Baranda vs Gustilo

Facts:

A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo
involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre
covered by OCT No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia.

The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the names of
petitioners Baranda and Hitalia.

The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and
Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772
over the same Lot No. 4517.

The Court found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently acquired by Perez,
Gotera and Susana.

Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was questioned by Perez
and others so a motion for reconsideration was filed.

Another case was filed by Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042) for the execution
of judgement in the resolutions issued by the courts.

In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO. 00827) involving the
same properties. (NOTE: This time three cases na ang involve excluding the case
at bar.)

The petitioners prayed that an order be released to cancel No.T-25772. Likewise

to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to
each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise
to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to
each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia.

In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito
Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the
same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.

However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice

of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title.

This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens in the new certificates.

Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for
reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

Issue: What is the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a
notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Held:

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the
requisites for registration. ... If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to
the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any
party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds
with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the
Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."

The function of ROD is ministerial in nature

The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds

encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent
Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over
the subject parcel of land.

In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or
other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the
Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land
Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.

No room for construction for the laws on functions of ROD

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds
to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room
for construction.
Balbin vs Register of Deeds

Where several co-owner’s duplicate of certificates of titles are issued, a voluntary

instrument cannot be registered without surrendering all the copies to the
Register of Deeds so that every copy of thereof would contain identical entries of
the transactions affecting the land covered.

FACTS:

Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of
deeds a duplicate copy of the registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed of
donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be annotated on the title. The
registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-vivos 2/3
portion of the land. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for
being “legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.” It appears that
previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are
three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino
Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owner’s
duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s copies of CTs had not been
presented by petitioners, the register of deeds refused to make the requested
annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, who upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.

ISSUE:

W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper

HELD:

YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their integrity may
be affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one
copy and not on the others. If different copies were permitted to carry different
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be
available.

Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is,
property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina, “there should
first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make
such a conveyance.” Assuming the conjugal nature of the property, the donation
bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely,
the fact that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than
½ his share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold
portions of the same land to 3 other parties.

Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio’s civil status,

character of land and validity of conveyances are in issue, the registration may
await the outcome of said case and parties may protect their rights by filing the
proper notices of lis pendens.
Philippine Banking vs Lui She

DOCTRINE:

Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is against a

constitutional prohibition, the same should be considered null and void.

FACTS:

Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the

portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino
Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right
to withdraw at any time from the agreement.

On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy
the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly
installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the
obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her
household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned
on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn

when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958
she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that
adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered
and the proceedings were abandoned.

In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to
respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later
date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that
the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and
inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the
annulment of the contracts.

ISSUE: Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid

HELD:

No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered
collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the
Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable
period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on
condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.

But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece
of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of
his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement
is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages
not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it— rights
the sum total of which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the
Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave
peril.

Ramirez vs Vda. Ramirez

FACTS:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964,
with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios
was appointed administratrix of the estate.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows:

the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to
the widow “en plenodominio” in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or
“free portion” shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad.”
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow‟s
usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino
national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:

ISSUE

WON the partition is valid insofar as

a. widow’s legitime

b. substitutions

c. usufruct of Wanda

HELD

a. YES, appellants do not question ½ because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over

which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any
kind whatsoever[2]

-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testator’s widow of a

usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the testator’s estate cannot be made
where it will run counter to the testator’s express will. The Court erred for
Marcelle who is entitled to ½ of the estate “enpleno dominio” as her legitime and
which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any
additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run
counter to the testator’s intention for as stated above his disposition even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only
case where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC,
cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is
VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it
validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does
not go beyond one degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that
there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the
substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the
establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe
usufructuaries and naked owners.

c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID

-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except toindividuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public
domain in the Philippines.[4]

The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not
only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is
of the opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed
USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the
usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not
vest title to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to
land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Decision:½ Marcelle (as legitime), ½ Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple
substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY; MULLER VS. MULLER

G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006

Doctrine:

He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands.

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were

married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in
Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The
Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura
Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and

maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties

before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It
also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because
the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.

The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement
for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the
amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Ruling:

No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

Ratio Decidendi:

There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the

Philippines.

Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.”

In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional
prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to
do indirectly what the fundamental law bars him to do directly.

With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement
on the ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law
and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly.

Ting Ho vs Teng Gui

Facts:

Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho
Belenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The controversy
revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which should form part
of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitioned
equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting
Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an estate. According
to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under
trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased
Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public
lands in thePhilippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent
took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit to their
exclusion and prejudice.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale was void

Ruling:

No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if the
price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in
reality a donatin, or some other act or contract. The sale in this case, was
however valid because the sale was in fact a donation. The law requires positive
proof of the simulation of the price of the sale. But since the finding was based on
a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a simulation.
The Court holds that the reliance of the trial court on the provisions of Article
1471 of the Civil Code to conclude that the simulated sales were a valid donation
to the respondent is misplaced because its finding was based on a mere
assumption when the law requires positive proof.

The respondent was unable to show, and the records are bereft of any evidence,
that the simulated sales of the properties were intended by the deceased to be a
donation to him. Thus, the Court holds that the two-storey residential house,
two-storey residential building and sari-sari store form part of the estate of the
late spouses Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal, entitling the petitioners to a four-
fifths (4/5) share thereof.

REGISTER OF DEEDS vs UNG SIU SI TEMPLEGR. No. L-6776 May 21,1955

FACTS:

A Filipino citizen executed a deed of donation in favor of the Ung Siu Si Temple,
an unregistered religiousorganization that operated through three trustees all of
Chinese nationality. The Register of Deeds refused torecord the deed of donation
executed in due form arguing that the Consitution provides that acquisition of
landis limited to Filipino citizens, or to corporations or associations at least 60%
of which is owned by suchcitizens.

ISSUE:

Whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious

organization whose founder,trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens
should be registered or not.

RULING:Sec. 5, Art. 13 of the Constitution provides that save in cases of

hereditary succession, no privateagricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associationsqualified to hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The Constitution does not make
anyexception in favor of religious associations

.The fact that appellant has no capital stock does not exempt it from the
Constitutional inhibition, since itsmember are of foreign nationality. The purpose
of the 60% requirement is to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to
acquire agricultural lands or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled
byFilipinos; and

the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock,
controllingmembership should be composed of Filipino citizens.

As to the complaint that the disqualification under Art. 13 of the Constitution

violated the freedom of religion,the Court was not convinced that land tenure is
indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or
worship
JG Summit vs CA

FACTS:

The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government

corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Ltd. for the construction, operation and management of the Subic
National Shipyard, Inc., later became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering
Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain a
shareholding proportion of 60%-40% and that the parties have the right of first
refusal in case of a sale.

Through a series of transfers, NIDC’s rights, title and interest in PHILSECO

eventually went to the National Government. In the interest of national economy,
it was decided that PHILSECO should be privatized by selling 87.67% of its total
outstanding capital stock to private entities. After negotiations, it was agreed
that Kawasaki’s right of first refusal under the JVA be “exchanged” for the right to
top by five percent the highest bid for said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards
Holdings, Inc. (PHI), in which it was a stockholder, would exercise this right in its
stead.

During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so, because
of the right to top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to top JG Summit’s
bid. JG Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO, as a shipyard is a public
utility and, hence, must observe the 60%-40% Filipino-foreign capitalization. By
buying 87.67% of PHILSECO’s capital stock at bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect
now owns more than 40% of the stock.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility

Whether or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond 40% of PHILSECO’s stocks

HELD:

In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG Summit relied on

sec. 13, CA No. 146. On the other hand, Kawasaki/PHI argued that PD No. 666
explicitly stated that a “shipyard” was not a “public utility.” But the SC stated that
sec. 1 of PD No. 666 was expressly repealed by sec. 20, BP Blg. 391 and when BP
Blg. 391 was subsequently repealed by EO 226, the latter law did not revive sec.
1 of PD No. 666. Therefore, the law that states that a shipyard is a public utility
still stands.
A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law is
therefore required to comply with the 60%-40% capitalization under the
Constitution. Likewise, the JVA between NIDC and Kawasaki manifests an
intention of the parties to abide by this constitutional mandate. Thus, under the
JVA, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki
could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of
stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock. The NIDC, on the other
hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government
corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is
nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization
as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.

Kawasaki was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits its
right of first refusal to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO. Thus,
Kawasaki cannot purchase beyond 40% of the capitalization of the joint venture
on account of both constitutional and contractual proscriptions.

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Petitioner, vs.

RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION,

FACTS:

Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) was

incorporated in 1966.

It was granted a franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the
North and South Luzon Tollways and Metro Manila Expressway.

CDCP Mining Corporation (CDCP Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, obtained loans

from Marubeni Corporation of Japan (Marubeni).

A CDCP official issued letters of guarantee for the loans although there was no
CDCP Board Resolution authorizing the issuance of such letters of guarantee.

CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans when CDCP and CDCP Mining were still
privately owned and managed

In 1983, CDCPs name was changed to Philippine National Construction

Corporation (PNCC) in order to reflect that the Government already owned
90.3% of PNCC and only 9.70% is under private ownership

Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid.

On 20 October 2000 and 22 November 2000, the PNCC Board of Directors (PNCC
Board) passed Board Resolutions admitting PNCCs liability to Marubeni.

Previously, for two decades the PNCC Board consistently refused to admit any
liability for the Marubeni loans.

In January 2001, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock Securities

Limited (Radstock), a foreign corporation.

Radstock immediately sent a notice and demand letter to PNCC

PNCC and Radstock entered into a Compromise Agreement.

Under this agreement, PNCC shall payRadstock the reduced amount of

P6,185,000,000.00 in full settlement of PNCCs guarantee of CDCP Minings debt
allegedly totaling P17,040,843,968.00 (judgment debt asof 31 July 2006).

To satisfy its reduced obligation, PNCC undertakes to (1) "assign to a third party
assignee to be designated by Radstock all its rights and interests" to the listed
real properties of PNCC; (2) issue to Radstock or its assignee common shares of
the capital stock of PNCC issued at par value which shall comprise 20% of the
outstanding capital stock of PNCC; and (3) assign to Radstock or its assignee
50% of PNCCs 6% share, for the next 27 years, in the gross toll revenues of the
Manila North Tollways Corporation.

Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) moved for

reconsideration. STRADEC alleged that it has a claim against PNCC as a bidder of
the National Governments shares, receivables, securities and interests in PNCC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between PNCC and Radstock is valid
in relation to the Constitution, existing laws, and public policy

HELD:

Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.

Its office address is at Suite 14021Duddell Street, Central Hongkong.

As a foreign corporation, with unknown owners whose nationalities are also

unknown, Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines pursuant to
Section 7, in relation to Section3, Article XII of the Constitution.

Consequently, Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of

lands in the Philippines. Contrary to the OGCCs claim, Radstock cannot own the
rights to ownership of any land in the Philippines because Radstock cannot
lawfully own the land itself.

Otherwise, there will be a blatant circumvention of the Constitution, which

prohibits a foreign private corporation from owning land in the Philippines. In
addition, Radstock cannot transfer the rights to ownership of land in the
Philippines if it cannot own the land itself.
It is basic that an assignor or seller cannot assign or sell something he does not
own at the time the ownership, or the rights to the ownership, are to be
transferred to the assignee or buyer.

The Corporation Code defines a sale or disposition of substantially all assets and
property of a corporation as one by which the corporation "would be rendered
incapable of continuing the business or accomplishing the purpose for which it
was incorporated" - any sale or disposition short of this will not need
stockholder ratification, and may be pursued by the majority vote of the Board of
Directors

Condominium Act 4726 SEC 5

Sec. 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or

other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided
interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or
shareholdings in the condominium corporation: Provided, however, That where
the common areas in the condominium project are owned by the owners of
separate units as co-owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be
conveyed or transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens, or corporations
at least sixty percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens,
except in cases of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a
condominium project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a
unit shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership or
stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien interest in such corporation
to exceed the limits imposed by existing laws.

CA 141

CHAPTER VII

JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR INCOMPLETE TITLES

Section47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 1987 within which to take
advantage of the benefit of this chapter: Provided, That this extension shall apply
only where the area applied for does not exceed 144 hectares. Provided, further,
That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
section forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this chapter, but this section shall not be construed as prohibiting
any of said persons from acting under this chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President.

Section48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of

the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act , to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the prior United
States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands
of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have
instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have
with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through

their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for
at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.

PD1529

CHAPTER III

ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

A. APPLICATIONS

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Secretary of DENR vs Yap

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

FACTS:

This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which
granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor
Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No.
1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed
a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the
petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which
was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:

Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed

agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping

with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from
the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration

before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang
Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s
death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But
by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death
of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering
the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification

dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR),
which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3
December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that
he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of
Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of

its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of
the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable
title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,

consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person

acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code
is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that

Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the
Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service
or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of
the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.