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Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018

Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Julia Diamond

To cite this article: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Julia Diamond (2018)
Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74:5, 348-358, DOI:
10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796

Published online: 31 Aug 2018.

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BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
2018, VOL. 74, NO. 5, 348–358
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796

NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK

Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018


Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Julia Diamond

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear ALCM; GLCM; India; missiles;
Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Robert S. Norris, a senior nuclear weapons; Pakistan
fellow with the FAS. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue’s column examines Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which
includes 140 to 150 warheads. The authors estimate that the country’s stockpile could realistically
grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, if the current trend continues.

Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal with indefinitely but might begin to level off as its current
more warheads, more delivery systems, and a growing weapons programs are completed.
fissile materials production industry. Analysis of a large
number of commercial satellite images of Pakistani
Nuclear policy developments
army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear
to be mobile launchers and underground facilities that Pakistan is modifying its nuclear posture with new
might be related to nuclear forces. short-range nuclear-capable weapon systems to coun-
We estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weap- ter military threats below the strategic level. The efforts
ons stockpile of 140 to 150 warheads (See Table 1). seek to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed
This stockpile exceeds the projection made by the US not only to respond to nuclear attacks, but also to
Defense Intelligence Agency in 1999 that Pakistan counter an Indian conventional incursion onto
would have 60 to 80 warheads by 2020 (US Defense Pakistani territory.1 This development has created con-
Intelligence Agency 1999, 38). siderable concern in other countries, including the
With several delivery systems in development, four United States, which fears that it lowers the threshold
plutonium production reactors, and its uranium enrich- for nuclear use in a military conflict with India.
ment facilities expanding, however, Pakistan has a stock- In the Worldwide Threat Assessment for 2018, US
pile that will likely increase further over the next 10 years. Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats said,
The size of the increase will depend on many factors. Two “Pakistan continues to produce nuclear weapons and
key factors will be how many nuclear-capable launchers develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short-
Pakistan plans to deploy, and how much the Indian range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-
nuclear arsenal grows. Speculation that Pakistan may launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic
become the world’s third-largest nuclear weapon state – missiles. These new types of nuclear weapons will
with a stockpile of some 350 warheads a decade from now introduce new risks for escalation dynamics and secur-
– are, we believe, exaggerated, not least because that ity in the region” (Coats 2018).
would require a buildup two to three times faster than Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which
the growth rate over the past two decades. We estimate includes all government agencies involved in the
that the country’s stockpile could more realistically grow nuclear mission, held its 23rd meeting on 21
to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, if the current trend December 2017, under the chairmanship of then-
continues. If that happens, it would make Pakistan the Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi. The group
world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapon state. But unless reviewed a study of “certain destabilizing actions”
India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds occurring in the region around Pakistan, including
up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect “the massive arms build-up in the conventional
that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will not continue to grow domain, nuclearization of the Indian Ocean Region

CONTACT Hans M. Kristensen hkristensen@fas.org


This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
© 2018 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 349

Table 1. Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018.


Warhead Number
Number of Year Range x yield of
Type NATO designation launchers deployed (kilometers)1 (kilotons)3 warheads2
Aircraft
F-16A/B ~24 1998 1,600 1 x bomb ~24
Mirage III/V ~12 1998 2,100 1 x bomb ~12
(or Ra-ad)
Subtotal: ~36 ~36
Land-based ballistic missiles
Abdali (Hatf-2) 10 (2015) 200 1 x 5-12 kt 10
Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) ~16 2004 300 1 x 5-12 kt ~16
Shaheen-1(Hatf-4) ~16 2003 750 1 x 5-12 kt ~16
Shaheen-1A (Hatf-4) - (2018) 900 1 x 5-12 kt -
Shaheen-2(Hatf-6) ~12 2014 1,500 1 x 10-40 kt ~12
Shaheen-3 (Hatf-6) - (2018) 2,750 1 x 10-40 kt -
Ghauri (Hatf-5) ~24 2003 1,250 1 x 10-40 kt ~24
NASR (Hatf-9) ~24 (2013) 60-70 1 x 5-12 kt ~244
Ababeel (Hatf-?) - - 2,200 MIRV or MRV -
Subtotal: ~102 ~102
Ground and air-launched cruise
missiles
Babur GLCM (Hatf-7) ~12 2014 3505 1 x 5-12 kt ~12
Babur-2/1(B) GLCM (Hatf-?) - -6 700 1 x 5-12 kt -
Ra’ad ALCM (Hatf-8) - (2017) 350 1 x 5-12 kt -
Ra’ad-2 ALCM (Hatf-?) - (2018) >350 1 x 5-12 kt -
Subtotal: ~12 ~12
Sea-based cruise missiles
Babur-3 SLCM (Hatf-?) - -7 450 1 x 5-12 kt -
Total ~140-150
1
Range listed is unrefueled combat range with drop tanks.
2
There may be more missiles than launchers but since each missile is dual-capable, this table assigns an average of one warhead per launcher unless noted
otherwise.
3
Yield estimate is based on the range of yields measured in the 1998 nuclear tests. It is possible that Pakistan since has developed warheads with lower and
higher yields.
4
Each NASR launcher has up to four missile tubes. But since NASR is a dual-capable system and the primary mission probably is conventional, this table
counts only one warhead per launcher.
5
The Pakistani government claims the Babur range is 700 kilometers, twice the 350-km range reported by the US intelligence community.
6
The Babur-2/1(B) seems to be an improved version of the original Babur GLCM. It was first tested on 14 December 2016.
7
The Babur-3 SLCM was first test launched on 9 January 2012 from an underwater platform.

and plans for development/deployment of [ballistic the National Command Authority’s latest statement on
missile defense].” The National Command Authority security and safety was, in part, a response to interna-
had paid similar attention to conventional weapons tional concern that Pakistan’s evolving arsenal – particu-
development at its meeting in 2016. larly its growing inventory of short-range nuclear weapon
At the 2017 meeting, according to a Pakistani Inter systems – could lead to problems with warhead manage-
Services Public Relations press release, the command ment and command and control during a crisis. Satellite
authority “reiterated Pakistan’s policy of developing and images show that security perimeters around many bases
maintaining Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the and military facilities have been upgraded over the past
policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and avoidance seven years in response to terrorist attacks.
of arms race,” while expressing confidence in the country’s Over the past decade, the US assessment of nuclear
“capability to address any form of aggression” (ISPR weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed
2017d). The National Command Authority also reviewed considerably from confidence to concern, particularly as
the “Nuclear Security Regime” of the nuclear arsenal and a result of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. In
expressed “full confidence” in both Pakistan’s command 2007, a US State Department official told Congress that,
and control systems and existing security measures meant “we’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper
to “ensure comprehensive stewardship and security of stra- structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integ-
tegic assets and materials.” It lauded the nuclear arsenal’s rity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compro-
“high standards of training and operational readiness.” mise” (Boucher 2007). In stark contrast, the Trump
The December 2017 meeting emphasized that administration assessment in 2018 was: “We are particu-
Pakistan strives for “peaceful coexistence in [South larly concerned by the development of tactical nuclear
Asia] and will endeavor to work with its neighbors to weapons that are designed for use in battlefield. We
ensure strategic stability” there (ISPR 2017d). As in 2016, believe that these systems are more susceptible to terrorist
350 H. M. KRISTENSEN ET AL.

theft and increase the likelihood of nuclear exchange in existence of Pakistan’s “low-yield, tactical nuclear
the region” (Economic Times 2017). Upon unveiling his weapons,” apparently the first time a top government
South Asia strategy on 21 August 2017, Trump urged official has done so (India Today 2015). But the New
Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, and York Times reported that although an unknown num-
noted the need to “prevent nuclear weapons and materi- ber of the tactical weapons had been built, they had not
als from coming into the hands of terrorists” (The White yet been deployed with warheads in the field (Sanger
House 2017). US concern over the security of Pakistan’s 2015).
tactical nuclear weapons precedes the Trump administra- In September 2016, in an interview on Geo News,
tion. In 2016, US Undersecretary of State Rose Pakistani defense minister Khawaja M. Asif said, “We
Gottemoeller told members of the US Congress, are always pressurised [sic] time and again that our
“Reinstate full original statement: “Battlefield nuclear tactical (nuclear) weapons, in which we have a super-
weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat iority, that we have more tactical weapons than we
because you're taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the need. It is internationally recognized that we have a
field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be superiority and if there is a threat to our security or if
made as secure” (Economic Times 2016). anyone steps on our soil and if someone’s designs are a
Pakistani officials reject such concerns and insist threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those
that nuclear weapons security is adequate. Samar weapons for our defense” (Scroll 2016).
Mubarik Mund, the former director of the country’s
National Defense Complex, explained in 2013 that a
Nuclear weapons production complex
Pakistani nuclear warhead is “assembled only at the
eleventh hour if [it] needs to be launched. It is stored Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile mate-
in three to four different parts at three to four different rial production complex that is expanding. It includes
locations. If a nuclear weapon doesn’t need to be the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant east of
launched, then it is never available in assembled Islamabad, which appears to be growing with the addi-
form” (World Bulletin 2013). tion of what could be another enrichment plant, as well
As for the unique effect of tactical nuclear weapons, as the enrichment plant at Gadwal to the north of
other Pakistani officials insist that the weapons are neither Islamabad (Albright, Burkhard, and Pabian 2018).
destabilizing nor lower the nuclear threshold. In 2015, Four heavy-water plutonium production reactors
General Khalid Kidwai, a member of Pakistan’s National appear to have been completed at what is normally
Command Authority, explained: “Pakistan opted to referred to as the Khushab Complex some 33 kilo-
develop a variety of short-range, low-yield nuclear weap- meters (20 miles) south of Khushab in Punjab pro-
ons, also dubbed tactical nuclear weapons,” as a “defensive, vince. Three of the reactors at the complex have been
deterrence response to an offensive doctrine” by India added in the past 10 years. The addition of a publicly
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 4). confirmed thermal power plant at Khushab provides
Kidwai said the NASR short-range weapon specifically new information for estimating the power of the four
“was born out of a compulsion of this thing that I men- reactors (Albright et al. 2018a). The New Labs
tioned about some people on the other side toying with the Reprocessing Plant at Nilore, east of Islamabad, which
idea of finding space for conventional war, despite reprocesses spent fuel and extracts plutonium, has been
Pakistan nuclear weapons.” Pakistan’s understanding of expanded. Meanwhile, a second reprocessing plant
India’s Cold Start strategy was, he said, that Delhi envi- located at Chashma in the northwestern part of
sioned launching quick strikes into Pakistan within two to Punjab province may have been completed (Albright
four days with eight to nine brigades simultaneously and Kelleher-Vergantini 2015).
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 8, Nuclear-capable missiles and their mobile launchers
9). Such an attack force might involve roughly 32,000– are developed and produced at the National Defence
36,000 troops. Complex (sometimes called the National Development
“I strongly believe that by introducing the variety of Complex) in the Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range
tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s inventory, and in the west of Islamabad. The complex is divided into two
strategic stability debate, we have blocked the avenues for sections. The western section south of Attock appears
serious military operations by the other side,” Kidwai to be involved in development, production, and test-
explained (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace launching of missiles and rocket engines. The eastern
2015, 4–5). section north of Fateh Jang is involved in production
After Kidwai’s statement, Pakistan’s Foreign and assembly of road-mobile Transporter Erector
Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry publicly acknowledged the Launchers (TELs), which are designed to transport
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 351

and fire missiles. Satellite images show the presence of it is the number of launchers or the warheads assigned
launchers for Shaheen I and Shaheen II ballistic mis- to them that are being discussed.
siles and Babur cruise missiles. The Fateh Jang section The amount of fissile material in warheads can be
has been expanded significantly over the past 10 years, reduced, and their yield increased, by using tritium to
with several large launcher assembly buildings. Other “boost” the fission process. But Pakistan’s tritium pro-
launcher and missile-related production and mainte- duction capability is poorly understood. A German
nance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and company allegedly provided Pakistan with a small
Taxila. amount of tritium and some tritium-processing tech-
Little is publicly known about warhead production, nology in the late 1980s (Kalinowski and Colschen
but experts have suspected for many years that the 1995),3 and China allegedly shipped some tritium
Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Wah, northwest of directly to Pakistan (Kalinowski and Colschen 1995,
Islamabad, serve a role. One of the Wah factories is 147, 181). The Khushab complex for years has been
located near a unique facility with six earth-covered rumored to produce tritium,4 and the PINSTECH
bunkers (igloos) inside a multi-layered safety perimeter complex near Nilore may do so as well (FAS 2000a).
with armed guards. The security perimeter was However, one rumored tritium extraction plant at
expanded significantly between 2005 and 2010, possibly Khushab turned out to be a coal-fired power plant
in response to terrorist attacks against other military (Burkhard, Lach, and Pabian 2017). Pakistan claimed
facilities. that all its nuclear tests in 1998 were tritium-boosted
Estimating the size of the Pakistani nuclear warhead HEU designs, but the yields detected by seismic signals
stockpile is fraught with uncertainty. A frequent mis- were not sufficient to substantiate such a capability.
take is to derive the estimate directly from the amount Nonetheless, Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman con-
of weapon-grade fissile material produced. As of the clude in The Nuclear Express that the tests included two
end of 2016, the International Panel on Fissile designs, the first of which was an HEU device that used
Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of boosting. The second test involved a plutonium device
approximately 3,400 kilograms (kg) of weapon-grade (Reed and Stillman 2009, 257–258).
(90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), If Pakistan has produced tritium and uses it in
and about 280 kg of weapon-grade plutonium. This second-generation single-stage boosted warhead
material is theoretically enough to produce between designs, then the 3,400 kg HEU and 280 kg weapon-
236 and 283 warheads, assuming that each first-gen- grade plutonium would potentially allow it to build
eration implosion-type warhead’s solid core uses either between 339 and 353 warheads, assuming that each
15 to 18 kg of weapon-grade HEU or 5 to 6 kg of weapon used either 12 kg of HEU or 4 to 5 kg of
plutonium.2 plutonium.
However, calculating stockpile size based solely on Despite these uncertainties, Pakistan is clearly
fissile material inventory is an incomplete methodology engaged in a significant build-up of its nuclear forces
that tends to produce inflated numbers. Instead, war- and has been for some time. In 2008, Peter Lavoy, then
head estimates must take several factors into account, a US intelligence officer for South Asia, told NATO
including the amount of weapon-grade fissile material that Pakistan was producing nuclear weapons at a
produced, warhead design choice and proficiency, war- faster rate than any other country in the world (US
head production rates, numbers of operational nuclear- NATO Mission 2008). Six years later, in 2014, Lavoy
capable launchers, how many of those launchers are described the purpose of the “expansion of Pakistan’s
dual-capable, nuclear strategy, and statements by gov- nuclear weapons program to include efforts to signifi-
ernment officials. cantly increase fissile material production to design and
Estimates must assume that not all of a country’s fabricate multiple nuclear warheads with varying sizes
fissile material ends up in warheads. Like other nuclear and yields, [and] to develop, test and ultimately deploy
weapon states, Pakistan probably maintains a reserve. a wide variety of delivery systems with a wide range to
Moreover, Pakistan simply lacks enough nuclear-cap- include battlefield range ballistic delivery systems for
able launchers to accommodate 200 to 300 warheads; tactical nuclear weapons” (Gul 2014)5 (Emphasis
furthermore, all of Pakistan’s launchers are thought to added.)
be dual-capable, which means that some of them, espe- Kidwai acknowledged in March 2015 that Pakistan
cially the shorter-range systems, presumably are “possesses a variety of nuclear weapons, in different
assigned to non-nuclear missions as well. Finally, offi- categories. At the strategic level, at the operational
cial statements often refer to “warheads” and “weap- level, and the tactical level” (Carnegie Endowment for
ons” interchangeably, without making it clear whether International Peace 2015, 6). In December 2017 he
352 H. M. KRISTENSEN ET AL.

provided more details, saying Pakistan’s nuclear strat- already modifying US-supplied F-16s for nuclear
egy required the “full spectrum of nuclear weapons in weapons, including West German intelligence offi-
all three categories – strategic, operational and tactical, cials reportedly telling Der Spiegel that Pakistan had
with full range coverage of the large Indian land mass already developed sophisticated computer and elec-
and its outlying territories.” He further explained that tronic technology to outfit the US F-16s with nuclear
the stockpile should have “appropriate weapons yield weapons” (Associated Press 1989). Delivery of addi-
coverage and the numbers to deter the adversary’s tional F-16s, including the more modern F-16C/D
pronounced policy of massive retaliation.” The weap- version, was delayed by concern over Pakistan’s
ons would give the Pakistani leadership the “liberty of emerging nuclear weapons program. The United
choosing from a full spectrum of targets, notwithstand- States withheld delivery in the 1990s. But the policy
ing the [Indian] Ballistic Missile Defence, to include was changed by the George W. Bush administration,
counter-value, counter-force, and battlefield” targets. which supplied Pakistan with the more modern
He added this implied that “counter-massive retaliation F-16s.
punishment will be as severe if not more” (Dawn The F-16A/Bs are based with the 38th Wing at
2017). Mushaf (formerly Sargodha) Air Base, 160 kilometers
How far Pakistan plans to go in terms of developing (100 miles) northwest of Lahore. Organized into the
a full-spectrum deterrent posture is unclear. It has 9th and 11th Squadrons (“Griffins” and “Arrows”
provided no public statements about its intent. In respectively), these aircraft have a range of 1,600 km
2015, however, Kadwai said that “the program is not (extendable when equipped with drop tanks) and most
open ended. It started with a concept of credible mini- likely are equipped to each carry a single nuclear bomb
mum deterrence, and certain numbers [of weapons] on the centerline pylon. Security perimeters at the base
were identified, and those numbers, of course, were have been upgraded since 2014. Nuclear bombs are
achieved not too far away in time. Then we translated probably not stored at the base itself but could poten-
it, like I said, to the concept of full spectrum deter- tially be kept at the Sargodha Weapons Storage
rence” in response to India’s Cold Start doctrine. As a Complex 10 km to the south. In a crisis, the bombs
result, he went on, “the numbers were modified. Now could quickly be transferred to the base, or the F-16s
those numbers, as of today, and if I can look ahead for could disperse to bases near underground storage facil-
at least 10 to 15 more years, I think they are going to be ities and receive the weapons there.
more or less okay.” He further noted, “we’re almost 90, The newest F-16C/Ds are based with the 39th Wing
95 percent there in terms of the goals that we had set at Shahbaz Air Base outside Jacobabad. The wing
out to achieve” 15 years ago (Carnegie Endowment for upgraded to F-16C/Ds from Mirages in 2011, and so
International Peace 2015, 6, 12). far has one squadron: the 5th Squadron (known as the
We estimate that Pakistan currently is producing “Falcons”). The base has been under significant expan-
sufficient fissile material to build 14 to 27 new war- sion, with numerous weapons bunkers added since
heads per year,6 although we estimate that the actual 2004. If the base has a nuclear mission, we suspect
warhead increase in the stockpile is probably around 10 the weapons are stored elsewhere in special storage
warheads per year. facilities. There are also F-16s visible at Minhas
(Kamra) Air Base northwest of Islamabad, although
that might be related to aircraft industry at the base.
Nuclear-capable aircraft
Some of the Mirage III and/or Mirage V aircraft
Pakistan probably assigns a nuclear strike mission to apparently have been equipped for nuclear weapons
select F-16A/B and Mirage III/V fighter squadrons. and have been used in test-launches of the nuclear-
The F-16 was probably the first aircraft in the nuclear capable Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile. The
role, but the Mirage quickly joined the mission. Pakistani Air Force is adding aerial refueling capability
The F-16A/Bs were supplied by the United States to the Mirage, a capability that would greatly enhance a
between 1983 and 1987. After 40 aircraft had been nuclear strike mission.
delivered, the US State Department told Congress in The Mirage fighter-bombers are focused at two
1989: “None of the F-16s Pakistan already owns or is bases. Masroor Air Base outside Karachi houses the
about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery” 32nd Wing with three Mirage squadrons: 7th
and Pakistan “will be obligated by contract not to Squadron (“Bandits”), 8th Squadron (“Haiders”), and
modify” additional F-16s “without the approval of the 22nd Squadron (“Ghazis”). A possible nuclear weapons
United States” (Schaffer 1989). Yet there were multi- storage site is located five km (three miles) northwest
ple credible reports at the time that Pakistan was of the base (Kristensen 2009), and since 2004, unique
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 353

underground facilities have been constructed at conventional warheads” and “provides an operational-
Masroor that could potentially be designed to support level capability to Pakistan’s Strategic Forces.” It said
a nuclear strike mission. This includes a possible alert the test launch “consolidates Pakistan’s deterrence cap-
hangar with underground weapons-handling ability both at the operational and strategic levels”
capability.7 (ISPR 2013a).
The other Mirage base is Rafiqui Air base near The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Ghaznavi
Shorkot, which is home to the 34th Wing with two (Hatf-3) was last reported test launched in 2014, after
Mirage squadrons: the 15th Squadron (“Cobras”) and which Inter Services Public Relations said the missile
the 27th Squadron (“Zarras”). was capable of delivering nuclear and conventional
There are also rumors that Pakistan intends to make warheads, and that the test was “the culminating
the Chinese-supplied JF-17 fighter nuclear-capable. point of the Field Training Exercise of Army Strategic
According to the Pakistani Senate Defense Committee Forces Command which was aimed at testing the
on National Defence, the pursuit of the JF-17 program operational readiness of a Strategic Missile Group
was partially triggered by US military export sanctions besides up gradation [sic] of various capabilities of
in response to Pakistan’s nuclear program, including Weapon Systems” (ISPR 2014a). Its short range of
the withholding of F-16 aircraft. “With spares for its approximately 300 km (186 miles) means that the
top-of-the-line F16s in question, and additional F-16s Ghaznavi cannot strike Delhi from Pakistani territory,
removed as an option, Pakistan sought help from its and Army units equipped with the missile are probably
Chinese ally” for the JC-17/FC-1 jet (Senate Committee based relatively near the Indian border (Kristensen
on National Defense 2016). A nuclear role could poten- 2016).
tially involve the dual-capable Ra’ad air-launched The Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) is a single-stage, solid-fuel,
cruise missile (ALCM), although plans are uncertain.8 dual-capable, short-range ballistic missile with a max-
imum range of 750 km (466 miles) that has been in
service since 2003.
Land-based ballistic missiles
The Shaheen-1 is carried on a four-axle, road-
Pakistan appears to have six currently operational mobile TEL similar to the one used for the Ghaznavi.
nuclear-capable land-based ballistic missiles: the Since 2012, Shaheen-1 test-launches have involved an
short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), extended-range version widely referred to as Shaheen-
Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4), and NASR (Hatf-9), and the med- 1A. The Pakistani government, which has declared the
ium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5) and Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6). range to be 900 km (560 miles), has used both desig-
Three other nuclear-capable ballistic missiles are nations. The Shaheen-1A was most recently reported
under development: the medium-range Shaheen-1A, test launched in 2015 (ISPR 2015b). Potential Shaheen-
Shaheen-3, and the MIRVed Ababeel. 1 deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara,
The Pakistani road-mobile ballistic missile force has and Pano Aqil.10
undergone significant development and expansion over One of the most controversial new nuclear-capable
the past decade-and-a-half. This includes possibly eight missiles in the Pakistani arsenal is the NASR (Hatf-9), a
or nine missile garrisons, including four or five along short-range, solid-fuel missile originally with a range of
the Indian border for short-range systems (Babur, only 60 km (37 miles) that has recently been extended
Ghaznavi, Shaheen-1, NASR) and three or four other to 70 km (43 miles) (ISPR 2017a). With a range too
garrisons further inland for medium-range systems short to attack strategic targets inside India, NASR
(Shaheen-2 and Ghauri).9 appears intended solely for battlefield use against
The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Abdali invading Indian troops.11 According to the Pakistani
(Hatf-2) has been in development for a long time. government, the NASR “carries nuclear warheads of
The Pentagon reported in 1997 that the Abdali appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot
appeared to have been discontinued, but flight-testing attributes” and was developed as a “quick response
resumed in 2002 and it was last reported test launched system” to “add deterrence value” to Pakistan’s strate-
in 2013. The 200-km (124-mile) missile has been dis- gic weapons development program “at shorter ranges”
played at parades several times on a four-axel road- in order “to deter evolving threats,” including evidently
mobile Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). The India’s so-called Cold Start doctrine (ISPR 2011b,
three-year gap in flight-testing indicates the Abdali 2017a). The four-axle, road-mobile TEL appears to
program may have encountered technical difficulties. use a snap-on system that can carry two or more
After the 2013 test, Inter Services Public Relations launch-tube boxes. The system has been tested in the
stated that Abdali “carries nuclear as well as past using a road-mobile quadruple box launcher. The
354 H. M. KRISTENSEN ET AL.

US intelligence community has listed the NASR as a Pakistan’s oldest nuclear-capable medium-range bal-
deployed system since 2013 (National Air and Space listic missile, the road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fuel
Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2013), and with a total of Ghauri (Hatf-5), was test-launched on 15 April 2015.
13 tests reported so far, the weapon system appears to The government said the “launch was conducted by a
be well-developed. Potential deployment locations Strategic Missile Group of the Army Strategic Forces
include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil.12 Command” for the purpose of “testing the operational
The medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-2 and technical readiness of Army Strategic Forces
(Hatf-6) apperars to be operational after many years of Command” (ISPR 2015a). The Pakistani government
development. Pakistan’s National Defense Complex has announced a range of 1,300 km (807 miles), while
assembled Shaheen-2 launchers since at least 2004 or NASIC has stated it to be 1,250 km (776 miles)
2005 (Kristensen 2007), and a 2017 US intelligence (National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC)
community report states that there are “fewer than 2017). The extra time needed to fuel the missile before
50” Shaheen-2 launchers deployed (National Air and launch makes the Ghauri more vulnerable to attack
Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2017). The than solid-fuel missiles, so it is possible that the
Pakistani government described the most recent longer-range versions of the Shaheen may eventually
Shaheen-2 test-launch, in November 2014, as a “train- replace the Ghauri.13 Potential deployment areas
ing launch” marking “the culminating point of the include the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot
Field Training Exercise of Army Strategic Forces area.14
Command which was aimed at ensuring operational On 24 January 2017, Pakistan test launched a new
readiness of a Strategic Missile Group” (ISPR 2014b). medium-range ballistic missile – Ababeel – that the
After the November 2014 test the Pakistani govern- government says is “capable of carrying multiple war-
ment reported the range as only 1,500 km heads, using Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle
(932 miles), but the US National Air and Space (MIRV) technology” (ISPR 2017b).15 The three-stage,
Intelligence Center (NASIC) continues to set the solid-fuel, nuclear-capable missile, which is currently
Shaheen-2’s range at 2,000 km (1,243 miles). The under development at the National Defense Complex,
Shaheen-2 is carried on a six-axle, road-mobile TEL. appears to be derived from the Shaheen-3 airframe
Pakistan conducted two test launches of the medium- and solid-fuel motor and has a range of 2,200 km
range Shaheen-3 in 2015. The Pakistani government said (1,367 miles). (ISPR 2017b; National Air and Space
the missile was capable of delivering a nuclear or conven- Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2017). After the test-
tional warhead, and NASIC estimates a range of 2,750 km launch, the Pakistani government declared that the
(1,709 miles) (National Air and Space Intelligence Center test was intended to validate the missile’s “various
(NASIC) 2017). The Shaheen-3 is carried on an eight-axle design and technical parameters,” and that Ababeel
TEL supplied by China and was displayed publicly for the is “aimed at ensuring survivability of Pakistan’s bal-
first time at the 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. The Shaheen-3 listic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile
will still require several more test-launches before it Defence (BMD) environment,” thus “further rein-
becomes operational. force[ing] deterrence” (ISPR 2017b). Development
The range of the Shaheen-3 is sufficient to target all of multiple-warhead capability appears to be intended
of mainland India from launch positions in most of as a countermeasure against India’s planned ballistic
Pakistan south of Islamabad. But apparently the missile missile defense system (Tasleem 2017).
was developed to do more than that. According to Gen.
Kidwai, the range of 2,750 km was determined by a
Ground- and air-launched cruise missiles
need to be able to target the Nicobar and Andaman
islands in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean that are Pakistan continues to develop versions of both the
“developed as strategic bases” where “India might think ground-launched Babur (Hatf-7) and the air-
of putting its weapons” (Carnegie Endowment for launched Ra’ad (Hatf-8) nuclear-capable cruise mis-
International Peace 2015, 10). But for a 2,750-km siles. The country tested the Babur-2/Babur-1(B)
range Shaheen-3 to reach the Andaman and Nicobar GLCM, each stated to be an enhanced version of
islands, it would need to be launched from positions in the original Babur, and the Ra’ad-2 ALCM, an
the very Eastern parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian extended-range version of the Ra’ad. The Pakistani
border. If deployed in the Western parts of Balochistan government says the Babur and Ra’ad systems both
province, however, the range of the Shaheen-3 would have “stealth capabilities” and “pinpoint accuracy,”
for the first time bring Israel within range of Pakistani and “a low-altitude, terrain-hugging missile with
nuclear missiles. high maneuverability” (ISPR 2011a, 2011c, 2016b,
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 355

2018a). The Babur and Ra’ad are both much slimmer Pakistan’s deterrence capability” by achieving “stra-
than Pakistan’s ballistic missiles, suggesting some tegic standoff capability on land and at sea” (ISPR
success with warhead miniaturization based on plu- 2016a). During a military parade in 2017, Pakistan
tonium instead of uranium. displayed what was said to be Ra’ad-2 ALCM,
The Babur is a ground-launched, subsonic, dual- apparently an enhanced version of the original
capable cruise missile that looks similar to the US Ra’ad. The Ra’ad-2 can reportedly reach targets at
Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, the Chinese a distance of 550 km (341 miles) (Khan 2017).
DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile, and the A potential deployment site for the Ra’ad is Masroor
Russian air-launched AS-15. The original Babur has Air Base outside Karachi, which is home to several
been test-launched 11 times (last in 2014) and is prob- Mirage squadrons and includes unique underground
ably operational with the armed forces. Its road-mobile facilities that might be associated with nuclear weapons
launcher appears to be a unique five-axle TEL with a storage and handling.18
three-tube box launcher that is different than the quad-
ruple box launcher used for static display. At different
Sea-launched cruise missiles
times, the Pakistani government has reported the range
to be 600 km (372 miles) and 700 km (435 miles) (ISPR Pakistan is also developing a sea-launched version of the
2011a, 2012a, 2012b), but the US intelligence commu- Babur known as Babur-3. The weapon is still in develop-
nity sets the range much lower, at 350 km (217 miles) ment and has been test-launched twice: On 9 January 2017,
(National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) from “an underwater, mobile platform” in the Indian
2017). Ocean (ISPR 2017c); and on 29 March 2018 from “an
Pakistan is developing an enhanced version of the underwater dynamic platform” (ISPR 2018b). The
Babur known as the Babur-2 or Babur-1(B) GLCM.16 Babur-3 is said to be a sea-based variant of the Babur-2
The weapon has been test-launched twice: on 14 GLCM, and to have a range of 450 km (279 miles) (ISPR
December 2016, and 14 April 2018 (ISPR 2016b, 2017c).
2018a). With a physical appearance and capabilities The Pakistani government says the Babur-3 is “cap-
similar to those of the Babur, the Babur-2/Babur-1(B) able of delivering various types of payloads . . . [that] . . .
apparently has an extended range of 700 km will provide Pakistan with a Credible Second Strike
(435 miles), and “is capable of carrying various types Capability, augmenting deterrence,” and described it
of warheads” (ISPR 2016b, 2018a). The fact that both as “a step towards reinforcing [the] policy of credible
the Babur and the “enhanced” Babur-2/Babur-1(B) minimum deterrence” (ISPR 2017c). The Babur-3 will
have been noted as possessing a range of 700 km indi- most likely be deployed on the diesel-electric Agosta
cates that the range of the initial system was likely class submarines (Khan 2015).
shorter. NASIC has not released information on an Once it becomes operational, the Babur-3 will provide
enhanced system. After the first test, the Pakistani Pakistan with a triad of nuclear strike platforms from
government noted that the system is “an important ground, air, and sea. The Pakistani government said
force multiplier for Pakistan’s strategic defence” (ISPR the Babur-3 was motivated by a need to match India’s
2016b). nuclear triad and the “nuclearization of [the] Indian
Babur TELs have been fitting out at the National Ocean Region” (ISPR 2018b). The Pakistani government
Defense Complex for several years and have recently also noted that Babur-3’s stealth technologies would be
been seen at the Akro garrison northeast of Karachi. useful in the “emerging regional Ballistic Missile Defense
The garrison includes a large enclosure with six garages (BMD) environment” (ISPR 2017c).
that have room for 12 TELs and a unique underground The future submarine-based nuclear capability is
facility that is probably used to store the missiles.17 managed by Headquarters Naval Strategic Forces
The air-launched, dual-capable Ra’ad (Hatf-8) Command (NSFC), which the government said in
has been test-launched six times, most recently in 2012 would be the “custodian of the nation’s 2nd strike
February 2016, and might be entering service soon. capability” to “strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible
The test-launches have been conducted from a Minimum Deterrence and ensure regional stability”
Mirage III fighter-bomber. The Pakistani govern- (ISPR 2012c).
ment states that the Ra’ad “can deliver nuclear and Kidwai in 2015 publicly acknowledged the need for
conventional warheads with great accuracy” (ISPR a sea-based second-strike capability and said it “will
2011c) to a range of 350 km, and “complement[s] come into play in the next few years” (Carnegie
356 H. M. KRISTENSEN ET AL.

Endowment for International Peace 2015, 16). The Disclosure statement


Pakistani Ministry of Defence Production in 2015 No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
announced a contract for “the indigenous development
of 1 [one] ship-borne system with 1 [one] Land Attack
Missile” to be completed by October 2018 Notes on contributors
(Government of Pakistan 2014–2015). Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear
Information Project with the Federation of American
Scientists in Washington, DC. His work focuses on research-
Notes ing and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the
1. For insightful analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear policy, see policies that direct them. Kristensen is a co-author of the
Siddique and Faisal (2016) and Dalton and Krepon world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford
(2015). University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media
2. These estimates are based on Table A.1 of the on nuclear weapons policy and operations. Inquiries should
International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile be directed to FAS, 1725 DeSales St NW, Sixth Floor,
Materials Report 2015: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Washington, DC, 20,036 USA; +1 (202) 5463300.
Material Stockpiles and Production report, 44. Available Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with the Federation of
at: http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr15.pdf. American Scientists in Washington, DC. His principal areas
3. See also Gordon (1989). of expertise include writing and research on all aspects of the
4. For references to tritium production at Khushab, see nuclear weapons programs of the United States, Russia,
Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar (2005) and FAS Britain, France, and China, as well as India, Pakistan, and
(2000b). Israel. He is the author of Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie
5. One year after providing this description of the R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (2002).
Pakistani nuclear warhead program, Lavoy was He has co-authored the Nuclear Notebook column since May
appointed as Special Assistant to the President and 1987.
Senior Director for South Asia at the National
Security Council. Julia Diamond is a consultant to the Nuclear Information
6. These estimates are based on reprocessing and ura- Project. Julia recently completed her master's degree in
nium enrichment plant capacities in International Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies at the Middlebury
Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Materials Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Her other
Report 2015: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material areas of research include US-Russian arms control and
Stockpiles and Production report, Appendices 2 and nuclear strategy.
3, 48–49. Available at: http://fissilematerials.org/
library/gfmr15.pdf.
7. For analysis of possible nuclear facilities at Masroor
Air Base, see Kristensen (2016).
8. See Fisher (2016) and Ansari (2013). References
9. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see
Albright, D., S. Burkhard, C. Chopin, and F. Pabian. 2018.
Kristensen (2016).
New Thermal Power Estimates of the Khushab Nuclear
10. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see
Reactors, Institute for Science and International Security,
Kristensen (2016).
May 23. Available at: http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/
11. For an excellent analysis of the doctrine and Pakistan’s
detail/new-thermal-power-estimates-of-the-khushab-
potential use of battlefield nuclear weapons, see
nuclear-reactors/12
Nayyar and Mian (2010).
Albright, D., S. Burkhard, and F. Pabian. 2018. Pakistan’s
12. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see
Growing Uranium Enrichment Program, Institute for
Kristensen (2016).
Science and International Security, May 30. Available at:
13. The Ghauri MRBM is based on North Korea’s No
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/pakistans-grow
Dong missile.
ing-uranium-enrichment-program/12
14. For analysis of possible missile brigade locations, see
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15. Note that the correct expansion of MIRV is Multiple Chashma Plutonium Separation Plant: Possibly
Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle. Operational, Institute for Science and International
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