Katarungang Pambarangay
by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority
MORATA vs GO
FACTS:
 October 5, 1982: SPS. Victor and Flora Go
- Filed a case against Petitioners, Julius Morata and Ma.
Luisa Morata for Sum of Money plus Damages
amounting to PhP 49, 400 at CFI Cebu
 Petitioners: Motion to Dismiss
- On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the
parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu Cityciting as
grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege
prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay
conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the
absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat
Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been
reached by the parties.
- The motion was opposed by private respondents.
 Respondent Judge Valeriano Tumol: denied the MTD
 MR: denied
 SC: by reason of MTDs denial
- Resolution dated Dec. 2, 1982: SC required
respondents to file an Answer, and likewise granted a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge
from requiring petitioners to file their answer and enter
into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154.
ISSUES:
1. W/N a conciliation proceeding under PD 1508 is also a
pre-requisite in filing a case in court for cases falling
under the RTC?
HELD: YES
"SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of
complaint. — No complaint, petition, action for
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the
parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by
the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly
to court in the following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property and support pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
Statute of Limitations." library
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.
— The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the same city
or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
except:
j Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now
" [1] Where one party is the government, or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
" [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and
the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
" [3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30
days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;
" [4] Offenses where there is no private offended
party:jgchanrobles.com.ph
" [5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime
Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the
Minister of Local Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2
and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all
types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same
city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction
whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that
should be compromised at the barangay level, in
contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon
over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon’s authority,
Section 2 of said law employed the universal and
comprehensive term "all", to which usage. We should neither
add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in
statutory construction that "where the law does not distinguish,
We should not distinguish."
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members
of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court
litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive
factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne
in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is
likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in
court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the
process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to
say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective.
Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would
stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages, as
in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his
case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid
the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed,
should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in
inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-
jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could
not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating
legislation.ch
There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the
Lupon "the authority to bring together the parties actually residing
in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes, . . .," its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon
as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would
bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives.
These objectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the
Lupon’s authority is exercised only in cases falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular
No. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, embodying
the directive "to desist from receiving complaints, petitions,
actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of
said Lupons," has been addressed not only to judges of city and
municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of first
instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and
courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial courts
under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president
Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated
November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:
"with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the
backlogs in the case of dockets of all government offices involved
in the investigation, trial and adjudication of cases, it is hereby
ordered that immediate implementation be made by all
government officials and offices concerned of the system of
amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No.
1508]." virtua1aw library
declare that the conciliation process at the barangay level,
prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint
in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the
exclusive competent of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts,
but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
UY vs CONTRERAS
FACTS:
 Felicidad Uy: subleased from Susana Atayde the other half
of the 2nd floor of the a building located at corner Reposo and
Oliman Streets, Makati
- She operated a beauty parlor
- Sublease Contract: expired on April 15, 1993
o However, she was not able to remove all her
movable properties
 April 17, 1993: An argument arose between Uy and Atayde
when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased
premises her remaining movable properties such as cabinets,
shelves, frames, a mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an
airconditioning casing
- Resulted to a scuffle between Uy and Atayde, and
several of Atayde’s employees, including Winnie Javier
(Private respondent)
 April 21, 1993: Private Respondents have themselves
medically examines for alleged injuries inflicted by Uy
 April 23, 1993: Private Respondents filed a Complaint with
the Barangay Captain of Valenzuela, Makati
 April 28, 1993: Confrontation Schedule
- Only Uy appeared
- Reset on May 26, 1993
 May 11, 1993: Office of the Prov. Prosec of Rizal filed 2
Informations for Slight Physical Injuries against Uy with MTC
Makati, Br. 61
 May 21, 1993: Judge Maximo Contreras ordered Uy to
submit her Counter-Aff
 Uy’s CounterAffidavit:
1. Petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing
of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation
proceedings as she and the private respondents are
residents of Manila
2. She also attached to it a certification by the barangay
captain of Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that
there was an ongoing conciliation between Atayde and
the petitioner in Barangay Case No. 1023
 Uy: filed a Motion to Dismiss for non-compliance with the
requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as a ground
 MTC Judge: denied MTD
 MR: denied
 SC: Certiorari
ISSUE: W/N respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the
motion to dismiss considering that the private respondents failed
to comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now
embodied in Section 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991
and further required under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
HELD: YES
The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally
governed by P.D. No. 1508 which was enacted on 11 June 1978.
However, the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically
Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof,[13] revised the law on
the katarungang pambarangay. As a consequence of this
revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed pursuant to
Section 534(b) of the Code.
In the proceedings before the court a quo, the petitioner and the
respondents had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further
invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of
the decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her
instant petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the private
respondents, realizing the weakness of their position under P.D.
No. 1508 since they did refer their grievances to what might
be a wrong forum under the decree, changed tack. In their
Comment, they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a
complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of
BarangayValenzuela,Makati, in compliance with the requirement
s of theKatarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Govern
ment Code."[20] Yet, in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd,
which is condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor, they
assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases before the
court a quo because (a) the petitioner and respondent Atayde are
not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality; (b) the
law does not apply when the action, as in the said cases, may
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even
assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she
has substantially complied with it.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have
exerted enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents
if prior referral to the lupon was necessary before filing the
informations.
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total
unawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991, more
specifically on the provisions on the katarungang
pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken judicial
notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to take
judicial notice of "the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines." We have ruled
that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. [21] He
should have applied the revised katarungang
pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991.
Had he done so, this petition would not have reached us and
taken valuable attention and time which could have been
devoted to more important cases.
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the
first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the
mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight
physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati
at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May
1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section
412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge
Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss the
criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge
under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section
412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states
that the parties may go directly to court where the action is
about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated,
pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the
prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a
maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the
private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of
Valenzuela, Makati.
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of
barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are
estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they
themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of
the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation
hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial
court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on
the barangay conciliation system.
Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged
physical injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would
only be slight physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of
the Revised Penal Code, considering that per the medical
certificates[22] the injuries sustained by the private respondents
would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of complication" and
there is no showing that the said injuries incapacitated them for
labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The
penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos and censure." These penalties
are light under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and would
prescribe in two months pursuant to Article 90.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17
April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two
months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the
filing of the private respondents' complaints with the lupon of
Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically
suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no
mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period
of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is
issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days
within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such
offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the
respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b),
Section 412 of the Local Government Code.
Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent
Judge that the petitioner "had already waived the right to a
reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela,
Makati, considering that the accused and the complainant
are residents of different barangays." The petitioner did not waive
the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela,
Makati; she submitted to it and attended the
scheduledconciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-
condition of referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.[23]
Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private
respondents that the parties could not agree on a compromise and
that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a
certification to file action.[24] The request is
dated 23 June 1993,[25] or nearly one and a half months after
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the
court a quo. Evidently, this was done to support their contention in
the said court that, in any event, there was substantial compliance
with the requirement of referral to thelupon. It must be stressed
that the private respondents, after failing to appear at the initial
confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed, had no
right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.
The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.
Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the
vital role which the revised katarungang pambarangay law plays
in the delivery of justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace,
stability, and progress therein, and in effectively preventing or
reducing expensive and wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes
cognizable by thelupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the
remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors should
exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it, and trial
courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for
non-compliance thereof.
WINGARTS vs MEJIA
FACTS:
 Johan L.H Wingarts and Ofelia Wingarts: jointly filed 3
letter complaints against Judge Servillano Mejia of MTC Sta.
Maria, Bulacan
- These complaints were offshoot of the 3 criminal cases
decided by Judge Mejia involving Wingarts and Col.
Rodulfo Munar
a. Malicious Mischief and Grave Threats:
Wingarts was the accused for both cases
b. Usurpation of Authority: Countercharge of
Wingarts
 1ST Administrative Complaint (relative to Malicious
Mischief)
1. Judge was charged with Malicious Delay in the
administration of justice.
2. The case allegedly dragged for one year and four months
in respondent's sala and was ultimately dismissed in a
decision dated June 8, 1994.
 2nd Administrative Complaint (relative to Grave Threats)
1. incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority for taking cognizance of Criminal Case No.
2664, entitled "People vs. Leo Wingarts," for grave
threats and for issuing a warrant of arrest against him
despite lack of prior barangay conciliation. The said case
was later dismissed and indorsed to the barangay official
concerned.
 3rd Administrative Complaint (relative to Usurpation)
1. unjust decision in usurpation of authority.
 Judge Mejia: COMMENT
1. he took cognizance of the case for Grave Threats in the
belief that there had been substantial compliance with
the requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
since a certification of the barangay captain regarding a
confrontation of the parties, the fact that no amicable
settlement was reached by them, and that he was
endorsing the filing of the case in court, had been duly
submitted to respondent judge
(hindi ko na nilagay mga di related sa LGC)
 Office of the Court Administrator:
o Charge of incompetence, ignorance of the law and
abuse of authority: meritorious
 Had respondent Judge exercised greater
prudence, he could have known at the
outset that under Art. 408 (c), Chapter 7,
Title One, Book III, R.A. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of
1991 (The Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law), offenses punishable
by imprisonment not exceeding one (1)
year or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) require prior barangay
conciliation. The crime of grave threats
punishable under Art. 282 of the Revised
Penal Code falls within the (p)urview of that
section.
 Had respondent Judge observed the
mandate of the aforequoted provision of
law he could have remanded the case to
the lupon instead of taking cognizance
thereof and prematurely issuing the
warrant of arrest against the accused.
 Administrative Sanction: was imposed against Judge Mejia
ISSUES:
1. W/N Judge Mejia is liable for incompetence and
ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of the
case for Grave Threats despite the legal obstacles
thereto?
HELD: YES
Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faith, bias or
partiality on his part, respondent judge should have exercised the
requisite prudence, especially under the environmental
circumstances of the aforesaid criminal case where personal
liberty was involved. He should have carefully examined all
relevant facts and issues and avoided the improvident issuance of
the warrant of arrest without a circumspect review of the case
which, after all, did not exhibit abstruse factual matters or
complicated legal questions. The present controversy could have
been avoided had he kept faith with the injunction that a member
of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and
jurisprudential developments because the learning process in law
never ceases.
In the present case, assuming that he did not act with malice or
bad faith and that he subsequently issued an order to recall the
warrant or prevent the arrest of complainant, such considerations
can mitigate but will not altogether exculpate him from the charge
of incompetence and ignorance of the law, which accordingly
warrants the imposition of an appropriate penalty on him. If judges
wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will not
only be confusion in the administration of justice but even
oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.
Moreover, judges are directed to desist from improvidently
receiving and desultorily acting on complaints, petitions,
actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa. 15We have repeatedly ruled that
the proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the
filing of any action or proceeding in court or other
government office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filed without
compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on
motion of any interested party on the ground that it fails to
state a cause of action. 16
In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately
penalized for his regrettably erroneous action in connection with
Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedly stressed
that a municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial
arm that is closest in reach to the public he serves, and he must
accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost
probity. 20Any kind of failure in the discharge of this grave
responsibility cannot be countenanced in order to maintain the
faith of the public in the judiciary, especially on the level of courts
to which most of them resort for redress.
WHEREFORE respondent Judge Servillano M. Mejia is
ORDERED to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00),
with a STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.