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QUIMEN V.

CA- Easement public highway, starting from the back of the sari-sari store and
LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE extending inward by 1m to her property and turning left for about
When the easement may be established on any of several 5m to avoid the store in order to reach the municipal road. The way
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.
is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action,
However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do explaining that the right of way through the brother’s property was a
not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacia’s
damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. property would no longer make the path straight. They held that it
FACTS: Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister, was more practical to extend the existing pathway to the public road
inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that was
the property equally among themselves. The shares of Anastacia the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the
and 3 other siblings were next to the municipal road. Anastacia’s parties concerned than passing through Anastacia’s property.
was at the extreme left of the road while the lots on the right were CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on
sold by her brothers to Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots behind Anastacia’s property. The court, however, did not award damages
Anastacia’s were sold by her (as her brother’s adminstratix) brother to her and held that Anastacia was not in bad faith when she
to Yolanda. resisted the claim.
Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be considered
Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first because it d as a servient estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin
no access to the public road. Anastacia prevailed upon her by the property of private respondent. She denies ever promising
assuring her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining Yolonda a right of way.
property (which was in front) for p200 per square meter. Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the second lot,
Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her the easement of right of way she provided was ipso jure
passageway to the public highway a portion of anastacia’s property. extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant
But when yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway and the servient estates in one person so that there was no longer
anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter any compelling reason to provide private respondent with a right of
barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.
After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the Quimens
(a brother), located directly behind the property of her parents who She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the
provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, shortest access to the public road because of the detour and that,
extending about 19m from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a
store of one brother, and Anastacia’s perimeter fence. net income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her
avocado tree, and considering that an avocado has an average life
In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from
right of way through Anastacia’s property. The proposed right of it.
way was at the extreme right of Anastacia’s property facing the ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail
2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the least over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of
onerous/least prejudicial to the parties judicial appreciation. When the easement may be established on
HELD: YES to both any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one
1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should
or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
another’s property when his tenement is surrounded by realties circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which
belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of shortest.
way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner TC’s findings:
thereof for the beneficial use of his property. > Yolanda’s property was situated at the back of her father’s
The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: property and held that there existed an available space of about
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without 19m long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between
an adequate outlet to a public highway; the boundary line and the house of Yolanda’ s father
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; > The vacant space ended at the left back of the store which was
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, made of strong materials
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the > Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of
servient estate. Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5)
These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway.
that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates CA’s finding:
of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay > The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m wide and 5m
P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between long at the extreme right of Anastacia’s property will cause the least
her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage
property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient through the property of Yolanda’ s father which would mean
estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials.
the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid
“[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, the
plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the SC accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would
public highway and there appears an imperative need for an demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public
easement of right of way to the public highway. highway, and another right of way which although longer will only
2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the easement of right require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative
of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the should be preferred.
servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement of Right of Way
shortest.”
Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription
because it is not a continuous easement. “The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way
necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the
FACTS: Petitioners’ parcel of land was connected to the Naga use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the
Market Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature
through the land of the Respondents, which they have been using of the use.” (17 Am. Jur. 972)
for more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a "It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous
chapel right in the middle of the road, blocking their usual path to servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be
the marketplace. One year after, by means of force, intimidation, shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous,
and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where the under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all
easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced with other claimants'."
barbed wires the road, closing their right of way from their house to
Igualdad St. and Naga public market. CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS 291
SCRA 122
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be [G.R. No. 125339. June 22, 1998]
acquired by prescription?
FACTS: Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas
HELD: No. Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and Avenue Extension, Quezon City, where they have been residing
apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. The from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the
easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous other hand, is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat along
because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man. Visayas Avenue which once included the disputed residential lots,
Minority Opinion (including the ponente): Lot 1 and Lot 2.
The said lots were originally part of a private road known as Road
Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar Ledesma, Inc. When Visayas
at least since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law Avenue became operational as a national road in 1979, Cesar
on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. Ledesma Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City to be
190. Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots.
as to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and there The petition was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into
would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the writer of this residential lots designated as Lot 1 and Lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar
opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by Ledesma, Inc. sold both lots to Macario Pacione in whose favor
the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere Transfer Certificates of Title were correspondingly issued. In turn,
tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and daughter-in-law,
cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way through respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione. When the Pacione
prescription. spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, visited the
property in 1987, they found out that the lot was occupied by a
squatter named Juanita Geronimo and a portion was being used as The second assignment of error was likewise properly rejected by
a passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. the appellate court. Primarily, the issue of legality or illegality of the
Accordingly, the spouses complained about the intrusion into their conversion of the road lot in question has long been laid to rest in
property to the barangay office. At the barangay conciliation LRC Case No. Q-1614 15 which declared with finality the legality of
proceeding, petitioners offered to pay for the use of a portion of Lot the segregation subdivision survey plan of the disputed road lot.
1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses rejected the offer. When Consequently, it is now too late for petitioners to question the
the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, the spouses validity of the conversion of the road lot
started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence. Petitioners protested Finally, questions relating to non-compliance with the requisites for
the enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides conversion of subdivision lots are properly cognizable by the
by residential houses belonging to different owners and had no National Housing Authority (NHA), now the Housing and Land Use
adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the Regulatory Board (HLURB), pursuant to Sec. 22 of PD 957 16 and
property of the Paciones. As their protest went unheeded, not by the regular courts.
petitioners instituted an action for easement of right of way with The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree.”
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The SEC. 22.No owner shall charge or alter roads, open spaces,
trial court issued a TRO directing the Pacione spouses to cease infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of
and desist from fencing the disputed property. subdivision developments as contained in the approved subdivision
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that one essential plan and/or represented in its advertisements, without the
requisite of a legal easement of a right of way was not proved. permission of the Authority and the written conformity or consent of
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of
affirmed the findings of the trial court. Their motion for the latter, by the majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.
reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the present
petition together with the issue of legality or illegality of the Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction,
conversion of Road Lot 2 into two (2) residential lots by the Cesar where jurisdiction is vested upon an administrative body, no
Ledesma, Inc. resort to the courts may be made before such administrative
ISSUE: WON the conversion of lot 2 to a residential lot was legal. body shall have acted upon the matter.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court ruled that
the first element of a compulsory easement of right of way, i.e., “that STA. MARIA V. CA|FAJARDO,
the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no 285 SCRA 351- Compulsory Servitude of Right of Way
adequate outlet to a public highway” is clearly absent. As found by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, an outlet already exists, Requirements of compulsory servitude of right of way: 1)
which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners’ property surrounded by immovables and no adequate outlet to a public
and which is connected to a private road about five hundred (500) highway; 2) payment of indemnity; 3) isolation is not due to the
meters long. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what owner of the dominant estate; 4) least prejudicial (and shortest if
is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory possible)
easement.
FACTS: Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs failed to prove the third
registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124, in Bulacan. requisite or that the isolation was not caused by the plaintiffs
themselves?
Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on
the northeast portion thereof; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, HELD: The plaintiffs sufficiently proved that they did not by
on the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b owned themselves cause the isolation.
respectively by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and As to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed out; thus: "Neither
Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by have the private respondents been able to show that the isolation of
the Jacinto family, on the northwest. their property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-
in-interest's own acts." In the instant case, the Court of Appeals
On February 17, 1992, Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants have found the existence of the requisites. The petitioners, however,
Sta. Maria for the establishment of an easement of right of way. insist that private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have,
Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties through their own acts of constructing concrete fences at the back
belonging to other persons, including those of the defendants; that and on the right side of the property, isolated their property from the
since plaintiffs have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an public highway. The contention does not impress because even
easement of a right of way passing through either of the alternative without the fences private respondents' property remains
defendants' properties which are directly abutting the provincial landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to different owners.
road would be plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and shortest access
to and from the provincial road; that plaintiffs' predecessors-in- Again, for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right
interest have been passing through the properties of defendants in of way under the Civil Code, to wit:
going to and from their lot; that defendants' mother even promised 1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has
plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access from 2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
their property to the road; and that alternative defendants, despite 3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the
plaintiffs' request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus, 4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
plaintiffs prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
defendants be established in their favor. They also prayed for distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. shortest (Art. 650).

RTC and CA both found for Fajardo and granted the easement of
right of way. On appeal, the Sta. Maria's allege that Fajardo failed
to prove that it was not their own actions which caused their lot to
be enclosed or cut-off from the road.
CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and that a right of way had already been granted by the sevient estate.
ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO, Petitioners, v.PATROCINIO Thus, there is no need to establish an easement over the
L. MARCOS, Respondent. respondent’s property.
G.R. No. 180282 : April 11, 2011
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a grant of legal
FACTS: On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for easement of right of way from their landlocked property through the
Easement of Right of Way against respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos. property of private respondent which is the shortest route in going
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of Lot to and from their property to the public street.
No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag City; while respondent
is the owner of Lot No. 1. As petitioners had no access to a public HELD: The petition is without merit.
road to and from their property, they claimed to have used a portion
of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, CIVIL LAW : Easement
however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights
petitioners have been granted another passageway by the spouses of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance
Benjamin and Sylvia Arce (Spouses Arce), the owners of another on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the
adjacent lot, the former instituted the complaint before the RTC and dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
prayed that they be granted a right of way over an area of 54 sqm presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of
of Lot 01 by paying the defendant the amount ofP54,000.00, and right of way may be granted.
that the right be annotated on defendant’s title. In addition to that,
the defendant will pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following
damages for attorney’s fees and costs of suit. requisites should be met: first, the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
In the defendant’s answer, he denied that he allowed anybody to second, there is payment of proper indemnity; third, the isolation is
use Lot No. 1 as passageway. Moreover, he stated that petitioners’ not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
claim of right of way is only due to expediency and not necessity for fourth, the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
there already is an existing easement of right of way available to servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
petitioners granted by the Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
establish another easement over respondent’s property. shortest.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners by finding In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to show sufficient factual
that they had adequately established the requisites to justify an evidence to satisfy the above-enumerated requirements. Admittedly,
easement of right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of they had been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot
the Civil Code. Also, the trial court declared petitioners in good faith owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said
as they expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity. outlet in going to and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there
however, the he CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision ruling is an existing outlet to and from the public road.
 The law provides that "No windows or balconies or other
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, similar projections which directly overlook the adjoining
and they have to pass through other lots owned by different owners property may be opened or built without leaving a distance of
before they could get to the highway. We find petitioners’ concept of not less than 2 meters between the wall in which they are built
what is “adequate outlet” a complete disregard of the well- and such adjoining property.
entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an  Stenberg argues that the action of Soriano has already
easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or prescribed.
artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate  It must be noted that there is no annotation in the Torrens title
is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a of the parties involved. (No easement of view in the title of
compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be Soriano and no right to easement on the title of Sternberg.)
satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be  Here, there is no question of easement.
imposed.

The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge
for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true
standard for the grant of the legal right is “adequacy.” Hence, when Issue: WON a right of action to enforce Article 582 of the Civil code
there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant may be lost by failure to prosecute within the prescriptive period
estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said fixed by the Code of Civil Procedure. YES
outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open
up another servitude is entirely unjustified. Therefore, the petition is Held: Yes.
denied. The Court affirms the ruling of the CA.
In this case, Sternberg has never prohibited Soriano from building
SORIANO v. STERNBERG any wall on his own land. Soriano’s cause of action only arose in
1905 when Sternberg built the offending edifice (building).
Facts:
 Oscar Sternberg owns a parcel of land with a two storey- Nevertheless, the windows complained of were permitted to be
house which was built in 1905. open for thirteen years (1918) without protest from Soriano. Soriano
 The said house has windows overlooking the adjacent lot must, consequently, by reason of his own laches, be considered to
belonging to Soriano. have waived any right which he may have had to compel the
 The windows were built on the wall of the house which has a windows to be closed.
1.36 m. distance from the dividing line between the two lots.
 Thereafter, Soriano filed an action to compel Sternberg to It is our holding that plaintiff right of action under article 582 of the
close the windows because it is less than 2 meters from the Civil Code accrued in 1905 when the windows in defendant's house
division line between the two lots and hence, a violation of were opened, and that, in accordance with Chapter III of the Code
Article 582 (now Article 670) of the Civil Code. of Civil Procedure, his action has prescribed.
Noise emanating from air-con units not nuisance per se –
The argument of Soriano that it was only in 1917, when he bought Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of
the land in question, that the statute of limitations began to run, is reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the
not convincing, for the general rule is, that once the statute begins
needs of the maker to the needs of the listener; Injury to a particular
to run, it never stops, and the transfer of the cause of action does
not have the effect of suspending its operation. person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive
characteristics will not render the noise an actionable nuisance.
Art. 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar Whether or not the noise is a nuisance is an issue to be resolved by
projections which afford a direct view upon or towards an adjoining the courts.
land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance of two
meters between the wall in which they are made and such Test to determine noise as a nuisance – The test is whether
contiguous property. Neither can side or oblique views upon or
rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected
towards such conterminous property be had, unless there be a
distance of sixty centimeters. The nonobservance of these by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss [i.e.
distances does not give rise to prescription. Actual Physical Discomfort]which goes beyond the reasonable
limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding
property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve
AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corp. the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it
G.R. No. 166744. November 2, 2006. within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another
SCRA Citation: 506 SCRA 625 owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable
regard for the rights of those affected by it.
DOCTRINE: Private and public nuisance; definition – The term
“nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of pecuniary
all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either estiation – an action to abate private nuisance, even wehere the
in person, property, the enjoyment of property, or his comfort; A plaintiff asks for damages is one incapable of pecuniary estimation
private nuisance is one which violates only private rights and
produces damage to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is FACTS: AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10-
public when it interferes with the exercise of public right by directly storey building in Makati City. Frabelle (Respondent) is a
encroaching on public property or by causing a common injury, an condominium corporation who's condominium development is
unreasonable interference with the right common to the general located behind petitioner. Respondent complained of the
public. In this case, the noise generated by an airconditioning 'unbearable” noise emanating from the blower of the air-
system is considered a private nuisance. conditioning units of petitioner.
ISSUES: Ongsiaco vs Ongsiaco
(1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the due
course of proceedings or a nuisance per se? Plaintiff: Caridad Ongsiaco
Defendant: Emilia Ongsiaco
Ponente: Reyes
(2) Is an action for abatement of a private nuisance, more
specifically noise generated by the blower of an air-conditioning FACTS:
system, even if the plaintiff prays for damages, one incapable of  Mother of Caridad & Emilia Ongsiako executed a deed of
pecuniary estimation? donation inter vivos, donating to her children a piece of land.
 According to the mother, when she made the donation, a greater
(3) What is the determining factor when noise alone is the cause of area was allotted to Ramon & Emilia because their shares were
complaint? low lands through which flowed the excess water from higher
estates. Later on, she learned that Ramon & Emilia started
constructing dikes which impeded the natural flow of water
HELD: coming from the higher estates. Hence, she executed a
(1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due document revoking the donation in favor of Ramon and Emilia
course of proceedings; the noise is not a nuisance per se. Noise and adjudicated their revoked shares to Caridad as mojera and
becomes actionable only whenn it passes the limits of reasonable the rest in equal shares.
adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the
ISSUE (the 3 issues in this case relate to the 3 causes of action):
maker to the needs of the listener. Injury to a particular person in a
(1) WON the donation was effectively revoked by virtue of the
peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not document drawn by the mother.
render the house an actionable nuisance–– in the conditions, of (2) (TOPICAL) WON there exists a cause of action for violation
present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many of right of legal easement of water.
necessary occupations. (3) WON there exists a cause of action for alleged fraudulent
reduction of Caridad’s share.
(2) Yes, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation HELD:
(1) No, the donation was not effectively revoked.
because the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
(2) No more cause of action because it had already prescribed.
a sum of money. (3) No, action had already prescribed.
RATIO:
(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the (1)
noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort  In order to set aside the donation, the revocation will only be
and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities rendering effective upon court judgment or consent of the donee. In this
adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.
case, there was neither a court judgment ordering the Jose 'Pepito' Timoner vs. People of the Philippines and The
revocation, nor was there a consent of Ramon & Emilia. Honorable Court of Appeals, IV Division (G.R. No. L-62050,
(2) November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 830)
 The legal easement of water is classified as continuous,
therefore subject to prescription by non-user for the period FACTS:
required by law. Under CC 631, easements are extinguished by Petitioner is the mayor of the town of Daet in Camarines Norte. He
non-user for 10 years, which in the case of continuous ordered the demolition of the stalls in Maharlika Highway, even
easements, shall be counted from the day on which an act showing himself up in those stalls during the demolition, after these
contrary to the same took place. establishments had been recommended for closure by the
 In this case, the dike was constructed in 1937/1938 (before the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with
war) and the action was only brought on 1951, way beyond the certain health and sanitation requirements. Among the structures
prescription period. thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the
 Furthermore, Caridad cannot argue that the dams constitute a complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-
nuisance and by virtue of CC 698, lapse of time does not legalize Rebustillos.
any nuisance, therefore, her action does not prescribe.
o First, the complaint does not set forth any fact which Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
shows that the dam is a nuisance. of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for
o Even assuming arguendo that it is indeed nuisance, CC judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint alleged that these
631 which is a more particular law which applies to stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se.
easements in particular will prevail over CC 698 which Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.
applied to nuisances in general (simple rule in stat con:
apply particular provisions over general ones). In such a ISSUE:
case, action had already prescribed Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's
(3) barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and,
 Prescribed because more than 20 years had elapsed since the therefore, under lawful authority.
partition (prescription: 10 years after partition only).
HELD:
We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in
JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT FOR ALL 3 CAUSES OF ACTION ARE question did constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article
DISMISSED. Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,


business, condition of property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or


(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or Abalos vs. Heirs of Vicente Torio
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or December 14, 2011
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; Petitioners: Jaime Abalos, Spouses Salazar, Consuelo Salazar,
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. Heirs of Aquilino Abalos, Heirs of Aquilina Abalos
Respondents: Heirs of Vicente Torio
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public
nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable Facts:
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger - July 24, 1996: Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of
or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is Possession and Damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
one that is not included in the foregoing definition. Pangasinan against Jaime Abalos and the spouses Salazar.
- Respondents contended that they are the heirs of Vicente Torio
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the who died intestate on the year 1973. They stated that Mr. Vicente
poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been recommended for allowed Jaime and Spouses Salazar to stay on his land (2,950 sq.
closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First m.) at Pangasinan.
Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, - After the death of Vicente, the respondents still allowed petitioners
declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se. Thus: to stay.
- On 1985, respondents requested Mr. Vicente and Salazar to
Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no vacate the subject lot but the latter refused.
semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the - Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners.
defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a - Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with
sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute Counterclaim and stated that respondents’ cause of action is barred
a menace to the health of the general public passing through the by acquisitive prescription.
street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as - Petitioners claim the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of
well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said the action and the persons of the defendant. They also alleged that
place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was they are in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the
a license, permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and subject lot as owners since time immemorial.
living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an act - They also said that they have been paying real property taxes and
which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or have been introducing improvements on the said land.
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons and the - December 10, 2003: MTC issued a Decision ordering herein
general public which posed a danger to the people in general petitioners to vacate the subject lot and turnover said property to
passing and using that place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the heirs of Vicente Torio.
the public by the invasion of its rights — the fact that it is in a public - Jaime and the Spouses Salazar appealed the Decision of the
place and annoying to all who come within its sphere. MTC with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
- June 14, 2005: RTC ruled in favor of Jaime and the Spouses
Salazar, holding that they have acquired the subject property other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
through prescription. Accordingly, the RTC dismissed herein transmit any right.
respondents’ complaint.
- Heirs of Vicente Torio filed a petition for review with the CA In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the
assailing the Decision of the RTC. property in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof
- June 30, 2006: CA granted the petition of the respondents (in this by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is
case). clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the
- Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was year 1984 wherein it contains a statement admitting that Jaime’s
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated November 13, 2006. house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents’ immediate
predecessor-in-interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating that Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having
herein petitioners are now the absolute and exclusive owners of the knowledge that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the
land in question by virtue of acquisitive prescription. owners of the disputed lot, petitioners’ possession could not be
deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire
the subject land by ordinary prescription.
Held:
After a review of the records, however, the Court finds that the In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners’
petition must fail as it finds no error in the findings of fact and possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of
conclusions of law of the CA and the MTC. respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory
Petitioners claim that they have acquired ownership over the character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the
disputed lot through ordinary acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long,
in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. Without good faith do not start the running of the period of prescription.
and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in
character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the character of
(30) years. petitioners’ possession of the subject property had become adverse,
still falls short of the required period of thirty (30) years in cases of
Possession “in good faith” consists in the reasonable belief that the extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records show that the
person from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, earliest Tax Declaration in the name of petitioners was in 1974.
and could transmit his ownership. There is “just title” when the Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was completed in
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one 2004. However, herein respondents’ complaint was filed in 1996,
of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or effectively interrupting petitioners’ possession upon service of
summons on them.
Based on the foregoing, JJaime Abalos and the Spouses Salazar
have not inherited the disputed land because the same was shown
to have already been validly sold to Marcos Torio, who, thereupon,
assigned the same to his son Vicente, the father of petitioners.

There is no doubt that the deed of sale was duly acknowledged


before a notary public. As a notarized document, it has in its favor
the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face.

In the instant case, petitioners’ bare denials will not suffice to


overcome the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed of sale.

The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of


the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

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