected from the regions of the Philippines,
those elected or selected from various sectors as may be provided by law, and those
chosen by the President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives
shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ration." 35 Lastly, in addition to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution as approved
on January 27, 1984, its accompanying ordinance reads as follows: "SECTION 1.
For purposes of the election of Members of the regular Batasang Pambansa on the
second Monday of May 1984 and subsequent elections and until otherwise provided
by law, the Members of the Batasang Pambansa, other than the sectoral
representatives and those chosen by the President from the Cabinet, shall be
apportioned to the different provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized
cities and the representatives districts of Metropolitan Manila as follows: "National
Capital Region: Manila six (6) Quezon City, four (4); Caloocan, two (2); Pasay, one
(1); Makati, one (1); Malabon, one (1); Navotas and Valenzuela, two (2); San Juan
and Mandaluyong, one (1); Taguig, Pateros and Muntinlupa, one (1)." 36 It would be,
therefore, as contended by respondent Commission to show lack of the fidelity to the
Constitution if the prayer for the abolition of the Metropolitan Manila, which is
expressly authorized and recognized by the fundamental law, be granted.
7 One last point. It is undeniable, therefore, that the creation of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission is free from any constitutional objection. There is, however, a
question that may arise in connection with the powers of the President over the
Commission. According to Presidential Decree No. 824: "The Commission, the
General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under the direct
supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this
Decree, the President shall the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance,
resolution or act of the Commission, the General and the Commissioners." 37 It may
give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it confers the power of control on the
President. That control he certainly exercises under the present Constitution over
the ministries. 38 His power over local governments does not go that far. It extends
no further than general supervision. 39 These doubts, however, do not suffice to
nullify such a provision. They can be set at rest. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad 40 shows
the way. After reiterating the classic doctrine of the presumption being always in
favor of constitutionality, Justice Malcolm, as ponente, categorically declared: "To
doubt is to sustain." 41 In this case, the validity of Republic Act No. 2972 of the
Philippine Legislature, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was
questioned. According to the opinion of Justice Malcolm: "A literal application of the
law would make it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to keep his account books in
any language other than English, Spanish, or oral dialect. The petitioner say the law
is susceptible of that interpretation might, and probably would, cause us to hold the
law unconstitutional." 42 The construction adopted to which the Court considered
permissible is "that the law only intended to require the keeping of such books as
were necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax
purposes" 43 Such a conclusion was reached by the invocation of "an elementary, a
fundamental, and a universal rule of construction, applied when considering
constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions one of
which will maintain and the other constructions one of which will maintain and the
other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former." 44 Succinctly put, that
construction that would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy. As
phrased by Chief Justices Hughes in Crowell v. Bengson, 45 "if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided." 46 N•r does it argue against the authoritative character of Justice
Malcom's ponencia in Yu Cong Eng that it was reversed in appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 47 During the period of American sovereignty, such
jurisdiction validly be exercised. Its decision then nullifying the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law is the law of the case. it does not follow, however, that the
reasoning on which the Philippine decisions was based is bereft of any legal
significance. It does not admit of doubt that Justice Malcolm and his brethren
considered fully the precise problem presented and the need for such a measure to
assure that the taxes to which the Philippine government was entitled would be fully
paid. It cannot be said that the American Supreme Court — in this as in other cases
of Philippine origin — was as well-informed. It did not possess — it could not possess
— full awareness of the conditions then existing in this country. After July 4, 1946,
when the Philippine declared its independence, therefore, it is not only
understandable but also proper that there be less reliance on American Supreme
Court decisions. What is undeniable as shown by the foregoing citations of case —
both Philippine and American — is that approach followed by Justice Malcom in the
interpretation of statutes to avoid any doubt as to its validity remains a fundamental
canon.
13
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
8 To show fidelity to his basic principle of construction is to lend substance to the
equally basic doctrine that the constitution enters into and forms part of every
statute. 48 Accordingly, the presidential power of control over acts of the Metro
Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in character.
There can be no valid objection to such exercise of authority. It is undisputed that
by virtue of the 1981 amendments to the Constitution, once again, "there is one
purpose which is crystal-clear and is the establishment of a single, not plural,
Executive." 49 So it was affirmed in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of
Labor. 50 There is significance to the fact that the Local Government Code 51 does
not include the Metro Manila Commission. That is clear recognition that some of its
attributes are those of a national character. Where, however, the acts of the Metro
Manila Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to local government
functions, the power of the President is confined to general supervision. As thus
construed, Section 13 clearly appears to be free from any constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56022 entitled Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, and the petition in G.R. No. 56124 entitled Gemiliano C.
Lopez, Jr. and Reynaldo B. Aralar v. Metropolitan Manila Commission, are dismissed.
No costs.
[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996]
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO
B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA
C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL
ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor
of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUBAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR.,
HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS,
HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in
their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS,
in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his
capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just
recently passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally
infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of
Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago,
Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,
mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the
minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No.
8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting
the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as
the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative
Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco
Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to
the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on
Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993,
public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local
Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with
amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of
Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading
on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the
Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An
Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent] Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the
Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May
19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first
public hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted
public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted
14
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be
approved without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No.
8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the
herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member
of the Committee on Local Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on
Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March
22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the
Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by
the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on
the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters
of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following
twin issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be
included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for
purposes of its conversion into an independent component city, and (II) Whether or
not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No.
8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives.
I
The annual income of a local
government unit includes the IRAs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because
its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having
computed Santiagos average annual income in the following manner:
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47
By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after
deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average
annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be
P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were
not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not
actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the national government
and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population,
land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because
Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must,
among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.1 Such income must
be duly certified by the Department of Finance.2
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by
the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on a
correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments
(IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of
local autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and
intensified empowerment of the local government system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is
constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own
affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but
not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit is
autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and
resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop
not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their oWn resources and
assets.6
15
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
The practical side to development through a decentralized local government
system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened
powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on
a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses.
Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local
government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources
to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions.7 Availment of such
resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the
right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a
just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of
the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial
boundaries.8.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization
proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance
its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the
Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance,
not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local
development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget
should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among
others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are
considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the
Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming
the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of
the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue
to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local government can
invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the
Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average
annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including
the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. To reiterate, IRAs
are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same
as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all
its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct
from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support
from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-
controlled corporations.12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 359313 correctly encapsulizes the full
import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues
and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of
the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other
shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-
recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan
proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others (Italics ours).14 Such order,
constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an
administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same,
is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless
such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the
governing statute, or other laws.15
II
In the enactment of RA No. 7720,
there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
-----------------------------------------------------------
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional
prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the
Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the
House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners
themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April
18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817
was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243.
Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated
in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of
the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant
controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was
already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the
Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No.
8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and
transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter,
or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted
public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on
SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading,
from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
16
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. x x x18
receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, III
which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained:
Every law, including RA No. 7720,
x x x To begin with, it is not the law-but the revenue bill-which is required by the has in its favor the presumption
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important of constitutionality
to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such --------------------------------------------------------------------
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. x x
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the
x as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a
presumption of constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it
revenue statute-and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
culminating in the enactment of the law-must substantially be the same as the
merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must
House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments
be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.20 Those who petition this court to declare a
but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the coequality of legislative
law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify
power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the
such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the
Senate.
justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners
to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding
xxx xxx xxx that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this
petition is, therefore, inevitable.
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs
11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate
against petitioners.
did was merely to take [H. No. 11197] into consideration in enacting S. No. 1630.
There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the SO ORDERED.
enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause
(which, it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on
the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter.
In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand,
the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems
from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment
of such laws.

17
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner
vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO
BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND
LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or modification of the proceedings
and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as
the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial
District, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana
Rimando Baniña, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al." dated November 4, 1975; July
13, 1976; August 23,1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979;
September 7, 1979; November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated
October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual
damages consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees
and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation
existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity
as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang,
La Union. While private respondents Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr.,
Sor Marietta Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are heirs
of the deceased Laureano Baniña Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before
the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred
involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate
of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned
by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained
and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages
against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,
respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in
the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However,
the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the
driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by
respondent judge and was subsequently docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By
virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private respondents amended the
complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were
impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised
affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the following
questioned orders, to wit:
(1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against
Bernardo Balagot;
(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Bislig and setting the hearing
on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the supposed lack of
jurisdiction;
(3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring there resolution of the grounds
for the Motion to Dismiss until the trial;
(4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the order of July 13, 1976 filed by the Municipality and Bislig for having
been filed out of time;
(5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976;
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for
decision it appearing that parties have not yet submitted their respective
memoranda despite the court's direction; and
18
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and/or order to recall prosecution witnesses for cross
examination.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion is
hereunder quoted as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
for the plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally, plaintiffs Juana
Rimando-Baniña, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Baniña Jr., Sor Marietta
Baniña, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia B.
Baniña the sums of P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the
lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral
damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against said defendants.
The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without prejudice to
another motion which was then pending. However, respondent judge issued another
order dated November 7, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order
of September 7, 1979 for having been filed out of time.
Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979 providing
that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the matter disposed
of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be elevated to a higher court in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering
a decision. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that while appeal of the decision maybe
available, the same is not the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and
allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking the good faith which is
indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. (Rollo, p. 42.) In addition,
the private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court,
including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and control its process
and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. (Rollo, p. 43.)
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to
dismiss.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the defense of
non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said
respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and
thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise
of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the
State in the guise of the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality
liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI,
Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued
except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied
consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing
consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising
from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a
person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government
of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see United States of America v. Guinto, G.R.
No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby
descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files
a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. (Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the
State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy
the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and
be sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends
on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean
19
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United
States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed
by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not
the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-
29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers becomes
important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of
its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo vs. Loy, decided by the
Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are
twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while
in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political
and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though
elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and
servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a
private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal
persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their
corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."
(112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp. 605-606.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or
tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the
District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the
construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at
the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the
conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its
regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.
Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be ––
imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's
dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to grave
abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction when it ruled on the
issue of liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court
is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting
in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely
gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under
the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
(Cruz, supra, p. 44.)

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he
was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair
of San Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)

20
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989
CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO and for and
in behalf of her minor children, VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all
surnamed STO. DOMINGO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside: (a) the
Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court now Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on
May 31, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 00613-R entitled Irene Sto. Domingo et al., v. City
Court of Manila et al., modifying the decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VIII 2 in Civil Case No. 121921 ordering the defendants (herein
petitioners,) to give plaintiffs (herein private respondents) the right to use a burial
lot in the North Cemetery corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease
sued upon, to search the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and to bury
the same in a substitute lot to be chosen by the plaintiffs; and (b) the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1985 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the undisputed facts of the
case are as follows:
Brought on February 22, 1979 by the widow and children of the late
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. was this action for damages against the
City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio
Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph
Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said
burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of
Manila.
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto.
Domingo and father of the litigating minors, died on June 4,1971
and buried on June 6,1971 in Lot No. 159, Block No. 194 of the
North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto.
Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 per
Official Receipt No. 61307 dated June 6, 1971 (see Exh. A) with an
expiry date of June 6, 2021 (see Exh. A-1). Full payment of the
rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the said receipt which
appears to be regular on its face. Apart from the aforementioned
receipt, no other document was executed to embody such lease over
the burial lot in question. In fact, the burial record for Block No.
194 of Manila North Cemetery (see Exh. 2) in which subject Lot No.
159 is situated does not reflect the term of duration of the lease
thereover in favor of the Sto. Domingos.
Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative
Order No. 5, Series of 1975, dated March 6, 1975, of the City Mayor
of Manila (See Exh. 1) prescribing uniform procedure and guidelines
in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and
disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc.,
subject Lot No. 159 of Block 194 in which the mortal remains of the
late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were laid to rest, was leased to the
bereaved family for five (5) years only, subject lot was certified on
January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation.
On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North
Cemetery then headed by defendant Joseph Helmuth authorized
the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of
the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a
bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the
cemetery y Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out
to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot
on All Souls Day in their shock, consternation and dismay, that the
resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone
marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant and
disgusted over such a sorrowful finding, Irene Sto. Domingo lost no
time in inquiring from the officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery,
defendant Sergio Mallari, and was told that the remains of her late
husband had been taken from the burial lot in question which was
given to another lessee.
Irene Sto. Domingo was also informed that she can look for the
bones of her deceased husband in the warehouse of the cemetery
where the exhumed remains from the different burial lots of the
North Cemetery are being kept until they are retrieved by interested
parties. But to the bereaved widow, what she was advised to do was
simply unacceptable. According to her, it was just impossible to
locate the remains of her late husband in a depository containing
thousands upon thousands of sacks of human bones. She did not
want to run the risk of claiming for the wrong set of bones. She was
even offered another lot but was never appeased. She was too
aggrieved that she came to court for relief even before she could
formally present her claims and demands to the city government
and to the other defendants named in the present complaint.
(Decision, Court of Appeals, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 34-55)
21
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
The trial court, on August 4, 1981, rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another single
lot within the North Cemetery for a period of forty-three (43) years
four (4) months and eleven (11) days, corresponding to the
unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon; and to search
without let up and with the use of all means humanly possible, for
the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and thereafter, to
bury the same in the substitute lot to be chosen by the plaintiffs
pursuant to this decision.
For want of merit, defendant's counterclaim is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 31, 1984 rendered
a decision (Rollo, pp. 33-40) modifying the decision appealed from, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED (is hereby modified) and another one is
hereby entered:
1. Requiring in full force the defendants to look in earnest for the
bones and skull of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., and to bury
the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs
hereunder;
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and
severally P10,000.00 for breach of contract;
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and
severally, P20,000.00 for moral damages;
4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and
severally, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages;
5. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and
severally, P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
6. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and
severally, on the foregoing amounts legal rate of interest computed
from filing hereof until fully paid; and
7. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and
severally, the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 40)
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, this instant petition (Rollo, pp. 7-27) filed on July 27, 1985.
The grounds relied upon for this petition are as follows:
I
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR GOOD FAITH AND THEIR LACK OF
KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT TO THE REMOVAL OF THE
SKELETAL REMAINS OF THE LATE VIVENCIO STO. DOMINGO,
SR. FROM THE SUBJECT BURIAL LOT.
II
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING PETITIONERS HEREIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
ALLEGED TORTS OF THEIR SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES, INSPITE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 OF
THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 409 (REVISED CHARTER OF MANILA)
AND OTHER APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT
EXEMPTING THE PETITIONERS FROM DAMAGES FROM THE
MALFEASANCE OR MISFEASANCE OF THEIR OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES, IF THERE BE ANY IN THIS CASE. (Brief for
Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 93-94)
In the resolution dated November 13, 1985 (,Rollo, p. 84), the petition was given due
course.
22
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not the operations and functions of a
public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the
City of Manila. The resolution of this issue is essential to the determination of the
liability for damages of the petitioner city.
Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted
for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances
of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in
the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which
may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Further Section 4,
Article I of the Revised Charter of Manila exempts the city from liability for damages
or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal
Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provision of its charter or any other
laws, or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or any other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. They allege that the
Revised Charter of Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by the Human
Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law.
Private respondents on the other hand maintain that the City of Manila entered into
a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with private
respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for
any-violation of the contract of lease.
Private respondents' contention is well-taken.
Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through
its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may
sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in
character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private
and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one
hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and
include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In McQuillin on
Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has
... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in
government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and
conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 [1978]). In
connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in
its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New
Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial
properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions,
cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws (Article 424; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, et al., 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).
Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary
functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contractu (Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil. 184 (1912)
or ex delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).
The Court further stressed:
Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and
in tort....
xxx xxx xxx
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must
answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant
in the course or line of his employment, by which another who is free
from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the
conditions herein stated, fall within tile operation of this rule of law,
and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the
requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The Court added:
... while the following are corporate or proprietary in character, viz:
municipal waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing
establishments, wharves, ferries and fisheries. Maintenance of
parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are also
recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character.
(Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansvulle, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N.E.
2nd 952, 954 cited in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra) (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North
Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by
resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904 (Petition,
Rollo pp. 20-21 Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila). The
administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer
(Ibid., Sec. 3189), the order and police of the cemetery (Ibid., See. 319), the opening
of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the
23
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent
of the cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and
guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North
Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the acts
of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class
of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private
respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee
remains as the law between them. (Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 11 [1 987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other
party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.
(Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 635 [1987]).
Noteworthy are the findings of the Court of Appeals as to the harrowing experience
of private respondents and their wounded feelings upon discovery that the remains
of their loved one were exhumed without their knowledge and consent, as said Court
declared:
It has been fully established that the appellants, in spite or perhaps
because, of their lowly station in life have found great consolation
in their bereavement from the loss of their family head, by visiting
his grave on special or even ordinary occasions, but particularly on
All Saints Day, in keeping with the deep, beautiful and Catholic
Filipino tradition of revering the memory of their dead. It would have
been but fair and equitable that they were notified of the intention
of the city government to transfer the skeletal remains of the late
Vivencio Sto. Domingo to give them an opportunity to demand the
faithful fulfillment of their contract, or at least to prepare and make
provisions for said transfer in order that they would not lose track
of the remains of their beloved dead, as what has actually happened
on this case. We understand fully what the family of the deceased
must have felt when on All Saints Day of 1978, they found a new
marker on the grave they were to visit, only to be told to locate their
beloved dead among thousands of skeletal remains which to them
was desecration and an impossible task. Even the lower court
recognized this when it stated in its decision thus:
All things considered, even as the Court
commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate
happening complained of and untimely desecration
of the resting place and remains of their deceased
dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by
them lacking in legal and factual basis. Under the
aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most
that plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of
subject lot with another lot of equal size and similar
location in the North Cemetery which substitute lot
plaintiffs can make use of without paying any
rental to the city government for a period of forty-
three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11)
days corresponding to the unexpired portion of the
term of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978
when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo, Sr. were prematurely removed from the
disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look
in earnest for the bones and skull of the late
Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in
the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs
hereunder. (Decision, Intermediate Appellate
Court, p. 7, Rollo, p. 39)
As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block
No. 195 of the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6,
2021 as clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City
of Manila and sealed by the city government, there is nothing in the record that
justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease. (Decision,
Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 3, Rollo, pp. 5-6).
Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City
of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify
and check the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city
that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March
6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is
not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. When subject
lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract
for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
24
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER
ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code reading as follows:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for
approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public
hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment
thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures
may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within
sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided,
however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending
the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the
tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty
(30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the
aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the
Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.1
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter
alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of
its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments
in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the
power of supervision over local governments.2
The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that
the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for
the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed.
Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-
compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a
certified true copy of the challenged decision.3 However, on motion for
reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the
petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests
in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,4 even as the accused in a criminal
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is
charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution
vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of
lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts,
if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in
the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those
who participated in its discussion.5
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty
of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that
the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative
25
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed
an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by
the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it
cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.
In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice
to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar
distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer
to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the
second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law."6 His conclusion was that the challenged section
gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by
the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation
not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing
powers of local governments,8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.
We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the
provision.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality
or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not
also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should
be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its
annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found
only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine
if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is,
with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that
was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter
except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary
Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act
not of control but of mere supervision.
The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because
the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests
in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on
Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not
supervision or control.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act,
which provided in its Section 2 as follows:
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its
passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided,
however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to
suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and
twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion,
the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive,
oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared
national economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this
authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended,
either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which
period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance
to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of
competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or
parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked.
Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax
or fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof
shall have ceased to exist.
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax
ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise
of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of
control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this
Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under
Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of
the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact,
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with,
the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the
26
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not
the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code is another matter.
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged
decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of SO ORDERED.
public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested
parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991
Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues
of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO,
submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were
DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners
copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in
vs.
accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF
Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among
MANDALUYONG, respondents.
the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code.

CRUZ, J.:
Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements
had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City
of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only
because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M.
the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not
among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under
To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the
PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the
respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully
case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that
examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the
even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the
were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of
Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The
the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show
judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in
that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard
the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.
on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published
in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue
of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3. Subsequently, the following developments transpired:

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission
does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues
of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been
shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this
requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public
investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.
We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as
their validity has not been raised in issue in the present petition.
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that
when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was
confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent
a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned
case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and
where they should file their complaints.

27
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L.
Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic
Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R.
Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an
of the Makati Police Force.
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time
from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front
license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations
Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the
Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez
invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the
confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles
for traffic violations.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant
to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the
Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction
under certain conditions.
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the
Court in his own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the
license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full
compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he
attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28,
1991.
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited
only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses.
On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11,
Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the
flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
providing inter alia that:
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The
Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center,
is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the
case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license
plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several
complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses
for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said
decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers
and motorists, the Court resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from
notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said
decision.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on
the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392.
It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the
responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring
coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide
application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination,
and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the
ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.
It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was
invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11
was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be
attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
28
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null
and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power.
The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which
does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made
no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in
the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the
early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the
uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be
dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the
validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally.
That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be
relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present
controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great
deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned
sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being
violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also
note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license
dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop their
"habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the
complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto
and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely
presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on
the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them
to fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent.
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise
of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate
rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases,
procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice,
which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to
such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs.
Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No.
81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition,
we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have
been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the
case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were
argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same
fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed
of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the
personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-
3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in
cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from
a discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the cases
wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure
followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above
all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in
Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor
General a petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11,
Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A.
Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby
impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The
comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the
Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised.
29
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which
the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of
the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of,
and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive
issues raised.
Now to the merits.
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the
specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local
Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote
the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic
problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate
such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These
requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the
presence of a sufficient standard. 5
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the
delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to
determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case
at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which
is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement
has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in
the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity
of the exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily,
the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific
case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing
municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. 7
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because
they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates
or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following
provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to
impose such sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline
drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in
Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the
powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such
violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the
proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The
suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public
convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case
may be, for their records update.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period,
reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for
the first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's
license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the
Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its
ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan
Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be
immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state
the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to
30
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:
Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket.

From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that

If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1
Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496,
proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court. because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be
submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office
shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges. or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act.
Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of
Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03
xxx xxx xxx
per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision
application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register
supplied). of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last
section of said ordinance impose a penalty for its violation, which
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance
to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner
prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least additional conditions.
allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations,
the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all xxx xxx xxx
other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are
able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power
They are mere
to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8
agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates
of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all
times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question,
which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the
force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting.
Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the
questioned sanction.
In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative of the Land Registration Act.
The decision held in part:
bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging
to the government. But as already intimated above, the powers of
the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held
valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general
law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance.
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other
ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of
implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional
requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts,
to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of
freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the
means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but,
worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In
so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
31
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the
Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by
R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of
traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including
those here questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of
motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of
traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of
more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also
reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of
such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in
the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for
— and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against — the imposition of such
penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they
cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated
legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not
to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating
authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without
such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of
license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43)
and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority
and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and
VOID; and
(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing
the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and
confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON.
FERDINAND J. MARCOS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cebu City, THE CITY OF CEBU,
represented by its Mayor, HON. TOMAS R. OSMEA, and EUSTAQUIO B.
CESA, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law are
the decision of 22 March 1995[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 20, dismissing the petition for declaratory relief in Civil Case No. CEB-
16900, entitled Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. City of Cebu, and its
order of 4 May 1995[2]denying the motion to reconsider the decision.
We resolved to give due course to this petition for it raises issues dwelling on
the scope of the taxing power of local government units and the limits of tax
exemption privileges of government-owned and controlled corporations.
The uncontradicted factual antecedents are summarized in the instant petition
as follows:
Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by
virtue of Republic Act No. 6958, mandated to principally undertake the economical,
efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan
International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, x
x x and such other airports as may be established in the Province of Cebu x x x (Sec.
3, RA 6958). It is also mandated to:
a) encourage, promote and develop international and domestic air traffic in the
Central Visayas and Mindanao regions as a means of making the regions centers of
international trade and tourism, and accelerating the development of the means of
transportation and communication in the country; and,
b) upgrade the services and facilities of the airports and to formulate internationally
acceptable standards of airport accommodation and service.
Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption
from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter:
Sec. 14. Tax Exemptions. -- The Authority shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed
by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities x x x.
32
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
On October 11, 1994, however, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge, Office of
the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several
parcels of land belonging to the petitioner (Lot Nos. 913-G, 743, 88 SWO, 948-A,
989-A, 474, 109(931), I-M, 918, 919, 913-F, 941, 942, 947, 77 Psd., 746 and 991-
A), located at Barrio Apas and Barrio Kasambagan, Lahug, Cebu City, in the total
amount of P2,229,078.79.
Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified,
claiming in its favor the aforecited Section 14 of RA 6958 which exempts it from
payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the
government performing governmental functions, citing Section 133 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local
government units:
Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. -
- Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
a) x x x
xxx
o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units. (underscoring supplied)
Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioners realty tax account,
insisting that the MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation whose tax
exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the
Local Government Code that took effect on January 1, 1992:
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privilege. Unless otherwise provided in
this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all
persons whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA No.
6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. (underscoring supplied)
xxx
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Taxes. x x x
(a) x x x
xxx
(e) x x x
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax
previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
As the City of Cebu was about to issue a warrant of levy against the properties of
petitioner, the latter was compelled to pay its tax account under protest and
thereafter filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 20, on December 29, 1994. MCIAA basically contended that the taxing
powers of local government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees of any
kind on an instrumentality of the national government. Petitioner insisted that while
it is indeed a government-owned corporation, it nonetheless stands on the same
footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government by the very
nature of its powers and functions.
Respondent City, however, asserted that MCIAA is not an instrumentality of the
government but merely a government-owned corporation performing proprietary
functions. As such, all exemptions previously granted to it were deemed withdrawn
by operation of law, as provided under Sections 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code when it took effect on January 1, 1992.[3]
The petition for declaratory relief was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16900.
In its decision of 22 March 1995,[4] the trial court dismissed the petition in light
of its findings, to wit:
A close reading of the New Local Government Code of 1991 or RA 7160 provides the
express cancellation and withdrawal of exemption of taxes by government-owned
and controlled corporation per Sections after the effectivity of said Code on January
1, 1992, to wit: [proceeds to quote Sections 193 and 234]
Petitioners claimed that its real properties assessed by respondent City Government
of Cebu are exempted from paying realty taxes in view of the exemption granted
under RA 6958 to pay the same (citing Section 14 of RA 6958).
However, RA 7160 expressly provides that All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees [sic], executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part of parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions
of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (/f/, Section 534, RA 7160).
33
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
With that repealing clause in RA 7160, it is safe to infer and state that the tax
exemption provided for in RA 6958 creating petitioner had been expressly repealed
by the provisions of the New Local Government Code of 1991.
So that petitioner in this case has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties
effective after January 1, 1992 until the present.
This Courts ruling finds expression to give impetus and meaning to the overall
objectives of the New Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160. It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the national government to the local government units. x x x[5]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in its 4 May
1995 order, the petitioner filed the instant petition based on the following
assignment of errors:
I. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE
PETITIONER IS VESTED WITH GOVERNMENT POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS WHICH PLACE IT IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS AN
INSTRUMENTALITY OR AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II. RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
LIABLE TO PAY REAL PROPERTY TAXES TO THE CITY OF CEBU.
Anent the first assigned error, the petitioner asserts that although it is a
government-owned or controlled corporation, it is mandated to perform functions in
the same category as an instrumentality of Government. An instrumentality of
Government is one created to perform governmental functions primarily to promote
certain aspects of the economic life of the people.[6] Considering its task not merely
to efficiently operate and manage the Mactan-Cebu International Airport, but more
importantly, to carry out the Government policies of promoting and developing the
Central Visayas and Mindanao regions as centers of international trade and tourism,
and accelerating the development of the means of transportation and
communication in the country,[7] and that it is an attached agency of the Department
of Transportation and Communication (DOTC),[8] the petitioner may stand in [sic]
the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government. Hence,
its tax exemption privilege under Section 14 of its Charter cannot be considered
withdrawn with the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter LGC)
because Section 133 thereof specifically states that the `taxing powers of local
government units shall not extend to the levy of taxes or fees or charges of any kind
on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities.
As to the second assigned error, the petitioner contends that being an
instrumentality of the National Government, respondent City of Cebu has no power
nor authority to impose realty taxes upon it in accordance with the aforesaid Section
133 of the LGC, as explained in Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation:[9]
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stock are owned by the National
Government. . . .
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and regulate gambling casinos. The latter role
is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of
the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be
and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened,
impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in
any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in the federal
government. (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least,
the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it
can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal
responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them.
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or
enterprise using the power to tax as a tool for regulation (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US
42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the power to destroy
(Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or
creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. (underscoring
supplied)
34
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
It then concludes that the respondent Judge cannot therefore correctly say that
the questioned provisions of the Code do not contain any distinction between a
government corporation performing governmental functions as against one
performing merely proprietary ones such that the exemption privilege withdrawn
under the said Code would apply to all government corporations. For it is clear from
Section 133, in relation to Section 234, of the LGC that the legislature meant to
exclude instrumentalities of the national government from the taxing powers of the
local government units.
In its comment, respondent City of Cebu alleges that as a local government unit
and a political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes
within its jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution[10] and
enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charter the
petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes,[11] this exemption was
withdrawn by Section 234 of the LGC. In response to the petitioners claim that such
exemption was not repealed because being an instrumentality of the National
Government, Section 133 of the LGC prohibits local government units from imposing
taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on it, respondent City of Cebu points out that the
petitioner is likewise a government-owned corporation, and Section 234 thereof does
not distinguish between government-owned or controlled corporations performing
governmental and purely proprietary functions. Respondent City of Cebu urges this
Court to apply by analogy its ruling that the Manila International Airport Authority
is a government-owned corporation,[12] and to reject the application
of Basco because it was promulgated . . . before the enactment and the signing into
law of R.A. No. 7160, and was not, therefore, decided in the light of the spirit and
intention of the framers of the said law.
As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited
in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its
abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the
tax on the constituency who are to pay it. Nevertheless, effective limitations thereon
may be imposed by the people through their Constitutions.[13] Our Constitution, for
instance, provides that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable and
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.[14] So potent indeed is the
power that it was once opined that the power to tax involves the power to
destroy.[15] Verily, taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal
and property rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property for
the support of the government. Accordingly, tax statutes must be construed strictly
against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. [16] But since taxes are
what we pay for civilized society,[17] or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns
against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority.[18] A claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and
based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. [19] Elsewise stated, taxation
is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception.[20] However, if the grantee of the
exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction
does not apply because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the
amount of money that has to be handled by the government in the course of its
operations.[21]
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our
jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue
of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section
5, Article X of the Constitution.[22] Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which,
however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6958 the petitioner
is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or
any of its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since
taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus
be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this rule
is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material
consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus
covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.[23]
The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the Constitution, provides
for the exercise by local government units of their power to tax, the scope thereof or
its limitations, and the exemptions from taxation.
Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on the taxing powers
of local government units as follows:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Power of Local Government Units.
Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial
institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other
acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves,
tonnage dues, and all other kinds of customs fees, charges and dues
except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local
government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into
or out of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of local
government units in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges
35
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
or otherwise, or other taxes, fees or charges in any form whatsoever
upon such goods or merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold
by marginal farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments
as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4) years,
respectively from the date of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum
products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or
similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided
herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons
engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and
common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the
issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof,
except, tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported,
except as otherwise provided herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business
Enterprises and cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810 and
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938)
otherwise known as the Cooperatives Code of the Philippines
respectively; and
(o) TAXES, FEES OR CHARGES OF ANY KIND ON THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. (emphasis supplied)
Needless to say, the last item (item o) is pertinent to this case. The taxes, fees or
charges referred to are of any kind; hence, they include all of these, unless otherwise
provided by the LGC. The term taxes is well understood so as to need no further
elaboration, especially in light of the above enumeration. The term fees means
charges fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of business or
activity,[24] while charges are pecuniary liabilities such as rents or fees against
persons or property.[25]
Among the taxes enumerated in the LGC is real property tax, which is governed
by Section 232. It reads as follows:
SEC. 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A province or city or a municipality
within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real
property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvements not hereafter
specifically exempted.
Section 234 of the LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of real
property taxes and withdraws previous exemptions therefrom granted to natural and
juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except
as provided therein. It provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from
payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof had been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, nonprofit or religious cemeteries and all lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and
exclusively used by local water districts and government-owned or
controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water
and/or generation and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for
under R.A. No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental
protection.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax
previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
These exemptions are based on the ownership, character, and use of the
property. Thus:
36
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
(a) Ownership Exemptions. Exemptions from real property taxes on the
basis of ownership are real properties owned by: (i) the Republic, (ii) a
province, (iii) a city, (iv) a municipality, (v) a barangay, and (vi)
registered cooperatives.
(b) Character Exemptions. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis
of their character are: (i) charitable institutions, (ii) houses and temples
of prayer like churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, and (iii) non-profit or religious cemeteries.
(c) Usage exemptions. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis of
the actual, direct and exclusive use to which they are devoted are: (i)
all lands, buildings and improvements which are actually directly and
exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes; (ii)
all machineries and equipment actually, directly and exclusively used
by local water districts or by government-owned or controlled
corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or
generation and transmission of electric power; and (iii) all machinery
and equipment used for pollution control and environmental
protection.
To help provide a healthy environment in the midst of the modernization of the
country, all machinery and equipment for pollution control and environmental
protection may not be taxed by local governments.
2. Other Exemptions Withdrawn. All other exemptions previously granted to natural
or juridical persons including government-owned or controlled corporations are
withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Code.[26]
Section 193 of the LGC is the general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges. It provides:
SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A.
6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
On the other hand, the LGC authorizes local government units to grant tax
exemption privileges. Thus, Section 192 thereof provides:
SEC. 192. Authority to Grant Tax Exemption Privileges.-- Local government units
may, through ordinances duly approved, grant tax exemptions, incentives or reliefs
under such terms and conditions as they may deem necessary.
The foregoing sections of the LGC speak of: (a) the limitations on the taxing
powers of local government units and the exceptions to such limitations; and (b) the
rule on tax exemptions and the exceptions thereto. The use
of exceptions or provisos in these sections, as shown by the following clauses:
(1) unless otherwise provided herein in the opening paragraph of Section
133;
(2) Unless otherwise provided in this Code in Section 193;
(3) not hereafter specifically exempted in Section 232; and
(4) Except as provided herein in the last paragraph of Section 234
initially hampers a ready understanding of the sections. Note, too, that the
aforementioned clause in Section 133 seems to be inaccurately worded. Instead of
the clause unless otherwise provided herein, with the herein to mean, of course, the
section, it should have used the clause unless otherwise provided in this Code. The
former results in absurdity since the section itself enumerates what are beyond the
taxing powers of local government units and, where exceptions were intended, the
exceptions are explicitly indicated in the next. For instance, in item (a) which excepts
income taxes when levied on banks and other financial institutions; item (d) which
excepts wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local government
unit concerned; and item (1) which excepts taxes, fees and charges for the
registration and issuance of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles. It may
also be observed that within the body itself of the section, there are exceptions which
can be found only in other parts of the LGC, but the section interchangeably uses
therein the clause except as otherwise provided herein as in items (c) and (i), or the
clause except as provided in this Code in item (j). These clauses would be obviously
unnecessary or mere surplusages if the opening clause of the section were Unless
otherwise provided in this Code instead of Unless otherwise provided herein. In any
event, even if the latter is used, since under Section 232 local government units have
the power to levy real property tax, except those exempted therefrom under Section
234, then Section 232 must be deemed to qualify Section 133.
Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude
that as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local
government units cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, taxes, fees and charges of
any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local
government units; however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities, and
municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax
except on, inter alia, real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any
of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted,
37
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person, as provided in item (a) of the first
paragraph of Section 234.
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural
or juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon
the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives
duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. The latter
proviso could refer to Section 234 which enumerates the properties exempt from real
property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of
the exemption insofar as real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention
only to those enumerated therein; all others not included in the enumeration lost
the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as to real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions covered
by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the
beneficial use of such property has been granted to a taxable person for
consideration or otherwise.
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the
effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to
natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is,
undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its
exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has
been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can
seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under
Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified
by Sections 232 and 234.
In short, the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133
that the taxing powers of the local government units cannot extend to the levy of:
(o) taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies or
instrumentalities, and local government units.
It must show that the parcels of land in question, which are real property, are any
one of those enumerated in Section 234, either by virtue of ownership, character, or
use of the property. Most likely, it could only be the first, but not under any explicit
provision of the said section, for none exists. In light of the petitioners theory that it
is an instrumentality of the Government, it could only be within the first item of the
first paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the term Republic of the
Philippines to embrace its instrumentalities and agencies. For expediency, we quote:
(a) real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.
This view does not persuade us. In the first place, the petitioners claim that it
is an instrumentality of the Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly
mentions the word instrumentalities; and, in the second place, it fails to consider
the fact that the legislature used the phrase National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities in Section 133(o), but only the phrase Republic of the Philippines
or any of its political subdivisions in Section 234(a).
The terms Republic of the Philippines and National Government are not
interchangeable. The former is broader and synonymous with Government of the
Republic of the Philippines which the Administrative Code of 1987 defines as the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from
the context, the various arms through which political authority is made affective in
the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. [27] These
autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions are the
political subdivisions.[28]
On the other hand, National Government refers to the entire machinery of the
central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local
governments.[29] The National Government then is composed of the three great
departments: the executive, the legislative and the judicial.[30]
An agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein;[31] while an instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned
and controlled corporations.[32]
If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of
the exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the
said section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government
mentioned in Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the
latter. Yet, it did not. Moreover, that Congress did not wish to expand the scope of
the exemption in Section 234(a) to include real property owned by other
instrumentalities or agencies of the government including government-owned and
controlled corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source of this
exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 464, otherwise known as The Real Property
Tax Code, which reads:
38
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
SEC. 40. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The exemption shall be as follows:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions and any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by its
charter: Provided, however, That this exemption shall not apply to real property of
the above-mentioned entities the beneficial use of which has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.
Note that as reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase and any government-owned
or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter was excluded. The justification for
this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax
exemption privileges, especially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of tax
exemption privileges in Section 193 and the special provision on withdrawal of
exemption from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of Section
234. These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure
autonomy to local governments[33] and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the
attainment of national goals.[34] The power to tax is the most effective instrument to
raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government
units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general
welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It may
also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other
units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion
and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was
a need for these entities to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or
otherwise, by paying the taxes and other charges due from them.[35]
The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the parcels of land in
question belong to the Republic of the Philippines whose beneficial use has been
granted to the petitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a taxable person.
Section 15 of the petitioners Charter provides:
Sec. 15. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. All existing public
airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or
immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airports, and all assets,
powers, rights, interests and privileges relating on airport works or air operations,
including all equipment which are necessary for the operations of air navigation,
aerodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are hereby transferred to
the Authority: Provided, however, that the operations control of all equipment
necessary for the operation of radio aids to air navigation, airways communication,
the approach control office, and the area control center shall be retained by the Air
Transportation Office. No equipment, however, shall be removed by the Air
Transportation Office from Mactan without the concurrence of the Authority. The
Authority may assist in the maintenance of the Air Transportation Office equipment.
The airports referred to are the Lahug Air Port in Cebu City and the Mactan
International Airport in the Province of Cebu,[36] which belonged to the Republic of
the Philippines, then under the Air Transportation Office (ATO).[37]
It may be reasonable to assume that the term lands refer to lands in Cebu City
then administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land the
respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves
a transfer of the lands, among other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer
of the beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by the Republic of
the Philippines.
This transfer is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof
because the petitioners authorized capital stock consists of, inter alia, the value of
such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports.[38] Hence, the petitioner
is now the owner of the land in question and the exception in Section 234(c) of the
LGC is inapplicable.
Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim that it was never a taxable person under
its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant
of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent
to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes
of real property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become,
even if it be conceded to be an agency or instrumentality of the Government, a
taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of
Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier
adverted to, applies to the petitioner.
Accordingly, the position taken by the petitioner is untenable. Reliance
on Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation[39] is unavailing since it
was decided before the effectivity of the LGC. Besides, nothing can prevent Congress
from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the Government
performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely
to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision and
order of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16900
are AFFIRMED.
39
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989 The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake
consultations and dialogues with local government
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, officials, civic, religious organizations and
vs. traditional leaders on the recent and present
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD political developments and other issues affecting
TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO Regions IX and XII.
PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
The result of the conference, consultations and
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner. dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous
governments of the two regions as envisioned and
may prod the President to constitute immediately
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents. the Regional Consultative Commission as
mandated by the Commission.

You are requested to invite some members of the

SARMIENTO, J.: Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on
November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The Congress of the Philippines. Your presence,
antecedent facts are as follows: unstinted support and cooperation is (sic)
indispensable.
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona
was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional 5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to
Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur. Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all
Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our
presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic)
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ."
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly for brevity).
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner,
Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said the following telegram:
members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed
on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their
respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM
later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN
again their positions as members of the Assembly. JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED
ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL
Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO
Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN
Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads: THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF
CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY

40
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF
MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of
petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore
was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the
seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in
the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker
vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly
resumed with the following Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
7. Dagalangit, Rakil
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10 Palomares, Diego
11. Quijano, Jesus
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the
House, with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend
the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in
order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare
the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also
that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding
Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the
session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two
motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are
approved. ...
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat
of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
41
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-
(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with
their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day
thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings
held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null
and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative
Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987
valid and subsisting, and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and
equitable. 2
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution
filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION
XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be
prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin
Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for
Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . .
and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for
reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona
in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly
. . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had
recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting
to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and
that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the
Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become
"moot and academic". 8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner
(pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason
simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was
done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court,
it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the
expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing
that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the
petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation,
or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the
records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since
November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang
Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a
conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that
their differences could be threshed out and settled." 11Certainly, that avowed
wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be
cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law,
does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the
opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin
with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption
before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any
opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled
amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by
the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive
to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case
[having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question
which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which
some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and
character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify
expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and,
unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for
seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the
petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary
requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of
the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject
to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised
with grave abuse.
42
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are
"autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less
strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called
autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-
government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by
Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things,
the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the
framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to
exercise the powers and responsibilities 18specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal
administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which
are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," 20 "which
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and
quasi-banking, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization
of all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing. 21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since
in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under
the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than
mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved
herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present
Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case,
since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the
proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two
senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic
of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
43
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it
and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand,
an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of
the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation.
Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."33 In
the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang
Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs
within the framework of national development plans, policies and
goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous
Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the
Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in
this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools
established by the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare
and other social services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages
and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the
enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to
assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and
the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this
Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the
Batasang Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the
expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as
Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds
that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole
purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules
of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2)
assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of
quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
"[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
44
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic]
his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the
petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals"
referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all
intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their
Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in
a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and
disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the
Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker
could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on
November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be
no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions
in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled
matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered
by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess
could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to
this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves
behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find
equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of
good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid
"recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not
apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was
what precipitated it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing
a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session
having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him
a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise
to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing
itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time.
In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain
that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang
Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member,
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991
REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
and CECILIA ALMAJOSE,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of the present
Constitution, the petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal, prays for the
nullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated
November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90-150 dated February 9, 1990.
The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to
dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan
of Rizal. Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)
The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position upholding the
private respondent's appointment by denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province
of Rizal was left vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.
In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay
Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a
Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to
endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested position of
PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal
before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.
45
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then
Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private respondent
as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers
of the said province which included three nominees of the petitioner. According to
Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified since she was the only Certified
Public Accountant among the contenders.
On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the
appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated
recommendation of Abella.
In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner
reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position
unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.
On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner
that Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum
requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget
officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the
petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees who are qualified for the
position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.
On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private
respondent's appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the said
appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally
authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required three
years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under
Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or
a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal &
Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the
petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM
validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the
petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.
On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.
On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against
the appointment of the private respondent and reiterating his position regarding the
matter.
Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions which
prompted the petitioner to submit before us the following assignment of errors:
A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF
RIZAL.
B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES
ALL THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS.
C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE
NOT QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT POSITION.
D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN
NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD
MEET THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 7-8, Rollo, pp. 15-16)
All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent
is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the
appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the
recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.
The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and
privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee
should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 112 which provides that:
Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil
service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the
administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget
and Management.
The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to the
contested position was made in derogation of the provision so that both the public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's
appointment.
46
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's
power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for
the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by
the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing authority, the
Minister (now Secretary) of public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same.
In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the
Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the issue before us.
Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code vested upon
the Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the power to appoint the
PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated the
qualifications for the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of the
same code states that:
(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a
citizen of the Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of a degree
preferably in law, commerce, public administration or any related course
from a recognized college or university, a first grade civil service eligibility or
its equivalent, and has acquired at least five years experience in budgeting
or in any related field.
The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with respect to the
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was vested in him before, then, the real intent
behind Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to recommend nominees to the
position of Provincial Budget Officer is to make his recommendation part and parcel
of the appointment process. He states that the phrase "upon recommendation of the
local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance
with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution
under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to
recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public
respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case
the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in
public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows:
As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from
among the recommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus qualified
and eligible for appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal.
Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local chief executive is merely
directory and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary
of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule otherwise would in effect give
the law or E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not
intended therein, taking into consideration that said officer has been
nationalized and is directly under the control and supervision of the DBM
Secretary or through his duly authorized representative. It cannot be
gainsaid that said national officer has a similar role in the local government
unit, only on another area or concern, to that of a Commission on Audit
resident auditor. Hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said
officer from the local government unit, he must be primarily the choice of
the national appointing official, and the exercise thereof must not be unduly
hampered or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected meets
the requirements for the position in accordance with prescribed Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations. In other words, the appointing official is not
restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or recommended by the
local chief executive in the final selection of an appointee for the position.
He may consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the nominees of
the local chief executive. (CSC Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)
The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one
Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and
Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly
innocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy
and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be
weighed in favor of autonomy.
The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal
since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in
this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national officers
cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or water down what little
grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal corporations.
President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine
Commission ordered the new Government "to devote their attention in the first
instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which natives of the
Islands, both in the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity
to manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable and
subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their
capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent
with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.
In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined both
executive and legislative powers was directed to give top priority to making local
autonomy effective.
47
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in
distinguishing between presidential control and supervision as follows:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11,
Article VII, 1935 Constitution)
the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to
"general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the
executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only
supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.
In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:
. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief
Justice, Concepcion as theponente, clarified matters. As was pointed out,
the presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general
supervision as may be provided by law. He could not thus go beyond the
applicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion on the
matter. Moreover, as had been earlier ruled in an opinion penned by Justice
Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143 [1955]) referred to by the
present Chief Justice in his opinion in the Hebron case, supervision goes no
further than "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand,
"means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It would follow then,
according to the present Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron opinion,
that the President had to abide by the then provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there
being no power of control that he could rightfully exercise, the law clearly
specifying the procedure by which such disciplinary action would be taken.
Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing
local autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amending the
Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing
Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No.
5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to
local governments governments."
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofar
as legal provisions are concerned, towards greater autonomy. It provided under
Article II as a basic principle of government:
Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.
An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It
called for a local government code defining more responsive and accountable local
government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary
alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local government code and
upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy
taxes was specifically settled upon local governments.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present
Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments
The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines
but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful.
Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the
Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards
the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to
develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal
of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.
48
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where
none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed
requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list
of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must
return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities
and qualifications.
The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however,
is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and
municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded
to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must
work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner
sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments
whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason
that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a
harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for this
reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power
between the two levels of government.
of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of
citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system
of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have
the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia
Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered to
appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees
submitted by the Provincial Governor.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.

It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
appointments of Justices and Judges.1âwphi1Under Article VIII of the Constitution,
nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
President makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her by the vs.
Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees, and HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local
appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be no Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of
reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power's the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA
personal choice. JR., respondents.

The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other
names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized vs.
before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as
had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative and the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.
the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are
manifest.

In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the
value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree
49
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a
member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints,
ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on
various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the
Constitution, and arbitrary detention.1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn
Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr.
Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor;
Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia
Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay
tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the
respondent Court of Appeals.2 We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the
City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having
supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City
Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the
public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best
suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-
career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office
of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties
and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are
pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or
force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner
handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City
Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any
explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause
since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given
the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with
Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered
trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo
Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo
City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales,
Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case
where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously
and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office,
Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the
other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same.
However, the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security men,
forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced
the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and decided
to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so
many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the
group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men,
led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the
bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod,
appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without
the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued,
Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders
of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby
causing injuries He was released only the following day.3
The Mayor thereafter answered4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The
opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing
on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local
Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the
parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner.
The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of
hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing
officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all
the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on
June 20,1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's
counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-
Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and
moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his
counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled
hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants
and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive
suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a
period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the
petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On
September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together
with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement
which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner
testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the
complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a
postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988
which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due
to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and
counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and
moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take
the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely
postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties
were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15,
1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his
witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of
transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to
December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.
On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for
postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15,
1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed
to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the
petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for
another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33
of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced.5
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for
prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in
the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of
preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for
prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order,
preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in
twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting
mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court
of Appeals, a petition for prohibition,6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the
complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R.
SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-
G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution
certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the
respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent
Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the
enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our
Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local
Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of
law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile"
towards him7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino party8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in
the last congressional and local elections;9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery
in Iloilo City.10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension
since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of
November 14, 1988),11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing
and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases. 12 He
likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in
Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his
request.13 He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
justifiable"14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which
required confinement; that his "vital"15 witness was also hospitalized16 but that the
latter unduly denied his request.17
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the
Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend
and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera
Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very
clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the
respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are)
political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure
speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these
contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way
we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that
"political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos
had attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery
in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can
not accept them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have
us accept them18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his
say so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible
public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be
performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive
can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to
defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas
Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in
fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the
petitioners.19
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not
given any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which
found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests.
Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer,
and based on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary
has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos'
actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government,
as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the
President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of
suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the
Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and
second, by deleting the phrase21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of
the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds
support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question
reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within
the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we
quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments
as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.23
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is
significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided
by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of
Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas
Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed,
the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case
may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within
seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the
respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately
prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the
said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid
period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.24
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an
elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance
in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of
said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings
of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall
not be counted in computing the time of suspension.25
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987
Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local
officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local
Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional
language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its
right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission
(of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local
government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or
Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal
corporations euphemistically to "small republics."26 Autonomy, in the constitutional
sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself
suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central
government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-
executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government
code,27 a local tax law,28 income distribution legislation,29 and a national
representation law,30 and measures31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level.
It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally,
that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions
for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise
to the President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.32
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like
the power of local legislation.33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and
insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the
Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary
authority as this Court has held,34 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884,
this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to
the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are
53
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent.
Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government officials does not include
the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service
so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code. ...35
xxx xxx xxx
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."36"Supervision" on the
other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties.37 As we held,38 however, "investigating" is
not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The
impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least
three cases, Lacson v. Roque,39 Hebron v. Reyes,40 and Mondano v. Silvosa,41 and
possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that
the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided
by law,"43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the
President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take
any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board."44 However,
neither Lacsonnor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive
from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control
powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus,
according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension
of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and
its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations.45
In Hebron we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified
by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the
absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with
respect to municipal officers ...46
In Mondano, the Court held:
... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form
of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit
written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a
copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail,
and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal
treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one
affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the
Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be
exercised by the Department Head over the administration of ...
municipalities ... . If it be construed that it does and such additional power
is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c)
of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be
deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the
Constitution.47
xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on
local officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the
Administrative Code.48
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to
suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not
exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as
in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.49
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of
the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes
that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although
Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the
President,50 Commissioner Blas Ople would not.51
54
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed
the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal"
are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the
stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held
that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.52
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization."53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to
break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments
from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation
of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has
not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are
subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely,
albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.
As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national
administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and
"ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only
to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.55
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit
another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the
fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact
facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases
yield prima faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public
office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly
another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to
suspend him out of office. As we held:56
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information
and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected
precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a
basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage
that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice.
For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded
against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case,
Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action,
he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive
suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable
length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is
he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga
They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as
mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted
continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason
and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite
manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order
of suspension should be lifted.57
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above
reasons,58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held,59 is simply "to
prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses"60 or to keep him off "the records
and other evidence.61
It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against
an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty
days,62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period
is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors
have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
55
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may
be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63 a longer suspension is unjust
and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest
of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his
suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt
has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to
say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out
his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent
Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to
inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent
Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case
against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that
the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor
piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent
Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of
Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave
abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any
talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that
Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the
possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a
violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of
suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court
is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to
perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third
suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier
issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the
Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake
steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal,
judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are
precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those
remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of
administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the
central government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was
meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the
latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the
fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter
may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against
local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does
not signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered,
but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect
or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time
of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper
charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous
suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if
warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
56
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.1âwphi1 The suspensions of the petitioners are
AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made
to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative
charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The
Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases
pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D.
YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR., respectively; JAMES BRETT and
SINAI C. HAMADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive
Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO N.
CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA S.
CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220,
dated July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed
on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the
Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional
on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution, in Article X,
provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted Constitution
or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous
region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative
commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a
list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the
basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the
organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions
shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development ;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized,
maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws.
The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the
National Government.
A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete Without reference to its historical
background.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg,
S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she
advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary
forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the President. After
the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and some members of her
Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13, 1986
and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA and
Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration, the
civil government of the CPLA a ceasefire agreement that signified the
cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall
not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by
peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall be a
continuing process until the demands of the Cordillera people shall have
been substantially granted.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the
government], in pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to
the Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman
of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:
Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory
body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and
undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group
of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of
the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera
people.
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into
law, known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative
powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was
created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the
establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function
is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the
region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with
the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field
offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities
in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national
and local government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera
58
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as
an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive
Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is
established and organized [sec. 17].
Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause
provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment
of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent
need, in the interest of national security and public order, for the President
to reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure in the
Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the
Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-
empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation
of an autonomous region on a permanent basis.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed
into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O.
No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as
well as all offices and agencies created under Execute Order No. 220 shall
cease to exist immediately upon the ratification of this Organic Act.
All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly shall automatically be transferred to the
Cordillera Autonomous Government.
I that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created.
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers
and prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful adherence to the
principle of separation of powers, require that its enactment be accorded the
presumption of constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute, the burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality
always rests upon the challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily
defeat the challenge.
We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated petitions.
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the
President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its
mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we
have come to the conclusion that petitioners' assertions are unfounded. Events
subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out this conclusion.
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the
consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and
agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative
region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not
create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides
for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the
creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous
region in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created.
The President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission
from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the
Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous region. The organic act
shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen
months from the time of its organization and enacted into law. Thereafter there shall
be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only then,
after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising
legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide
for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime
These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken by the President are
obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly petitioner Yaranon who views E.O.
No. 220 as capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) of Balweg,
as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the measures taken
by the President, We can only inquire into whether or not the measures violate the
Constitution. But as we have seen earlier, they do not.
2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is,
as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in
the Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25].
59
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous
region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide,
we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It
created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main
objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services
[secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene
yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying
priority projects and development programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an implementing
body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio
City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as
regular members and all regional directors of the line departments of the National
Government as ex-officio members and headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10
and 11]. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They
merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing
local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic
groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur
development in the Cordilleras.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored
by the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President and appropriate national
departments and agencies to make available sources of funds for priority
development programs and projects recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the
power given to the President to call upon the appropriate executive departments and
agencies of the National Government to assist the CAR [sec. 24].
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened,
enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative
Commission. The President then appointed its members. The commission prepared
a draft organic act which became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and
the House of Representatives. The result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act
for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was signed into law on October 23,
1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall
complete the process outlined in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years
and we find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is
still to be created, showing the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have
shown that petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of
the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally unfounded.
Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed.
II
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is
a territorial and political subdivision. The Constitution provides in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
contemplated by the Constitution, Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that
E. 0. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political
subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not
create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger
subdivision.
1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political
subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities
and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to
public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose
of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the
CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of
services is nothing new.1âwphi1 The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which
was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1,
established eleven (11) regions, later increased to twelve (12), with definite regional
centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the
National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional
offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement
laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the
people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments,
bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in
the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided by law. [See
Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions
created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of
the CAR requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of
the National Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups
and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and
the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the
CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the
indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the
CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency
of the National Government, similar to the regional development councils which the
President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are
"composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations
within the region for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be
considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development council.
III
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet,
Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which
compose the CAR.
We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent misconception of the concept
of local autonomy.
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37
SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed
also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express
guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy
Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the
irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country
[Villegas v. Subido, supra.]
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant
of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the
provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic
structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and
special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would
prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting
gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political
subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous
region vested with political autonomy.
Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the creation of
the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces and
city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities
are insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION, respondents.
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in first offense and a fine of
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The P1,000.00/day
religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the
youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media b) Suspension of the business
trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. permit for Six (6) months for the
second offense, and a fine of
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, P3,000.00/day
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it
leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of c) Permanent revocation of the
the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to business permit and
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. imprisonment of One (1) year, for
the third and subsequent offenses.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and
hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows: Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from
publication thereof.
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS reading as follows:
PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY
ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF
CASINO.
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND
PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990
against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;
Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the
operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business
permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another
the operation of casino within the city limits. Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment
of CASINO;
Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by
any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance
establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel
for casino operation and other gambling activities. existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and
allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation
of CASINO;
Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business
permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following
penalties, to wit: WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art.
99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local
a) Suspension of the business Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall
permit for sixty (60) days for the enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals

62
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such
activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to
protect social and moral welfare of the community;
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled
that:
Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan
de Oro is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the
following penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the
proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the operation,
conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure
thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one
(1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion
of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person
responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of
gambling CASINO.
Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its
publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued
the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision
was denied on July 13, 1993. 2
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in holding that:
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit
the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino
within the City's territorial limits.
2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance"
found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only
mean "illegal gambling."
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are
therefore invalid on that point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and
partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant
with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality
concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et
al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in
disposing of the issues presented in this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited
the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner
in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause
now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:
Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a)
The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an
efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Enact ordinances intended to
prevent, suppress and impose
appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places,
vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and
maintenance of houses of ill
repute, gamblingand other
prohibited games of chance,
fraudulent devices and ways to
obtain money or property, drug
addiction, maintenance of drug
dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing,
distribution or exhibition of
obscene or pornographic materials
or publications, and such other
activities inimical to the welfare
and morals of the inhabitants of
the city;
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and
businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of
chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law
and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local
government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over
"illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of
casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de
Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the
authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy
as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as
various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation.
In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and
other social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence
of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote
the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local
government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant allforms of gambling
without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise,
it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other
forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact
that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to
prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of
casinos.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of
modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than
P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More
than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued
by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions,
pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or
part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local
Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code
specifically provides:
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the
lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various
provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the
general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the
family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call
attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of
gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a
martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos
"on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.
While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is
nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for
that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it
has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-
racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this
Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts
do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the
political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only
by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our
scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches
decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who
will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance
No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and
not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are
less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of
chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated
with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to
only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed.
65
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite
conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the
inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve
more than short shrift from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869
and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from
exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The
petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the
ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail
against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local
Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but
merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino
over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D.
1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or
repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the
decree has only been "modifiedpro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already
dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn
PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its
operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the
prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the
word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government
units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the
petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction,
PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must
all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty
imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist
except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to
exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation
of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause,
conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the
specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code.
Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause,
which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order
No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby
repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other
decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to
or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939
regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act.
No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree
No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741;
Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No.
436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential
Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby
repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it
governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar
as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections
2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67,
68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as
amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or
part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v.
Apostol, 10 this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed
on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior
law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a
sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an
unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal
a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears
that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the
question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special.
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary,
as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding
in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims
under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or
detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution
of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would
show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code
but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the
fiscal problems of the government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another
in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of
a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between
P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other
but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case
before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the
Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually
complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit,
the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept;
it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners'
suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would
erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication
that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of
Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races
at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion
urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the
contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and
force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the
playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute
is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress
as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers
and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless
there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature
might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great
a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the
municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not
prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the
mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening
the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm that Congress retains control of the local government
units although in significantly reduced degree now than
under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes
the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall.
True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now
be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still
the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of
their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City
will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of
large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the
workman" 13 and that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and
ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must
be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George
Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the
father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to
decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D.
1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be
revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all
official acts. We do not find such contravention here.
67
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local
Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or
suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino
and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify
much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling
casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1869.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52,
I stated in a separate opinion that:
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition,
control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling
properly pertain to "state policy". It is, therefore, the political
departments of government, namely, the legislative and the
executive that should decide on what government should do in the
entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people
for such policy." (Emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any
form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the
Filipino moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing
erosion.
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in
the country.
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough
reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help
improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino moral character.
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always moral and
2) the ends do not always justify the means.
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And yet,
legalization of the former will not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial
revenue for the government can be realized from it. The same is true of gambling.
In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government (through
PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling
casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public
opinion in the city is very much against it, and again the question must be seriously
deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the
further destruction of the Filipino sense of values?
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my views on
certain aspects of this case.
I.
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation
(PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-called petition
for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal
cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
unconstitutional — for, inter alia, having been enacted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, for impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with
public policy — the challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further
underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the
ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and against the State's
national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not
68
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the
case is one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative to the
hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not filed
with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a
favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the filing of the petition with the Court of
Appeals may have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the
petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our decisions
in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs.
Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:
A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of
First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly,
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted by those
"in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court
to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the revenue
of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra — resulting from the
deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"
— was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of
the burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs
which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding
jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. (citations omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before
us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same
is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
II.
The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An Ordinance
Prohibiting the Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit
To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be Used Its Premises or Portion
Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation
Therefor." They were enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled, "Resolution
Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of
the Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on 19
November 1990 — nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a
contract of lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's Pryce Plaza
Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino — which resolution was vigorously
reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang
Panglungsod's express powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a),
subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and
pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the general welfare clause)
which reads:
69
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as
the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local Government
Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general authority
to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is
concerned.
I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No. 1869.
III.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances
as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is
unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the
constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as
offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So
reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.
IV.
From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de
Oro City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling
casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR,
as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the people
of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an
arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify
much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling
casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1869.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52,
I stated in a separate opinion that:
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition,
control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling
properly pertain to "state policy". It is, therefore, the political
departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive
that should decide on what government should do in the entire area
of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such
policy. (emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any
form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the
Filipino moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing
erosion.
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in
the country.
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough
reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help
improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino moral character.
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always moral and
2) the ends do not always justify the means.
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And yet,
legalization of the former will not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial
revenue for the government can be realized from it. The same is true of gambling.
In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government (through
PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling
casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public
opinion in the city is very much against it, and again the question must be seriously
deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the
further destruction of the Filipino sense of values?
70
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my views on
certain aspects of this case.
I.
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation
(PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition,
thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition
under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action
therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional — for, inter
alia, having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the
obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy — the
challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of
Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further underscores the
"declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being
contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution,
violative of the Local Government Code, and against the State's national policy
declared in P.D. No. 1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have
jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is
one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative to the
hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not filed
with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a
favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the filing of the petition with the Court of
Appeals may have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the
petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our decisions
in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs.
Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:
A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of
First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly,
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted by those
"in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court
to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the revenue
of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra — resulting from the
deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"
— was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of
the burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs
which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding
jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. (citations omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before
us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same
is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
71
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
II.
The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An Ordinance
Prohibiting the Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit
To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be Used Its Premises or Portion
Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation
Therefor." They were enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled, "Resolution
Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of
the Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on 19
November 1990 — nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a
contract of lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's Pryce Plaza
Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino — which resolution was vigorously
reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang
Panglungsod's express powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a),
subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and
pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the general welfare clause)
which reads:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as
the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local Government
Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general authority
to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is
concerned.
I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No. 1869.
III.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances
as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is
unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the
constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as
offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So
reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.
IV.
From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de
Oro City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling
casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR,
as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the people
of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an
arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.
G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991
RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR LEANDRO
VERCELES, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng
mga barangay or the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case.
On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of
Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of
the Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in
Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the
election of its officers.
Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente
Avila of Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres
of Baras. The Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of
Provincial Government Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman
72
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
with Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor
Arnold Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its
members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked
out.
The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding
officer. Chosen as members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila,
Jacob and Sales.
Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC:
President — Ruperto Taule
Vice-President — Allan Aquino
Secretary — Vicente Avila
Treasurer — Fidel Jacob
Auditor — Leo Sales1
On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent
a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government, * protesting
the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several
flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.2
In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as
President of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent
Governor denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent
Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a
purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his appointment as a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected
President of the FABC in Catanduanes.3
On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election
of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a
new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director
of Region V of the Department of Local Government.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but
it was denied by respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989.5
In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions
of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null
and void.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election
protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of
Barangay Councils;
2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an
election protest;
3) Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest,
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in nullifying the election;
The Katipunan ng mga Barangay is the organization of all sangguniang
barangays in the following levels: in municipalities to be known as katipunang
bayan; in cities, katipunang panlungsod; in provinces, katipunang panlalawigan; in
regions, katipunang pampook; and on the national level, katipunan ng mga
barangay.6
The Local Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan ng mga
barangay at all levels shall be organized:
Sec. 110. Organization. — (1) The katipunan at all levels shall be organized
in the following manner:
(a) The katipunan in each level shall elect a board of directors and a set of
officers. The president of each level shall represent the katipunan concerned
in the next higher level of organization.
(b) The katipunan ng mga barangay shall be composed of the katipunang
pampook, which shall in turn be composed of the presidents of the
katipunang panlalawigan and the katipunang panlungsod. The presidents
of the katipunang bayan in each province shall constitute the katipunang
panlalawigan. The katipunang panlungsod and the katipunang bayan shall
73
Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
be composed of the punong barangays of cities and municipalities,
respectively.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local
Government Code empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing
circulars and the rules and regulations to carry out the various administrative
actions required for the initial implementation of this Code in such a manner as will
ensure the least disruption of on-going programs and projects7 issued Department
of Local Government Circular No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989,8 to provide the guidelines
for the conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at the
municipal, city, provincial, regional and national levels.
It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants
jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the
election of officers of the FABC, the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial
level. It is petitioner's theory that under Article IX, C, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective barangay officials.
On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent Secretary that any violation
of the guidelines as set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest
and would vest upon the Department jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be
filed in relation thereto.
Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on
Elections shall exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitution
expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction or elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.9
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials
is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the
law,10 the sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed
with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has
duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within 10
days after the proclamation of the results. A voter may also contest the election of
any barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines by filing a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of the
election.11 Only appeals from decisions of inferior courts on election matters as
aforestated may be decided by the COMELEC.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is
over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will
of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression
of the sovereign power of the people.12 It involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote.13 Specifically, the term "election," in the
context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing
of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
votes14 which do not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga
barangay. "Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters
involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after
proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the
office in dispute15 and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to
proceedings after the proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation
controversies are allowed.16
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-
up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong
barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective
members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election contests
involving elective barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC over
the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the
representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level
conducted by their own respective organization.17
However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to
entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and
regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of
1987, ** the respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision
of local government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor
compliance thereof by said units."
Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in See. 7, Chapter
II, Book IV of the Administrative Code, to wit:
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(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department
objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;
Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of
his rule-making power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of
law.18
Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests
jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest
filed in relation thereto and consequently declare an election null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered,
administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers.19 The jurisdiction of
administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes
reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves.20 Such jurisdiction
is essential to give validity to their determinations.21
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by
necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power
to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng
mga barangay. An understanding of the extent of authority of the Secretary over
local governments is therefore necessary if We are to resolve the issue at hand.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the
exercise of general supervision22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law."23 The general supervision is exercised by the President through
the Secretary of Local Government.24
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or
neglects to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether said local government or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers
act within the scope of their authority.25 Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body.26
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the
President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no
authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the
katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than
the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local
government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and
non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component
of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.
In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional
Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs
of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to
general supervision over local governments.27
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local
governments.28 This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it
is declared that "the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress."29 To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review
the regularity of the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the
avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments.
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations
and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
"monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances.30 To monitor
means "to watch, observe or check.31 This is compatible with the power of
supervision of the Secretary over local governments which as earlier discussed is
limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local
Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars,
rules and regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be enforced. Since
the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local
governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG
Circular.32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local
affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by
respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June
18, 1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his
jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election
protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary
courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the
protest.33
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The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which
states that "whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election
shall be declared null and void by the Department of Local Government and an
election shall conduct and being invoked by the Solicitor General cannot be applied.
DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July 3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989 elections
of the FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction that laws, including
circulars and regulations34 cannot be applied retrospectively.35Moreover, such
provision is null and void for having been issued in excess of the respondent
Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot confer
jurisdiction upon itself.
As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court finds that respondent
Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local
Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawiganconsists of the
governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the
presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial
federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan.36
As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has
an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president
becomes a member of the assembly. If the president of the FABC assumes his
presidency under questionable circumstances and is allowed to sit in
the sangguniang panlalawiganthe official actions of the sanggunian may be
vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a
proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has already ruled that the
respondent Secretary has no jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the elections.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the validity of the elections should
now be resolved in order to prevent any unnecessary delay that may result from the
commencement of an appropriate action by the parties.
The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section
2.4 of DLG Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President
or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a
quorum." The rule specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or
Vice-President who shall preside over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken
in its ordinary signification, i.e., it must be imperative or mandatory and not merely
permissive,37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. If it had
been intended that any other official should preside, the rules would have provided
so, as it did in the elections at the town and city levels38 as well as the regional
level..39
It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President
presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of
the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of
the aforesaid mandatory provision. On this ground, the elections should be nullified.
Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants shall be constituted to oversee and/or witness the
canvassing of votes and proclamation of winners. The rules confine the role of the
Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants to merely overseeing and witnessing the
conduct of elections. This is consistent with the provision in the Local Government
Code limiting the authority of the COMELEC to the supervision of the election.40
In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the elections.
There was direct participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary
to what is dictated by the rules. Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors
to oversee the elections in view of the walk out staged by its two other members, the
Provincial COMELEC Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. The objective of
keeping the election free and honest was therefore compromised.
The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of the FABC held on June 18,
1989 is null and void for failure to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No.
89-09.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a supplemental
petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his
memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio as temporary
representative of the Federation to the sangguniang panlalawigan of
Catanduanes.41 By virtue of this memorandum, respondent governor swore into said
office Augusto Antonio on June 14, 1990.42
The Solicitor General filed his comment on the supplemental petition43 as required
by the resolution of the Court dated September 13,1990.
In his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the supervening event alleged by
petitioner as something immaterial to the petition. He argues that Antonio's
appointment was merely temporary "until such time that the provincial FABC
president in that province has been elected, appointed and qualified."44 He stresses
that Antonio's appointment was only a remedial measure designed to cope with the
problems brought about by the absence of a representative of the FABC to the
"sanggunian ang panlalawigan."
Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) provides-
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(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the
vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents
of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial
federation who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states:
xxx xxx xxx
The sangguniang panlalawigan of each province shall be composed of the
governor as chairman and presiding officer, the vice-governor as presiding
officer pro tempore, the elective sangguniang panlalawigan members, and
the appointive members consisting of the president of the provincial
association of barangay councils, and the president of the provincial
federation of the kabataang barangay. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Ignacio vs. Banate Jr.45 the Court, interpreting similarly worded provisions of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of
the sangguniang panlungsod,46 declared as null and void the appointment of private
respondent Leoncio Banate Jr. as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
City of Roxas representing the katipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay for he
lacked the elegibility and qualification required by law, not being a barangay captain
and for not having been elected president of the association of barangay councils.
The Court held that an unqualified person cannot be appointed a member of the
sanggunian, even in an acting capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer,47 the appointment of
Nemesio L. Rasgo Jr. as representative of the youth sector to the sangguniang
panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was never the president of
the kabataang barangay city federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337.
In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is
likewise explicit. To be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in
the sangguniang panlalawigan is the president of the katipunang panlalawigan. The
appointee must meet the qualifications set by law.48 The appointing power is bound
by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the appointee
to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego,
the Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does
not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay
councils.
Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the
federation but he was not even present during the elections despite notice. The
argument that Antonio was appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency of the
service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of
being president of the federation, his appointment to the sangguniang
panlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such appointment is merely in a
temporary capacity. If the intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the
interest of the federation in the sanggunian, he should have appointed the
incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity. For even under the guidelines,
the term of office of officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of
their election until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified,
without prejudice to the terms of their appointments as members of the sanggunian
to which they may be correspondingly appointed.49 Since the election is still under
protest such that no successor of the incumbent has as yet qualified, the respondent
Secretary has no choice but to have the incumbent FABC President sit as member
of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner since he was elected the
president of the federation but not Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly
the protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's charge of political
interference by respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed.
The barangays should be insulated from any partisan activity or political
intervention if only to give true meaning to local autonomy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the resolution of respondent
Secretary dated August 4, 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in
excess of jurisdiction.
The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held on June 18, 1989 is hereby
annulled.1âwphi1 A new election of officers of the federation is hereby ordered to be
conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations.
The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of Augusto
Antonio as representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity
is declared null and void.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted
under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police
power under the general welfare clause.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved
Resolution No. 60 which reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF
EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF
UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex "A" p. 39)
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families
of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements,
would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the
Municipality of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41)
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal
secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo,
Annex "C", p. 43).
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its
expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA
disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds
for the implementation thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", P. 44)
Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp. 45 and 48,
respectively) filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent
in its Decision No. 1159, in the following manner:
Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following grounds, to
wit:
1. Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of Makati
and the intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of 'police
power and parens patriae and
2. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a Certification,
dated June 5, 1989, has already appropriated the amount of P400,000.00
to implement the Id resolution, and the only function of COA on the matter
is to allow the financial assistance in question.
The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state that:
a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or rational
relation to the public safety, health, morals, or general welfare to
be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power. The mere
assertion by the legislature that a statute relates to the public
health, safety, or welfare does not in itself bring the statute within
the police power of a state for there must always be an obvious and
real connection between the actual provisions of a police regulations
and its avowed purpose, and the regulation adopted must be
reasonably adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained. 16
Am. Jur 2d, pp. 542-543; emphasis supplied).
Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between the objective
sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the
alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati.
Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is
still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should
be for a public purpose, i.e., that the disbursement of the amount of
P500.00 as burial assistance to a bereaved family of the Municipality of
Makati, or a total of P400,000.00 appropriated under the Resolution,
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should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the
inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few
individuals as in the present case. On this point government funds or
property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes. (Cf. Section
4[2], P.D. 1445). (pp. 50-51, Rollo)
Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality of Makati,
through its Council, passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60
(Rollo, Annex "H", p. 52).
However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No.
1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action
of certiorari praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims,
"Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of
the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v.
CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may
exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid
delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from
the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule,
municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and
purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have
been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of
life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called
inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are
those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of
the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that
the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising
such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal
corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as
are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power
is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only
does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but
the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause:
pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace
and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337,
"every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for
governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve
morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and
most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends
the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an
existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social
life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very
foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it is not
confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it
must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs.
IAC, supra).
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or
relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s.
1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants
of Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its
exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be
with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
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includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it
is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as
to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128).
Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still
subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a
public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the
inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as
in the present case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is
towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate
social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general
welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity
and respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p. 12)
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the
poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as
subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may
receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our
local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed
giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the
bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not
complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more
painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60
vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less
in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is
hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON
CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-
64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON
CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not
later than six months from the date of approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by
city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon
City Council passed the following resolution:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it
does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon
City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required
6% space intended for paupers burial.
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Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be
enforced
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul
Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is
contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act,
and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both
petitioners and respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings.
The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City
Council filed the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it
is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon
City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, "
to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort
and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking
or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a
source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the
power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his
property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not
taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote
the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the
destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the
respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower court's
ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:
The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid
exercise of the police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537),
does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in
question except the provision granting police power to the City.
Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon
City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business,
trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the
City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit
(People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of
Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A
fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also
prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because
under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision
thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that
upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a
private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory
clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a
memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in question be
justified under sub- section "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537
which authorizes the City Council to-
'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and provide for their burial
in such proper place and in such manner as the
council may determine, subject to the provisions
of the general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries and governing funerals and disposal of
the dead.' (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes
confiscation or as euphemistically termed by the respondents,
'donation'
We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the
ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. The police
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power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep.
Act 537 which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance and
regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this act and such
as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort
and convenience of the city and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein;
and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful
fines or penalties as the City Council may
prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of
this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic
principles. Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the
provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1
subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government
by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)
police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to
exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p.
50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his
property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to
destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power,
the owner does not recover from the government for injury
sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said
that police power is the most essential of government powers, at
times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of
the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660;
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power
embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya
Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power
is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to
limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of
the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself,
it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the
most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under
the modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions.
The field and scope of police power have become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare
have become almost all embracing and have transcended human
foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands
of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the
extent or scope of the police power by which and through which
the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare.
(Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of the government
and the due process clause being the broadest station on
governmental power, the conflict between this power of
government and the due process clause of the Constitution is
oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is
usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in
the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property
with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed
article, such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series
of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an
outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the
heavy burden shouldered by whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted
legislation whether national or local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v.
Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of
validity and, more so, where the ma corporation asserts that the ordinance was
enacted to promote the common good and general welfare.
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In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v.
City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court speaking through the then Associate
Justice and now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any
evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice
Malcolm 'The presumption is all in favor of validity. ... The action
of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular ... municipality and
with all the facts and lances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well-being of the people. ... The Judiciary should
not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There
was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal
ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in
Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.)
We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v.
Board of Health supra :
... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as
the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power,
may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the
best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled
principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society,
that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his
title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right
to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of
the community. An property in the state is held subject to its
general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and
general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in
their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as
the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested
in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power
to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and
safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive
inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not
exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the
center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place
subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section
177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in
such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate
private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and
practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires
payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws
and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to
buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure
the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments.
The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on
implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law
as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad
and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking.
Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had
incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating.
The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as
having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted
the permits to commence operations.
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WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987
FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA
MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO, FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE
OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along
Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a
conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as
a talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they
have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous
authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny
this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public
property. At the petitioners' behest, we have issued a temporary restraining order
to preserve the status quo between the parties pending our decision. 1 Now we
shall rule on the merits.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent
stags and sell in the above-mentioned place. 2 The action was protested on
November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the
defendants from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the
controversy. 3 On January 18, 1964, while this case was pending, the municipal
council of San Fernando adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the
subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the
municipality, 4 thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four
years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid
case and held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature,
was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private
occupancy. 5 The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. 6
The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from
the place; in fact, according to then they and the 128 other persons were in 1971
assigned specific areas or space allotments therein for which they paid daily fees to
the municipal government. 7 The problem appears to have festered for some more
years under a presumably uneasy truce among the protagonists, none of whom
made any move, for some reason that does not appear in the record. Then, on
January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San
Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to
restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. 8
Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the municipal
attorney, 9 respondent Vicente A. Macalino, as officer-in-charge of the office of the
mayor of San Fernando, issued on June 14, 1982, a resolution requiring the
municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls in the
subject place beginning July 1, 1982. 10The reaction of the petitioners was to file a
petition for prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6470, on June 26, 1982. The respondent judge denied the petition
on July 19, 1982, 11 and the motion for reconsideration on August 5,
1982, 12 prompting the petitioners to come to this Court on certiorari to challenge
his decision. 13
As required, respondent Macalino filed his comment 14 on the petition, and the
petitioners countered with their reply. 15 In compliance with our resolution of
February 2, 1983, the petitioners submitted their memorandum 16 and
respondent Macalino, for his part, asked that his comment be considered his
memorandum. 17 On July 28, 1986, the new officer-in-charge of the office of the
mayor of San Fernando, Paterno S. Guevarra, was impleaded in lieu of Virgilio
Sanchez, who had himself earlier replaced the original respondent Macalino. 18
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties in their
respective pleadings, we rule for the respondents. The petition must be dismissed.
There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which
they are sought to be evicted is a public plaza, as found by the trial court in Civil
Case No. 2040. This finding was made after consideration of the antecedent facts
as especially established by the testimony of former San Fernando Mayor Rodolfo
Hizon, who later became governor of Pampanga, that the National Planning
Commission had reserved the area for a public plaza as early as 1951. This
intention was reiterated in 1964 through the adoption of Resolution No. 29. 19
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It does not appear that the decision in this case was appealed or has been
reversed. In Civil Case G.R. No. 6740, which is the subject of this petition, the
respondent judge saw no reason to disturb the finding in Civil Case No. 2040 and
indeed used it as a basis for his own decision sustaining the questioned order. 20
The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under lease to
them by virtue of contracts they had entered into with the municipal government,
first in 1961 insofar as the original occupants were concerned, and later with them
and the other petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor in
1971 for which they saw they are paying daily fees. 21 The municipal government
has denied making such agreements. In any case, they argue, since the fees were
collected daily, the leases, assuming their validity, could be terminated at will, or
any day, as the claimed rentals indicated that the period of the leases was from
day to day. 22
The parties belabor this argument needlessly.
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of
lease or any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point
was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 23decided in 1915, where
the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said
municipality in favor of a private person.
Justice Torres said in that case:
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use
in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town
roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the
promenades, and public works of general service supported by
said towns or provinces.
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the
municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude
from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole
benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said
plaza or public place to the defendant for private use the plaintiff
municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by
executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor
is it empowered so to do.
The Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything which is
not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract,
and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce, as was
decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February
12, 1895, which says: "communal things that cannot be sold
because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are
those for public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands,
rivers, fountains, etc."
Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C,
whereby the municipality of Cavite leased to Hilaria Rojas a
portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or
effect, because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased
cannot be the object of a was held that the City of contract.
In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, 24 it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a
portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta. Cruz, being likewise beyond the
commerce of man.
Echoing Rojas, the decision said:
Appellants claim that they had obtained permit from the present of
the City of Manila, to connect booths Nos. 1 and 2, along the
premises in question, and for the use of spaces where the booths
were constructed, they had paid and continued paying the
corresponding rentals. Granting this claim to be true, one should
not entertain any doubt that such permit was not legal, because
the City of Manila does not have any power or authority at all to
lease a portion of a public sidewalk. The sidewalk in question,
forming part of the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, could not be a proper
subject matter of the contract, as it was not within the commerce
of man (Article 1347, new Civil Code, and article 1271, old Civil
Code). Any contract entered into by the City of Manila in
connection with the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra
vires. (Municipality of Cavite vs. Roxas, et a1, 30 Phil. 603.) The
sidewalk in question was intended for and was used by the public,
in going from one place to another. "The streets and public places
of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public,
and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same
shall only be used or occupied for other purpose as provided by
ordinance or regulation; ..." (Sec. 1119, Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila.) The booths in question served as fruit stands for
their owners and often, if not always, blocked the fire passage of
pedestrians who had to take the plaza itself which used to be
clogged with vehicular traffic.
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Exactly in point is Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 25 where the
Supreme Court declared:
There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be
used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences,
and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to
abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public
dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to
the public in general They are outside the common of man and
cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private
parties.
Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the
first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there
now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and
accepted this earlier, considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was decided,
the municipalcouncil of San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No. 29,
series of 1964, declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the
municipality.
It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal
council of San Fernando that respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he
ordered the demolition of the stags constructed in the disputed area. As officer-in-
charge of the office of the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to
its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San
Fernando, conformably to the aforementioned orders from the court and the
council. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he had acted without authority or
taken the law into his hands in issuing his order.
Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercising his authority for it
has been established that he directed the demolition of the stalls only after, upon
his instructions, the municipal attorney had conducted an investigation, to look
into the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers
of San Fernando. 26 There is evidence that the petitioners were notified of this
hearing, 27which they chose to disregard. Photographs of the disputed
area, 28 which does look congested and ugly, show that the complaint was valid
and that the area really needed to be cleared, as recommended by the municipal
attorney.
The Court observes that even without such investigation and recommendation, the
respondent mayor was justified in ordering the area cleared on the strength alone
of its status as a public plaza as declared by the judicial and legislative authorities.
In calling first for the investigation (which the petitioner saw fit to boycott), he was
just scrupulously paying deference to the requirements of due process, to remove
an taint of arbitrariness in the action he was caged upon to take.
Since the occupation of the place in question in 1961 by the original 24
stallholders (whose number later ballooned to almost 200), it has deteriorated
increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in general. The proliferation of
stags therein, most of them makeshift and of flammable materials, has converted it
into a veritable fire trap, which, added to the fact that it obstructs access to and
from the public market itself, has seriously endangered public safety. The filthy
condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items are sold, has aggravated
health and sanitation problems, besides pervading the place with a foul odor that
has spread into the surrounding areas. The entire place is unsightly, to the dismay
and embarrassment of the inhabitants, who want it converted into a showcase of
the town of which they can all be proud. The vendors in the talipapa have also
spilled into the street and obstruct the flow of traffic, thereby impairing the
convenience of motorists and pedestrians alike. The regular stallholders in the
public market, who pay substantial rentals to the municipality, are deprived of a
sizable volume of business from prospective customers who are intercepted by
the talipapa vendors before they can reach the market proper. On top of all these,
the people are denied the proper use of the place as a public plaza, where they may
spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic and
other communal activities of the town can be held.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered
by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare
clause. 29 This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and
make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as
shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein." This authority was validly exercised in this casethrough the adoption of
Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have
effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be
surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. 30 In fact, every
contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it
contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing
legal order. 31 This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of
the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the
general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which
is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. 32
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We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petition for prohibition. On the contrary, he acted correctly in
sustaining the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from
the disputed area and clear it of an the structures illegally constructed therein.
The Court feels that it would have been far more amiable if the petitioners
themselves, recognizing their own civic duty, had at the outset desisted from their
original stance and withdrawn in good grace from the disputed area to permit its
peaceful restoration as a public plaza and parking place for the benefit of the whole
municipality. They owned this little sacrifice to the community in general which
has suffered all these many years because of their intransigence. Regrettably, they
have refused to recognize that in the truly democratic society, the interests of the
few should yield to those of the greater number in deference to the principles that
the welfare of the people is the supreme law and overriding purpose. We do not see
any altruism here. The traditional ties of sharing are absent here. What we find,
sad to say, is a cynical disdaining of the spirit of "bayanihan," a selfish rejection of
the cordial virtues of "pakikisama " and "pagbibigayan" which are the hallmarks of
our people.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision dated July 19, 1982, and
the order-dated August 5, 1982, are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order
dated August 9, 1982, is LIFTED. This decision is immediately executory. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-45338-39 July 31, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
POLICARPIO GONZALES and AUGUSTO JOSUE, respondents-appellants.
FELICIANO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of two (2) parcels of land situated in
Tañong Malabon, Metro Manila and designated as Lots 1 and 2 of Plan MR-1018-
D. Lot I which adjoins F. Sevilla Boulevard has an area of 605 square meters; Lot
2, an interior lot abutting F. Sevilla Boulevard only on its northern portion, is 664
square meters in area. This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until the
occupants thereof, among them appellants Policarpio Gonzales and Augusta
Josue, started filling it. Each of appellants who are brothers-in-law, constructed a
mixed residential and commercial building on the interior part of Lot 2.
On 14 April 1955, then President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 144,
entitled "Reserving for Street Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain
Parcels of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon."1 Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or
settlement and reserved for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation.
The Municipal Council of Malabon then passed Resolutions2 authorizing the filing
of ejectment cases against appellants so that Proclamation No, 144 could be
implemented. On 23 June 1955, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pasig, Rizal filed
separate complaints against appellants for the recovery of the portions of Lot 2
they were occupying.
Appellants disputed the light of the Government to recover the land occupied by
them. In his answer, Policarpio Gonzales claimed (1) that Lot 2 was covered by a
lease application, and later a miscellaneous sales application, filed before the
Bureau of Lands; (2) that he had a municipal permit to construct a building as well
as a business license duly issued by the Office of the Mayor of Malabon; and (3)
that the lot occupied by him was not needed by the Municipality of Malabon in the
widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard. The defenses interposed by Augusto Josue were
substantially similar to those raised by Policarpio Gonzales.
Upon agreement of the parties, the separate cases were tried jointly. On 28
January 1967, the trial court, presided over by then Judge Cecilia Muñoz-Palma,
rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the complaints to be justified and meritorious, this
Court orders defendants Policarpio Gonzales and Augusto Josue and/or
their agents, representatives, successors-in-interest to vacate Lots 1 and 2
of Plan MR1018-D as described in the complaint, and to remove at their
expense their respective buildings and/or improvements erected and
existing on said lots, and restore the possession thereof to the Republic of
the Philippines, and to pay the corresponding costs in the respective cases.
SO ORDERED.3
Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated 1 December
1976, the Court of Appeals, speaking through Mr. Justice Luis B. Reyes, certified
the consolidated cases to this Court since the appeals raised only a question of
law, that is, whether Presidential Proclamation No. 144 was valid or not.4
Although appellants filed separate briefs before the Court of Appeals, their
common defense was presented and discussed in very similar language:
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Stripped of surplusage, it is respectfully submitted that Proclamation No.
144 dated April 14, 1955 of the President of the Philippines, more
particularly that portion which withdrew from sale and settlement the land
in question and reserving [the] same for parking space purposes, is not in
accordance with Section 83 of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act
No. 141, and therefore, invalid. Under said law "parking space" is not one
of those reservations for public benefit which the President of the
Philippines may designate by proclamation from any tracts of land of the
public domain. The reservation for "parking lots" under the presidential
proclamation in question is not required by public interest, nor it is for the
benefit of the public, because only those who have cars can use the
parking lot. Public use or public benefit must be for the general public and
not a use by or for particular persons. The essential feature of public use
is that it should not be confined to privileged individuals, but open to the
general public. This is not so of the parking space as contemplated by the
presidential proclamation in question. (Citations omitted.)
Section 83 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Law provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
[now Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources], the President may
designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain
as reservation for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines [now
Republic of the Philippines] or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for
quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires
it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads,
hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas
comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's
village and other improvements for the public benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants urge this Court to declare Proclamation No. 144 invalid. They contend
that the setting aside of the lots occupied by them for parking space purposes does
not redound to the public benefit as required under Section 83 of the Public Land
Act. They claim that only certain privileged individuals, i.e., those who have cars,
can avail of the parking facility without any advantage accruing to the general
public.
As observed by the trial court, Proclamation No. 144 was issued by then President
Ramon Magsaysay in response to several resolutions passed by the Municipal
Council of Malabon, Rizal, which had become particularly aware of the increasing
vehicular traffic and congestion along F. Sevilla Boulevard.5 The Municipal Council
had proposed to widen F. Sevilla Boulevard and at the same time, to reserve an
area for parking space to ease up traffic problems, in anticipation of the completion
of the then proposed market and slaughterhouse located to the west of F. Sevilla
Boulevard. In this day and age, it is hardly open to debate that the public has
much to gain from the proposed widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and from
establishment of a municipal parking area. Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla
Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was prevalent; this, of course, caused the
build up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort and
inconvenience of the public who use the streets. Traffic congestion constitutes a
threat to the health, welfare, safety and convenience of the people and it can only
be substantially relieved by widening streets and providing adequate parking
areas.
Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas
along public streets or highways is allowed6 which clearly indicates that provision
for parking spaces serves a useful purpose. In other jurisdictions where traffic is at
least as voluminous as here, the provision by municipal governments of parking
space is not limited to parking along public streets or highways. There has been a
marked trend to build off-street parking facilities with the view to removing parked
cars from the streets. While the provision of off-street parking facilities or carparks
has been commonly undertaken by private enterprise, municipal governments
have been constrained to put up carparks in response to public necessity where
private enterprise had failed to keep up with the growing public demand. American
courts have upheld the right of municipal governments to construct off-street
parking facilities as clearly redounding to the public benefit.7
Appellants, however, allege that the benefits, if any, that may be derived from the
proposed street-widening and parking space will be confined to people who have
cars, hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for
public use or benefit. Appellants would restrict property reserved for public use or
benefit to include only property susceptible of being utilized by a generally
unlimited number of people. The conception urged by appellants is both flawed
and obsolete since the number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether
property is properly reserved for public use or public benefit. In the first place,
Section 83 above speaks not only of use by a local government but also of "quasi-
public uses or purposes." To constitute public use, the public in general should
have equal or common rights to use the land or facility involved on the same
terms, however limited in number the people who can actually avail themselves of
it at a given time.8 There is nothing in Proclamation No. 144 which excludes non-
car-owners from using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact
happen to be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open
for the public in general.
Besides, the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not determine either the
validity or invalidity of Proclamation No. 144. What is important are the long-term
benefits which the proposed street widening and parking areas make available to
the public in the form of enhanced, safe and orderly transportation on land. This is
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the kind of public benefit envisioned by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal
and which was sought to be promoted by the President in issuing Proclamation No.
144.
We believe and so hold that Proclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid.
Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of Lots No. 1 and 2
shall be subject to existing private rights, if any there be. Prior to the issuance of
Proclamation No. 144, appellants had applied for miscellaneous sales applications
over the lots respectively occupied by them. Insofar as appellant Policarpio
Gonzales is concerned, it is not disputed that he had acknowledged the ownership
of the National Government of the land applied for by him.9Although not expressly
stated, Augusto Josue must be deemed to have similarly admitted that ownership
by the National Government since he filed a miscellaneous sales application with
the Bureau of Lands, an agency of the Government, an application which can only
be filed in respect of tracts of public land, not private land.
The miscellaneous sales application, however, of appellant Policarpio Gonzales had
not been approved by the Bureau of Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144 was
issued; the land therefore retained its character as land of the public domain.
Upon the other hand, the miscellaneous sales application of appellant Augusto
Josue had already been rejected in an Order of the Director of Lands dated 8
January 1954.10 Accordingly, no private rights had accrued and become vested in
appellants. In both cases, the lots remained public lands and were in fact subject
to the free disposition and control of the Government.
Appellants allege having built mixed residential and commercial buildings on Lot
2.1âwphi1 The evidence of record discloses that appellants had secured the
appropriate municipal permits or licenses therefor, that is, for the construction of
said buildings as well as the carrying on of business therein. However, since the
lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of lands
of the public domain was directly under the executive control of the Director of
Lands,11 and not of local government officials, the Malabon Municipal Mayor must
be held to have exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the public
domain to appellants by constructing thereon commercial and residential use
buildings, or any other kind of building for that matter.
Sometime after Proclamation No. 144 was issued by the President, appellants
brought their predicament to the attention of the President. The then Presidential
Complaints and Action Committee ("PCAC") conducted an investigation on the
basis of which it eventually recommended the exclusion from the reservation of the
lots affected, in line with the "Land for the Landless" policy of President
Magsaysay's administration.12 The then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources similarly recommended the exclusion of the portion of Lot 2 occupied by
appellants and forwarded to the Office of the President a draft of a proposed
amendment of Proclamation No. 144 specifically excluding Lot 2 from the scope of
application thereof .The amendment, however, remained merely a proposal for
failure on the part of the President of the Philippines to act favorably thereon.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated 28 January 1967 of then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1
is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104786 January 27, 1994
ALFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO CRIBILLO, MARTIN ARAPOL, CORAZON
ALCASID, PRIMITIVA SEDO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In the case before us, we are called upon to decide whether or not petitioner's
operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within a particular district
or zone in Davao City.
On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning
Ordinance of Davao City," Section 8 of which states:
Sec. 8. USE REGULATIONS IN C-2 DISTRICTS (Shaded light red in
the Expanded Zoning Map) — AC-2 District shall be dominantly
for commercial and compatible industrial uses as provided
hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
3.1 Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street
parking space (see parking standards of P.D. 1096) and provided
that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from any
residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings.
(Emphasis provided)
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Upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance by Zoning
Administrator issued on February 10, 1987 Building Permit No. 870254 in favor of
petitioner for the construction of a funeral parlor in the name and style of
Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor.
Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao, Davao City that
the construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance
No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni
Kristo Chapel and several residential structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
conducted an investigation and found that "the nearest residential structure,
owned by Wilfred G. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south. . . . ."1
Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued
to construct his funeral parlor which was finished on November 3, 1987.
Consequently, private respondents filed on September 6, 1988 a case for the
declaration of nullity of a building permit with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the trial court.2
After conducting its own ocular inspection on March 30, 1989, the lower court, in
its order dated July 6, 1989, dismissed the complaint based on the following
findings:3
1. that the residential building owned by Cribillo and Iglesia ni
Kristo chapel are 63.25 meters and 55.95 meters away,
respectively from the funeral parlor.
2. Although the residential building owned by certain
Mr. Tepoot is adjacent to the funeral parlor, and is only separated
therefrom by a concrete fence, said residential building is being
rented by a certain Mr. Asiaten who actually devotes it to his
laundry business with machinery thereon.
3. Private respondent's suit is premature as they failed to exhaust
the administrative remedies provided by Ordinance No. 363.
Hence, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. (CA G.R. No. 23243).
In its decision dated November 29, 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court by annulling building permit No. 870254 issued in favor of petitioner.4 It
ruled that although the buildings owned by Cribillo and Iglesia ni Kristo were
beyond the 50-meter residential radius prohibited by Ordinance 363, the
construction of the funeral parlor was within the 50-meter radius measured from
the Tepoot's building. The Appellate Court disagreed with the lower court's
determination that Tepoot's building was commercial and ruled that although it
was used by Mr. Tepoot's lessee for laundry business, it was a residential lot as
reflected in the tax declaration, thus paving the way for the application of
Ordinance No. 363.
Hence, this appeal based on the following grounds:
The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the
Tepoot building adjacent to petitioner's funeral parlor is residential
simply because it was allegedly declared as such for taxation
purposes, in complete disregard of Ordinance No. 363 (The
Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City) declaring the subject
area as dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses.
We reverse the Appellate Court and reinstate the ruling of the lower court that
petitioner did not violate Section 8 of Davao City Ordinance No. 363. It must be
emphasized that the question of whether Mr. Tepoot's building is residential or not
is a factual determination which we should not disturb. As we have repeatedly
enunciated, the resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts
where findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding
on this court, except only where the case is shown as coming under the accepted
exceptions.5
Although the general rule is that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on us, 6 this admits of exceptions as when the findings or conclusions
of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other.7 While the
trial court ruled that Tepoot's building was commercial, the Appellate Court ruled
otherwise. Thus we see the necessity of reading and examining the pleadings and
transcripts submitted before the trial court.
In the case at bar, the testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's
building was used for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a
laundry business was conducted.8 But while its commercial aspect has been
established by the presence of machineries and laundry paraphernalia, its use as a
residence, other than being declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fully
substantiated.
The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's decision was based on
Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes as residential. It is our
considered view, however, that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of
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Local Government Code up to Decentralization, Local Autonomy
the property for zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner
as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a
commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature
of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a
property for zoning purposes.

Needless to say, even if we are to examine the evidentiary value of a tax declaration
under the Real Property Tax Code, a tax declaration only enables the assessor to
identify the same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not bind a
provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code,9 appraisal
and assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of "any previous
assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is based on a taxpayer's
declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be
assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is
commercial.

The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial and,
therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial or
C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as
residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that
determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial character of
the questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private respondents
have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that
Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential
zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial
purpose," as gleaned from Ordinance No. 363.

The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance
is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. 10Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental
aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The
ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part
of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered
thereunder.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1991 is
hereby REVERSED and the order dated July 6, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
91