HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E.

DE LEON The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a
letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6)
other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF
Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica
Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995
and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it
did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional
Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of
petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses”
before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be
heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to
study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. NO.
Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of
government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and
section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were
examination. deliberately made to distort the truth.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of
their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the
sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge
Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:

1. NO.
The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause
against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

2. NO.
STONEHILL v. DIOKNO
Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were
alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which they were served 4 search warrants, directing any peace
officer to search petitioners’ persons and/or premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences
for: “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized in
the offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’ residences.
Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law x x x.
is immaterial to the invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and
seized: “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”
The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court: x x x If letters
and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of
an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such
searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al.
are not the proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation
and thus they have no cause of action (only the officers or board members of said corporation may
assail said warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners’ personalities),
the 3 warrants issued to search petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches
and seizures made therein are made illegal.
The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JESUS P. MORFE and
FIRST MUTUAL SAVING AND LOAN ORGANIZATION, INC., respondents.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures
seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones. In the very
nature of things, unreasonableness is a condition dependent upon the circumstances surrounding
each case, in much the same way as the question whether or not "probable cause" exists is one which
must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner
set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

In the case at bar, none of these are met.

The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific
violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found
the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other words,
it would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in
the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
codes. General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions
Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211) rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect
DECISION its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.
PADILLA, J.:
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
I. THE FACTS uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission society and a peaceful community.
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed
to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
II. THE ISSUE
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIAN DEEN ESCAÑO, VIRGILIO TOME USANA
and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused, VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused-
appellants.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The acquittal on appeal of certain accused based on reasonable doubt
benefits a co-accused who did not appeal or who withdrew his appeal.
—In filing the instant motion, Escaño relies on a single ground, that is, that the28 January 2000
Decision of this Court on the appeal interposed by his co-accused is applicable and favorable to him
and entitles him to an acquittal pursuant to Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the New Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision states as follows: Section 11.
Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court
is favorable and applicable to the latter. Escaño argues that the Decision of this Court is applicable and
favorable to him in that “the factual findings therein equally support the conclusion that not all the
elements of the offense charged have been prove [d] and that no criminal liability can, thus, be imputed
to [him].” x x x We find merit in the instant Manifestation and Motion. Consistent with our ruling in a
number of cases, the acquittal of Usana and Lopez based on reasonable doubt should benefit movant
Escano notwithstanding the fact that he withdrew his appeal.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also
be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public
security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their
suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the
alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media,
most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can
Alvarez v. CFI Tayabas
January 29, 1937 | J. Imperial
Nature: Original action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.
Facts
 The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936 issued by CFI Tayabas, as well as the
order of a later date authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles
seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles be returned to him.
o The search warrant was issued by virtue of an affidavit from a reliable source that
the petitioner kept in hi house, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender.
o The petitioner is said to have been charging usurious rates of interest in violation
of the Anti-Usury law.
o The chief of the secret service to conduct the search swore to the truth of his
statements not upon personal knowledge but from a reliable person.
 Having the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and
residence at 7PM on June 4, 1936 and seized and took possession of the following articles:
internal revenue licenses, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4 notebooks, 4
check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of
copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs
of purchases of copra, 2 packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis
Fernandez, 14 bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan contracts
with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of
HSBC.
o The search were made with the opposition of the petitioner on the ground that the
agents seized even the originals of the documents.
o The articles were not immediately brought to the judge who issued the warrant
and hence, the petitioner filed a motion on June 8, praying that Emilio Siongco or
any other agent be ordered immediately to deposit all seized articles and that said
agent be declared guilty of contempt of court.
 On September 10, 1936, the CFI of Tayabas issued an order holding: that the search warrant
was obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that Emilio Siongco did not commit any
contempt of court and must be exonerated therefore, and that the chief of the Anti-Usury
Board must show cause within 2 days why all the articles must not be returned to the
petitioner.
Issues:
1. WON the search warrant issued is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit of
Agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts.
YES.
2. WON the search warrant issued is illegal because it was not supported by other affidavits
aside from that made by the applicant. YES.
3. WON the search warrant issued is illegal because it authorized its execution at night. YES.
4. WON the search warrant issued is illegal because it lacks an adequate description of the
books and documents to be seized. NO.
5. WON the search warrant issued is illegal because the articles were seized in order that the
Anti-Usury Board might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case which
might be filed against the petitioner for violating the Anti-Usury law. YES.
6. WON the petitioner cannot question the validity of the search warrant because he waived
his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise where he agreed to pay P200 for the
purpose of evading criminal proceedings. NO.
7. WON the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie because he can appeal from the orders
which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his petition. NO.
Held
1. Yes.
 Art. III Sec. 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution and General Order 58 Sec. 97 provide protection
against unreasonable search and seizures such that there must be a probable cause in order
to validly issue a search warrant.
 In addition, there must be an application for such supported by oath of the applicant and the
witness he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of the fact within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses.
 In this case, Almeda’s affidavit, as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made.
2. Yes.
 In the general sense, neither the Constitution nor General Order 58 provides that it is
imperative to take the depositions of the witnesses in addition to the affidavit of the
applicant for search warrant.
 The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to
satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
 Hence, if the affidavit of the applicant for search warrant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
of the depositions of other witnesses.
 However, in this case, Almeda’s affidavit was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts
was not personal but merely hearsay. Hence, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit
of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant.
3. Yes.
 General Order 58 Sec. 101 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively
asserted in the affidavit that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched.
 In this case, the affidavit has been declared insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively
upon it is illegal, hence the search could not legally be made at night.
4. No.
 The Constitution and General Order 58 requires that the application for search warrant must
contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized. These provisions are mandatory and strict.
 However, when by nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given.
 In this case, the description substantially complies with the legal provisions because the
officer who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify
the articles, which he did.
5. Yes.
 It is illegal for it is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting
the compulsion of an accused to testify against him.
  In this case, it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to
enable the Anti-Usury board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the
articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed
against him.

6. No.
 There is no such waiver. First, it is because the petitioner denied the offer of compromise.
Second, it is for the reason that if there was a compromise, it referred not to the search
warrant and the incidents thereof but to the institution of criminal proceedings for violation
of the Anti-Usury Law.
 The waiver could have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner
voluntarily consented to the search and seizure but such was not the case because the
petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient
inventory furnished him by the agents.

7. No.
 Sec. 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that mandamus will not lie when there is
another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 In this case, an appeal from said orders would not be a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
because a long time would have to elapse before he recovers possession of the articles and
before his rights are restored to him.

Ruling
The search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1996, and the orders of the respondent court authorizing
the retention of the articles, are declared ILLEGAL and are SET ASIDE.

It is also ordered that the presiding judge over CFI Tayabas direct the immediate return of the articles
taken from the petitioner.
SOLIVEN, petitioner VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR, respondent on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable
167 SCRA 393 cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.
FACTS: Third issue
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the President’s filing of her
of Manila complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
ISSUES: under the trial court’s jurisdiction. àThis would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt
filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under of court or perjury.
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President -This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally -The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws
3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit Additional Issue:
DECISION: Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on
public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions. press freedom.
The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED. -Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the
RATIO: “chilling effect” point.
Background of the first issue SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.
 MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues. With regard
 APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied to whether or not the libel case would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom, Gutierrez
by the Secretary of Justice believes that this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now rather than later.
 MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the Quotable quotes: “Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can
resolution of the Secretary of Justice be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.” –United States v. Bustos
“No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the
 MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary
citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.” –People v. Perfecto
Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.
-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a “Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed”, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-
affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:
Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrests.
-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report
and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause (and
PAPA v. MAGO
G.R. No. L-27360/February 28, 1968/EN BANC
Original action in the SC for prohibition and certiorari, praying for the annulment of the order issued
by respondent judge
Parties:
Petitioners:
Ricardo G. Papa (Chief of Police of Manila), Juan Ponce Enrile (Commissioner of Customs), Pedro Pacis
(Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila), Martin Alagao (Patrolman, head of counter-intelligence of
the Manila Police Department)
Respondents:
Remedios Mago
Hilarion Jarencio (Presiding Judge of Br. 23, CFI of Manila)
J. Zaldivar
November 4, 1966 – having received information the day before that a certain shipment of misdeclared
and undervalued personal effects would be released from the customs zone of the port of Manila,
Alagao and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs conducted surveillance of two trucks
allegedly carrying the goods. When the trucks left the customs zone, elements of the counter-
intelligence unit intercepted them in Ermita. The trucks and the nine bales of goods they carried were
seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation those claiming ownership showed the
policemen a “Statement of Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501” issued by the
Bureau of Customs in the name of one Bienvenido Naguit.
Mago filed with the CFI of Manila a Petition for Mandamus with restraining order or preliminary
injunction, alleging that she was the owner of the goods seized, which were purchased from Sta.
Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga. She hired the trucks owned by Lanopa (who filed with
her) to bring the goods to her residence in Sampaloc, Manila. She complained that the goods were
seized without a warrant, and that they were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff
and Customs Code even if they were misdeclared and undervalued because she had bought them
without knowing they had been imported illegally. They asked that the police not open the bales, the
goods be returned, and for moral and exemplary damages.
November 10, 1966 – Judge issued an order restraining the police from opening the nine bales in
question, but by then some had already been opened. Five days later Mago filed an amended petition
including as party defendants Pedro Pacis and Martin Alagao.
December 23, 1966 – Mago filed a motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory
ordered by the court of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same
should be released upon her posting of the appropriate bond. The petitioners in the instant case filed
their opposition, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over the case and thus no jurisdiction to
order the release (case under jurisdiction of CTA), and as the goods were not declared they were
subject to forfeiture.
March 7, 1967 – assailed Order issued by Jarencio, authorized release under bond of goods seized and
held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code. The bond of
P40,000.00 was filed five days later. On the same day, Papa filed on his own behalf a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector
of Customs to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court’s action on the MR, petitioners filed the present action.
Arguments of Petitioners (that seem important)
(1) CFI had no jurisdiction over the case
(2) Mago had no cause of action in the civil case filed with the CFI due to her failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention
Arguments of Respondents
(1) It was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide
Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No.
67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods
in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs
(2) Petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes
had been paid and said goods had left the customs premises and were no longer within the control of
the Bureau of Customs
IMPORANT ISSUE (there’s another involving illegal search and seizure): WON the judge acted with
jurisdiction in issuing the Order releasing the goods in question
HELD: NO. Petition granted, case filed by Mago dismissed.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, to
(1) assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines
and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws
(2) prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and
(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.
The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected on Informal Entry". As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported
goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated
only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be
paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment
of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject
of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of
Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a
comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts
of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales
upon examination and inventory, shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared,
presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. (e.g. 40 pieces of ladies’ sweaters assessed in the
Statement when there actually 42 dozen; 100 watch bands were assessed but 2,209 dozen, etc.)
The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under
Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The Court had held
before (and did again in this case) that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to
law, is subject to forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and
forfeiture.
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs
area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were
intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department,
acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by
the Commissioner of Customs, the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the
goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty
to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been
paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question,
therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the
petition for mandamus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if
the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The Court reiterated its ruling in De Joya v. Lantin: The owner of seized goods may set up defenses
before the Commissioner of Customs during the proceedings following seizure. From his decision
appeal may be made to the Court of Tax Appeals. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in
cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs
authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its
exclusive appellate jurisdictions. Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such
law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance
is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First
Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or
control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of
Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of
Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the
Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the
tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of
First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs
had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. Not having acquired jurisdiction
over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.
Aniag Jr. v Comelec 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
“Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on check pt. – petitioner charged in violation of
Omnibus Election Code (gun ban)– invokes deprivation of Constitutional right on due process of law.”
Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the Comelec in connection to the national & local
election, the Sgt-at-Arms of the House of Representatives requested petitioner to return the 2 firearms
issued by the House to him. In compliance, petitioner ordered his driver Arellano to pick up the firearms
in his house to return them to Congress. On his way back to the Batasan Complex, Arellano was flagged
down in a check point and police search the car. Upon finding the guns, he was apprehended and
detained and his case was referred for inquest to the City prosecutor office. Petitioner was not made a
party to the charge but was invited to shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained the purpose how
Arellano came to have the firearms boarded on the car and wrote the prosecutor to exonerate Arellano
from the charges. The prosecutor recommended dismissing the case. The Comelec however issued a
resolution filing information in violation of the gun ban against petitioner. Petitioner moves for
reconsideration to the Comelec which was denied hence this petition contending that the search on
his car was illegal and that he was not impleaded as respondent in the preliminary investigation and
his constitutional rights for due process was violated.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law.
Held: The court held that as a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued
by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful
arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of (1) moving vehicles (2) the seizure of
evidence in plain view and (3) search conducted at police or military checkpoints which are not
illegal for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and
the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search, and (4) Stop-and-search without
warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were
reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters is also recognized by the court to be legal. An
extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender
or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the
vehicle to be searched. Because there was no sufficient evidence that would impel the policemen to
suspect Arellano to justify the search they have conducted, such action constitutes an unreasonable
intrusion of the petitioner’s privacy and security of his property in violation of Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. The manner by which
COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The
facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such
offense. Thus the court declared the warrantless search and seizure of the firearms as illegal hence
inadmissible to court as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing
arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of
reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for
the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of
firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun
Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for
the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then
instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to
Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint,
the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then
explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the
firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued
Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation
of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified
from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution
No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other
acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus,
according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of
petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in
Congress in the elections.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the
firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority.
However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed
within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the
car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well
as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been
valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of
the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP
with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was
a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process.
Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation
against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the
warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search
cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is
unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
Rudy Caballes y Taino vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]
First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 41 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a
routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two
police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taiño. When asked
what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes'
consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR).
The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the
wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8
kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the highvoltage wires
were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep
loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan,
Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the
crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded
not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz,
Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In
a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the
decision by certiorari.
flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they
saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was
unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common
for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have
received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires
in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is
replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence
is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner
by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the
search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached
Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By
uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission
that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were
informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof.
Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to
sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right
of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

Issue: Whether Caballes’ passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will look
at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes’
part on warrantless search and seizure.

Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons
and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III
thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional
events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot
be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of
the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police
officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does
not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants
if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police
officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to
see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was
Josefino S. Roan vs. Honorable Romulo T. Gonzales
GR No. 71410, November 25, 1986

FACTS:
A search warrant was issued by respondent judge Romulo T. Gonzales on May 10, 1984. The
application for the said search warrant was personally filed by PC Capt. Mauro Quillosa. Together with
Quillosa were two witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who presented to respondent judge
their respective affidavits taken by police investigator Pat. Josue V. Lining. The application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to, as such respondent Judge proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents
of the application to ascertain if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, Quillosa subscribed
and swore the said application before respondent judge.
Roan’s house was searched two days after the issuance of the search warrant. The said
search was conducted by military authorities. Despite none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered, the officers who performed the search found one Colt Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets
which they confiscated. The said items served as bases for the charge of illegal possession of firearms
against the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant be annulled on the ground that it violates the privacy of one
person’s house

HELD:
YES. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by
the judge or some authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. There must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to
prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable cause, as described by Judge Escolin
in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, refers to “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense arein the place sought to be searched.” The probable cause must refer
to only one specific offense.
Capt. Quillosa was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay
and not of information personally known to him as required by settled jurisprudence. It is axiomatic
that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was
not because there was no valid search warrant and absent of such warrant, the right thereto was not
validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner’s premises
had no right to be there and therefore had no right to seize the pistol and bullets.