Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006 commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth at
Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. The dispositive
RENNIE DECLARADOR, Petitioner, portion of the decision reads:
vs.
HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge, In view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the
Branch 14, Roxas City, and FRANK evidence presented by the prosecution, the court finds
BANSALES, Respondents. CICL Frank Bansales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder being charged. Being a minor, 17
DECISION years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
CALLEJO, SR., J.: charged, he is entitled to a special mitigating
This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the circumstance of minority, and is sentenced to suffer an
portion of the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(RTC), Roxas City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. C- (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) month of
1419-10-2002, suspending the sentence of respondent reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of Yvonne
Frank Bansales and ordering his commitment to the Declarador, a civil indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand
Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. for moral damages, Forty-Three Thousand Pesos
Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985. He was a (P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorney’s fee of One
student at the Cabug-Cabug National High School in Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and unearned
President Roxas, Capiz. At around 9:45 a.m. on July 25, income of One Million Three Hundred Seventy
2002, Yvonne Declarador was stabbed to death. After Thousand Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P1,370,000.70).
conducting the autopsy on the cadaver, Rural Health The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank
Physician Pilar Posadas prepared a Post-Mortem Bansales) and his teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug
Certificate indicating that the victim sustained 15 stab National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are
wounds on different parts of the body. 2 jointly subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the
On October 10, 2002, an Information charging Frank crime was established to have been committed inside the
Bansales with murder was filed by the Assistant classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and
Provincial Prosecutor with the Family Court. The during school hours.
accusatory portion reads: Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the
That on or about 9:45 o’clock in the morning of July 25, sentence is suspended and the Child in conflict with the
2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug National High law (CICL), Frank Bansales is ordered committed to the
School in President Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, and within Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia,
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
armed with a knife and with intent to kill, did then and Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault Provincial Prosecutor, the Private Prosecutors, the
and stab with the said knife [his] teacher, one YVONNE DSWD Capiz Provincial Office, Roxas City, the
DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth, Concordia, Guimaras,
latter multiple fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the accused and his counsel, Atty. Ramcez John Honrado.
the body which caused the immediate death of the said SO ORDERED. 4
Yvonne Declarador. On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference
The crime was committed with the attendance of the for 10:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003 with the Public
qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident Prosecutor, the Social Welfare Officer of the court, and
premeditation and abuse of superior strength considering the Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Rehabilitation
that the attack was made by the accused using a long Center for Youth, considering that the accused would
knife which the latter carried along with him from his turn 18 on June 3, 2003. 5
house to the school against his lady teacher who was Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
unarmed and defenseless at that time and by inflicting filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
upon the latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife wounds of Court assailing that portion of the decision of the trial
resulting to her death. 3 court’s decision suspending the sentence of the accused
In view of the plea of the accused and the evidence and committing him to the rehabilitation center.
presented, the RTC rendered judgment on May 20, 2003 Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential
finding Bansales guilty of murder. However, the court Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC
suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his
2
10
(otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict appellate jurisdiction. A direct invocation of the
with the Law), the benefit of a suspended sentence does original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of
not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense certiorari may be allowed only when there are special
punishable by death, 6 reclusion perpetua or life and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically
imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. set out in the petition. 11 This is an established policy
Ondo, 7 petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this
with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to
he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
suspended sentence. prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. 12
In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no However, in Fortich v. Corona, 13 the Court held that
standing to file the petition, considering that the offense considering the nature and importance of the issues
charged is a public crime brought in the name of the raised and in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid
People of the Philippines; only the Office of the Solicitor future litigations, the Court may take cognizance of a
General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition in court petition for certiorari directly filed before it. 14 Moreover,
assailing the order of the RTC which suspended the this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a
service of his sentence. He further avers that Section 32 particular case from their operation whenever the
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an interests of justice so require.
automatic suspension of sentence and allows the court to In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case,
commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence, the court involving as it does a juvenile and the application of the
did not abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
the accused.
The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with
In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient the qualifying circumstance of either evident
personality to file the petition. premeditation or abuse of superior strength. Under
The OSG, for its part, posits that respondent’s sentence Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
cannot be suspended since he was charged with a capital Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial
insists that the entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended court found him guilty of murder.
sentence does not depend upon the sentence actually Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:
imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of
for the crime charged as provided for by law.
Youthful Offender. – If after hearing the evidence in the
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether proper proceedings, the court should find that the
petitioner has standing to file the petition; (2) whether youthful offender has committed the acts charged against
petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty,
filing his petition with this Court; and (3) whether including any civil liability chargeable against him.
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion However, instead of pronouncing judgment of
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful
the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public,
and his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may
Center for the Youth. suspend all further proceedings and commit such minor
The petition is granted. to the custody or care of the Department of Social
On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the Welfare and Development or to any training institution
surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, operated by the government or any other responsible
he has sufficient personality to file the instant special person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of
civil action for certiorari. 8 This is in line with the age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper,
underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules after considering the reports and recommendations of the
of Court in order to promote their object. 9 Moreover, the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the
OSG has filed its comment on the petition and has joined government training institution or responsible person
the petitioner in his plea for the nullification of the under whose care he has been committed.
assailed portion of the RTC decision. Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender
On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review for suspension of his sentence, the court may require the
on certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC Department of Social Welfare and Development to
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its
3
prepare and submit to the court a social case study report as "deserving of, or capable, or liable to punishment;
over the offender and his family. liable to be punished; may be punished; liable to
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and punishment." 15 The word "punishable" does not mean
supervision by the representative of the Department of "must be punished," but "liable to be punished" as
Social Welfare and Development or government training specified. 16 In U.S. v. Villalon, 17the Court defined
institution as the court may designate subject to such punishable as "deserving of, or liable for, punishment."
conditions as it may prescribe. Thus, the term refers to the possible, not to the actual
sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be,
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful and not which is imposed.
offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence
under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime
offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on
one who is convicted for an offense by the Military the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the
Tribunals. actual penalty imposed but the possible one which
determines the disqualification of a juvenile. 18 Despite
The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC where, the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge,
except for those under paragraph 3, Section 32 of the law, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the sentence
the sentence of the accused is automatically suspended: meted against him. By this act, respondent Judge
Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
Disposition Orders. – The sentence shall be suspended of jurisdiction.
without need of application by the juvenile in conflict We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took
with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:
conference within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the
social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time
parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
or a combination of the following disposition measures offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the any civil liability which may have resulted from the
juvenile: care, guidance, and supervision orders; Drug offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
and alcohol treatment; Participation in group counseling judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
and similar activities; Commitment to the Youth conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
Secretary of DSWD. already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of
the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of
the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
in conflict with the law with the disposition measure and various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose
shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
a conference for the evaluation of such report in the The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension
guardian, and other persons whose presence may be of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is
deemed necessary. already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other
juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life not been deleted from Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344.
imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the
judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D.
age or over. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-
18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a
Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion
offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to
reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the
benefits of a suspended sentence. "Punishable" is defined
4
death or death, are disqualified from having their reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before the
sentences suspended. Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11,
Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be 2004 and July 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
[3] [4]
read and construed together because enactments of the (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his
same legislature on the same subject are supposed to petition for probation.
form part of one uniform system; later statutes are The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
supplementary or complimentary to the earlier On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC,
supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5, Article II
[5]
subject and to have enacted the new act with reference of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
[6]
thereto. 19Statutes in pari materia should be construed Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for
together to attain the purpose of an expressed national selling dangerous drugs. The Information reads:
[7]
policy. 20
The Prosecution, through the
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is undersigned Public Prosecutor,
GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Judge charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez
suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales is a.k.a. Allan and Michael Padua y Tordel
NULLIFIED. a.k.a. Mike, with the crime of violation of
SO ORDERED. Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in
relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a)
SECOND DIVISION and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig
City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the
MICHAEL PADUA, G.R. No. 168546 accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y
Petitioner, Velchez and Michael Padua y
Present: Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17)
years old, conspiring and
confederating together and both of
QUISUMBING them mutually helping and aiding
- versus - CARPIO MORALES one another, not being lawfully
authorized to sell any dangerous
TINGA,
drug, did then and there willfully,
VELASCO, JR., and unlawfully and feloniously sell,
BRION, JJ deliver and give away to PO1
Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-
buyer, one (1) folded newsprint
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: containing 4.86 grams of dried
Respondent. marijuana fruiting tops, which was
July 23, 2008 found positive to the tests for
marijuana, a dangerous drug, in
violation of the said law.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Contrary to law. [8]
- - - - - - - - - - - -x
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua,
DECISION assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty.
[9]
respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for prosecutor interposed no objection. Thus, the RTC on
[11]
certiorari and denied his motion for the same date issued an Order stating that the former
[12]
5
plea of Padua of not guilty was considered Chief of the Pasig City Parole and
withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
guilty. Hence, in a Decision dated February 6, 2004, the
[13]
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO
RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged: Teodoro Villaverde recommended that
In view of the foregoing, the Court minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed
finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel on probation, anchoring his
guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of recommendation on Articles 189 and 192
R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child
8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and and Welfare Code, as amended, which
therefore, sentences him to suffer an deal with the suspension of sentence and
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years commitment of youthful offender. Such
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as articles, therefore, do not find application
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four in this case, the matter before the Court
(4) months of reclusion temporal as being an application for probation by
maximum and a fine of Five Hundred minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). suspension of his sentence.
No subsidiary imprisonment, On the other hand, Section 70 is
however, shall be imposed should [the] under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which
accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to deals with the Program for Treatment and
Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents.
SO ORDERED. [14] Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of
R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for of either Section 15 or Section
Probation dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a
[15]
Traffickers and
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pushers. Any person
Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order convicted for drug
denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that trafficking or
under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person
[19]
pushing under this Act,
convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege regardless of the penalty
granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus: imposed by the
Before this Court now is the Post- Court, cannot avail of the
Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on privilege granted by the
minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared Probation Law or
by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Presidential Decree No.
Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the 968, as
6
amended. (underlining I.
supplied) THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT
WHEREFORE, premises OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN
considered, the Petition for Probation filed APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE II
by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as OF R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION
it is hereby DENIED. 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW.
SO ORDERED. [20]
II.
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC
order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE RULE
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH
Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in THE LAW HAS NO APPLICATION TO
a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his THE INSTANT CASE. [24]
petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of
WHEREFORE, in view of the Appeals err in dismissing Paduas petition for
foregoing, the petition is certiorari assailing the trial courts order denying his
hereby DENIED for lack of merit and petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep.
ordered DISMISSED. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
[25]
SO ORDERED. [21] 2006, violated? and (3) Does Section 32 of A.M. No.
[26]
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas
AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR because it merely applied the law and adhered to
AND OTHER PURPOSES. [22]
amended. (Emphasis supplied.) 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both
The law is clear and leaves no room for pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking Furthermore, suspension of sentence under
or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be
[37]
avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18
construction is that when the words and phrases of the years of age is found guilty of the offense charged,
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
determined from the language employed and the statute court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute
[29]
suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344,
[38]
is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of
its literal meaning and applied without attempted age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain- child, order execution of sentence, or extend the
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until
maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years.
intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis
[30]
Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there and thus, could no longer be considered a child for [39]
Undeniably, Amistoso's death on December 11, 2012 preceded the Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial
promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and
Court, Branch 163, Pasig City, for two counts of rape. He
unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso's appeal only because it was pled not guilty when arraigned. After pretrial and trial,
not immediately informed of his death.
the trial court found him guilty as charged and imposed
Amistoso's death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court's Decision on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso's conviction,
irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become
count. The trial court further ordered him to indemnify
final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside. the victim P50,000.00 in each case or a total amount
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to:
of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.
(1) NOTE PIS Lansangan's letter dated June 20, 2013 providing the
Court with a certified true copy of Amistoso's Death Certificate;
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed,
(2) SET ASIDE its Decision dated January 9, 2013 and DISMISS in its Decision dated March 27, 2008, appellants
Criminal Case No. 10106 before the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 48 by
reason of Amistoso's death on December 11, 2012; and
conviction, but modified it with an additional award
of P50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate amount
(3) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's Decision dated January 9, 2013 filed by the PAO given the
of P100,000.00, as moral damages.
Court's actions in the preceding paragraphs.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant elevated the case to this Court on
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appeal.
G.R. No. 185843
Appellee,
Present: In a Resolution dated July 20, 2009, we dismissed
the appeal for failure of appellant to sufficiently show
reversible error in the challenged decision as would
CORONA,
warrant the exercise of the Courts appellate
Chairperson,
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the March 27, 2008 Decision
- versus - VELASCO,of the JR.,
CA was affirmed in toto.
NACHURA,
DEL In the instant motion, appellant alleges that he
MENDOZA,and private complainant contracted marriage on August
19, 2009, solemnized by Reverend Lucas R. Dangatan of
Jeruel Christ-Centered Ministries, Inc. at the Amazing
Promulgated:
Grace Christian Ministries, Inc., Bldg. XI-A, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City. Attached to the motion is
RONIE DE GUZMAN,
March the pertinent Certificate of Marriage and a joint sworn
[1]
Appellant. 3, 2010
statement (Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay)
executed by appellant and private complainant,
[2]
SO ORDERED.
Article 344 of the same Code also provides G.R. No. 163879 July 30, 2014
DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, Petitioner,
ART. 344. Prosecution of the vs.
crimes of adultery, concubinage, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES
seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of RODOLFO M. PALMA and ROSARIO F.
lasciviousness. x x x. PALMA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
In cases of seduction, abduction, G.R. No. 165805
acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the DR. CLENIO YNZON, Petitioner,
marriage of the offender with the offended vs.
party shall extinguish the criminal action PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES
or remit the penalty already imposed upon RODOLFO M. PALMA AND ROSARIO F.
him. x x x. PALMA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On several occasions, we applied these provisions Before this Court are appeals via Rule 45 from the
to marriages contracted between the offender and the Decision1 dated June 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
offended party in the crime of rape,[5] as well as in the CA-G.R. CR No. 27293, affirming the Decision 2 dated
crime of abuse of chastity,[6] to totally extinguish the February 28,2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that convicting appellant Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao (Dr.
may have been imposed upon those found guilty of the Cabugao) and Dr. Clenio Ynzon (Dr. Ynzon) of the crime
felony. Parenthetically, we would like to mention here of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
56
3
The Information alleged – Normal liver, bile ducts, gallbladder, pancreas, spleen,
That on or about June 17, 2000in the City of Dagupan, kidneys and urinary bladder.
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable There is no free peritoneal fluid.
Court, the abovenamed accused, DR. ANTONIO There is localized tenderness in the paraumbilical region,
P.CABUGAO and DR. CLENIO YNZON, being then the more so in the supra and right paraumbilical areas.
attending physicians of one RODOLFO PALMA, JR., a
There is a vague elongated hypoechoic focus in the right
minor 10 years old, confederating and acting jointly with
periumbilical region roughly about 47 x 18 mm
one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
surrounded by undistended gas-filled bowels. This is
feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness and
suggestive of an inflammatory process wherein
imprudence to perform immediate operation upon their
appendiceal or periappendiceal pathology cannot be
patient, RODOLFO PALMA, JR. of acute appendicitis,
excluded. Clinical correlation is essential."6
when they, the said physicians, should have been done so
considering that examinations conducted upon their Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination noting the
patient Rodolfo Palma, Jr. seriously manifest todo so, following: "rectal: good sphincter, negative tenderness,
causing by such negligence, carelessness, and negative mass." The initial impression was Acute
imprudence the victim, RODOLFO PALMA JR., to die Appendicitis,7 and hence, he referred the case to his co-
due to: accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon.8 In the later part of the
morning of June 15, 2000, Dr. Ynzon went to the hospital
"CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST, METABOLIC
and readthe CBC and ultrasound results. The
ENCEPHALOPATHY, SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE
administration of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to
APPENDICITIS), CEREBRAL ANEURYSM
JRwere ordered. Thereafter, JR was placed on
RUPTURED (?)"
observation for twenty-four (24) hours.
As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr.
In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of
Antonio P. Cabugao, to the damage and prejudice of the
abdominal pain and his parents noticeda swelling in his
legal heirs of said deceased RODOLFO PALMA, JR. and
scrotum. In the afternoon of the same day, JR vomitted
other consequential damages relative thereto.
out greenish stuff three (3) times and had watery bowels
CONTRARY to Article 365, 1st par. of the Revised Penal also three (3) times. The nurses on-duty relayed JR's
Code. condition to Dr. Ynzon who merely gaveorders via
Dagupan City, Philippines, January 29, 2001. telephone.9Accused continued medications to alleviate
Arising from the same events, the Court resolved to JR's abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR
consolidate these cases.4 The facts, as culled from the again vomitted twice, had loose bowel movements and
records, are as follows: was unable to sleep. The following morning, June
17,2000, JR's condition worsened, he had a running fever
On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, of 38°C. JR's fever remained uncontrolled and he became
ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained unconscious, he was given Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium
of abdominal pain to his mother, Rosario Palma. At 5 (1 ampule). JR's condition continued to deteriorate that
o’clock that sameafternoon, Palma's mother and father, by 2 o'clock in the afternoon, JR's temperature soared to
Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR to the clinic of 42°C, had convulsions and finally died.
accused Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general
practitioner, specializing in familymedicine gave The Death Certificate10 dated June 19, 2000 prepared by
medicines for the pain and told Palma's parents to call Dr. Cabugao indicated the following causes of death:
him up if his stomach pains continue. Due to persistent Immediate cause: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST
abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the early morning of June 15, Antecedent cause: METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY
2000, they returnedto Dr. Cabugao, who advised them to
Underlying cause: SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE
bring JR to the Nazareth General Hospital in Dagupan
APPENDICITIS)
City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said
hospital at 5:30 in the morning.5 Other significant conditionscontributing to death:
Blood samples were taken from JR for laboratory testing. CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)
The complete blood count conveyed the following result: No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On
wbc – 27.80 x 10 9/L; lymphocytes – 0.10 and February 1, 2001, an Information was filed against
neutrophils – 0.90. Diagnostic ultrasound was likewise accused for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
conducted on the patient's lower abdomen by radiologist, At their arraignment, both accused, duly assisted by
Dr. Ricky V. Querubin, with the following findings: counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
57
On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused, by surgery but no surgery was done by the accused. But
the trial court found the following circumstances as the accused could not have found out the real disease of
sufficient basis to conclude that accused were indeed JR because they were treating merely and exclusively the
negligent in the performance of their duties: symptoms by means of the different medications to arrest
It is unquestionable that JR was under the medical care of the manifested symptoms. In fact, by treating the
the accused from the time of his admission for symptoms alone, the accused were recklessly and
confinement at the Nazareth General Hospital until his wantonly ignoring the same as signs of the graver health
death. Upon his admission, the initial working diagnosis problem of JR. This gross negligence on the part of the
was to consider acute appendicitis. To assist the accused accused allowed the infection to spread inside the body
in the consideration of acute appendicitis, Dr. Cabugao of JR unabated. The infection obviously spread so
requested for a complete blood count (CBC) and a fastand was so massive that within a period of only two
diagnostic ultrasound on JR. The findings of the CBC and a half (2 ½) days from the day of admission to the
and ultrasound showed that an inflammatory process or hospital on June 15, 2000, JR who was otherwise healthy
infection was going on inside the body of JR. Said died [of] Septicemia (Acute Appendicitis) on June 17,
inflammatory process was happening in the periumbilical 2000.11
region where the appendix could be located. The initial On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused' conviction,
diagnosis of acute appendicitis appears to be a distinct the Court of Appeals gave similar observations, to wit:
possibility. x x x. The foregoing expert testimony clearly revealed such
Dr. Ynzon ordered medications to treat the symptoms want of reasonable skill and care on the part of JR's
being manifested by JR. Thereafter, he ordered that JR be attending physicians, appellants Dr. Cabugao and Dr.
observed for 24 hours. However, the accused, as the Ynzon in neglecting to monitor effectively and
attending physicians, did not personally monitor JR in sufficiently the developments/changes during the
order to check on subtle changes that may occur. Rather, observation period and act upon the situation after said
they left the monitoring and actual observation to 24-hour period when his abdominal pain subsisted, his
resident physicians who are just on residency training condition even worsened with the appearance of more
and in doing so, they substituted their own expertise, skill serious symptoms of nausea, vomiting and diarrhea.
and competence with those of physicians who are merely Considering the brief visit only made on regular rounds,
new doctors still on training. Not having personally the records clearly show such gross negligence in failing
observed JR during this 24-hour critical period of to take appropriate steps to determine the real cause of
observation, the accused relinquished their duty and JR's abdominal pain so that the crucial decision to
thereby were unable to give the proper and correct perform surgery (appendectomy) had even been ruled out
evaluation as to the real condition of JR. In situations precisely because of the inexcusable neglect to undertake
where massive infection is going on as shown by the suchefficient diagnosis by process of elimination, as
aggressive medication of antibiotics, the condition of the correctly pointed out by the trial court. As has been
patient is serious which necessitated personal, not succinctly emphasized by Dr. Mateo, acute appendicitis
delegated, attention of attending physicians, namely JR was the working diagnosis, and with the emergence of
and the accused in this case. symptoms after the 24-hour observation (high fever,
xxxx vomiting, diarrhea) still, appellants ruled out surgery, not
even considering exploratory laparoscopy. Dr. Mateo also
Throughout the course of the hospitalization and expressed the opinion that the decision to operate could
treatment of JR, the accused failed to address the acute have been made after the result of the ultrasound test,
appendicitis which was the initial diagnosis. They did not considering that acute appendicitis was the initial
take steps to find out if indeed acute appendicitis was diagnosis by Dr. Cabugao after he had conducted a rectal
what was causing the massive infection that was ongoing examination.
inside the body of JR even when the inflammatory
process was located at the paraumbilical region where the Medical records buttress the trial court's finding that in
appendix can be located. x x x treating JR, appellants have demonstrated indifference
and neglect of the patient's condition as a serious case.
There may have been other diseases but the records do Indeed, appendicitis remains a clinical emergencyand a
not show that the accused took steps to find outwhat surgical disease, as correctly underscored by Dr. Mateo, a
disease exactly was plaguing JR. It was their duty to find practicing surgeon who has already performed over a
out the disease causing the health problem of JR, but they thousand appendectomy. In fact, appendectomy is the
did not perform any process of elimination. Appendicitis, only rational therapy for acute appendicitis; it avoids
according to expert testimonies, could be eliminated only clinical deterioration and may avoid chronic or recurrent
58
appendicitis. Although difficult, prompt recognition and REFERRED SUBJECT PATIENT TO A SURGEON,
immediate treatment of the disease prevent DR. CLENIO YNZON;
complications. Under the factual circumstances, the IV
inaction, neglect and indifference of appellants who, after
WHETHER THE DEFENSE NEVER STATED THAT
the day of admission and after being apprised of the
THERE IS GUARANTEE THAT DOING SURGERY
ongoing infection from the CBC and initial diagnosis as
WOULD HAVE SAVED THE PATIENT;
acute appendicitis from rectal examination and
ultrasound testand only briefly visited JR once during V
regular rounds and gave medication orders by telephone WHETHER THE WITNESSES FOR THE
– constitutes gross negligenceleading to the continued PROSECUTION INCLUDING PROSECUTION'S
deterioration of the patient, his infection having spread in EXPERT WITNESSES EVER
sofast a pace that he died within just two and a half (2 ½) DECLARED/TESTIFIED THAT PETITIONER DR.
days’ stay inthe hospital. Authorities state that if the CABUGAO HAD THE DUTY TO PERFORM
clinical picture is unclear a short period of 4 to 6 hours of IMMEDIATE OPERATION ON RODOLFO PALMA,
watchful waiting and a CT scan may improve diagnostic JR., AND THEY FAILED TO STATE/SHOW THAT
accuracy and help to hasten diagnosis.Even assuming THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH OF JR WAS
that JR's case had an atypical presentation in view of the ACUTE APPENDICITIS;
location of his appendix, laboratory tests could have VI
helped to confirm diagnosis, as Dr. Mateo opined thatthe
possibility of JR having a retrocecal appendicitis should WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED
have been a strong consideration. Lamentably, however, BY THE PROSECUTION EVER QUESTIONED THE
as found by the trial court, appellants had not taken steps MANAGEMENT AND CARE APPLIED BY
towards correct diagnosis and demonstrated laxity even PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO;
when JR was already running a high fever in the morning VII
of June 17, 2000 and continued vomiting with diarrhea, WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED
his abdominal pain becoming more intense. This is the BY THE DEFENSE ARE UNANIMOUS IN
reason why private complainants were not even apprised APPROVING THE METHOD OF TREATMENT
of the progress of appellants' diagnosis – appellants have APPLIED BY BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS ON
nothing to report because they did nothing towards the SUBJECT PATIENT, AND THEY
end and merely gave medications to address the DECLARED/AFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD
symptoms.12 FIRST PLACE SUBJECT THE PATIENT UNDER
Thus, these appeals brought beforethis Court raising the OBSERVATION, AND WOULD NOT PERFORM
following arguments: IMMEDIATE OPERATION;
I VIII
WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AS WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DR.
CONTAINED IN THE INFORMATION IS "FAILURE YNZON WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE REQUIRED
TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION UPON THE QUANTUM OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
PATIENT ROFOLFO PALMA JR. OF ACUTE DOUBT THAT THE PATIENT WAS SPECIFICALLY
APPENDICITIS; SUFFERING FROM AND DIED OF ACUTE
II APPENDICITIS; and
WHETHER THE SUBJECT INFORMATION IX
APPEARS TO HAVE ACCUSED BOTH ACCUSED WHETHER THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT THE
DOCTORS OF CONSPIRACY AND THE APPEALED SPECIFIC SURGICAL OPERATION KNOWN AS
DECISION SEEMS TO HAVE TREATED BOTH APPENDECTOMY CONSTITUTED CRIMINAL
ACCUSED DOCTORS TO BE IN CONSPIRACY; NEGLIGENCE.
III In a nutshell, the petition brought before this Court raises
WHETHER PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO IS A the issue of whether or not petitioners' conviction of the
GENERAL PRACTITIONER (NOT A SURGEON) crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
AND HAVE EXCLUDED SURGERY FROM THE arising from analleged medical malpractice, is supported
LIMITS OFHIS PRACTICE, AND IT WAS NOT AND by the evidence on record.
NEVER HIS DUTY TO OPERATE THE PATIENT Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually
RODOLFO PALMA JR., THAT WAS WHY HE factual in nature, which as a general rule, findings of
59
factof the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding A That means that infection would spread throughout the
and conclusiveupon this Court, and we will not normally body, sir.
disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the Q If unchecked doctor, what will happen?
court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record
A It will result to death.17
or unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension
of facts. Inthe instant case, we find the need to make xxxx
certain exception. Q And what would have you doneif you entertain other
AS TO DR. YNZON'S LIABILITY: considerations from the time the patient was admitted?
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or A From the time the patient was admitted until the report
failing to do, without malice, an act from which material of the sonologist, I would have made a decision by then.
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of Q And when to decide the surgery would it be a
precautionon the part of the person performing or failing particular exact time, would it be the same for all
to perform such act.13 The elements of reckless surgeons?
imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do A If you are asking acute appendicitis, it would be about
an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is 24 hours because acute appendicitis is a 24-hour disease,
voluntary; (3) that it bewithout malice; (4) that material sir.
damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5)
that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of Q. And would it be correct to say that it depends on the
the offender, taking into consideration his employment or changes on the condition of the patient?
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, A. Yes, sir.
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and Q. So, are you saying more than 24 hours when there are
place.14 changes?
With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the A. If there are changes in the patient pointing towards
offense have been clearly established by the evidence on appendicitis then you have to decide right there and then,
record. The court a quoand the appellate court were one sir.
in concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the
Q. So if there are changes in the patient pointing to
required standard of care expected from doctors.
appendicitis?
In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to
A. It depends now on what you are trying to wait for in
prevent certain death, it was necessary to perform surgery
the observation period, sir.
on JR immediately. Even the prosecution’s own expert
witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo,15 testified during cross- Q. So precisely if the change is a condition which bring
examination that he would perform surgery on JR: you in doubt that there is something else other than
appendicitis, would you extend over a period of 24
ATTY. CASTRO:
hours?
Q. Given these data soft non-tender abdomen,
A. It depends on the emergent development, sir.
ambulatory, watery diarrhea, Exhibit C which is the
ultrasound result, with that laboratory would you operate Q. That is the point, if you are the attending physician
the patient? and there is a change not pointing to appendicitis, would
you extend over a period of 24 hours?
A Yes, I would do surgery.
A. In 24 hours you have to decide, sir.
Q And you should have done surgery with this particular
case?" xxxx
A Yes, sir.16 Q. And that is based on the assessment of the attending
physician?
xxxx
A. Yes, sir.18
COURT:
Dr. Mateo further testified on cross-examination:
Q You stated a while ago doctor thatyou are going to [do]
surgery to the patient, why doctor, if you are notgoing to ATTY. CASTRO:
do surgery, what will happen? Q: So you will know yourself, as far as the record is
A If this would be appendicitis, the usual progress would concerned, because if you will agree with me, you did
be that it would be ruptured and generalized peritonitis not even touch the patient?
and eventually septicemia, sir. A. Yes, I based my opinion on what is put on record, sir.
Q What do you mean by that doctor? The records show that after the observation period, the
60
abdominal pain is still there plus there are already other A. Yes. Sir.
signs and symptoms which are not seen or noted. Q. Isn't it a fact thatto rule out acute appendicitis as not
Q. But insofar as you yourself not having touched the the disease of JR, surgery or operation must be done, isn't
abdomen of the patient, would you give a comment on it Doctor?
that? A. You have to correlate all the findings.
A. Yes, based on the record, after 24 hours of Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
observation, the pain apparently was still there and there
A. Yes.
was more vomiting and there was diarrhea. In my
personal opinion, I think the condition of the patient was Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute
deteriorating. appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right
Doctor?
Q. Even though you have not touched the patient?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is toreally determine if it is
A. I based on what was on the record, sir.19
an acute appendicitis, you have to operate.21
From the foregoing, it is clear that if JR’s condition
xxxx
remained unchecked it would ultimately result in his
death, as what actually happened in the present case. Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering
Another expert witness for the defense, Dr. Vivencio that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering
Villaflor, Jr. testified on direct examination that he would that JR likewise was feverish and that he was vomiting,
perform a personal and thorough physical examination of does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis
the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6 hours, to wit: Doctor?
ATTY. CASTRO: A. Its possible.
Q. As an expert doctor, if you were faced with a history Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the
of abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting, fever, anurecia impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned
(sic), elevated white blood cell count, physical that the only way to rule out the suspect which is acute
examination of a positive psoas sign, observation of the appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier
sonologist of abdominal tenderness and the ultrasound Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
findings of the probability of appendiceal (sic) pathology, A. Yes, sir.22
what will you do if you have faced these problems, Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
Doctor? requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
A. I will examine the patient thoroughly and it will patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
depend on my physical examination and that isprobably opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinions of
every 4 to 6 hours, sir.20 qualified physicians stems from its realization that the
On cross-examination, Dr. Villaflor affirmed: latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
most instances are incapable of intelligently
Cross Exam. By Atty. Marteja:
evaluating.23 From the testimonies of the expert witnesses
Q. x x x However, there are corrections and admissions presented, it was irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon failed
made at that time, your Honor, do I understand thatT/C to practice that degree of skill and care required in the
does not mean ruled out but rather to consider the matter? treatment of his patient.
A. Yes, now that I have seen the records of the patient, it As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon
says here, impression and T/C means to consider the revealed want of reasonable skill and care in attending to
appendicitis. the needs of JR by neglecting to monitor effectively the
Q. Isn't it that it is worth then to say that the initial developmentsand changes on JR's condition during the
working diagnosis on Rodolfo Palma, Jr., otherwise observation period, and to act upon the situation after the
known as JR, to whom I shall now refer to as JR, the 24-hour period when his abdominal pain persisted and
primary consideration then is acute appendicitis, is that his condition worsened. Lamentable, Dr. Ynzon appeared
correct to say Doctor? to have visited JRbriefly only during regular rounds in
A. I think so, that is the impression. the mornings. He was not there during the crucial times
on June 16, 2000 when JR's condition started to
Q. x x x Now if it is to be considered as the primary deteriorate until JR's death. As the attending surgeon, he
consideration in the initial working diagnosis, isn't it a should be primarily responsible in monitoring the
fact that it has tobe ruled out in order to consider it as not condition of JR, as he is in the best position considering
the disease of JR? his skills and experience to know if the patient's
61
condition had deteriorated. While the resident-doctors- presence of all the elements of the crime for which the
onduty could likewise monitor the patient’scondition, he accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is
is the one directly responsible for the patient as the the perpetrator of the crime. Based on the above
attending surgeon. Indeed, it is reckless and gross disquisitions, however, the prosecution failed to prove
negligence of duty to relegate his personal responsibility these two things. The Court is not convinced with moral
to observe the condition of the patient. Again, acute certainty that Dr. Cabugao isguilty of reckless
appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the imprudence as the elements thereof were not proven by
emergence of graver symptoms after the 24-hour the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
observation, Dr. Ynzon ruled out surgery for no apparent Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the
reason. We, likewise, note that the records are devoid of failure to perform appendectomy on JR, or the failure to
showing of any reasonable cause which would lead Dr. determine the source of infection which caused the
Ynzon tooverrule appendectomy despite the initial deterioration of JR's condition. However, a review of the
diagnosis of appendicitis. Neitherwas there any showing records fail to show that Dr. Cabugao is in any position
that he was entertaining another diagnosis nor he took to perform the required appendectomy.
appropriate steps towards another diagnosis.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of
Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, this case is the fact that Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon,but
what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the a general practitioner specializing in family
conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, medicine;27 thus, even if he wanted to, he cannot do an
by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack operation, much less an appendectomy on JR. It is
of precaution. It is that which supplies the criminal intent precisely for this reason why he referred JR to Dr. Ynzon
so indispensable as tobring an act of mere negligence and after he suspected appendicitis. Dr. Mateo, the
imprudence under the operation of the penal law. This is prosecution’s expert witness, emphasized the role of the
because a conscious indifference to the consequences of surgeon during direct examination, to wit:
the conduct is all that is required from the standpoint of
ATTY. MARTEJA:
the frame of mind of the accused.24 Quasioffenses
penalize the mental attitudeor condition behind the act, Q. You had mentioned that under this circumstances and
the dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight, condition, you have mentioned that surgery is the
the "imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which solution, would you have allowed then a 24 hour
punish the intentional criminal act.25 This is precisely observation?
where this Court found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his A. If there is a lingering doubt, inshort period of
seemingly indifference to the deteriorating condition of observation of 18-24 hours can be allowed provided that
JR that he as a consequence, failed to exercise lack of there would be close monitoring of the patient, sir.
precaution which eventually led to JR's death. Q. Would you please tell us who would be doing the
To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an monitoring doctor?
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his A. The best person should be the first examiner, the best
patient is to be determined according to the standard of surgeon, sir.
care observed by other members of the profession in
good standing under similar circumstances bearing in Q. So that would you say that it is incumbent on the
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of surgeon attending to the case to have been the one to
treatment or the present state of medical science. In observe within the period of observation?
accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having A. Yes, because he will be in the best position to observe
the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and the sudden changes in the condition of the patient, sir.
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ Q. And how often would in your experience doctor, how
such training, care and skill in the treatment of his often would the surgeon re-assist (sic) the condition of
patients. He, therefore, has a duty to use at least the same the patient during the period of observation?
level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor
A. Most foreign authors would recommend every four
would use to treat a condition under the same
(4) hours, some centers will recommend hourly or every
circumstances.26 Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that
two hours but here in the Philippines, would recommend
degree of care and precaution demanded by the
for 4 to 6 hours, sir.28
circumstances.
Dr. Cabugao’s supervision does not cease upon his
AS TO DR. CABUGAO'S LIABILITY:
endorsement of his patient to the surgeon. Here, Dr.
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to Cabugao has shown to have exerted all efforts to monitor
prove two things — the fact of the crime, i.e., the
62
his patient and under these circumstances he did not have We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when
any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzon’s competence and JR's condition began to deteriorate. Even so, before he
diligence. Expert testimonies have been offered to prove left, he made endorsement and notified the resident-
the circumstances surrounding the case of JR and the doctor and nurses-on-duty that he will be on leave.
need to perform an operation. Defense witness, Dr. Moreover, while both appeared to be the attending
Villaflor, on cross examination testified, to wit: physicians of JR during his hospital confinement, it
Q. Isn't it a fact that torule out acute appendicitis as cannot be said that the finding of guilt on Dr. Ynzon
notthe disease of JR, surgery or operation mustbe done, necessitates the same finding on the co-accused Dr.
isn't it Doctor? Cabugao. Conspiracy is inconsistent with the idea of a
A. You have to [correlate] all the findings. felony committed by means of culpa.32 Thus, the
accused-doctors to be found guilty of reckless
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor? imprudence resulting in homicide, it must be shown that
A. Yes. both accused-doctors demonstratedan act executed
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of
appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right foresight, carelessness, or negligence. Noteworthy, the
Doctor? evidence on record clearly points to the reckless
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is to really determine if it is imprudence of Dr. Ynzon; however, the same cannot be
an acute appendicitis, you have to operate.29 said in Dr. Cabugao's case.
xxxx AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner
that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died on
that JR likewise was feverish and that he was vomitting, December 23, 2011 due to "multiorgan failure" as
does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis evidenced by a copy of death certificate.33 Thus, the
Doctor? effect of death, pending appeal of his conviction of
petitioner Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal and
A. It’s possible. pecuniary liabilities should be in accordance to People v.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the Bayotas,34 wherein the Court laid down the rules in case
impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned the accused dies prior to final judgment:
that the only way to rule out the suspect which is acute 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it? liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
A. Yes, sir.30 Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
negligent or lacked the necessary precaution in his only the civil liability directly arising from and based
performance of his duty as a family doctor. On the solely on the offense committed, i.e.,civil liability ex
contrary, a perusal ofthe medical records would show delictoin senso strictiore."
that during the 24-hour monitoring on JR, it was Dr. 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
Cabugao who frequently made orders on the notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
administration of antibiotics and pain relievers. There also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
was also repetitive instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
JR to Dr. Ynzon as it appeared that he is suspecting other sources of obligation fromwhich the civil liability
appendicitis. The referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon, may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
is actually an exercise of precaution as he knew that a) Law
appendicitis is not within his scope of expertise. This
clearly showed that he employed the best of his b) Contracts
knowledge and skill in attending to JR's condition, even c) Quasi-contracts
after the referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon. To be sure, the d) x x x x x x x x x
calculated assessment of Dr. Cabugao to refer JRto a e) Quasi-delicts
surgeon who has sufficient training and experience to
handle JR’s case belies the finding that he displayed 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
inexcusable lack of precaution in handling his patient.31 Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
63
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and
action may be enforced either againstthe the offended party desires to recover damages from the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, same act or omission complained of, the party may file a
depending on the source of obligation upon which the separate civil action based on the other sources of
same is based as explained above. obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111.37 If
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a the same act or omission complained of arises from
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action must be
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private- the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules
offended party instituted together therewith the civil of Court:38
action. In such case, the statute of limitationson the civil Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the brought against executor or administrator. — No action
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article upon a claim for the recovery of money or debtor interest
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
apprehension on a possible privation of right by administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or
prescription.35 an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery against him. (Emphases ours)
of civil liability subsists as the same is not based on Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover
delictbut by contract and the reckless imprudence he was damages from the same act or omission complained of
guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised Penal arising from contract, the filing of a separate civil action
Code.1âwphi1For this reason, a separate civil action may must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5,
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice.
obligation upon which the same is based, 36 and in If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money
accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on against the decent, arising from contract, express or
Criminal Procedure, we quote: implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent,
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising against the decent, must be filed within the time limited
from the delict. However, the independent civil action in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except
instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources that the executor or administrator may bring against the
of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal claimants. Where an executor or administrator
representative of the accused after proper substitution or commencesan action, or prosecutes an action already
against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor
accused may besubstituted for the deceased without may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set
minor heirs. off against each other in such action; and if final
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
or representatives to appear and be substituted within a amount so determined shall be considered the true
period of thirty (30) days from notice. balance against the estate, as though the claim had been
presented directly beforethe court in the administration
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in approved at their present value.
these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the
deceased. As a final note, we reiterate thatthe policy against double
recovery requires that only one action be maintained for
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be the same act or omission whether the action is brought
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the against the executor or administrator, or the estate. 39 The
offended party may file against the estate of the heirs of JR must choose which of the available causes of
deceased. (Emphases ours) action for damages they will bring.
64
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness
ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is hereby ACQUITTEDof the and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven
Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing
disposition of this case, his criminal liability is damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and
extinguished; however, his civil liability subsists. A prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount
separate civil action may be filed either against the of P8,542.00.
executor/administrator, or the estateof Dr. Ynzon, That as further consequence due to the strong impact,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which
same are based. required medical attendance for a period of less that
SO ORDERED. nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing
his customary labor for the same period of time.
G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, the charge. Trial then ensued.
vs. On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145,
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the
PHILIPPINES, respondents. "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with slight physical injuries," and
DAVIDE, JR., J.: sentencing her:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita [t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol
Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five
Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency,
of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency;
complainant sustained physical injuries, while the and to pay the costs. 4
damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the term in this wise:
complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1 against As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused,
petitioner with the Fiscal's Office. complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D,
On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment
as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review,
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries
Property with Slight Physical Injury." The thru reckless imprudence is now punished with
information read: penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in
Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost
Injury as follows: of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the (P5,000.00).
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No.
Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file
Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to
and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to
no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing
and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of
in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to
manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and file her brief. 6
regulations and without taking the necessary care and After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner
precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals
65
7
rendered a decision on 31 January 1996 affirming B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
the appealed decision. GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus: IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN
IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET
ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF
OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the
ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise
IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the
AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9 penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless
xxx xxx xxx imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was
not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense
POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR was arresto menor — not arresto mayor.
LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of that the courts below should have pronounced that
Appeals denied petitioner's motion for there were two separate light felonies involved,
reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 property, instead of considering them a complex
of the Rules of Court premised on the following crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do not . . . rate
grounds: a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:
DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double
RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE less serious physical injuries, damage to property
CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries,
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS complaint for the slight physical injuries and another
AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31,
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY
SOURCE. The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by
investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE because in that case the negligent act resulted in the
SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to
ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT property which were both less grave felonies and
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL which, therefore, constituted a complex crime.
TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE
ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE In the instant case, following the ruling in
PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE reckless imprudence should have been charged in a
IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO separate information.
MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two
RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER light offenses, both imposable in their maximum
MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE period and computed or added together, only sum up
PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as
COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE. imposed by the lower courts."
66
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of
offense of slight physical injuries through reckless prescription of the crime, arguing that the
imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the
is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the
Here, since the information was filed only on 13 incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico
January 1988, or almost three months from the date v. Isidro. 17
the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner
already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus: expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in
In the instant case, following the ruling in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error.
the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through However, she considers the OSG's reliance
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a on Buerano v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for
separate information. And since, as a light offense, it nothing there validates the "complexing" of the crime
prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal liability of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and
therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and damage to property; besides, in that case, two
91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], separate informations were filed — one for slight and
Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's and the other for damage to property through
motion to quash that part of the information charging reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case,
him with that light offense. following Arcaya v. Teleron 19 and Lontok v.
20
Petitioner further claims that the information was Gorgonio, two informations should have been filed.
filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would
Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She only apply here on the assumption that it was proper
submits that damage to property and slight physical to "complex" damage to property through reckless
injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the imprudence with slight physical injuries through
rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise
filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide,
have tolled the statute of limitations, this time which is not covered by the Rule on Summary
invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13 Procedure.
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, Petitioner finally avers that People v.
23
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with Cuaresma should not be given retroactive effect;
petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or
menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto render nugatory the en banc ruling
mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.
Code. The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is
that conformably with Buerano v. Court of correct.
Appeals, 14which frowns upon splitting of crimes and II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence
prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to resulting in damage to property in the amount of
"complex" reckless imprudence with slight physical P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight
injuries and damage to property because what the law physical injuries are light felonies.
seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article
imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was
48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
no need for two separate informations.
the quasi offenses in question.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be
that although the Municipal Trial Court had
questioned for the first time on appeal.
jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight
physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction
took cognizance of this case because it had the over the offenses in question.
jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have
damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice already prescribed.
the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG I. The Proper Penalty
cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15
67
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is
penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the
trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30
Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may
their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in be either lower than or equal to the penalty
its maximum period is the proper penalty. prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides: This being the case, the exception in the sixth
paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight
who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act physical injuries is public censure, this being the
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
correccional in its medium period; if it would have property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, imprudence in this case did not result in damage to
the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period property only. What applies is the first paragraph of
shall be imposed. Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, 4 months) for an act committed through reckless
shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute imprudence which, had it been intentional, would
a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused
would have constituted a less serious felony, the deliberately, the crime would have been malicious
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code,
be imposed. and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its
When the execution of the act covered by this article medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day
shall have only resulted in damage to the property of to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that
damages to three times such value, but which shall in provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth
no case be less than 25 pesos. paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months.
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall imprudence resulting in damage to property to the
exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its
rules prescribed in Article 64. minimum and medium periods, which could be
anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a
The provisions contained in this article shall not be maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court,
applicable: since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal in the imposition of the penalties therein provided
to or lower than those provided in the first two "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion
paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply. Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo),
but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate
Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act
in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight
menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 or lack of skill. 26
to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is,
68
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in complaint for the lesiones menor graves and damage
slight physical injuries is punishable by public to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31,
censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law Hence, the trial court erred in considering the
carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave
exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light
penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical
provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty injuries.
lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is a light felony. Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here,
that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting
resulting in slight physical injuries should have been
in damage to property is, as earlier discussed,
charged in a separate information because it is not
penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional
However, petitioner may no longer question, at this
penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code,
stage, the duplicitous character of the
the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony —
information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in
not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes. resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This
than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in
on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as a motion to quash before she pleaded to the
follows: information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave single complaint or information and the accused fails
felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for to object to it before trial, the court may convict the
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious accused of as many offenses as are charged and
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its proved and impose on him the penalty for each of
maximum period. them. 29
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a Quasi Offenses in Question.
complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be
Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the determined by the law in force at the time of the
resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a institution of the action, unless the statute expressly
light felony, there is no complex crime, thus: provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is intended to operate as to actions pending before its
light, there is no complex crime. The resulting enactment. 30
offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony At the time of the filing of the information in this
may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
felonies of damage to property and slight physical otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization
injuries, both resulting from a single act of Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof provided that
imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They except in cases falling within the exclusive original
cannot be charged in one information. They are jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the
separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts
vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and
Phil. 513). Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses
less serious physical injuries, damage to property punishable with imprisonment of got exceeding four
amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
chief of police did not err in filing a separate thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment,
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another regardless of other imposable accessory or other
69
penalties, including the civil liability arising from Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
kind, nature, value or amount thereof." injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence
determined by the duration of the imprisonment and resulting in damage to property in the amount of
the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty
charged. The question thus arises as to which court is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, prescribes in five years.
such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses
physical injuries. have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had office three days after the incident in question tolled
jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the the running of the prescriptive period.
duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
years, which was co-extensive with prision Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. —
correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise: The period of prescription shall commence to run
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section of information, and shall commence to run again
3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has when such proceedings terminate without the accused
placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express stopped by any reason not imputable to him.
provision of law to the contrary it is logical and (emphasis supplied)
reasonable to infer from said provisions that its Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the
intention was to place offenses penalized prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filing
with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of of the complaint or information," does not distinguish
the peace and municipal courts and not under that of whether the complaint is filed for preliminary
courts of first instance. examination or investigation only or for an action on
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of
of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held
jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's
MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, office suspends the running of the statute of
which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the limitations.
graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary
Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also Procedure, which provides that in cases covered
fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the
injuries was cognizable by said courts. prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC
property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was without need of a prior preliminary examination or
also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila
MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced
was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium only by information." However, this Section cannot
periods — the duration of which was from 1 month be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is
and 1 day to 4 months. interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be information directly with said courts.
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases
RTC of Makati. is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question. 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in
the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
diminish, increase or modify substantive
70
37
rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order of
on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975, reviving the
and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails. Information in Criminal Case No. B-537-74 of the Court
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, and to
be recalled that what was involved therein was a prohibit said court from conducting further proceedings
violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the on the case.
applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San
Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on
to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations September 24, 1974 with respondent court, accusing
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification of
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14,
Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of 1948 the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale
prescription is suspended only when judicial of a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. to quash the Information on the ground of prescription of
Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive the crime charge, as the said document of sale of Lot No.
period was not interrupted by the filing of the 378-C was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered with
complaint with the Office of the Provincial the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and
Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial as a consequence the original certificate of title was
proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title issued,
period there was only the filing of the information in and since then Eugenio Cabral had publicly and
the proper court. continuously possessed said property and exercised acts
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are of ownership thereon, which facts are apparently
covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof admitted in the letter of San Diego's lawyer to Cabral on
and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. September 17, 1953. After hearing said motion, Judge
Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in Juan F. Echiverri, in a Resolution dated March 25, 1975,
question was interrupted by the filing of the granted the motion to quash and dismissed the
complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the Information on the ground of prescription. The order of
vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the dismissal was predicated upon said court's finding that
termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold the factual averments contained in the notion to quash
petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses were supported by the evidence. Private prosecutor, who
charged in the information in this case. was not present during the hearing of the motion to
quash, filed a motion dated April 8, 1975, for the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. reconsideration of said Resolution. This was opposed by
The challenge decision of respondent Court of petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no longer
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action
the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was in April 1974 against the same accused (Eugenio Cabral)
affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal on the basis of the same factual averments contained in
Case No. 33919. the criminal Information. Acting on the motion for
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED. reconsideration, respondent. Judge Benigno M. Puno,
No pronouncement as to costs. now presiding, ordered on May 12, 1975 the Fiscal to
SO ORDERED. "make known his position to the Court." In compliance
with said Order, the Fiscal submitted his comment dated
G.R. No. L-41692 April 30, 1976 May 19, 1975, expressing the view that the crime, has
EUGENIO CABRAL, petitioner, not prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only
vs. discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and "...
HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, Judge of the Court of that, in the interest of justice, arraignment and trial is
First Instance of Bulacan, PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both parties
BULACAN, and SILVINO SAN DIEGO, respondents. in their total meaning and import in determining once
Arturo Agustines for petitioner. and for all the direction direction and thrust of these
evidence of both parties."
Celso B. Poblete for private respondent.
Two (2) days later on, or on May 21, 1975, respondent
Judge set aside the Resolution of March 25, 1975, and
ANTONIO, J.:p
reinstated the Information. Petitioner moved for
71
reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the petitioners nine months thereafter, or on June 11, 1957.
judgment of acquittal which became final immediately The issue is whether or not the court had jurisdiction to
upon promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled enter that order. While the court may find it necessary to
for correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil hear the views of a private prosecutor before acting on a
Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal, it does not follow
to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This that it can set aside its order dismissing the case even if
motion was denied, as well as the second motion for the same has already become final. There is no law
reconsideration, hence this petition, raising the issue of which requires notice to a private prosecutor, because
whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside under the rules all criminal actions are prosecuted "under
its Resolution of March 25, 1975. the direction and control of the fiscal" (Section 4, Rule
The issue being purely legal and considering that the 106). It appearing that the order already final, the court
matter has been amply discuss in the pleadings, 1 this acted without jurisdiction in in issuing the the subsequent
case was deemed submitted for decision without need of order.
memoranda. And likewise, in People v. Sanchez, 5 it was held that "a
The Solicitor General was required to appear in this case, judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse
and he recommends giving due course to the petition and of the period for perfecting an appeal, ... Under the
the reversal of the challenged order. According to the circumstances, the sentence having become final, no
Solicitor General, the Resolution of March 25, 1975 court, not even this high Tribunal, can modify it even if
dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription erroneous ...". We hold that these rulings are applicable
of the crime became a bar to another charge of to the case at bar.
falsification, including the revival of the Information. While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San
This is more so, because said Resolution had already Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for
become final and executory, inasmuch as the Fiscal reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day
neither sought its reconsideration nor appealed therefrom period, such move did not stop the running of the period
within the. reglementary period of fifteen (15) days after for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to
his receipt of a copy thereof on March 31, 1975. When appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his
the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the
or about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of
order of dismissal, the same had already long been final. the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or
We agree with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the
is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash period for appeal. 6
based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for The right of the offended party to appeal is recognized
the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code under the old Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Section
also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of 4 of Rule 110 which provides that the prosecution shall
the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." be "under the direction and control of the fiscal" without
Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification the limitation imposed by section 107 of General Order
under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the No. 58 subjecting the direction of the prosecution to the
Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty right "of the person injured to appeal from any decision
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum of the court denying him a legal right", said right to
periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This appeal by an offended party from an order of dismissal is
crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here, San Diego had no longer recognized in the offended party. ... (U)nder
actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery the new Rules of Court, the fiscal has the direction and
after the document was registered in the Register of control of the prosecution, without being subject to the
Deeds on August 26, 1948. right of intervention on the part of the offended party to
In Pangan v. Pasicolan, 4 where the trial court set aside appeal from an order dismis ing a criminal case upon
its own order dismissing the criminal case nine (9) petition of the fiscal would be tantamount to giving said
months thereafter, this Court held that the order was null party as much right the direction and control of a
and void for want of jurisdiction, as the first order had criminal proceeding as that of fiscal. 7
already become final and executory. More important, he lost his right to intervene in the
Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the Court criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on
of First Instance of Pampanga setting aside its order of September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and
September 10, 1956 dismissing the case against Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations
that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14,
72
1948 was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action the husband having died on September 6, 1970 and his
against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the
Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V- following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the
74) for the recovery of the same property and damages. It complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and
appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
order of dismissal was issued there was a pending civil In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered
action arising out of the same alleged forged document from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City
filed by the offended party against the same defendant, that the abovementioned property had already been
the offended party has no right to intervene in the transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, single, of legal
prosecution of the criminal case,, and consequently age, Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa,
cannot ask for the reconsideration of the order of Philippines" under TCT No. T-9885. They further
dismissal, or appeal from said order.8 allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed on
Orders of May 21, 1975, August 4, 1975 and September May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia
3, 1975, of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. No Pampo. The deed of sale was registered with the Register
pronouncement as to costs. of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26, 1961. Upon
G.R. Nos. 74226-27 July 27, 1989 examination of the document, they found that the
signature of their parents were allegedly falsified and that
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, accused also made an untruthful statement that she was
vs. single although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes
MIZPAH R. REYES, respondent. on May 2, 1950. The document was referred by the
Pacianito B. Cabaron for respondent. complainants to the National Bureau of Investigation
Celso C. Dimayuga co-counsel for respondent. (N.B.I.) for examination of the signatures of their parents
and a report was returned with the finding that the
CORTES, J.: signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia
Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the
The crime of falsification of a public document carries accused and after conducting an investigation, the fiscal
with it an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its filed with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more XIII, Lipa City on October 18, 1984 two (2) informations
than P5,000.00 [Art. 172, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]. both for falsification of public document, the first in
Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime Criminal Case No. V-1163, for allegedly making it
prescribes in ten (10) years [Art. 90, par. 3 (RPC)]. The appear in the notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo,
ten (10) year prescriptive period commences to run "from the mother of the accused, participated in the sale of a
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's signature, and the
party, the authorities, or their agents . . ." [Art. 91, second in Criminal Case No. V-1164, for allegedly
(RCP)]. In the instant case, the public document making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of
allegedly falsified was a notarized deed of sale registered sale, more specifically, by stating that accused was
on May 26, 1961 with the Register of Deeds in the name single.
of the accused, private respondent herein, Mizpah R.
Reyes. The two informations for falsification of a public Before arraignment, accused filed a motion to quash both
document subject matter of the controversy were, informations on grounds that: (1) "The criminal action or
however, filed only on October 18, 1984. The liability has been extinguished by prescription of the
complainants claim that they discovered the falsified crime in the light of Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA 606;" and
notarized deed of sale in June 1983. The Court is tasked (2) "The trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense
with determining whether the crime has prescribed which charged and the person of accused because of non-
hinges on whether or not its discovery may be deemed to compliance with the pre-conciliation requirement of P.D.
have taken place from the time the document was No. 1508." [Rollo, p. 33].
registered with the Register of Deeds, consistent with the The trial court granted the motion and quashed the
rule on constructive notice. informations in the two (2) cases stating that:
The antecedent facts are as follows: xxx
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a ...The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. All
parcel of land located in Lipa City registered in their Persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of
names under TCT No. T-7471. Both are now deceased, registration.
73
The essence, therefore, of registration is to serve notice hearing the motion, the judge issued a resolution granting
to the whole world of the legal status and the dealing the motion to quash and dismissing the information on
therewith. the ground of prescription. Private prosecutor filed a
If registration is a notice to the whole world, then motion for the reconsideration of the resolution. Acting
registration is in itself a notice and therefore, the on said motion, the trial court ordered the fiscal to make
prescriptive period of registered document must start to known his position. The fiscal filed a comment stating
run from the date the same was annotated in the Register that the crime has not prescribed as the complainant San
of Deeds. Diego claimed that he only discovered the crime in
October 1970. Thereafter, the trial court set aside its
In these two cases in question, prescriptive period of ten resolution granting the accused's motion to quash and
(10) years should have started from May 26, 1960 (sic). reinstated the information. The accused brought the case
Considering the lapse of more than twenty (20) years to the Supreme Court questioning the trial court's
before the two informations were filed, the crimes for authority to set aside its resolution granting his motion to
which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are charged have quash. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused
already prescribed. by holding that the aforementioned resolution has already
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, Criminal Cases Nos. become final and executory for failure of the fiscal to file
V-1163 and V-1164 are quashed. [Rollo, pp. 33-34]. a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
From the trial court's order quashing the two (2) period. The motion for reconsideration filed by the
informations, the People, petitioner herein, filed an private prosecutor was disregarded because of the latter's
appeal with the Court of Appeals (then designated as the lack of legal standing. Another reason given by the Court
Intermediate Appellate Court). In a for its decision is the following:
decision ** promulgated on April 3, 1986, the Court of . . .The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. The Court of a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to
Appeals rejected the theory of petitioner that the another prosecution for the same offense [Secs. 2(f) and
prescriptive period should commence on June 1983, 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court]. Article 89 of the
when the complainants actually discovered the fraudulent Revised Penal Code also provides that "prescription of
deed of sale. The appellate court sustained the trial the crime is one of the grounds for "total extinction of
court's ruling that the prescriptive period started on May criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime
26, 1961, when the deed of sale was registered with the of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and
Register of Deeds of Lipa City. Hence, this petition for (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which carries an
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium
Appeals, filed by the People, through the Solicitor- and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
General. P5,000.00. This crime prescribes in ten (10) years
Among the authorities relied upon by the Court of [Article 90, Revised Penal Code]. Here, San Diego had
Appeals in dismissing petitioner's appeal is the case actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery
of Cabral v. Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, April 30, 1976, 70 after the document was registered in the Register of
SCRA 606, where the Supreme Court made a statement Deeds on August 26, 1948.
to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public xxx
document, the prescriptive period commences from the [Cabral v. Puno, supra at p. 609].
time the offended party had constructive notice of the Although the prescription of the crime was not squarely
alleged forgery after the document was registered with in issue in Cabral, it is apparent that the statement of the
the Register of Deeds. However, petitioner contends that Court on prescription and constructive notice was not
this particular statement is not doctrine but merely totally irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Moreover,
an obiter dictum. it is not without any legal basis.
The Cabral case stemmed from the filing on September The rule is well-established that registration in a public
24, 1974 of an information accusing Eugenio Cabral of registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is
the crime of falsification of public document for constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests,
allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are
the complainant Silvino San Andres in a deed of sale of a charged with knowledge of what it contains [Legarda and
parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Garcia v. Court of
quash the information on the ground of prescription of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22,
the crime, as the notarized deed of sale was registered 1980, 95 SCRA 380; Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
with the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948. After
74
Corporation v. Pauli, et al., G.R. No. L-38303, May 30, In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the
1988,161 SCRA 634; See also Sec. 52, Pres. Decree No. discovery of the same [Emphasis supplied].
1529 (1978)]. In Armentia v. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-18210, December
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that a purchaser of 29, 1966,18 SCRA 1253, where a notarial document
registered land is presumed to be charged with notice of recorded with the Registry of Deeds was sought to be
every fact shown by the record. The Court, in explaining annulled, the Court, interpreting the phrase "from the
the nature of the rule on constructive notice and the time of the discovery" found in the aforequoted provision
presumption arising therefrom stated in Gatioan v. of the Civil Code, ruled that "in legal contemplation,
Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28 1969, 27 SCRA discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the
706, 712-713, that: time the document was registered in the Register of
xxx Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice
to the whole world . . ." [See also Avecilla v. Yatco, 103
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such Phil. 666 (1958); Gerona v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-
record is constructive notice of its contents and all 19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153; Carantes v. Court
interests, legal and equitable, included therein ... of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33360, April 25, 1977, 76 SCRA
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser 514; Cultura v. Tupacar, G.R. No. L-48430, December 3,
has examined every instrument of record affecting the 1985,140 SCRA 311; Cimafranco v. IAC, G.R. No. L-
title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with 68687, January 31, 1987, 147 SCRA 611; Hongkong and
notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., supra.]
to know every fact which an examination of the record However, petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be Penal Code which states that "the period of prescription
overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise shall commence to run from the day the crime
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record is discovered by the offended party,the authorities, or
would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be their agents. . cannot be construed in the same manner
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the because the rule on constructive notice is limited in
record contains any more than one may be permitted to application to land registration cases. It is argued that
show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. haste should be avoided in applying civil law
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts presumptions to criminal suits.
which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule Although caution should be observed in applying the
must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless rules of construction in civil cases in the interpretation of
confusion and useless litigation. criminal statutes, the Court will not hesitate to do so if
xxx the factual and legal circumstances so warrant. Hence,
It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition in Mercado v. Santos, 66 Phil. 215 (1938), the Court
of the property of the deceased was executed by some of applied the presumption arising from the allowance of a
his heirs, the registration of the instrument of partition will to bar a criminal action. In theft particular case, the
with the Register of Deeds is constructive notice that said petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will of his
heirs have repudiated the fiduciary relationship between deceased wife. The will was duly probated. Sixteen (16)
them and the other heirs vis-a-vis the property in months thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against
question. The heirs who were not included in the deed of petitioner for falsification or forgery of the will.
partition are deemed to have notice of its existence from Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case claiming that
the time it was registered with the Register of Deeds [De the order probating the will is conclusive as to its
la Cerna v. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-28838, August 31, authenticity and due execution. The motion having been
1976, 72 SCRA 514]. Likewise, the rule on constructive denied, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
notice has been applied in the interpretation of a the Court of Appeals (CA) which ruled that "the
provision in the Civil Code on the prescription of actions judgment admitting the will to probate is binding upon
for annulment of contracts which is parallel to Art. 91 of the whole world as to the due execution and genuineness
the Revised Penal Code. The Civil Code provision states: of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are
Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought concerned, but not for the purpose of punishment of a
within four years. crime." But the Supreme Court reversed the CA decision
by ruling that, in accordance with See. 625 of the then
This period shall begin: Code of Civil Procedure which provides that "the
xxx allowance by the court of a will of real and personal
estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution," *** a
75
criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the It is evident that there is merit in petitioner's claim that
forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate the law on prescription of civil suits is founded on
by a court of competent jurisdiction. different policy considerations from that of the law on
It is, however, insisted in this case that the rule on prescription of criminal actions. However, the Court does
constructive notice applies only in civil cases. It is argued not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and
that the law on prescription of crimes is founded on a rules of interpretation used in the law on prescription of
principle different from that of the law on prescription in civil suits, including the rule on constructive notice, can
civil actions. The difference, it is claimed, precludes the not be applied in criminal actions.
application of the rule on constructive notice in criminal The considerations in providing for prescription of civil
actions. suits are based mainly on practical and equitable
The statute of limitations of civil actions was explained grounds. The lapse of a considerably long period of time
in Penales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. obscures the surrounding circumstances of a particular
73611, October 27, 1986, 115 SCRA 223, 228 in the claim or right and erodes the integrity of whatever
following manner: evidence may be presented in support of an action to
enforce or contest such claim or right. Moreover, where a
Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose particular right has accrued in favor of a party, the
whose object is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left on a
from springing up at great distances of time and precarious balance, always susceptible to possible
surprising the parties or their representatives when the challenge by an adverse party. After a certain period of
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or time fixed by law, the right enjoyed by a party must be
death or removal of witnesses . . . accorded respect by prohibiting adverse claims the
On the other hand, the Court in People v. Moran, 44 Phil. factual basis of which can no longer be verified with
389, 405-406 (1923), discussed the nature of the statute certainty. Hence, the law on prescription of civil suits is
of limitations in criminal cases as follows: properly called a statute of repose.
xxx The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best
. . . The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily evidence that can be obtained is also a major
and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that consideration in criminal trials. However, the law on
after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the prescription of crimes rests on a more fundamental
offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to principle. Being more than a statute of repose, it is an act
his country; and resume his immunities as a citizen; and of grace whereby the state, after the lapse of a certain
that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to
of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted prosecute the criminal act. While the law on prescription
out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be of civil suits is interposed by the legislature as an
liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only impartial arbiter between two contending parties, the law
because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and
of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender
the statute is a recognition and notification by the [People v. Moran, supra, at p. 405]. Hence, in the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that
out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted
positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. [People v. Moran, supra; People v. Parel, 44 Phil. 437
Independently of these views, it must be remembered (1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956)]. The
that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only application of the rule on constructive notice in the
productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would
justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere most certainly be favorable to the accused since the
natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned
the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale
statutes enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant
maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May
imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a
from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the public document having been filed only on October 18,
best evidence that can be obtained. 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961,
xxx the crime for which the accused was charged has
prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed
76
no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied
quashing the two informations on the ground of the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise
prescription. denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court
hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and
is AFFIRMED. prohibition. In the assailed decision of
SO ORDERED. 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of
merit. 6
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal
JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner, liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription.
vs. He avers that since the second marriage contract was
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in
HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, Presiding 1975,7such fact of registration makes it a matter of public
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world.
JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents. The offended party therefore is considered to have had
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco for constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of
petitioner. 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent. the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the
corresponding information for bigamy should have been
BELLOSILLO, J.: filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage concealment of the bigamous marriage" as declared by
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity Church in
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.1 Bigamy Marikina on
carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. 15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that
Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime from the moment of registration the marriage contract
prescribes in fifteen (15) years.2 The fifteen-year was open to inspection by any interested person.
prescriptive period commences to run from the day on On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the prescriptive period does not begin from the commission
authorities, or their agents . . .3 of the crime but from the time of discovery by
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems complainant which was in July 1991.
impliedly admitted.4 At least, it is not expressly denied. While we concede the point that the rule on constructive
Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his notice in civil cases may be applied in criminal actions if
prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred, which the factual and legal circumstances so warrant,8 we agree
hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken with the view expounded by the Court of Appeals that it
place from the time the offended party actually knew of cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the
the second marriage or from the time the document possibility of its being more favorable to the accused.
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with The appellate court succinctly explains —
the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of
notice. constructive notice should be applied in the case at bar,
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May principally citing in support of his stand, the cases
1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People
bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, v.Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 This Court is of the view that the principle of
February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the
Nievera remained valid and subsisting. 5 crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by
that his criminal liability for bigamy has been the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous
extinguished by prescription. subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is
generally entered into in a place where the offender is not
77
known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his various local civil registries all over the country to make
legal impediment to contract another marriage. certain that no second or even third marriage has been
In the case of real property, the registration of any contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate
transaction involving any right or interest therein is made spouse. This is too formidable a task to even
in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said contemplate.
property is located. Verification in the office of the More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property
Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions Registration Decree) provides for constructive notice to
involving the said property can easily be made by any all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry
verification by the offended person or the authorities of affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of
the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
marriage may be entered into in a place where the land to which it relates lies from the time of such
offender is not known to be still a married person. registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the provision either in Act
petitioner wherein constructive notice was applied, No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts.
involved therein were land or property disputes and 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the
certainly, marriage is not property. conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the
constructive notice rule to the documents registered in
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the the Civil Register.
principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well
entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there
liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the was no concealment at all because his marriage contract
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which
registration thereof would amount to almost absolving is open to all and sundry for inspection. We cannot go
the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the along with his argument because why did he indicate in
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be the marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously
open and made of public record by its registration, the hiding his true status as a married man? Or for that
offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the
officiating authority and those concerned the existence of subsequent marriage in Marikina so that everything
his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He
them that he is still a married person. He likewise knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform
conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous him to punishment under the Marriage Law. 10 Obviously,
marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to
married person. And such a place may be anywhere, his first spouse and gambled instead on the probability
under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous that she or any third party would ever go to the local civil
marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple
It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for expedience of having the second marriage recorded in
the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day the local civil registry, he has set into motion the running
on which the said crime was discovered by the offended of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary
party, the authorities or their agency (sic). and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by
by the offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing right
of bigamy were to be counted from the date of into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating
registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of
the said offense would almost be impossible. The conveyance and other similar documents without due
interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social
fearless violations of a social institution cherished and institution, the preservation of which is a primary
protected by law. 9 concern of our society.
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
notice will make questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the AFFIRMED.
marriages listed in the National Census Office and in SO ORDERED.
78
G.R. No. L-47684 June 10, 1941 hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be prosecuted before final
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- judgment in the basic case, it would be impossible to
appellant, determine the period of prescription — whether twenty
vs. years or five years — as either of these two periods is
DIONISIO A. MANEJA, defendant-appellee. fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the
defendant in the main case.
First Assistant Solicitor-General Reyes and Solicitor
Barcelona for appellant. The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the
Del Rosario & Del Rosario, Pelaez & Pelaez and offense of false testimony is the same, whether the
Hilario B. Abellana for appellee. defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or
Godofredo Reyes and Enrique Medina as private acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of pure
prosecutors. coincidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180 of
the Revised Penal Code — and the instant case falls on
MORAN, J.: one of them — uniformly presuppose a final judgment of
The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite
period of prescription for the offense of false testimony to the action ability of the crime of false testimony.
which, in the instant case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in Order of dismissal is reversed, and let the case be
relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings,
commence from the time the appellee, Dionisio A. without costs.
Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in
criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as the G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final vs.
in December, 1938, as the prosecution contends. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as
We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
one. The period of prescription shall commence to run Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal,
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91,
Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false CRUZ, J.:
testimony, considering that the penalties provided
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law
therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in
specifying the prescriptive period for violations of
every case, made to depend upon the conviction or
municipal ordinances.
acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of
testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial
actionable offense until the principal case is finally purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of
decided. (Cf. U. S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
People vs. Marcos, et al., G.R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable offense, The offense was allegedly committed on May 11,
it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended 1990.1 The referral-complaint of the police was received
party, the authorities or their agents. by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on
If the period of prescription is to be computed from the May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was
date the supposed false testimony is given, it would be filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on
impossible to determine the length of such period in any October 2, 1990. 3
particular case, depending, as it does depend, on the final The petitioner moved to quash the information on the
outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was
testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
murder. If the accused is found guilty, the penalty the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. 4
prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion In the present petition for review on certiorari, the
temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which petitioner first argues that the charge against her is
case the period of prescription is twenty years (art. governed by the following provisions of the Rule on
90, idem). On the other hand, if the accused is acquitted, Summary Procedure:
the penalty prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto
mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in
for prescription is only five years. Upon these the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
79
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive
following cases: period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint
xxx xxx xxx against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor
B. Criminal Cases: General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
2. Violations of rental law; Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
by law for the offenses charged does not exceed six a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability requisite preliminary investigation therein;
arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
xxx xxx xxx Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said
cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However,
by complaint or by information filed directly in court in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
without need of a prior preliminary examination or complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in In all cases such institution interrupts the period of
Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
shall be commenced only by information; Provided, Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent
further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office
oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase
sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party. "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases"
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled applies to all cases, without distinction, including those
"An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court
Begin to Run," reading as follows: of Appeals: 5
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-
following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal examined the question and, after mature consideration,
ordinances shall prescribe after two months. has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the should be, the one established by the decisions holding
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court,
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
the institution of judicial proceedings for its examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt
investigation and punishment. the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings even if the court where the complaint or information is
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
not constituting jeopardy. Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be complaint or information" without distinguishing
acts defining and penalizing violations of law not whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied) examination or investigation merely, or for action on the
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or
beyond the information is filed may only proceed to investigate the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
commission of the offense, the charge against her should proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to
have been dismissed on the ground of prescription. deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication
80
on account of delays that are not under his control. All However, the case shall be deemed commenced only
that the victim of the offense may do on his part to when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and
the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On not on any date before that.
the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-
incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are
last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988. instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
special cases," which plainly signifies that the section General that they include administrative proceedings. His
does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1
on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
the canon that words in a statute should be read in former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the
to discover the true legislative intent. Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
Procedure that among the offenses it covers are power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is substantive right. 7
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110. Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been
"offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the
obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum
vesting in such courts: period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By
contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four Rule on Summary Procedure.
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
That in offenses involving damage to property through proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility
criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from
twenty thousand pesos. their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary the problem here sought to be corrected.
Procedure.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its
complaint or information shall be filed directly in court alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two
without need of a prior preliminary examination or months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with
preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
81
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued
proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of
interrupted the period was the filing of the information the Committee to include the inventory and review of all
with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the
already prescribed. earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is
challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by
Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court high government officials like presence of marginal
of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the
ground of prescription. It is so ordered. borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. feasibility of the project for which financing is being
sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan
G.R. No. 140231 July 9, 2007 release was made."
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD Among the accounts referred to the Committee's
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), represented by Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, petitioner, transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, Office of the After it had examined and studied all the documents
Ombudsman-Manila, CONCERNED MEMBERS OF relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee
THE PNB BOARD OF DIRECTORS, REYNALDO classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as
TUASON, CARLOS CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO, behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and
JR., LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS BANAGA, inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's
JOHN DOES, and NORTHERN COTABATO investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained
SUGAR INDUSTRIES, INC. loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the
(NOCOSII), respondents. PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value
from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the
DECISION required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the
The Presidential Commission on Good General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note
Government1 (petitioner) filed the herein Petition of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo,
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site
assailing the Resolution2 dated May 21, 1999 of and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB;
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB No. 0-95-0890 that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the
which dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint for approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) about 6% of its obligation.
No. 30193 against concerned members of Philippine Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant
National Bank (PNB) Board of Directors and Northern Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Cotabato Sugar Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) officers, Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents.
namely: Reynaldo Tuason, Carlos Cajelo, Jose Barquillo, Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following
Jr., Loreto Solsona, Primicias Banaga and John Does provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019:
(respondents); and the Order4 dated July 23, 1999 which Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
The facts: by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the be unlawful:
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest xxx
Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the
behest loans, determine the parties involved and Government or giving any private party any unwarranted
recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
thereby. official, administrative or judicial functions through
82
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable 6. ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and WHICH ADOPTS THE "DISCOVERY RULE" SHALL
employees of offices or government corporations charged APPLY IN THIS CASE;
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. 7. THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER LOAN
xxx TRANSACTIONS IN THE NATURE OF BEHEST
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any LOANS ARE KEPT SECRET.8
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
officer profited or will profit thereby. not finding that a probable cause exists for violation by
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading the private respondents of section 3 (e) and (g) of RA
before the the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator 3019 despite the presence of clear, overwhelming and
Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the unrebutted evidence.9
case based on the available evidence. In its Comment, the Ombudsman, without delving on the
In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95- issue of prescription, in view of Presidential Ad Hoc
0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or Desierto (1999),10 contends that its finding of
lack of probable cause against the respondents and for insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause
prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto against respondents deserves great weight and respect,
approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999.5 and must be accorded full weight and credit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 6 but it was No comment was filed by the rest of the respondents.
denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, The issue before the Court is whether the Ombudsman
1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that: (a) the
July 23, 1999.7 offense leveled against respondents has prescribed; and
Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to this Court and (b) no probable cause exists against respondents.
in support of its petition alleges that: The petition is partly meritorious.
A) The Respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in discretion in dismissing the subject complaint on the
dismissing the complaint filed by the Petitioner on the ground of prescription.
ground of Prescription considering that: Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors
1. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER and Officers of NOCOSII are charged with violation of
BEHEST LOANS AS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH IS R.A. No. 3019, a special law. Amending said law,
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XI, SECTION Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,11 increased the
15, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years.
2. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive
TRUSTEE TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, 12 as amended, which
BENEFICIARY; provides:
3. THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
OF CONTINUING CRIMES AS THE STATE commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
CONTINUES TO SUFFER INJURY ON EACH DAY not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
OF DEFAULT IN PAYMENT. HENCE, the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY; and punishment.
4. PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
MUST BE PLEADED, OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
WAIVED; run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
5. PRESCRIPTION HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN constituting jeopardy.
THIS CASE. SINCE IT MAY BE WAIVED OR MAY The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the
NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE, THE OMBUDSMAN aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS THE Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,13 where the
COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION; Court held:
83
x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. information with the appropriate courts.18 Settled is the
No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere
made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the prosecutory powers without good and compelling
loans.' Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the reasons to indicate otherwise.19 Said exercise of powers
prescriptive period for the offenses with which is based upon his constitutional mandate20 and the courts
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not
computed from the discovery of the commission thereof only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
and not from the day of such commission. powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase 'if the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,
same not be known' in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory
not mean 'lack of knowledge' but that the crime 'is not proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will
reasonably knowable' is unacceptable, as it provides an grievously hamper the functions of the office and the
interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, courts, in much the same way that courts will be
which is written in a clear and unambiguous language swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion
and thus provides no room for interpretation but only on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided
application.14 to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.21
The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. While there are certain instances when this Court may
Desierto(2001),15 thus: intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when
necessary to afford adequate protection to the
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary
committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a
the government as the aggrieved party could not have prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the
known of the violations at the time the questioned acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo v. ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is
Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction
Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution
supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have dared rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are
to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc been denied,22 none apply here.
Committee on Behest Loans.
After examination of the records and the evidence
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason
second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
amended, provides that prescription is interrupted 'when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.16 No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a
Records show that the act complained of was discovered capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
in 1992. The complaint was filed with the Office of the tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.23 The exercise of
Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,17 or within three (3) years power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must
complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
years. positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.24
grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo, in dismissing the
cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that criminal complaint, as approved by Ombudsman
the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether Desierto, is worth-quoting, thus:
there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
84
Taking into consideration the provisions of representing 90% of NOCOSII's subscribed capital stock,
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order and assigned their subscription rights to future stocks in
No. 61, the subject transactions can not be classified as favor of PNB;26 (2) the Deed of Assignment dated
behest. September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII assigned its share
Evaluation of the records of this case reveals that the of sugar and molasses from the operation of its sugar
loans acquired by NOCOSII are actually foreign loans central located at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, North
from Midland Bank Ltd. of London. There were no direct Cotabato in favor of PNB;27 (3) the Joint and Solidary
loans released by PNB but merely credit Agreement dated September 5, 1975 whereby the
accommodations to guaranty the loans from Midland NOCOSII officers bound themselves jointly and
Bank. severally liable with the corporation for the payment of
NOCOSII's obligations to PNB;28 (4) the Real Estate
Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals offered by Mortgage dated October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII
NOCOSII are insufficient, it should be noted that under mortgaged various buildings, machineries and
PNB Board Resolution No. 689 dated July 30, 1975, one equipments, otherwise known as the NOCOSII Sugar
of the conditions imposed to NOCOSII was the execution Mill Plant, with an estimated value of P307,593,000.00
of contract assigning all NOCOSII's share of sugar and in favor of PNB;29 and (5) the Chattel Mortgage with
molasses to PNB. NOCOSII was also required to Power of Attorney dated October 2, 1981 whereby
increase its paid up capital at P5,000,000.00 a year NOCOSII mortgaged various transportation, agricultural
starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980 or a total and heavy equipment in favor of the PNB;30fourthly,
of P25,000,000.00. In addition thereto, the stockholders PNB imposed other conditions, such as, (1) the
of NOCOSII were required to pledge or assign all their submission by NOCOSII of the Central Bank's approval
present and future shares to PNB while the of its foreign loans; (2) the submission by NOCOSII of
accommodation remains standing. The proposed plant the required clearances from the National Economic
site which was offered as collateral was estimated to Development Authority (NEDA) and/or Presidential
cost P307,903,000.00. The foregoing collaterals offered Committee on Sugar Industry (PHILSUGIN); (3)
by NOCOSII are more than sufficient to cover the loans submission by NOCOSII of its milling contracts covering
of P333,465,260.00. a total area of not less than 14,000 hectares; (4)
Furthermore, since the loan was approved by PNB, it submission by NOCOSII of the government permit that
presupposes that all the required clearances were the planters can cultivate the required hectarage; (5)
submitted by NOCOSII including the clearance from the further increase in NOCOSII's total paid-in capital
Office of the President; and having complied with all the to P25,000,000.00 at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April
documentary requirements, NOCOSII became entitled to 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980; (6) deposit in NOCOSII's
the release of the loan. account with the PNB of all cash proceeds of NOCOSII's
Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was foreign loans the disposition of which shall be subject to
undercapitalized because its paid up capital was the bank's control; and, (7) designation by the PNB of its
only P50,000,000.00. Complainant, however, failed to own representatives in NOCOSII's Board of Directors
consider the other assets of NOCOSII which also form and its own comptroller who shall have the authority to
part of its capital. x x x25 control all disbursements and receipts of funds of
The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of NOCOSII.31
probable cause by the Ombudsman is borne out by the The herein assailed Orders being supported by
evidence presented by petitioner: firstly, there were no substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to
direct loans released by PNB but merely credit exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the
accommodations to guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports
from Midland Bank Ltd. of London; secondly, NOCOSII the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be
effectively came under government control since 1975 overturned.32
when PNB acquired a majority of the voting rights in WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as
NOCOSII and was given the power to appoint a to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21,
comptroller therein; thirdly, PNB's credit 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman
accommodations to NOCOSII between 1975 and 1981 in in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
the aggregate sum of P333,465,260.00 were sufficiently SO ORDERED.
secured by: (1) the Assignment of Subscription Rights
and/or Pledge of Shares dated September 5, 1975 G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
whereby NOCOSII officers pledged their shares of stock,
85
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated
vs. 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for
10
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had
TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents. deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
DECISION submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City
TINGA, J.: Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation
This is a Petition for Review of the resolutions of the
1
of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned
Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution,
Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
his subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2
Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. amended, which provides that violations penalized by
12
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this
both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the
on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18
for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the
account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not
amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the
upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail. 3
law contemplates judicial, and not administrative
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998,
Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa
4 more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no
Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City
5 information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the
Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had
only Tongson appeared and filed his counter- already prescribed. Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that
13
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner. 15
averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through
fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the
Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that same, stating that the offense had already prescribed
he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for
16
signatures on the said checks had been falsified. reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary
17
documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and
purportedly the same as the those appearing on the declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the
checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse
7
filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office
claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
Cawili's business associate.8
citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan. Thus, the Office of the
18
Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Office filed an information charging petitioner with
20
Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ The petition is meritorious.
explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of
First on the technical issues.
special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period
for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his
special act, does not provide for the prescription of the petition before the Court of Appeals substantially
offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to complies with the rules, the verification being intended
it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
governs the prescription of offenses penalized pleading are true and correct and not a product of the
thereunder. The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v.
23 imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that
Reyes, Jr., wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
24 this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency
proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the
judicial proceedings, and not the one before the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in
attaching to said motion an amended dismissing the petition on the ground that there was
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Still, 27 failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original
the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A
that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements plain reading of the petition before the
would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the
resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, a certified true
33
petition is patently without merit and the questions raised copy of which was attached as Annex "A." Obviously,
34
it was patently without merit and the questions are too ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is
unsubstantial to require consideration. tolled only upon filing of the information in court.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of
29
According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case
Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non- is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, wherein this Court ruled that
36
compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for
the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City preliminary investigation suspends the running of the
Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco
of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It case similarly involved the violation of a special law,
argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner
prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. notes. He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court
37
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide Olarte, we held that the filing of the complaint in the
47
When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
offenses under special laws which do not provide their preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read: does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In
accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after addition, even if the court where the complaint or
four years for those punished by imprisonment for more information is filed may only proceed to investigate the
than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender, and hence, the
48
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company
49
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-
50
and punishment. Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the
Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings both special laws, the Court ruled that the
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
constituting jeopardy. proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and
51
penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities
but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised
No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the
52
(4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
same be not known at the time, from the discovery criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the
thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that prescriptive period.
only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of
the prescriptive period. The following disquisition in the Interport
Resources case is instructive, thus:
53
inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on
24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year
institution of the criminal proceedings against the prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals
accused. These cases were followed by our declaration
44