Marriage and Validity Digests
Castillo v Republic Tani dela fuente v delafuente
FACTS:
Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts.
During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with
his former girlfriend. The couple’s relationship turned tumultuous after the
revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got
married and were blessed with two childåren. However, after thirteen years of
marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Tired of her husband’s infidelity, she left
the conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with him. Felipe’s
irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with
her, and not supporting their children for a period of not less than ten years
without any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder. Mirasol filed a
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage which was granted by the trial
court. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC
determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
RULING:
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the
respondent’s unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a
disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging
the essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe’s personality profile did not emanate from a
personal interview with the subject himself. Apart from the psychologist’s
opinion and petitioner’s allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to
prove that Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged
personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable.
The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which
effectively incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to
his wife was medically or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.
The petition for review was denied.
Facts:
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in
Mandaluyong City after being in a relationship for five (5) years. They had two
children. While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that
Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as
they went on with their marital life. His jealousy became so severe that he even
poked a gun to his 15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave
who made the latter feel maltreated and molested. Sometime in 1986, the
couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an
affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head.
She left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children by
herself. On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. As support to her petitions, clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo
V. Lopez was presented as an expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any
responsive pleading. The trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a
waiver of his right to present evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage.
Held: Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent
suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it
chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez
since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of
respondent's mental and psychological condition. Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states
that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as
hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist,
since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. Article 68 of the Family
Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner
and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner
show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations
expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage. The incurability and severity
of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He
vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit
that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This
was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly
refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and
suggested couples counseling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of
her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be
examined by Dr. Lopez. Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's
personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of
giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that the
marriage be annulled. Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by
intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as
his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack
of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost
cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to
respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their
marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform
his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe
that respondent's mental illness is incurable.
The petition is granted.
Garlet v Garlet Singson v singson

Keuppers v Judge Murcia

Foreign Divorce Digests
Fujiki v Marinay
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3] Fujiki
and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article
15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Medina v Koike
Facts:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent
Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14,
2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.[4] Their union bore two children, Masato
Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on
April 4, 2007. On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws
of Japan, filed for divorce[6] before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi
Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the
Divorce Certificate[7] and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family
Register of Michiyuki Koike. Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate
annotated on her Certificate of Marriage[9] on file with the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition[10] for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code[11] before
the RTC. At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.[12] On the
other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely,
"Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"[13] and
"Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"[14] both issued by the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a
document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the
Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of
the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification[15] issued by the City Civil
Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed
and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of
Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000"[16] and "The Civil Code of Japan
2009"[17] were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on
divorce.[18]
Issues:
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in
denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
Ruling:
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the
Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:... the
law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage.[26]
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven.[30] Since our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven like any other fact.[31]
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter
are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented
before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question
of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the
case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the
pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.
 Republic v Manalo
Facts:

On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that:
Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHIDO MINORO;
Recently, a case for divorce was filed by petitioner in Japan and after due proceeding, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipino family rights and duties, together with determination of their condition
and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it
was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating
him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of
the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national,
who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
Issue:
Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the
one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in
the foreign divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address the anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the
instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien
land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them are based merely on superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or
not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry,
has the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
Property Relations
Dino v Dino
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married
on 14 January 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. On 30 May
2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since her
early formative years. The trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code. Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of
petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial
court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
Salas v Agila
Facts: On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena
Aguila were married. Aguila gave birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five
months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer
communicated with Aguila or their child.
On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition states that they “have no conjugal properties whatsoever”. On
May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of
their conjugal property, if any. On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a
manifestation and motion stating that she discovered 3 properties registered
to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas. However, Salas alleged that Aguila
waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in consideration of other
properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. RTC directed Salas and Aguila
to partition by proper instruments of conveyance the discovered properties.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the
marriage of Salas and Aguila, thus a conjugal property and subject for
partition between them.
Ruling: Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by
Salas during the validity of their marriage.
The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of
the registered owner, Salas.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under
this property regime, property acquired during marriage is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and
governed by the rules of co-ownership.

Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-

ownership.

Lim v equitable bank

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to mortgage his share in a property in order to secure a loan. This first loan extended by
BDO in 1989 was fully paid by Franco in 1992. However in 1996, Franco and their mother obtained another loan over the same property which they failed to pay.
Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan. Petitioner thus tried to get a TRO and for the foreclosure and to secure a
cancellation of the SPA executed in favor of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and
that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner
was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his
signature was forged. The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner’s mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage contract was forged is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized document.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioner was able to prove that the SPA was forged.
2. Whether or not Respondent Bank was failed to exercise due diligence when granting the loan without the signature of Petitioner's wife in the mortgage
contract.
HELD:
1. NO. Petitioner was not able to prove that his signature was forged. No evidence was ever presented to prove the allegation: the alleged forged signature was
never compared with the genuine signatures of petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted.
2. NO. Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was never raised as an issue. Hence, the absence of his wife’s signature on the mortgage
contract also has no bearing in this case.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not
overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a
conjugal property may be mortgaged. However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property
was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was
conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were
acquired by [one spouse]. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the
title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN v. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, GR No. 201061, 2013-07-03 Ocampo v ocampo
Facts: On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non- Virginia
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila ) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage
Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan with Deogracio Ocampo (
City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III. Deogracio
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally) who was a ) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin's family. In December 1981, ground of psychological incapacity. The decision became final,
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived... together since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage.
as husband and wife. Sally's father was against the relationship. On on 7 March 1982, in order to
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties,
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin's marital... status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered. Benjamin and Sally's cohabitation produced two
and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual
children, Bernice and Bentley. The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on
for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of
evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or their respective stand. On January 13, 2004, the trial court
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was rendered the assailed Order
bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked... the stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to
trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
the Family Code... and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate... children. ISSUE
Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage : Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the
License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.[5] The trial court ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it psychological perversity.
could not be registered due to Benjamin's subsisting marriage with Azucena RULING
Ruling:
: NO. The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
declared void under Article 36
because a marriage could not be non-existent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally
of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties
further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she... would have proven her
marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Benjamin was the informant in their children's birth... certificates where he stated that he was their Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who
father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as
further alleges that Benjamin was not... the informant in the birth certificates of his children with in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code provide in the the
Azucena. absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
First, Benjamin's marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained
court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin... and them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who
Azucena was valid and subsisting. did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally,... the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally.
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care
As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and
and maintenance of the family and of the household
Sally "was made only in jest"[16] and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of [Sally], intended to
cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society
especially from her parents seen as Chinese... conservatives."[17] In short, it was a fictitious
marriage.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is... necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized
without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired
by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus,... both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given
by Benjamin's father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally's Answer to the petition before
the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin's late... father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x As regards the
seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord
with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.[26] The... properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin[27] with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property
covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally[28] with the descriptive...
title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were
registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to"
preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered... owner.
[29] Such words do not prove co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
 Dela pena v avila
FACTS:
Antonia Dela Pena (Antonia) obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the
sum of P250,000.00 with interest pegged at 5% per month. Antonia executed a
promissory note and a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 277 square meter
parcel of residential land, together with the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina
City and previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia),
“married to Antegono A. Dela Peña” (Antegono) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. N-32315 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.[to secure the payment of the loan
obligation.
Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of
Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00. As such
Gemma caused the transfer of the aforesaid property to her name. Gemma also
constituted a real estate mortgage over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a
loan facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.
Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, that
she was the true and lawful owner of the property and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale
Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated. The Register of Deeds inscribed the
adverse claim.
FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted
over the property due to Gemma’s failure to pay the loan. As the highest bidder at the
public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership
over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of the
Marikina registry.
Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin Dela Peña (Alvin), filed against Gemma the
complaint for annulment of deed of sale as the subject realty was conjugal property, and
that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not
consented to by Antegono who was already dead by that time. Gemma specifically
denied the material allegations, maintaining that the realty was the exclusive property of
Antonia who misrepresented that her husband was still alive.
RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute
Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. CA reversed the RTC decision,
stating that the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove
that the same was acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that
the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the
subject property to FEBTC-BPI are upheld as valid and binding. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by
TCT No. N-32315 conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña.
HELD:
No, petition is denied. CA decision affirmed in toto.
Fehr v fehr
FACTS:
In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to
Bruno's residence and lived with him. During the time they lived
together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG Condominium on
installment. They got married in 1985.
In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and
Bruno void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered
the dissolution of their conjugal properties. The properties were
divided into three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and 1/3 for the
children. The custody of children was awarded to Elna, being the
innocent spouse. Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer ownership
of Suite 204 LCG Condominium because it was declared to have
been the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr, acquired prior his
marriage.
Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held
in an order that Art. 147 of the Family Code should apply, being the
marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded Elna of the
previous agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds from
the sale thereof proportionately among them. It also affirmed of the
previous ruling regarding the Suite 204. Elna filed special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its
Decision dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive
property of Bruno Fehr.
RULING:
No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common
property of Elna and Bruno and the property regime of the parties
should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. Suite
204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly,
under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 147 applies in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is void under Article 36.
All these elements are present in the case at bar.