CHAPTER 3

The Behavioral
Data Language
~ ~-1 ...... . .

'ir:;;:-; ; ... .

~-f~ll~Iectin.g
~:lt: a dom.ain for psychology, behaviorism distinguishes between behavior and
Jf.;~fology. A prior1 attempts to drnw this disti11ction having failed, an empÍ1'ical or
-th~p'°retical definition of behavio1' eme1'ging .from a science of behavior is probably the
:'Jf~1i'. usefúl. The distinction is important for molar behaviorisni which a1'gues, mostly
:i~.flactical groun.ds, for an auton.omous science of behavior indcpe11dent_ of physiology.
·'i%ffo1' a science of behavior to develop, observation must genera te descriptive reports,
! :lt{fed in the c~tego_ries. of language and perception. . So~u epistemologists con.elude
1 -f'nq't··'all obse1-11atron rs d1ctated by theory. Neve1·theless, tf seems that the dcgree to

f. ·fb.1fch
1 .,...,,¡. ·an obse1'vation is contaminated by theor11 varies, depending on. the obsert/ation.
r ~ IT/Afrhis continuum between the purely observational and the purely inferential, ínter-
, ., ;;:'.·.. t J
1
;iffii/c.t ive ag_reerr:ent can_ be_ used as a cotivenient measure, with objectivity increasin.g
·~$lf!_:increasing intersubJectrve agreement.
-!~f fr constructing a behavioral data lan.guage, some belzaviorists irzsist that only phys-
'/fff.{}escriptíons be used_ However, this i11.siste11ce is not on.l)' imp,·actical; it is also
' !f~d 011 false intuitions about the 011.tological superiority of physical propertics. Psy-
t~i/ogy must be free to use properties it fin.ds ejfective as long as they are intersubjec-
Hf~-Zy ídentifiable .
1r~ost behavíorists prefer to exclude Jrom the behavioral data language any desc1'ip-
·!i~-~~ e~pressed in: .actíon_ language, tl~e inten.si~n.al mode, purposive ternu, or ntolar
, t~;fgones . In practice: thi~ preference .'s afien v10lated. The reasons both for the pref-
; , ~~~!-~tes and J~r tite vwlations are vaned, and they farther clarify beltaviorist notions
( :tí{ i,_i!1pir~calness an~ _objectivi~y . .
! ir~nctwnal º!
de..(intt1ons stzmulus and respotts: are ~en ved ..·.fi-o,n empírica[ findings,
· n'.·M{Y. afien specify prope1 tres that are psycholog1cal-1. e., derived fi·o111 psychological
'B·;JCneriments
.:rt,.i;. . . and not used by ti1e o·tite1· sczences
· . D espite
· appearances to the contrary,
alfonctional approach · t ·, [ , ,d · · ·
.·1~,f~ . , ª',
tS no cu cu 1101 oes tt conta1n111ate the behatJioral data lan-
f '.-~age w,th theory.
....
·' , '
'

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 ,¡r. ·

,/
,,.,,, -jQ
THE BEHA VIORAL DATA LAN
GUAGE

Having rejected introspection b h . . . . . '.

natural world. Th ~ e avio1:sm 1S restncted to observattons of tij
gram is the sel t' e ~xt ffia..Jor node ln the behaviorist conceptual tree d[a
all beh . . ec ton rom that world of a do'main for psychology. Althoug'. ·
aviohn sts agree that behavior is the dornain of psychology they di~.
agree on w at const't t b h . . . . ' . .·
the branch . 1 u es <! ~v1or, and their vanous not:lons of behav1or fo1
es leading from th1s second node. . r3
Once ad · 15
· d .:
f omain efined, the next majar nade forms around the quest10J
0
how obse~vations of this domain are to be reported, since obs.ervationi
alo~e _are an inadequate basis for a science. They must be described, and d~~
· a 1anguage. Behaviorists insist that the descnpt1ve
scnpt10 n s require · · 1anguag,.
of psychology must meet their standards of objectivity and empiricalness, a ·'. t
th ey propase various methods to ensure this. 1 These proposals constitute tij)
branches arising from the third major nade. This chapter will ex_ami_ne an~
evaluate these various behaviorist conceptions of behavior and sc1ent1fic de~
scription. t;
·i
BEHA VIOR AND PHYSIOLOGJ '.
The Behavioral Superfi~( ·
\ij .
In defining behavior as the domain of psychology, a serious problem aris-~
in distinguishing between behavior and physio~ogical events. Despite numej .
ous behaviorist attempts to define this boundary, or "behavioral superfice.~
in Bentley's phrase, 2 it remains elusive. E ven the distinction betweeri what ·!3; .
inside the body and what is outside is not helpful, far the skin is not an in{¡ .
portant border in defining the behaviorál superfice. As discussed in the nexi
chapter, behaviorists commonly speak of "covert" behavior, "neural r~
sponses," and ·"private stimuli." Although located inside the body, these even ~
are included within the domain of behavior. Similarly, the popular behavior~
ist definition of behavior in terms of "muscle contraction and glandular s~f:
cretion" refers to events normally inside the body. Attempts to differentiatÍ
psychology as the study of the organism as a whole in contrast to physiologÍ,:
as the study of parts of the organism also fail because psychologists often study ·
isolated responses (e.g., the eye blink) and physiologists frequently investiE
gate systems (e.g . , reproduction) that involve large-scale and coordinated
mechanisms. 3 ,

A priori definitions of this sort are inevitably inadequate because they at;
tempt to carve out a scientific dorhain befare it is known which phenomen ;·
are usefully investigated by a particular methodology, relewant to a parl
ticular scientific interest, or covered by a particular scientific theory. A more
promising approach is to propase a posterlori definitions dependent on actuai
developments within a science of behavior. Such definitions change along with
the science. .-

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 BEHA VIOR AND PHYSIOLOGY 31
,,
,l
1: •
'Jy behavionst experiments concentrated on b~haviors, such as maze
·_· g, eye blinks, and lever pressing, which on the basis of antecedent re-
:,_ h seemed to be good p'r ospects for further investigation. These proto-
.· J~:!f~ t~,~xperiments comprise initial paradigms for the domain of behaviorist
., í~:''-.e 1 and they constitute a primitive definition of "behavior." With ad-
7. '. ~s.in behavioral research, laws are discovered which govern not only the
t. ~:? ~igm beha viors but a wider range of phenomena as well. This range then
'.'· · , ,}mines a scientific domain, with "behavior" defined as whatever con-
{ .', ~:to these laws. 4 Thus emerges an empirical definition of the behaviorist
:/'. .").!":··: Jn. At a more advanced stage, laws are organiz-ed by comprehensive
( ,. ological theories, and the terms of the science are extended to whatever
.=\~,.;,,):>.mena are covered by a theory. 5 Conceivably, this theoretical definition
· ,JP,i.'.'.~ behavioral domain may even exclude phenomena initially thought to
·. . .,~--_:-~radigmatic behavior. Thus, the domain of the behavioral
:~-~ :. ; .
science, and ·
.j~~i?.i stinction between the behavioral and the physiological in particular, cannot
,r?t .}~cisely defined a priori but rathei:: must evolve in a dialectic within the
. . 'c e itself. ..

·~\¡_~;:!;\.t. .
Molar Behaviorism
·:; ; tan behaviorists wis~ t? exclude physiological events from t_he. ~o~ain of
rm!.t ~hology . To the maJOnty who do, however, a comn1.on obJeCtlOn lS that
:j J}g a restricted domain is not scientifically legitimate. lt is often argued that
·ii(J avior is just an outward manifestation of biological events occurring within
-fgj~:,:prganism and that behavior is in reality just a subdomain of a neurophy-
-s.~Jogical science. 6
j~~haviorists who reject this criticism argue that an autonomous science of

r,~
,h iljavior independent of physiology is not only possible but also desirable. 7

.=J,;11,
~os~tion, known as "molar_ behaviorism,,, can be interpreted as both a
~~:s.cnpt1on about
.
what the subJect matter of psychology should be and an
~j:p.irical hypothesis about the outcome of the proposed program. As the lat-
if/,mol ehaviorism hy othesi awfulness can be found at the be-
-t1iy.ioral lev eal to physiolo ical events inside t e o y.
~f., such lawfulness a mo.lar behaviorist science would not be oss1 e.
¼,i; ~-s a prescr~ptl?n, .~o ar e a v1ons_m asserts a so that ~n autonom~us sci-
epee of behav1or 1s desirable. Such cla1ms rest on assumpt1ons concern1ng the
-#~(poses and goals of'science. 8 Within the behaviorist family, the commonly
líl~-~ed belief is that the goals of scientific psychology are the prediction and
-~ P:.trol_of behavior, as ~entioned _in chapter 1. If the hypothe~is that lawful-
1Ji~ ex1sts at the behav1oral le:el 1s confirme_d, then th~s~ tw1n goals are at-
'.~i!N,a ble by an autonomous sc1ence of behav1or. Descnpt1ons of the current
~y~ronment in conjunction with laws stating how behavior is a function of
:flt~?environment yield predictions of behavior. Conversely, behavioral laws
J.
.-~
..-
¡ ,1r, .

. . ¡:~:~.¡~
1
·.. _·:,;:: .
-··'.:· <
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32 THE BEHAVIORAL DATA LANGUAGE
· t be changed in order ·t.á . ,
. h
may b e use d to d etennme ow t e en h v1· ronment n1us
¿· . the control o f be, '
modify behavior in a desired direction, thereby me iaung -',
havior. · f :~1 ·
. . . . . . d that inclus1on o reports;
In oppos1t1on to molar behav1onsm 1t 1s argue . . d ..-.~!
. . , · pred1ct1on an con. ·.
about phys1ology 1n psychology s data .base can 1mprove . . ,:,.J. ,
. .
trol. Knowledge of the phys1olog1cal causes o f b h ·
e av1or might
. 1ncrease tifo
/
pre~ision of prediction, a~d direct physiological _n1anipulat1on, ra b~~/~~_ t p1 .'.:
envir~nmental _cha_nge, 1:111~ht be the m_ost effect1ve met?o~ for mothay~i,}
behav1or. In reJect1ng th1s hne of reason1ng, molar behav~onsts note . t,_}
fact, present knowledge of physiology is insufficient for e1ther the predictio;~ •.
or control of behavior. In contrast, currently available behavioral ·laws hav;r : ·
already proven useful for these purposes. Second, they argue _that lawf~111:e~¡ ·
cannot be created by knowledge of the physiological mechan1sms mediatm~~
that lawfulness . Lawfulness between behavior and the environment either exi
ists or it does not, and lawfulness in the intermediate steps does not chang~~
that fact. 9 Third, even if knowledge of physiology improved prediction an~}
control of behavior, in practice, the relevant physiological events are usuallfi
inaccessible. It is norm.ally far simpler to observe or manipulate the envirori~ .
ment in order to predict or control behavior than to observe or modify even~
in the nervous system., especially when large numbers of people are affectd,'; ·
'l .
by the same environ1nent. 10 ~i .
Besides these practica} arguments, a distrust of the role of physiology id/: :
psychology also undedies behaviorist support for molar behaviorism. Manl · .
behaviqrists_ fear that a concern with physiology tends to divert attention awaft
from ~ehavior, the 1najor interest of psychology, and ª"':"ªY from the envii
ronmeüt, the ultima.te cause of behavior. 11 S0n1e behaviorists also see the threatf
of min~-body dualism lurking in physiological psychology. 12 They argue thaJ
physio~ogical psychology often finds a proxÍlnate ·cause for events of interes{
but th~n leaves this proximate cause unexplained, giving the impression tha(
it is br;ought about by an agent or act of will hidden in the recesses of th~
central ¡nervous system. In contrast, a molar science of behavior, by showin{ .·
that belpavior
.
is caused by the environment, excludes unscientific causes ot1
this SOlit. ·r
The ~r_gu~1ents s~1pporting mo~ar behaviori~m clearly show that i~s choi~~:· ·
of beháv1or 1n relat1on to the environment as 1ts sale data must be v1ewed m:
part as i a tac ti cal decision. It is based on an assess1nent of what course of ac-·
tion sh~ws th_e 1no~t pronlÍse ~or athieving the scientific prediction and con~
trol ofl1 behav1or, g1ven our present state of knowledge. As our knowledgé..
grows ¡with. the development. of the two sciences~ it is possi~le that this as-0 :
sessment w1ll change. 13 In th1s respect the exclus10n .of phys1ological obser~·
vationsl from the mola.r behavioris.t data base contrasts with the exclusion oe
introspbctive observations . The rejection of the latter, as discussed in the pre;\
ceding ~hapter, is in sorne cases based on episte1n6logical considerations rathei
1

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 ,. ~

FROM STIMULATION TO RE ~

.:{ . ll relative to the contempo-

?,tactical ones, and is therefore not 1n a case 5
' tate of scientific knowledge. . d · ·l ti·o 1shi·p to.
..'.~ estncttng
. . . h 1 b
the don1a1n of psyc o ogy to e_ ªh v1or an its h a· l
re I~' froin''
·_; vironn1ent, molar behavioris111 does not entirely exclude P .ysio o_gyl .
1
-:<l:ience of behavior. For one thing, physiology may play a theorehucah ro e.
'' · · t d t at ypo-
·.: n.~:-discussed in the n~xt chapt~r, ~any behav1onsts con e°: in a
-~~t ifical constructs denot1ng phys1olog1cal processes must be incl_uded
· ·5fu .¡¡¡~~ological theory intended to organize and explain molar beh~vioral l_aws.
~pd, sorne behaviorísts who support an autonomous behav1oral science
:~rtheless propase that this science will eventually be reduced to a niore
., l amen tal science of physiology .14 This will occur when the postula tes of
'} .. ~_rnpleted science of behavior are den1onstrated to be the theorems of the
,~{fii,~,cing science. Prornoting a reduction of this sort is congruent with be-
:'.t ittiorist aspirations toward the unity of science. It also supports the case for
¡-~i~Jar. behaviorisrn since the reduction is possible only after the n10Iar behav-
' -,iqti~ séience is con1.pleted. 15 Third, a behaviorist may use physiological find-
l ,~¡¡1,.-~.and theory as heuristics for suggesting hypotheses concerning beha vior.
1 -i'[~s -heuristic function usually proves reciproca!, since behavioral laws and
1 • ·~:i:f.1. Q~__·ry may prove equally useful for guiding physiological research. 16

r
<
:~.
FROM SENSORY STIMULATION TO SCIENTIFIC REPORT
, finitions of behavior demarcate a scientific do1nain; they do not create a
\ , :a: .l :base. The latter is reserved fÓr the human scientist in interaction with
)tfd)natural wodd. Characterizing this interaction is. an epistemological prob-
i{;ff.not yet satisfactorily resolved. Obviously the 111.ere arrival at a sensory
:.:'.!.·~~~ptor of energy from an object is only a necessary but not a sufficient con-
~· -"ion for a scientific empirical observation.
J!fh analyzing the concept of observation, the behaviorist science has the ad-
\~~tage that the process of observation falls within its dom.ain. Not only does
· .:/26Hse·r vation pro vide a data base for psychology, it is itself also a subject for
~]l¼~stigation by that science. 17 According to many behaviorists, observation
}tti··
." ., ~t-: ,:
kind of behavior. Although no 1novements are necessarily associated with
:,1~>tct of observation, it still falls within the rubric of "behavior" under son1.e
_:¡ID,pirical or theoretical definitions . 18 Sorne behaviorists, Í?r exa1nple, sug-
-:1.i t st that observation is a learned skill, acquired by the san1e principies as are
:jffffíer
· ··r.11.·, ·.
forrris of complex behavior. 19 Others 1naintain that observation in-
~~füves a covert perceptual response governed by the same laws that describe
'ilff! ·,. 20
i10,5;:frt behavior.
"f·if"···
·~s;!~tt'he occurrence of an observation does not in itself contribute to the data
;~\~.e. First the observation must be transformed into a data report, and it is
·~tlp:~ report, in s_o me linguistic form, that enters the data base. To be sure, an
·.l ~ividual may acquire considerable knowledge through observation without
rr~r.::-:
•.1h1J,,i,,
·,~-",:;-.~
•ó-J :c,
···.u¡'} ..).. '
-~ 1<\. •
¡
· ! ! .. t;•, '

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 V

~~
b
,:!19' THE BEHA VIORAL DA TA LANGUAGE

ever verbalizing it H . . . . ·.;.

balizat· f · owever, for th1s knowledge to const1tute a sc1ence, ver~
ion o some for 15 . . . . . h r:,
ized b b m necessary. Sc1ence 1s a social enterpnse c aracter~
Y ver al statements of laws and theories. 21 .. -:;'
Just as an obs · . ·. .1
· l . ervation cannot be defined s1mply as a react1on to sensor~1
st1mu at1on , so a report cannot be defined as a vocal reaction · to st1mu · 1at10~
· :t ·
~ven th0 ~gh that vocal reaction imparts knowledge about that stimulatio~;~
. he n:-elting of an ice cube is not a rep_o rt about the temperature, nor is a~
infant s _cry a report of its discomfort although in both cases there is a reliabÍ!¡-
correlation between an event and its known cause. These events may, how{;
· ¿·1cants, or mea:mring instruments, far sorne uno b serve~
ever , fu ne t"ion as 1n Jf,
cause. Whether or not they are indicants and instruments depends on whethe~t
someone uses them for these purposes. Thus, something is an indicant or in~;
st ru°?'ent, in addition to being a mere series of causally related events, d~j
pend1ng on its role in human activity. J
A verbal response is a report, in· addition to being a mere indicant when i_~
plays a rather more complicated role in human social interactions. 22 Bot~ .
speaker and listener are part of a language community whose members com_j ·
municate in a number of ways, one of which is reporting. Skinner's theorj'.;
of verbal behavior suggests one way to conceptualize these social interaéi
tions. He theorizes that the verbal_ community shapes and reinforces verb~Jf .
reports (i.e., "tacts") because these reports reinforce members of the verbaJi
community by extending their contact with the environment. 23 As discussef:
in chapter 7, contingencies of reinforcen1ent are used by some behaviorists'.:.
for a behavioral interpretatiori of purpose. Theref~re, in contrast to reflexiv~·:
cries and melting ice cubes, true reports may be said to be verbal responses·
which occur for the purpose of imparting knowledge. 4-
~
•i
Categori~~\
It would appear, prima facie 1 that the objectivity of an observational report.
can be determined in a fairly straightforward manner. lt should depend sim/ ·
ply on how closely the report corresponds to what is observed. But meas..
uring this correspondence requires a· comparison between a report and the.
world reported about. This conception, however, is misleading. Reports are.
in the form of statements, but the world is not propositionalized. Words and.
sentences cannot be compared with the universe to measure the degree of
correspondence. There are criteria f or assessing the degree of correspondence
between two descriptions but not between a description and the world. 24
Therefore, objectivity must be determined by comparisons among descrip.:.
tions rather tha·n between a description and the world.
Verbal descriptions capture the world by classifying stimulation from the
world into the categories of language. A language with a different word for
each and every s_timulation would neither communi_cate usefully nor could it

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 '
i;;, FROM STIMULATION TO REPORT 35
.:\ ~\,~~(-;!,/···.
[·~r~tj~rned._ ~atural languages note recurrences of stimulation by using the
·s.~ ·_,;:idescnpt1ons to report them. In one sense, howev-e r, stimulation never
fj~iff$. One stimulation is never strictly identical to another if for no reason
Jii~~>than that they differ in either temporal or spatial location. Therefore,
l_~g_i,iage categories carr identit cri ·a hat indica te which ro erties to note
.:->·.';,~ 1c to ignore in classif in two stimulations in the same cate ory as a
J.i.iJ:W:·-_. ce. ·ese cnteria are human prod~cts, either as deliberate c:eations
~l~~t·the results of natural human tendenc1es to transfer and generahze pre-
9,f~~~::,learning . .S:onsequently, there is no unique description or set of de-
. )i0ns inherent in nature. Tfie un1verse can be classifíed in an infinite number •
~i~a..ys, none o which is the only true one_- The choice o a e ass1 1~at1on
$~t-~ ~lll .1s a human choice and therefore subJect to human goals and 1nter-
. ·;,.-:-..,•-:is ·
~c;:ts~l~. :: · .
":f,,:.·~t,}•, I'"
··-i (fas not only observational reports that are dependent on a system of cat-
. e"ti1~]ies; so are the observations then1selves. What a stimulation .- is perceived
: a·srj.'{a.; fpends heavily on the observer's previous experience. This previous ex-
; p~j e?ce, as summarized by perceptual variables such as set, expectation, and
f oi§-W.:Ory, has been arnply experimentally demonstrated to influence percep-

! Q~;Ó,}-even in the apparently simple case of signa! detection. Thus, observa-

¡ ciW.Áio'as well as observational reports are conceptual in nature, and the belief
; 4ité~bservational purity, unaffected by the perceiver's contribution, is a false
t 'l"ííl ,.,
1
t ~-~f~·
,.-"}<,, -..,. ..

¡ ;-~;¡;:~
: · Observation Versus Theory
¡ ;~~;;~!
j -~ hough observations and observational reports are relative to a set of -con-
: c4i,fs.,. t~is <loes ~ot i_n i~self_undermine the behaviorist search ~or empirical
object1v1ty. The 1mphcat1on 1s that more than one set of observat1onal reports
d~i:accurately describe a scientific subject matter, but given human flexibility
jq:i~reating and interchanging concepts, this fact should pose no problem.
()l'bs.ervations and observational reports can still be empirical and objective.
·._:4,1owever, sorne epistemologists cast doubt on this conclusion. They argue
t4i J; the concepts operating in everyday perception can be viewed as a prim-
idN.e theoretical systern. As science develops, this primitive system is gradu-
_.a_Ú,)t replaced by more formal scientific theory. Since the concepts of percep-
-~ojl .are thus supplied by theory, observation is, in a sense, dictated by theory.
~h~refore, there are no theory-independent facts by which to test a theory.
Sfuée all observation is theory-laden, a comprehensive theory, or world view,
c~n.not be- overthrown by disconfirming observations. In particular, there is
r{qi~rational way to decide between two rival theories, since each determines
or;l-ly observations compatible with itself, and there are no neutral facts by

l
26
1 wlíich to evaluate the competing claims.

,r is thesis denying the distinction between the theoretical and the obser-

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36 THE BEHAVIORAL DATA LANGUAGE

vational seen1.s to doom behaviorist attempts to establish a science which-j tJ

both objective and empirical. The thesis implies on the 011.e hand that no d:, . ~
tum is purely empirical, since all observation is contaminated by theory, a.·-: a
on the other hand that no data-gathering n1ethod is objective, since all obs~l
vations are dependent on the particular theoretical views of the observer. ·;~ ~
For the most part, behaviorists ignore the thesis and continue to collect a;~. t
they consider objective and en1.pirical. Those who do acknowledge the thJt · ~
~ften a~gue that it is exaggerated. Although theory may ~nfl1:1ence observ!.:
t1011., th1s effect, they claim, can be overcome by careful sc1ent1fic methods~ ·t
Two rival theorists, for example, can agree as to whether a rat turned rig'.;·
or left without letting their competing theories dictate their observations.·i~ I
deed it is difficult to evaluate the thesis on this point. To de1nonstrate ,m. l
stances in which observation is theory-laden or that rival theories are inco~j J
mensurate it is necessary to use either theory-neutral facts, which the thé~Í1
·
d erues, or the theory-laden facts of yet another parad1gn1 · theory. 28 Mote
over, íf the thesis is itself a paradig1n theory, then it, too, will dictate obse;.
vations of scientific activity confirn1atory of itself. ,.~{ ,.
Although the arguments for the thesis are therefore not conclusive, its a~ . e
tithesis, nan1ely that there is a sharp and clear distinction between the obs(t, f
vational and the theoretical, is equally difficult to defend. Because perceptio1 - 5
and report are necessarily conceptual, observation cannot be entirely indepe~ . (
dent of knowledge and belíef. However, it should be possible to establish)' ~
continuurn based on the degree to which knowledge and belief contribute f .·¡
.
the data report. Surely there is a difference between the report "Smith rán· i
fi.ve nüles" and the report "Smith unconsciously atten1.pted to iinpress hii ~
friends with his running" as descriptions of the same event. Although ea~ i
report may involve inference and interpretation, clearly they are of a great~ 1
degree in the latter. ¡1.
No known metric fot precise measurement along this continuum currentlj
exists. However, in practice, many behaviorists tend, in effect, to use inter- .
subjective agreement as a convenient index. Descriptíons which command
universal assent fron1 observers can be regarded at one end of the continuum .
while those generating n1.uch disagreement are at the other. 29 Somewhere be-
tween the two extre1nes, a degree of disagreen1ent occurs at which point tht
description is said to be inferential, interpretive, or theoretical, rather than
observational. The location of this point rnust be imprecise because, as noted¡
intersubjective agreen1ent has never been precisely defined or measured. Nói ·
is there any consensus on the degree of intersubjec_tive agreement required fo¡
a description to qualify as an observation. N evertheless, the fact that there n
only an in1precise border on a continuum rather than two discontinuous sharplJ
defined classes does not imply that there is no distínction between observa·
tion and theory. No point sharply differentiates when day becomes night eithe1, .
yet the distinction between night and day is as clear as the difference betwecn
. h t an d d ay. 30
n1g ..

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 . -~;

i\f .. -/:
t:f • '~·
CRITERIA FOR THE DATA LAN~ul\'· cQ
Ci E

¡\)~g
)J!Jt porters of the thesis denying the distinction between theory , and obser-
might reply that in.tersubiective agreeni.ent is not a valid 1neasure of
0
:. fiir.vational purity süice it may J indicate merely the degree to w h"
- ~
.1ch Obs~rv-
¡ :ii~l~are the same theoretical paradigm. If this is the case, then ~nte~subJec-
1 tf~l~k··and behaviorist objectivity n 1ay in.deed be relative to the ~c1ent1~c p~r-
:r~r~ shared by behaviorists. Only within this paradig1n can intersubJective
iitt~Wtnent be used to distinguish the objective and empirical observatio°: from
¡ 4.e~\~ubjective and inferential interpretation. However, because evaluat1on of
¡ ·c~g!hesis is so difficult this relativity need not necessarily be conceded. On
l tn;t~t!her hand, if the _thesi~ is true, then the relativity of objectivity a~1.d .em-
1 P.~~~í f;ln_ess _to ª para~1gm 1s still not particularly damaging to be~av1onsm.
! ~~\A~1:v1ty IS necessanly true, according to the thesis, for all of sc1ence, not
¡\ j?. ~hl,f.:i; .:
1
i!t~sychology, and the science of behavior can proceed as norn1al science.
f :i(~~i,:.: .
¡! '.fif~)
:,i/1\i ,..
CRITERIA FOR THE BEHAVIORAL DATA LANGUAGE
f~g(_p roblem therefore confronting the behaviorist is to characterize the k ind
¡ ~Jt~¡J°orts ~hich opt~1ni~~ b?t~ intersubjective agreement and scientific use-
! f4W~ss. Th1s latter cntenon IS 1n1portant because, as shown below, those de-
[ sfj~hons wi~h maxiinum inte~su_bje_ctive agreement are too narrow t_o be of
1 1;¡:f~J:;to the sc1ence. Therefore, 1t 1s hkely that the characterization of accept-

¡ ~91~: data reports will change a.s the science develops and notions of usefulness
~~,~ge. The ?ody of acc_el:'table data reports constitute~ t~e data. base of the
·¡·

¡ s~~~pce and, 1n charactenz1ng these reports, the behav1onst may be said to

1 ~~e a "behavioral data language." This latter phrase is used rather than the
!iÜ~ff common '_'o~ser:ational language" in ~rder not to suggest that it is based 1:1
, 0ffe¼.~':1tlear-cut d1stinction between observat1on and theory. //
1 ·,:; ·- ~· ,
! . ,....

:~/:~t- Physical Description

::J!«J~e-
~
.. '-l.J.1,·r.~,, ~··
.~g!:-l":11.- 1

way behaviorists define the behavioral data language is to restrict it to

lt(cal descriptions of behavior and th~ environment. "Phys~ca~ descrip-
. t'i[ff/' however, can mean a number of thtngs. lt can n1ean descnpt1011s men-
.~{9jpng only those pr~1ic;;,~-~-~-~-~ed by the h sical sciences . In this case, re-
. ~pJ&fises could be descnbed as movements of bo ily parts from one set of
. q~*lf.t9inates in space to another. Similarly, stimuli could be described in terms
· ~f,~ easurements of energy either arrivin.g at the sensory receptor (the 4 'prox-
. ~fi,i" stimulus") or actually stimulating activity in a receptor (the "effective
· s~(tülus "). 31
,: · },:~omewhat broader definition of "physical description" includes not only
: tJ 1,;,;;p:rop~rti~sical scíence ~u~~_na!_prop~~s defi~1ed in tenns
: q f'·µe former. 3 Relational propert1es create no probleiñs l5ecause, m one sense,
f :~ ?hysical properties are relational. When an object is described as "7 cen-
1

1 t.~ t.ters," its length is being specified relative to a standard unit of length.

¡. 'il~\fo··t.,:'r;
.'lir,~1¡:
,!i.l
•
! ..•.. ...•,
~i~·

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 ~..,
')
~8 THE BEHAVIORAL DATA LANGUAGE
;·
The "decibel" · f . . . ....
. . as a unit o . sound 1ntens1ty 1s a good example because i(
1
ex~ icitly ~efined as a ratio. Moreover, which properties are considerel~
l at1onal 1s 1t If 1 · . ·.·
. . se re at1ve to what 1s taken as basic or absolute. For exampl~;
dens~ty Is. assumed as an absolute property then mass can be regarded :(
relat1onsh1p between density and volume. Thus, relational properties defi~'..
b_y psychology are just as "physical" as those used in physics. This conq·t
s~on, however, has no bearing on the question of whether relational prop;
tie~ a~tually function as discrimmatj_~e sti!nuJ¿~g_~nͧffiS, 33 The presi,
point IS only that descriptions of relational properties, such as ''being the lar;:.
of two squares," seem to be suitable candidates for the behavioral data . f"
guage.

Objection 1: It is Impractical. Although a number of behaviorists pay 1{ ·

service to the ideal of a data language consisting ·solely of physical desc1
ti?ns of this sort, in fact, no behaviorist has ever carried out this progra~/
F1rst, the complexity of describing even the sin:iplest response (e. g., a s J
in this way is overwhelming. Second, the technological problems in con ·..
ually measuring all the energies at sensory receptors appear practically in~µ,
mountable. Moreover, to determine the energy arriving at a recessed req».
tor like the retina or the energy effectively stimulating a receptor requ¼:;1
~ observat~on inside t~e body. 35 !hus,. a beh~vioral data la_nguage restricted~
"'-. ) the predica tes used 1n the phys1cal sc1ences 1s of no practica! value. .•
. One partial solution is to relax the requirement for descriptions of stilllq
at the receptor and allow descr~p!~.9.µs _
.qf obj<;_~~s...in....!be environment (i.e., ..,,
"distal" or "potential" stímulÜs) without concern for how their energies i'~
pinge on the sensory receptor. 36 This waiver helps somewhat, but the prq"ffi
lem is not solved entirely. Many distal stimuli are also extremely difficul(.
describe with the properties of physics. For exan1ple, many behaviors (e:g11
• • • • ~ ~:i:
smiling) are distal st1m~h for other nearby organ1sms. If they cannot j
physically described as responses, they also cannot be physically describedt·.
stimuli.
'
Objection 2: Objective ~ Physical. Despite the impracticality of restrict''.:i
the behavioral data language to the predicates of the physical sciences, so·
behaviorists still insist that the language of the physical sciences is the ide
for psychology. They feel that the propertit;s discovered by the other natuJ
\ sci~nces ar~ the mos_t fundam~ntal an,~ o_bjecti~; descriptions of nature. Th~
cla1m that 1n report1ng an obJect as 3 1nches a more objective descriptiq6
is given than when it is reported as a "wide smile." Objects or events ti
ported by the latter description differ in a variety of ways, and the attribut~ºl
of the description seems to be primarily a matter of human subjective jud)
ment. The property "3 inches," however, appears to be an objective ·pro~
erty of a class of objects all of which shard an absolutely iden,tical feature, 11~
,¡·

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 1

CRITERIA FOR THE DATA LANGUAGE 39

·~_:f. to human judgment. This line of reasoning is congruent with the tra-
:;l theory of identical elements which maintains that objects are similar
i_,classified together because they possess identical elements in com-
¡3,.7,,Thus, sorne behaviorists contend, the properties of physics denote /
·-:¡nena sharing inherent identical elements of nature while other classi- ·--i
~;y ·schemes rely on subjective judgments. l
.'.~':' fallacy of this line of reasoning becomes apparent when one questions
~í; ture of the element that all three-inch objects have in common. 38 Of
·:i ·they share the property "3 inches," but by the same token, all wide
~tshare the property "wide smile." True, wide s1niles differ from one to
'J \r, but so do three-inch objects. Consider a three-inch-deep pond, a
; J,i):ch distance between two points in a vacuum, and a sphere with
·~:::-inch circumference. A possible reply might be that the element all these
'.'.Jl.nch objects have in common is that they yield identical results when
.ffc-al measuring óperations are applied to them. However, in what sense
\ :\ e: .measuring operations or the results "identical"? Consider how one
"·res the depth of a pond in comparison to how one measures the cir-
,_.~rence of a sphere. Measurement of objects by use of a measuring rod,
. _l'',;:a:i:nple, involves a variety of movements, depending on the size, shape,
~ .
-·aóon, and composition of the object, among other factors . In what way
J:.;these measuring activities "identical"?
;;;.~. the basic property of number presents similar problems. Three days,
\.tables, three sentences, and three theories are all identical in number,
...'Ów are the counting procedures the "same'' in each case? Similar ques-
'¾~:a:rise concerning the results of the operations. If the scientist orally re-
<\ the result by saying "Three inches," is this the identical result as the
:h record "three inches" or "3 in." or someone else saying "Three inches"
·~-:different voice? There is a further complication: an operation.is a mea-
·ent only under the proper conditions. Extreme temperatures, the pres-
.,p f magnetic fields, electrical disturbances, etc. may disqualify the oper-
:,';¡,from constituting a n1.easurement. Because there are an indefinite number
·ys in which conditions are not proper, it is not possible to state explic--
)1 t:he operations necessary for a n1.easurement, nor are the operations
:.sary to create standard conditions the same in every case.
{iseems clear fro'm these considerations that th~ operations by which ob-
\ are known to have a physical property, even one as basic as "3 inches,"
"f\a class of operations sharing no common element other than they are
i;h ring operations ·properly carried out. The rules for class membership
i1~._,'t be explicated and depend ultimately on human judgment. lt follows
·b ere is no "identical" measuring operation or result to serve as the iden-
1·:.Jement shared by ~11 three-inch objects. The only identical element for
· ee-inch objects is that they are three inches, just as being a wide smile
,.: : identical element for all wide smiles. Just as humans develop tacit
..

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 40 THE BEHAVIORAL DATA LANGUAGE

knowledge as to when an act1v1ty is a proper n1easuring operation, !'

¡
learn to recognize when facial 1novements are wide smiles. . . J.
The above considera.tions refute the views of thqse behavion st5 who e~
tend that the properties used in physics are inherent in nature ª nd th eref~
objective. As argued earlier, there are ~man y cla.ssificatory sy 5t e 1ns for e~,
gorizing the world, and those of the natural sciences are only ~ sm~ll s~b~
The properties attributed to nature are always relative to identity cnt~na·~.
ated by hu111ans. Criteria for all properties, including those of physics, ;~
pend ultimately 011 hun1an pattern recognition. 39 In no sense does one ~ar~
ular set of properties, rather than another, d escn·b e nature " ª s it really 1s ·:t,u
:·;

An Alternatfoe: Intersubjective Agreemettt. Not all properties are _e qually usf ,

f~r science, however, since not all properties a:..~ ~~qually ~~?gn1_zab!:. ?r s¡j ·
c1fiable . S01ne properties are poorly defmea, ano- tra1111ng nrclrscnn11nat :
then1 cannot be highly successful. Therefore, intersubjective agreement~. '
identifying then1 is. notgrear,-and their usefulness for science is minimal. T:l( ·
instead of attributm~bjecti~i:tY::..t o _only___those properties ~hought to
herent in nature, a ~ p.ragniatic criter n can be subst1tuted. Pred1c~ .
~e·,t
can be j udged as -~b}ect~-~ ---~~_t-9___~~~~ha vi oral_d~t~_la~et_·. ·
t ~basis of' tliectegree of intersubjective agreement they ach1eve . The pr()~
erties·useu-bycne phys1ca1 sc1encésareoften 1dent1Iiable Dy-simple point~
.
readings for which discrimination training can be rather precise. H-ence, ·tffi
-~
recognizability ofthese properties, as measured by intersub ·ective a reemel
is extre1nely high. 40 Yet, as argued above, a data languag<=t linlited to t ·~ff.
[15reChcates 1s -too narrow for · psycholo~y. ·- · .. _· ·-·· --·-·-·---- ,,~·

. -. - -·A--bel1Vi6i'al..scierrce·-nñfstíl1erefore make use of a broader range of pnj¡

erties, . inclu~ing t~os~ which achieve a high degree of intersubjective agrl.c

t
-j;;;.. 1nent ~~ their apphcat101~ but an~ n~t the standard prop_erties of the other.~;: .
ences. The degree of mtersubJective agree1nent requ1red for a predicatef: ·
qualify for. the be~aviora] d~ta _Ianguag~ is not a _settled que~tion. Nor are thl
rules for fon11ula~1~1g descnp~10ns wh1ch n1_e et such a quahfication. It appem .
that the . acceptab1hty of particular propert1es must be judged on a case-1:i,~
ca~e bas1s, at 1east ~or the present. In the final analysis, the objectivity oftffi
sc1ence depends ultm1ately on sound human scientific judgment in these dii
c1s10ns . .j
~
.1
An Initial Formulati~1
It is clear fro1n these considerations that the boundary of the behavioral
language is neither sharply defined nor permanent. Whether or not a re d\l
d~,
is an "objec~ive" d~s_cription and :Whether or rio~ it is "observat~onal" are r!qj
a matter of 1ts pos1t1on on a cont111uu111 than of 1ts possessiori ·0r certain all-d~
~---- ____
1

none features, and intersubjective agreen1ent proves to be -~~

")n impo t
r an t a (;
_,
···"'"-----·--~---··----.. ______________ . ..;.,.

/ l
~

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 ~
CRITERIA FOR THE DATA LANGUA.G
F.

\: continua. Beca use behaviorists differ as. to the exact . location of t~at
· it may be impossible to define a precise border without appeahng
.,·. ry, ·r
standards. Neverthele!S, a number o b e h av1onsts
. . suggest ru l es
}tr;~:ide a general cha,rá-~terization. A convenient reference point is the
;;\'.,?. 'delines advanc~y MacCorquodale
•1:gu1 ,
and Meehl (1954) whose for- .
'[bi1. is influential, r presentative, and instructive. 42 For the co.Qstructlon
ib language they suggest:
-:'f~ ;ith the complete stream of activity as it runs off in the time sequence, the
''«,, un~lassified JAux of behavior. Any arbitrary inter!!.J!l of the flux can be de-
faby time-points and exa1nined for the presence of certain properties. The op-
;1.i' specificatíon of a descriptive property of an interval permits the use of words
~g to the animal's visible anatomy, the descriptive words of the physical thing-
:gf; · and special words which we define explicitly in terms of these. Observa-
.·tences are formulated in these words, and must not involve even implicit ref-
~~ó · any other interval of the flux. . . .
.:\¡_'·'extensional
.
connectives such as "in order that . . . " . . . are clearly forbidden
~g beyond the descriptive properties of the interval. (pp. 220-221)
)frn1ulation is helpful in conceptualizing a nun1ber of issues related to {
:·\riposition of the behavioral data language. \ 1
\ ./
,,J··

Action Language
:- r these issues is whether descriptions of behavior as actions are perniit-
<the behavioral data lang'llage. The concept of an action is best eluci-
.{by examples distinguishing action language from action-neutral lan-
'/. Consider the difference between the description "The rat pressed the
. ·own" (action language) and "The movement of the rat's limbs caused
.··ction of the lever" (action-neutral language); or "The rat n1.oved its paw
t ,/A to B~' (a_ction) versus '_'The ra~'s paw mov_ed_ froi:n A to B" (act~on-
1.
¡:.·0
}) ..43 ~t 1s d1fficult to -spec1fy ~rec1sely :What d1st111gu~shes the
·cnpt1ons, but at least one d1fference 1s that the act1on descnpt1on 1m-
:w~ k1~ds

:ñ !íiii~-~~t the behavior is brought about by an a~en~. 44 Whe~eas the action

.-4.'-~J-p t1on says that the rat pro uce the e ectlon, the act1on-neutral de-
.;f!,ir~
.·:·'•": t,.,
.'"Jion lea ves open th e poss1"b"l"
11ty t h at th e rat ,s b o d y cause d t l1e d eflection
ing dropped onto the lever, or by undergoing a convulsion.
. '·:· ould seem that action language violates behaviorist canons for the ·be-
·_·..,_, ___;'r°al data language. First, it appears that action language breaches
f ·t l~mbrquodale and Meehl's stricture that observation sentences not involve
11
• ,_) cit reference to any other intervals of the flux." To detern1ine if a per-
s. .;, · ~J:bodily n1.ovement is an action rather than, say, a tic, muscle spasn1, o r
. ~,-';:t ~~~,oned reflex, it is often necessary ~º. know or in_fer something_ about tl~e
.·. , · · .n ance of that movement. In descnbmg a movement as an act1on, one 1s
· J "bre implicitly saying so1nething about the context of that movement. 45
r·
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~e:;-
')
'\z THE BEHAVIORAL DATA LANGUAGE
· ·,

?n the continuum discussed abov . .·':·~

1n the "interpretive,, e, ª:~~~~---1-~?guage thus seems to fall to .í·
..... --- ···- ·--·-·--·-·--·· .........._.._:t~-~. ge--...for. -....
movement as an a t.
behav1onst ......... ...c.- · - ·-·-cs-:-·--..r-·- --·-·:.r::·
. ..... . ·-···· comiort. ..:)econu, to uescn .
'/!,
. e ion Is to I h -·--- - ..
descnption of b h . ª~P Y t e conceptual scheme of agency to;.(·
As explai·ned . e havior, and this see1ns undesirable for a number of reasti'
in e apter 9 th f . . ..
tions, such h . ' e concept ·º the agent bears certa1n conn-o.
haviorist . as t efnotion of free will, which are contrary to fundamental:>
VIews o beha vior. 46 . :'t
N.evertheless
. l . • i ·
n pracuce, most behaviorists use action language almos(·.
·:
Clu SIVe Y 1n describ.
c.ri=-,--._______ 11:J:.S b e h av1or.
-=---d.
r-:- 'f7 _..._ __ ~ - : - -
Act1on-neutra1 aescnptions o ehav1or~
· ..
lt: lCUlt to b } ··- -· .,.
Th . ormu ate, and act1on language is therefore used for convenie.rl
,...
\.
- be ::e Is ª tradeoff b~tw~en observ~ti?nal purity and usefulnes~- Also, it.:i
' . gued that the entena for descnb1ng a movement as an act1on are ob~
tive ~n~ observable, and therefore, action language is merely a higher-oi96
descnption of what is observed. 48 Indeed, sorne have argued that these high°Í,
arder descriptions are so basic that normally we see behavior as actions rat.ij,
than as movements, and further interpretation is unnecessary. 49

/
lntensional Descripti~
Another issue that arises in the construction of a behavioral data languag~:
whether to include intensional language. Intensionality is a cóncept that '.§
been understood in many ways. 50 It may refe_~__to... tn:!~..~~~crip~ons of beh: .
ip~, ...which· -mention.. obj<:?.cts which do not necessa~ily _Exist. F~r example, i"l?
r~t searches for food" or "Th~ rat éxpects foo-~f· ~-~~ i?tensiona~ i~ this se~~ ·
stnce they may be true even 1f the food does not ex1st. Descnpttons of \]j'
sort are referentially opaque in that terms with identical reference cannot nt«;
essarily be substituted for one another. Por example, if Bill is Mary's fat ':,. ·
but Tom <loes not know this, then "Mary's father" cannot be substituted···
"Bill" in the sentence "Tom is expecting Bill to arrive." ¡;~
Intensional descriptions may include those which attribute a pfoposid;IJl
attitude to a person even though that person may have not emittea'arr~
Bal behavior. For example, "Tom hopes it will rain," attributes the P~-·
sifion"'TI-will rain·" to Tom although he may not have stated it explicitly. '
intensional descriptions may refer to descriptions of behavior and the en~1;
ronment in terms of their meaning for the subject rather than in terms indr
·pendent of the subject's pen;eptions and beliefs about the world. 51 1 j
With sorne notable exceptions, h,.~-~~vio~~~-ts. generallyJ_ej.ectint.~!?--~!~
52
guage f,o_:rjp..dµsior:i in ~l,i~J?el1.ªyiqral _g::i~.~_la1!g~~_g_e. For one thing, th.e w1
te;;:·s Í~nal mode of discourse is not used by any other science. Therefore, ~~

~¡ use of intensional language would undermin~ the behaviorist pursuit of t~

unity of sci_ence. Furthermore, if the i~te~sio . nal_ mode is not reducible ~o ~~
tensional d1scourse, then psychology IS irreducible to sorne more baste s~;
ence. 53 Second , intensional language entails ideas ¡antithetical . :to
. behavioti1~

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 'CRITERIA FOR THE DATA ·LANGUAGE 43
~{'
f: : Since the obiects of proposítional attitudes do not necessarily exist,
~;~ften said to .~'inexist" in the mind, as Brentano .expresses it. Simi- \ \\
~~n~~l descriptions of organisms imply. c o ; ; ~ s s . T~ s~y that
~ is "lic)píng," "believ~ng," or "expect1ng 1mphes that 1t 1s con-
) rhus , inteITTionality ~ I d inject mi~and consciou~ness where be-
r-· ,,-......_., , ........... .....___,,,,-.,
_,t . y to elüninate them. -------------· , .., ,_.,.
·:·t: ol::ijec 10n ~sionality in the data language is that it presup-
·:~:,b asic properties of behavior certain qualities which behaviorists pr~-
·.-..:~ plain rather than assume as given. 54 By taking "The rat searches for ·
:~:d" as a fundamental description of behavior, ·the ·intensional mode al-
:'..~sumes a kind of intelligence and adaptiveness that ought to be e~-
:.-.·by behavioral theories beginning with fewer presuppositions. Sím1-
,..;the process by which stimuli and responses acquire meaning for the
ir.o.r
~.... ' . .
by which subjects adopt beliefs and expectations ought to be ex-
. . . .
~a'by the behavioral science and not presupposed by 1ncorporat1ng 1n-
} :..:?!-I language into observationa:l · reports . The rejection of intensional
;ge for the behavioral data language does not imply that intensional de-
?'> ns are illegitimate or have no place in a science of behavior. They cer-
: ave their use in everyday speech, and within the behavioral science
..:~ay ·be incorporated either in the the0retical language (chapter 4) or given
'"··v ioral interpretation (chapter 10) .
.· aps the most incisive objection to the inclusion of intensional language :\ t
· hehavioral data language is that the intensional mode involves far too \
.\.· terpretation and too little observation. At that end of the continuum,
>to achieve intersubjective agreement and is anthropomorphic and pro-
·. . Quine (1960) expresses his doubts about intensionality in these terms:

Jiderlying methodology ·of the idioms of propositional attitude contrasts strik-

·~ ith the spirit of objective science at is rnost representative. . . . In indirect
ion
. we project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications ' we
. ·"::e .the speaker's state of mind to have been, and then we say what, in our lan-
, ,ll - ¡

~~ ; is natural and relevant for us in the state thus feigned. An indirect quotation
': usually expect to rate only as better or worse, more or less faithful, and we
. ,.hope for a strict standard of more or less; wha.t is involved is evaluation, rel-
"o specia1 purposes, of an essentially dramatic act. . . . In the strictest scientific
, .. . . the essentially dtamatic idiom of propositional attitudes will find no place.
,18-219)
'
~,: ;\~over, as Quine notes, the attribution of propositional attitudes also en- ·
·ters problems arising from the indeterminacy of translation thesis ac-
.n g to which the attribution of a proposition, through translation or in-
. ) ,.quotation, is relative to a nonunique syste1n of analytic hypotheses. 55
:.· ~· ~ .'~.1tp.determinacy adds further imprecision to intensional descriptions, thereby
·{: :ng their suitability for the behavioral data language.

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44 T HE BE HA V r ORAL DATA LA N GUA GE

·'~{'.
,.
'}f.

. . . . . . . intensional discourse i1(

Although 1n pnnc1ple behav1onsts avoid using . ll pears ¡ :~;
. pract1ce
d a t a Ianguage , 111. . , 1ntens1ona
. · 1 1angua ge occas1ona Y . ap 11,'.
. .
h av1onst .. that such 1nstances are¡,
descriptions . Indeed, son1e cnt1cs argue . l d . :'
inere oversights on the part of behaviorists but that intensiona escnptf"
are a b so 1rteJy--necessary for understandmg · b e11av10r.
· 56 I n contrast to. n1osfJ;.-·
. havioríst.SJ.o.l.m.a.¡:¡) agree.s with this contention and 1nakes extensive us.;
\intensionality. He speaks of experitnental subjects, including rats, as !·~,
posítionalizing " and impu"ting descríptíons to stimulí. 57 _1-:Ie also repres.~.
knowledge in the fonn of belíefs , expectations, and cogn1t10ns. Howevef.
is not clear whether Toln1an intends these descriptions to be part of the 1;-
~1avioral data,·-la.t=l%1::1-a.ge. or whether these i.ntensi~E_al -~ttribu tions
_!!!g_~ria~s_ (see next chapter). 58 · ------·'

.{ ..
Movement Versus Achieverrié ·
....~.
Descriptions of behavior within the behavioral data language are traditionij; ·
59
classified as either repo~~~ements or report~[ achieve~ent._ In{~
forn1.er, behavior is described as a 1novement, or set of :rñoven:1én:ts, 1ndep' ·
dent of what effects these movements have. For example, "The rat's fii
paws moved to the right" is a m.oven1ent-description. In contrast, "Thef ·
depressed the lever," by specifying only the effect of the behavior, i( .
achievernent-description. Justas the movement-description does not indit.~
how the 1nove1nents affect the environment, so the achievement-descript.~
does not specify which n1ovements brought about the achievement. A rat :~3 :¡
depress a lever in 111any ways , and the achieve1uent-description <loes nor::· ·.
port which one actually occurred. :
This 111oven1ent-versus-achieven1ent distinction does not bear close set :
tiny. In order to report that a moven1ent has occurred, it is necessary to ;, . .
tect that movement. Often this detection is performed by a recording ins{
ment. For example, a device detects when saliva is secreted or when an eyéffl
has closed . In this case, the n1ove1nent is said to have occurred only wh~
behavior has a particula_r effe~t on t?e rec~:>rding instrument. M?reover, th~)
is xnore tha.n one way 111 wh1ch th1s effect can be brought about. Thus, t& ,
inovement-description reduces to an achievement-description. In situation/·
which there is no formal recording instrument, the hum.an observer 111 ust dei
tect the m?ve~nent. However, in this case, the human observer is functionin~
as a detect1011 mstrument. The observer, too, detects the movement only wh~n .
it has a certain effect on the perc~ptual system, and this effect can be broug\
about in a variety of ways. In e1ther .case, moven1ent-description reduces::!'A ·
· ·
achievement- d escnpt10n. 60
.
This analysis ~onceptual~zes a hu~an observer as a detection or recognitiJ
instrun1ent and 1s helpful m resolv1ng problems raised above with regard j
properties that cannot usefully be defined by the dimensions used by t~ :
·~

' ~
,:
•_¡ :
if .
..;¡ '

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 ..Y..6
CRITERIA FOR THE DATA LANGUAGE ~
/

:,:i_ · . b id to be defined by the reaction

i: · h
:Lsciences. T _e~e p_ro pert1es can e sa
61 Sorne properties, useful to _ t h e b e h av- \
'·..'.úman recogn1t10n instrume~t. b h perties of phys1cs and are )
. b c1fied y t e pro . .
lta·Janguage, cannot e spe . . This fact partly JUSt1fies the
·. d l attern recogn1t1on. f 1
··(:lepen . e1~t _on 1.~rJ?::~. ~ --···¡-; ·-.....- -·· ... . . ·;;-·terms, that is, in tern1s o 10w
·\of descnb111g st1~l~h !.~-- _pe_:::P.Y~~J't:.'/ their hysical paraineters. 62
,·pear to the expenmenter rather than uy . Pd bl . ,, d "of equal
. .b d '' dan ue an
:-g"' hts for example, m1ght be descn e as re h d . t 1·ty When
'
.¡~s" rather than as being of a part1cu ar wave en
. 1 1 gt an 111 ensh . . t
,, . . · · · strun1.ent, t en 1n er-
fuan observer 1s conceptuahzed as a recognition in b d tood
¿..1ve - agreement, both w1thm . . an d across o b se rvers , can . e un ers f . _
,:·-:l' 'é:· asure of the rehab1hty. . . of t h"1s 1nstrumen . t , an d the importan ce o 1n
\\ ~ctive agree1nent can be more readily appreciated .
'ht;,
~-
,:s.M••

Purposive Language
~~,f
:?;·'.: .

•:·:6 ther problem arising in choosing a behavioral data language is whether

:~:'.Fto include purposive descripti9~,,0JJ¿_ehavior. Although 111.ost beh~v-
' \,feject purposive language,'otñers d1sagree. They argue that a descnp-
'f.íbehavior as movement or even as achieven1.ent is inadequate. Behav-
':.~y claim, has descriptive properties beyond those of movements ~nd
::~ments because behavior has purpose. 63 As Toln1.an (1932), the lead1ng
érit for these "purposive behaviorists," asserts:
.,'.¡·
' .'.'.g . . . that behavior . . . has descriptive properties of its own, we must next
:·· what . . . these identifying properties are. The first . . . answer to this ques-
·.:: . . that behavior . . . always seems to have the character of getting-to or
.,.from a specific goal-object, or goal-situation. The complete identification of
gÍe behavior-act requires . . . a reference first to sorne particular goal-object
.hich that act is getting to, or . . . getting from, or both. (p. 10)
'..z;.,. •
:.l • •

<··· óbvious that a description of behavior as mere movement lacks any

pn of the purpose of the behavior. Even an achievement-description fails
'p ict the purposive qualities of behavior. On the one hand, not all
it-ements are purposes . A rat, for example may inadvertently depress a
~hy backing into it while escaping an electric shock or by emitting an
. ·ditioned reflex. In either case the achievement-response of lever deflec-
...as occurred but not the purposive act oí deflecting a lever. On the other
} behavior can be purposive without ~chievement. A rat may nu1 through
i,e for the purpose of getting the food at the end although it does not
/ e this goal. It may not even achieve the effect "approaching the food"
'. ..se its route through the 1naze may increase its distance from the food
,?
i _. } a~se there is no f ood in the .goa~ box. Hence, although achieveinent- /;
_, .· ~,:_pt1ons are son1ewhat teleolog1cal 1n that they involve effects rather than i ·
=) í they are not fully purposive. {

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 ~
,..
')
6,.46 T HE BE HA VI ORAL DATA LA N GUA GE

Behaviorist. oppositi·on to purpos1ve

. b e h av10nsm
. . .
anses on two .counts. :·
~any behaviorists, while possibly agreeing that behavior manife st5 pu]'
s~veness, deny that this characteristic n1ust be taken as a fundamental d_e~o2
tlve prop t
. er Y o
f b e h a~1or.
· . .
lnstead, they ma1nta1n, t?e purpos~
·ve quaht11r'
beha:.
beha~ior can be expla1ned as the result of more bas1c properties 0 .f :
?es_cnbed as movements or achievements (see chapter 7). Pu_rposive ,~e~
ions~~· however, contend that ~urposi:e _qualities o~ behavior ~::. 6
gent . and belong among the bas1c descnpt1ve properues of behavi_ )
/1
This doctrine of "emergence" is not clearly explicated by purposive beh .
iorists, and it is therefore difficult to assess their claim. Some of th e ª ·
guity of the position is apparent in Tolman (1932):
"E.mergent ,, b e h av1or
· phenomena are correlated w1th
· p h ys10
· 1og1ca
· ¡ P henomena of m ··
and gland and sense organ. But descriptively they are different from the latte~. Wh ,,
they are or are not ultimately in sorne metaphysical sense compl~tely reducible to:}
latter we are not here attempting to say. (footnote, p. 7, emphas1s added) '
lf in stressing the emergent nature of purpose the doctrine merely asser~s .t~·
purposive properties do not · appear among the descriptive propert1e~-~
movements, or achievements, then surely it is correct. However, this fact~;
no bearing on whether or not purposiveness is explainable by a theory at sci'
simpler level of descriptive analysis. On the other hand, if the doctrine ass.~r,
a priori that purposiveness as an emergent is not explainable at a more molf
ular behavioral level then the doctrine appears premature. 65 Perhaps pur
sive behaviorism is best viewed then as the empirical hypothesis that law ...
ness, and therefore prediction and control, can most clearly be found wi(
data described purposively rather than as movement_s or achievements.
A second source of behaviorist criticism of purposive behaviorism is t.
purposive descriptions are highly interpretive and therefore do not achi :.
the degree of intersubjective consensus desirable for the behavioral data la
guage. 66 To this criticism, a purposive behaviorist can reply that it is O ~;
with the everyday concepts of purpose that disagreement is common. s~·
entifically defined purposive concepts can be objectively attributed on the O ! ¡

sis of objective criteria, and intersubjective agreement can be maintained. T .o ~.

objective criteria suggested for purpose are "persistence until" and "doclj ;
ity. " 67 The former is demonstrated when an organism continues to have tHt ·
same goal object despite variations in behavior caused by obstacles or chan{ \
in the location of the goal and when its behavior ceases when the goal objf ·
is removed entirely. "Docility" refers to the demonstration of learning reO ·
tive to a particular goal. That is, · ,
•
Wherever a response is ready (a) to break out into trial and erro~ and (b) to select. ·:
the more efficíent of such trials and errors with respect to getting that end- such;a
response expresses and defines something which, for convenience, we name- as a p~i
pose. Wherever such a set of facts appears . . . there we have objectively manifes'
and defined that which is conveniently called a purpose. (Tofman, 1932, p. 14) . :{
~{
¡;
!
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 CRITERIA FOR THE DATA LANGUAGE 47

\\ objective criteria, Tolman believes, purposes can be identified with

: égree of intersubjective agreement. .
peply on the part of the purposive behaviorist is not entirely conv1nc-
it; it_is not obvious that the required observations for attributing pur-
's.s can be performed without pres~.!:!'~.:~~~-~~rpo~ivene~s. For ~x-
, an constancy of the goal-object despite variat i-óns in 1nterven1ng
· · (i. e., "persistence until") be demonstrated without assuming
._ge of the goal-object? Second, the objective criteria for purpose
.:e a series of experiments on the basis of which purpose can be at-
.} Without the evidence of these experiments, the attribution of pur-
~--only a hypothesis about the possible results of the required experi-
·'· Therefore, a report in purposive terms of an observacioh of a single
·:of beha vior transcends the o bservation and enters the realm of infer-
·/ ic violares MacCorquodale and Meehl's condition that observation
':t:s not involve " implicit references to any other intervals of the flux."
\ purposive language, even with objective application criteria, does not
it O be a good candidate for the behavioral data language.

Descriptive Level
ptions also differ in descriptive level, or degree of "molarity." 69 A par-
/instance of arm and finger movements might be describable as "writ-
·'/ ame," "signing a check," or " buying a house," each o f which is an
·e description of the act. Similarly, a part of the environment might
:aneously be "a table," " a piece of furniture," or "a birthday g ift." The
· tions differ as to the context in which they embed the behavior. " Signing
·,
·.:k " embeds the movement in .a context that includes social institutions ,
·'.s money and banks, while "writing a name" does not. 70
:: ~.t his reason sorne behaviorists oppose the use of molar description in /
·• avioral data language since it goes beyond the properties of the inter- r
·ing observed . It involves more interpretation than th e simpler, more )
_)1Iar description. Furthermore, it is claimed, molecular description in l_ .
·:,of a series of 1novements or muscle contractions conserves much of the 1
:: -ation lost in molar description.
'-eply to thís objection to molar description it should be noted that mo-
r description also loses information. It is not clear that the description
-~g a house" can be derived from a description of the person's move-
~1:.For this derivation it is necessary to include a description of the social /
_u tions, and such a descríption at a molecular level of movements is im- "'l
/
le. Therefore, a molecular description loses crucial infor mation and may
-t fail to capture what the person is doing. 71
4,
:e the other features of descriptions discussed above, molarit y is a di- .
· ~t ion rather than an all-or-none quality. Usually the ~ f : m.olar the_.de- , ;.,
tion, the greater its social significa_µ ce .. lt is more important to know that ..., _.-'
. r- - . /
/

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 48 THE BEHA VIORAL DATA LANGVAGE

a 1nan is robbing a bank than that he is raising his arn1, even though he-i:
be robbing the bank by raising his ann. On the other hand, the more ·ni,
the description, the greater the context behavior is en1bedded in and the ~
roon1 for 111isinterpretation. There is likely to be more intersubjective agt
1nent over whether a 111 an winked his eye than over whether he was tri
to attract attention, even though it may be true that he was trying ~o .ª tf
attention by winking his eye. 72 Also, lawfulness might be mor~ r~adlly f9'.~ '
with more 111.olar units of behavior. Thus, in selecting a descnptive levet
the behavioral data language, there is often a trade-off between social si( .
icance and lawfulness on the one hand, and íntersubjective agreement otj;J ·
other. Once again, good scientific judgn1ent is called far. r/
·:'J
¡f .
;~ .

FUNCTIONAL DEFINITI@ · ,il'.'...

;;_~
Behaviorist standards of objectivity and empiricalness determine necessaryf._ '
not sufficient conditions for inclusion in the behavior data language. SeJ, .'
tion often depends on en1.pirical findings. One typical behaviorist strateg.~ i
to select predicates which categorize behavior and the environ1nent into el~~·
experiinentally found to be lawfully related. This "functional" approach~ .
be illustrated by a schen1atic example. An experin1.enter begins with an inJ
class of behaviors defined by son1e set of features. Certain aspects of this)
sponse class (e. g . , its frequency of occurrence) are found to be function._;,
related to certain aspects of the environ1nent. By judicious variatíon of:;'
environn1.ent and careful obse,;-vation of the behavior, the e~p~d-rn.eriier ;-·-·
d~lineate a class of environmental even~s covered by the functio~;al ~elat'ib .
~-ti~P· _This class is a "fundional stimúlus cla_ss." ___:¡
In exploring the li1nits of the functional relationship, the experimenter .:_:
find that the functional stünulus class controls a class of behavior not {
fectly congruent with the initial class of behaviors. The experimenter tR
delineates the class of behaviors empirically found to be under the functict
control of tl~; functi_onal stünulus class, thus ~etern1i.ning a "functional ~ ·
sponse cl~ss. Expenmental study of the funct1onal response class may sy ;
gest adjustn1ents in the n1embership of the functional stimulus class wh{
in turn, n1a y suggest further 1nodifications of the functional response di,. -
This process of titratíon everitually distills functional stirnulus and respoti'
classes that optiinize the lawfulness between behavior and environnient. T'11
point is often judged by "smoothness of curves", or "simplicity." The act~'..
process of functional definition <loes not necessarily follow the steps of t;<
ídealized illustration. The only critical feature is that stimulus and respo ·
classes are defined on the basis of what is empirically found to be functionaill
related. 73 ·

1
¡

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 FUNCTIONAL DEFp,, 1 . . ~
o.
'" '1.lON

:~.
~-
Circularity
~ .
{: f this sort appear hopelessly circular. Stitnulus is what controls \\
;¿
,'._~:
J.:. ·
1
74
response is what is controlled by stünull~S. Th~ circu_larity,
ore apparent than real. There is indeed a k1nd of ctrculanty, or
;·is m Ad. . h
,.:'r eciprocity, in the process o[ functional definition. ~ust~ent 1~ t e
·á of a functional stimulus class may cause a correspo?d1ng adJUSt-
t: functional stimulus class, and vice versa. This circulanty, however,
·:tuous" rather than a vicious cycle, with each cycle tightening the
~al correlation. lf the experimenter's intuitions prove valid, the cycles
'. : ard, and later adjustments are near zero. If the cycles do not, then
:;·:e notice that the experin1.enter is on the wrong track.
-~)s also a benign circularity in definition. Stimulus is defined in tern1s
W1i?:ilse, and response in terms of stimulus. However, thi~ circularity, too,
4Ír.oublesome. Relationships must always be defined th1s way. The cen-
\~ition is that of the "functional relation," and "stimulus" and "re-
:\ >are defined in pairs as the relata of this relationship. lt also follows
;~.istatement "Responses are functionally related to stin1uli" is indeed a
.'.iy when referring to functional responses and stin1uli .
.' theless, the functional approach is far fron1 vacuous. Dernonstrating
7.·,articular functional stimulus or response class is not the null set has
.'/.e mpirical significan.ce. That certain specified bits of behavior forrn a
)1al response class in relation to certain specified aspects of the envi-
:'t -forrning the associate<:1: .fu~ctional stimulus class is not a tautology .
.:··pe the tautology, how/ver, it'is"ñe.~essary that the functional stimulus {\
$._ponse classes be specifi_ed independ~nt of one another. lf the response ~ \
~~ ed as "vvhatever is co":rttrelkd. ..by the functional stitnulus," and the
's' is ·specified as "whatever is res pon.si ble far the functional response,"
;e.forrnulation is again enmeshed in circularity.
;.\ the functional ap-P,roach 1nust consist of two logically distinct pro-
).üne, the .s ele~ti~_p,ioc~~sist.s of the delin~ation of response a_nd
~s classes. Th1s 1s the .rlfration)procedure, descnbed above, by wh1ch
·:h1bers of the two cla&,es ar~,.ielected so as to maximize orderliness in
·) .. -In this selection proc~;s:,··; timulus and response classes are related by
·rocity in which members. ar~ selected far one class on the basis of their
\;on n1embers of the other class, and vice versa .
.\ other process is that of specffication: Once functional classes are se-
::\t i~ n~cessary to speci\)' tl~em. In this process, at least one of the classes
,: .e specified iqdepencteñd~ óÍ\he other. This in1plies that when a func-
{:', response class is specified as an achievement class (e. g., "any body
'i ent that deflects the lever"), · and a stimulus (e.g., "lever") is men-
:'.1U1 the specification, that stimulus term must be defined by its ordinary
l
;·ary meaning rather than by a functional definition.

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 ....:~
50 THE BEHAVIORAL DATA LANGUAGE

. 'l
Specific.i-t·
The independent specifi r· f fi . · ·1
· ica ion o a unct1onal class poses a number of ¡; .
lems. Often the sti ¡ d · ~
. mu us an response classes yielded by the funct1onal 's
tton process do ot d ·
n correspon to classes defined by a property used by.
ence.
,,S Por example' the .c. •
runctiona 1 st:Imulus
· · t h e v.e rb aI resp
class controll1ng
am~ loudn~ss as the comparison tone" consists of tones of variou(.
quenc1es
. and
. 1ntens1t1es
· · w h"1ch have no physical parameter 1n
· common. ] :,. ,
bso1e 1den t 1t Y denves
· · · ~·
from the fact that they are judged by human hsten(
e of equal loudness. To be sure, the locus of all points representing t!
ton~s can be described by an "equal loudness contour" on a graph wit ::'.:
ten s ity and frequency as the two axes. Yet, this locus does not correspon·;.
any acoustical property of sound typically of interest to physics. · ··<h
Often a name is given to the property exemplified by a functional class·
<loes not correspond to a property used by other sciences. In this exam, .
the members of the class may be said to share the "same Ioudness." Bec~:· ·
<; functional classes of this sort are selected on the basis of the behavior o ·
j organism rather than the effects on a more typical measuring instrument/!
r property is often called "psychologic~l. " 75 Note that the property is "p:~
chological,, only because afilie selection criteria for class membership, j.~D, .
not because of its ontological status or because it is "non-physical." In (t
equal 'loudness contours can be specified solely in terms of the obviotii,
physical parameters of frequency and intensity. ·:~
Other functional classes, or psychological properties, cannot so readilyf
specified by the properties of natural science. More often than not, the
bers selected for a functional class have no commonalities specifiable by bl
m·~,
scientific properties. This is, of course, the very problem encountered ab&l
in relation to the construction· of the behavioral data language: Many pri(
erties of interest to psychology are not those used by the other · scienc,j
Therefóre, ihe considerations discussed above are relevant to the .prese';t"'
pro blem. ·,,;,
·W
Relational properties acceptable for the behavioral data language are ·:1
suitable for the specification of a functional class. lt is, however, an empiri¡
question whether a relational property, in fact, characterizes any function~
stimulus class. The controversy surrounding the phenomena of transpositiQ~
can be viewed as a debate concerning this question. 76 In any case, as argu~
above, the use of relational properties in no way compromises the objectivit¡
of behavioral language. .'}
On the other hand~ specifications using properties which are neither thosr
of the physical scíences nor relations among them raise the difficulties dis:
cussed above. Properties of this sort are often necessary and useful, and be~
haviorists must use· them when they are called for. Once again intersubjectiv~
agreement in using them to identify a class is an important criterion for their

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 FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION 51

.º \Iity. If they can be specified precisely enough to mediate the predic-

·fcbntrol of behavior, then their use can be justified. Acceptability de-
·''ltimately on scientific judgment in a case-by-case consideration of
}. l functional class specifications. 77
,; '

.,..- Functional Classes for Verbal Behavior

'- ·f.·
. ..~_·'..'.. pr9blem, arises in specifying functional stimuli rfof verbal behavior.
'J. ve'(bal res~~nse is under the control of a hi~y a~stract and subtle
)y- of'rhe--·environrnent. In rnany of these cases, 'the' best and perhaps
y._ way tó specify the functional stimulus class is by using a description
w.~~me form as the verbal response under examination. 78 For example,
.-'..e a subject emits the verbal response "twice as many." Assume further
)is fot.Índ that che subject emits this verbal response only when pre-
':,.~ ith two groups of objects and one group has twice as many elements
.::Jpther. ~n specifying this functional stimulus class it will be necessary
'.~;:the term "twice as many" although this is the form of the verbal re-
i, being considerea.·""'-
':-s this create a vicious circularity? Not necessarily. It is possible that
~gh the forn1 of the response en1.itted by the subject is the same as that
~d by the experimenter in specifying the stimulus, the two may not be-
,.-;b the same functional response class. The experimenter's response may
}.Jo the environment and to other behaviors in ways that are different
:r those of the subject's response. This difference in function is reflected
r\ logical distinction, to be discussed in chapter 11, between the "object
·,.?,ge" of the subject and the "pragmatic meta-language" of the experi-
:er.
~Y situation is inescapable. The subject's verbal response R 1 is explained,
(Jt, by specifying a functional stimulus. This specification is itself a ver-
\ ;.. . ..;~ sponse, R 2 , emitted by the experimenter. Therefore, R 2 can also be ex-
} ~ J,ed, by a se~ond. experimenter, start~ng with its.· function~l di~~rim_ina~ive
··j1~ 1:1lus as spec1fied by R3. If the expenmenters are careful 1n the1r d1scnm-
. :>~,.~i,r :\)ns and descriptions, then R2 and R3 will be identical, or at least synon-
-:u s . Eventually the supply of synonyms will be exhausted as R 3 is ex-
: / ijM?,ed by R 4 , and so on.
l} f¡there is no ~eed, however, to enter th_is i~finite s~~ies. Rj is adequately
-~ ~:J;i.ined by us111g Rj + 1 , and the explanat1on 1s not v1t1ated by the fact that
fü1ti(Rj
,;-iWt~-
+ 1 can also be explained. Every explanation is in the form of behavior
.,rJWit(;;h can be explained although it need not be. On the other hand, the prac-
'fjf> f using th~ response-~o-be-explai~ed in ~pecifying the sti:r:nulus can be
¡~~sed. Assert1ng that X 1s the f~nct1onal st1mulus for th~ ver~al response
. . 'f can come to serve as a subst1tute for the careful spec1ficat1on of func-
. .:,,al stimuli. Therefore, wherever possible, the practice is to be avoided.
' ;: ::~
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 52 THE BEHAVIORAL DATA LANGUAGE

In tensionafi .·
~

<~.:,,~ functional
n
approach offers the opportunity to reintroduce aspects of int~
) sio a.lity into the behavioral science. In functional tern1s, the stimulus ó'
\ ' p~rtícula;-;esponse is not necessarily a mon1tmtary energy of specific physÍ
:3') din1ensions arriving at the receptors. The functional class of environmeq,
events, all of vvhich leave behavior invariant, is ordinarily best specified-·
con1.plex objects or situations which hay·e-.. iñ.eaning and may not correspó~
___ ..- to specific physical dimensions im1nediately affecting' the organism. As B~
-~ says, the stin1.ulus "recedes." 79 This reced'ed functional stimulus, because <·
selected by the subjec?soehavior father than by a priori properties, is, r:'
sense, an " .~1:_~_en~ional" stitnulus. 80 Sitnilarly, specification of the functióz
response will rarely be possible in ter:n1S of bodily n1ove111ents. Instead, :~~i 1

specification will be a m.ore molar description of a set of behaviors that .~

vary and hence have functional "meaning" for the subject. 81 Functional sti,!
uli and responses differ, l~oweve~, from tra_ditional in_tensional objects in.t~{·l·j
the former are to be spec1fied us1ng extens10nal pred1cates and they are cgj
ceived as classes whose n1embers exist in the world rather than inexist in _ ,~[t
. d ~
1n1n . tf
'.;)
Wha t Is LearÁ1
The use of functional definitions reintroduces the question, disc~1ssed
=t*!
abo:¡
as to whether observation is necessarily conta1ninated by theory. A descrf.;
tion of a bit of behavior in functional terms seems to be dictated by a thec}I
or hypothesis about how that behavior is related to a class of stin~uli. 'tili~
question of ~hat is learned ill~strates the point. . ·:.i
When an 1nstance of behav10r occurs, there are mult1ple ways of descrj¡
i?g, or categorizin_g it. For exa1nple, the be~avior of a rat in a maze at a pjJ
t1cular 1no1nent m1ght equally well be descnbed as: ~~

R 1 = turning right - ~~
R 2 = turning south J{
R 3 = turning toward the light ' :.i
R 4 = a description of a particular group of effector movements.
1]
,J
1

Assume that this ins:ance of behavior occurs _under circumstances (e.g.,

1nforcement, cont1gu1ty) wh1ch produce learn1ng. As a result there will bé:§1
change in s01ne class of behaviors. · ?i
It is a matter of considerable debate an1ong behaviorists as to the exact nj
ture of this class. The four descriptions of behavior listed above not only rj
port the behavior, they also categorize it into four different classes which á'
not fully coextensive. Under certain circumstances, the behavior of turniÁt
right is not the behavior of turning soµth, nor is it always equivalent to.i
w
.:,
)
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 FUNCT[ONAL DEFtN1·f'roN53
1
J¡r:oup of e~fector n10:1ements .. Tl~e controv~rsy over what is _learn.ed 'I
i's ··tl1.e quest1on of wh1ch descnpt1on of the 111.stance of behav1or also
82
}Iy characterizes the class of behaviors altered by lea~1~ing. Thus the ( · '
}'t an be understood as a disagreen1ent over the definit1011 of the func- )
).if~sponse class. . . .
¡:_ .:_
ixheory of what is learned is partly supported by experunents 111 wluch
'ijpus proposed functional classes do not overlap so it can be deter-
_:, ~hich class is the learned one. 83 Fro1n experiments of this sort along
;lher theoretical considerations, a theory of what is learned en1.erges. If
ttive data reports are dictated by theory in this way, then the behav-
-~_ra language seems seriously contaminated by theory.
9.~er examination, however, reveals that observational reports are 11ot
91nised in a functional approach. Note that each of the four descrip-
,i~ 'sted above meets the standards of objeé:tivity and empiricalness dis-
~1r,. ..
tf': earlier. Observers, regardless of their theoretical orientations, would
? :(( high degree of intersubjective agreen1e1Ú over the applicability of any
l\_these descriptions to a particular instance of behavior. _As a report of
:cular instance of behavior, each is independent of any theory of learn-
:~:mfusion occurs because the description of the instance of behavior is
:~~ description of a class of behaviors. What is dictated by theory is the
~i1 of one from these acceptable, objective, and learning-theory-inde-
__ i:it descriptions of a datu111. 84 The theory determines into which of four
ble classes the response is n1ost use_fi-1.lly categorized.
}ory detennines this selection because it suggests which descriptions yield
~,:eatest sin1.plicity and orderliness in the science. Consider an exan1.ple.
~bse that experünental research indicates the functional response class for
'.\1g is best described by description R1 (i. e., turning right). A generali-
·t _.- .about learning can then be sim.ply stated: When R 1 occurs under con-
~. hs a, b, e, . . . (e. g., reinforcement, contiguity),· then response class R 1
,~.., -;~\ed in ways x, y, z, . . . (e.g., increases in frequency). If, however,
:}r~r?;jption R 2 (i.e., turning south) is use~ for the behavioral data language,
.::--' ;:~he generalization grows more complicated. lt is not true that when R 2
tfs· under learning conditions that the response class R2 is learned. There-
.· , n~:\dditional statements are necessary. These staten1ents nlight be in the
·,.:~~Ml of rules on transforn1Íng a R2 description int~ .ª R1. description, or al-
Jlf.JJ.~.e ly, they n1ay take the _fonn of a complex d1sJunct1on of many more
,isjjfJPC la ws. .
:{:;W,J:~ · of the ap?ro_priate des_criptions in the beha:ioral data lang~age thus
··_".' _. -~,..~fies generahzat1ons, and 1t does the saine for higher level behav1oral laws
}':· . :t.heories. 85 Experimental findings and theory thus help in the choice of the
~:v_µseful observational description for an instance of behavior, but they do
J1dern1Íne its descriptive or observational nature.
,.

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