Tanada v.
Tuvera Statement of the Case
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
Facts:
On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the
OfficialGazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was
concurred only by 3 judges.Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the
decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for
advisory opinion. February Revolution took place,which subsequently required the new
Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court).
Issue:
Whether publication is still required in light of the clause ³unless otherwise provided´.
Held:
The clause ³unless it is otherwise provided,´ in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to
thedate of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event beomitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediatelyupon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication. The legislature may in itsdiscretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. Publicationrequirements applies to (1) all
statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directlyconferred by the
Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or
implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a
citynotwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects onlythe inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to ³fill in
the details´ of the CentralBank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further,
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.
Reasoning:
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upontheir
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette,
to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date
specified by thelegislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1429. October 4, 2002]
FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL, complainant, vs. Judge EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Alcala, Pangasinan, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges ought to be familiar with the Rules on Summary
Procedure governing ejectment cases. Failure to observe them constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
The sworn Administrative Complaint,1 filed by Francisca P. Pascual, charged Judge
Eduardo U. Jovellanos of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Alcala, Pangasinan with
gross ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, abuse of discretion and neglect of duty. 2
The Antecedents
The facts in the present case are summarized by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in its January 28, 2002 Memorandum 3 addressed to this Court as
follows:
Complainant x x x alleges that she filed a complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil
Case No. 730 against a certain Lorenzo L. Manaois. The complaint was dismissed
without prejudice for being insufficient in some material allegations (Order dated 13
October 1999). On 15 November 1999, she filed a corrected complaint which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 740.
Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out arguing that the new
allegations in the complaint are false. After the period to answer lapsed and no answer
was submitted, complainant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated 15 December
1999. Defendant opposed the motion.
On 30 May 2000, defendants motion to strike out was granted by respondent Judge.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order.
Based on the foregoing, complainant accuse[d] respondent Judge of Neglect of Duty
anchored on the following grounds:
a. Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to Strike Out. Inspite
thereof, respondent Judge granted the motion 120 days after its filing, thus defeating
the summary nature of the case;
b. The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any findings of fact because
no hearing was conducted relative thereon;
c. Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the defendant in his
Order granting the motion to strike out when he pointed out x x x that the complaint in
this case is virtually a rehash of the complaint in Civil Case No. 730 x x x. Complainant
asserts that the same is to be expected because the defects or insufficiency in the first
complaint were just being rectified in the later one;
d. Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present, unacted upon.
Meanwhile, defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the proceedings, started the
construction of a one-storey building on the subject land. To protect her interest,
complainant filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction dated 8 May 2000. Acting
thereon, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated 9 May 2000
and set the hearing on the Injunction. On said date, complainant was able to present
evidence in support of her application while defendant chose not to present
controverting evidence and to just submit a memorandum.
On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO (29 May 2000), complainant filed an
Extremely Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to grant her application for injunction. On 7 June
2000 defendant filed his memorandum. However, until the present, respondent Judge
has not ruled on her application on preliminary injunction.
Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with the construction of the building
and even started with a new one. Hence, a contempt charge was filed by herein
complainant on 8 May 2000. Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt charge on the
ground that it was filed in the same proceedings ([C]ivil [C]ase No. 740) and the filing
fee was not paid. The court, however, motu propio docketed the complaint for
contempt as Civil Case No. 744 while the required docket and other fees were paid by
defendant on 31 May 2000. On same date, the court issued an Order furnishing anew
the defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge. These, complainant
claims, cured the defect cited by defendants/respondents in their motion to dismiss.
However, respondent Judge still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to the prejudice
of herein complainant.4
In his Comment5 dated September 30, 2000, respondent denied the allegations in
the Complaint. He accused Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino, complainants counsel in the
forcible entry case, of having a penchant for filing administrative cases against him
instead of appealing decisions before the proper court. Respondent added that none of
the charges had any factual or legal bases. He insisted that his Decision in Civil Case No.
730 had been rendered with utmost good faith, honesty and sound discretion. 6
The OCAs Recommendation
After investigation of this case, the OCA found that respondent failed to apply the
Rule on Summary Procedure, which he ought to have been very conversant with,
because it was a common procedure in municipal courts. Accordingly, it recommended
that respondent be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 and warned that the
commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. 7
This Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the penalty, taking note that
this is respondents second infraction.
Administrative Liability
Judges are the visible representations of law and justice. 8 They ought to be
embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. 9 In particular, municipal
judges are frontline officers in the administration of justice. 10 It is therefore essential
that they live up to the high standards demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct. 11 To
be able to render substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal
system, they are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of all laws
and prevailing jurisprudence.12 Judicial competence requires no less.13
Moreover, judges are bound to dispose of the courts business promptly and to
decide cases within the required period. 14 For it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed
is justice denied. Procrastination among members of the judiciary in rendering
decisions and in acting upon cases before them not only causes great injustice to the
parties involved, but also invites suspicion of ulterior motives on their part. 15
It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and
promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes
respect for the rule of law. 16 The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated
precisely to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to
observe the period within which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting judge to
administrative sanctions.17 For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and expressly
prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for extension.18
In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of the relevant
provisions on ejectment.19 He has evidently been remiss in resolving the forcible entry
case, pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. 20 Verily, judgment should
have been rendered based on the allegations of the Complaint and the evidence
presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of
ten (10) days from the service of the summons. 21 Section 6 of the Rule allows the trial
court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an
answer within the reglementary period. 22 Moreover, under Section 10 of the Rule,
respondent was duty-bound to render his decision within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing
them.23 This notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for Summary
Judgment24 dated December 15, 1999, filed in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
Furthermore, respondent failed to apply these very basic rules when he granted
the defendants Motion to Strike Out which was in reality a motion to dismiss, a
prohibited pleading.25 In his Order26 dated May 30, 2000, he ruled that the Complaint in
Civil Case No. 740 was a mere rehash of the dismissed Complaint in Civil Case No. 730.
He cited Section 1227 of Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure as basis for this
ruling. In doing so, he committed an obvious mistake showing gross ignorance of the
law. This is because the civil case assigned to him is for forcible entry, which is governed
by the Rule on Summary Procedure. 28 In fact, all cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are governed by this Rule.29
It must likewise be underscored that respondent dismissed Civil Case No. 730
without prejudice, on the theory that the date of the dispossession had not been
initially indicated in the Complaint. Thus, it would reasonably be expected that the
allegations in that civil case would be reiterated in Civil Case No. 740. Needless to state,
what also contributed to the delay in the resolution of the main case was the grant of
the Motion to Strike Out based on misplaced reasoning. 30
Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure reflects a serious degree
of incompetence.31 When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 32 A member of the bench must be constantly
abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments, bearing in mind that this learning
process never ceases. It is indispensable to the correct dispensation of justice. 33
Delay
Respondent claimed that if there was any delay on his part in resolving the
incidents, it was not intentional but merely brought about by pressure from work. 34
We are not convinced. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Canons on Judicial Ethics
mandates that a judge should dispose of the courts business promptly and decide each
case within the period prescribed therefor. 35 We have held in numerous cases that
failure to decide within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. 36
In the present case, the heavy caseload in respondents sala, though unfortunate,
cannot excuse him from due observance of the rules. We reiterate that judges, when
burdened by heavy caseloads that prevent them from deciding cases within the
reglementary period, may ask for additional time from this Court. Indubitably,
respondent has failed to do so.37 He ought to know that the speedy resolution of
forcible entry cases is a matter of public policy. His inaction for almost three years on
complainants Motion for Summary Judgment practically rendered nugatory the whole
purpose of summary proceedings -- to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases.38 By tarrying too long in deciding this forcible entry case, he
failed to live up to the mandate of the Code of Judicial Conduct to maintain professional
competence.39 Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the
performance of their judicial functions and duties.40
In determining his administrative liability, we note that this is not the first
infraction of respondent.41 In Espiritu v. Jovellanos,42 he was found guilty of gross
misconduct for his partiality to one of the parties, for which he was fined P20,000.
Indeed, it seems that he has remained undeterred in disregarding the law and the
Code which he has pledged to uphold. 43 He appears to be unfazed by the previous
penalties and warnings meted out to him. 44 Since this is his second infraction, he
deserves a sanction heavier than that recommended by the OCA.
WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance
of the law and is FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000). He is further
warned that a repetition of this or similar offenses will be dealt with even more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., abroad on official leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1106. June 17, 2003]
CELESTINA B. CORPUZ, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, complainant, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO ANA F. SIAPNO, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Celestina B. Corpuz, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, filed an Affidavit Complaint [1] against the respondent Orlando Ana F.
Siapno, Presiding Judge of the same Court, charging him with Violation of
Administrative Circular Nos. 3-92 and 17-94, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Falsification, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Officer, Abuse of Authority, Delay in the
Administration of Justice and Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleged that immediately upon his assumption of office, respondent
Judge proposed to her that they extort money from litigants; that respondent Judge
used his chambers as his residence; that he failed to make the required inventory of
cases; that he used his filing cabinet for storing personal belongings instead of case
records; that he allowed his family to use a typewriter issued by the Supreme Court;
that he dismissed five criminal cases against his friend and drinking companion, Captain
Josephus Javonillo; that he falsified his Certificate of Service by stating therein that he
conducted sessions everyday of the week when he was always absent on Thursdays and
Fridays; that he intimidated three police officers who filed complaints for grave slander
against him; that he maligned complainant in the presence of the public; that he sent
his court personnel on personal errands such as marketing chores and washing dishes;
that he dismissed a rape case despite the interest of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development in the case since the victim was a minor; that he returned criminal
cases for barangay conciliation despite the presence of certificates to file action therein
but entertained the countercharges despite the lack of said certifications; that he failed
to resolve three criminal cases within the period prescribed by the Supreme Court; that
he failed to award civil damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 12527 and 13482; that he
instigated persons to stage a demonstration against complainant; and that he ordered
complainant to drop a case for robbery filed by the latters niece.
Respondent filed his Comment on April 7, 1997, [2] wherein he vehemently denied
the charges against him. More specifically, he averred that he sleeps in his houses in
Dagupan City and Asingan; that the inventory of cases was done by Judith Tambo under
his supervision; that the filing cabinet in his court was not being used for kitchen
utensils and personal belongings; that he owns three typewriters and a personal
computer in his house; that he does not have drinking sessions with Captain Javanillo;
that he holds sessions only from Mondays to Wednesdays because the Public
Prosecutor and PAO lawyer assigned to his branch are available only on those days; that
the three policemen voluntarily withdrew the cases for grave slander against him; that
his resolution dismissing the rape cases were affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor; that
he referred Criminal Cases Nos. 16050, 16039 and 17001 to the barangay conciliation
because the validity of the certifications to file action was questioned by the counsel;
that all cases forwarded to his chambers are decided and resolved with dispatch; that
he did not award civil damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 12527 and 13482 because the
prosecution did not present any evidence therefor; that he did not tell complainant and
her niece to drop the robbery case.
The Court referred the case to Executive Judge Luis M. Fontanilla of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 42, for investigation. The case was thereafter
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. The OCA adopted Judge Fontanillas findings and recommended that
all the charges against respondent Judge be dismissed, except that for Ignorance of the
Law for failure to award civil damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 12527 and 13482, for
which respondent Judge must be fined in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00).
Pursuant to a Resolution dated March 19, 2001, [3] both parties manifested their
willingness to have the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the records. [4]
 We agree with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
The Investigating Judge found that complainant failed to present substantial
evidence to prove her allegations that respondent proposed to her the extortion of
litigants; that he used his chambers as his place of residence; that he used the filing
cabinet for his kitchen utensils, that he devoted the typewriter issued by this Court for
use by his family; that he had drinking sprees with Capt. Javanillo; that he sent court
personnel on unofficial errands; that the dismissal of the rape charges were unjustified.
Moreover, the Investigating Judge found that the charges that respondent Judge failed
to hold sessions on Thursdays and Fridays are unfounded.
Anent the charge of failure to conduct the docket inventories, a judge is not
required to personally catalog the records of cases during the physical inventory. This
can be delegated to members of his staff who should regularly report to him. Precisely,
this is what respondent did in this case when he instructed Judith Tambo to do the
physical count of the case records.
Regarding the return of Criminal Cases Nos. 16050, 16039 and 17001 to the
Barangay Captain in spite of the issuance of a Certification to File Action, Investigating
Judge Fontanilla pointed out that respondent is presumed to have acted in good faith
because he was apparently motivated by the idea that the charges and counter-charges
could be settled before the barangay captain. It must be remembered that a judge
enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function no less than
any other public officer. [5] The presumption of regularity of official duty may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. [6] Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an
officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be made in favor of its
lawfulness.[7]
Moreover, complainant based the charges on the nagging suspicion that
respondent was influenced by the fact that her brother was the private prosecutor in
the cases which where filed with his court. As held by the Investigating Judge,
respondent cannot be disciplined based on a nagging suspicion. [8] The dearth of
evidence to substantiate this accusation justifies respondents absolution from the
charge. Surely, we cannot allow ourselves to be a medium in destroying the reputation
of any member of the bench by pronouncing his guilt with alacrity on a mere accusation
based on tenuous, if not nonexistent, evidentiary support. In administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the act complained of
rests on complainant. Failing in this, the complaint must be dismissed. [9]
As to respondent Judges failure to award civil damages in Criminal Cases Nos.
12527 and 13482, the records disclose that both accused in said cases pleaded guilty to
the charges against them and respondent Judge imposed fines corresponding to the
damages alleged in the Informations therein. In Criminal Case No. 12527, the
Information alleged that the damages suffered amounted to P38,800.00. [10] Respondent
Judge imposed on accused a fine of P33,900.00 representing the amount of repair on
the damaged property.[11] Similarly, in Criminal Case No. 13482, damage to property in
the amounts of P34,700.00 and P15,000.00 were alleged in the Information.
Respondent Judge meted out a fine of P49,700.00 representing the damages sustained
by the offended parties.
In justifying his omission to award civil damages, respondent Judge alleges that
the prosecution did not present any evidence regarding the civil aspect of the case.
[12]
This was error. Concomitant with his rendition of a guilty verdict, respondent should
likewise make a finding on the accuseds civil liability because it is basic that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. [13] Furthermore, Article 2202 of the Civil
Code provides that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages may have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant.
Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when a complaint or information
is filed even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim
them, it is understood that the offended party has the right to prove and claim for
them, unless a waiver or reservation is made, [14] or unless in the meantime, the
offended party instituted a separate civil action. [15] In such case, the civil liability arising
from a crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does
not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil
action against the defendant.[16] Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil
liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered. [17]
The rule expressly imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with
respect to the civil liability arising from the offense, if no reservation has been made to
ventilate it in a separate action.[18] Indeed, even in case of an acquittal, unless there is a
clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the
offended party.[19] Therefore, it was error for respondent not to have entered judgment
with respect to the civil liability.[20]
It is also fundamental that the imposition of the fine imposed in the criminal case
is not for the purpose of indemnifying the aggrieved party but for vindicating the State
for the offense committed by the wrongdoer.
[A]n offense causes two classes of injuries-the first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding
penalty, and the second is thepersonal injury caused to the victim of the crime which
injury is sought to be compensated thru indemnity which is civil in nature. Hence, when
no civil action is expressly instituted it shall be impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. That means that if two actions are joined in one as twins, each one complete
with the same completeness as any of the two normal persons composing a twin. It
means that the civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes
provided by law.[21] (emphasis and italics supplied)
The methods for indemnifying the private complainant is provided for under the
provisions on civil liability which, under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, includes:
restitution;[22]reparation for the damage caused;[23] and indemnification for
consequential damages.[24] Pursuant to these statutory provisions, it behooves
respondent to require the production of evidence to make a finding on civil liability. This
is especially so where the accused has pleaded guilty and has therefore admitted his
liability.
When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes
the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the court the
duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence.[25] Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.[26]
While we agree with the recommendations for the dismissal of the charges against
respondent Judge except for Ignorance of the Law, we find the recommended amount
of fine to be insufficient.
The records show that this is not respondents first administrative case. He has
been administratively sanctioned by the Court in the following cases:
(1) Re: Absences of Judge Orlando A. Siapno, [27] where respondent was suspended
indefinitely on April 15, 1997;
(2) Lu v. Siapno,[28] an administrative complaint for gross incompetence, gross ignorance
of the law, gross misconduct and abdication of official function, where respondent
judge was imposed a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and sternly warned that
the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely; and
(3) Judge Alicia Gonzales-Decano v. Judge Orlando Ana F. Siapno,[29] a case filed against
respondent by Urdaneta RTC Executive Judge Decano for his failure to decide several
cases with in the required periods, where he was again fined Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be
severely dealt with.
Obviously, being chastised thrice has not reformed respondent judge. It seems
that respondent has remained undeterred in disregarding the law which he has pledged
to uphold and the Code which he has promised to live by. [30] He appears to be unfazed
by the previous penalties and warnings he received.[31]
Given the foregoing circumstances, more stringent penalties than those
recommended by the Investigating Judge is warranted in this case. The amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is more commensurate for respondent Judges
infraction in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge Orlando Ana F. Siapno
is found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is FINED the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
All other charges filed against respondent Judge are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Atienza v. Brillantes AM NO. MTJ 92 706 March 25, 1995
FACTS:
This a complaint by Lupo Atienza for gross immorality and appearance of
impropriety against Judge Brillantes.
Lupo Alleges that he has 2 children with Yolanda de Castro, who are living
together in a home purchased by him in 1987 in Manila. On 1991, Lupo saw Brillantes
sleeping on his bed. Upon inquiry, the houseboy told that Brillantes had been
cohabiting with de Castro. Lupo left the home without confronting Brillantes.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children from him. Lupo claims that Brillantes is married to Ongkiko
with whom he has 5 children. Brillantes on his part, alleged that Lupo was not married
to de Castro and that he is not married to Ongkiko although he admits having 5 children
with her. Brillantes claims that when he married de Castro in 1991 at California, he
believed in all good faith and with all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
because her first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license.
Brillantes argues that the provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code does not
apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by
the Civil Code of the Philippines while the second marriage which took place in 1991
was governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to Brillantes.
HELD:
Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code in 1988 regardless of date of the first marriage. Besides, Art. 256 of the
Family Code said Art. 15 is given “retroactive effect” insofar as it does prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with Civil Code or other laws. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke
good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to
be able to cohabit with a woman.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE
LAROYA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution [1] dated
December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution [2] dated
August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
 Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity)
and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other
hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed
as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil
case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case.
The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil
case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case
is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The
MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court
(Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, [3] assailing the MCTCs Order of
dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by
the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy
should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even
on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure
error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC
denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and
believe that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party,
believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless
imprudence against the second party. On the other hand, the second party, together
with his operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to
file a civil case for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private
complainant in the criminal case.[4]
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action
for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal
case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a
separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is
different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an
accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the
same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil
case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that
Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-
delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the
criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not
state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited
their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper
remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the
order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal
question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the
independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not
state in its order of dismissal [5] that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice. [6] Absent a
declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without
prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil
action under Rule 65.Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for
certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought. [9] However, there
is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow
the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
action.
 Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil
action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions
arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal
case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil
case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate
civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the
private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim
in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such
separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for
brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently
of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of
the evidence for the prosecution,all civil actions arising from the same act or omission
were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to
the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the
1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring
such action.Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and
now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-
delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make
a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.The prescriptive
period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run
even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles
of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed
instituted in the criminal action.[10]
 Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a
separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the
criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the
criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but
its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising
from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if
reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended
upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal
action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-
delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing
of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this
procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action
in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal
action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate
civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action.Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-
delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the
offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the
offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as
follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offendedparty. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111,
this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present
Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may bring such an action but the
offended party may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the
criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim
for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court
should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim
for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case
against the offended party after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance
with the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily
complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules
precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the
accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the
criminal case. However, the same provision states that any cause of action which could
have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may
be litigated in a separate civil action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file
his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal
action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action
but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if
such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without
violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously
and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil
action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of
another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to
litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not
file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the
period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177
of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy
which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the
ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in
the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil
action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced
in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the
independent civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. InAzucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the
civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept
of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal action although arising
from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and
the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies
under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December
1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before
the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No.
17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002]
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L.
CANCIO, petitioner, vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises pure
questions of law involving the March 20, 1998 [1] and June 1, 1998[2] Orders[3] rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of B.P.
No. 22 and three cases of Estafa, against respondent for allegedly issuing the following
checks without sufficient funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check No. 25001151 in the amount
of P80,000.00; 2) Interbank Check No. 25001152 in the amount of P 80,000.00; and 3)
Interbank Check No. 25001157 in the amount of P30,000.00. [4]
 The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Criminal Case No. 13356, for
Violation of B.P. No. 22 covering check no. 25001151 on the ground that the check was
deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the check. The two
other cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22 (Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filed
with and subsequently dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga,
Branch 1, on the ground of failure to prosecute.[5]
Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, Branch 49, and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On
October 21, 1997, after failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved to
dismiss the estafa cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right
to file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases. On the same date, the
trial court granted the motions of the prosecution. Thus-
Upon motion of the prosecution for the dismissal of these cases without prejudice to
the refiling of the civil aspect thereof and there being no comment from the defense,
let these cases be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect of the
cases.
SO ORDER[ED].[6]
On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money, seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases. On
February 18, 1998, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that
petitioners action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent further prayed
that petitioner should be held in contempt of court for forum-shopping. [7]
On March 20, 1998, the trial court found in favor of respondent and dismissed the
complaint. The court held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent on
the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits
which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection. It further held that the
filing of said civil case amounted to forum-shopping.
On June 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[8]
Hence, the instant petition.
The legal issues for resolution in the case at bar are: 1) whether the dismissal of
the estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection of
the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases; and 2) whether the filing of said civil
action violated the anti-forum-shopping rule.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code;[9] and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 [10] of the Civil Code,[11] intentional torts
under Articles 32[12] and 34,[13] and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176[14] of the Civil
Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent
and distinct from the criminal action [Article 33, [15] Civil Code].[16] Either of these two
possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject, however, to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. [17]
The modes of enforcement of the foregoing civil liabilities are provided for in the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court was
issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took effect on December 1, 2000, must
be given retroactive effect in the instant case considering that statutes regulating the
procedure of the court are construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.[18]
Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxxxxxxxx
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988 and under the
present Rules, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action,
but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action before the
prosecution starts to present evidence.[19]
Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the old rules considered them impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-
delicto in the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action. Under the present Rules, however, the independent civil actions may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the
right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil
Code.[20]
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his
cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action. Pertinent
portion of the complaint reads:
xxxxxxxxx
2. That plaintiff is the owner/proprietor to CANCIOS MONEY EXCHANGE with
office address at Guagua, Pampanga;
3. That on several occasions, particularly on February 27, 1993 to April 17
1993, inclusive, defendant drew, issued and made in favor of the plaintiff the
following checks:
CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
 1. INTERBANK CHECK NO. 25001151 March 10, 1993 P80,000.00
2. INTERBANK CHECK NO. 25001152 March 27, 1993 P80,000.00
3. INTERBANK CHECK NO. 25001157 May 17, 1993 P30,000.00
in exchange of cash with the assurance that the said checks will be honored for
payment on their maturity dates, copy of the aforementioned checks are hereto
attached and marked.
4. That when the said checks were presented to the drawee bank for
encashment, the same were all dishonored for reason of DRAWN AGAINST
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (DAIF);
5. That several demands were made upon the defendant to make good the
checks but she failed and refused and still fails and refuses without justifiable
reason to pay plaintiff;
6. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay
plaintiff the value of the checks, the latter was forced to hire the services of
undersigned counsel and agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys
fees and P1,000.00 per appearance in court;
7. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay
plaintiff and forcing the plaintiff to litigate, the latter will incur litigation expenses
in the amount of P20,000.00.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is prayed of this Court that after due notice
and hearing a judgment be rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as
follows:
a. the principal sum of P190,000.00 plus the legal interest;
b. attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance;
c. litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00
PLAINTIFF prays for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
x x x x x x x x x.[21]
Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce respondents obligation to make good the
value of the checks in exchange for the cash he delivered to respondent. In other
words, petitioners cause of action is the respondents breach of the contractual
obligation. It matters not that petitioner claims his cause of action to be one based
on delict.[22] The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the
law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made
in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for
relief.[23]
Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved in the October 21, 1997 order
of the trial court was the civil action ex delicto. To reiterate, an independent civil action
arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of
the Civil Code [w]hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. Thus, in Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America,[24] the Court, applying
Article 31 of the Civil Code, held that a civil case seeking to recover the value of the
goods subject of a Letter of Credit-Trust Receipt is a civil action ex contractu and not ex
delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the
offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. [25] In the instant
case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil
action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the
same act.[26] Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal,
a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil
action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa
cases against respondent did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum-
shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although
the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they
are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are
based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa
contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the
law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.[27]
Clearly, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for
collection of the value of the checks issued by respondent. Being an independent civil
action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require
no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-shopping
will not operate to bar the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
March 20, 1998 and June 1, 1998 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge
of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON, respondents
October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972
and they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van
Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
business is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is declared with right relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground adultery.
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for
before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
community property as of June 11, 1982. HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO
ISSUE: issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise NO
control over conjugal assets? Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
RULING: established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed. jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
valid according to their national law. representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical
From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage between them with supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the time of the filing of the criminal case.
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and
representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
property. former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
G.R. No. 80116 may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view
June 30, 1989 of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture
marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149,
married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant respondents.
Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against
the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the QUISUMBING, J.:
court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen
Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was
seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
 opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997
Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied. Rules of Civil Procedure).

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity
Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
children should be vested to Wolfgang. judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody
of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the
already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC records remain unclear.
Judge Salonga.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.
the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her
previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their SECOND DIVISION
children. [G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for DANDAN,* respondents.
reconsideration. DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J .:
Ruling: Yes. FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as way their relationship soured.Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
in the case at bar. California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment
even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier
justice or when supervening events warrant it. Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming
jurisdiction as regards child custody and support. to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children
Ruling: Yes. of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April
recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner
and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the deceased Arturo, intervened.
award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
 On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to
appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would
be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972.Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties
due to lack of judicial approval. [3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was
it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as
his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo.On 27
November 1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of
Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in
favor of the two intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate
children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in
their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988[6] partial reconsideration
was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-
half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.
[7]
Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947,
their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one
of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was
decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which
provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the
appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987
decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings. [8] On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual
issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their
respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the issue as to
who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is
one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and
admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is
clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of
Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains
as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties
other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987
of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply
issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents,
the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised,
among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. [11] To this, petitioner
replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of
the divorce they obtained. [12] Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue
with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v.
Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower
court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light
of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. [14]Petitioner opposed the
motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. [15] The trial court did
not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her
motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were
married in the Philippines."[16] It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the
finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial
court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when
their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; [17] it did
not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. [18] In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate
title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial
court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she
was since 1954.[19]Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their
divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial
court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case
returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court
should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial
court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping,[21] the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve
the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. [22] The present petition deals with
declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial
courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain
properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare
the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan
as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous
decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis,
all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise
AFFIRMED.The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
GARCIA vs. RECIO G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,
respondent
October 2, 2001
FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal
in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian
family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992,
respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina,
herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived
separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998,
petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in
November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior
marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first
marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the
first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and
recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce
obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a
foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be
authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient;
and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be
demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object
properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil
Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and
limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type
of divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes,
still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who
marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy”.
This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted.
Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law
governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and
respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively
showing the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such
evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two
existing marriage certificates.
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-19671 July 26, 1966
FACTS
—Tenchavez and Escaño contracted a valid marriage. A few months after, they became
estranged. The latter left for the US and obtained a “final and absolute” decree of
divorce in Nevada, acquired American citizenship, and married an American.
—The decision of the Court, promulgated on 29 November 1965, in the same case, is
being assailed by Vicenta Escaño as to the award of moral damages against her.
—She argues that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial
of consortium anddesertion of her husband are not included in the enumeration of
cases where moral damages may lie.
—ISSUE
—Whether the desertion by a spouse is an actionable wrong within the contemplation
of Article 21 of the NCC?
RULING
—Yes. The desertion by a spouse is an actionable wrong within the contemplation of
Article 21 of the NCC.
—The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced
by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon
plaintiff’s feelings in a manner “contrary to morals, good customs or public policy” (Civ.
Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.
Art 19
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP V. CAG.R. NO. 81262 August 25, 1989FACTS:
Respondent Restituto Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay in a dual
capacity, as a purchasing agentand administrative assistant to the engineering
operations manager. In 1972, globe Mackay discovered fictitious purchasesand other
fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Respondent was
the one who discovered theanomalies and reported them to his immediate superior
Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then theExecutive Vice President
and General Manager of Globe Mackay.A day after respondent Tobias made the report,
petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was thenumber one suspect and
ordered him to take one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to
leave his tabledrawers open and to leave the office keys. When respondent Tobias
returned to work after the forced leave, petitionerHendry went up to him and called
him a crook and a swindler. Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test.
Also,he was instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials
for examination by the police investigators todetermine his complicity in the
anomalies.Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing
private respondent of participation in theanomalies. Not satisfied with the police
report, petitioners hired a private investigator, Jose Fernandez who submitted areport
finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was
still to be conducted.Petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from
work preparatory to the filing of criminal chargesagainst him.DioscoroTagle, Metro
Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining
to thealleged anomalous transactions, submitted a report reiterating his previous
finding that the handwritings, signatures, andinitials appearing in the checks and other
documents were not those of Tobias. Moreover, lie detector tests conducted onTobias
also yielded negative results. Notwithstanding the two police reports, petitioners filed
with the City Fiscal of Manila acomplaint for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently, five othercriminal complaints
were filed against Tobias. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the
fiscal.Meanwhile, Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has
been terminated. Tobias filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal which has been dismissed
by the labor arbiter. On appeal, the National Labor RelationsCommission reversed the
labor arbiters decision. Secretary of Labor reinstated the labor arbiters decision.
Tobias appealedthe Secretary of Labors order with the Office of the President. During
the pendency of the appeal, petitioners andrespondent Tobias entered into
a compromise agreement regarding the complaint for illegal dismissal.Unemployed,
Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However,
petitionerHendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating
that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay dueto dishonesty.Respondent Tobias filed a
civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
abusiveacts of petitioners. Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for
damages in the lawful exercise of their right todismiss respondent. On the other side,
respondent contends that because of petitioners abusive manner in dismissing him
aswell as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the petitioner must indemnify him for the damage
that he had suffered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to respondent in relation to Article
19 of the New Civil Code.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to Tobias andfor which the respondent must be indemnified.
Furthermore, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides that, Every personmust, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observehonesty and good faith. This article, known to contain
what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, setscertain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in
the performance of ones duties.A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results indamage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.Upon reporting for work,
Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said that respondent Tobias was a crook and
aswindler to the company. Considering that the first report made by the police
investigators was yet to be submitted, thestatement made by Hendry was baseless. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during
theinvestigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the New Civil Code. The Courthas already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which
theright is exercised and the effect flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively,
then the employer is liable for damagesto the employee. Under the circumstances of
this case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner theirright to
dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation
to Article 21 of the CivilCode
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO J. MARASIGAN,respondents.G.R. No. 120639. September
25, 1998FACTS:
Marasigan, a lawyer, is a BPI credit card holder. His contractual relationswith BPI went
on smoothly until October 1989, when his statement of accountamounting to P8,987.84
was not paid in due time. BPI demanded immediatepayment, and required him to issue
a check in favor of BPI, otherwise his card willbe suspended. Marasigan issued a post-
dated check (PDC) in favor of BPI.BPI, having been informed of the PDC only a week
after receipt, already sent a letterto Marasigan, informing him of the temporary
suspension of the privileges of hiscard. He was also told to refrain from using his card to
avoid anyinconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding
accountwithin 5 days from receipt of the letter, his membership will
be permanentlycancelled.On the other hand, confident that he had settled his account
with the issuance of the postdated check, Marasigan invited some guests at Café
Adriatico (there isalso no showing that he received the letter from BPI before he went
to CaféAdriatico). When he presented his credit card to paythe bill, the it
wasdishonored and one of his guests paid the bill by using her own credit
card.Marasigan asked BPI to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and to
returnthe said check to him because according to him,
BPI violated theiragreement that once Marasigan issues the check to the to cover
hisunpaid account, BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card
.Marasigan filed a complaint for damages against BPI before the trial court, and thetrial
court ruled in favor of him. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE/S:
1.W/N BPI had the right to suspend the credit card of the Marasigan2.W/N
the trial court and CA erred in holding BPI liable for damages
HELD:
1 . Y E S 2 . Y E S
RATIO:
Under the terms and conditi ons of the credit card, signed by Marasigan,
any cardwith outstanding balances after 30 days from original billing shall
automatically besuspended. Marasigan admitt ed that he did not pay within
30 days for his originalbilling. BPI could automatically suspend his credit card
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159590. October 18, 2004]
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED, petitioner, vs. CECILIA
DIEZ CATALAN, respondent.
[G.R. No. 159591. October 18, 2004]
HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED, petitioner, vs. CECILIA DIEZ
CATALAN, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us are two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court separately filed by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited
(HSBANK) and HSBC International Trustee Limited (HSBC TRUSTEE). They seek the
reversal of the consolidated Decision, [1] dated August 14, 2003, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 75756 and 75757, which dismissed the petitions for certiorari of
herein petitioners assailing the Order, dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 44, Bacolod City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-11372 that denied their respective
motions to dismiss the amended complaint of respondent Cecilia Diez Catalan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
 On January 29, 2001, respondent filed before the RTC, a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against petitioner HSBANK, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-11372,
due to HSBANKs alleged wanton refusal to pay her the value of five HSBANK checks
issued by Frederick Arthur Thomson (Thomson) amounting to HK$3,200,000.00. [2]
On February 7, 2001, summons was served on HSBANK at the Enterprise Center,
Tower I, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas St., Makati City.[3] HSBANK filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Answer or Motion to Dismiss dated February 21, 2001.
[4]
Then, it filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated March 8, 2001, on the grounds that (a) the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; (b) the RTC has not
acquired jurisdiction for failure of the plaintiff to pay the correct filing or docket fees; (c)
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the person of HSBANK; (d) the complaint does not state
a cause of action against HSBANK; and (e) plaintiff engages in forum-shopping. [5]
On September 10, 2001, Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading
petitioner HSBC TRUSTEE as co-defendant and invoking Article 19 of the Civil Code as
basis for her cause of action.[6]
The Amended Complaint alleges:
Defendants HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, doing business in the Philippines, are
corporations duly organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with head office
at 1 Grenville Street, St. Helier Jersey, Channel Islands and with branch offices at Level
12, 1 Queens Road Central, Hongkong and may be served with summons and other
court processes through their main office in Manila with address at HSBC, the
Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas Street, Makati City.
Sometime in March 1997, Thomson issued five HSBANK checks payable to Catalan,
to wit:
CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
807852 Mar. 15, 1997 $600,000.00
807853 Mar. 17, 1997 800,000.00
807854 Mar. 17, 1997 600,000.00
807855 Mar. 22, 1997 600,000.00
807856 Mar. 23, 1997 600,000.00
TOTAL $3,200,000.00
The checks when deposited were returned by HSBANK purportedly for reason of
payment stopped pending confirmation, despite the fact that the checks were duly
funded. On March 18, 1997, Thomson wrote a letter to a certain Ricky Sousa [7] of
HSBANK confirming the checks he issued to Catalan and requesting that all his checks
be cleared. On March 20, 1997, Thomson wrote another letter to Sousa of HSBANK
requesting an advice in writing to be sent to the Philippine National Bank, through the
fastest means, that the checks he previously issued to Catalan were already
cleared. Thereafter, Catalan demanded that HSBANK make good the checks issued by
Thomson. On May 16, 1997, Marilou A. Lozada, personal secretary and attorney-in-fact
of Thomson, wrote a letter to Sousa of HSBANK informing him that HSBANKs failure to
clear all the checks had saddened Thomson and requesting that the clearing of the
checks be facilitated. Subsequently, Thomson died and Catalan forwarded her demand
to HSBC TRUSTEE. Catalan sent photocopies of the returned checks to HSBC
TRUSTEE. Not satisfied, HSBC TRUSTEE through deceit and trickery, required Catalan, as
a condition for the acceptance of the checks, to submit the original copies of the
returned checks, purportedly, to hasten payment of her claim. HSBC TRUSTEE
succeeded in its calculated deception because on April 21, 1999, Catalan and her
former counsel went to Hongkong at their own expense to personally deliver the
originals of the returned checks to the officers of HSBC TRUSTEE, anxious of receiving
the money value of the checks but HSBC TRUSTEE despite receipt of the original checks,
refused to pay Catalans claim. Having seen and received the original of the checks,
upon its request, HSBC TRUSTEE is deemed to have impliedly accepted the
checks.Moreover, the refusal of HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE to pay the checks is
equivalent to illegal freezing of ones deposit. On the assurance of HSBC TRUSTEE that
her claim will soon be paid, as she was made to believe that payments of the checks
shall be made by HSBC TRUSTEE upon sight, the unsuspecting Catalan left the originals
of the checks with HSBC TRUSTEE and was given only an acknowledgment
receipt. Catalan made several demands and after several more follow ups, on August
16, 1999, Phoenix Lam, Senior Vice President of HSBC TRUSTEE, in obvious disregard of
her valid claim, informed Catalan that her claim is disapproved. No reason or
explanation whatsoever was made why her claim was disapproved, neither were the
checks returned to her. Catalan appealed for fairness and understanding, in the hope
that HSBC TRUSTEE would act fairly and justly on her claim but these demands were
met by a stonewall of silence. On June 9, 2000, Catalan through counsel sent a last and
final demand to HSBC TRUSTEE to remit the amount covered by the checks but despite
receipt of said letter, no payment was made. Clearly, the act of the HSBANK and HSBC
TRUSTEE in refusing to honor and pay the checks validly issued by Thomson violates the
abuse of rights principle under Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires that everyone
must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. The
refusal of HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE to pay the checks without any valid reason is
intended solely to prejudice and injure Catalan. When they declined payment of the
checks despite instructions of the drawer, Thomson, to honor them, coupled with the
fact that the checks were duly funded, they acted in bad faith, thus causing damage to
Catalan. A person may not exercise his right unjustly or in a manner that is not in
keeping with honesty or good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability for abuse of
right.[8]
Catalan prays that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE be ordered to pay P20,864,000.00
representing the value of the five checks at the rate of P6.52 per HK$1 as of January 29,
2001 for the acts of HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in refusing to pay the amount justly
due her, in addition to moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.[9]
On October 2, 2001, HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on
the grounds that: (a) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint since the action is a money claim for a debt contracted by Thomson before
his death which should have been filed in the estate or intestate proceedings of
Thomson; (b) Catalan engages in forum shopping by filing the suit and at the same time
filing a claim in the probate proceeding filed with another branch of the RTC; (c) the
amended complaint states no cause of action against HSBANK since it has no obligation
to pay the checks as it has not accepted the checks and Catalan did not re-deposit the
checks or make a formal protest; (d) the RTC has not acquiredjurisdiction over the
person of HSBANK for improper service of summons; and, (e) it did not submit to the
jurisdiction of the RTC by filing a motion for extension of time to file a motion to
dismiss.[10]
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2001, summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to
the In House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) at the Enterprise Center, Tower 1,
Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas, Makati. Without submitting itself to the
jurisdiction of the RTC, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint, dated October 29, 2001, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC
over it.[11] HSBC TRUSTEE alleges that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did
not confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over it because: (a) it is a corporation separate and
distinct from HSBANK; (b) it does not hold office at the HSBANK Makati or in any other
place in the Philippines; (c) it has not authorized HSBANK Makati to receive summons
for it; and, (d) it has no resident agent upon whom summons may be served because it
does not transact business in the Philippines.
Subsequently, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Submission, dated November 15, 2001,
attaching the Affidavit executed in Hongkong by Phoenix Lam, Senior Vice-President of
HSBC TRUSTEE, attesting to the fact that: 1) HSBC TRUSTEE has not done nor is it doing
business in the Philippines; 2) it does not maintain any office in Makati or anywhere in
the Philippines; 3) it has not appointed any agent in Philippines; and 4) HSBANK Makati
has no authority to receive any summons or court processes for HSBC TRUSTEE. [12]
On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.
[13]
The RTC held that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because it
is an action for damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code for the acts of unjustly
refusing to honor the checks issued by Thomson and not a money claim against the
estate of Thomson; that Catalan did not engage in forum-shopping because the
elements thereof are not attendant in the case; that the question of cause of action
should be threshed out or ventilated during the proceedings in the main action and
after the plaintiff and defendants have adduced evidence in their favor; that it acquired
jurisdiction over the person of defendants because the question of whether a foreign
corporation is doing business or not in the Philippines cannot be a subject of a Motion
to Dismiss but should be ventilated in the trial on the merits; and defendants
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC setting up in their Motions to
Dismiss other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction.
HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate motions for reconsideration [14] but both
proved futile as they were denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 20, 2002. [15]
On February 21, 2003, Catalan moved to declare HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in
default for failure to file their answer to the amended complaint.
On March 5, 2003, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate petitions for
certiorari and/or prohibition with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 75756 [16] and
75757,[17]respectively.
Subsequently, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed before the RTC separate
Answers ad cautelam, both dated March 18, 2003, as a precaution against being
declared in default and without prejudice to the separate petitions for certiorari and/or
prohibition then pending with the CA.[18]
Meanwhile, the two petitions for certiorari before the CA were consolidated and
after responsive pleadings were filed, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.
In a consolidated Decision dated August 14, 2003, the CA dismissed the two
petitions for certiorari.[19] The CA held that the filing of petitioners answers before the
RTC rendered moot and academic the issue of the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioners; that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter since it is
one for damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code for the alleged unjust acts of
petitioners and not a money claim against the estate of Thomson; and, that the
amended complaint states a cause of action under Article 19 of the Civil Code which
could merit a favorable judgment if found to be true. The CA noted that Catalan may
have prayed for payment of the value of the checks but ratiocinated that she merely
used the value as basis for the computation of the damages.
Hence, the present petitions.
In G.R. No. 159590, HSBANK submits the following assigned errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE COURT A
QUO, ACTING AS AN (SIC) REGULAR COURT, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT SEEKING TO ORDER HSBC TRUSTEE, THE EXECUTOR OF THE DECEASED
FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON, TO PAY SUBJECT CHECKS ISSUED BY THE LATE
FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON, ADMITTEDLY IN PAYMENT OF HIS INDEBTEDNESS TO
CATALAN.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT SEEK TO ORDER HSBANK AND HSBC INTERNATIONAL
TRUSTEE LIMITED TO PAY THE OBLIGATION OF THE (SIC) FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON
AS EVIDENCED BY THE CHECKS, BUT PRAYS FOR DAMAGES EQUIVALENT OR COMPUTED
ON THE BASIS OF THE VALUE OF THE CHECKS BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE MANDATES OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT ALLEGATIONS
IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT MAKE OUT A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH COULD MERIT A
FAVORABLE JUDGMENT IF FOUND TO BE TRUE, OR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HSBANK, AS DRAWEE
BANK.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN DISREGARDING THE FACT
THAT CATALAN ENGAGED IN FORUM SHOPPING BY FILING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
WHILE HER PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE SUPPOSED WILL OF THE DECEASED
FREDERICK ARTHUR THOMSON IS PENDING WITH ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE COURT A
QUO.
 V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT HSBANK HAD
SUBMITTED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO BY SUBMITTING AN ANSWER
TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.[20]
In G.R. No. 159591, HSBC TRUSTEE also assigns the foregoing first, second and
fifth errors as its own.[21] In addition, it claims that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT ORDERING THE
DISMISSAL OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST HSBC TRUSTEE DESPITE THE FACT
IT HAS NOT BEEN DULY SERVED WITH SUMMONS. [22]
HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE contend in common that Catalan has no cause of
action for abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code; that her complaint, under
the guise of a claim for damages, is actually a money claim against the estate of
Thomson arising from checks issued by the latter in her favor in payment of
indebtedness.
HSBANK claims that the money claim should be dismissed on the ground of
forum-shopping since Catalan also filed a petition for probate of the alleged last will of
Thomson before RTC, Branch 48, Bacolod City, docketed as Spec. Proc No. 00-892. In
addition, HSBANK imputes error upon the CA in holding that by filing an answer to the
amended complaint, petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
HSBC TRUSTEE maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it for
improper service of summons.
In her Comment, Catalan insists that her complaint is one for damages under
Article 19 of the Civil Code for the wanton refusal to honor and pay the value of five
checks issued by the Thomson amounting to HK$3,200,000.00. She argues that the
issue of jurisdiction has been rendered moot by petitioners participation in the
proceedings before the RTC.
Succinctly, the issues boil down to the following:
1) Does the complaint state a cause of action?
2) Did Catalan engage in forum-shopping by filing the complaint for damages
when she also filed a petition for probate of the alleged last will of Thomson with
another branch of the RTC? and,
3) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE? Corollary
thereto, did the filing of the answer before the RTC render the issue of lack of
jurisdiction moot and academic?
We shall resolve the issue in seriatim.
Does the complaint state a cause of action against HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE?
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint
alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the
court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? [23] The inquiry is into the
sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. [24] If the allegations in the
complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be
dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants.[25]
Catalan anchors her complaint for damages on Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
speaks of the fundamental principle of law and human conduct that a person " must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith." It sets the standards which may
be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. [26] But a right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith;
but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. [27] There is an abuse of right when it is
exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. [28]
Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle, three elements must
concur, to wit: (a) that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith;
and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. [29]
In this instance, after carefully examining the amended complaint, we are
convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on tort
under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It is evident that Catalan is suing HSBANK and HSBC
TRUSTEE for unjustified and willful refusal to pay the value of the checks.
HSBANK is being sued for unwarranted failure to pay the checks notwithstanding
the repeated assurance of the drawer Thomson as to the authenticity of the checks and
frequent directives to pay the value thereof to Catalan. Her allegations in the complaint
that the gross inaction of HSBANK on Thomsons instructions, as well as its evident
failure to inform Catalan of the reason for its continued inaction and non-payment of
the checks, smack of insouciance on its part, are sufficient statements of clear abuse of
right for which it may be held liable to Catalan for any damages she incurred resulting
therefrom. HSBANKs actions, or lack thereof, prevented Catalan from seeking further
redress with Thomson for the recovery of her claim while the latter was alive.
HSBANK claims that Catalan has no cause of action because under Section 189 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check of itself does not operate as an assignment of
any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not
liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies it. However, HSBANK is not
being sued on the value of the check itself but for how it acted in relation to Catalans
claim for payment despite the repeated directives of the drawer Thomson to recognize
the check the latter issued. Catalan may have prayed that she be paid the value of the
checks but it is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action, as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.[30]
Anent HSBC TRUSTEE, it is being sued for the baseless rejection of Catalans
claim. When Catalan parted with the checks as a requirement for the processing of her
claim, even going to the extent of traveling to Hongkong to deliver personally the
checks, HSBC TRUSTEE summarily disapproved her claim with nary a reason. HSBC
TRUSTEE gave no heed to Catalans incessant appeals for an explanation. Her pleas fell
on deaf and uncaring corporate ears. Clearly, HSBC TRUSTEEs acts are anathema to the
prescription for human conduct enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Did Catalan engage in forum-shopping?
It has been held that forum-shopping exists where a litigant sues the same party
against whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and
the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in
one case is a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would constitute res
judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest.[31]
Thus, there is forum-shopping when there exist: a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in
the other.[32]
Applying the foregoing requisites to the case before us in relation to Spec. Proc
No. 00-892, the probate proceeding brought by Catalan before RTC, Branch 48, Bacolod
City, it is obvious that forum-shopping does not exist.
There is no identity of parties. HSBANK is not a party in the probate
proceeding. HSBC TRUSTEE is only a party in the probate proceeding because it is the
executor and trustee named in the Hongkong will of Thomson. HSBC TRUSTEE is
representing the interest of the estate of Thomson and not its own corporate interest.
With respect to the second and third requisites, a scrutiny of the entirety of the
allegations of the amended complaint in this case reveals that the rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for therein are different from those pleaded in the probate proceeding,
such that a judgment in one case would not bar the prosecution of the other
case. Verily, there can be no forum-shopping where in one proceeding a party raises a
claim for damages based on tort and, in another proceeding a party seeks the
allowance of an alleged last will based on ones claim as an heir.After all, the merits of
the action for damages is not to be determined in the probate proceeding and vice
versa. Undeniably, the facts or evidence as would support and establish the two causes
of action are not the same.[33] Consequently, HSBANKs reliance on the principle of
forum-shopping is clearly misplaced.
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE?
The Rules of Court provides that a court generally acquires jurisdiction over a
person through either a valid service of summons in the manner required by law or the
persons voluntary appearance in court.[34]
In holding that it acquired jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, the RTC
held that both voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by setting up in
their Motions to Dismiss other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction. On the other
hand, the CA ruled that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE are estopped from challenging the
jurisdiction of the RTC because they filed their respective answers before the RTC.
We find that both lower courts overlooked Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides that the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, such omission does not aid HSBANKs
case.
It must be noted that HSBANK initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer or Motion to Dismiss. [35] HSBANK already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over it by
praying that its motion for extension of time to file answer or a motion to dismiss be
granted. The Court has held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as,
to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.[36] Consequently, HSBANKs
expressed reservation in its Answer ad cautelam that it filed the same as a mere
precaution against being declared in default, and without prejudice to the Petition for
Certiorari and/or Prohibition xxx now pending before the Court of Appeals [37] to assail
the jurisdiction of the RTC over it is of no moment. Having earlier invoked the
jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time to file
answer or motion to dismiss, HSBANK, effectively submitted voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise, even before
this Court.
In contrast, the filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be
considered a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a conditional
appearance, entered precisely to question the regularity of the service of summons. It
is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
jurisdiction of said court, e.g., invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be
considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. [38] HSBC TRUSTEE
has been consistent in all its pleadings in assailing the service of summons and the
jurisdiction of the RTC over it. Thus, HSBC TRUSTEE cannot be declared in estoppel
when it filed an Answer ad cautelam before the RTC while its petition for certiorari was
pending before the CA. Such answer did not render the petition for certiorari before the
CA moot and academic. The Answer of HSBC TRUSTEE was only filed to prevent any
declaration that it had by its inaction waived the right to file responsive pleadings.
Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under
the laws of the British Virgin Islands. For proper service of summons on foreign
corporations, Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a foreign
private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be
made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or if
there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or
on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
In French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[39] we had occasion to
rule that it is not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a defendant foreign
corporation is doing business. For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of doing
business must first be "established by appropriate allegations in the complaint" and the
court in determining such fact need not go beyond the allegations therein. [40]
The allegations in the amended complaint subject of the present cases did not
sufficiently show the fact of HSBC TRUSTEEs doing business in the Philippines. It does
not appear at all that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any act which would give the
general public the impression that it had been engaging, or intends to engage in its
ordinary and usual business undertakings in the country. Absent from the amended
complaint is an allegation that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any act in the country
that would place it within the sphere of the courts jurisdiction.
We have held that a general allegation, standing alone, that a party is doing
business in the Philippines does not make it so; a conclusion of fact or law cannot be
derived from the unsubstantiated assertions of parties notwithstanding the demands of
convenience or dispatch in legal actions, otherwise, the Court would be guilty of
sorcery; extracting substance out of nothingness.[41]
Besides, there is no allegation in the amended complaint that HSBANK is the
domestic agent of HSBC TRUSTEE to warrant service of summons upon it. Thus, the
summons tendered to the In House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) for HSBC
TRUSTEE was clearly improper.
There being no proper service of summons, the RTC cannot take cognizance of the
case against HSBC TRUSTEE for lack of jurisdiction over it. Any proceeding undertaken
by the RTC is therefore null and void. [42] Accordingly, the complaint against HSBC
TRUSTEE should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over it.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 159590 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75757 dismissing the petition for
certiorari of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited is AFFIRMED.
The petition in G.R. No. 159591 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75756 dismissing the petition for certiorari of
the HSBC International Trustee Limited is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Civil Case No. 01-11372 against the HSBC International Trustee Limited, and all its
orders and issuances with respect to the latter are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is hereby ORDERED to DESIST from maintaining
further proceedings against the HSBC International Trustee Limited in the case
aforestated.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
G.R. No. 96126 August 10, 1992
ESTERIA F. GARCIANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EMERITO LABAJO, LUNISITA MARODA, LALIANA
DIONES, CANONISA PANINSORO, DIONISIO ROSAL, REMEDIOS GALUSO, FLORDELUNA
PETALCORIN, MELCHIZEDECH LOON, NORBERTA MARODA and JOSEPH
WIERTZ, respondents.
Basilio E. Duaban for petitioner.
Julius Z. Neri for private respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
complaint for damages filed by the petitioner against the private respondents.
The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate
Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. On January 13, 1982, or before the
school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter
was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed (Exh. B). The application
was recommended for approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and
approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors (Exh. B-1).
On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her
husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing her of the decision of Fr.
Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the president of the Parent-
Teachers Association and the school faculty, to terminate her services as a member of
the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment
between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of
getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position
without a written contract (Exhs. C and 1). Upon her return from Austria in the later
part of June, 1982, she received the letter informing her that her services at the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She made inquiries from the
school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the Board of Directors of
the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that she
was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . . effective
July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before this
date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore
it is declared null and void . . ." (Exhs. D and 2).
On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the
Board of Directors, out of a membership of nine (9), resigned their positions from the
Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's
deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning the
integrity of the Board's decision" (Exh. E).
On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial
Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the
faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on August 30, 1985, ordering the
defendants jointly and severally to pay her P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000
exemplary damages, P32,400 as lost earnings for nine years, and P10,000 as litigation
expenses and attorney's fees.
The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
CV No. 10692), which on August 30, 1990 reversed the trial court's decision thus:
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, the complaint is
dismissed, and defendants-appellants are absolved from any liability
to plaintiff-appellee. With costs against plaintiff-appellee. (p.
13, Rollo.)
The plaintiff-appellee (now petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration which the
Court of Appeals denied on October 26, 1990. Hence, this petition for review wherein
the lone error assigned by petitioner reads:
Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in absolving the private
respondents from liability by faulting the petitioner for her failure to
report back to her work. (p. 6, Rollo.)
After a careful perusal of the petition and the respondents' comments, the Court
resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone possesses
the authority to hire and fire teachers and other employees of the school, did not
dismiss the petitioner. It in fact directed her to report for work. While the private
respondents sent her a letter of termination through her husband, they admittedly had
no authority to do so. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed:
We agree with defendants-appellants, however, that they should not
have been held liable to plaintiff-appellee for damages. Defendants-
appellants had no authority to dismiss plaintiff-appellee and the latter
was aware of this. Hence, the letter of termination sent to her
through her husband (Exhs. C and 1) by defendants-appellants had no
legal effect whatsoever. It did not effectively prevent her from
reporting for work. What is more, it was subsequently repudiated by
the Board of Directors which directed her to report for work. (Exhs. D
and 2) There was, therefore, no reason why she did not continue with
her teaching in the school. No evidence had been presented to show
that defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting for work.
The fact that defendants-appellants had "acidly" received the action
of the Board of Directors repudiating their decision to terminate
plaintiff-appellee is not proof that defendants-appellants had
effectively and physically prevented plaintiff-appellee from resuming
her post. It was nothing more than a reaction to what defendants-
appellants perceived as an affront to their collective prestige. It would
appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her
teaching job in the school and has no right to recover damages from
defendants-appellants. (p. 13, Rollo.)
Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from
unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or
public policy.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from
teaching was her own choice. While the respondents admittedly wanted her service
terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her
post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the school principal and Fr.
Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly
threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for
damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent
from the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or
public policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her
prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply
with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost
earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under
Article 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to court to demand equity, must come
with clean hands. Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to recover
damages to injured persons who are not themselves at fault (Mabutas vs. Calapan
Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG 5828, cited in Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p.
87). Moral damages are recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation
to Article 21 (Flordelis vs. Mar, 114 SCRA 41). In the case at bar, petitioners is not
without fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and failed to report
back in time for the regular opening of classes. Secondly, for reasons known to herself
alone, she refused to sign a written contract of employment. Lastly, she ignored the
Board of Directors' order for her to report for duty on July 5, 1982.
The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified for she is not
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages. (Art. 2234, Civil Code).
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the damages awarded by the trial court
to the petitioner for they did not have any legal or factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz , Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 156841. June 30, 2005]
GF EQUITY, INC., petitioner, vs. ARTURO VALENZONA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals October
14, 2002 Decision[1] reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dated June
28, 1997[2] which dismissed the complaint of herein respondent Arturo Valenzona
(Valenzona) for breach of contract with damages against herein petitioner GF Equity,
Inc. (GF Equity).
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer W. Steven Uytengsu
(Uytengsu), hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska basketball team in the
Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) under a Contract of Employment. [3]
As head coach, the duties of Valenzona were described in the contract to include
the following:
xxx
1. . . . coaching at all practices and games scheduled for the CORPORATIONs TEAM
during the scheduled season of the ASSOCIATION . . ., coaching all exhibition
games scheduled by the corporation as approved by the PBA during and prior to the
scheduled season, coaching (if invited to participate) in the ASSOCIATIONs All Star
Game and attending every event conducted in association with the All Star
Game, and coaching the play-off games subsequent to the scheduled season based on
the athletic program of the PBA.
xxx
3. The COACH agrees to observe and comply with all requirements of the
CORPORATION respecting conduct of its TEAM and its players, at all times whether on
or off the playing floor. The CORPORATION may, from time to time during the
continuance of this contract, establish reasonable rules for the government of its
players at home and on the road; and such rules shall be part of this contract as fully is
(sic) if herein written and shall be the responsibility of the COACH to implement; x x x
4. The COACH agrees (a) to report at the time and place fixed by the CORPORATION in
good physical condition; (b) to keep himself throughout the entire season in good
physical condition; (c) to give his best services, as well as his loyalty to the
CORPORATION, and to serve as basketball coach for the CORPORATION and its
assignees; (d) to be neatly and fully attired in public and always to conduct himself on
and off the court according to the highest standards of honesty, morality, fair play and
sportsmanship; (e) not to do anything which is detrimental to the best interests of the
CORPORATION.
xxx
7. The COACH agrees that if so requested by the CORPORATION, he will endorse the
CORPORATIONs products in commercial advertising, promotions and the like. The
COACH further agrees to allow the CORPORATION or the ASSOCIATION to take pictures
of the COACH alone or together with others, for still photographs, motion pictures or
television, at such times as the CORPORATION or the ASSOCIATION may designate, and
no matter by whom taken may be used in any manner desired by either of them for
publicity or promotional purposes. (Underscoring supplied).
xxx
Even before the conclusion of the contract, Valenzona had already served GF
Equity under a verbal contract by coaching its team, Hills Brothers, in the 3 rd PBA
Conference of 1987 where the team was runner-up.
Under the contract, GF Equity would pay Valenzona the sum of Thirty Five
Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) monthly, net of taxes, and provide him with a service
vehicle and gasoline allowance.
While the employment period agreed upon was for two years commencing on
January 1, 1988 and ending on December 31, 1989, the last sentence of paragraph 3 of
the contract carried the following condition:
3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the
CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team,
the CORPORATION may terminate this contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Before affixing his signature on the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who
pointed out the one-sidedness of the above-quoted last sentence of paragraph 3
thereof. The caveatnotwithstanding, Valenzona still acceded to the terms of the
contract because he had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who had recommended him
to the management of GF Equity.
During his stint as Alaskas head coach, the team placed third both in the Open and
All-Filipino PBA Conferences in 1988.
Valenzona was later advised by the management of GF Equity by letter of
September 26, 1988 of the termination of his services in this wise:
We regret to inform you that under the contract of employment dated
January 1, 1988 we are invoking our rights specified in paragraph 3.
You will continue to be paid until your outstanding balance which, as of
September 25, 1988, is P75,868.38 has been fully paid.
Please return the service vehicle to my office no later than September 30,
1988.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
Close to six years after the termination of his services, Valenzonas counsel, by
letter of July 30, 1994,[5] demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation arising
from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. GF Equity, however,
refused the claim.
Valenzona thus filed on September 26, 1994 before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila a complaint[6] against GF Equity for breach of contract with damages, ascribing
bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to the rights of the plaintiff by
unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the contract without just cause and legal and
factual basis. He prayed for the award of actual damages in the amount of P560,000.00
representing his unpaid compensation from September 26, 1988 up to December 31,
1989, at the rate of P35,000.00 a month; moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00;
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00; attorneys fees in the amount
of P100,000.00; and costs of suit.
Before the trial court, Valenzona challenged the condition in paragraph 3 of the
contract as lacking the element of mutuality of contract, a clear transgression of Article
1308 of the New Civil Code, and reliance thereon, he contended, did not warrant his
unjustified and arbitrary dismissal.
GF Equity maintained, on the other hand, that it merely exercised its right under
the contract to pre-terminate Valenzonas employment due to incompetence. And it
posited that he was guilty of laches and, in any event, his complaint should have been
instituted before a labor arbiter.
The trial court, upholding the validity of the assailed provision of the contract,
dismissed, by decision of June 28, 1997, [7] the complaint of Valenzona who, it held, was
fully aware of entering into a bad bargain.
The Court of Appeals, before which Valenzona appealed, reversed the trial courts
decision, by decision of October 14, 2002, [8] and accordingly ordered GF Equity to pay
him damages.
In its decision, the appellate court held that the questioned provision in the
contract merely confers upon GF Equity the right to fire its coach upon a finding of
inefficiency, a valid reason within the ambit of its management prerogatives, subject to
limitations imposed by law, although not expressly stated in the clause;
and the right granted in the contract can neither be saidto be immoral, unlawful, or con
trary to public policy. It concluded, however, that while the mutuality of the clause is
evident, GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily terminating . . . Valenzonas
employment and opened itself to a charge of bad faith. Hence, finding that Valenzonas
claim for damages is obviously . . . based on Art. 19 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.,
the appellate court awarded Valenzona the following damages, furnishing the
justification therefor:
. . . a) Compensatory damages representing his unearned income for 15 months. Actual
and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of a pecuniary loss in
business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation. As testified, his employment
contract provided a monthly income of PhP35,000, which he lost from September 26,
1988 up to December 31, 1989 as a consequence of his arbitrary dismissal; b) Moral
damages of PhP20,000. The act caused wounded feelings on the part of the
plaintiff. Moral damages is recoverable under Article 2220 and the chapter on Human
Relations of the Civil Code (Articles 1936) when a contract is breached in bad faith;
c) Exemplary damages of PhP20,000, by way of example or correction for the public
good; and d) When exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees can also be given.
We deem it just to grant 10% of the actual damages as attorneys fees. (Underscoring
supplied)
Hence, this petition at bar, GF Equity faulting the appellate court in
. . . CONCLUD[ING] WRONGLY FROM ESTABLISHED FACTS IN A MANNER VIOLATIVE OF
APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.[9]
GF Equity argues that the appellate court committed a non-sequitur when it
agreed with the findings of fact of the lower court but reached an opposite conclusion.
It avers that the appellate court made itself a guardian of an otherwise intelligent
individual well-versed in tactical maneuvers; that the freedom to enter into contracts is
protected by law, and the courts will not interfere therewith unless the contract is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order; that there was
absolutely no reason for the appellate court to have found bad faith on its part; and
that, at all events, Valenzona is guilty of laches for his unexplained inaction for six years.
Central to the resolution of the instant controversy is the determination of
whether the questioned last sentence of paragraph 3 is violative of the principle of
mutuality of contracts.
Mutuality is one of the characteristics of a contract, its validity or performance or
compliance of which cannot be left to the will of only one of the parties. [10] This is
enshrined in Article 1308 of the New Civil Code, whose underlying principle is
explained in Garcia v. Rita Legarda, Inc.,[11] viz:
Article 1308 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:
The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be
left to the will of one of them.
The above legal provision is a virtual reproduction of Article 1256 of the old Civil Code
but it was so phrased as to emphasize the principle that the contract must
bind both parties. This, of course is based firstly, on the principle that obligations arising
from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and
secondly, that there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential
equality to which is repugnant to have one party bound by the contract leaving the
other free therefrom (8 Manresa 556). Its ultimate purpose is to render void a
contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively
upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.
x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract
containing a condition which makes its fulfillment or pre-termination
dependent exclusively upon theuncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.
Not all contracts though which vest to one party their determination of validity or
compliance or the right to terminate the same are void for being violative of the
mutuality principle. Jurisprudence is replete with instances of cases [12] where this Court
upheld the legality of contracts which left their fulfillment or implementation to the will
of either of the parties. In these cases, however, there was a finding of the presence
of essential equality of the parties to the contracts, thus preventing the perpetration of
injustice on the weaker party.
In the case at bar, the contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the right of GF Equity
to pre-terminate the contract that if the coach, in the sole opinion of the corporation,
fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the corporation
may terminate the contract. The assailed condition clearly transgresses the principle of
mutuality of contracts. It leaves the determination of whether Valenzona failed to
exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach Alaska team solely to the
opinion of GF Equity. Whether Valenzona indeed failed to exhibit the required skill or
competitive ability depended exclusively on the judgment of GF Equity. In other words,
GF Equity was given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective
of the soundness, fairness or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its opinion.
To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary
and illegal dismissals, for void contractual stipulations would be used as justification
therefor.
 The assailed stipulation being violative of the mutuality principle underlying
Article 1308 of the Civil Code, it is null and void.
The nullity of the stipulation notwithstanding, GF Equity was not precluded from
the right to pre-terminate the contract. The pre-termination must have legal basis,
however, if it is to be declared justified.
GF Equity failed, however, to advance any ground to justify the pre-termination. It
simply invoked the assailed provision which is null and void.
While GF Equitys act of pre-terminating Valenzonas services cannot be considered
willful as it was based on a stipulation, albeit declared void, it, in doing so, failed to
consider theabuse of rights principle enshrined in Art. 19 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones
rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give every
one his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground,
hence, contrary to law, and GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such
pre-termination, e.g.that Valenzona breached the contract by failing to discharge his
duties thereunder, GF Equity failed to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-
terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona to thus entitle him to
damages under Art. 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code the latter of which
provides:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
In De Guzman v. NLRC,[13] this Court quoted the following explanation of Tolentino
why it is impermissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of
justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be
said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or
offends morals or good customs. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law
are the supreme norms of justice which the law develops and which are expressed in
three principles: honeste vivere,[14] alterum non laedere[15] and jus suum quique tribuere;
[16]
and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to
abuse our rights to prejudice others.
The disquisition in Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of
Appeals[17] is just as relevant as it is illuminating on the present case. In that case, this
Court declared that even granting that the therein petitioners might have had the right
to dismiss the therein respondent from work, the abusive manner in which that right
was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which the petitioners must be held liable.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some
basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION
ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code,
seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which
were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that]
should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these
principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper.[18] Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
As for GF Equitys defense of laches on account of Valenzonas invocation of his
right under the contract only after the lapse of six years, the same fails.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It is not concerned with mere
lapse of time; the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches. [19]
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Our courts are
basically courts of law, not courts of equity. Laches cannot thus be invoked to evade the
enforcement of an existing legal right. Equity, which has been aptly described as a
justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law. Aequetas nunquam contravenit legis. Thus, where the claim was filed within the
statutory period of prescription, recovery therefor cannot be barred by laches. The
doctrine of laches should never be applied earlier than the expiration of time limited for
the commencement of actions at law, [20] unless, as a general rule, inexcusable delay in
asserting a right and acquiescense in existing conditions are proven. [21] GF Equity has
not proven, nay alleged, these.
Under Article 1144[22] of the New Civil Code, an action upon a written contract
must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. Since the
action filed by Valenzona is an action for breach upon a written contract, his filing of the
case 6 years from the date his cause of action arose was well within the prescriptive
period, hence, the defense of laches would not, under the circumstances, lie.
Consequently, Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages his salary which he
should have received from the time his services were terminated up to the time the
employment contract expired.[23]
As for moral damages which the appellate court awarded, Article 2220 of the New
Civil Code allows such award to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional
design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. It contemplates
a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill-will. [24] Bad faith means
a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. It must, however,
be substantiated by evidence. Bad faith under the law cannot be presumed, it must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
As earlier stated, however, the pre-termination of the contract was not willful as
GF Equity based it on a provision therein which is void. Malice or bad faith cannot thus
be ascribed to GF Equity.
The unbroken jurisprudence is that in breach of contract cases where a party is
not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to
the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation which the
parties had foreseen or could reasonably have foreseen. The damages, however, do not
include moral damages.[25]
The award by the appellate court of moral damages must thus be set aside. And so
must the award of exemplary damages, absent a showing that GF Equity acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. [26]
The award to Valenzona of attorneys fees must remain, however, GF Equity having
refused to pay the balance of Valenzonas salaries to which he was, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, entitled under the contract, thus compelling him to litigate
to protect his interest.[27]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 2002 is
hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered declaring the assailed provision of the contract
NULL AND VOID and ORDERING petitioner, GF Equity, to pay private respondent, Arturo
Valenzona, actual damages in the amount of P525,000.00 and attorneys fees in the
amount of P60,000.00.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs.
Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's
resolution of September 3, 1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-
a-vis the factual findings of the court below, the evidence of record and the contentions
of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be
extensively reproduced hereunder:
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered
indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel
where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said
defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his
grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until
September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for
a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his
application for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8,
1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified
male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios
Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was
raped. The court a quo, which adopted her evidence, summarized the
same which we paraphrased as follows:
Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974
when she testified, single and had finished a college
course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It
appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking
along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the
San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack,
defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car
driven by a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant
Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before
September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel, and Bunag,
Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that
he invited her to take their merienda at the
Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San
Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as
she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5,
1974).
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat
beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by
her right side. The car travelled north on its way to
the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San
Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the
right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the
duo ignored and instead threatened her not to
make any noise as they were ready to die and would
bump the car against the post if she persisted.
Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course
thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they reached a
motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from
the car against her will, and amidst her cries and
pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to
the joint strength of the two male combatants
because of her natural weakness being a woman
and her small stature. Eventually, she was brought
inside the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr.
deflowered her against her will and consent. She
could not fight back and repel the attack because
after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and
embraced her, his companion held her two feet,
removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr.
threatened her that he would ask his companion to
come back and hold her feet if she did not
surrender her womanhood to him, thus he
succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff
described the pains she felt and how blood came
out of her private parts after her vagina was
penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr.
(t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked
Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go home but
the latter would not consent and stated that he
would only let her go after they were married as he
intended to marry her, so much so that she
promised not to make any scandal and to marry
him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the
car that they used had already gone, and proceeded
to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila
where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the evening
(t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock
that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr.,
father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that
the following day which was a Monday, she and
Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a
marriage license, which they did. They filed their
applications for marriage license (Exhibits "A" and
"C") and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr.
returned to the house of Juana de Leon and lived
there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973
to September 29, 1973.
On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left
and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and
compelled her to go back to her parents on October
3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went
home and could not sleep and eat because of the
deception done against her by defendants-
appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in
toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who declared
that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to
arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his sister
who is the mother of plaintiff asked him to look for
her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his
sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nag-
asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in
the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his sister
told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by
barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor,
Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr.
were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister
requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he
did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met
defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare,
the children are here already. Let us settle the
matter and have them married."
He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost
her honor, she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his
father promised they would be married.
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-
appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant
on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and
 defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the
opposition of the latter's father to their relationship.
Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married,
and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito
Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the
afternoon of September 8, 1973, when defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-
appellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San
Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to (the)
aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later,
Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could
get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-
appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where
they tried to get a room, but these were full. They finally got a room
at the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant registered using his
real name and residence certificate number. Three hours later, the
couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the house of Juana de
Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they stayed until September 19,
1873. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the
plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats made to his life
prompted him to break off their plan to get married.
During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone
to the house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she
would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned
Atty. Conrado Adreneda, member of the board of directors of
Mandala Corporation, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer,
three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 and
September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He
came to know about his son's whereabouts when he was told of the
couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his
mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives
and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to
his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein
private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father,
Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at
Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly
abducted and raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering
petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado
Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating
Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as
defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly committed by
trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that
defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant;
(2) in finding that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be
wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant
damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered
judgment dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on
a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent court failed to consider vital
exhibits, testimonies and incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the
misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on preparation of judgment; and (2)
it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there
was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement to
marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take
into consideration the alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry,
and that there was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple
elopement and agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement to marry has been
sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits
presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and
evidence presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in the factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would
want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial
and documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court, and as further
meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore,
once again constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential
mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this
Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in
case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing
and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive.
This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or weigh such
evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that
might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must
stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal
any feature falling within, any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may
warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing
considerations and our review of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent
court in favor of private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the
trial court erred in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable,
except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the
necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to
those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said
Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to
remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is
intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly
abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will,
and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to
thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days,
irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly
insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly
justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to
paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the
trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape,
despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with
the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words,
criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause
thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was
by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did
not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein
private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such
preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are
not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with
continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of
witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal
action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain
his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense
in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment
and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Padilla, J., concur.
Nocon, J., took no part.
Wassmer vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
12 SCRA 648
Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on August
23, 1954. The wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954. All the necessary
preparations were undertaken for the said event. However, two days before the
wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz informing her that the wedding will not push
through because his mother opposed the union. The following day, he sent her a
telegram stating that he will be returning very soon. Francisco never showed up and has
not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The
trial court ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion
for new trial and reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Francisco
appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that the judgment is contrary to law as there
is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.
Issue: May Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of promise to
marry?

Held: Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, which
provides: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. Surely this is not a case of
mere breach of promise to marry. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21.
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein
by the former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision 1 dated April 30, 1981
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's complaint
and set aside the resolution 2 dated October 21, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance
of Davao, 16th Judicial District, amending the dispositive portion of its decision dated
June 21, 1976 and ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the
minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of
P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of
P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages; and (4) to pay attorney's fees in the sum of
P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action
for acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez.
The case was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and docketed as
Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that
sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant
located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day following
their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was
billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita
asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the
pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after
the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they
repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974,
whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for
help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other
man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of
the complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as
a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income
of P5,000 to P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child,
the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's
Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of
counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary damages and litigation
expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on
August 3, 1975. In its order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the
amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint
reiterating his previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive
portion of which reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and against defendant Ivan
Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of
P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages; and, the sum of
P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay
the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration.
Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not
supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the recognition
and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino's
motion for reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated
June 21, 1976 to read as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael
Constantino, and against defendant Ivan Mendez ordering the latter
to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and
moral damages and the sum of P200.00 as and by way of payment of
the hospital and medical bills incurred during the delivery of plaintiff-
minor Michael Constantino; to recognize as his own illegitimate child
 the plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be entitled to all
the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such
status; to give a permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff
Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00; and the sum of
P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay
the costs of this suit.
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and the
complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court and
in dismissing the complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings of
the trial and in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed out that
the appellate court committed a misapprehension of facts when it concluded that Ivan
did not have sexual access with Amelita during the first or second week of November,
1976 (should be 1974), the time of the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a
persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual
findings of the trial court and rectify the errors it committed as may have been properly
assigned and as could be established by a re-examination of the evidence on record. It
is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule
are considered final and conclusive even on this Court (Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals,
et al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, this Court will review only errors of law committed by the Court of
Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts of the Court
of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, et al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that
Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that
Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on
the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on this Court as the same is
supported by the evidence on record. Even the trial court initially entertained such
posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only when
acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on October 21, 1976, its
earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that she
had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of November, 1974
(TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her response that she could not
remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid, p. 106).
Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the
crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely
testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October
and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as
correctly pointed out by private respondent's counsel, citing medical science (Williams
Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean duration of actual pregnancy,
counting from the day of conception must be close to 267 days", the conception of the
child (Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or
sometime in the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she had
sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted
by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan
Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty. Roberto
Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances of her
pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4)
months pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the
child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8, 1975,
p. 65) is belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she
revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not
possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend
because of gossips so she left her work. An order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative
allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil
Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her
virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse is
not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is
not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's
Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted
to Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise
of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was
informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a
married man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November,
1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the
alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella), petitioner, vs. JOSE LIM, CHUY
CHENG KENG and HARRISON LUMBER, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] dated 12 May 1998 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46224. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated 6 March 1997, 3 July 1997 and 3
October 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque, Branch 260 [2] (trial court) in Civil
Case No. 95-032.
The Facts
On 23 March 1995, petitioner David Reyes (Reyes) filed before the trial court a
complaint for annulment of contract and damages against respondents Jose Lim (Lim),
Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber, Inc. (Harrison Lumber).
The complaint[3] alleged that on 7 November 1994, Reyes as seller and Lim as
buyer entered into a contract to sell (Contract to Sell) a parcel of land (Property) located
along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City. Harrison Lumber occupied the Property as lessee
with a monthly rental of P35,000. The Contract to Sell provided for the following terms
and conditions:
1. The total consideration for the purchase of the aforedescribed parcel of land
together with the perimeter walls found therein is TWENTY EIGHT MILLION
(P28,000,000.00) PESOS payable as follows:
(a) TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS upon signing of this Contract to Sell;
(b) The balance of EIGHTEEN MILLION (P18,000,000.00) PESOS shall be paid on or
before March 8, 1995 at 9:30 A.M. at a bank to be designated by the Buyer but upon
the complete vacation of all the tenants or occupants of the property and execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale. However, if the tenants or occupants have vacated the
premises earlier than March 8, 1995, the VENDOR shall give the VENDEE at least one
week advance notice for the payment of the balance and execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
2. That in the event, the tenants or occupants of the premises subject of this sale shall
not vacate the premises on March 8, 1995 as stated above, the VENDEE shall withhold
the payment of the balance of P18,000,000.00 and the VENDOR agrees to pay a penalty
of Four percent (4%) per month to the herein VENDEE based on the amount of the
downpayment of TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS until the complete vacation of
the premises by the tenants therein.[4]
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the
Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng [5] and Harrison
Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the
penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. The complaint further
alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the
P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase
price of P18,000,000.
On 3 May 1995, Keng and Harrison Lumber filed their Answer [6] denying they
connived with Lim to defraud Reyes. Keng and Harrison Lumber alleged that Reyes
approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their
difficulty in finding a new location for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that as
of March 1995, it had already started transferring some of its merchandise to its new
business location in Malabon.[7]
On 31 May 1995, Lim filed his Answer [8] stating that he was ready and willing to
pay the balance of the purchase price on or before 8 March 1995. Lim requested a
meeting with Reyes through the latters daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute
Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. On 9
March 1995, Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim because
Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected
Reyes offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes title to the Property. Lim
learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation (Line
One) on 1 March 1995 for P16,782,840. After the registration of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the Register of Deeds issued to Line One TCT No. 134767 covering the Property.
Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.
On 2 November 1995, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
due to supervening facts. These included the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa
against Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and nullification of sale and
title plus damages before another trial court.[9] The trial court granted the motion in an
Order dated 23 November 1995.
In his Amended Answer dated 18 January 1996, [10] Lim prayed for the cancellation
of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment in an Order
dated 7 October 1996.
On 6 March 1997, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit
the P10 million down payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque.
The trial court granted this motion.
On 25 March 1997, Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order dated 6 March
1997 on the ground the Order practically granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in his
Amended Answer.[11]The trial court denied Reyes motion in an Order [12] dated 3 July
1997. Citing Article 1385 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that an action for
rescission could prosper only if the party demanding rescission can return whatever he
may be obliged to restore should the court grant the rescission.
The trial court denied Reyes Motion for Reconsideration in its Order [13] dated 3
October 1997. In the same order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10
million down payment with the Clerk of Court on or before 30 October 1997.
On 8 December 1997, Reyes[14] filed a Petition for Certiorari[15] with the Court of
Appeals. Reyes prayed that the Orders of the trial court dated 6 March 1997, 3 July
1997 and 3 October 1997 be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 12 May 1998, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled the trial court could validly issue the assailed orders in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. The court may grant equitable reliefs to breathe
life and force to substantive law such as Article 1385 [16] of the Civil Code since the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court do not apply to this case.
The Court of Appeals held the assailed orders merely directed Reyes to deposit
the P10 million to the custody of the trial court to protect the interest of Lim who paid
the amount to Reyes as down payment. This did not mean the money would be
returned automatically to Lim.
The Issues
Reyes raises the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court could issue
the questioned Orders dated March 6, 1997, July 3, 1997 and October
3, 1997, requiring petitioner David Reyes to deposit the amount of
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) during the pendency of the action,
when deposit is not among the provisional remedies enumerated in
Rule 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial court could issue
the questioned Orders on grounds of equity when there is an
applicable law on the matter, that is, Rules 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure.[17]
The Courts Ruling
Reyes contentions are without merit.
Reyes points out that deposit is not among the provisional remedies enumerated
in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Reyes stresses the enumeration in the Rules is
exclusive. Not one of the provisional remedies in Rules 57 to 61 [18] applies to this case.
Reyes argues that a court cannot apply equity and require deposit if the law already
prescribes the specific provisional remedies which do not include deposit. Reyes
invokes the principle that equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or x x x judicial rules of procedure. [19] Reyes adds the fact that the
provisional remedies do not include deposit is a matter of dura lex sed lex.[20]
The instant case, however, is precisely one where there is a hiatus in the law and
in the Rules of Court. If left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at
the expense of Lim. The hiatus may also imperil restitution, which is a precondition to
the rescission of the Contract to Sell that Reyes himself seeks. This is not a case of
equity overruling a positive provision of law or judicial rule for there is none that
governs this particular case. This is a case of silence or insufficiency of the law and the
Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the courts to
make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. [21] This calls for
the application of equity,[22] which fills the open spaces in the law.[23]
Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the
deposit of the P10 million down payment in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity
jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt
its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its
statutory or legal jurisdiction.[24] Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may
be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are
inadequate.[25]
Reyes is seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. In his amended answer, Lim is
also seeking cancellation of the Contract to Sell. The trial court then ordered Reyes to
deposit in court the P10 million down payment that Lim made under the Contract to
Sell. Reyes admits receipt of the P10 million down payment but opposes the order to
deposit the amount in court. Reyes contends that prior to a judgment annulling the
Contract to Sell, he has the right to use, possess and enjoy [26] the P10 million as its
owner[27] unless the court orders its preliminary attachment.[28]
To subscribe to Reyes contention will unjustly enrich Reyes at the expense of Lim.
Reyes sold to Line One the Property even before the balance of P18 million under the
Contract to Sell with Lim became due on 8 March 1995. On 1 March 1995, Reyes signed
a Deed of Absolute Sale[29] in favor of Line One. On 3 March 1995, the Register of Deeds
issued TCT No. 134767[30] in the name of Line One. [31] Reyes cannot claim ownership of
the P10 million down payment because Reyes had already sold to another buyer the
Property for which Lim made the down payment. In fact, in his Comment [32] dated 20
March 1996, Reyes reiterated his offer to return to Lim the P10 million down payment.
On balance, it is unreasonable and unjust for Reyes to object to the deposit of the
P10 million down payment. The application of equity always involves a balancing of the
equities in a particular case, a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Here, we find the equities weigh heavily in favor of Lim, who paid the P10 million down
payment in good faith only to discover later that Reyes had subsequently sold the
Property to another buyer.
In Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corp. v. IAC,[33] this Court held the plaintiff
could not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the
pendency of the suit at the expense of whomever the court might ultimately adjudge as
the lawful owner. The Court declared:
In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted
among others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain
amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is
willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. x x x
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioners
objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the
assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of
aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action but is a contractual
obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development Program (Rollo, p. 252).
There is also no plausible or justifiable reason for Reyes to object to the deposit of
the P10 million down payment in court. The Contract to Sell can no longer be enforced
because Reyes himself subsequently sold the Property to Line One. Both Reyes and Lim
are now seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. Under Article 1385 of the Civil Code,
rescission creates the obligation to return the things that are the object of the contract.
Rescission is possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever
he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is
restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.[34]
 Thus, since Reyes is demanding to rescind the Contract to Sell, he cannot refuse to
deposit the P10 million down payment in court. [35] Such deposit will ensure restitution
of the P10 million to its rightful owner. Lim, on the other hand, has nothing to refund,
as he has not received anything under the Contract to Sell. [36]
In Government of the Philippine Islands v. Wagner and Cleland Wagner,[37] the
Court ruled the refund of amounts received under a contract is a precondition to the
rescission of the contract. The Court declared:
The Government, having asked for rescission, must restore to the defendants whatever
it has received under the contract. It will only be just if, as a condition to rescission, the
Government be required to refund to the defendants an amount equal to the purchase
price, plus the sums expended by them in improving the land. (Civil Code, art. 1295.)
The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another is embodied in Article 22 [38] of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to
substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. One condition for invoking this
principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on contract, quasi-
contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. [39] Courts can extend this
condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party, during the
pendency of the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the
Rules of Court.
Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite, money paid by a
buyer if the seller himself seeks rescission of the sale because he has subsequently sold
the same property to another buyer.[40] By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily offers
to return what he has received from the buyer. Such a seller may not take back his offer
if the court deems it equitable, to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution, to
put the money in judicial deposit.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. [41] In this case, it was
just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million
down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim. [42]
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella), petitioner, vs. JOSE LIM, CHUY
CHENG KENG and HARRISON LUMBER, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] dated 12 May 1998 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46224. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated 6 March 1997, 3 July 1997 and 3
October 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque, Branch 260 [2] (trial court) in Civil
Case No. 95-032.
The Facts
On 23 March 1995, petitioner David Reyes (Reyes) filed before the trial court a
complaint for annulment of contract and damages against respondents Jose Lim (Lim),
Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber, Inc. (Harrison Lumber).
The complaint[3] alleged that on 7 November 1994, Reyes as seller and Lim as
buyer entered into a contract to sell (Contract to Sell) a parcel of land (Property) located
along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City. Harrison Lumber occupied the Property as lessee
with a monthly rental of P35,000. The Contract to Sell provided for the following terms
and conditions:
1. The total consideration for the purchase of the aforedescribed parcel of land
together with the perimeter walls found therein is TWENTY EIGHT MILLION
(P28,000,000.00) PESOS payable as follows:
(a) TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS upon signing of this Contract to Sell;
(b) The balance of EIGHTEEN MILLION (P18,000,000.00) PESOS shall be paid on or
before March 8, 1995 at 9:30 A.M. at a bank to be designated by the Buyer but upon
the complete vacation of all the tenants or occupants of the property and execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale. However, if the tenants or occupants have vacated the
premises earlier than March 8, 1995, the VENDOR shall give the VENDEE at least one
week advance notice for the payment of the balance and execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
2. That in the event, the tenants or occupants of the premises subject of this sale shall
not vacate the premises on March 8, 1995 as stated above, the VENDEE shall withhold
the payment of the balance of P18,000,000.00 and the VENDOR agrees to pay a penalty
of Four percent (4%) per month to the herein VENDEE based on the amount of the
downpayment of TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS until the complete vacation of
the premises by the tenants therein.[4]
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the
Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng [5] and Harrison
Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the
penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. The complaint further
alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the
P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase
price of P18,000,000.
On 3 May 1995, Keng and Harrison Lumber filed their Answer [6] denying they
connived with Lim to defraud Reyes. Keng and Harrison Lumber alleged that Reyes
approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due to their
difficulty in finding a new location for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that as
of March 1995, it had already started transferring some of its merchandise to its new
business location in Malabon.[7]
On 31 May 1995, Lim filed his Answer [8] stating that he was ready and willing to
pay the balance of the purchase price on or before 8 March 1995. Lim requested a
meeting with Reyes through the latters daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute
Sale and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. On 9
March 1995, Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to Lim because
Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected
Reyes offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes title to the Property. Lim
learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation (Line
One) on 1 March 1995 for P16,782,840. After the registration of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the Register of Deeds issued to Line One TCT No. 134767 covering the Property.
Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.
On 2 November 1995, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
due to supervening facts. These included the filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa
against Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and nullification of sale and
title plus damages before another trial court. [9] The trial court granted the motion in an
Order dated 23 November 1995.
In his Amended Answer dated 18 January 1996, [10] Lim prayed for the cancellation
of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment in an Order
dated 7 October 1996.
On 6 March 1997, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit
the P10 million down payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque.
The trial court granted this motion.
On 25 March 1997, Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order dated 6 March
1997 on the ground the Order practically granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in his
Amended Answer.[11]The trial court denied Reyes motion in an Order [12] dated 3 July
1997. Citing Article 1385 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that an action for
rescission could prosper only if the party demanding rescission can return whatever he
may be obliged to restore should the court grant the rescission.
The trial court denied Reyes Motion for Reconsideration in its Order [13] dated 3
October 1997. In the same order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10
million down payment with the Clerk of Court on or before 30 October 1997.
On 8 December 1997, Reyes[14] filed a Petition for Certiorari[15] with the Court of
Appeals. Reyes prayed that the Orders of the trial court dated 6 March 1997, 3 July
1997 and 3 October 1997 be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 12 May 1998, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled the trial court could validly issue the assailed orders in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. The court may grant equitable reliefs to breathe
life and force to substantive law such as Article 1385 [16] of the Civil Code since the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court do not apply to this case.
The Court of Appeals held the assailed orders merely directed Reyes to deposit
the P10 million to the custody of the trial court to protect the interest of Lim who paid
the amount to Reyes as down payment. This did not mean the money would be
returned automatically to Lim.
The Issues
Reyes raises the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court could issue
the questioned Orders dated March 6, 1997, July 3, 1997 and October
3, 1997, requiring petitioner David Reyes to deposit the amount of
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) during the pendency of the action,
when deposit is not among the provisional remedies enumerated in
Rule 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial court could issue
the questioned Orders on grounds of equity when there is an
applicable law on the matter, that is, Rules 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure.[17]
The Courts Ruling
Reyes contentions are without merit.
Reyes points out that deposit is not among the provisional remedies enumerated
in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Reyes stresses the enumeration in the Rules is
exclusive. Not one of the provisional remedies in Rules 57 to 61 [18] applies to this case.
Reyes argues that a court cannot apply equity and require deposit if the law already
prescribes the specific provisional remedies which do not include deposit. Reyes
invokes the principle that equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or x x x judicial rules of procedure. [19] Reyes adds the fact that the
provisional remedies do not include deposit is a matter of dura lex sed lex.[20]
The instant case, however, is precisely one where there is a hiatus in the law and
in the Rules of Court. If left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at
the expense of Lim. The hiatus may also imperil restitution, which is a precondition to
the rescission of the Contract to Sell that Reyes himself seeks. This is not a case of
equity overruling a positive provision of law or judicial rule for there is none that
governs this particular case. This is a case of silence or insufficiency of the law and the
Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the courts to
make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. [21] This calls for
the application of equity,[22] which fills the open spaces in the law.[23]
Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the
deposit of the P10 million down payment in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity
jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt
its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its
statutory or legal jurisdiction.[24] Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may
be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are
inadequate.[25]
Reyes is seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. In his amended answer, Lim is
also seeking cancellation of the Contract to Sell. The trial court then ordered Reyes to
deposit in court the P10 million down payment that Lim made under the Contract to
Sell. Reyes admits receipt of the P10 million down payment but opposes the order to
deposit the amount in court. Reyes contends that prior to a judgment annulling the
Contract to Sell, he has the right to use, possess and enjoy [26] the P10 million as its
owner[27] unless the court orders its preliminary attachment.[28]
 To subscribe to Reyes contention will unjustly enrich Reyes at the expense of Lim.
Reyes sold to Line One the Property even before the balance of P18 million under the
Contract to Sell with Lim became due on 8 March 1995. On 1 March 1995, Reyes signed
a Deed of Absolute Sale[29] in favor of Line One. On 3 March 1995, the Register of Deeds
issued TCT No. 134767[30] in the name of Line One. [31] Reyes cannot claim ownership of
the P10 million down payment because Reyes had already sold to another buyer the
Property for which Lim made the down payment. In fact, in his Comment [32] dated 20
March 1996, Reyes reiterated his offer to return to Lim the P10 million down payment.
On balance, it is unreasonable and unjust for Reyes to object to the deposit of the
P10 million down payment. The application of equity always involves a balancing of the
equities in a particular case, a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Here, we find the equities weigh heavily in favor of Lim, who paid the P10 million down
payment in good faith only to discover later that Reyes had subsequently sold the
Property to another buyer.
In Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corp. v. IAC,[33] this Court held the plaintiff
could not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the
pendency of the suit at the expense of whomever the court might ultimately adjudge as
the lawful owner. The Court declared:
In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted
among others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain
amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is
willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. x x x
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioners
objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the
assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of
aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action but is a contractual
obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development Program (Rollo, p. 252).
There is also no plausible or justifiable reason for Reyes to object to the deposit of
the P10 million down payment in court. The Contract to Sell can no longer be enforced
because Reyes himself subsequently sold the Property to Line One. Both Reyes and Lim
are now seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. Under Article 1385 of the Civil Code,
rescission creates the obligation to return the things that are the object of the contract.
Rescission is possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever
he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is
restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.[34]
Thus, since Reyes is demanding to rescind the Contract to Sell, he cannot refuse to
deposit the P10 million down payment in court. [35] Such deposit will ensure restitution
of the P10 million to its rightful owner. Lim, on the other hand, has nothing to refund,
as he has not received anything under the Contract to Sell. [36]
In Government of the Philippine Islands v. Wagner and Cleland Wagner,[37] the
Court ruled the refund of amounts received under a contract is a precondition to the
rescission of the contract. The Court declared:
The Government, having asked for rescission, must restore to the defendants whatever
it has received under the contract. It will only be just if, as a condition to rescission, the
Government be required to refund to the defendants an amount equal to the purchase
price, plus the sums expended by them in improving the land. (Civil Code, art. 1295.)
The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another is embodied in Article 22[38] of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to
substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. One condition for invoking this
principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on contract, quasi-
contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. [39] Courts can extend this
condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party, during the
pendency of the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the
Rules of Court.
Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite, money paid by a
buyer if the seller himself seeks rescission of the sale because he has subsequently sold
the same property to another buyer.[40] By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily offers
to return what he has received from the buyer. Such a seller may not take back his offer
if the court deems it equitable, to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution, to
put the money in judicial deposit.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. [41] In this case, it was
just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million
down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim. [42]
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
THIRD dIVISION
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private
respondents),respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which
afirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner,
who was then the President of the West Visayas College liable for damages under
Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with
honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the
West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that
capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of
the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against
school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a
letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the
club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo,
thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which
provided:
Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal
officers of this Office disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was
the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student
organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the Constitution and
By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the
treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid and
other humanitarian purposes; that in compliance with said resolution
and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo extended loans to some
officers and members of the Club upon proper application duly
approved by the majority of the members of the Executive Board; and
that upon receiving the report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the
funds of the Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the
matter and having been convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and
the other officers and members of the Club, that Office rendered the
order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's order or
decision, it is contended that approval by that Office of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is necessary for its effectivity
and validity and since it was never submitted to that Office, the Club
had no valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a consequence,
Resolution No. 2 which was passed based on the Constitution and By-
Laws- is without any force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta
Delmo, who extended loans to some officers and members of the
Club pursuant thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she and the other
students involved are deemed guilty of misappropriating the funds of
the Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and
Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Club,
respectively, testified that the Club had adopted its Constitution and
By-Laws in a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant to
Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the majority of the
members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2, which
resolution became the basis for the extension on of loans to some
officers and members of the Club, that the Club honestly believed
that its Constitution and By-Laws has been approved by the
superintendent because the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon,
assured the President of the Club that he will cause the approval of
the Constitution and By-Laws by the Superintendent; the officers of
the Club have been inducted to office on October 9,1965 by the
Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise allowed to
cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action
taken by the Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as
well as the officers and members thereof by dropping them from
membership therein. However, this Office is convinced that Violets M.
Delmo had acted in good faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in
extending loans to the officers and members of the Student
partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer to
discharge finds to students in need of financial assistance and other
humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr.
Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given in his
capacity as adviser of the Club and extension of the Superintendent's
personality. Aside from misleading the officers and members of the
Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give
the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the Superintendent for
approval despite his assurance to the Club president that he would do
so. With this finding of negligence on the part of the Club adviser, not
to mention laxity in the performance of his duties as such, this Office
considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the
questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate
for any award or citation from this school or any organization in this
school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar
of the school and she alone has maintained her scholarship. The
decision in question would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice
and frustrate her dreams of graduating with honors in this year's
commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and
hereby directs that appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter
all other Club members or officers involved in this case, be not
deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if they are
otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all
the records of the case. On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the
following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly
mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same day,
he returned by mail all the records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of
Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to
furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to
the Director informing the latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not
retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram
from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was
impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor
students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being awarded
the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a
reconsideration of the latters" decision because he believed that Delmo should not be
allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter
into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for
damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo
passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her
parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of
the spouses Delmo. The court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad
faith. Per investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano
Bernardino of the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the
defendant who inducted the officers of the Student Leadership Club
on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club was allowed to cosponsor the
Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not
approve of the constitution and by-laws of the Club, why did he
induct the officers into office and allow the Club to sponsor the
Education Week Celebration"? It was through his own act that the
students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with the defendants
tacit recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon,
Club Adviser, who made the students believe that he was acting as an
extension of Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that,
although, he kaew as early as April 27,1966 that per on of r
Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo,
he kept Id information to . He told the Court that he knew that the
letter of Director Bernardino directed him not to deprive Miss Delmo
the honors due her, but she (sic) says that he has not finished reading
the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to give
honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma,
pp. .33-35). It could not be true that he has not finished reading the
letter-decision, Exh. "L," because said letter consisted of only three
pages, and the portion which directed that Miss Delmo "be not
deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if otherwise
entitled thereto is found at the last paragraph of the same. How did
he know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of
bias and prejudice. When his action would favor him, he was
deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of Miss
Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the
exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino, he withheld the
information from Miss Delmo. This is eloquently dramatized by Exh.
"11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966, Director Bernardino cabled him
to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of
informing Miss Delmo about the decision, since he said he mailed
back the decision on April 28,1966, he sent a night letter on April
29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter that he had
returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the record. Why a
night letter when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in
the case, because graduation day was only four days ahead? An
examination of the telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he
had been sending ordinary telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5",
Exhibit "7"). At least, if the defendant could not furnish a copy of the
decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told her about it or
that Miss Delmo's honors and citation in the commencement be
announced or indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one who cannot admit a
mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is home out by his own testimony
despite his knowledge that his decision to deprive Miss Delmo of
honors due to her was overturned by Director Bernardino, he on his
wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that she did not
deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized supplied).
Despite the telegram of Director Bernardino which the defendant
received hours before the commencement executory on May 3-
4,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his
testimony that he would be embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46).
Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment and not that of r
Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly
disregarded by bim And certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's
embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust
of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having been challenged
by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of
contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Come to
think of it. He refused to obey the directive of Be o and instead, chose
to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to
her parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate;
exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or not
the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that
petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed.
It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was
brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages
are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act
or omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform
Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of
the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's
duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he received
the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the
case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages.
Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the
girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner
likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court
correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a
copy of the decision, he could have used his discretion and plain
common sense by informing her about it or he could have directed
the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed commencement
program or announced it during the commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director
Benardino hours before the commencement exercises on May 3-4,
1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to give the honors due Miss
Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so,
to the prejudice of and in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr.
Pacifico Delmo, father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see
defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme
disappointment and humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with
circumspection and due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch
as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying the
lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is
liable for damages in his personal capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same case
of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good
(Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo
damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity,
separately from and in addition to what they are already entitled to as
sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is
modified insofar as moral damages are awarded to the spouses in
their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in the preceding paragraph.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Digest of no. 22 case:
Ledesma vs Court of Appeals (Article 27 of the New Civil Code)
Jose B. Ledesma vs Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 449 (1988)
Facts:
A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as Magna Cum Laude, because the
president, herein petitioner Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas College neglected his
duty to inform the student on the result of a case against the student which has, as its
punishment, the removal of awards or citations of the student. Said case was the
extension of loans to students, which the president contends to be against the school
rules and regulations, and which the student innocently performed in her capacity as
the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club and in accordance to the Constitution and
By-Laws of the club, on the belief that said constitution was presented and approved by
the president. The student appealed to the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools
after being denied for reconsideration by the president, where upon investigation, it
was found out that the student acted in good faith and that her awards be reinstituted.
The president, upon receiving said decision, delayed action and even e-mailed the
director to reverse his decision. The student therefore graduated as a plain student and
without honors and her award as Magna Cum Laude was only entered on the scholastic
records weeks after the receipt by the president of the decision and after the
graduation.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes. The president’s failure to graduate a student with honors and blatant disregard of
the student’s rights on the account of him being embarrassed shows neglect of duty
without just cause, rendering him liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code.
Undoubtedly, the student and the student’s parents went through a painful ordeal
brought about by such neglect. Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article 27
are but proper.
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed
the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of
grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered
them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual
damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC,
ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR.,
RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias
TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE
COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac,
Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen
Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another,
and acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence
prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at
the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte,
and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and
thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the
furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and
carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages,
and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their
public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor,
and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino
who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it
was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment
of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and
all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of
this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo,
Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto
Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal
participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They
contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the
evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the
clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the
municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was
a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the
demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the
petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the
market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five
months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged
the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages,
P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
 WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the
sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable
doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to
complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil
liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the
crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act
was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing
(sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record
established that complainants suffered actual damages, the
imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I malicious mischief.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS
PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING
PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY
AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION
DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL
WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO
UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL
DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF
NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED
RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT,
THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic)
'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN
DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY
WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY
WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court
committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the
criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the
defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal
case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They
cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the
amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in
a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil.
748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo
Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil.
496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case
before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts
stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the
market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of
the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated
coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the
violence must be employed against the person, not against property
as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense
other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for
threats or malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render
judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that
they were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under
which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either
threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that
the act was by means of threats', it does not allege the particular
threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the
nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter
into trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in
accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable
for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the
demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111,
Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People
v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil
might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the
 properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the
accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have
reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the
civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action.
(Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution
when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil
liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability
arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo
v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or
omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where
provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as
a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these
two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended
party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of
criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code
provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in
the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person
who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence
is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People
v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332,
Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based
upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to
file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would
not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led
to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and
in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his
personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil
Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by
such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged,
which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section
1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil
action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the
criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal
considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A
person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar,
he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at
least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same
for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner
not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello,
120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in
the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been
accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the
serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the
entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil
action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by
both the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones,
complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No.
32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not
vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his policemen,
forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods
inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the
goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it
cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the
store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since
then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken
out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not
been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not
up to that time complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused
Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went
to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the
stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after
having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein,
they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping.
Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the
goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the
complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that
they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se
is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has
been paying rentals for the premises to the government which
allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that
the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of
the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor
to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras
were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and
members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the
Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an
inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods
to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal
Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited,
that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of
substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of
remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates
of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action
but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it
render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but
hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this
question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are
distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the
reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or
other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence:
(b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of
the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of
the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based
on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here
suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it
clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same
act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and
therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal
action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and
disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise
render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any
significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are
distinct and separate.
 In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is
much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is
inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the
accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must
recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the
nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and
oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil
action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because
the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or
injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp.
288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant
damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29
clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has
been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages
is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code
provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil
action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate
filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of
acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can
stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It
does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act
from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a
provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the
victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he
seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of
the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for
the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action
mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved,
civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But
for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should
the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any
less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established
or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully
terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of
course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering
moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil
action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera, Plana,
Escolin, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
De Castro, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr. J., is on leave.
PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS (G.R. No. 102007)
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2013 Labels: civil liability, criminal liability, Obligations and
Contracts
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died. Consequently, the Supreme Court
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General
to file its comment with regard to the civil liability of Bayotas arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish
his civil liability.
HELD:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of the convict personal
liabilities are extinguished, as to pecuniary penalties liability therefore is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Thus the court made a ruling as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon;
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Aricle 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-
contracts, Delicts…,Quasi-delicts;
3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued
but only by way of separate civil action and may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation aside from delicts;
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription.
In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability based
solely on the act of rape. Hence, his civil liability also extinguished together with his
criminal liability upon his death.
MHP GARMENTS, INC. VS. CA
GR No. 86720 2 September 1994
DOCTRINE:
Under the Civil Code, damages may be recovered for violation of constitutional rights
andliberties from any public officer or private individual. Art 32 speaks of an officer or
employee or person"directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of constitutional
rights and liberties. It is not the actoralone (i.e., one directly responsible) who must
answer for damages; the person indirectly responsible alsohas to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art 32 makes the persons who
aredirectly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
Petitioners:
MHP Garments, Inc. and its employee, Larry De Guzman
Respondents/Injured Parties:
Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales
Tort/Event:
Warrantless search and seizure of boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits
FACTS:
MHP
Garments Inc. (“MHP”) was granted the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official
Boy
Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In its Memorandum Agreement with
the Boy Scouts of thePhilippines, MHP was given the authority to undertake or cause to
be undertaken the prosecution in courtof all illegal sources of scout uniforms and
scouting supplies.Upon receipt of information that Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman,
and Gertrudes Gonzales (the
“respondents”) were selling Boy Scouts items
and paraphernalia without any authority, Larry De Guzman,an employee of MHP, was
tasked to undertake surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine
Constabulary (the “PC”). Thereafter, De Guzman together with 3 PC men went to the
stores of responden
tsat the Marikina Public Market and without any warrant, seized the boy and girl scouts
pants, dresses, and
suits on display at the stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed
respondents. The itemswere then turned over by the PC Captain to MHP for
safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfaircompetition was then filed against
respondents. After a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscaldismissed the
complaint and ordered the return of the seized items. Respondents then filed a civil
case
against MHP and De Guzman (the “petitioners”) for sums of money and damages.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners should be held liable for damages, even if they did not actually
effect theseizure of the merchandise
YES
HELD:
The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and
seizurevouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions
committed by any publicofficer or private individual.
 An infringement of this right justifies an award for damages. The allencompassing
protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government andindirectly
by private entities.
Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonablesearch and
seizure. A warrantless search may only be done under the circumstances provided in
the Rulesof Court. The evidence in this case did not justify the warrantless search and
seizure. The progression oftime between the receipt of information and the raid
shows there was sufficient time for the application fora judicial warrant. In not
procuring a judicial warrant, the petitioners and the PC took the risk of a suit for
damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the respondents’ right against
unreasonable search
and seizure.
ON PETITIONERS’ ARGU
MENT THAT IT WAS THE PC THAT CONDUCTED THE RAID AND THEIRPARTICIPATION
WAS ONLY TO REPORT THE ILLEGAL ACTIVITY:
The members of the PC team should have been included in the complaint; still, the
omission will notexculpate petitioners.
Under the Civil Code, damages may be recovered for violation of constitutionalrights
and liberties from any public officer or private individual
. RTC, BRANCH 170, Malabon, Metro Manila, and SPS. CRISTINA MALICSI and DANILO
2 MALICSI,
Art 32
3 FACTS:
speaks of an officer oremployee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rightsand liberties of another.
Thus, it is
not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who mustanswer for damages;
the person indirectly responsible also has to answer for the damages or injurycaused
to the aggrieved party.
Art 32 makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.
It encompasses within its ambit those directly,as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violations.
In this case, petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of
respondents againstunreasonable search and seizure.
Firstly,
they instigated the raid pursuant to the Memorandum Agreementto undertake the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. The acts committed by
thePC of unlawfully seizing the merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for
unfair competition werefor the protection and benefit of the petitioners. It is, thus,
reasonably fair to infer that it was upon MHP'sinstance that the PC conducted the raid
and effected the illegal seizure. Also, the raid was conducted with the active
participation of their employee. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, De
Guzman was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. In fact, MHP even
received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized and refused to surrender them
for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. Secondly,
Letter of Instruction No. 12994 (“LOI”) was precisely crafted to safeguard not only the
privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional rights.
Under the LOI, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting
goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant.
Respondents' rights are immutable and petitioners did not have the unbridled license
to cause the seizure of respondents' goods without any warrant. And thirdly, if
petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party
complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of
respondents' claim; but they did not.
G.R. No. L-71914 January 29, 1986
ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES, petitioner, vs.HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY,
'Vacation' Judge of
respondents
In Criminal Case No. 23633 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro Manila,
Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The aggrieved
party therein was Zenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In said case Zenaida Cruz
Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor, Atty.
Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced by the
Court to a fine of P50.00. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable
to present evidence to prove damages against the accused. Neither was she able to
make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Instead, she
filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the Regional Trial Court
for damages arising from the defamatory words uttered against her by Cristina Malicsi
which was the subject of the information filed against the latter for intriguing against
honor. Said case is Civil Case No. 357-MN.At the pre-trial plaintiff admitted that she was
represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case against defendant Cristina
Malicsi and in said case she did not reserve the right to file a separate action for
damages. She further admitted that the appearance of said private prosecutor was for
the purpose of proving damages against the accused. After said admission made by
plaintiff, the parties agreed to have the Court rule on the question of whether or not
plaintiff by her being represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case and her
failing to make a reservation in said case to file a separate action was barred from filing
a separate civil action for damages against the accused Cristina Malicsi. On said issue,
the Court a quo ruled in favor of the defendants, relying principally upon Roa vs. dela
Cruz, 107 Phil. 8, and dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule laid down in the Roa case should govern this one
HELD:
NO. In the instant case the criminal action against defendant Luat did not proceed to
trial, as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The mere appearance of private counsel in
representation of the offended party did not constitute such active intervention as
could only import an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action. It is as
reasonable to indulge the possibility that the private prosecutors appeared precisely to
be able to make a seasonable reservation of the right to file a separate civil action
which, even if unnecessary at the time would nevertheless have been the prudent and
practical thing to do for the purpose of better protecting the interest of their clients.
But as matters turned out, the accused pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was
immediately sentenced. Thereafter there was no chance to enter such a reservation in
the record. We do not believe that plaintiffs' substantive right to claim damages
should necessarily be foreclosed by the fact at best equivocal as to its purpose that
private prosecutors entered their appearance at the very inception of the proceeding,
which was then cut short at that stage. It cannot be said with any reasonable certainty
that plaintiffs had thereby committed themselves to the submission of their action for
damages in that action. The rule laid down in Roa vs. De la Cruz, supra, does not govern
this case. The ends of justice will be better served if plaintiffs are given their day in
court. (pp. 457-458) Upon authority, therefore, of Meneses vs. Luat We find and so hold
that the mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein
private respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the
aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her
claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil
action for damages
Because the accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately
sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support
of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil
action.
Yakult Phils. v. CA
G.R. No. 91856, October 5, 1990
Gancayco, J.
Facts:
In 1982, five-year old Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de
la FuenteStreet, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by motorcycle owned by
Yakult Philippines anddriven by its employee, Larry Salvado. The latt er was
charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries
in an information that was filed with the thenCity Court of Manila. In 1984, a complaint
for damages was filed by Roy Camaso representedby his father, David Camaso,
against Yakult and Salvado in RTC Manila. A decision
wasr e n d e r e d i n t h e c i v i l c a s e o r d e r i n g d e f e n d a n t s Ya k u l t a n d S a l
v a d o t o p a y j o i n t l y a n d severally the plainti ff sums for actual expenses
for medical services and hospital bills,attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.
Issue:
whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper evenif
there was no reservation to file a separate civil action
Held:
Yes. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:S
EC
. 1.
Insti tuti on of criminal and civil acti ons
. — When a criminal acti on
isi n s ti t u t e d , t h e c i v i l a c ti o n f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f c i v i l l i a b i l i t y i s i
m p l i e d l y instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civilaction, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil actionprior
to the criminal action.x x x The reservati on of the right to insti tute the
separate civil acti ons shall
bem a d e b e f o r e t h e p r o s e c u ti o n s t a r t s t o p r e s e n t i t s e v i d e
n c e a n d u n d e r circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to
makesuch reservation. T h e c i v i l a c ti o n f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f c i v i l l i a b i l i t
y i s i m p l i e d l y i n s ti t u t e d w i t h t h e c r i m i n a l a c ti o n u n l e s s t h e o ff e n
d e d p a r t y w a i v e s t h e c i v i l a c ti o n , r e s e r v e s h i s r i g h t t o insti tute it
separately or insti tutes the civil acti on prior to the criminal acti on. It is
alsoprovided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall
be madebefore the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording theoffended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In this
case, the offendedparty has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right
to institute it separately. Neitherhas the offended party instituted the civil action prior
to the criminal action. However, thecivil acti on in this case was fi led in court
before the presentati on of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal
action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was dulyinformed, so that in
the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents
G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, CITY OF PASIG, respondent
G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999
Facts:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays and converted into a separate one, the City
Council of Pasig passed and approved an ordinance, creating Barangay Karangalan
scheduling the plebiscite on the creation of said barangay on June 22, 1996. Upon
learning of the ordinance, the Municipality of Cainta filed a petition on June 19, 1996 to
the Commission on Elections to suspend or cancel the scheduled plebiscite. According
to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangay involve areasincluded in the
pending case before the RTC Antipolo Rizal, Br. 74 for settlement of boundary dispute,
hence the plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall
have been finally decided by the court.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued another ordinance,
creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15,
1997. Again the Municipality of Cainta filed another petition on March 12, 1997 to
suspend or cancel the plebiscite on the same ground as for the proposed creation of
Barangay Karangalan.
The COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held
in abeyance until the boundary dispute is settled because it presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided. The City of Pasig filed the petition (G.R. No.
125646) to the Supreme Court, arguing that there is no prejudicial question since the
same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both
cases are civil, as in the instant case.
In the case of Barangay Napico, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for
beingmoot because the plebiscite was already held and the creation ratified and
approved by the residents. Hence, the Municipality of Cainta filed a petition (G.R. No.
128663) to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute
between the two local governments.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the pending civil case on boundary dispute presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before the creation of the proposed barangays.
While the City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases
are civil, as in the instant case, still in the interest of good order, the Court can suspend
action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or
linked to the first.
The decision on whose territorial jurisdiction the areas fall has material bearing to the
creation of the proposed Barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is
properly identified territorial jurisdiction for these define the limits of the exercise of
the governmental powers of the LGU. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires
(beyond the legal capacity). Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding
of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same until
the resolution of the boundary dispute.
In the case of Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the petition of the
Municipality of Cainta has been rendered moot and academic because the plebiscite
was already held. The issues raised are still pending and must first be resolved.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in
abeyance; and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the creation of Barangay
Napico should be annulled and set aside, and any plebiscite thereto is hold in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other
FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati
City, respondents. than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.

Article 40 In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment

In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. They’ve had 4 children since declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the

then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

nullity of their marriage due to Felix’s PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal With regard to Beltran’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of

home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even

against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a

Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran defense.

raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings July 31, 2000 (G.R. No. 138509)
if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower PARTIES:
court denied Beltran’s petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS
then elevated the case to the SC. Respondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a FACTS:
prejudicial question in the case at bar. • October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified
HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two or terminated
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue • January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the • Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. • February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s marriage is not a • Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final marriage license
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves • Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
*After petitioner sued for bigamy, it’s just when the respondent filed a declaration of
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
absolute nullity.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
ISSUE:
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a
HELD: Facts:
• A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt orders denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.
or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:7 Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for
the criminal action; and
the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
both took their oath of office on February 16 and 17, 1989.
proceed
In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into
said designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral
the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a
representatives. Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC
judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second
Negros Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was
marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity,
the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all dismissed.

legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner.
Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It
is, therefore, not a prejudicial question
*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity
of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)
G.R. No. 110544 Case Digest
G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995
Reynaldo Tuanda, etc., petitioners
vs The Honorable Sandiganbayan, Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes,
respondents
Ponente: Kapunan
The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of
taking advantage of their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to
Estrellanes and Binaohan.
Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on
the ground that a prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null
and void ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying
that the Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in
the city/municipality to warrant representation.
Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private
respondents have rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the
presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the private respondents were entitled to
the slaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null
and void, they would still be given salaries because of the period they acted as
representatives has made them a de facto officers.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC
nullification of the appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation
of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit
a written show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their
failure to appear in court today for the arraignment.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute
to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners'
motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to
suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic
issue involved
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two
alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in
violation of petitioners' right to due process.
Issue: The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives.
Held:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. 15
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil
case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant
suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against
petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this
case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769)
and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was
premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private
respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action
was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private
respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled
to compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court
and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as
sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a
petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private
respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of
office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as
sectoral representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event
that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be
considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually
rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.
 but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
JULIANA P. YAP, Petitioner, G.R. No. 101236
It was held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
vs. January 30, 1992
cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil
MATIN PARAS AND ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR.,
action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, Respondent.
the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused".
According to Yap, Paras sold IN 1971 to her his share in the intestate estate for P300.00.
Indeed, the civil case at bar does not involve the same facts upon which the criminal
The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, (in 1990), Paras
action is based. There was no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less
sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a
importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue
raised in the civil action would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and
criminal case.
Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. On the
same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City.
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa
against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato,
presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr., who dismissed the criminal case on the
ground that the issue in the civil case is prejudicial to the criminal case for estafa.
Issue:
Is the Judge correct in motu proprio dismissing the criminal case?
Ruling:
The judge is wrong. First, he should not have dismissed the criminal case but only
suspended it. Second, it was wrong for him to dismiss the criminal case outright, since it
requires a motion first from the proper party.
The rule provides: Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in
a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests. Third, there is actually no prejudicial question here.
Anent the issue of prejudicial question, the rule provides that:
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before
the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another
court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime