Torts

TORTS
SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL G.R. No. L-3756

SANTISMO ROSARIO DE FILIPINAS v. June 30, 1952
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION LABRADOR, J.
PLAINTIFF-APPELEE: Sagrada Orden de DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: National Coconut
Predicadores Del Santismo Rosario de Filipinas Corporation
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This is an action to recover the possession of a piece of real property (land
and warehouses) situated in Pandacan Manila, and the rentals for its occupation and use.
FACTS
A piece of real property (land and warehouses) situated in Pandacan, Manila belongs to the plaintiff, in
whose name the title was registered before the war. During the Japanese military occupation (January 4,
1943), the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho for the sum of
P140,000, and thereupon title thereto issued in its name. After liberation (April 4, 1946), the United States
Alien Property Custodian took possession, control, and custody thereof under Section 12 of the Trading
with the Enemy Act. During the year 1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export Management
Company under a custodianship agreement with United States Alien Property Custodian and when it
vacated the property it was occupied by the defendant herein.
Plaintiff made claim to the property before the United States Alien Property Custodian, but as this was
denied, it brought an action in court to annul the sale of property of Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its
possession. It is claimed by plaintiff that the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void
because it was executed under threats, duress, and intimidation. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff to
recover from the defendant the sum of P3,000 a month, as reasonable rentals, from August, 1946, to the date
the defendant vacates the premises. The judgment declares that plaintiff has always been the owner, as the
sale of Japanese purchaser was void ab initio; that the Alien Property Administration never acquired any
right to the property, but that it held the same in trust until the determination as to whether or not the owner
is an enemy citizen; that defendant cannot claim any better rights than its predecessor, the Alien Property
Administration, and; that as defendant has used the property and had subleased portion thereof, it must pay
reasonable rentals for its occupation.
Against this judgment this appeal has been interposed.

ISSUE/S
WON defendant is liable for rentals or compensation for the use and occupation of the property from the
middle of August 1946 to February 28, 1949
RULING
No, defendant is not liable. If defendant-appellant is liable at all, its obligations, must arise from any of the 4
sources of obligations, namely, law, contract or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence.
Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered the premises and occupied it with
the permission of the entity which had the legal control and administration thereof, the Alien Property
Administration.
Neither was there any negligence on its part. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between
the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho, which had secured the possession of the property
from the plaintiff-appellee by the use of duress, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee
(defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property
by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. The Alien Property Administration had the control and administration of the
property not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title, the Taiwan Tekkosho, but by
express provision of law (Trading with the Enemy Act).
Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff-appellee herein, but a trustee of the Government of
the United States in its own right, to the exclusion of, and against the claim or title of, the enemy owner.
From August, 1946, when defendant-appellant took possession, to the late of judgment on February 28,
1948, Alien Property Administration had the absolute control of the property as trustee of the Government
of the United States, with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner.
Therefore, even if defendant-appellant were liable to the Alien Property Administration for rentals, these
would not accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff-appellee, the owner, but to the United States Government.
Lastly, there was no agreement between the Alien Property Custodian and the defendant-appellant for the
latter to pay rentals on the property. The existence of an implied agreement to that effect is contrary to the
circumstances. The Copra Export Management Company, which preceded the defendant-appellant, in the
possession and use of the property, does not appear to have paid rentals therefor. The Trading with the
Enemy Act was purely a measure of conversation, hence, it is very unlikely that rentals were demanded for
the use of the property. When the National coconut Corporation succeeded the Copra Export Management
Company in the possession and use of the property, it must have been also free from payment of rentals,
especially as it was Government corporation, and steps where then being taken by the Philippine
Government to secure the property for the National Coconut Corporation.
Hence, the plaintiff-appellee's claim for rentals may not be predicated on any negligence or offense of the
defendant-appellant, or any contract, express or implied, because the Alien Property Administration was
neither a trustee of plaintiff-appellee, nor a privy to the obligations of the Taiwan Tekkosho, its title being
based by legal provision of the seizure of enemy property. We have also tried in vain to find a law or
provision thereof, or any principle in quasi contracts or equity, upon which the claim can be supported. On
the contrary, as defendant-appellant entered into possession without any expectation of liability for such use
and occupation, it is only fair and just that it may not be held liable therefor . And as to the rents it collected
from its lessee, the same should accrue to it as a possessor in good faith.
Santa’s Barbies 18-19
TORTS
NAGUIAT V. NLRC GR NO. 116123
MARCH 13, 1997
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.
SERGIO F. NAGUIAT, doing business under the name NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and style SERGIO F. NAGUIAT ENT., INC., & CLARK (THIRD DIVISION), NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FIELD TAXI, INC. (CFTI) OF WORKINGMEN and its members, LEONARDO T.
GALANG, et al.
Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65, Rules of Court) assailing the Resolutions of the NLRC (3rd Division) which affirmed
with modifications the decision of Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos
FACTS
1. CONCESSIONAIRE’S CONTRACT – CFTI and the Army Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) for the
operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base
▪ Sergio (father) – CFTI's president; Antolin (son) – vice-president; CFTI was a family-owned corporation
2. Galang, et. al – previously employed by CFTI as taxicab drivers
▪ Daily Boundary Fee – US$26.50 (1AM – 12NN) and US$27 (12NN – 12MN)
▪ Incidental Expenses (maintenance) – accounted against them, including gasoline expenses
▪ Worked 3 – 4 a week, depending on the availability of taxicabs; Earned not less than US$15 daily
▪ Excess earnings – were required to make cash deposits to the company, could be withdrawn every 15 days
3. US military bases phase-out in the Philippines (including the Clark Air Base)
▪ AAFES was dissolved; services of the drivers were officially terminated on November 26, 1991
▪ AAFES Taxi Drivers Association (drivers' union), through Eduardo Castillo (local president), and CFTI held
negotiations as regards separation benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers
▪ Agreement – separated drivers will be given P500 for every year of service as severance pay
▪ Most accepted said amount in Dec. 1991 and Jan. 1992; BUT, Galang, et. al refused to accept theirs
4. Galang, et al disaffiliated themselves from the drivers' union
▪ COMPLAINT – payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out
▪ Entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings of US$15 for working 16 days a month
5. PETITIONERS – cessation of business of CFTI was due to great financial losses and lost business opportunity
resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of
the RP-US military bases agreement
▪ Agreed with the drivers' union to grant it separation pay equivalent to P500 for every year of service
6. LABOR ARBITER – ordered the latter to pay Galang, et. al P1,200 for every year of service "for humanitarian
consideration" setting aside the earlier agreement between CFTI and the drivers' union
▪ Rejected the allegation of CFTI since, at the time it ceased operations, CFTI was profitably earning and the
cessation of its business was due to the untimely closure of Clark Air Base
7. NLRC – granted separation pay to the Galang, et. al
▪ ½ month salary should be US$120 but such can not be paid in US Dollar which is not the legal tender
▪ Paras (Art. 1249, NCC) – defines legal tender as that which a debtor may compel a creditor to accept in
payment of the debt
▪ Complainants (creditors) can be compelled to accept the Philippine peso which is the legal tender
▪ Table of Conversion – exchange rate at the time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment should be used
▪ Since the choice is left to the debtor, Galang, et. al may choose to pay in US dollar
ISSUE/S
WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in unilaterally
increasing the amount of severance pay granted by the labor arbiter
RULING
SOLGEN – unqualifiedly supports the allegations of Galang, et. al
SUPREME COURT
1. AMENDED COMPLAINT – Galang, et. al inferred that their monthly take-home pay amounted to not less than
$240; such was not refuted nor controverted by the petitioners
▪ They did not even appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter nor manifest any error in his findings
▪ They are in ESTOPPEL for not having questioned such facts when they had all opportunity to do so
2. CLAIM – closure of their taxi business was due to great financial losses
▪ Business losses, in order to sustain closure of business and warrant exemption from payment of separation
pay, must be proved with clear and satisfactory evidence; RECORDS – devoid of such evidence
3. AMOUNT OF SEPARATION PAY (Art. 283, Labor Code) – NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that Galang, et. al were entitled to separation pay of $120 (½ of $240 monthly pay) or its peso equivalent
for every year of service
4. LIABILITY OF PETITONERS
Naguiat Enterprise NOT Liable – Galang, et. al were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a
boundary or commission basis
▪ Documents submitted (drivers' applications for employment with CFTI and social security remittances and
payroll of Naguiat Enterprises) – showed that none of them were its employees
▪ Concessionaire Contract – CFTI became the owner of the taxicabs, the principal investment and asset
▪ CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association – members are the employees of CFTI and for collective bargaining
purposes, the definite employer is the Clark Field Taxi Inc.
▪ CFTI was the actual and direct employer, and that Naguiat Enterprises was neither their indirect employer nor
labor-only contractor. It was NOT involved at all in the taxi business.
CFTI president SOLIDARILY LIABLE
▪ Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as president of CFTI, cannot be exonerated from joint and several liability
in the payment of separation pay to Galang, et. al
▪ Actively managed the business; an "employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code
▪ Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were "close family corporations" owned by the Naguiat family
▪ Sec. 100, par. 5 of the Corporation Code – stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless
the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance
▪ RECORDS – did NOT show that CFTI obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance
▪ CORPORATE TORT - no definite scope
▪ TORT - violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law, a breach of a legal duty
▪ Art. 283, Labor Code – employer must grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses
▪ CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation; its stockholder who was actively engaged in
the management or operation of the business should be held personally liable.
▪ Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable for corporate tort because he had actively engaged in the management and
operation of CFTI, a close corporation
▪ Antolin Naguiat NOT personally liable – although he carried the title of general manager, it had not been
shown that he had acted in such capacity; no evidence on the extent of his participation in the management
or operation of the business was preferred.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of
the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Petitioner CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat, president and co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and
severally, the individual respondents their separation pay computed at US$120.00 for every year of service, or
its peso equivalent at the time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment;
(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin T. Naguiat are ABSOLVED from liability
in the payment of separation pay to individual respondents.
DETAILS THAT ARE NOT RELEVANT BUT MIGHT GET ASKED ANYWAY
(Art. 283, Labor Code) … In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay
shall be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least 1/2 month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction
of at least 6 months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
TORTS
BAKSH v. CA GR NUMBER: 97336
DATE: February 19, 1993
PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., J.:
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES,
respondents.
APPEAL by certiorari under Rule 45 to review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
OCTOBER 27, 1987: Private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial
court a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married.
Marilou Gonzales alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) yearsold, single, Filipino and a
pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; Gashem Shookat
Baksh, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City,
and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan
City;
BEFORE AUGUST 20 1987: the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage;
SOMETIME IN 20 AUGUST 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she
was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment,
she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of
not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
ANSWER OF BAKSH WITH COUNTERCLAIM: He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or
agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her
parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to
his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and
finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was
unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00
as moral damages.
ISSUE/S
WHETHER OR NOT BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY CAN GIVE RISE TO CAUSE FOR
DAMAGES
RULING
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited to negligent acts or omissions and
excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well
such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal
system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts
or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills
that vacuum. It is even post
ulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of
the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo American law on
torts.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintif’s parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
not because of lust but because of moral seduction—the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in
its example earlier adverted to. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied
in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or neglig ence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
TORTS
CASE TITLE: Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. GR NUMBER: L-29041
v. First Farmers Milling Co. DATE: March 24, 1981
PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera, J.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. DEFENDANT: First Farmers Milling Co., Inc.
This is an appeal taken by Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. from the order dated November 28, 1967
issued by the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI (Pasig), in Civil Case No. 9185, as well as the Order dated March 5,
1968 denying the Motion for its reconsideration.
FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant had commenced, on March 18, 1966, an action for Injunction and Prohibition with
Damages against defendants First Farmers Milling Co., Inc. (FFMC), various named planters nearby, and
Ramon Nolan being the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration. It was alleged, that in the year of
1964, the defendant FFMC that operated a sugar central known as the First Farmers Sugar Central. Then, for
the crop years 1964-65 and 1965-66, the defendants transferred their quota allotments to their co-defendants
FFMC and are actually milling their sugar with FFMC. This illegal transfer of the quota allotments was
done over the protest and objections of the plaintiff, but with the unjustified illegal approval of their co-
defendant the Sugar Quota Administration.
After the defendants (FFMC, the adhering planters, and the Sugar Quota Administrator) had filed their
respective answers, the plaintiff-appellant filed a Motion to admit Amended and Supplemental Complaint.
PNB(Philippine National Bank) and NIDC (National Investment and Development Corporation) as party
defendants, “who became creditors of defendant FFMC central prior to the institution of the instant case,
and who therefore are necessary parties, is fatal to the complaint.” It was alleged, that defendants NIDC and
PNB extended loans to FFMC in the amount of P12,210,000.00 on June 18,1965 and P4,000,000.00 on Dec.
14, 1966, to assist in the illegal creation and operation of said mill, hence a joint tortfeasors in the trespa ss
of plaintiff’s rights. It was prayed that they be ordered to jointly and severally pay plaintiff actual and
exemplary damages of not less that P1 million pesos.
Then the defendant filed their respective answer. In their answer, the PNB and NIDC had contended that
they had no participation whatsoever either directly or indirectly on the alleged illegal transfer of the
defendant planters from the plaintiff to the defendant mill. In addition, the granting of loans by the
defendants PNB and NIDC in favor of the defendant mill did not violate any rights of the plaintiff because
these loans were extended in the ordinary and usual course of business as authorized by their charter. Hence,
the latter defendants did not commit any tortious action against the plaintiffs and, consequently the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against the defendants (PNB and NIDC).
ISSUE/S
WON the allegations of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint constituted a sufficient cause of action
against PNB and NIDC.
RULING
NO.
It is basic that the complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause of action. “Ultimate facts” are the important and substantial facts, which either directly
form and basis of the plaintiff’s primary right, and duty, or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions
by the defendant.
When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states that the Complaint states no cause of action, the
rule is that its sufficiency can only be determined by considering the facts alleged in the Complaint and no
other. The allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and it is not permissible to go beyond and
outside of them for date or facts. And the test of sufficiency of the facts alleged is whether or not the Court
could render a valid judgment as prayed for accepting as true exclusive facts set forth in the Complaint.
The subject Amended and Supplemental Complaint fails to meet the test. It is not supported by well-pleased
averment of facts. Nowhere is it alleged that defendants-appellees had notice, information or knowledge of
any flaw, much less any illegality, in their co-defendants’ actuations, assuming that there was such a flaw or
illegality. Although it is averred that the defendant’s acts were done in bad faith, the Complaint does not
contain any averment of facts showing that the acts were done in the manner alleged.
“The doing of an act which is in itself perfectly lawful will not render one liable as for a tort, simply
because the unintended effect of such act is to enable or assist another person to do or accomplish a
wrong, assuming, of course, that there was such wrong.”
Bad faith is never presumed (Art. 527, NCC). And it has been held that “to support a judgment for damages,
facts which justify the inference of a lack or absence of good faith must be alleged and proven.”
TORTS
CASE TITLE: G.R. No. L-33171
May 31, 1979
CINCO v. CANONOY MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the

Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of
Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT,
VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO,
respondents-appellees.
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered on
November 5, 1970.
FACTS
CINCO filed a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by
Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto,
a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the
civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of
the criminal suit.
The City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on
certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one
of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case.
Plaintiff - it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the
Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by
petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered
and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Private respondents - Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her
employees, particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the
criminal action.
RULING
YES.
It is evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
between the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action,
as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding the civil
action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to "other
civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in
which case once the criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered."
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica as
enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but
also damage to property. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for
the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since
"harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself
include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible
for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated.
SC Grants the WRIT OF CERTIORARI. SC orders the City Court of Mandaue to proceed with the hearing of the
case.
E.g. A footnote, a dissent, a concurrence etc.
TORTS QUASI-DELICTS; Concepts and Requisites

ELCANO v. HILL G.R. No. L-24803
May 26, 1977
BARREDO, J.
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as
their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, father and natural guardian of said minor,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants defendants-appellees
NATURE OF THE ACTION: APPEAL from the order of the CFI of QUEZON CITY in which, through a
MOTION TO DISMISS, it dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs for RECOVERY OF DAMAGES from
defendant Reginald, minor and married, and his father Marvin, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito.
FACTS
*So guys this was during the time that marriage of a minor was a mode of emancipation*
Defendant-appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally with the CFI of QUEZON CITY. After due
trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent coupled with
mistake. No parties issued to the Supreme Court a copy of the acquittal presumably because plaintiffs do not
disputed that such was the basis in the court’s decision.
The motion to dismiss was based on:

1.) a violation of Sec. 1, Rule 107 (now Rule 111), of the Revised Rules of Court;
2.) that the action is barred by prior judgement in that it is final or in res-judicata; and
3.) that the complaint had no cause of action against the defendant Marvin because he was relieved as a
guardian of Reginald through emancipation by marriage.
• CFI: Motion to dismiss was denied. o Motion for

Reconsideration (MR): Granted
ISSUE/S
1.) Whether or not the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed.
2.) Whether or not Art. 2180 (2) & (3) of the Civil Code applies against Marvin Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence of the act complained of, Reginald, though a minor, was
already legally married
RULING
FIRST ISSUE: NO, the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
The case of Barredo v. Garcia, through Justice Bocobo, speaks of the dual character (civil and criminal) of
fault or negligence as a source of obligation.
• It was the EMPLOYEE, not the employer, being sued in this case.
• The separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code, has been fully
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such conviction, he could have been sued for this
civil liability arising from the crime.
• FIRST DISCUSSION: Art. 365 of the RPC punishes reckless and simple negligence. If the
provisions of the Old Civil Code on Quasi-Delicts speak of fault or negligence not punished by law,
then that would only mean the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope in
actual life and the Court does not think that the lawmakers intended for such an absurd or anomalous
situation to occur.
• SECOND DISCUSSION: Quantum of evidence necessary in criminal cases is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which is higher than the one required in civil cases, which is preponderance of
evidence. That would suffice to make the defendant pay damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt but can be proven by
preponderance of evidence. The defendant, in such cases, can and should be made responsible under
Art. 1902 – 1910 (presently, 2176, 2180, 2181, 2183, 2190, 2191, 2192 and 2193). Otherwise, there
would be many instances of undvindicated civil wrongs (Ubi jus indemnified remedium).
• THIRD DISCUSSION: There is a lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action
for culpa aquiliana, as there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that Art. 1902 – 1910 provides for these other
remedies. This is for the better safeguarding of private rights. An independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by
the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
According to the Code Commission: Under Art. 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or “culpa aquiliana”. But said article
forestalls a double recovery.
Lastly, the case of Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co, holds that Art. 2176, referring to fault or
negligence covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts in criminal character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both, and would be entitled in
such to the bigger award of the 2, assuming the awards made in the 2 cases vary. In other wor ds, extinction
of civil liability in Rule 111, Sec. 3(e) refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Art. 100 of the RPC,
whereas civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Culpa Aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
SECOND ISSUE: YES, Art. 2180 (2) and (3) appliy to Atty. Marvin Hill thus, is not free from
responsibility on the possible civil liability despite Reginald’s emancipation by marriage.
Article 2180 provides "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company."
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was
still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
According to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child
under Art. 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons. The clear implication of Article 399 of the Old Civil Code, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance
of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any
act that can give rise to judicial litigation
Justice Aquino concurs with the meaning of Art. 2176 in that it comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. It includes any rational conception of liability for
the tortious acts likely to be developed by society (citing Justice Street in Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP)
TORTS
CASE TITLE GR NUMBER: 165732
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco DATE: December 14, 2006
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT: DEFENDANT/RESPONDENTS:
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN
ADMER PAJARILLO LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON
LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and
VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision issued by the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank’s cashier as she would
sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and
pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline
with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline’s husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo. The respondents
reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Pajarillo was convicted. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Meanwhile, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages against
Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner’s defense:
1. Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one arm’s length he stepped backward,
loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.
2. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about
10 meters away from the bank and saw her talking to a man thereat; that she left the man under the fly-over,
crossed the street and approached the bank.
RTC decision: The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo’s claim that he
merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo’s bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming
around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and
the police authorities. The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally
liable with Pajarillo. There was no showing that the rules and regulations were faithfully complied with by
the security guards.
CA decision: Affirmed RTC’s decision but modified Safeguard’s liability from soloidary to subisidiary as
the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts,
but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code as provided by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely
dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline
2. Whether Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
RULING
1. Yes. The records do not show that Pajarillo had attended classroom instruction on company rules
and regulations as lesson plans.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of
the security guard’s performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997
conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in
collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on
security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the employees.
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline’s act of just depositing her firearm for
safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given
on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.
2. Yes. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of
the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176
of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may
be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.
A reading of respondents’ complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover
damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo’s act
of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code.
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in
the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from crime. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil
case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.
Hence, The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
(Damages awarded by RTC)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and
against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the
plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS
(P157,430.00), as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney’s fees; and 6. costs of suit.
TORTS
INIEGO-V.-PURGANAN GR NUMBER: G.R. No. 166876.
DATE: March 24, 2006.
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
PETITIONER: ARTEMIO INIEGO DEFENDANT/s: HONORABLE JUDGE GUILLERMO G.
PURGANAN, in his official capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, City of
Manila, and FOKKER C. SANTOS
NATURE OF THE ACTION: this is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court urging the
Supreme Court to reverse the 28 October 2004 Decision and 26 January 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Eighth
Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 76206 denying due course to the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner under Rule 65,
elevating the 21 October 2002 Omnibus Order and the 21 January 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42,
City of Manila.
FACTS
GUIDE: (DETAILS MATTER)
-1 March 2002: private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and damages against
Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego,
as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident that
happened on 11 December 1999, when a freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private
respondent’s jitney which private respondent was driving at the time of the accident.
-24 August 2002: private respondent filed a Motion to Declare defendant in Default allegedly for failure of
the latter to file his answer within the final extended period.
-28 August 2002: petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground,
among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of action of the case.
-21 October 2002: public respondent Judge Guillermo G. Purganan, acting as presiding judge of the RTC,
Branch 42, Manila, issued the assailed Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the petitioner and
the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default of the private respondent. (Ground for the dismissal of the Motion to
declare the defendant in default: The court believed the assertion of Iniego that he never received the decion rendered on 28
Aug. 2002. “The explanation of defendant IÑEGO has merit. The order dated 12 August 2002 was sent to a wrong address, thus
defendant IÑEGO did not receive it. Since it was not received, he was not aware that the court would grant no further extension.
The Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss has to be granted and the Motion to declare Defendant IÑEGO [in default] has to be
DENIED”Ground for the denial of the Motion to dismiss: “The plaintiff opines that this court has exclusive jurisdiction
because the cause of action is the claim for damages, which exceeds P400,000.00. The complaint prays for actual damages in
the amount of P40,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of
P150,000.00. Excluding attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, the total amount of damages being claimed is
P490,000.00. Proceeding on the assumption that the cause of action is the claim of (sic) for damages in the total amount of
P490,000.00, this court has jurisdiction. But is the main cause of action the claim for damages? The court said that the main
cause of action of the petition is not a claim for damages but of quasi delict. Hence it is not capable of pecuniary estimation. As
a result, the RTC has exlcusive jurisdiction over the case. This court is of the view that the main cause of action is not the claim
for damages but quasi-delict. Damages are being claimed only as a result of the alleged fault or negligence of both
defendants under Article 2176 of the Civil Code in the case of defendant Pinion and under Article 2180 also of the Civil Code
in the case of defendant Iniego. But since fault or negligence (quasidelicts) could not be the subject of pecuniary estimation,
this court has exclusive jurisdiction.”
-7 November 2002: petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Omnibus Order of 21 October
2002.
-21 January 2003: public respondent issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.(Reason: ‘What this court referred to in its Order sought to be reconsidered as not capable of pecuniary
estimation is the CAUSE OF ACTION, which is quasi-delict and NOT the amount of damage prayed for.’)
-Petitioner elevated the 21 October 2002 and 21 January 2003 Orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals
on petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
28 October 2004: the Court of Appeals denied the appeal for lack of merit.
-22 November 2004: petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals on
26 January 2005. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE/S
1. WoN the action is capable of pecuniary estimation; hence jurisdiction is either with MTC, MeTC, MCTC
or the RTC depending on the amount of the damages claimed;
2. WoN that the moral and exemplary damages claimed by private respondent should be excluded from
the computation of the total amount of damages for jurisdictional purposes because the said moral and
exemplary damages arose, not from the quasi-delict, but from the petitioner’s refusal to pay the actual
damages.
RULING
1. Yes, it is capable of pecuniary estimation. Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and
effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the de-
fendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are therefore capable of pecuniary estimation. According to
respondent Judge, what he referred to in his assailed Order as not capable of pecuniary estimation is the
cause of action, which is a quasi-delict, and not the amount of damage prayed for. From this, respondent
Judge concluded that since fault or negligence in quasidelicts cannot be the subject of pecuniary
estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed respondent Judge in this respect.
Respondent Judge’s observation is erroneous. It is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, that what must be determined to be capable or incapable of pecuniary
estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject matter of the action. A cause of action is “the
delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the
plaintiff.” On the other hand, the “subject matter of the action” is “the physical facts, the thing real
or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not
the delict or wrong committed by the defendant. (In the case of Lapitan vs. Scandia Inc., et.al, the Court, through
Justice JBL Reyes said:“In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction
is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts] would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]. x x x.”)Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts
are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because
of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed in such actions represent the monetary
equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by
the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto or a
consequence thereof. It bears to point out that the complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC
actually bears the caption “for DAMAGES”The fault or negligence of the defendant, therefore, is
inextricably intertwined with the claim for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-delict
without a claim for damages. We therefore rule that the subject matter of actions for damages based on
quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary estimation.
2. The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of
damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise
from the same or from different causes of action. Despite our concurrence in petitioner’s claim that
actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation, we find
that the total amount of damages claimed by the private respondent nevertheless still exceeds the
jurisdictional limit of P400,000.00 and remains under the jurisdiction of the RTC.If the claims for moral and
exemplary damages are not included in the computation for purposes of determining jurisdiction, only the
claim for actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00 will be considered, and the MeTC will have
jurisdiction. We cannot give credence to petitioner’s arguments. The distinction he made between
damages arising directly from injuries in a quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for
a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as the damages sought by respondent originate from the same
cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or negligence of the employee and the juris tantum
presumption of negligence of his employer in his selection and supervision are the seeds of the damages
claimed, without distinction. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and
exemplary damages arose from a cause of action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in the
computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still proper. All claims for damages should be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether they arose from a single
cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert
as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section
provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. 15 Hence, whether or not the different claims
for damages are based on a single cause of action or different causes of action, it is t he total amount
thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the total
amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.
In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation.
As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the
amount of damages claimed. In this case, the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdic tion of
the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of
courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.
In quasi-delict, exemplary damages are awarded when the act or omission which caused injury is attended
by gross negligence. (Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 524 [1999])
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, civil actions
to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
(quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or
previously instituted. The reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights,
but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. (Hambon vs. Court of
Appeals, 399 SCRA 255 [2003])
TORTS
John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, GR NUMBER: 160283
Inc. DATE: October 14, 2005
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc.
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65976, dated 25 September 2003. Said Decision denied the
petitioners appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), La Union, Branch 31, in
Civil Case No. A-1646.
FACTS
Petitioner Chan, Jr. owns the Aringay Shell Gasoline Station, in Sta. Rita East,
Aringay, La Union. The gasoline station is bounded on the south by a chapel of respondent INC.
The gas station needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms, whereupon petitioner
procured the services of Dioscoro Ely Yoro, a retired general of the AFP, who was allegedly a
construction contractor in the locality. Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement which
provided, inter alia:
4. Any damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY incurred during the
digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY;
5. In the event that valuable objects are found on the property, the same shall be divided
among the parties as follows:
FIRST PARTY - 60%
SECOND PARTY - 40%
6. In the event that valuable objects are found outside the property line during the said
digging, the same shall be divided among the parties as follows:
FIRST PARTY - 35%
SECOND PARTY - 65%
The diggings commenced. Members of respondent INC then informed petitioner that the digging penetrated
a portion of the land belonging to the former (INC), which affected the foundation of the said chapel, to the
damage and prejudice of the respondent.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner and one Teofilo Oller, petitioner’s engineer, before the
RTC.
RTC: Diggings were NOT intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks, but were made to
construct tunnels to find HIDDEN TREASURE. Petitioner and Yoro were held solidarily liable to
respondent on a 35%-65% basis (petitioner liable for the 35%) and absolved Yoro from liability.’
633,595.50 actual damages

500,000 moral damages
10,000,000 exemplary damages
50,000 attorney’s fees
20,000 litigation expenses
CA: Affirmed the RTC but with modification of damages. “The basis of their solidarity is not the
Memorandum of Agreement but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity.”
moral damages DELETED

exemplary damages REDUCED to 50,000
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses REDUCED to 30,000
CONTENTION OF PETITIONER: No liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely on Yoro.
The MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight by the courts.
Since nothing in the MOA goes against the law, morals, good customs and public policy, it must govern to
absolve him from any liability.
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT: The MOA should not absolve petitioner from any liability. This
written contract clearly shows that the intention of the parties therein was to search for hidden treasure. The
aim of the petitioner and Yoro to intrude and surreptitiously hunt for hidden treasure in the respondents
premises should make both parties liable.
ISSUE/S
W/N THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY
THE PETITIONER AND YORO HAS THE EFFECT OF MAKING THE LATTER
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT
RULING
NO.
The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused
damage to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have
affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on respondent’s premises was caused by fault.
Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the petitioner and
Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other.
Petitioner and Yoro are liable as they are joint tortfeasors. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had
provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or
outside petitioners property line.
TORTS
FGU Insurance Corporation vs Court of Appeals GR No. 137775 & GR No. 1470704
March 31, 2005
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.
st
FGU Insurance Corp (1 petition) CA, San Miguel Corporation, Estate of Ang Gui and
Estate of Ang Gui, represented by Lucio, Julian and Co To (1st petition)
Jaime (2 nd petition) CA, San Miguel Corporation and FGU Insurance
Corporation (2 nd petition)
Two separate petitions for review assailing the Decision of the CA in CA-GR CV No. 49624, entitled, San
Miguel Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee versus Estate of Ang Gui, represented by Lucio, Julian and Jaime,
all surnamed Ang, and Co To, Defendants-Appellants, ThirdParty Plaintiffs versus FGU Insurance
Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 22. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P1,346,197.00 and an interest of

6% per annum to be reckoned from the filing of this case on October 2, 1990;
2) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
an additional sum of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
3) With cost against defendants.
For the Third-Party Complaint:
1) Ordering third-party defendant FGU Insurance Company to pay and reimburse defendants the amount of
P632,700.00
FACTS
Anco Enterprises Company (ANCO) is a partnership between Ang Gui and Co To. Said partnership was
engaged in the shipping business. It owned the M/T ANCO tugboat and the D/B Lucio barge which we
operated as common carriers. The D/B Lucio, having no engine of its own and therefore could not maneuver
itself, was towed via tugboat to move. On 23 September 1979, San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shipped
from Mandaue City, Cebu, on board the D/B Lucio for towage by M/T ANCO, the following: (40,550 cases
amounting to P1,833,905)
Bill of Lading No. 1 Estancia, Iloilo (consignee SMC Beer Marketing Division- Estancia Beer Sales Office,
Estancia, Iloilo)
25,000 cases Pale Pilsen
350 cases Cerveza Negra
Bill of Lading No. 2 San Jose, Antique (consignee SMC-BMD- San Jose Beer Sales Office, San Jose,
Antique)
15,000 cases Pale Pilsen
200 cases Cerveza Negra
The vessels arrived at San Jose, Antique around 1PM, 30 September 1979. Due to the big waves caused by
the stormy weather, the arrastre workers unloading the cargoes for SMC complained about their difficulty in
doing so. SMC’s District Sales Supervisor, Fernando Macabuag, requested the representative of ANCO to
transfer the barge to safer place within which they may continue unloading as the same might not be able to
withstand the big waves while attached to the wharf. Said request went unheeded, as the ANCO
representative was confident they could continue unloading without any damage caused to the barge by the
waves. At that time, all other vessels in the area left the wharf to seek shelter. Only 10,790 cases of beer
were discharged into the custody of the arrastre operator. Around 10PM, the crew abandoned the vessel due
to the barge’s ropes being cut off by the waves. Around midnight, the barge ran aground and broke, with the
cargoes of beer being swept away. As such, there was failure on the part of ANCO to deliver to SMC’s
consignee 29,210 Pale Pilsen cases and 550 Cerveza Negra cases, each case valued at P45.20 and P47.10,
respectively. SMC’s claim against ANCO amounted to P1,346,197. Subsequently, SMC filed a complaint
for Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages against ANCO for the aforementioned amount, plus
interest, litigation expenses and 25% of the total claim as attorney’s fees.
The partnership was dissolved with the death of Ang Gui, prompting SMC to filed a 2 nd amended complaint
impleading the survivor, Co To and the Estate of Ang Gui. ANCO admitted that the cases were loaded on
the vessel belonging to it but due to an agreement it had with SMC, the former would not be held liable for
any losses or damages resulting to the cargoes by reason of fortuitious event, in this case, the storm. ANCO
further asserted that there was an agreement between it and SMC to insure the cargoes in order to recover
indemnity in case of loss. Pursuant to said agreement, the cargoes to the extent of P20,000 was insured with
FGU Insurance Corp for the total amount of P858,500 per Marine Insurance Policy No. 29591. With leave
of court, ANCO, filed a Third-Party Complaint against FGU, alleging that the loss of the cargoes occurred
as a result of risks insured against in the insurance policy and during the existence and lifetime of said
insurance policy. ANCO further asserted that in the remote possibility that the court will order ANCO to
pay SMC’s claim, FGU should be held liable to pay to SMC.
FGU, in answer to the Third-Party Complaint, admitted the existence of the Insurance Policy but maintained
that the alleged loss cannot be attributed directly or indirectly to any of the risks insured against. According
to FGU, it is only liable in case of: a) total loss of the entire shipment; b) loss of any case as a result of the
sinking of the vessel; or c) loss as a result of the vessel being on fire. Furthermore, FGU alleged that ANCO
and SMC failed to exercise ordinary diligence or the diligence of a good father of a family in the care and
supervision of the cargoes insured to prevent its loss and/or destruction. FGU prayed for the dismissal of the
Third-Party Complaint and asked for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Trial Court found that although the cargoes were indeed lost due to fortuitous event, there was failure on
ANCO’s part, through their representatives, to observe the degree of diligence required that would
exonerate them from liability. It held the Estate of Ang Gui and Co To liable to SMC. With respect to the
Third-Party Complaint, the court a quo found FGU liable to bear 53% of the amount of the lost cargoes,
holding that the risk insured against was the cause of the loss. The appellate court affirmed in toto the
decision of the lower court and denied the motion for reconsideration and the supplemental motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE/S
1st petition: 1) WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding FGU liable under the insurance
contract considering the circumstances surrounding the loss of the cargoes
2nd petition: 1) CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the findings of the lower court that the
negligence of the crewmembers of the D/B Lucio was the proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes
RULING
No, the calamity which caused the loss of the cargoes was not unforeseen nor was it unavoidable. In fact,
the other vessels in the port of San Jose, Antique, managed to transfer to another place, a circumstance
which prompted SMCs District Sales Supervisor to request that the D/B Lucio be likewise transferred, but
to no avail. The D/B Lucio had no engine and could not maneuver by itself. Even if ANCOs representatives
wanted to transfer it, they no longer had any means to do so as the tugboat M/T ANCO had already
departed, leaving the barge to its own devices. The captain of the tugboat should have had the foresight not
to leave the barge alone considering the pending storm. While the loss of the cargoes was admittedly caused
by the typhoon Sisang, a natural disaster, ANCO could not escape liability to respondent SMC. The records
clearly show the failure of petitioner’s representatives to exercise the extraordinary degree of diligence
mandated by law. To be exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster should have been the proximate
and only cause of the loss. There must have been no contributory negligence on the part of the common
carrier.
No, There was blatant negligence on the part of the employees of defendants-appellants when the patron
(operator) of the tug boat immediately left the barge at the San Jose, Antique wharf despite the looming bad
weather. Negligence was likewise exhibited by the defendants-appellants representative who did not heed
Macabuag’s request that the barge be moved to a more secure place. The prudent thing to do, as was done
by the other sea vessels at San Jose, Antique during the time in question, was to transfer the vessel to a safer
wharf. The negligence of the defendants-appellants is proved by the fact that on 01 October 1979, the only
simple vessel left at the wharf in San Jose was the D/B Lucio.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and
1745 Nos. 5, 6, and 7 . . .
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless
the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
Art. 1739. In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster
must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the common carrier must exercise due
diligence to prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence of flood, storm, or other
natural disaster in order that the common carrier may be exempted from liability for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods
Limpangco Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co: . . . To be exempt from liability because of an act of God, the tug must be
free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. For,
although the immediate or proximate cause of the loss in any given instance may have been what is termed an act
of God, yet, if the tug unnecessarily exposed the two to such accident by any culpable act or omission of its own, it is
not excused
Standard Marine Ins. Co. v. Nome Beach L. & T. Co.: The ordinary negligence of the insured and his agents has long
been held as a part of the risk which the insurer takes upon himself, and the existence of which, where it is the
proximate cause of the loss, does not absolve the insurer from liability. But willful exposure, gross negligence,
negligence amounting to misconduct, etc., have often been held to release the insurer from such liability
Williams v. New England Insurance Co: while mistake and negligence of the master or crew are incident to
navigation and constitute a part of the perils that the insurer is obliged to incur, such negligence or recklessness
must not be of such gross character as to amount to misconduct or wrongful acts; otherwise, such negligence shall
release the insurer from liability under the insurance contract.
TORTS
VERGARA v. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77679
DATE: September 30, 1987
PONENTE: Padilla, J.
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT: DEFENDANT:
Vicente Vergara The Court Of Appeals and Amadeo Azarcon
NATURE OF THE ACTION:
Action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code)
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
 The action arose from a vehicular accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when
Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-
residence of the private respondent, causing damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed at
P53,024.22.
 In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged principally: "that his driver Martin Belmonte
operated said cargo truck in a very diligent (and) careful manner; that the steering wheel refused to
respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes, the said
cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff (private respondent) and that the said accident was an act
of God for which he cannot be held liable."
 Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation,
alleging that said cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident, belonging to the petitioner, was insured
by the third party defendant insurance company.
 The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent.
 Court of Appeals
 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, which ordered Petitioner to pay, jointly and severally
with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, to the private, respondent the following: (a)
P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs
 On the third party complaint, the insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the
following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy;
and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees
ISSUE/S
Whether or not this act or omission can be considered as a "negligent" act or omission.
RULING
 Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him guilty of fault or negligence is not
tenable.
 It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case
at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which
defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
 The findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court, which we are not prepared to now disturb,
show that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was sufficiently established by the policy
report and the testimony of Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the
surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the
right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of
the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the
store warehouse of the plaintiff."
 According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to
mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not
be consideration as fortuitous in character.

TORTS
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL vs. GR NUMBER 138550
CORDERO DATE: October 14, 2005
PONENTE: Sandoval-Guiterrez, J.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC. NOEL CORDERO
This is a petition for review on certiorari on the Decision of the CA (April 30, 1999) in the case “Cordero
vs. AmEx International Inc.”
FACTS
1988—Nilda Cordero (wife of Respondent) applied for and was issued an American Express charge card by
petitioner. Nilda signed the back portion of the card hence manifesting her acceptance of the terms of the
agreement. An extension charge card was likewise issued to respondent who also signed the same.
Nov. 29, 1991—Respondent with his family (wife, daughters, sisters-in-law, and uncle-in-law) went on a 3-
day holiday trip to HK where they stayed at the Excelsior Hotel.
Nov. 30, 1991—In the early evening, the group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop to pick up some
chocolate candies. Noel handed the sales clerk his AmEx extension charge card to pay. The sales clerk
verified the card by calling the AmEx Office in HK, but Susan Chong (the store manager) informed the
respondent that she had to confiscate the card. She then cut the card in half in front of his family and other
customers lined up the counter to Noel’s embarrassment. Nilda’s card was then used to pay the chocolates.
They returned to the hotel and Nilda called up AmEx’s office in HK. Johnny Chen, the Senior Authorizer,
informed her that on Nov. 1, 1991, a person in HK attempted to use a charge card with the SAME number
as Noel’s. Their protocol under the Inspect Airwan Support System in HK is used to protect their company
and the cardholders from fraud. Once the card is placed in this system, the person whom the card is tendered
must verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the cardholder is established, the card is
honored. Otherwise, the card is revoked and confiscated. When the Watsons clerk called their office, its
representative wants to talk to respondent in order to verify the latter’s identity. When respondent refused, it
led to the confiscation of respondent’s card.
March 1992—Respondent filed with the RTC, Branch V, Manila, a complaint for damages (award for
moral and exemplary, plus attys fees) against petitioner for the humiliation the former suffered.
February 1995—The trial court found that the inexcusable failure of defendant (petitioner herein) to inform
plaintiff (respondent herein) of the November 1, 1991 incident despite sufficient time was the proximate
cause of the confiscation and cutting of plaintiffs extension card which exposed the latter to public
humiliation for which defendant should be held liable.
The CA AFFIRMED the RTC ruling, but reduced the damages to 150K (MD); 100K (ED)
ISSUE/S
W/N AmEx is liable for damages
RULING
Contention of Respondent Noel: He anchored his claim on ARTICLE 2176 NCC
SC Ruling 2: In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply (LRT vs.
Navidad [2003]).
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or
injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent (The Consolidated Bank v CA [2003]).
We cannot sustain the trial courts conclusion.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of
Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent
talked to petitioners representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder
of the card. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to petitioner. If at all, the
cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative
(Basis: Cross-examination of Johnny Cheng). Significantly, paragraph 16 of the Cardmember Agreement
signed by respondent: petitioner can revoke respondents card without notice, as was done here. It bears
reiterating that the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioners
representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no
negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.
FOOTNOTES
1. The Watsons Chemist Shop is located at 277C Ocean Gallery, Kowloon, HK
2. RTC awarded 300K Moral Damages (MD) ; 200K Exemp Damages (ED); 100K attys fees
3. In re: RULING
Contention of AmEx: This raises questions of fact outside SC’s domain
SC: Rule 45 has exceptions as pronounced in Baricuatro v. CA (2000) 1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record.
4. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
TORTS
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS G.R. No. 170631
INTERNATIONAL v. ABEJAR February 10, 2016
Leonen, J.
PETITIONER: Caravan Travel and Tours RESPONDENT: Ermilinda R. Abejar
International, Inc.
NATURE OF THE ACTION: Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Caravel Travel and Tours
International, Inc. (Caravan) prays that the Decision dated October 3, 2005 and the Resolution dated
November 29, 2005 of the CA be reversed and set aside. This case harmonizes the requirements of Article
2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and the registered-owner rule.
FACTS
Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street, United
Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM 19512 was
travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its
left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the
back of the van. Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the
hospital. Instead of doing so, Bautista left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the
van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital. Upon
investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan. Caravan is a corporation
engaged in the business of organizing travels and tours. Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive
the van as its service driver. Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite medical
attendance, Reyes died 2 days after the accident.
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised her since she was
9 years old, filed a Complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan. RTC found that Bautista was
grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. It awarded damages in favor of Abejar. CA affirmed with
modification. Hence, this Petition was filed. Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit
because she is not a real party in interest. According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can
enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's action for damages. Caravan adds that Abejar
offered no documentary or testimonial evidence to prove that Bautista, the driver, acted "within the scope of
his assigned tasks" when the accident occurred. According to Caravan, Bautista's tasks only pertained to the
transport of company personnel or products, and when the accident occurred, he had not been transporting
personnel or delivering products of and for the company. Abejar argues that since Caravan is the registered
owner of the van, it is directly, primarily, and solidarily liable for the tortious acts of its driver.
ISSUE/S
1. WON Abejar is a real party in interest
2. WON Caravan should be held liable as an employer, pursuant to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
RULING
1. Yes, Abejar is a real party in interest. "To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he [or she] must appear to be the present real owner of the right
sought to be enforced." Respondent's capacity to file a complaint against petitioner stems from her
having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes. Art. 233 of the Civil Code provides that,
“The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of
the child as the parents.”
Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' paternal grandparents are also both deceased.
The whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no record that Reyes
has brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances that respondent took custody of Reyes when
she was a child, assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental authority
over her. As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily recognized
rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with Art. 220 of the Family Code, respondent supported
Reyes' education and provided for her personal needs.
Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on two grounds. First,
respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason that when
Reyes died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent would have felt upon the loss
of one's child. It is for this injury-as authentic and personal as that of a natural parent-that respondent
seeks to be indemnified. Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes' actual parents would
have been capacitated to do. Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. While parental authority
is terminated upon emancipation, respondent continued to support and care for Reyes even after she
turned 18. Her relationship with respondent remained the same. The anguish and damage caused to
respondent by Reyes' death was no different because of Reyes' emancipation.
In any case, the termination of respondent's parental authority is not an insurmountable legal bar that
precludes the filing of her Complaint. This court has declared that Art. 1902 of the old Civil Code
(now Art. 2176) is broad enough to accommodate even plaintiffs who are not relatives of the
deceased.
2. Yes, Caravan should be held liable as an employer. The resolution of this case must consider 2 rules.
First, Art. 2180's specification that "employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees... acting within the scope of their assigned tasks." Second, the operation of the registered-
owner rule that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their
vehicles. These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also
the registered owner of a vehicle. Art. 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment
relationship between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of
his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
It is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with Arts. 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code. The appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner
rule and Art. 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of
the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable
presumption that the requirements of Art. 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Art. 2180 has arisen.
This disputable presumption recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former that
should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a hapless
pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover the employment relationship of the owner
and the driver, or any act that the owner may have done in relation to that employment. The
registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public.
Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration. Hence, presumption that the
requirements of Art. 2180 have been satisfied arises. It is now up to petitioner to establish that it
incurred no liability under Art. 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following: first,
that it had no employment relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of
his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of Bautista.
On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time of the accident. On the
second, petitioner presented no positive evidence to show that Bautista was acting in his private
capacity at the time of the incident. On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised
the requisite diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista. In its selection of Bautista as a
service driver, petitioner contented itself with Bautista's submission of a non-professional driver's
license. Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate another's motor
vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. To prove that it exercised
the required diligence in supervising Bautista, petitioner presented copies of several memoranda and
company rules. These, however, are insufficient because petitioner failed to prove actual
compliance. Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals emphasized that to establish
diligence in the supervision of employees, the issuance of company policies must be coupled with
proof of compliance. For failing to overturn the presumption that the requirements of Article 2180
have been satisfied, petitioner must be held liable.
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same
order of preference shall be observed.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible… Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry… The responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage.
Requirements of Art. 2180: A reading of Art. 2180 reveals that in order for an employer to be liable for the
acts of its employee, it is required that the employment relationship is established, that the employee acted
within the scope of his or her assigned tasks, and that the employer failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee.
Petitioner's interest and liability is distinct from that of its driver. Regardless of petitioner's employer-
employee relationship with Bautista, liability attaches to petitioner on account of its being the registered
owner of a vehicle that figures in a mishap. This alone suffices. A determination of its liability as owner can
proceed independently of a consideration of how Bautista conducted himself as a driver. While certainly it
is desirable that a determination of Bautista's liability be made alongside that of the owner of the van he was
driving, his non-inclusion in these proceedings does not absolutely hamper a judicious resolution of
respondent's plea for relief.
TORTS
St. Martin Polyclinic v. GR No. 217426
LWV Construction Corporation December 04, 2017
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and the Resolution of the CA, which affirmed with
modification the Decision and the Order of the RTC of Mandaluyong City, and thereby ordered St. Martin
Polyclinic, Inc. (PETITIONER) to pay LWV Construction Corporation (RESPONDENT) temperate
damages in the amount of P50,000.
FACTS
RESPONDENT is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia.
PETITIONER is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative Council Approved Medical Centers
Association (GAMCA) and is authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for
overseas employment.
RESPONDENT referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin) to PETITIONER for a

pre-deployment medical examination in accordance with the instructions from GAMCA. After undergoing
the required examinations, PETITIONER cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as
evidenced by a Medical Report. Based on the foregoing, RESPONDENT deployed Raguindin to Saudi
Arabia, allegedly incurring expenses in the amount of P84,373.41. When Raguindin underwent another
medical examination with the General Care Dispensary (GCD) of Saudi Arabia, he purportedly tested
positive for hepatitis C virus (HCV). The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia required a re-
examination of Raguindin, which the GCD conducted. But the results remained the same and were reflected
in a Certification. An undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed
such finding, thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines.
RESPONDENT filed a COMPLAINT for sum of money and damages against PETITIONER before the
MeTC, claiming that the latter was reckless in issuing its Medical Report. It averred that it relied on
PETITIONER’S declaration and incurred expenses as a consequence. Thus, RESPONDENT prayed for the
award of damages in the amount representing the expenses it incurred in deploying Raguindin abroad.
PETITIONER, in its answer, denied liability and claimed the following:
1. RESPONDENT was not a proper party in interest for lack of privity of contract between them;
2. MeTC lack JD over the case since it is of interpretation and implementation of a contract of
employment;
3. Action is premature as Raguindin has yet to undergo a post-employment medical examination
following his repatriation; and
4. Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the Medical Report issued by PETITIONER had
already expired on April 11, 2008, or 3 months after its issuance on January 11, 2008.
MeTC: Rendered judgment in favor of RESPONDENT and ordered PETITIONER to pay the amount of
P84,373.41 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
● Held that it had jurisdiction over the case, it was a claim for actual damages incurred in the
deployment of Raguindin in the amount of P84,373.41
● RESPONDENT was a real party in interest, as it would not have incurred expenses had
PETITIONER not issued the Medical Report certifying that Raguindin was fit to work
● RESPONDENT was entitled to be informed accurately of the precise condition of Raguindin before
deploying the latter abroad and had sustained damage as a result of the erroneous certification
● Rejected PETITIONER’S contention that Raguindin may have contracted the disease after his
medical examination in the Philippines up to the time of his deployment, there being no evidence
RTC: Dismissed PETITIONER’S appeal and affirmed the MeTC Decision in its entirety
CA: Affirmed the RTC Decision, with the modification deleting the award of actual damages and instead,
awarding temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.
● PETITIONER failed to perform its duty to accurately diagnose Raguindin on its Medical Report
● PETITIONER could not disclaim liability on the ground that Raguindin tested positive for HCV in
Saudi Arabia after the expiration of the Medical Report on April 11, since the GCD issued its
Certification on April 28, or a mere 17 days from the expiration of the Medical Report
● It is contrary to human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such as Raguindin, would
immediately contract a serious virus at the very beginning of a deployment
● No evidence shown that RESPONDENT actually incurred the amount of P84,373.41 as expenses for
Raguindin's deployment
● DELETED the award of actual damages; awarded temperate damages in the amount of P50,000
ISSUE/S
WON PETITIONER was negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring Raguindin "fit for employment"
and hence, should be held liable for damages
RULING
NO. An action for damages due to the negligence of another may be instituted on the basis of Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict. The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2)
the presence of fault or negligence in the performance or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal
connection between the negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-existing contractual relation. As a
general rule, any act or omission coming under the purview of Art. 2176 gives rise to a cause of action
under quasi-delict, a basis for a claim of damages. Quasi-delict is one among several sources of obligation
(Art. 1157, NCC).
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Alano v. Magud-Logmao) – Art. 2176 is not NOT all-
encompassing enumeration of all actionable wrongs which can give rise to the liability for damages. Under
the Civil Code, acts done in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 will also give rise to damages.
● Art.19 – general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is NOT the basis of
an actionable tort. Art. 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may arise
when it is alleged together with Art. 20 or Art. 21.
● Art. 20 – violations of existing law as basis for an injury; allows recovery should the act have been
willful or negligent. Willful may refer to the intention to do the act and the desire to achieve the
outcome which is considered by the plaintiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence may refer to a
situation where the act was consciously done but without intending the result which the plaintiff
considers as injurious
● Art. 21 – injuries that may be caused by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by law; requires
that the act be willful, that there was an intention to do the act and a desire to achieve the outcome.
The legal issues revolve around whether such outcome should be considered a legal injury on the
part of the plaintiff or whether the commission of the act was done in violation of the standards of
care required in Art. 19
Art. 2176 covers situations where an injury happens through an act or omission of the defendant.
● POSITIVE ACT – the intention to commit the outcome is irrelevant; act itself must NOT be a breach
of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation
● FIND – WON there is fault or negligence attending the commission of the act which necessarily
leads to the outcome considered as injurious by the plaintiff
● Required degree of diligence will be assessed in relation to the circumstances of each and every case
● Applies when the negligent act causing damage to another does NOT constitute a breach of an
existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation
CASE AT BAR – courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the provisions of Arts. 19,
20, and 21 of the Civil Code
● RESPONDENT mainly avers that had PETITIONER not issued a "fit for employment" Medical
Report to Raguindin, the former would not have suffered actual damages
● Claimed negligent act was NOT premised on the breach of any law; no pre-existing contractual
relation was averred to exist between the parties – Art. 2176 should govern
NEGLIGENCE – failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury
● PRESUMPTION – a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have
been fair and regular
● Negligence cannot be presumed and must be proven by him who alleges it
● Sec. 1, Rule 131 of the ROC – burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts
in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law
● Quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence
It was therefore incumbent upon RESPONDENT to show that there was already negligence at the time the
Medical Report was issued.
a. May it be through evidence that show that standard medical procedures were not carefully observed
b. Or that there were palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness for deployment at that time
RESPONDENT only submitted evidence which demonstrate that months after the Medical Report was
issued, Raguindin, who had already been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV.
● Possible that Raguindin became exposed to the HCV only after his medical examination.
● PUBLISHED REPORTS (WHO) – incubation period for HCV is 2 weeks – 6 months, and following
initial infection, approximately 80% of people do not exhibit any symptoms
● FACT – Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately after the medical examination
and could have possibly contracted the same only when he arrived thereat
● (Medical Report Issuance – January 11, 2008; Expiration – April 11, 2008) – no guarantee that
Raguindin's medical status in the intervening period would remain the same up until that date
● Expiration date only means that the Medical Report is valid - and as such, could be submitted - as a
formal requirement for overseas employment; it does not create legal basis to hold the issuer
accountable for any intervening change of condition from the time of issuance up until expiration
● There being no negligence proven by RESPONDENT through credible and admissible evidence,
PETITIONER CANNOT be held liable for damages under Art. 2176.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 11, 2014 and the
Resolution dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125451 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE is entered, DISMISSING the complaint of respondent LWV
Construction Corporation for lack of merit.
TORTS
LG FOODS v. Pagapong-Agraviador GR NUMBER: 158995
DATE: September 26, 2006
PONENTE: GARCIA, J.:
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO HON.PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-
GABOR, Vice President and General Manager, AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
petitioners of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City,
and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA
VALLEJERA, respondents.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
FEBRUARY 26, 1996: Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa
Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident. In time, an Information for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered
by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed
the criminal case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against
the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death
of the Vallejeras’ 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set
the case for pre-trial. With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court, the
petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-
10845.
April 25, 2003, the CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court averring that the complaint neither
represents nor implies that the responsibility charged was the petitioner’s subsidiary liability under Art. 103,
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, it was held that responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176,
Civil Code, which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate,
and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior showing of the latter’s
insolvency.”
ISSUE/S
WHETHER OR NOT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE SPOUSES VALLEJERA IS FOUNDED ON

ART. 103 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AS AVVERED BY LG FOODS OR ON ART. 2180 OF
THE CIVIL CODE.
RULING
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made to
account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint did not
even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his
insolvency.
Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy
against the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence
on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their
driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the
vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a)
not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file
an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of these two possible liabilities may be
enforced against the offender.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee.
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
TORTS
CASE TITLE: Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. GR NUMBER: 147703
v. People DATE: April 14, 2004
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. People of the Philippines
Before this Court if a Petition for Review, assailing the March 29, 2000 and the March 27, 2001 Resolutions
of the CA. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the RTC of San Fernando La Union in Criminal Case
No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution.
FACTS
On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven(11) days to six (6) years,
and to pay damages:
1. To the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES = 50k(indemnity for his death) + P25,383.00 (funeral expenses)
+ P2,500 a month (his unearned income for one year) + 50k (indemnity for the support of Renato
Torres) + 300k as moral damages
2. To the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO = 50k (indemnity for her death) + P237,323.75 (for funeral
expenses) + P 45,000.00 per annum (unearned income for three years) + 1million (moral damages) +
200k (attorney’s fees)
3. To the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA = 50k (indemnity for her death) + P22,838.00 (funeral
expenses) + P20,544.94 (medical expenses) + 1k per month (expenses and her loss of income) +
P100k for moral damages
4. To MAUREEN BRENNAN = P229,654.00 (hospital expenses) + 170k for the orthopedic surgeon
(doctor’s fees) + P22,500.00 for the neurologist + P150k to cover future correction of deformity of
her limbs + 1 million for moral damages
5. To ROSIE BALAJO = P3,561.46 as medical expenses + 2k as loss of income + 25k for moral
damages
6. To TERESITA TAMONDONG = P19,800.47 as medical expenses + 800 for loss of income + 25k
for moral damages
7. To JULIANA TABTAB = P580.81 as medical expenses + P 4,600.00 as actual damages + P1400
loss of her earning + P10,000 as moral damages
8. To MIGUEL ARQUITOLA = P12,473.82 as hospital expenses + P14,530.00 as doctor’s fees + P1k
for medicines + P50k as moral damages
9. To CLARITA CABANBAN = P155 for medical expenses + P87 for medicines + P1,1710.00 as
actual damages + 5k as moral damages
10. To MARIANO CABANBAN = P1,395.00 for hospital bills + P500.00 for medicine + P2,100.00 as
actual damages + P1,200 for loss of her income + 5k as moral damages
11. To LA UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY – the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace = 250k as
actual damages (total wrecked vehicle)
12. To the owner of the JEEPNEY = P22, 698.38 as actual damages.
The court further ruled that petitioner, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused. The accused jumped bail and remained at-large (Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the ROC
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for the accused, also admittedly hired
by petitioner, and filed a notice of appeal, which was denied, by the trial court. Simultaneously, petitioner
(Philippine Rabbit) filed its notice of appeal from judgment of the trial court. Motion was denied.
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising
from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers
subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Art. 103 of the RPC becomes conclusive and enforceable.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal
the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
RULING
NO. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio,
dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that
appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed
these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.24
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a
criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of
conviction meted out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict
per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil
action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended
party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to
protect the remaining civil interest therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect,
they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they
may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former
cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of
the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-
employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily
liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an
employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his
flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is
correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the
primary civil liability.
STUDY CRIMPRO REGARDING BAIL

TORTS
CASE TITLE: G.R. No. 150157
MANLICLIC v. CALAUNAN January 25, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
Assailed before Us is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the (RTC)
of Dagupan City, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI)
solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
FACTS
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo
Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit
Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North
Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side
of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the
right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and
stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was
unhurt.
A criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. The criminal case was tried ahead of
the civil case.
Plaintiff’s version (CALAUNAN) - the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on
the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of
overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit
Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of
the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus
and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and
the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The
bus also overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound.
Respondent’s version (MANLICLIC & PRBLI) - Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question.
However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the
jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their
testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the instant case
RTC - Ruled in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.
CA - Affirmed RTC’s decision in toto.
*Calaunan died during the pendency of the action, substituted by his wife and children
*CA acquitted Manliclic in the criminal case
ISSUE/S
1.WON the testimonies in the criminal case should be considered as an admissible evidence t o the Civil
Case?
2. WON the acquittal of MANLICLIC on the criminal case has an effect on the civil case?
RULING
1. YES. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on
their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a
privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform
to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be
admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence alone may be
insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence,
to be considered and given the importance it deserves.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in
evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by
both petitioners.
2. YES. Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted
not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based
on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section
applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi -
delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all
its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is
now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with
it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising
from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on
the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to
civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to
speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be
instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana.
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though
that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that
there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its
driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the
bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles
without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe
that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made
responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt
petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply
with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the
accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should
have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen
by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of
PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules
and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by
petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
E.g. A footnote, a dissent, a concurrence etc.
TORTS QUASI DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM A BREACH OF CONTRACT

FGU INSURANCE v. G.P. G.R. No. 141910
SARMIENTO TRUCKING August 6, 2002
VITUG, J.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION
and LAMBERT M. EROLES, respondents
FACTS
• June 18, 1994: G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to delivery 30 units of Condura
S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu trucks, driven by Lambert Eroles (Eroles) from their plant
site of Concepcion Industries, Inc. (Concepcion) along South Superhighway in Alabang to the Central
Luzon Applicanes in Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the road along McArthur highway, it
collided with an unindentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to its
cargoes.
• FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), insurer of the shipment, paid Concepcion the value of the cargoes in
the sum of Php 204,450. FGU, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of Concepcion, sought
reimbursement from GPS. GPS failed to heed the claim so FGU filed a complaint for damages and
breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Eroles with the RTC Branch 66 of Makati. o
Answer of Respondents: They asserted GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion since 1988
and it was not engaged in business as a common carrier and that they claimed the cause of damage was
purely accidental.
o FGU presented evidence in relation to damages while GPS filed a motion to dismiss with leave
of court of the complaint of the petitioner by way of demurrer of evidence on the ground that
FGU failed to prove that it was a common carrier.
• April 30, 1996; RTC; Granted the motion to dismiss o Application on the law on common carriers is not
warranted and presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier is not availing.
o Under the law on obligation and contract, negligence or fault is not presumed. The law on
quasi-delict provides for some presumption of negligence but only upon attendance of some
circumstances, such as that in Art. 2185 of the NCC.
o Motion for Reconsideration by the Petitioner: Denied
• CA:
o Petitioner’s contention: The RTC erred in holding that the GPS was not a common carrier
and dismissing the complaint on a demurrer to evidence.
o Decision (June 10, 1999): Appeal denied and ruled in favor of GPS.
 Because it is the appellant (FGU) who insists that the appellees (GPS) can still be
considered as a common carrier, despite its limited clientele, (assuming it was really a
common carrier), it follows that it (appellant) has the burden of proving the same. It
(plaintiff-appellant) must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, which
means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the
other, which it ultimately failed to do.
 The appellee trucking corporation has been its exclusive contractor, hauler since 1970,
defendant has no choice but to comply with the directive of its principal, the
inevitable conclusion is that the appellee is a private carrier.
o MR of Petitioner: Denied
ISSUE/S
Whether or not respondent GPS may be held liable as a common carrier?
RULING
NO, GPS cannot be held liable for damages as a common carrier. Despite that, he cannot escape
liability by reason of culpa contractual.
In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a
party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a
contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause
for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered.
The remedy serves to preserve:
a.) expectation interest, which is interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a
position as he would have been had the contract been performed; or
b.) reliance interest, which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contact by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not bee named; or
c.) restitution interest, which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on
another party.
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and
petitioners assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in
its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation in this case, the
delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of care
and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish
otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not himself be
ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners
principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties
who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical position.
Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor
prejudice a third person. Petitioners civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana,
which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the
part of the defendant.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Evidence for the plaintiff shows no proof that defendant was violating any traffic regulation. Hence, the
presumption of negligence is not obtaining.
Considering that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that defendant is a common carrier and defendants driver
was the one negligent, defendant cannot be made liable for the damages of the subject cargoes.
TORTS
CASE TITLE GR NUMBER: 122039
Calalas v. Court of Appeals DATE: May 31, 2000
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT: DEFENDANT/RESPONDENTS:
VICENTE CALALAS COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE
SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA
NATURE OF THE ACTION: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
At 10 o’clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a
college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned
and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers,
Sunga was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end
of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As
she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the “distal third of the left tibiafibula
with severe necrosis of the underlying skin.” Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and
case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to
September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she
would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said
period.
What was filed: Sunga filed complaint for damages against Calalas for breach of contract of carriage
Petitoner’s answer: Filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner of Isuzu truck. He also filed
another civil case for quasi-delict against Verena and Salva for the damage suffered by the jeepney.
RTC: The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as thirdparty defendant and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasidelict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas
for the damage to his jeepney.
CA: On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi delict, and that the common carrier
failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the thirdparty
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether or not Calalas should be free from liability in the breach of contract of carriage
RULING
1. Yes. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi
delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second,
breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is
the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving
the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.2 In case of death or injuries to passengers,
Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden
of proof.
(Why Calalas violated the contract of carriage in accordance with Article 1755)
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic.—No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or
impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading
freight, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner’s driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of
the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity.—No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or
more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
TORTS
SALUDAGA vs. G.R. No. 179337

FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY
30 April 2008
PONENTE:
JOSEPH SALUDAGA FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO

C. DE JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the June 29, 2007
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87050, nullifying and setting aside the November
10, 2004 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 98-89483 and
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner; as well as its August 23, 2007 Resolution4 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.5
FACTS
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University (FEU)
when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school premises
on August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF)
due to the wound he sustained.6 Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained
that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was
filed against him.
Saludaga file a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached their
obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to
learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services
within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for
whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and to pay attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General Insurance.8
The RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner. Respondents appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside the
RTC’s decision. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE/S
WON FEU is liable for damages for breach of contract.
RULING
YES. FEU is liable for damages for breach of contract. It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere
proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding
right of relief. In the instant case, the Court finds that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no
less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie
showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to
its students.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards
assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not
proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure
to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A
learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its
premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation
to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
Thus, the defense of force majeure must also fail. One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of
God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate
cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect
is found to be partly the result of a persons participation whether by active intervention, neglect or failure
to act the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of their
obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing a
safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award
of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual
basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendants acts.
For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified security guard,
which resulted to the latter's breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to
respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with Galaxy for being grossly
negligent in directing the affairs of the security agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that hi s
medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but said representations were not fulfilled because they
presumed that petitioner and his family were no longer interested in filing a formal complaint against them
-Petitioner spent P35,298.25 for his hospitalization and other medical expenses.
-Civil Code, Art. 2208:
In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(2) when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest;
-[A] corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it, such that, save for certain exceptions, corporate officers who entered into contracts in behalf
of the corporation cannot be held personally liable for the liabilities of the latter. Personal liability of a
corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not necessarily) with the corporation may so validly
attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is
guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest
resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance
of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate
secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with
the corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate
action.27
None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case; hence, respondent De Jesus should
not be held solidarily liable with respondent FEU.
-security agency recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or security guards to a client, the
employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency, and not the client. The fact that a client company
may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the
client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or
omissions.31
TORTS
Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso and CA GR No. L-21438
September 28, 1966
PONENTE: Sanchez, J.
Air France Rafael Carrascoso and CA
Review on certiorari. The CFI of Manila sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Carrascoso P25,000 by way
of moral damages; P10,000 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first
class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the
legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000 for attorneys' fees; and the
costs of suit. On appeal, the CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
FACTS
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate
his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat
would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many
of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was
having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified
Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the
plane.
ISSUE/S
WON the award of moral damages was proper
RULING
Yes. The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith,
with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening
the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first
class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man"
whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white
man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for,
and for which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him. The manager not
only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will;
he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly,
this is bad faith.
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled
in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article
21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation.
And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule
or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.
Austro-American S. S. Co. vs Thomas: "Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger's check, it
was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected."
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort"
Lipman vs Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.: "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came
to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told
him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination,
there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language
to him, as by calling him a lunatic," and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable
for the mental suffering of said passenger.
TORTS
VESTIL v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE G.R. No. 74431
COURT DATE: November 6, 1989
PONENTE: Cruz, J.
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT: DEFENDANT:
Purita Miranda Vestil and Agustin Vestil Intermediate Appellate Court, David Uy and
Teresita Uy
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is an appeal to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial
court
FACTS
 On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in
the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She
was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine
days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15,
1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
 Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the
possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the
charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and
that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
 After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and
dismissed the complaint.
 Court of Appeals
 It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible
under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had
died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees.
Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the
death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
 Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has
not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she
claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because
she is one of Miranda's heirs.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not Purita is the possessor of the dog.
RULING
 While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's
estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own house.
 there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly,
and used it virtually as a second house
 her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog
 The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975,
when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys
with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually.
 Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites
 asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies
 Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr.
Tautjo
 the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten
by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death
 The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not
acceptable.
 Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be
lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also
contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not
speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the
alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
TORTS
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. vs. CA GR NUMBER 110295
DATE: October 18, 1993
PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Lydia Geronimo (private respondent) was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan
City; an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods for the
students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public.
August 1989—Some parents and students complained that the Coke and Sprite softdrinks contained fiver-
like matter and other foreign substances or particles. She then went over her stock of softdrinks and
discovered the presence of the same foreign substance in the unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in
the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle.
She brought the bottles to the Regional Health Office of the DOH at San Fernando, La Union, for
examination; subsequently, she received a letter from the DOH informing that the samples she submitted
“are adultered”; as a consequence, her sales severely dropped from 10 cases/day to 2-3 cases resulting to a
loss of P200.00-P300.00/day.
December 1989—She had to lose shop because of the losses. She became jobless and destitute; she
demanded from petitioner payment of damages but was rebuffed by it.
May 1990—Lydia filed a complaint for damages against petitioner (5K actual damages; 72K as
compensatory damages; 500K moral damages; 10k exemplary damages)
CONTENTION OF PETITIONER: failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription since the
complaint is for breach of warranty under ARTICLE 1561
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT: the complaint is one for damages which does not involve an
administrative action; the basis being on an injury to plaintiff’s right which can be brought within 4 years
pursuant to ARTICLE 1146
Trial Court: Motion to Dismiss GRANTED. Exhaustion does not apply. The complaint is based on a
contract, not quasi-delict. On the basis of Art 1571 in re Art 1562, the complaint should’ve been filed within
6 months from the delivery of the thing sold
CA: Ruled in favor of RESPONDENT, the complaint being one for quasi-delict not breach of warranty.
See Footnotes: Singson v. Court of Appeals || Air France vs. Carrascoso || Guarino v. Mine Safety
Appliance Co.
ISSUE/S
W/N The action for damages should be treated breach of warranty (prescription: 6 mos) or quasi-delict (4
yrs)
RULING
Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual obligations.
The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore,
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in
the complaint.
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of or
encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code. The
vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the
ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from
fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility
arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the
courts, according to the circumstances. Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of
their obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action
based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the
parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be
deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.
FOOTNOTES
CA’s RATIONALE:
Singson v. Court of Appeals, Air France vs. Carrascoso : the Supreme Court ruled: It has been repeatedly
held: that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.
Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co (AMERICAN JURIS): the authorities are one in saying that he
availability of an action or breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods
SC FOOTNOTES:
ARTICLE 1567: In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect between
withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages either
case.
The first remedy is known as the redhibitory action and the second, the accion quanti minoris.
(TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V,
1992 ed., 123).
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on
negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Quasi-
delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa
aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the
common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

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TORTS

SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL G.R. No. L-3756

Against this judgment this appeal has been interposed.

Santa’s Barbies 18-19

Santa’s Barbies 18-19

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the

TORTS QUASI-DELICTS; Concepts and Requisites

The motion to dismiss was based on:

• CFI: Motion to dismiss was denied. o Motion for

Santa’s Barbies 18-19

633,595.50 actual damages

moral damages DELETED

The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P1,346,197.00 and an interest of

3) With cost against defendants.

For the Third-Party Complaint:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

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We cannot sustain the trial courts conclusion.

RESPONDENT referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin) to PETITIONER for a

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WHETHER OR NOT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE SPOUSES VALLEJERA IS FOUNDED ON

STUDY CRIMPRO REGARDING BAIL

TORTS QUASI DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM A BREACH OF CONTRACT

The remedy serves to preserve:

SALUDAGA vs. G.R. No. 179337

JOSEPH SALUDAGA FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO

WON FEU is liable for damages for breach of contract.

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Whether or not Purita is the possessor of the dog.

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