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PEOPLE V. EDNA MANGLAN
G.R. No. 170470, 26 September 2006, J. Chico-Nazario
PRINCIPLE: Article 14, Aggravating Circumstances – By
means of Inundation, Fire, Etc.
Around 4:45 a.m. on 2 January 2001 when Bernado and his
tanods saw Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Separa with her
head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the house
of her employer at Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have
boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified
as Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have
instructed that she be brought to Nipa St., but upon arrival there,
she changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to
Balasan St. where she finally alighted. 30 mins later,Barangay
Chairman Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the
house of the employer of the housemaid. When the chairman
returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a report form pedicab
driver Gruta who was also a tanod, that shortly before the
occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid) coming
out of the house. Edna was brought to the Barangay Hall and
thereafter admitted that she is the one who started the fire
because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and
that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer
told her just rid a broomstick in going home. (Burned the house
by lighting a crumpled newspaper and threw them on top of the
table inside the house).
The fire resulted in the destruction of the house of Separa and
other adjoining houses and the death of Separa Spouses and
their 4 children.
RTC Ruling: Edna is guilty of the crime of arson with multiple
homicide (death penalty)
CA Ruling: Affirmed with modification on the award of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged.
There is no crim of arson with multiple homicide. The
information in this case erroneously charged with a complex
crime. There 2 laws that govern the crime of arson where death
results therefrom Article 320 as Mended by RA 7659 and
Section 5 PD 1613.
RPC Art. 320: Destructive Arson: If as a consequence of the
commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death
results, the mandatory of penalty of death shall be imposed
PD 1613: Sec. 5 (Simple Arson): Where Death results from
arson: if by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed.
Art. 320 of the RPC as amended, with respect to destructive
arson, and the provisions of PD No .1613 respecting other cases
of arson provide only one penalty for the commission of arson,
whether considered destructive or otherwise, where death
results therefrom. The raison d’tre is that person is itself the end
and death is simply the consequence. Accordingly, in cases
where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was / were perpetrated whether arson,
murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor: (1) if the main objective is
the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by
reason or on the occasion of arson, the crim is simply arson
and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (2) if on the other
hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who
may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as
the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is
arson only; and (3) if the object is likewise to kill a particular
person and in fact the offender has done so, but fire is
resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there
are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide /
murder or arson.
From the reading of the body of the information, “that on or about
2 January 2001, the said accused with intent to cause damage,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully x x x and deliberately set
fire upon the two-storey residential house of Separa x x x.
As stated in the information, accused was charged with having
intentionally burned the house of Separa. Said conflagration
likewise spread and destroyed 7 adjoining houses.
Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may
be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple
arson. Such is the case notwithstanding the error in the
designation of the offense in the information, the
information remains effective insofar as it states the facts
constituting the crime alleged therein. What is controlling
is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violate, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited.
There is, thus a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC
as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613 categorically provides that the penalty
to be imposed for simple arson is reclusion perpetua to death.
No aggravating alleged in the information, the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua.
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TOPIC: Aggravating Circumstances (Evident Premeditation)
[G.R. No. 132568. February 6, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MATT G. CAMPOMANES and EDWIN D.
ROSITA, accused-appellants.
FACTS:
On December 30, 1994, at around 10:30 p.m., Aureada, a
security guard at the Rizal Park, was guarding the area around
the monument of Dr. Jose Rizal when he saw Matt
Campomanes, a park photographer, running after Loreto
Alkonga, also a park photographer.[4] Campomanes caught
Alkonga and grabbed the latters collar, causing both of them to
lose their balance and fall on the ground, about three (3) meters
away from Aureada.[5] Aureada blew his whistle, but the two,
instead of stopping, began grappling for Alkongas camera and
hitting each other using the same.[6] Aureada then saw Edwin
Rosita, another park photographer, arrive. Rosita appeared very
angry, and brought out a balisong or fan knife, pointing the same
in the direction of Alkonga.[7] Aureada tried to fire a warning shot
but his rifle misfired. Seeing what Aureada was trying to do,
Rosita instead went after the latter who started running
away.[8] Aureada took his mobile radio and called the park
security patrol. Then Aureada saw Rosita begin stabbing
Alkonga who was sitting on the ground with his arms raised and
held by Capomanes.[9] After Rosita stabbed the victim several
times, he, together with Campomanes, ran towards Manila
Hotel. Shortly thereafter, they were apprehended by the park
security patrol.

Meanwhile, Aureada brought Alkonga to the Philippine General
Hospital. Thereafter, he went to the headquarters of his security
agency near the Rizal Park where he identified the two accused,
Rosita and Campomanes, as the perpetrators of the
crime.[10]Alkonga died in the hospital at 2:00 a.m. the following
day due to multiple stab wounds.[11]
Prosecution witness SPO2 Roberto Gutierrez testified that at
about 1:00 a.m. on December 31, 1994, and while he was on
duty at the Ermita Police Station, he took the sworn statement
of Renante Aureada regarding the stabbing of one Loreto
Alkonga. While making a sworn statement, Aureada identified
Rosita as the one who stabbed Alkonga, and Matt Campomanes
as the one who held the arms of Alkonga while the latter was
being stabbed.[12]
SPO2 Jose Bagkus was the night shift investigator on duty at
the Homicide Division of the Western Police District
on December 31, 1994. His testimony corroborated that of
SPO2 Gutierrez on material points, particularly the identification
by Aureada of Rosita as the one who stabbed Alkonga, and of
Campomanes as the one who held the arms of the victim while
the latter was being stabbed.[13] Aureada gave a sworn
supplemental statement of the same tenor in the presence of
SPO2 Bagkus.
Anent the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant
contends that it is plain error on the part of the lower court to
appreciate the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
on the basis of the presence of conspiracy. The Solicitor
General joins in this contention but alleges instead the presence
of treachery to qualify the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not evident premeditation was attendant in
the commission of the crime to qualify it to murder
RULING: Evident premeditation may be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance after the following requisites are
sufficiently established: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [32] It is true
that where conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the
attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and
means of executing the crime, the existence of evident
premeditation can be taken for granted.[33] However, where no
such evidence exists, and where conspiracy is merely inferred
from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the crime, as
in the case at bar, the above requisites of evident premeditation
need to be established.[34] A careful perusal of the records of this
case shows that evident premeditation was not sufficiently
proven, and thus, may not be appreciated.
We agree, however, with the Solicitor General that treachery is
present. There are two conditions for the existence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, viz: (1) the employment of
the means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate
and conscious adoption of the means of execution. [35]
In the case at bar, eyewitness Aureada testified that when the
victim was stabbed by Rosita, said victim was in a sitting position
with arms raised and held by Campomanes.
ATTY. NOGALES:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you see him (Rosita) actually stab Loreto Alkonga?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far were you?
A 5 meters away, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
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Q Was that the first time he stabbed Loreto Alkonga after Edwin
Rosita failed to get to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q That was the first time?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. NOGALES:
Q And will you please tell the court the relative position between
(sic) Edwin Rosita and Loreto Alkonga when the first stabbed
Loreto Alkonga?
A Loreto Alkonga was then sitting at the back of the monument
with arms raised which were being held by Matt Campomanes
and in that situation he was being stabbed by Edwin Rosita.
Q Now, if you are Edwin Rosita, how will you please
demonstrate to the court how he was stabbing Alkonga?
A (witness demonstrating by stooping while he was stabbing
Loreto Alkonga with his right hand and going at the other side
and stabbing Loreto Alkonga).[36]
It is clearly deducible from the foregoing that the manner by
which the victim was killed was deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused to ensure the execution of the dastardly
act without affording the victim any opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate. In a sitting position with arms restrained by one of
the accused, the victim becomes a helpless and defenseless
object of the attack. It is immaterial that the victim initially
grappled with Campomanes and was even able to hit the latter
with the camera. Crucial is the moment when Rosita came with
a bladed weapon, and with the victim in a sitting position with his
arms raised and held by Campomanes, said victim was
repeatedly stabbed by Rosita. Such manner of killing had been
declared by this Court in a plethora of cases to be attended by
treachery.
---------------------------xxx-----------------------
CRAFT FRAUD OR DISGUISE
GR. No. 196735, August 03, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANILO
FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA,
CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, AND
ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN PROMULGATED: ALVIR,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS., Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS: On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the
afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were
eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library
of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were
attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and
lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his
injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of
the Scintilla Juris fraternity and separate informations were also
filed against them for the attempted and frustrated murder of
Sigma Rho fraternity members.
LOWER COURT RULING
RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted
murder. Others were acquitted. The case against Guerrero was
ordered archived by the court until his apprehension. CA
affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: W/N "masks and/or other forms of disguise" as an
aggravating circumstance must be appreciated.
HELD: In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating
circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to

remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his
crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that
tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell
off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging
disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a
concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of
disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently
apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they
were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the
accused were not wearing masks is also not violative of their
right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused.
Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the act of
all." This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan
to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to
prove that some of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of
murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder. All that is
needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements
of the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient
details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26, 2010 is
AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano,
Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva, Warren L.
Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-
61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case
Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and
Q95-61137.
--------------------------xxx------------------------
Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los
Santos, and Joselito Tamayo vs. People of the Philippines
and Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108280-83 / 16 November 1995./ Justice Puno
Art. 14 – Aggravating Circumstances – Abuse of Superior
Strength
FACTS:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political
polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This
was the time when the newly-installed government of President
Corazon C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies,
demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos loyalists,"
supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension
and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into
violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen
Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in
court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists
charging them with the murder of Salcedo.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was
scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists.
Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their
application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback,
three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the
Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by
Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an
impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered
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speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy
Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked
the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced.
Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to
disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this
was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said
"Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega
added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the
crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The
loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and
threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards
Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized.
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the
Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie
Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President
Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and
informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered
them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she
continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin,
Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos,
Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!"
A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police.
Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A
commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor,
saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the
"Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man
wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons
shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!"
The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers
appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and
boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate
himself from the group but they again pounced on him and
pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various
parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician
at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the
maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the
maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones
in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which
Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a
while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them.
But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as
another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de
los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked
him even as he was already fallen. Salcedo tried to stand but
accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear.
Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting:
"Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!" Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but
the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo
boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more
fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick
him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly
boxed him. Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the
victim but did not notice what he did.
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and
wipe off the blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps
and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary
of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar
pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded
for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo
ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?"
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued
along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost
consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help

of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila
but he was refused admission. So they took him to the Philippine
General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He
sustained various contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and
skull fractures
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and
several press people, both local and foreign. The press took
pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news
the following day, capturing national and international attention.
This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional
Command and the Western Police District to investigate the
incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put
up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for
persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the
killers. Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato
Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their
identification, several persons, including the accused, were
apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their
participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their
respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was
not in any of the photographs presented by the prosecution
because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon City.
Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time
of the incident. Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was
allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures
to be developed at that time. He claimed to be afflicted with
hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do
things forcefully. Richard de los Santos admits he was at the
Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. He
said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his
face appeared in some of the photographs. Unlike the other
accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a
member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended
the rally on that fateful day. According to him, he saw Salcedo
being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the
incident. His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the
maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. Joel Tan also testified that he
tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The
maulers however ignored him
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision
finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los
Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of
murder qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years
10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was
likewise convicted as an accomplice
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on December 28, 1992,
modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer
but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for
Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court
found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because
the information against him did not allege the said qualifying
circumstance.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the aggravating circumstance of abuse of strength is
present in this case.
HELD:
Yes, it is present.
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were
numerous by as much as fifty in number and were armed with
stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of
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their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any
attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They followed
Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument
several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was
already fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo
was able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe
off the blood from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue
him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he
find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from
his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang
in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his
pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and
prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim
qualifies the killing to murder.
Other aggravating cirumstances discussed:
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated
in the instant case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo
was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the
assailants' safety from any defense the victim could have made.
True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and unexpected but it
was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow
t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against
the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate
court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the
temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he,
unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person being attacked.
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was
alleged in the information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the
attack against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred
by the raging animosity against the so-called "Coryistas." It was
not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among
appellants. At the time they were committing the crime, their
actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a
concerted effort to bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a
conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who among
the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to
sustain a conviction. Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts
of the others regardless of the intent and character of their
participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
-----------------------------xxx--------------------------
G.R. No. 175980 February 15, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ADRIANO
CABRILLAS, Accused, BENNY CABTALAN, Appellant.
ART. 14. Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery
DEL CASTILLO
FACTS
Version of the Prosecution
Prosecution witness Wilfredo Pacayra (Wilfredo) narrated that
on July 11, 1999 at around 7:00 p.m., he went to the store of
Susan Cabtalan (Susan) to buy salt. While thereat, Benny and
Adriano asked him to join them in their drinking spree to which
Wilfredo obliged. In the course of their drinking spree, Wilfredo
noticed that Benny and Adriano had bolos, locally known as
sundang, tucked on their waists. He also heard the two talking
about their plan to assault someone that same night. Sensing
that something wrong would happen, Wilfredo left them and
walked home.
Upon reaching his house, Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and
Adriano circling the house of Jesus Cabujat’s (Jesus) daughter,
Elena Raypan (Elena), which is just about two arms length away

from his house. Thereafter, the duo stood on a dark portion of
the road. Later on, he saw Jesus and his 9-year-old
granddaughter Jonalyn C. Raypan (Jonalyn) walking towards
the house of Jonalyn’s mother, Elena. Jesus stopped and turned
towards a grassy area to urinate when suddenly, Benny and
Adriano emerged from their hiding place. They held Jesus by his
shoulders and alternately stabbed him. At that moment, Jesus
shouted "I am wounded, please help me because I was stabbed
by Benny and Adriano." Jesus then fell to the ground while
Benny and Adriano immediately fled from the crime scene.
For her part, prosecution witness Jonalyn narrated that on the
night of the incident, she fetched her grandfather Jesus from her
Ate Susan’s house. She and her grandfather walked side by side
in going back to their house. However, upon reaching the vicinity
of their house, her grandfather went across the street to urinate.
It was then that she saw Benny and Adriano on the same street.
She knew the two because Benny and her father are cousins
while Adriano and her mother are also cousins. She saw the two
men take hold of her grandfather’s arms, after which Benny
stabbed her grandfather with a long bolo. She heard her
grandfather say "Donie, help me, I am wounded." After that,
Jonalyn saw Benny go home.
Elena also testified that when she heard her father shouting for
help, she immediately went outside the house and saw Benny
releasing her father. As she got nearer to Jesus, Benny and
Adriano ran away. When Elena asked her father as to who
stabbed him, the latter replied that it was Benny and Adriano.
Jesus was rushed to a hospital where he was pronounced dead
due to multiple stab wounds. His family spent ₱18,500.00 for his
wake and burial. At the time of his death, Jesus was earning
₱1,000.00 a week as a farmer.
A case for murder was accordingly filed against Benny and
Adriano and a warrant was issued for their arrest which was,
however, returned unserved since they could no longer be
located. It appears that on July 13, 1999, at around noontime,
Benny and Adriano escaped by ferryboat to Catbalogan, Samar.
Two years later, or on July 31, 2001, Benny was arrested in Las
Piñas City by virtue of an alias warrant of arrest.
RTC Ruling
On August 29, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision
convicting Benny of the crime of murder. The trial court
appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery since the attack upon Jesus who was unarmed and
unsuspecting was without any warning. It also found the
existence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength as both Benny and Adriano held, subdued and attacked
the 69-year-old defenseless Jesus. The trial court further held
that conspiracy was evident since Benny and Adriano had
common criminal intent and were united in its execution.
CA Ruling
The CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction through
its August 29, 2006 Decision. However, it did not anymore
consider the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength as the qualifying circumstance of treachery already
absorbed it.
ISSUE
Whether treachery attended the killing as to qualify the crime to
murder.
SC RULING
The appeal lacks merit.
Treachery attended the killing of Jesus, hence, the crime
committed is murder.
Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person, which
is not parricide or infanticide, committed with any of the
Page 5 of 21
attendant circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, among which is treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the victim might make. "The essence of treachery is that
the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape."
Based on the account of the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, there
is no doubt that treachery was present. It was established that
Benny and Adriano were in the crime scene prior to the incident.
They hid in a dark portion of the road and assaulted Jesus with
their bolos while he was urinating with his back to them. They
even held him by his shoulders to render him defenseless and
unable to resist the attack on him by his assailants.
All told, Jesus was unaware of the imminent peril to his life and
was rendered incapable of defending himself. From the
suddenness of the attack upon Jesus and the manner it was
committed, there is no doubt that treachery indeed attended his
killing.
The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses
usually remains undisturbed.
The trial and appellate courts reached the same conclusion that
the testimonies of eyewitnesses Wilfredo and Jonalyn deserve
credence as both narrated in a straightforward manner the
details of Benny and Adriano’s attack upon Jesus. Benny,
however, still disputes the credibility of these witnesses by
pointing out that Wilfredo’s testimony that he and Adriano took
turns in stabbing Jesus differs from that of Jonalyn who stated
that while the two assailants attacked Jesus in unison, it was
only Benny who inflicted the mortal wounds. The Court,
however, finds this inconsistency to pertain merely to the
manner the fatal stab wounds were inflicted on Jesus. The
materiality of the assailants’ exact position during their attack on
the victim is a trivial and insignificant detail which cannot defeat
the witnesses’ positive identification of Benny as one of the
assailants. Besides, "[i]t is perfectly natural for different
witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying
details as there may be some details which one witness may
notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact,
jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of
narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their
testimonies were [fabricated] and rehearsed."
Benny’s assertion that Wilfredo is not a credible witness since
he surfaced three years after the incident to testify for the
prosecution also fails to impress. It is worthy to mention that the
proceedings in this case was suspended for two years because
Benny and Adriano left Pinabacdao, Samar and the warrant for
their arrest could not be served on them. Also, deference or
reluctance in reporting a crime does not destroy the truth of the
charge nor is it an indication of deceit. Delay in reporting a crime
or an unusual incident in a rural area is well-known. It is common
for a witness to prefer momentary silence for fear of reprisal from
the accused. The fact remains that Wilfredo fulfilled his duty as
a good member of society by aiding the family of Jesus when
they were seeking justice. In the absence of other
circumstances that would show that the charge was a mere
concoction and that Wilfredo was impelled by some evil motives,
delay in testifying is insufficient to discredit his testimony.
The fact that Wilfredo and Jonalyn are related to the victim also
does not diminish their credibility. While admittedly, Wilfredo is
a relative of the husband of Julita, who is the daughter of Jesus,

and Jonalyn is Jesus’s granddaughter, relationship per se does
not evince ulterior motive nor does it ipso facto tarnish the
credibility of witnesses. "Mere relationship to a party cannot
militate against the credibility of witnesses or be taken as
destructive of the witnesses’ credibility." What matters is that
Wilfredo and Jonalyn positively identified Benny and Adriano as
the assailants of Jesus and that they testified in a straightforward
manner. These indicate that the two are telling the truth.
As to the inconsistencies in Elena’s testimony and in her affidavit
as to who asked her father the identity of the assailants, the
same deserves scant consideration. It is settled that "affidavits
or statements taken ex parte are generally considered
incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to
testimony given in court, and whenever there is inconsistency
between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the
testimony commands greater weight." The trial court therefore
did not err in affording more credence to Elena’s testimony given
in open court despite her having previously executed an affidavit
which was inconsistent with her testimony. To stress, "appellate
courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts with regard
to the assessment of credibility of witnesses. The reason for this
is that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grilling examination."
Benny’s defense of alibi was properly rejected.
"Alibi is the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to concoct
and difficult to disprove." For this defense to prosper, proof that
the accused was in a different place at the time the crime was
committed is insufficient. There must be evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be within the immediate vicinity
of the crime during its commission.
Here, Benny did not satisfactorily demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the
night of its commission. While he denies being at the scene of
the crime when it happened, he claims to be within a reasonably
near area which is his residence in Barangay Pilaon. The murder
of Jesus occurred in Barangay Laygayon, which is more or less
3½ kilometers away from the place where Benny claimed he
was in. Benny testified that the distance between these two
barangays can be covered in an hour’s walk. Thus, even if he
traveled by foot to another barangay, it was still not too far away
to render it physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene
at the time of its commission. Furthermore, Benny’s alibi is
uncorroborated. "Courts may give credence to alibi only if there
are credible eyewitnesses who can corroborate the alibi of
accused." In contrast, alibi becomes weaker in the face of the
positive identification made by the witnesses for the prosecution,
as in this case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 29, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00039 that affirmed with
modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, is AFFIRMED with further
modifications. Appellant Benny Cabtalan is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jesus Cabujat the
following: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages; (3) ₱ 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (4) ₱
25,000.00 as temperate damages; and (5) interest on all
damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Page 6 of 21
-------------------------------xxx-------------------------------
ART. 14. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY
PEOPLE VS. VILLACORTA
G.R. No. 186412 Sept. 7, 2011
LEONARDo-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Villacorta was charged with the crime of murder. The Information
stated that Villacorta, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed
Danilo Cruz, thereby inflicting serious wounds which caused
immediate death. Upon arraignment, Villacorta pleaded not
guilty.
Immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta, Cruz was
rushed to and treated as an out-patient at Tondo Medical
Center. It was only after 22 days that Cruz was admitted to San
Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where
he died the following day. Dr. Belandres, Head of the Tetanus
Department at the San Lazaro Hospital, testified that, using
Cruz’s medical chart and diagnosis, he was able to determine
that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound. The
prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical
treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center,
subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other
hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound, or
Cruz’s activities within the 22 days.
RTC: Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Danilo Cruz of P50,000 as civil indemnity plus the
costs of suit.
CA: Affirmed in toto the RTC judgment against Villacorta.
Hence, this appeal before the SC.
ISSUE: WON Villacorta is guilty of murder, qualified by
treachery
RULING (NO)
We do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, there
is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event
he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held
liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus
infection, and not the stab wound. Proximate cause has been
defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in
the early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and
treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On
February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro
Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he
died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution
did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment
Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits
by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-

up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities
between January 23 to February 14, 2002.
There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the
stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro
Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If
Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then
the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days
later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has
a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that
exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have
one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only
deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely the remote cause,
and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the
proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.
Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1)
of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon
Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a
finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries
may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily
included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight
physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting
the offense of murder. We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable
for attempted or frustrated murder because the prosecution was
not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. The intent must be
proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor.
The onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant but on the
prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should
not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove
this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking
but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but
physical injuries only. Evidence on record shows that Cruz was
brought to Tondo Medical Center for medical treatment
immediately after the stabbing incident. Right after receiving
medical treatment, Cruz was then released by the Tondo
Medical Center as an out-patient. There was no other evidence
to establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or
required medical attendance for more than nine days. Without
such evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.
We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it
being sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved during
trial. The Information specified that accused, armed with a
sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one
DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ. Treachery exists when an offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense
that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what
must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed,
namely: (1) the employment of such means of execution as
would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense
or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of
the means of execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying
circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of
expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the
victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the
Page 7 of 21
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Likewise,
even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive
is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this
case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was
attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without provocation.
With the aggravating circumstance of treachery, we can
sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto
menor in the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30)
days. Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta a straight
sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; but given that
Villacorta has been in jail since July 31, 2002 until present time,
already way beyond his imposed sentence, we order his
immediate release.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, affirming the Decision
dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding
Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
slight physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266
of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of thirty (30) days arresto menor. Considering that Villacorta has
been incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein
imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to
cause Villacortas immediate release, unless Villacorta is being
lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within
five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance with
such order. Villacorta is ordered to pay the heirs of the late
Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00).
----------------------------xxx---------------------
PEOPLE V. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ
G.R. No. 139542, 21 June 2001, J. Gonzaga-Reyes
PRINCIPLE: Article 14, Aggravating Circumstances – Treachery
On about 2:30 p.m, 31 October 1998, both the families of Noel
Andres and that of Gonzales were on their way to the exit of the
Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection near the Garden of
Remembrance, while Gonzales was turning left towards the exit
and Andres was headed straight along the road to the exit, their
vehicles almost collided. Gonzales continued driving while
Andres drove behind for some time and cut him off when he
found the opportunity to do so. Andres then get out of the
vehicle and knocked on the appellants car window.
Prosecution: Andres calmly told Gonzales to be careful with his
driving and that he was with his family. He saw Gonzales turning
red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle when he
was blocked by Gonzales son (said anong problema sa erpat ko
kineme). Andres testified that he felt threatened so he
immediately boarded his vehicle and partially opened the car
window just wide enough to talk back to Gonzales son.
Suddently, one of his passengers said binaril kame. He turned
to his wife and saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned
around and saw his son and nephew wounded.
Defense: It was Andres who cut Gonzales path by positioning
the FX obliquely along his lane. Andres went out from the car

and cursed them (Shutang ina mes, mashonda ka na di ka
marunong magmaneho, bobita ka – ganern). Gonzales stayed
inside the car and replied (pasensya na bes, nasilaw ako,
aksidente lang). Andres allegedly go out again of his vehicle
and continued shouting and cursing. Dino, son of Gonzales who
was riding another car confronted Andres. And when Andres
went inside his car, this prompted Gonzales to get his gun from
he glove compartment and feeling that his son was threatened
he go out of his car ready to shoot. Trisha, her daughter, arrived
and pushed Gonzales right away. She hugged her father and in
the process held his hand holding the hand. Gonzales wanted
to free his hand and with Trishas substantial body weight
pushing against him, Gonzales lost his balance and accidentally
fired. Gonzales stated that he did not know he shot somebody
until the complainants got out of the vehicle carrying a bloodied
small boy.
An information for the complex crime of murder, double
frustrated murder and attempted murder were filed.
RTC: convicted with the following circumstances qualifying the
offense: treachery and abuse of superior strength upon the
person of Andres, but instead hitting Feliber Andres (pregnant
wife) on the left back portion of the head, as well as John Andres
and Kevin Ordoo physical injuries (only because of timely
medical attention)
Records show that the wife of Andres did not die
instantaneously. She lived to give birth to a baby girl by CS
and died the following morning but as to medical finding,
the cause of death is gunshot wound. While the other two
was treated for extraction of metallic fragments on their
faces. There is treachery when the offender commits any crime
against persons, employing means, methods, and forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make. To appreciate treachery, two
conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means
of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Defendant contended that the shooting happened in a matter of
seconds and that is was preceded by a heated argument
between the parties. It is argued that the shooting could not
have been attended by treachery. There was no time for
Gonzales to consciously and deliberately employ the mode of
attack against Andres, nor any against the victim, to insure its
execution and at the same time to eliminate any form of
retaliation from the alleged intended victim (of which the OSG
agreed that there is no attendant of treachery and that he is only
liable for homicide and frustrated homicide as regards the other
victims as the children sustained head injuries which could lead
to their death if not treated immediately) (No mitigating as there
is no voluntary surrender – inconsistent with his testimony).
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an attendant of treachery in
appreciating the case against the Gonzales.
The appeal has merit. Treachery under par. 16 of Article 14
is defined as the deliberate employment of means methods
or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
Page 8 of 21
intended victim might raise. (See above requisites so
treachery will be appreciated). The suddenness of the attack,
the infliction of the wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable
position of the victim at the time the attack was made or the fact
that the victim was unarmed do not by themselves render the
attack treacherous. This is of particular significance in a
case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused
whereby he gained an advantageous position over the
victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered
defenceless.
The means employed for the commission of the crime or
the mode of attack must be shown to have been
consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to
insure the consummation of the crim and at the same time
eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended
victim.
Accordingly, it has been consistently held by the SC that
chances encounters, impulse killings or crimes committed
at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated
altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack
of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a
treacherous mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made
by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victims
provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden attack
made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the
victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the
rebellious aggressive behaviour of the victim were held to
be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently
forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply
the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the
accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation
on the part of the latter.
The determining factor on whether or not the commission of the
crim is attended by treachery is not the resulting crim committed
but the mode of attack employed in its execution. Treachery is
never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must
be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively
as the crime itself.
The SC affirmed the recommendation of the OSG that the
shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the
crime committed for the death of the wife of Andres is homicide
and not murder. The encounter between the two parties was a
chance encounter. They were total strangers before their
vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the memorial
park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks that followed
the near collision was fanned by a short temper, which in the
case of Gonzales, was augmented by the improvident use of
firearm. From the readings of the TSN, it was Andres who
provoked the altercation by tailing to the vehicle of
Gonzales after the near collision towards the exit until he
had the chance to cut him off to scold him for his failure to
observe traffic rules. Andres statement that he calmly
approached Gonzales was belied by the witnesses. When
he met Dino, while walking back to his car, Andres shouted
onto the former, and as a result, Gonzales alighted the
vehicle and fired a single shot.
The SC did not find any conclusive evidence to appreciate
treachery. The pictures indicate that Gonzales fired at the FX at
an angle away from Andres and that Gonzales was not aiming

at anybody in particular. It is clear that the shot was fired away
from Andres. The bullet hit his wife near her temple above the
left eye indicating that she was facing left towards her husband
when the shot was fired. Therefore belying any attempt to shoot
Andres. The fact that Gonzales fired his gun from behind
the victim does not by itself amount to treachery. There is
no evidence in record that Gonzales positioned himself
behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired
the shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals
that the position of the appellants car was not of his own
doing but it became so when Andres overtook his car and
cut off his path.
The Trial Courts finding that the loading of the gun, the cocking
of the hammer and finally the pulling of the trigger constitute a
deliberate effort on the part of Gonzales to use the gun as a
means of treacherous attack is patently erroneous. A single
and continuous attack cannot be divided into stages to
make it appear that treachery was involved. The entire
incident happened in a matter of minutes. It was an error to
divide the assault in stages to arrive at the conclusion that the
mode of attack was consciously employed by Gonzales. He
prepared the gun before getting out of his car, had loaded it
when he was still at home, and ready to fire when he alighted
his car. There was no time for him to reflect on the mode of
attack since he just picked up his gun and alighted from his
car and shot at the FX a few seconds after Dino and Andres
started shouting at each other.
The Court does not also agree that the weapon used by
itself is determinative of treachery unless it is shown, and
it is not herein shown, that the appellant deliberately used
the gun to insure the commission of the crim and to render
the unarmed victim defenceless. The encounter between
them was a chance encounter. Th shooting was clearly a spur
of the moment or impulsive decision made by Gonzales
preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of Andres.
As regards to the injuries sustained by the two children, the
crime committed are two counts of slight physical injuries (there
is no intent to kill). The mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete self defense of
a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong were not
convincingly proved and none can be considered in the
imposition of penalties.
SC: Triacl court decision is modified. Andres is guilty of
homicide and sight physical injuries for the other two victims.
-----------------------------xxx--------------------------
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T.
ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL DOE
and SEVERAL OTHER DOES (at large), accused, DONATO
B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, accused-
appellants.
CASE No.: G.R. Nos. 100801-02. August 25, 2000
TOPIC: TREACHERY
PONENTE: JUSTICE DE LEON
FACTS: On April 21, 1989 at around 7:00am, the car of U.S.
Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint U. S. Military
Assistance Group (JUSMAG), was ambushed at the corner of
Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Initial
investigation by the Central Intelligence Service (CIS), shows
that on the date and time of the ambush, Col. James Rowe, was
on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car which was being driven
Page 9 of 21
by Joaquin Vinuya; and that they were at the corner of Tomas
Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City on their way to
the JUSMAG Compound along Tomas Morato Street when
gunmen who were on board an old model Toyota Corolla car
suddenly fired at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and seriously
wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by
the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car when it
sped away from the site of the ambush. The same Toyota
Corolla car was later recovered on the same day by a team from
the Philippine Constabulary (PC), at No. 4 Windsor Street, San
Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.
Upon further investigation of the case, the CIS agents
established through a confidential intelligence information the
involvement of appellant Donato Continente, an employee of the
U.P. Collegian in U.P. Diliman, Quezon City, in the ambush.
After accosting appellant Continente inside the said U.P.
campus, the CIS team took him to Camp Crame in Quezon City
for questioning. During the interrogation in the presence of Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala in Camp Crame on June 17, 1989,
appellant Continente admitted to his participation in the ambush
of Col. James Rowe and his driver as a member of the
surveillance unit under the Political Assassination Team of the
CPP-NPA. Among the documents confiscated from appellant
Continente by the CIS agents, and for which a receipt dated
June 16, 1989 was prepared and issued by Sgt. Reynaldo dela
Cruz, was a letter addressed to "Sa Kinauukulan". At the dorsal
right hand side of the letter appear the acronyms "STR PATRC"
which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng Rebolusyon" and
"Political Assassination Team, Regional Command".
Another confidential intelligence information established the
participation of appellant Juanito Itaas in the said ambush of Col.
James Rowe and his driver on April 21, 1989. Appellant Itaas,
who was a known member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based
in Davao City was arrested in Davao City and was brought to
Manila for investigation. CIS investigated and took down the
statements of appellant Itaas who disclosed during the
investigation that he was an active member of the Sparrow Unit
of the NPA based in Davao City and confessed, in the presence
of Atty. Filemon Corpuz who apprised and explained to him his
constitutional rights, that he was one of those who fired at the
gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. James Rowe. The said
appellant identified the Toyota Corolla car that the assailants
rode on April 21, 1989 and the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col.
Rowe.
Meanwhile, it appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and
his driver was witnessed by a certain Meriam Zulueta. Zulueta
was about to cross the Tomas Morato Street on her way to the
JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a practicum in the
JUSMAG Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots. Upon
looking at the direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw
persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car at a distance
of more or less one (1) meter at the corner of Tomas Morato
Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Zulueta returned to
the side of the street to seek for cover but could not find any so
she docked and covered her head with her bag while
continuously looking at the persons who were firing at the gray
car. She recognized appellant Juanito Itaas when the latter was
presented for identification in Camp Crame as the person,
directly behind the driver of the maroon car, whose body was
half exposed while he was firing at the gray car with the use of
along firearm. The shooting incident lasted for about five (5)
seconds only after which the maroon car made a U-turn to
Timog Avenue toward the direction of Quezon Boulevard while
being followed by a white Mitsubishi Lancer car.

Zulueta also recognized appellant Donato Continente whom she
had encountered on at least three (3) occasions at a carinderia
outside the JUSMAG Compound. Her first encounter with
appellant Continente was at around three o'clock in the
afternoon on April 17, 1989 when she went out of the JUSMAG
Compound to a carinderia nearby. She mistook the said
appellant for a tricycle driver who was simply walking around the
premises. She saw appellant Continente in the same carinderia
again on the following day, April 18, 1989, and she was even
teased by her companions that he was her escort. On April 19,
1989, Zulueta saw appellant Continente for the third time inside
the same carinderia while the latter was merely standing. She
came to know the identity of appellant Continente when
Continente was presented to her in Camp Crame for
identification. She thought that he was the tricycle driver whom
she had seen in the carinderia near the JUSMAG Compound.
Zulueta likewise recognized the driver of the white Mitsubishi
Lancer car as the same person whom she had encountered on
two occasions. Zulueta disclosed that in the morning of April 19,
1989, the white Mitsubishi Lancer car was parked along the side
of Tomas Morato Street which was near the corner of Scout
Madrinas Street. Her attention was caught by the driver of the
car, who was then reading a newspaper, when the latter
remarked "Hoy pare, ang sexy. She-boom!" as she was walking
along the street toward the JUSMAG Compound. On April 20,
1989, she saw the same person inside the white Mitsubishi
Lancer car which was then parked along the side of Tomas
Morato Street while she was again on her way to attend
practicum in the JUSMAG Compound. She learned of the
identity of the driver as a certain Raymond Navarro, who is
allegedly a member of the NPA, from the pictures shown her by
the CIS investigators in Camp Crame.
Joaquin Vinuya testified that he was employed by the JUSMAG,
as driver, and assigned to Col. James Rowe. On April 21, 1989,
he fetched Col. Rowe from his house in Potsdam Street,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong to report for work in JUSMAG. While
he was making a right turn at the intersection of Timog Avenue
toward Tomas Morato Street, he noticed four (4) people on
board a red car, two (2) of whom suddenly opened fire at the car
that he was driving hitting him in the process. The shooting
incident happened very fast and that he had no opportunity to
recognize the persons inside the red car. Despite the incident,
Vinuya managed to drive the car to the JUSMAG Compound.
Upon arrival at the JUSMAG Compound, he found out that Col.
James Rowe, who was sitting at the back seat of the car, was
also hit during the shooting incident.
Col. James Rowe and Joaquin Vinuya were initially brought to
the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City for treatment.
Subsequently, they were transferred to the Clark Air Base
Hospital in Pampanga but then Capt. Rowe was already dead.
Vinuya was treated in the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga
for four (4) days for the injuries he sustained on his head,
shoulder, and on the back portion of his left hand. Thereafter, he
was taken back to JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to
recuperate.
For the foregoing, 2 informations were filed against Itaas and
Continente for the crimes of murder and frustrated murder. The
RTC rendered its decision finding both appellants Juanito Itaas
and Donato Continente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both
crimes. Continente and Itaas separately instituted the instant
appeal.
ISSUE/s: Whether treachery can be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in this case.
RULING: YES.
Page 10 of 21
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 248. Murder.-- Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with
the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall
of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of
any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse."
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin
Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make. The evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution
was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the
commission of the crime without the least danger unto
themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims.
Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with
powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was
being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog Avenue
and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning,
appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said
car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed
for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the said ambush is
murder.
AS TO CONSPIRACY AND LIABILITY:
At the outset, in the case at bench, the SC reversed the finding
of conspiracy by the RTC. Accordingly, appellant Donato
Continente is liable for the crimes charged in these criminal
cases only as an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code. In order that a person may be considered an
accomplice in the commission of a criminal offense, the following
requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice. The prosecution failed to establish, either directly or
by circumstantial evidence, that appellant Donato Continente

was privy to any conspiracy to carry out the ambush on Col.
James Rowe and his driver on that fateful morning of April 21,
1989. The evidence adduced disclose that the participation of
appellant Continente was made only after the plan or decision
to ambush Col. Rowe was already a fait accompli. Continente
was merely assigned to the vicinity of the JUSMAG Compound
in Tomas Morato Street, Quezon City, before the shooting
incident to gather certain data, specifically the number of people
and volume of vehicles in the area, the measurement of the
streets, and the distance of the JUSMAG Compound from
Tomas Morato Street. Subsequently, Continente reported his
findings to Freddie Abella and that thereafter the latter had taken
over the activity. Significantly, appellant Continente was not
even present at the scene of the crime on April 21, 1989.
The error of the trial court in its appreciation of appellant
Continente's participation in the crimes charged lies in its
apparent confusion regarding the distinction between a
conspirator and an accomplice. In view of its effect on the liability
of appellant Continente, the distinction between the two
concepts as laid down by this Court in the case of People vs. de
Vera, et al. needs to be reiterated, thus: “Conspirators and
accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree
with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the
criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon
such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after
the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they
agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a
crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be
committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of the crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not
essential to the perpetration of the offense.”
With respect to appellant Juanito Itaas, however, the trial court
correctly found that the evidence against him which consist of
his written confession and the straightforward and credible
testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta, even if
taken independently, are sufficient to convict him. Appellant
Itaas categorically admitted in his written confession that he and
his companions fired at the gray Mitsubishi car of Col. James
Rowe at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street
in Quezon City. Moreover, prosecution witness Meriam Zulueta
positively identified appellant Itaas as one of the persons she
saw on board a car who fired at a gray car at the same time and
place where Col. Rowe and his driver were ambushed.
With respect to the liability of appellant Itaas for the wounding of
Joaquin Vinuya, it appears that the said victim sustained injuries
on his scalp, on the left shoulder and on the back portion of the
left hand from the ambush. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, a felony is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. The evidence adduced by the prosecution,
particularly the opinion of Dr. Jose Santiago in his testimony, is
not sufficient to establish the crime of frustrated murder. This
Court notes that the wounds sustained by the victim are not fatal
wounds but merely superficial wounds. The records disclose
that Joaquin Vinuya managed to drive the car of Col. Rowe
toward the JUSMAG Compound which is 200 meters away from
the site of the ambush. It also appears that Vinuya was treated
Page 11 of 21
for his wounds for only four (4) days at the Clark Air Base
Hospital in Pampanga after which he was brought back to the
JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate. Hence, the
crime committed as against him is only attempted murder.
In view of the foregoing, appellant Juanito Itaas should be held
liable for the crimes of murder and attempted murder for his
direct participation in the killing of Col. James Rowe and in the
wounding of his driver Joaquin Vinuya, respectively. Due to the
absence of any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in both
cases, the penalty to be imposed on appellant Itaas is reclusion
perpetua for the murder of Col. James Rowe and the medium
period of prision mayor for the attempt on the life of Joaquin
Vinuya. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the latter
case, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant
Itaas is the medium period of prision mayor and the minimum
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, that is,
prision correccional.
On the other hand, being an accomplice to the crimes of murder
and attempted murder, the penalty to be imposed on appellant
Donato Continente shall be the medium periods of reclusion
temporal and prision correccional, respectively. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in both cases, the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed on appellant Continente as an
accomplice to the crime of murder is the medium period of
reclusion temporal and the minimum shall be prision mayor,
while the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the said
appellant as an accomplice to the crime of attempted murder is
the medium period of prision correccional and the minimum shall
be arresto mayor.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 and Q-89-4844 is hereby MODIFIED, as
follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843, appellants Juanito Itaas and
Donato Continente are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder, as principal and as accomplice,
respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Appellant
Continente as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Both appellants Itaas and
Continente are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally the
amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, Col. James
Rowe, by way of civil indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844, appellants Juanito Itaas and
Donato Continente are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of attempted murder, as principal and as
accomplice, respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and six (6) months
of prision mayor, as maximum. Appellant Continente, as
accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum. SO
ORDERED.
---------------------------------xxx-----------------------------

TOPIC: Aggravating Circumstances (Treachery)
[G.R. No. 128900. July 14, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ALBERTO S. ANTONIO, SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1
HONORIO CARTALLA, JR., accused-appellants.
FACTS:
The victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional
basketball player, succumbed instantaneously to a single
gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly
precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto
Ambet S. Antonio, a one-time chairman of the Games and
Amusement Board (GAB). It was during his stint as such that he
and Tuadles became socially acquainted. They somehow lost
touch, but later became reacquainted when they both started
frequenting the International Business Club (IBC), located along
Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses
amenities such as a dining room, music bar and
gameroom. Often, the two would meet with other members and
friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the
club. Their preferred games were poker or pusoy dos, ordinary
poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of
thousands of pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of
November 1, 1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny
Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the
club for another poker session, their third night in a row. Antonio
arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around
midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting
for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos,
a game for two (2) players only. They continued playing until
morning, pausing only when either of them had to visit the
restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 oclock in the
morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings
from the loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the
prosecution and the defense presented two very different
scenarios. The prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in
the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio
pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very
close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish
the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the
prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a
security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles
occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments
on the testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that
their argument was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay Antonios
winnings. In the middle of a heated altercation where they
traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from
atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he
reached for Tuadles hand and they grappled for possession of
the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face
down to the floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who
had actually pulled the trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the
shooting was accidental, and his only motivation was to defend
himself. He also refuted the testimony of the prosecutions
eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis could not have seen the
actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito
Nieto, who were alerted by Antonios yells, reached the scene
when Tuadles had already been shot and was lying on the floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call
an ambulance or check if he was still alive. Instead, and there is
no dispute in these succeeding events, Antonio convinced the
Page 12 of 21
two (2) security guards, prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis
included, to accompany him to his home in Greenmeadows
Subdivision, Quezon City, after which they proceeded to the San
Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a member of
the San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonios
residence for several hours, during which time Antonio made
phone calls and summoned his lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock in
the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, placed
himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada and the police authorities. Later, the two security guards
and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the club where they waited
for the police investigators. Sometime thereafter, SG Bobis
narrated the events and executed his statement at the police
station, a statement which he would repudiate three (3) days
later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against
Antonio for the crime of murder. Also charged as accessories
were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not treachery attended the commission of
the offense charged
RULING:
There was no treachery in this case.
There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused
Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack
to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk
to himself.[34] It ruled that treachery qualified the killing to
murder. The trial court did not explain the basis for the
qualification except for a terse citation that there was a sudden
attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. As stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page
decision, typed single space, the trial court devoted only a few
sentences to the issue of treachery.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into
murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of
the mode of attack for a specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It
was a spur of the moment crime.
The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery
where accused made no preparation or employed no means,
method and form of execution tending directly and specially to
insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish
risk from defense which the victim may take.[35]
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia
where the aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode of attack
intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself.[36]
A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of
alevosia where it did not appear that the aggressor had
consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the
perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself, as where the
appellant followed the victims when the latter refused appellant's
invitation to have some more alcoholic drinks.[37]
The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a
finding of alevosia if the mode adopted by the accused does not
positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to
insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any
risk to themselves arising from the defense that might be
offered.[38]
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when
decision to attack was arrived at on the spur of the moment. [39]
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the
means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without
danger to the offender arising from the defense or retaliation that
might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for

treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form
was deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the
offender.[40] Such deliberate or conscious choice was held non-
existent where the attack was the product of an impulse of the
moment.[41]
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack
makes the killing a murder because of treachery is not
consistent with the decisions of this Court. [42] Conscious
deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of attack has to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. For it is likewise an
established principle that the quantum of evidence to prove a
person's being guilty of a crime is also required to prove
treachery. The same degree of proof to dispel any reasonable
doubt is required before any conclusion may also be reached
respecting the attendance of treachery, whether as qualifying or
aggravating, in a criminal case.[43] There is no such proof in this
case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio
and Tuadles spent several hours having fun playing "pusoy
dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles could
not pay to appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument
arose, with appellant Antonio and Tuadles standing face to face
three (3) feet away from each other, a fact attested to by the
defense and even by the prosecution eyewitness himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were
arguing. Antonio even called out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just
before the shooting, Bobis heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka
kasi. The argument precluded the presence of treachery. If
Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill
Tuadles, there was no reason to call for a Sergeant or any
eyewitness for that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v.
Alacar,[44] where we held that there was no treachery where the
attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. More recently,
in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on
guard, such as when a heated argument preceded the attack, or
when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants
and the initial assault could not have been
unforseen.[45] (Underscoring Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would
still be no treachery. In People v. Chua,[46] we reiterated our
consistent view that:
While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden
impulse, it was preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility
and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack and
should have put the deceased on guard.
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was
forewarned and could have anticipated the aggression of the
accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded
by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant
Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it
cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with
treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to
kill Tuadles in the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot of
their argument which neither of them had foreseen. Hence,
there was no treachery because treachery requires that the
mode of attack must have been thought of by the offender and
must have sprung from an unforeseen occurrence.[47]
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove
him to pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however,
cannot co-exist with treachery. In passion, the offender loses his
reason and control. In treachery, on the other hand, the means
Page 13 of 21
employed is adopted consciously and deliberately. One who, in
the heat of passion, loses his reason and self-control, cannot
consciously employ a particular means, method or form of attack
in the execution of the crime.[49] Thus, the killing of Tuadles by
appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and
favorably considered by the trial court to elevate the killing to
murder, was not proven by convincing evidence[50] is advocated
by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief. He agreed with
Appellant Antonio's contention on the matter:
On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to
agree with this particular submission of Antonio. Antonio and
Tuadles engaged in pusoy dos. In the beginning, they were
heard laughing and kidding each other (nagtatawanan at
nagkakantiyawan).Later, the banter turned into verbal
altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the
incipient violence. Hence, Tuadles could have braced himself
with the aggression of Antonio. There is no treachery when the
killing results from a verbal altercation or spat between the victim
and the assailant such that the victim must have been
forewarned of the impending danger. In this case, Bobis testified
that he saw Antonio and Tuadles facing each other before
Antonio raised his hand and shot Tuadles on the forehead. The
proximate distance of three feet between Tuadles and Antonio
immediately before the fatal shooting allowed and gave Tuadles
opportunity to defend himself.[51]
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal code.
--------------------------xxx-------------------------
TREACHERY
G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs.CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
FACTS: In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman
to her home at Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them.
When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop
about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the
rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she
was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while
Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored
Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the
middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached
them, and asked: “Who are you? (Show me your) I.D.” When
Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the
I.D., without bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk
and asked accused: “Why are you bothering us?” Accused
pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired
at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment,
and asked: “Why did you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the
sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused
ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then
turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “Do
you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and took a step backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her
senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help.
She repeatedly shouted: “Oh, my God, he’s got a gun. He’s
gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the while, accused
was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the
latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the

sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away.
Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued
to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side
of accused’s car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen
circled around accused’s car, trying to put some distance
between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two.
Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined
her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat
beside Leino on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He
faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper
jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall
beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and
saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled
to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people
who saw the incident.
As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed
against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was
charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN,
and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and
wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When
Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the
hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for
Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.
Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi.
ISSUE: W/N THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE KILLING OF CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE
SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY TREACHERY.
HELD:
The accused claims that treachery was not present in the killing
of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was
not shown that the gunman consciously and deliberately
adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution
of the crime. The accused asserts that mere suddenness of
attack does not prove treachery.
The 3 Informations charged the accused with having committed
the crimes with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident
premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for,
admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter
or a chance meeting on the street since the victims were
unknown to the accused and vice-versa. It, however,
appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery in
the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established
the sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified that
for no apparent reason, the accused suddenly alighted from his
car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were then
walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D.
After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from
behind Leino and asked what was going on. Chapman then
stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what
was wrong. There and then, the accused pushed Chapman,
pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack
was unexpected. “Why did you shoot me?” was all Chapman
could utter. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried
out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even
then, there is no evidence on record to prove that the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to
insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to
himself. The accused acted on the spur of the moment. Their
meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The
Page 14 of 21
time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short
and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of
a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of the accused rather
than a deliberate act of will. Mere suddenness of the attack on
the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. Hence,
absent any qualifying circumstance, the accused should only be
held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery
clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence
shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, the accused
ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became
hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant’s car. When the
accused went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried
to put some distance between them. After a minute or two, the
accused got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on
the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy,
the two were gunned down by the accused . Clearly, the
accused purposely placed his two victims in a completely
defenseless position before shooting them. There was an
appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and
the shooting of Leino and Hultman – a period which the accused
used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself.
DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial court, dated
December 22, 1992, thus:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John
Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said
deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the victim's death; and,
One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him
to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay
the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death;
Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred
Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-
Four Thousand Fourty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said
deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
damages; and Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as
exemplary damages.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused
Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for
the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision
mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the
said offended party the following amounts: (P30,000.00)
pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity
for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three
Hundred Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos
(P118,369.84) and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of

U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay
each of the three (3) offended parties the sum of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million
[P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
-------------------------------xxx--------------------------------
People of the Philippines vs. Rene Siao
G.R. No. 126021 / 03 March 2000./ Justice Gonzaga-Reyes
Art. 14 – Aggravating Circumstances – Ignominy
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for
the prosecution in this wise:
Joy Raymundo and private complainant Estrella Raymundo are
cousins. They worked as house maids of appellant's family.
Reylan Gimena was also a helper of appellant's family. Estrella
was then a 14-year old "probinsiyana" from Palompon, Leyte.
On May 27, 1994, at about 3:00 p.m., in the Siao residence
located at 417-A Basak Brotherhood, Cebu City, appellant
ordered Reylan Gimena, a houseboy of the Siaos, to pull
Estrella to the room of the women. Gimena dragged her toward
the women's quarters and once inside, appellant pushed her to
the wooden bed (naomog). Appellant pointed a pistol colored
white at Gimena and the face of Estrella.
Producing a candle and a bottle of sprite, appellant asked
Estrella to choose one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of
sprite. He also told Gimena "Reylan, birahi si Ester." (Reylan do
something to Ester.) Appellant lighted the candle and dropped
the melting candle on her chest. Estrella chose a bottle of sprite
because she was afraid of the pistol. She was made to lie down
on her back on the bed with her head hanging over one end.
Whereupon, appellant poured sprite into her nostrils as she was
made to spread her arms. While appellant dropped the bottle of
sprite into her nostrils, he pointed the gun at her face. Estrella
felt dizzy and her eyesight became blurred. She tried to fold her
arms to cover her breasts but appellant ordered Gimena to hold
her hands.
Appellant then tied her feet and hands with an electric cord or
wire as she was made to lie face down on the bed. After that,
appellant untied her hands and feet but tied her back with the
same wire.
As appellant pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to
remove her pants and T-shirt, she sat on the bed and did as she
was told and when she was naked, appellant commanded her
to take the initiative (ikaw ang mauna sa lalaki.) She did not
understand what appellant meant. At this point, appellant poked
the gun at her temple.
Appellant then commanded Gimena to remove his shorts. But
Gimena refused. Gimena did not remove his shorts but let his
penis out.
Appellant spread the arms of Estrella and made her lie down
spread. She felt dizzy and shouted for help twice. Appellant
ordered Gimena to rape Estrella. At first Gimena refused to heed
the command of appellant to rape Estrella (birahi) because,
according to Gimena, he has a sister. Appellant said that if they
would not obey, he would kill both of them.
Appellant told Gimena, "Reylan, do something (birahi) to Ester!"
Estrella was made to suck the penis of Gimena at gunpoint. She
complied with the order of appellant and when the penis of
Page 15 of 21
Gimena was inside her mouth, appellant kept looking and
pointing his handgun at them.
Thereafter, Gimena got on top of Estrella (gisakyan) and did the
sexual act (kayatan). She felt excruciating pain. Gimena made
push-and-pull movements for around 10 minutes. Appellant
looked on and said, "why did it take you long to penetrate?"
While Gimena was making the push-and-pull movements,
appellant held the legs of Estrella to keep them apart.
After Gimena had sexual intercourse with Estrella, she sat down.
Not long after, appellant said: "You do it again." Gimena said
that he could not do it again because he was already very tired.
But appellant pointed the pistol at Gimena's temple. Gimena
obeyed the order of appellant because the pistol was pointed at
him. They were made to lay side by side while appellant kept on
pointing the pistol at them. Gimena, who was behind Estrella
made a push-and-pull movements so that his organ would reach
her private part.
After the side by side position, they were made to assume the
dog position (patuwad). Appellant commanded her to do it but
she refused because she was already tired. Appellant pointed
the pistol at her, so she obeyed his order. Gimena said: "I will
not do that because I am already tired." At that, appellant pointed
the pistol at Gimena. Thus, Gimena copulated with Estrella in
the manner dogs perform the sexual intercourse. Gimena
shouted for help. Somebody knocked on the door and they
heard the voice of Teresita Pañares, the older sister of appellant.
Appellant ignored Pañares and kept on pointing the pistol at
Estrella and Gimena, as he looked at them with wide-open eyes
(siga). Shortly, appellant told them to go to the boy's room. They
complied with his order tearfully, after he followed them laughing
all the while. Appellant then warned them: "If you will tell the
police, I will kill your mothers.".
At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Estrella
and Joy Raymundo sought permission to go home. On their way
home, they met an old man who saw Estrella crying. The old
man took them to his house. After the incident was reported to
the police, Senior Police Officer Reynaldo Omaña conducted
the investigation and arrested Gimena, who was identified by
Esrtrella as the one who raped her on orders of appellant. The
police officers looked for appellant to shed light on the reported
rape. But they could not locate him.”
To sum up, Ester Raymundo and Reylan Gimena were forced
and intimidated at gunpoint by accused-appellant Rene Siao to
have carnal knowledge of each other. Rene Siao called Reylan
Gimena inside the women's quarter. After Rene Siao closed the
door, he told Reylan, "Reylan, birahi si Ester". Since Reylan was
at a loss as to what to do, Rene Siao commanded Ester at
gunpoint to "suck (um-um) the penis" of Reylan Gimena. Both
Reylan and Ester performed the sexual act because they were
afraid they will be killed. Thereafter, accused-appellant
commanded Reylan to rape Ester in three (3) different positions,
pointing the handgun at them the whole time.
(Yung defense ni Rene Siao, magulo. Basta tungkol sa
nawawalang watch. Medyo unrelated. Ito yung kinuwento ni Sir
sa class, yung prosecution’s version)
ISSUE/S:
Whether the aggravating circumstance of ignominy is present in
this case.
HELD:
Yes, it is present in this case.
Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a
deadly weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. But the trial court overlooked and did not take into
account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and

sentenced accused-appellant to the single indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in
committing the rape used not only the missionary position, i.e.
male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs
do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven like the crime itself in
the instant case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy
attended the commission thereof.
However, the use of a weapon serves to increase the penalty.
Since the use of a deadly weapon increases the penalty as
opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only
affects the period of the penalty, said fact should be alleged in
the information, because of the accused's right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Considering that the complaint (which was later converted into
the Information) failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon,
specifically, that herein accused-appellant was armed with a
gun, the penalty to be reckoned with in determining the penalty
for rape would be reclusion perpetua, the penalty prescribed for
simple rape under Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Simple rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua, which must be applied regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have
attended the commission of the deed. Hence, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is correct.
NOTE: (Re: Rape)
Third, accused-appellant contends that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses do not conform to common experience
due to the following reasons: Reylan Gimena ejaculated three
times in a span of less than 30 minutes; the rape took place
within earshot and near the presence of other people; Ester and
Reylan did not make a dash for freedom during the ten minutes
it took Rene Siao to follow them from the women's quarter to the
male's quarter where the latter wanted them to resume their
copulation; a barangay tanod was present at the place of the
alleged rape at about 4:00 p.m.; the private complainant
reported the incident to an old man she chanced upon on her
way home.
Again, the points raised by accused-appellant are trite and of no
consequence. First of all, the important consideration in rape is
not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ. Well-settled is the rule that
penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is what
constitutes rape. Thus, this factor could not affect the case for
the prosecution. Second, accused-appellant's argument that it
is impossible to commit a rape in house where there are many
occupants is untenable. We have held in a number of cases that
lust is no respecter of time and place. It is not impossible to
perpetrate a rape even in a small room. Rape can be committed
in a house where there are many other occupants. Third, Ester
and Reylan could not be expected to flee or even to attempt to
flee under the circumstances. Undoubtedly, considering that
Ester was only fourteen-years old and a newly employed
housemaid, while Reylan Gimena a seventeen-year old
houseboy, they were easily intimidated and cowed into
submission by accused-appellant, who aside from being their
"amo" or employer, was menacingly threatening to kill them or
their family with a gun if they did not do as he commanded them
to do. Thus, it was not improbable for them not to attempt to
escape when as accused-appellant perceived they had an
opportunity to do so. Moreover, while most victims will
immediately flee from their aggressors, others become virtually
catatatonic because of the mental shock they experience. It was
also not improbable for them to report the incident to an old man
they met on the road as there was no on else to turn to.
Page 16 of 21
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a
totally different version of the story. Accused-appellant sought
to establish by his story that since Ester was caught stealing
money and the personal belongings of the people in the
household she had motive to implicate accused-appellant in
such a serious charge. We cannot see how a 14-year old girl
from the rural area could fabricate such charges borne out of a
desire for revenge.
On the contrary, this theory of accused-appellant backfires on
him because it appears that due to the thefts allegedly
committed by Ester, Rene Siao decided to vent his ire by
subjecting her to a perverted form of punishment and using
Reylan as an instrument thereof. As to the charge of accused-
appellant that the father of Ester tried to extort a huge sum of
money from the accused-appellant's family so that the case
against him will be dropped, we agree with the trial court that
this contention is largely self-serving as it is uncorroborated.
-------------------------xxx----------------------
G.R. No. 145993 June 17, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. RUFINO
MALLARI y ILAG, Appellant.
ART. 14. Aggravating Circumstances: By means of motor
vehicle
DAVIDE, JR.
Version of the Prosecution
Liza Galang testified that on 7 July 1996 at around 4:00 p.m.,
her common-law husband Joseph admonished Rufino and his
brothers Ino and Felix Mallari not to drive fast while passing by
Joseph’s house. Rufino and his brothers, who were then hot-
tempered, challenged Joseph to a fight. The latter just ignored
the challenge; and, instead he and his own brothers Radi and
Manny asked apology from Rufino.
Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza were watching a
basketball game at the barangay basketball court, Rufino and
his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons, arrived
and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away.
When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded
and drove the truck parked near the basketball court and
continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter,
which caused his instantaneous death.
Liza further testified that at the time of his death, Joseph was 37
years old. He was a foreman in a construction firm with a daily
income of ₱350 and also a carpenter and mason with a daily
income of ₱250. She spent less than ₱20,000 for the coffin,
tomb, funeral, and other expenses during the wake of Joseph.
Edgar Bawar, a friend of Joseph, testified that at 6:24 p.m. on 7
July 1996, while Joseph was watching a basketball game,
Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix, who were carrying bladed
weapons, arrived and chased Joseph. Joseph ran away, and
Rufino pursued him with the truck. Upon catching up with him,
Rufino bumped Joseph, as a result of which the latter died on
the spot.
Dr. Erwin Escal testified that the cause of death of Joseph, as
stated in the Medico-Legal Report, was "[c]rushing injury on the
head secondary to vehicular accident." Joseph’s head was
deformed with multiple skull fractures and lacerations and brain
tissue evisceration.
RTC RULING
The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Liza Galang and Edgar Bawar that
Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph. Appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted Rufino of
murder and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty.
ISSUE

Whether Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph with the truck he
was driving.
SC RULING
The antecedent events show that, indeed, Rufino deliberately
ran over Joseph. At around 4:00 p.m. of 7 July 1996, when
Rufino passed by Joseph’s house while driving the truck, he got
angry when Joseph admonished him not to drive at high speed
in front of Joseph’s house. Rufino, already in a fighting mood,
challenged Joseph to a fight, but the latter just ignored it. To put
an end to the argument, Joseph and his brothers apologized to
Rufino.
Apparently, Rufino was not appeased by the apology and
continued to harbor ill-feelings against Joseph. Rufino got the
chance to vent his anger not long thereafter. At around 5:30
p.m., while Joseph was watching a basketball game at the
basketball court located beside Rufino’s house, Rufino and his
brothers Ino and Felix, carrying with them bladed weapons,
attempted to stab Joseph. But before they could do it, Joseph
was able to run away. They chased Joseph, but were unable to
catch up with him. Instead of giving up on his evil design, Rufino
went back to the basketball court, boarded the truck parked
nearby, and resumed his pursuit of Joseph. Upon seeing Joseph
on the road, Rufino hit him with the truck.
We note that the testimonies of Liza and Edgar were consistent
with their respective sworn statements, which they gave to the
police investigator in the morning of 8 July 1996. Considering
that less than twenty-four hours had elapsed from the time of the
bumping incident, Liza and Edgar could not have concocted a
story to pin down Rufino for the death of Joseph. Thus, there is
no reason to doubt the veracity of the sworn statements and the
testimonies of Liza and Edgar.
Moreover, the defense has not shown any reason why Edgar,
who corroborated Liza’s testimony about the incident, would
perjure himself to pin down Rufino. Absent any evidence
showing any reason or motive for the prosecution witnesses to
perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive
exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and
credit.
In comparison, Rufino and Myrna gave inconsistent testimonies.
Myrna wanted the court to believe that her husband was in no
way at fault by stating that Rufino was driving at a slow pace,
while Rufino himself declared that he was driving at a speed of
eighty kilometers per hour. Myrna’s attempt to cover up the
misdeed of her husband is obvious; hence, the integrity of her
declarations becomes questionable.
Rufino himself made inconsistent statements. At first, in the
course of the direct examination, Rufino declared that prior to
the bumping incident he saw Joseph pass by his house, walking
in a zigzag manner. This testimony was an attempt to give
credence to his allegation that Joseph was drunk, which was
why he threw stones at the truck for no reason at all. But when
he was asked during his cross-examination about his altercation
with Joseph earlier that fateful day, Rufino made a complete
turnaround and declared that he saw Joseph for the first time at
the place where he was run over.
Moreover, the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna do not inspire
belief for being improbable and not in accord with human
experience. It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be
credible, it should come not only from the mouth of a credible
witness, but should also be credible, reasonable, and in accord
with human experience.
According to Rufino, he saw Joseph when the truck was four
meters away from the latter and he blew his horn three times.
This is altogether unbelievable. At a speed of eighty kilometers
Page 17 of 21
per hour, a four-meter distance could easily be covered by the
truck in a split second, and there would be no time for the driver
to blow the horn before the impact. Much less could there be
time for a person on the road to pick up a stone and hurl the
same to an oncoming truck. Thus, it is simply impossible that
Joseph was able to hurl a stone at the truck before he was run
over.
Neither can we believe Rufino’s testimony that he first saw
Joseph on the road when the truck was just four meters away
from him. According to Rufino, the road was clear because only
Joseph and the truck he was driving were on the road.
From Rufino’s own testimony, it appears that his view was
unobstructed. He could have seen Joseph from afar and could
therefore have avoided bumping the latter had he really wanted
to.
Obviously, the stone-throwing incident was concocted by the
defense as a last ditch effort to have Rufino absolved from his
criminal act. Unlike the prosecution witnesses who executed
their sworn statements on the morning after the subject incident,
Rufino’s sworn statement was executed only on 15 August 1996,
or more than one month after the incident. Thus, Rufino had
enough time to reflect and come up with a plot. Unfortunately for
him, the story he concocted is so incredible that we are not
inclined to believe it.
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s finding that
Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph with the truck he was
driving.
Rufino’s culpability having been resolved, we now come to the
penalty to be imposed. The trial court imposed the death penalty
on the ground that the qualifying circumstance of use of motor
vehicle is present. Rufino, however, argues that the use of a
motor vehicle was only incidental, considering that he resorted
to it only to enable him to go after Joseph after he failed to catch
up with the latter. The fallacy of this argument is obvious.
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in
pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with
the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is
therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to
perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills
another "by means of a motor vehicle" is guilty of murder. Thus,
the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. The
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, we shall apply
Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
In the present case, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery, which were alleged in the
information, were not proved. What was proved was the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender through the
testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by the
prosecution.
We have held that for voluntary surrender to be appreciated as
a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a
person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A
surrender is considered voluntary if it is spontaneous and shows
the intention of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to
the authorities because he either acknowledges his guilt or
wishes to save the government the trouble and expense

necessarily included for his search and capture. All these
requisites are present in this case.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the
presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua,
not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 25, of Biñan, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 9621-
B convicting appellant RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG of the crime of
murder is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. The penalty is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua;
2. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱50,000
is reduced to ₱25,000, and the awards of actual and moral
damages are reduced to ₱9,200 and ₱50,000, respectively; and
3. Appellant Rufino Mallari y Ilag is further ordered to pay the
heirs of Joseph Galang an indemnity ex delictoin the amount of
₱50,000.
Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
-----------------------------xxx--------------------------------
ART. 14 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; BY MEANS OF
MOTOR VEHICLE
PEOPLE v. ENGUITO
G.R. No. 128812 February 28, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS
on September 22, 1991 at about 3:00 o'clock early dawn at
Marcos Bridge, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to kill and with treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously chased, bumped and hit the motorela which Wilfredo
S. Achumbre was riding with his Ceres Kia automobile bearing
Plate No. 722 and as a consequence thereof, the motorela was
dragged and fell on the road causing the driver (Felipe
Requerme) and its passenger Rosita Requerme to sustain
serious bodily injuries while the deceased Wilfredo S. Achumbre
was able to run towards the railings at Marcos Bridge but
accused with intent to kill him hit instantaneously immediately
rammed and hit him with his driven vehicle cutting his right leg
and thereafter ran over him thereby causing mortal harm on his
body which was the direct and immediate cause of his
instantaneous death. the wrong done in the commission of the
crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not
necessary for its commission. Upon arraignment, accused,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with Less Serious
Physical Injuries. CA found that since the prosecution's
evidence showed that accused killed the victim by means of
motor vehicle, he should be guilty of the crime of murder and not
of homicide.
ISSUE: WON accused should be guilty of crime of murder
aggravated by means of motor vehicle
RULING
The basic rule in criminal law is that a person is responsible for
all the consequences of his unlawful or wrongful act although
such consequences were different from those which he
Page 18 of 21
originally intended. Even if it be assumed that the real intention
of accused-appellant was to surrender the victim to the police
for mauling him, his act of pursuing the victim, who was a
passenger of the motorela, resulted in the injuries of the driver
and the other passenger of the motorela. Appellant himself
testified that when he followed the motorela, he was "very near"
and that he saw the deceased Achumbre jump out on the right
side of the motorela but he went ahead; he allegedly "tried to
evade, but he was so near." Upon seeing that Achumbre was
trying to jump out of the motorela, accused-appellant should
have known that by closely following, pushing and bumping the
motorela, he could injure the passengers, which is what
happened in this case. Moreover, accused-appellant ignored the
pleas of Rosita Requerme, the other passenger and wife of the
driver of the motorela, for him to stop bumping and pushing the
motorela. Instead, he persisted resulting in the motorela turning
on its side and in the opposite direction. Verily, the act of
accused-appellant in relentlessly pursuing the motorela is a
manifestation of his intention to perpetrate the crime.
The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by
the use of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the
killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof.
Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia
Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his
actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there was a
police mobile patrol near the crossing. Accused-appellant could
have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking
the law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant
already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela
but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after
hitting the deceased who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at
the railing of the Marcos bridge. Accused-appellant further used
the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than
one (1) kilometer away from the place of the incident that he
stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which
was following him.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated. Evidence shows that accused-appellant was
further pursued by the police. Appellant himself testified that he
stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped but
admitted having "stopped farther than the police mobile". The
foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a
mitigating circumstance in the case at bar will not affect the
penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code. The crime committed by accused-appellant is the
complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a
complex crime shall be the maximum period of the penalty for
the most serious crime. The crime was committed in 1992 where
the penalty for the crime of murder, which is the most serious
crime, was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The death penalty
being the maximum period of the penalty for murder should be
imposed for the complex crime of murder with less serious
physical injuries considering that under Article 63, an indivisible
penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision convicting accused-appellant
Thadeos Enguito of the complex crime of Murder with Less

Serious Physical Injuries and sentencing him to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of deceased Wilfredo Achumbre the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity; P1,680,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; P
16,300.00 as actual damages; P 50,000.00 as moral damages;
and to further pay the spouses Felipe and Rosita Requerme the
amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages.
---------------------------xxx--------------------------
PEOPLE V. STEPHEN MARK WHISENHUNT
G.R. No. 123819, 14 November 2001, J. Ynares- Santiago
PRINICIPLE: Article 14, Aggravating Circumstances –
Cruelty
Accused and victim (Elsie) were lovers. They met at the Apex
Motor Corp. where accused was the manager while Elsie was
the assistant personnel manager. Both of them were married
but they were estranged from their respective spouses. In April
1993, Elsie resigned from Apex to avoid nasty rumors about her
illicit affairs with the accused. It appears however that she
continued her affair with the accused even after she resigned
from Apex. On 23 September 1993, an Apex employee
assigned to drive the accused, reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at
the latters condominium in Annapolis Greenhills. Accused
ordered him to fetch Elsie at her parents house in Blumentritt.
At 2 p.m., Elsie told the driver to go to the Apex office in
Mandaluyong to deliver the paper bag to Amy Serrano, the
Personnel Manager. He proceeded to the Apex Office and then
returned to Platinum. Accused asked him to stay because he
had to drive Elsa home at 10 p.m. He waited until a little past
10 p.m. when he had not heard from the accused, he told Lucy,
the housemaid, the he was going home.
The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-
appellants unit. At around noon, Lucy asked if he had seen a
kitchen knife which was missing. He then overheard Lucy ask
accused-appellant who told her that the kitchen knife was in his
bedroom. Demetrio saw accused-appellant go inside the room
and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to Lucy. At 3:40 p.m.,
Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for accused-appellant. He
went out to buy the cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At 5:00
p.m., accused-appellant told Demetrio to go home. On
September 25, 1993, Demetrio reported at the Platinum
Condominium at around 8:00 a.m. He was allowed by accused-
appellant to go to Apex to follow up his salary. While he was
there, Amy Serrano asked him if Elsa was still in accused-
appellants condominium unit. Although Demetrio did not see
Elsa there, he answered yes. Amy gave him black plastic
garbage bags which he turned over to accused-appellant upon
his return to the condominium. The latter then ordered him to
drive Lucy to Cubao and to go home to get some clothes, since
they were leaving for Bagac, Bataan. On the way to Cubao, Lucy
told Demetrio that she was going home. He dropped her off in
front of the Farmers Market. Thereafter, he proceeded to his
house in Fairview, Quezon City, to pick up some clothes, then
returned to the condominium at around 10:00 a.m.
Accused-appellant asked him to check the fuel gauge of the
car. He was told to go to Apex to get a gas slip and then to gas
up. At around noon, he went back to the condominium. He had
lunch outside at Goodah, then returned to accused-appellants
unit and stayed in the servants quarters. While Demetrio was
in the servants quarters watching television, accused-appellant
came in. He asked Demetrio how long he wanted to work for
him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him forever,
Page 19 of 21
and expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused-
appellant shed tears and embraced Demetrio. Then accused-
appellant said, May problema ako, Rio. Demetrio asked what it
was, and accused-appellant told him that Elsa was
dead. Demetrio asked, Bakit mo siya pinatay? Accused-
appellant answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather she died
of bangungot.
Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused-
appellant said that he had already beheaded her. He asked
Demetrio if he wanted to see the decapitated body, but the latter
refused. The two of them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills
Shopping Center and bought a big bag with a zipper and rollers,
colored black and gray.[15] Demetrio noticed that accused-
appellant seemed nervous and his eyes were teary and
bloodshot.
When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant
asked Demetrio to help him wrap the body in the black garbage
bags. Demetrio entered accused-appellants bathroom and
found the dismembered hands, feet, trunk and head of a
woman. He lifted the severed head by the hair and, when he
lifted it, he saw Elsas face. He placed this in a black trash
bag. He helped accused-appellant place the other body parts in
three separate garbage bags. They packed all the garbage bags
in the bag with the zipper and rollers, which they had bought in
Shoppesville. Then, they brought the bag down and loaded it in
the trunk of accused-appellants car. After that, they boarded the
car. Demetrio took the wheel and accused-appellant sat beside
him in front.[16]
It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant
left the condominium. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive
around Batangas and Tagaytay City. After leaving Tagaytay,
they entered the South Luzon Expressway and headed towards
Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When they were near Puting Kahoy and
Silangan, accused-appellant told Demetrio to turn into a narrow
road. Somewhere along that road, accused-appellant ordered
Demetrio to stop the car. Accused-appellant alighted and told
Demetrio to get the bag in the trunk. Accused-appellant took the
plastic bags inside the bag and dumped them by the
roadside. Then, accused-appellant returned the empty bag in
the trunk and boarded the car. He called Demetrio and
said, Tayo na Rio, tuloy na tayo sa Bataan. It was already 6:30
p.m.
Demetrio drove to the Sta. Rosa exit gate, along the South
Luzon Expressway, through EDSA and towards the North Luzon
Expressway. They stopped at a gasoline station to refuel. They
then took the San Fernando, Pampanga exit, and were soon en
route to the Whisenhunt family mansion in Bagac, Bataan .
Before reaching Bagac, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to
stop the car on top of a bridge. Accused-appellant told Demetrio
to get off and to throw a bag into the river. Later, they passed
another bridge and accused-appellant again told Demetrio to
pull over. Accused-appellant alighted and threw Elsas clothes
over the bridge. On the way, Demetrio noticed that accused-
appellant took something from a bag, tore it to pieces and threw
it out of the window. When they passed Pilar, Bataan, accused-
appellant threw Elsas violet Giordano bag. As they reached the
road boundary of Bagac, accused-appellant wrung a short-
sleeved dress with violet and green stripes, and threw it on a
grassy lot. It was about midnight when accused-appellant and
Demetrio arrived at the mansion. Demetrio was unable to sleep
that night, as he was scared that he might be the next victim.
The next morning, at 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant ordered
Demetrio to clean the trunk of the car, saying, Rio, linisan mo
ang sasakyan para ang compartment hindi babaho. At 1:00

p.m., accused-appellant and Demetrio started off for Manila. As
they passed a place called Kabog-kabog, he saw accused-
appellant take out an ATM card. Accused-appellant burned the
middle of the card, twisted it and threw it out of the window. They
arrived at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue at 2:30
p.m. Demetrio asked accused-appellant if he can get off since
he wanted to go home to Fairview. Before Demetrio left,
accused-appellant told him, Rio, you and your family can go on
a vacation. I will give you money. Accused-appellant then gave
Demetrio P50.00 for his transportation going to Fairview.
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what
happened. His wife told him to report the incident to Fiscal Joey
Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to the house of Fiscal Diaz in
Fairview to talk to him. And thereafter went to NBI.
In his defense, he first learned of Elsa’s death when he was
arrested by the NBI on September 28, 1993. He denied having
anything to do with her death, saying that he had no reason to
kill her since he was in love with her. Sometime during his
relationship with Elsa, he claimed having received in the mails
two anonymous letters. The first one reads: Salamat sa
pagpapahiram mo ng sasakyan at driver. Pero masyado kang
pakialamero, Steve. Walanghiya ka. Para kang
demonyo. Pinakialaman mo ang di sa yo. Lintik lang ang walang
ganti. Matitiyempuhan din kita. Putang ina mo. The second
letter says: Steve, Ang kay Pedro kay Pedro. Kapag
pinakialaman ay kay San Pedro ang tungo. Mahal mo ba ang
pamilya mo? Iniingatan mo ba ang pangalan
mo? Nakakasagasa ka na. Upon Elsa’s knowledge, she got
very upset and said that the letters came from Fred, her
estranged husband.
RTC Ruling: Accused was convicted of the crime of murder
(Demetrio as credible witness).
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged.
Findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses
command great weight and respect since it had the opportunity
to observe their demeanor while the testified in court. Perhaps
more damning to accused-appellant is the physical evidence
against him. The findings of the forensic biologist on the
examination of the hair samples and bloodstains all confirm
Elsas death inside accused-appellants bedroom. On the other
hand, the autopsy report revealed that Elsa was stabbed at least
three times on the chest. This, taken together with Demetrios
testimony that accused-appellant kept the kitchen knife inside
his bedroom on September 24, 1993, leads to the inescapable
fact that accused-appellant stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom or
bathroom.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth,
and it ranks high in the hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence.
For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It
speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.
While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death
of Elsa, the confluence of the testimonial and physical evidence
against accused-appellant creates an unbroken chain of
circumstantial evidence that naturally leads to the fair and
reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant was the author of
the crime, to the exclusion of all others. The rules on evidence
and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence when the following requisites
concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the
inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Page 20 of 21
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully
proven by the prosecution without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that
Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants
condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September
24, 1993, accused-appellants housemaid was looking for her
kitchen knife and accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it
was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993, accused-
appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body
parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants
bedroom; that accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by
a roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna; that accused-
appellant also disposed of Elsas personal belongings along the
road going to Bagac, Bataan; that the mutilated body parts of a
female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were found
by the police and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio
pointed; that hair specimens found inside accused-appellants
bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from
Elsas head; and that the bloodstains found on accused-
appellants bedspread, covers and in the trunk of his car, all
matched Elsas blood type.
Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-
Legal Officer, Dr. Mendez, did not examine the pancreas of the
deceased notwithstanding Demetrios statement that, according
to accused-appellant, Elsa died ofbangungot, or hemorrhage of
the pancreas. Because of this, accused-appellant insists that
the cause of death was not adequately established. In any
event, the foregoing does not detract from the established fact
that Elsas body was found mutilated inside accused-appellants
bathroom. This clearly indicated that it was accused-appellant
who cut up Elsas body to pieces.Naturally, accused-appellant
would be the only suspect to her killing.
As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was
convincing. Accused-appellant attempts to refute Demetrios
statements by saying that he had repeatedly reprimanded the
latter for discourteous and reckless driving, and that he had
already asked the latter to tender his resignation. Thus,
accused-appellant claims that Demetrio imputed Elsas death on
him in order to get back at him. This Court finds the cruel
treatment by an employer too flimsy a motive for the employee
to implicate him in such a gruesome and hideous crime. Rather
than entertain an accusation of ill-motive and bad faith on
Demetrio Ravelo, this Court views his act of promptly reporting
the incident to his family and, later, to the authorities, as a
genuine desire to bring justice to the cruel and senseless slaying
of Elsa Santos Castillo, whom he knew well.
The court do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution
sufficiently proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever
there is inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. From
viewing the photograph of accused-appellant that he has a
rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately
proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing
at the corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the
trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head
constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim,
thus qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accused-
appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body
like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of
her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to
 Page 21 of 21

rot on the ground. The sight of Elsas severed body parts on the
ground, vividly depicted in the photographs offered in evidence,
is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer
cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of
disposing of her remains.
Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would
still be murder because of the dismemberment of the dead
body. One of the qualifying circumstances of murder under
Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is outraging or
scoffing at (the) person or corpse of the victim.
SC: Accused is guilty as charged.
-------------------------------END-------------------------------