Professional Documents
Culture Documents
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
2015])
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J : p
Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was
declared dead on arrival. Later, at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District office, Arca gave
descriptions of the faces of appellant and the dark thin man who
stabbed Yap ("John Doe"). From a surveillance digital photo and
video clip shown to him, Arca positively identified Abner Astor
(Astor) as one of the two men sitting beside the store as
lookouts. Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against
appellant and Astor. But only appellant was arrested as Astor,
John Doe and Peter Doe remained at large.
Dr. Belgira affirmed the findings in his Medico-Legal
Report 5 stating:
TRUNK:
1) Stab wound, left anterior costal region, measuring
2 x 0.5 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline, 9
cm deep. The wound tract is directed
posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards,
cutting the sixth anterior thoracic rib and
piercing the heart.
CONCLUSION:
The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to a
stab wound of the trunk.
He explained that it was possible that the lone stab wound
caused by a sharp object, such as a knife, was inflicted while the
victim was standing, and found no other injuries such as defense
wounds. 6
For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of
the incident, he was at his house in Bigaa taking care of his
three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes. He
stayed in the house until his wife finished the laundry at past
3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his co-accused Astor. While
he admitted that he was a resident of Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his
family transferred to their other house at Bigaa. He denied
knowing Arca and he does not know of any motive for Arca to
testify against him. He worked in a copra company in Lidong but
stopped reporting for work after May 16, 2006 as he was selling
fish. He was arrested by the police at the rotunda in Legazpi
when he was buying medicine for his sick child. 7
Appellant's wife, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified to
confirm that at the time of the incident he was at their house
while she was doing the laundry just adjacent to their house. On
cross-examination, she was asked the distance between their
place and Bgy. Rawis and she replied that it will take less than
one hour from Bigaa to Rawis. 8
On June 24, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
appellant of the crime charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Court
hereby finds accused Charlie Orosco GUILTY of the crime
of robbery with homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of
Lourdes Yap P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of
death, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Insofar as the other accused is concerned, the case is
hereby sent to the archives, pending their eventual
arrest.HAICTD
So Ordered. 9
ATTY. BAÑARES
We have already foreseen the witness to pinpoint at
anyone.
ACP NUQUI
No. He said that the . . . .
ATTY. BAÑARES
Then, let him voluntarily do it.
ACP NUQUI
Okay.
ATTY. BAÑARES
Your Honor, I move that the prosecutor will transfer to
another question because we keep on waiting
already.
ACP NUQUI
Your Honor, it is understandable that even he is slow, he
keeps on glancing at the person.
COURT
Observations are all noted.
xxx xxx xxx
ACP NUQUI
At this point, Your Honor, I would like to make of record
that when it comes to the person of Charlie Orosco,
Your Honor, he stopped and did not say — he did not
nod or do anything of what he has been doing when
the other persons were identified.
COURT
Okay. Noted. 11
A. I am afraid.
COURT
He can not because he is afraid. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
At the next hearing, Arca was recalled to the witness stand and
this time he was able to pinpoint appellant as among those
persons who robbed and killed Yap, thus:
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q. You mentioned that you saw two (2) persons talking to
Lourdes Yap. Who are these persons you are referring
to?
ATTY. CHAN
Your Honor please, we are again registering our objection.
COURT
Witness may answer.
WITNESS
A. Charlie Orosco and a certain thin person.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q. Why are you able to say that Charlie Orosco was one of
the persons talking, how long have you known
Charlie Orosco?
A. He always go with a fisherman and act as helper and
because of that I know him.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q. You mentioned that you have long known Charlie
Orosco. Will you look around and point to him if he is
in Court?
INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man wearing
a yellow T-shirt with handcuff and when asked
answered by the name of Charlie Orosco.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
No further questions Your Honor. 13
Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court
concluded that he had positively identified appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap, viz.:
Here, Albert Arca, the prosecution's main witness,
positively identified accused Orosco as one of [the] two
men who robbed and killed Lourdes Yap on that fateful
day. As observed by the trial court during the bail
hearings, when asked to identify one of the men who
robbed and killed the victim, Arca was trembling and
constantly looking towards the direction of accused
Orosco. Though simple-minded, Arca was well-aware of the
possible consequences his testimony could trigger. To the
Court's mind, Arca's act of constantly looking towards
Orosco's direction whenever he was asked to point out
one of the culprits, is a mute but eloquent manner of
identifying Orosco as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
As such, Arca's act is sufficient identification already.
Later, when Arca was recalled to the stand to answer
some additional questions, he was able to gather enough
courage to point out to Orosco as the man who held the
hands of Lourdes Yap while his companion stabbed her.
Arca stated that he was hesitant to identify and point out
accused earlier because he feared what Orosco might do
to him. Incidentally, both Orosco and his wife stated that
they do know neither Albert Arca nor Lourdes Yap. Thus, it
appears that there is no reason whatsoever for Arca to lie
and attribute the crime to Orosco. Following settled
jurisprudence, Arca's positive identification of Orosco
prevails over the latter's alibi. 14
IECcAT
DECISION
GARCIA, J : p
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. However, you saw these two (2) accused, Juan Cabbab
and Segundino Calpito shoot at you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell the court if how far were these two (2)
accused when they were firing at you?
A. Eight (8) meters, sir.
Q. And therefore what time is it when they were firing at
you?
A. If I'm not mistaken it was 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. 10
xxx xxx xxx
William Belmes on cross-examination
ATTY. YANURIA:
Q. In other words, it was you being shot out by Segundino
Calpito and Juan Cabbab but you did not see them
shoot at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan?
A. I saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino fire at Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan (the witness using the
word "banat") and when they already fell down, they
continued firing attempt and in my case I rolled and
they also fired at me. 11
The above testimony adequately showed that Belmes was able to
look at and see appellant at the time he perpetrated the crime. To
our mind, Belmes could not have made a mistake with respect to
appellant's identity, what with the fact that just a few hours
before the incident, it was even appellant himself who invited
Belmes and his group to play poker. For sure, Belmes had a face-
to-face encounter with appellant before the assault and thus
would be able to unmistakably recognize him especially because
at the time of the attack, Belmes was just eight (8) meters away
from appellant and conditions of visibility were very good at the
time of the incident as it was only around 4:00 in the afternoon.
Jurisprudence recognizes that it is the most natural reaction of
victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the
perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the
crime was committed. 12 cSEAHa
459-477)
[G.R. No. 195244. June 22, 2015.]
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite
crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony
of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be
the product of his imagination. 8
On July 23, 2010, however, the CA, giving credence to the
child witness, and opining that his inconsistencies did not
discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the
appellant, 9 ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision dated January 27, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 211 of Mandaluyong City in
Crim. Case No. MC03-7597, is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION in that the award of P57,500.00 as
actual damages should be DELETED and in lieu thereof,
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should
be AWARDED the heirs of Josephine Castro y Barrera.
SO ORDERED. 10
Issues
In this appeal, the appellant posits that the adverse
testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being filled with
inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that unlike
him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of the
house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to Carl's
recollection, the place was not even dark when the stabbing
attack on the victim occurred because his father said that he
had turned the light on upon hearing somebody
shouting "Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten
his bolo, and gone outside the house. 11
Moreover, the appellant maintains that the Prosecution
did not prove that violence or intimidation was employed in the
course of the robbery. He argues that he could not be held
liable for robbery by using force upon things considering that
the culprit had neither broken any wall, roof, floor, door or
window to gain entry in the house nor entered the house
through an opening not intended for entrance. If at all, he
could be liable only for the separate crimes of theft and
homicide, not of the composite crime of robbery with
homicide. 12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
the evidence showed that the appellant's principal intent had
been to rob the victim's house, with the homicide being
perpetrated as a mere incident of the robbery; and that Carl
positively identified the appellant as the person who had
stabbed the victim, his identification bearing "all the earmarks
of credibility especially when he has no motive for lying about
the identity of the accused." 13
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The most important task of the State in the successful
prosecution of the accused is his credible and competent
identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, this
appeal turns on whether or not the identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was
credible and competent considering that the identifying
witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony
positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the
person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and
killed his mother.
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability
to relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards
that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Courtmakes clear who may
and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. —
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome
of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification. (18 a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. — The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of
their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception
to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to
render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
(19a)
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a
relevant event or incident, and can communicate such
awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a
witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a
person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of
the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with
which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent,
for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not
grounds for disqualification. 14cDSAEI
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J :p
On February 10, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape.
The RTC gave credence and probative weight to Clarissa's
testimony and rejected the defenses of denial and alibi of the
accused. The court ruled that the latter's testimonies were full of
inconsistencies and were not in accord with human experience.
The RTC further ruled that the four accused conspired in the
robbery with rape. The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
(1) Finding RODOLFO SUYU, WILLY SUYU, FRANCIS
CAINGLET and ROMMEL MACARRUBO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape and
hereby sentence each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua;
(2) Ordering the accused to pay, jointly and severally, the
amount of P1,510.00 representing the value of the jewelry
(earring) and cash belonging to Clarissa Angeles; and
(3) Ordering the accused to indemnify, jointly and
severally, Clarissa Angeles the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED. 47
The accused appealed the decision to the Court. After the parties
submitted their respective briefs, the Court ordered the transfer
of the case to the CA pursuant to its ruling in People v. Mateo. 48
The CA rendered judgment affirming, with modification, the
decision of the trial court. The fallo of the decision of the CA
reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the
decision dated 10 February 2003 of the court a quo is
perforce AFFIRMED but with the modification that insofar
as the accused-appellant ROMMEL MACARUBBO is
concerned, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to
Fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, in its medium
period, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 49
Pros. Sagucio:
Q: Now, you said that when you were first investigated by
the police or at the CVRH that you are (sic) not raped
which is half true (sic) and now when you were again
investigated you said you were raped, what made
you changed (sic) your mind? ACaTIc
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Suyu, G.R. No. 170191, [August 16, 2006], 530 PHIL
|||
569-597)
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p
Findings:
1. Gunshot wound, point of entry, 0.5 x 0.5 cms,
circular, with inverted edges at the mid left
frontal area. Hematoma formation is noted at
the site of entry.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HE[M]ORRHAGE SECONDARY [TO] GUNSHOT
WOUND
Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound
due to the circular and inverted edges of the point of entry. She
concluded that since there was no point of exit, the victim was
shot at close range. 8
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for a long
time. He stated that he was on his way home to the
neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9,
2003, in the light of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter the
house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to
the victim's right forehead and demanded money. De la Peña hid
behind a tree ten meters away. When the victim stated that the
money was not in his possession, appellant shot him. He went
home and reported the incident the following morning. 9
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on
his way to the victim's house to collect his daily wage when he
saw appellant in the yard of the victim's house. He inquired from
appellant if the victim was around. Appellant responded that the
victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was in
his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning
that he learned that the victim died. Asor then proceeded to
report the incident. 10
EASIHa
The victim's mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for
funeral and burial expenses in the amount of P33,300.00.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him.
Appellant claimed that he was in Batangas City, with his brother
Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to
Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of "robbery with
murder." 11 Appellant's brother, Benjamin, tried to corroborate his
testimony. 12
The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence
presented, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the affirmative
testimony of the prosecution's witnesses deserved more weight
than the appellant's defense of denial and alibi. Thus, finding the
prosecution's witnesses to be credible and that the killing of the
victim to be by reason of the robbery, the RTC decision's decretal
portion read:EcSCAD
707)
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
The Case
Aurora Engson Fransdilla (Fransdilla), the lone appellant,
seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on February 28,
2011, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her
conviction and that of her co-accused for robbery on the basis
of conspiracy, with modifications as to the penalty imposed,
under the decision rendered on September 15, 1999 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, in Quezon City. 2
Antecedents
As factual background, the CA adopted the summary
rendered by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
appellee's brief, viz.:
On February 20, 1991 between 3 o'clock and 4
o'clock in the afternoon, at private complainants'
residence at No. 24, Mabait St., Teachers Village, Quezon
City, private complainant Lalaine Yreverre saw appellant
Aurora Engson in front of their gate. Upon noticing
Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what
is their purpose, as there were four (4) of them. Aurora
then inquired about Cynthia Yreverre, n Lalaine's sister.
The latter replied that Cynthia was in the Japanese
Embassy and asked Aurora if there was any other person
whom she wanted to talk to. It was then that Aurora told
Lalaine that she was from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA). It was upon said pretension
that Lalaine offered herself to instead talk to her and
allowed her to enter their house. When they were already
having a conversation, Aurora asked Lalaine if she could
use the telephone, which the latter acceded to and
handed her a cordless telephone. Lalaine noticed that
Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone and even
said that the person she was calling did not know how to
use the telephone. But still, Aurora kept on dialing the
telephone.
Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette.
After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the four (4) other
men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly
came inside the house. The four (4) men stood behind
Aurora who was still dialing the telephone. When Aurora
told that she could not contact the person she was
calling, she asked Lalaine if she could use the comfort
room, which the latter again permitted. Aurora stood up,
put down the telephone, got her bag and went to the
comfort room. When Aurora came back, she sat down
again but in crossed-legs as she said she was having a
menstrual period. Upon saying that, Lalaine's attention
was focused on her. At this juncture, accused Edgardo
Cacal poked a gun at Lalaine's neck and announced that
it was a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo Cacal was
poking a gun at Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang
and the two (2) other men proceeded to the kitchen. In
the kitchen, Danilo and his two (2) other companions
herded their maids, private complainant's niece and
cousin inside the bodega.
Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at
Lalaine's neck, thereafter, pulled Lalaine's hair and
dragged her upstairs and brought her inside Cynthia's
room. The gun still being poked at Lalaine, Cacal looked
around the room and when he spotted upon the vault he
dropped Lalaine, opened the door and called for his
companions to come along. Accused Cuanang came up
and the two (Cacal and Cuanang) carried the vault and
brought it downstairs. But before they went downstairs,
they threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to just
stay in the room, but Lalaine opened the door and
followed them.
When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused
Cacal turned his back and saw her. Accused Cacal then
brought her inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal
pushed her towards her bed and she fell. Cacal told her
to just stay, and then he searched the room. Lalaine
managed to stand up but Cacal slapped her. While sitting,
accused Cuanang came and tied her arms at her back.
While she was being tied, appellant Aurora Fransdilla
peeped inside the room. It was also at the time that
accused Cacal and Cuanang searched the entire room
and took all the jewelries and things they saw. TIADCc
P10,000.0
two (2) pairs of gold earrings
0
180,000.0
one (1) gold necklace with pendant
0
one (1) Louie Viton Brown
11,000.00
Leather (sic)
one (1) Gucci Ladies watch 13,000.00
two (2) gold earrings w/diamond
80,000.00
pendant
CASH MONEY 7,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated as
follows:
1. The identity of all the accused as indicated in the
information.
2. The accused Manuel Silao and Edgar Silao are brothers
and first cousins of private complainant Cynthia
Yreverre and prosecution witness Lalaine Yreverre.
3. The accused Manuel Silao had entered the house of
complainant on several occasions to visit relatives.
4. The accused Edgardo Cacal is the driver of Manuel Silao
and knows Manuel's brother accused Edgar Silao.
5. The accused Manuel Silao has a pending criminal case
for illegal possession of firearms before the RTC,
Manila.
6. The accused Manuel Silao is the owner of one Cal. 9mm
Springfield bearing Serial No. 64624 with one
magazine containing eight (8) ammunitions, although
only 4 were delivered to the Court.
7. The accused were all investigated in connection with
the instant case, without the assistance of counsel.
8. The person depicted in the picture marked as Exhibit
"E" is accused Manuel Silao while the one in the
photograph marked as Exhibit "D" is accused Danilo
Cuanang.
9. On February 20, 1991, Edgar Silao was in Quezon City. 5
TITLE 10 – CHAPTER II
[G.R. No. 160188. June 21, 2007.]
DECISION
TINGA, J :
p
This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal
law jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively concedes having
performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead
insists that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated
theft only, not the felony in its consummated stage of which he
was convicted. The proposition rests on a common theory
expounded in two well-known decisions 1 rendered decades ago
by the Court of Appeals, upholding the existence of frustrated
theft of which the accused in both cases were found guilty.
However, the rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed
by this Court.
As far as can be told, 2 the last time this Court extensively
considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or
consummated theft was in 1918, in People v. Adiao.3 A more
cursory treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People
v. Sobrevilla, 4 and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC. 5 This petition now
gives occasion for us to finally and fully measure if or how
frustrated theft is susceptible to commission under the Revised
Penal Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems
from an Information 6 charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela
(petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft.
On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon
were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within
the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago
(Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the
open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who
was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of
detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded
these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was
waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and
after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide
Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in
the open parking space. 7
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He
boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where
Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these
acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was
leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a
receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by
fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow
security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise
recovered. 8 The filched items seized from the duo were four (4)
cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and
three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an
aggregate value of P12,090.00. 9
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security
office before they were transferred on the same day to the Baler
Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon City, for
investigation. It appears from the police investigation records
that apart from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons
were apprehended by the security guards at the scene and
delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in
connection with the incident. However, after the matter was
referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only
petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant
City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the
day after the incident. 10
CaAcSE
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find
expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As
a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws,
it is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly
provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision,
disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question
whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the
undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary
is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately,
our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From
the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term
is embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the
acts of execution. For example, the statutory definition of murder
or homicide expressly uses the phrase "shall kill another," thus
making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the
victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code, its elements are spelled out as
follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft . — Theft is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter's
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall
fail to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged
the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or object of the damage
caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a
field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of
its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or
shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm
products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three
alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be
committed. 41 In the present discussion, we need to concern
ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it
that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and
sustained. On the face of the definition, there is only one
operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft — the
taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the
provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft,
there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that
the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or
violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without
the consent of the owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft
as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely:
(1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. 42
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the
definition of theft, which under early Roman law as defined by
Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass "any kind of
physical handling of property belonging to another against the
will of the owner," 43 a definition similar to that by Paulus that a
thief "handles (touches, moves) the property of
another." 44 However, with the Institutes of Justinian, the idea had
taken hold that more than mere physical handling, there must
further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus:
"[f]urtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel
ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve." 45 This requirement
of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was maintained in both the
Spanish and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since been
abandoned in Great Britain. 46
In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded
with apoderamiento, or "unlawful taking," to characterize theft.
Justice Regalado notes that the concept ofapoderamiento once
had a controversial interpretation and application. Spanish law
had already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was
constitutive ofapoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled
with "the intent to appropriate the object in order to
constitute apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive
the lawful owner of the thing." 47 However, a conflicting line of
cases decided by the Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that
there must be permanency in the taking 48or an intent to
permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property; 49 or that
there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent,
as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance
of the proprietary rights of the owner already
constituted apoderamiento. 50 Ultimately, as Justice Regalado
notes, the Court adopted the latter thought that there was no
need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his
property to constitute an unlawful taking. 51DHTECc
It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish
decisions cited therein, that the criminal actors in all these
cases had been able to obtain full possession of the personal
property prior to their apprehension. The interval between the
commission of the acts of theft and the apprehension of the
thieves did vary, from "sometime later" in the 1898 decision; to
the very moment the thief had just extracted the money in a
purse which had been stored as it was in the 1882 decision; and
before the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen from the
building where the theft took place, as had happened
in Adiao and the 1897 decision. Still, such intervals proved of no
consequence in those cases, as it was ruled that the thefts in
each of those cases was consummated by the actual possession
of the property belonging to another.
In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an
accused was guilty only of frustrated rather than consummated
theft. The case is People v. Sobrevilla, 57where the accused, while
in the midst of a crowd in a public market, was already able to
abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the
latter, perceiving the theft, "caught hold of the [accused]'s shirt-
front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a struggle,
he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who
was afterwards caught by a policeman." 58 In rejecting the
contention that only frustrated theft was established, the Court
simply said, without further comment or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is groundless. The
[accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-book, and that
determines the crime of theft. If the pocket-book was
afterwards recovered, such recovery does not affect the
[accused's] criminal liability, which arose from the
[accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book. 59
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish
Supreme Court cases cited in the latter, in that the fact that the
offender was able to succeed in obtaining physical possession of
the stolen item, no matter how momentary, was able to
consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited
therein contradict the position of petitioner in this case. Yet to
simply affirm without further comment would be disingenuous, as
there is another school of thought on when theft is
consummated, as reflected in the Diño and Floresdecisions.
Diño was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years
after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The accused therein, a
driver employed by the United States Army, had driven his truck
into the port area of the South Harbor, to unload a truckload of
materials to waiting U.S. Army personnel. After he had finished
unloading, accused drove away his truck from the Port, but as he
was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was
stopped by an M.P. who inspected the truck and found therein
three boxes of army rifles. The accused later contended that he
had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the
agreement that they were to meet him and retrieve the rifles
after he had passed the checkpoint. The trial court convicted
accused of consummated theft, but the Court of Appeals
modified the conviction, holding instead that only frustrated theft
had been committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident
intent of the accused was to let the boxes of rifles "pass through
the checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as the truck had
already unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it would be allowed
to pass through the check point without further investigation or
checking." 60 This point was deemed material and indicative that
the theft had not been fully produced, for the Court of Appeals
pronounced that "the fact determinative of consummation is the
ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if
it were more or less momentary." 61 Support for this proposition
was drawn from a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated
24 January 1888 (1888 decision), which was quoted as follows:
Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa
sustraida sea determinate de la consumacion del delito de
hurto es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que
permitan al sustractor la libre disposicion de aquella,
siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente, pues de
otra suerte, dado el concepto del delito de hurto, no puede
decirse en realidad que se haya producido en toda su
extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de tomar la
cosa ajena. 62
Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then
concluded:
This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order
to make the booty subject to the control and disposal of
the culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed
through the M.P. check point, but since the offense was
opportunely discovered and the articles seized after all
the acts of execution had been performed, but before the
loot came under the final control and disposal of the
looters, the offense can not be said to have been fully
consummated, as it was frustrated by the timely
intervention of the guard. The offense committed,
therefore, is that of frustrated theft. 63
CHDaAE
Diño thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to
freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of apprehension is
determinative as to whether the theft is consummated or
frustrated. This theory was applied again by the Court of Appeals
some 15 years later, in Flores, a case which according to the
division of the court that decided it, bore "no substantial
variance between the circumstances [herein] and in
[Diño]." 64 Such conclusion is borne out by the facts in Flores. The
accused therein, a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring
Company, issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea van to the
truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto
his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck
driver proceeded to show the delivery receipt to the guard on
duty at the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on
inspecting the van, and discovered that the "empty" sea van had
actually contained other merchandise as well. 65 The accused was
prosecuted for theft qualified by abuse of confidence, and found
himself convicted of the consummated crime. Before the Court of
Appeals, accused argued in the alternative that he was guilty
only of attempted theft, but the appellate court pointed out that
there was no intervening act of spontaneous desistance on the
part of the accused that "literally frustrated the theft." However,
the Court of Appeals, explicitly relying on Diño, did find that the
accused was guilty only of frustrated, and not consummated,
theft.
IV.
The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was
guilty of frustrated, and not consummated, theft. As we
undertake this inquiry, we have to reckon with the import of this
Court's 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC. 78
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had
espied four (4) persons in the premises of his plantation, in the
act of gathering and tying some coconuts. The accused were
surprised by the owner within the plantation as they were
carrying with them the coconuts they had gathered. The accused
fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized, and were
subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to
the police. After trial, the accused were convicted of qualified
theft, and the issue they raised on appeal was that they were
guilty only of simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was
qualified, following Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, 79 but
further held that the accused were guilty only of frustrated
qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of
whether the theft was consummated or frustrated was raised by
any of the parties. What does appear, though, is that the
disposition of that issue was contained in only two sentences,
which we reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified
theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the felony
as a consequence. They were not able to carry the
coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely
arrival of the owner. 80
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment,
whether Diño, Flores or the Spanish authorities who may have
bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed evident problems with
this formulation in Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the
actors "were not able to perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the felon as a consequence." 81 However,
per Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is frustrated
"when the offender performs all the acts of execution," though
not producing the felony as a result. If the offender was not able
to perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted,
provided that the non-performance was by reason of some cause
or accident other than spontaneous
desistance. Empelis concludes that the crime was frustrated
because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to
the timely arrival of the owner. However, following Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, these facts should elicit the conclusion that
the crime was only attempted, especially given that the acts
were not performed because of the timely arrival of the owner,
and not because of spontaneous desistance by the offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we
consider the present petition. Even if the two sentences we had
cited actually aligned with the definitions provided in Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code, such passage bears no reflection that it
is the product of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal
or jurisprudential thought. Instead, the passage is offered as if it
were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so settled it
required no further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or
even cited as authority on theft. Indeed, we cannot see
how Empelis can contribute to our present debate, except for the
bare fact that it proves that the Court had once deliberately
found an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Even if Empelis were
considered as a precedent for frustrated theft, its doctrinal value
is extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that
inform it, and also by the fact that it has not been entrenched by
subsequent reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable
given that frustrated theft is viable in this jurisdiction.
Considering the flawed reasoning behind its conclusion of
frustrated theft, it cannot present any efficacious argument to
persuade us in this case. Insofar as Empelis may imply that
convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this
jurisdiction, that decision is subject to reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the
1870 Codigo Penal de España was then in place. The definition of
the crime of theft, as provided then, read as follows:
Son reos de hurto:
1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o
intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas,
toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de
su dueño.
It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the
aforecited Spanish Supreme Court decisions were handed down.
However, the said code would be revised again in 1932, and
several times thereafter. In fact, under the Codigo Penal Español
de 1995, the crime of theft is now simply defined as "[e]l que, con
ánimo de lucro, tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad
de su dueño será castigado." 82
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal
code of Spain, "la libre disposicion" of the property is not an
element or a statutory characteristic of the crime. It does appear
that the principle originated and perhaps was fostered in the
realm of Spanish jurisprudence.
The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in
his 1926 commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal de España.
Therein, he raised at least three questions for the reader whether
the crime of frustrated or consummated theft had occurred. The
passage cited in Diño was actually utilized by Viada to answer
the question whether frustrated or consummated theft was
committed "[e]l que en el momento mismo de apoderarse de la
cosa ajena, viéndose sorprendido, la arroja al suelo ." 83Even as
the answer was as stated in Diño, and was indeed derived from
the 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, that decision's
factual predicate occasioning the statement was apparently very
different from Diño, for it appears that the 1888 decision involved
an accused who was surprised by the employees of a
haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of clothing off a
mannequin, and who then proceeded to throw away the garment
as he fled. 84
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated
theft, and willingly recites decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain that have held to that effect. 85 A few decades later, the
esteemed Eugenio Cuello Calón pointed out the inconsistent
application by the Spanish Supreme Court with respect to
frustrated theft.
Hay frustración cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por
las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del carro
que los conducia a otro que tenían preparado, 22 febrero
1913; cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto por la
intervención de la policia situada en el local donde se
realizó la sustracción que impidió pudieran los reos
disponer de lo sustraído, 30 de octubre 1950. Hay "por lo
menos" frustración, si existe apoderamiento, pero el
culpale no llega a disponer de la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay
frustración "muy próxima" cuando el culpable es detenido
por el perjudicado acto seguido de cometer la
sustracción, 28 febrero 1931. Algunos fallos han
considerado la existencia de frustración cuando,
perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento de
llevar los efectos hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889,
22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo 1921; esta doctrina no es
admissible, éstos, conforme a lo antes expuesto, son
hurtos consumados. 86
Ultimately, Cuello Calón attacked the very idea that frustrated
theft is actually possible:
La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que
el hurto se consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la
disposición del agente. Con este criterio coincide la
doctrina sentada últimamente porla jurisprudencia
española que generalmente considera consumado el hurto
cuando el culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y ésta quede
por tiempo más o menos duradero bajo su poder. El hecho
de que éste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es
indiferente. El delito no pierde su carácter de consumado
aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o
fuere recuperada. No se concibe la frustración, pues es
muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la
consumación del hurto no lo consume efectivamente, los
raros casos que nuestra jurisprudencia, muy vacilante,
declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos
consumados. 87 (Emphasis supplied)
Cuello Calón's submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike
Viada, who was content with replicating the Spanish Supreme
Court decisions on the matter, Cuello Calón actually set forth his
own thought that questioned whether theft could truly be
frustrated, since "pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es
necesario para la consumación del hurto no lo consume
efectivamente." Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee
how the execution of all the acts necessary for the completion of
the crime would not produce the effect of theft. SCADIT
DECISION
PERALTA, * J :
p
II.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION RELIED
NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE BUT ON THE
WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE
RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN PHILIPPINES VS.
ALVARIO.
III.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT [AFFIRMED] THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE [THE] FACT [THAT] THERE WAS NO
FURTIVE TAKING OR UNLAWFUL ASPORTATION, IN THE
CRIMINAL SENSE, CONSIDERING THAT THE TAKING, IF
AT ALL, WAS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND
ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT
IN ABUNDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL., AND THE
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE RECEIPT MARKED AS EXHIBIT "2"
FOR THE DEFENSE, LIKEWISE MARKED AS EXHIBIT "C"
FOR THE PROSECUTION (COMMON EVIDENCE) NOT
FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DUE TO THE GROSS
NEGLIGENCE OF THE FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONER IN THE GREATER INTEREST OF JUSTICE,
ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN SARRAGA, SR. VS. BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK. 12
We deny.
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons
nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter's consent. 13 As defined and penalized, the
elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking
was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the
consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished
without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons
or force, upon things. 14 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an
internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the
offender of the thing subject of asportation. 15 Although proof
as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of
the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain is the usual
motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful
property appertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. 16 As to the concept of "taking" —
The only requirement for a personal property to be
the object of theft under the penal code is that it be
capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of
"asportation," which is defined as "carrying away."
Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft
provision of the penal code does not require asportation
or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner
of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised Penal
Code includes any act intended to transfer possession
which . . . may be committed through the use of the
offenders' own hands, as well as any mechanical device .
. . . 17
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the
taking of the jeep's alternator, starter, battery, and two tires
with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were
installed in the pick-up owned by Lim. 18 With such admission,
the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the
missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the
transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds that Medina
unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind
the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through
the presentation of supporting documentary evidence or
corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the
owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were
exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim
consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts;
and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from
the jeep and their placement to the pick-up. Neither did Medina
adduce any justifying 19 or exempting 20 circumstance to avoid
criminal liability.
On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he
entrusted to Medina the jeep's repair it was still in running
condition and complete with alternator, starter, battery, and
tires, which went missing by the time the vehicle was
recovered from the auto shop. 21 Likewise, the testimony of
Beltran is definite and straightforward. He declared that he
was not able to get the jeep in the morning of September 4,
2002 because its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with
rims could not be found, and that when he asked Medina as to
their whereabouts the latter told him that he took them, placed
the starter in Lim's pick-up while the alternator was in the
repair shop. 22 Medina informed him that the jeep's missing
parts were actually installed to Lim's other vehicle which was
also being repaired at the time. 23However, Beltran did not know
or had not seen other vehicles owned by Lim at Medina's
shop. 24 In the afternoon of the same day, he was able to get
the jeep but not its missing parts. 25 He concluded that they
were lost because he inspected the jeep. 26
Abundo v. Sandiganbayan, 27 which was relied upon by
Medina, does not apply. In said case, the element of lack of
owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent
since the records showed that Abundo made a request in
writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among the
pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A
memorandum receipt was issued and signed. Pursuant thereto,
the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking or
unlawful asportation. The physical and juridical possession of
the junk chassis was transferred to Abundo at his request,
with the consent or acquiescence of the owner, the
Government, represented by the public officials who had legal
and physical possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft
implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there can be no
theft when the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of
the thing. The Court agreed with the observation of the
Solicitor General that a thief does not ask for permission to
steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the consent or
acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious. 28
Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported
acknowledgment receipt 29 that he and Tumamao identified
during their presentation as witnesses for the defense.
According to his testimony, Mendoza came to his (Medina's)
place and saw the subject auto parts while being transferred
from the jeep to the pick-up and that, relative thereto, Medina
even called barangay officials and let them signed a document
to bear witness on the matter. 30 The document, dated July 25,
2002, which was marked as Exhibit "2," was signed by
Mendoza, Jovy Bardiaga (said to be Lim's chief mechanic),
Mario Pascual (said to be Medina's helper), and Rosalina
Bautista and Tumamao (said to be barangay kagawads).
Ostensibly, they signed the document while facing each other
in front of Medina's house. 31
aTHCSE
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J : p
PHIL 126-137)
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J : p
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
In an Order 2 dated January 18, 2005, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132, ordered appellant's release
from confinement after having posted a bond in the amount
P100,000.00 undertaken by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance
Company, Inc. under Bond No. 8385. Appellant was thereafter
arraigned where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. 3 Trial on
the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that private complainant Juanita
Flores (Flores) was engaged in the business of guaranteeing
purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and
disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration.
Appellant initially worked as Flores' househelp but was
eventually hired to work at Flores' office performing clerical jobs
like sorting invoices. When Flores' business grew, appellant was
assigned to bill and collect from sub-guarantors, and to encash
and deposit checks. On July 15, 2004, appellant collected
P640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. However, appellant did not
remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in her (Flores') account.
Instead, she issued 15 personal checks totaling P640,353.86 and
deposited them to Flores' account. All the checks were
dishonored upon presentment due to "account closed." Appellant
thereafter absconded.
For her part, appellant denied having stolen the amount of
P640,353.86.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
In a Judgment 4 dated March 26, 2008, the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 132, found appellant guilty of the crime of qualified theft,
thus:
Given the foregoing, accused Nielles took P640,353.86
belonging to private complainant Juanita J. Flores,
without the latter's consent. The taking was done with
intent to gain because when the accused's checks
bounced, she failed to remit or return the amount. The
accused's act was accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, but rather by the use of abuse of confidence
reposed [by] private complainant [upon] her. Thus, the
elements of theft, as well as the circumstances that made
the same as qualified theft, are present in the instant
case. AHDacC
The CA, however, in its Decision 8 dated May 26, 2011, was not
impressed by appellant's protestations. It held that the fact that
Flores was out of the country during the commission of the
offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has satisfactorily
established that upon her arrival in the Philippines, she
immediately investigated the matter and talked to the sub-
guarantors. Flores also confirmed that indeed appellant issued 15
personal checks in lieu of the amounts collected and deposited
the same to Flores' account but were all dishonored upon
presentment. Significantly, the CA noted that aside from her bare
denial, appellant did not present any evidence to support her
claim that she did not steal the amount of P640,353.86 from
Flores. In fine, the CA found all the elements for the crime of
qualified theft to be present.
Thus, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial
court, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is
hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed 26 March 2008
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
132 in Criminal Case No. 04-3643 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. She is further
ordered to pay Private Complainant the amount of
P640,353.86.
SO ORDERED. 9 SDHCac
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Nielles, G.R. No. 200308 (Resolution), [February 23,
|||
2015])
DECISION
BRION, J :
p
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a
reversible error in affirming the RTC's decision convicting the
petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the
commission of the crime
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays
down the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of a complaint
or information, provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person,
all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the
commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise date the offense was committed except when it is
a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the
complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be
proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the
proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within
the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action. DIEAHc
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge
of qualified theft since the information stated the approximate
date of the commission of the offense through the
words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner
could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with
which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the
information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he
needed to know about the charge to enable him to prepare his
defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise
date when the offense was committed, as to be inclusive of the
month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material
element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft
could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. 17 Clearly, the
month of November is the month right after October.
The crime of qualified theft was
committed with grave abuse of discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in
relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to
gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of
the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e.,
with grave abuse of confidence. 18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution's
evidence proved, through the prosecution's eyewitnesses, that
upon the petitioner's instruction, several pieces of wide flange
steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once
in November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street,
Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took
construction materials from the project site, without the
authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the
construction materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission
of the crime
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because
the alleged stolen beams or corpus delicti had not been
established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged
stolen beams in court was fatal to the prosecution's cause.cTCADI
23-34)
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE AND INTENT; INVALUABLE AIDS IN
DETERMINING THE LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. — It is worth
recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held
liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of
variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the
modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are
invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate
conclusion thereon.
2. ID.; KIDNAPPING; INTENT TO DEPRIVE THE OFFENDED PARTY
OF HER LIBERTY; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case
at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any
motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the
wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other
esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his
need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along
the way 'Mam (sic) Corina was telling me 'Beloy, I know your
family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why
are you doing this?' I told her 'Mam (sic), because I need money
and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances
from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic) . . . ."
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the
charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the
proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to
exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of
the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty, and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was
merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United
States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has
been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the
victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time
but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds
the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses
they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation
of the victims liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious
illegal detention. That appellants in this case had no intention
whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal
liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional
testimony of appellant Puno.
3. ID.; ID.; "RANSOM"; DEFINED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. —
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as
equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the
immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant
personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price
or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. It can
hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash
and checks demanded from her at gunpoint, what she gave under
the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnappings. These were merely
amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the
occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by
appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed
is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however,
reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the
highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential
Decree No. 532.
4. ID.; "HIGHWAY ROBBERY" (P.D. NO. 532); MODIFIES ARTS. 306
AND 307 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; CONSTRUED.
— Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is
evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which
treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the
alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as
"highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our
previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that
highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. Presidential Decree No 532 did introduce
amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code
by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the
offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and
without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed.
Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least
four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the
presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they
use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But,
and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under
the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are
directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived
victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on
the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same
as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential
Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its
aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under
the old Brigandage Law. Erroneous advertence is nevertheless
made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said
amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway.
Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the
absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily
puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of
that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal
interpretation that any unlawful taking of properly committed on
our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule
of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law
should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may
appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he
who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin
deep into its meaning, and the fundamental rule that criminal
justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of
doubt.
5. ID.; ID.; BRIGANDAGE AND ROBBERY, DISTINGUISHED. — The
following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery
are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of
continuing validity: "The main object of the Brigandage Law is to
prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the
offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three
armed persons for the purpose indicated in art 306. Such
formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It
would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a
member or members of the band actually committed robbery or
kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The
crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band
are shown to be such as are contemplated by art. 306. On the
other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members
were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing
robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage,
but only robbery . Simply because robbery was committed by a
band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it
was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art.
306, it is required that the band 'sala a los campos para
dedicarse a robar.'" In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter
alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants. The martial law
legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No.
532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been
unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the
same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion
is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction,
since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances
under which the decree to be construed originated.
Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and
strongest in the law. Further, that Presidential Decree No.
532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and
not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single
act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused
as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the
"innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another," and which single act of depredation would be
capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the
people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries,"
and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people," such
that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CONVICTION; NO
PROCEDURAL OBSTACLE THEREON WHEN THE ELEMENTS OF
THE OFFENSE PROVED IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE
OFFENSE CHARGED; CASE AT BAR. — We further hold that there
is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the
crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with
kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been
proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which
they are charged. For the former offense, it is sufficient that the
elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof
shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain
(animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information
where it is charged that there was unlawful taking
(apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things
subject of the robbery. These foregoing elements are necessarily
included in the information filed against appellants which, as
formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such
allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary
implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's
money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was
unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot
be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom
does not include but could negate the presence of any of the
elements of robbery through intimidation of persons.
DECISION
REGALADO, J : p
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Puno y Guevarra, G.R. No. 97471, [February 17, 1993])
DECISION
CARPIO, J : p
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01381 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 137, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207
finding her guilty of thirty (30) counts of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December
1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI. 1
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig
made withdrawals from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated
the same for her personal benefit. 2Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president
and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of
WPESLAI's bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other
bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check
payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This
procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to
another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However,
Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it
appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made
into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to
simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital
contribution. 3
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of qualified
theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI'S funds a total of P6,268,300.00, broken
down into the following amounts:
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J :
p
793-809)
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p
The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is
based on two factors: 1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed; and 2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be
fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3 x 80-age of the deceased at the time of his
death = life expectancy) which is adopted from the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality. 60 Net income is computed by deducting from the amount of the victim's gross
income the amount of his living expenses. As there is no proof of Biag's living expenses, the net
income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income. 61 Thus, the loss of earning capacity
of the deceased is computed as follows:
= 16 x P54,750.00
= P876,000.00
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p
Q How far was that house of Aquino from the place where
your father was stabbed?
A Quite far, sir.
Q Were you able to reach the house of Joel Aquino?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Aquino and these two (2) persons do to your
father when you reached his house?
A They brought him down from the tricycle.
Q Where did these three (3) persons bring your father?
A They brought my father to their friend.
Q Did you come to know who was that friend where your
father was brought?
A I do not know the name of their friend.
Q What happened to your father when he was brought to
their friend?
A My father was already dying and they went back to him
and stabbed him several times. IcaHTA
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Aquino y Cendana, G.R. No. 201092, [January 15,
|||
DECISION
SERENO, C.J :p
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the
twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the
displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires.
Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated
the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen
tires. 7
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established
that all thirteen (13) tires found in the possession of Ong
constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to
overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. 8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification
by reducing the minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1)
day to six (6) years of prision correcional. 9
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2 (a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known
to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1)
a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused,
who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that
the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
(4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself
or for another. 10
aEcHCD
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met
the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all the
elements of fencing are present in this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar
(Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal — the
caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen — testified that the crime of robbery had been committed
on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the
tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565 11 dated 10 November 1994
and an Inventory List. 12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise
testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by
their Sinumpaang Salaysay 13 taken at the Southern Police
District at Fort Bonifacio. 14 The report led to the conduct of a
buy-bust operation at Jong Marketing, Paco, Manila on 27
February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the
perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact that thirteen
(13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do
not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice
in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38)
missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that
the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in
Ong's possession. 15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the
said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of P45,500
where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980. 16
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should
know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty
to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that
such fact exists. 17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell
of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, 18 ought to have known
the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown
seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the
thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership
of the tires. 19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy
until the delivery of tires happened in just one day. 20 His
experience from the business should have given him doubt as to
the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his
first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if
Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets. DSacAE
565-575)
DECISION
ABAD, J : p
233-238)
DECISION
BRION, J : p
THE PETITION
In her petition, the petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the
CA erred in affirming (with modification) the judgment of
conviction against her, despite the prosecution's failure to prove
her guilt of the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner maintains that she is not engaged in the business
of buying and selling palay and that the "Kasunduan" between
her and Teresita does not contain their real agreement of a
simple money loan. She argues that the prosecution failed to
establish all the elements of estafa because she never received
the P132,000.00 from Teresita; that an element of the crime is
that "the offender receives the money, or goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to
return, the same."
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the present petition. The CA did not commit any
reversible error in its decision of September 10, 2007.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the offense of estafa committed with abuse of
confidence requires the following elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same[;]
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. 13
We find that all the elements of estafa are present in this case:
that the petitioner received in trust the amount of P132,000.00
from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and misappropriated
it when she failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon
demand.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief
the "Kasunduan" presented in evidence by the prosecution that
was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the
terms of agreement between her and Teresita. This document
clearly stated that the petitioner received in trust the amount of
P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay with
the corresponding obligations to (1) deliver the palay to the
Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998, and
(2) return the P132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November
28 in the event that the petitioner failed to
make palay purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties
is the formal expression of the parties' rights, duties, and
obligations and is the best evidence of the parties' intention.
Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement. 14 However, this rule, known as theParol
Evidence Rule, admits of exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to
a written agreement may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading the following:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties
or their successors in interest after the execution of
the written agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, the petitioner alleges that the
subject "Kasunduan" failed to express the real agreement
between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan
agreement and not that of a principal-agent relationship in the
buy-and-sell of palay. The documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by the petitioner, however, fail to support her claims.
The RTC found that the receipts presented by the petitioner to
prove her loan obligation with Teresita were vague, undated and
unsigned. 15 Also, the RTC observed that the witnesses who
testified that they saw the petitioner sign the "Kasunduan" were
not even certain of the real transaction between the petitioner
and Teresita. 16 These findings of fact and evidence, which were
affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect and finality by this
Court. Where the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals, there is great reason not to disturb
these findings and to regard them not reviewable by this Court. 17
Also, we cannot sustain the petitioner's claim that she had been
the victim of a fraud because Teresita deceived her into signing a
blank document; that she signed the "Kasunduan," even if it had
no date and amount written on it, because Teresita led her to
believe that the document would be used merely for show
purposes with the bank. 18
For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the
causal (dolo causante) inducement to the making of the
contract, 19 and must be serious in character.20 It must be
sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into
error, taking into account the circumstances of each case. 21
In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the
petitioner. In her Memorandum 22 to this Court, she narrated that
after she signed the "Kasunduan," Teresita subsequently made
her execute a deed of sale over her property, which deed she
refused to sign. 23 This statement negates the petitioner's self-
serving allegation that she was tricked by Teresita into signing a
blank "Kasunduan," as she was fully aware of the possible
implications of the act of signing a document.
We affirm the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as it
is fully in accordance with the law. We explained in People v.
Temporada 24 that:
"The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par.
2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds
P22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the
penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión
correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). . . .
DaScHC
DECISION
PERALTA, J :p
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration,
filed with this Court the present petition stating the following
grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE
LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING
ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS
THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY
DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE
OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE IN THAT —
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD
WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY
SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY
TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991
WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE
TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND
TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF
UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD — AN
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE — WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH —
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO
(2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER — ACCUSED
IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL,
CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN
AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as
petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it
sufficiently established the designation of the offense and
the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements
of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are
conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms
the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. 4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in
affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to
this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the
trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991
marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same
was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The
CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise
an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of
evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The
established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a
timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5 TCcSDE
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at
One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ...(interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in
excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos
you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1)
year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of
statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal
wording of the law ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ...(interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
...then ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as
unconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
...as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in
excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
...and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one
(1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you. DIHETS
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v.
Helm, 30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal
Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar
Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form.
The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide
whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.;(1)
Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness
of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction,i.e.,whether more serious
crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the
present case, because in Solem what respondent therein deemed
cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota
after it took into account the latter's recidivist statute and not
the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally,
the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five
years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless,
respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole under South Dakota's recidivist statute
because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual
antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true
that the imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless,
the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a
domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime,
the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing
the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon
such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer's
loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is
so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher
penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of the crime
and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious
implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the
penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed
by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property;
Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take
or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment
or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not
exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount involved is more
than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if
the amount involved is more than six thousand
pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium
and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than twelve thousand pesos but is less thantwenty-
two thousand pesos.If the amount exceeds the latter,
the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also
suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the
funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. DAaEIc
JUSTICE PERALTA:
...and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine
those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the
Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of
those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I don't think it is within the power of the Supreme
Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred
(P100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
...One (P100.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
...has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to
in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a
power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you. 46
353-498)
DECISION
AZCUNA, J :p
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 125 of the Revised
Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 45 thereof, is the August 3,
2000 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13885,
which affirmed the June 23, 1992 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, in Criminal Case No. 4116 finding
petitioner guilty of swindling (estafa) under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The facts appearing from the record are as follows:
Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant
Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business. On several occasions, Uy
entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on
the part of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to
return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of
time.
On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy's
house at Nueva Villa Subdivision, Barangay Alangilan, Batangas
City and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of jewelry as she
had a buyer at that time. Because petitioner is
his "kumadre", since Uy was one of the sponsors in the wedding
of petitioner's daughter, and because petitioner was his agent for
quite a time, Uy agreed. He showed petitioner some pieces of
jewelry and allowed the latter to select from them. ACHEaI
On April 13, 1989, an Information for estafa under Article 315, par.
1 (b) of the RPC was filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Amelia
Perez-Panganiban against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas City.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty".
While admitting to have had several dealings with private
complainant Uy, petitioner claimed that her last transaction with
him was on December 22, 1988. She denied the truth of
the Katibayan, alleging that there was a time, prior to January 10,
1989, when she got pieces of jewelry from Uy that she was
required by him to sign in a blank piece of paper. CITcSH
14-25)
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
The Facts
The instant case arose from the filing of three (3)
separate Informations 4 charging Cheng of the crime
of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of
the RPC before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
226 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75440, Q-98-
75441, and Q-98-75442. According to the prosecution, private
complainant Rowena Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng entered
into an agreement whereby Rodriguez shall deliver pieces of
jewelry to Cheng for the latter to sell on commission basis.
After one month, Cheng is obliged to either: ( a) remit the
proceeds of the sold jewelry; or ( b) return the unsold jewelry to
the former. On different dates ( i.e., July 12, 1997, July 16, 1997,
and August 12, 1997), Rodriguez delivered various sets of
jewelry to Cheng in the respective amounts of P18,000.00,
P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon delivery of the last batch of
jewelry, Cheng issued a check worth P120,000.00 as full
security for the first two (2) deliveries and as partial security
for the last. When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to
return the unsold jewelry on due date, Rodriguez presented the
check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored due to
insufficient funds. Upon assurance of Cheng, Rodriguez re-
deposited the check, but again, the same was dishonored
because the drawee account had been closed. Rodriguez then
decided to confront Cheng, who then uttered "Akala mo,
babayaran pa kita?" Thus, Rodriguez was constrained to file
the instant charges. 5
In defense, Cheng denied receiving any jewelry from
Rodriguez or signing any document purporting to be contracts
of sale of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a usurious
moneylender. She then admitted having an unpaid loan with
Rodriguez and that she issued a check to serve as security for
the same, but was nevertheless surprised of her arrest due to
the latter's filing of Estafa charges against her. 6
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 7 dated December 7, 2000, the RTC found
Cheng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts
of Estafa and, accordingly, sentenced her as follows: ( a) for the
first count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to
six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to
eight (8) years of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period (maximum); ( b) for the
second count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year,
eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods to six (6)
years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8)
years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (maximum); and (c) for the third
count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, eight (8)
months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods to four (4) years, two (2) months,
and one (1) day to five (5) years, five (5) months, and ten (10)
days of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (minimum). 8
The RTC found that the prosecution has sufficiently
proven through documentary and testimonial evidence that: ( a)
Rodriguez indeed gave Cheng several pieces of jewelry for the
latter to either sell and remit the proceeds or to return said
jewelry if unsold to the former; and (b) Cheng neither returned
the jewelry nor remitted their proceeds to Rodriguez within the
specified period despite the latter's demands. In contrast,
Cheng failed to substantiate her claims through the
documentary evidence she presented while her testimony was
deemed to be incredible and not worthy of belief. 9
Aggrieved, Cheng appealed 10 to the CA. aScITE
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 11 dated March 28, 2006, the CA affirmed
Cheng's conviction for three (3) counts of Estafa, with
modification as to the penalties, as follows: ( a) for the first
count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is
P257,950.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) for the
second count of Estafawhere the amount misappropriated is
P36,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9)
years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third count
of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P18,000.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum. 12
The CA agreed with the RTC's findings that the
prosecution had sufficiently established Cheng's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, pointing out that Rodriguez's testimony was
"'more candid, credible and straightforward' and that 'her
demeanor in the witness stand is worthy of belief'" as opposed
to that of Cheng which is highly self-serving and
uncorroborated. 13 Further, the CA found that a modification of
Cheng's penalties is in order to conform with prevailing law
and jurisprudence on the matter. 14
Undaunted, Cheng moved for reconsideration 15 but was
denied in a Resolution 16 dated June 26, 2006; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
the CA correctly affirmed Cheng's conviction for three counts
of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of
the RPC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be[.]
xxx xxx xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property; HEITAD
Separate Opinions
BERSAMIN, J., dissenting:
SO ORDERED.
The CA later denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration on June 26, 2006. 5
In her present appeal, the petitioner urges the Court to
consider and resolve the following issues, namely:
I
WHETHER THE PETITIONER COMMITTED THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PARAGRAPH 1(B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
MERITS OF THE PETITIONER'S DEFENSE. 6
In its comment, 7 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that the petitioner hereby seeks the review of the
facts and the evidence; that the appeal should be rejected
because it urges a departure from the general rule that the
CA's findings of fact, which have affirmed the factual findings
of the trial court, should be accorded great respect, even
finality; that this case did not constitute an exception to
warrant the re-evaluation of the unanimous findings of fact of
the lower courts; that the Prosecution established the guilt of
the petitioner by sufficiently showing the concurrence of all
the essential elements of the offense charged; and that her
bare denial, being negative in nature, did not prevail over the
positive evidence presented against her.
Submission
I vote to acquit the petitioner on the ground that the
State did not establish her guilt for estafa through
misappropriation beyond reasonable doubt. I insist that in
every criminal prosecution, the State must discharge the duty
to establish the guilt of the accused by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the accused is entitled to
acquittal.
The felony of estafa through misappropriation is defined
and penalized in Article 315, 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,
viz.:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud
is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period if
such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if
such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any
of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property. (bold
emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of estafa through misappropriation are: (a)
that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration or under any other circumstances involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion
or diversion of such property by the person who has so
received it or a denial on her part that she received it; ( c) that
such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another;
and (d) that there be demand for the return of the property. 8
According to the CA, the Prosecution established the
petitioner's commission of estafa through misappropriation, to
wit:
All these elements were duly proven by the
Prosecution.
The 2 written agreements stipulated that the
pieces of jewelry were delivered to Accused-Appellant to
be sold on commission basis or to be returned if unsold
within 1 month. Clearly, the jewelry delivered to Accused-
Appellant was for a specific purpose, that is, for
Accused-Appellant to sell them, and in the event that it
cannot be sold, to return the same to Private
Complainant.
Accused-appellant, however, insisted that the
Prosecution "failed to prove the existence of
misappropriation" as there was no proof that the
accused-appellant kept the proceeds of the sale."
We disagree.
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" as used
in Article 315 connote an act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own or of devoting
it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
"misappropriate" a thing of value for one's own use or
benefit, not only the conversion to one's personal
advantage but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without a right. Misappropriation or
conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Failure to
account, upon demand, for funds or property held in
trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
Demand need not be formal. It may be verbal. A
query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the
one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount to a
demand. In this case, despite repeated demands from
Private Complainant, Accused-Appellant still failed to
return the jewelry or to remit the proceeds of the sale to
the prejudice of Private Complainant. Accused-
Appellant's failure to account for the jewelry entrusted to
her by Private Complainant constitutes misappropriation.
Accused-Appellant is, thus, liable for conversion under
Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
xxx xxx xxx 9
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
Upon arraignment on December 11, 1987, the accused, then
assisted by counsel de oficio for arraignment only, entered a plea
of not guilty. The pre-trial having been waived, trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the
testimonies of Alfonso Piscasio, its expert witness, Narciso
Correa, Angelita Demapilis, Teresita Gonzales, Noel Hilario and
Santiago Panganiban. The testimonies of Dante Liwanag, Cecilia
Sayo and Jessybelle San Diego were dispensed with. The
defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Alberto
C. Gonzales and Criselda Sarmiento-Oplas. The testimony of
Oplas, the defense's expert witness, can be summarized as
follows:
Oplas stated that she went over the bank reconciliation
statements for the whole year of 1996 and January to March
1997, the financial statements called financial conditions and the
financial operations of the company for the years ending
December 1996 and March 1997. She noticed that one of the
recording items stated "overstatement of deposit" or
overrecording of deposit so that it was deducted from the book.
Another reconciling item stated "understatement deposit" and it
was added. In "overstatement of deposit," she found a notation
"shortage" but did not find that the amount added in the case of
understatement of deposit was offset against the shortage or the
amount deducted from the book in case of overstatement of
deposit. 8
Consequently, the RTC rendered a Decision dated August 20,
2001, finding petitioner Grace San Diego guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing findings, the Court
hereby finds accused GRACE SAN DIEGO y TRINIDAD
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED
THEFT as defined and penalized under Article 310, in
relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code,
and accordingly, sentences her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for forty years without pardon before
the lapse of 40 years and with the accessory penalties of
death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code, and to
indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., in the amount of Php6,016,084.26.SCaITA
SO ORDERED. 9
The CA did not err when it ruled that the proof adduced by the
prosecution is sufficient to prove petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution presented the testimony of its
expert witness, Alfonso Piscasio, the cooperative's independent
auditor since 1992. He stated that his audit was based on
standard and generally accepted auditing procedures. 14 The audit
report, duly offered and presented in the trial, was supported by
certifications by several depository banks of the cooperative
indicating its balance on its account. Records are bereft of any
showing that the audit report made by the independent auditor is
erroneous and unsupported by documents and bank statements.
Thus, there lies no reason for this Court not to accord full faith
and credit to his report. aDSHCc
From the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the
penalty that is two (2) degrees higher than prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods. In view, however, of the
incremental penalty in simple theft under Article 309 of the RPC,
which is likewise applicable to the crime of qualified theft, when
the value of the thing stolen is more than P22,000.00, the penalty
shall be imposed in its maximum period with an additional period
of one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. In
the case at bar, the value of the property stolen as determined by
the RTC and modified by the CA is P2,080,000.00. Deducting
P22,000.00 to the amount, the difference of P2,058,000.00 will
then be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than
P10,000.00, we will have two hundred five (205). Thus, 205 years
is the incremental penalty. Since the imposable penalty for
qualified theft is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods to be imposed in its maximum period which is eighteen
(18) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days to twenty
(20) years, if we add the incremental penalty of two hundred five
(205) years, then the range of the penalty is two hundred twenty-
three (223) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days to
two hundred twenty-five (225) years. However, such penalty
cannot be imposed because the maximum penalty that can be
imposed is only up to 40 years, which is the maximum period
of reclusion perpetua. cCAIaD
SO ORDERED.
||| (San Diego y Trinidad v. People, G.R. No. 176114, [April 8, 2015])
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J :p
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
DECISION
BRION, J : p
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who
had transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter
only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged
him to assume the responsibility. 11 On redirect examination,
Wagas declared that Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the
country; that he signed the letter only to accommodate the pleas
of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing Cañada's
application for overseas employment. 12 The Prosecution
subsequently offered and the RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal
evidence. 13
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11,
2002, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged and
he is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve
(12) years of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to
thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua as
maximum;
2. To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in
the sum of P200,000.00; CAHaST
3. To pay said complainant the sum of P30,000.00 by
way of attorney's fees; and
4. the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements constituting the crime of estafa,
namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment
for an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover
the check despite having been informed that the check had been
dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt
of the postdated check and upon Wagas' assurance that the
check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, 15 arguing that the Prosecution did not establish
that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had
negotiated the check to the latter; that the records showed that
Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray's
testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not
reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar
with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of the case
based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the
testimony of Cañada who could not testify during the trial
because he was then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray's
testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration, opining that the evidence Wagas desired
to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and
that there was no compelling ground to reverse its decision. 16 DSAEIT
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused
whom you are talking with?
A: I know it was him because I know him.
Q: Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you
had a transaction with the accused through
telephone conversation, and as a consequence of
that alleged conversation with the accused through
telephone he issued a check in your favor?
A: No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
Q: But still through the telephone?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see
you personally regarding the 200 bags rice
transaction?
A: No. It was through telephone only.
Q: In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200
bags of rice through the accused himself?
A: Yes. It was through Robert.
Q: So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200
sacks of rice through somebody other than the
accused?
A: Yes, sir. 37
Ligaray's statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had
ordered the rice because he "know[s]" him was still vague and
unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and
should not support a finding of Ligaray's familiarity with Wagas as
the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray's answers that
Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray's prior to the
transaction. Thus, the RTC's conclusion that Ligaray had
transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual
basis, the RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the
identification of the buyer to be Wagas. DIESHT
PHIL 224-243)
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
Antecedents
Villanueva stands charged with estafa as defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal
Code under the information that reads:
That on or about the 16th day of August 1994, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of deceit, false pretenses
and fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud, following PNB checks, [to] wit:
P185,000.
031526 9-02-94
00
185,000.0
031527 9-17-94
0
185,000.0
031528 10-02-94
0
185,000.0
031529 10-17-94
0
031532 9-16-94 85,000.00
031533 10-16-94 85,000.00
031534 11-16-94 85,000.00
as payment for various jewelries (sic) purchased
to (sic) the said complainant, the accused well knowing
that at the time of issue thereof, the said checks have no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover
the amount of the said checks, neither will said checks be
honored or paid upon presentment, the bank dishonored
and returned the said checks for the reason "account
closed" or "stopped payment" or should have been
dishonored for insufficiency of funds had not the said
accused, without any valid reason, ordered her drawee
bank to stop payment and despite repeated demands
accused failed and refused to deposit the amount
necessary to cover the aforesaid check or to pay the value
thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the aforesaid amounts.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Version of the Prosecution
In August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Villanueva through a
townmate. The latter was interested in buying jewelry. Being then
engaged in the business of selling jewelry, Madarang went to
Villanueva's residence at the Galeria de Magallanes, and was
able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth
P1,010,000.00. 5 Villanueva made out nine checks drawn against
Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated.
Villanueva signed a receipt reading as follows: 6
August 16, 1994
Received from MRS. LORETO A. MADARANG the following jewelries (sic) with the
corresponding amount DHEcCT
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:
Nonetheless, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the
trial court, which is 14 years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, both of reclusion temporal, is
erroneous. Said court did not pay obeisance to the
teaching of People v. Hernando, viz.:
Presidential Decree No. 818 provides:
"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another
by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as
defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal of the amount
of fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under
theRevised Penal Code, the penalty shall be
termed reclusion perpetua;
xxx xxx xxx."
"xxx xxx xxx
Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty two
thousand pesos, the penalty of reclusion temporal is
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos but the total
penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be
termed reclusion perpetua. As used herein, reclusion
perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense. It
merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account
of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty
two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos.
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, such
as estafa, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of theRevised Penal Code, and the minimum
term of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense." "The penalty next lower should be
based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is
left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it
can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into
which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition
of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence." DaTICE
BERSAMIN, J : p
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended in the CA that: (1) her
conviction should be set aside because the evidence presented
against her had been obtained in violation of her constitutional
right against self-incrimination; (2) her rights to due process and
to counsel had been infringed; and (3) the evidence against her
should be inadmissible for being obtained by illegal or
unconstitutional means rendering the evidence as the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision 4 affirming
the judgment of the RTC, to wit:
In summary, we find no grounds to disturb the findings of
the lower court, except the provision of the dispositive
portion in case 94-5525 requiring the accused to pay BPI
Family P2,000. This must be deleted because the accused
had already paid the amount to the depositor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of
P2,000 to the complainant in case 94-5525 be deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner still insists that her conviction was
invalid because her constitutional rights against self-
incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied. In
behalf of the State, the Office of the Solicitor General counters
that she could invoke her rights to remain silent and to counsel
only if she had been under custodial investigation, which she was
not; and that the acts of her counsel whom she had herself
engaged to represent her and whom she had the full authority to
replace at any time were binding against her.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
We first note that the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact
about the transactions that gave rise to the accusations in court
against her for four counts of estafathrough falsification of a
commercial document. She raised no challenges against such
findings of fact here and in the CA, being content with limiting
herself to the supposed denial of her rights to due process and to
counsel, and to the inadmissibility of the evidence presented
against her. In the CA, her main objection focused on the denial
of her right against self-incrimination and to counsel, which
denial resulted, according to her, in the invalidation of the
evidence of her guilt.
Debunking the petitioner's challenges, the CA stressed that the
rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under
the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation of
a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any
investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents.
Instead, she underwent an administrative investigation as an
employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being
conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give
evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply
broke down bank when depositors Matuguina and Cornejo
confronted her about her crimes. We quote with approval the
relevant portions of the decision of the CA, viz.:
The accused comes to Us on appeal to nullify her
conviction on the ground that the evidence presented
against her was obtained in violation of her constitutional
right against self-incrimination. She also contends that her
rights to due process and counsel were infringed. Without
referring to its name, she enlists one of the most famous
metaphors of constitutional law to demonize and exclude
what she believes were evidence obtained against her by
illegal or unconstitutional means — evidence
constituting the fruit of the poisonous tree. We hold,
however, that in the particular setting in which she was
investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an
accused to counsel and against self-incrimination are not
apposite.
The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are
peculiarly rights in the context of an official proceeding
for the investigation and prosecution for crime. The right
against self-incrimination, when applied to a criminal trial,
is contained in this terse injunction — no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words,
he may not be required to take the witness stand. He can
sit mute throughout the proceedings. His right to counsel
is expressed in the same laconic style: he shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel . This means
inversely that the criminal prosecution cannot proceed
without having a counsel by his side. These are the
traditional rights of the accused in a criminal case. They
exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal
indictment and trial for a criminal offense. But
sinceMiranda vs. Arizona 384 US 436, the law has come to
recognize that an accused needs the same protections
even before he is brought to trial. They arise at the very
inception of the criminal process — when a person is
taken into custody to answer to a criminal offense. For
what a person says or does during custodial investigation
will eventually be used as evidence against him at the
trial and, more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his
eventual conviction. His trial becomes a parody if he
cannot enjoy from the start the right against self-
incrimination and to counsel. This is the logic behind what
we now call as the Miranda doctrine. cCHITA
The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise
words the occasion for the exercise of the new right and
the protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an
individual is subjected to police interrogation while in
custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in a significant way. It is when custodial
investigation is underway that the certain procedural
safeguards takes over — the person must be warned prior
to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning.
We must, therefore, be careful to note what
the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was never intended
to hamper the traditional law-enforcement function to
investigate crime involving persons not under restraint.
The general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding
process, as the US Supreme Court recognizes, which is
not preceded by any restraint on the freedom of the
person investigated, is not affected by the holding, since
the compelling atmosphere inherent in in-custody
interrogation is not present.
The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source
of a provision in our 1987 bill of rights that any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel, a
provision identical in language and spirit to the earlier
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. People vs.
Caguioa 95 SCRA 2. As we can see, they speak of the
companion rights of a person under investigation to
remain silent and to counsel, to ensure which the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine had also to be
institutionalized by declaring that any confession or
admission obtained in violation of these rights is
inadmissible. But to what extent must the rights to remain
silent and to counsel be enforced in an investigation for
the commission of an offense? The answer has been
settled by rulings of our Supreme Court in Caguoia and in
the much later case of Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan 234
SCRA 175 incorporating in toto the Miranda doctrine into
the above-cited provisions of our bill of rights. Thus, the
right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only
in the context in which the Miranda doctrine applies —
when the official proceeding is conducted under the
coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There
are no cases extending them to a non-coercive setting.
In Navallo, the Supreme Court said very clearly that the
rights are invocable only when the accused is under
custodial investigation. A person undergoing a normal
audit examination is not under custodial investigation and,
hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law
enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.
By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may
not be said to be under custodial investigation. She was
not even being investigated by any police or law
enforcement officer. She was under administrative
investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in
purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her
freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There
was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say
anything. It was an act of conscience that compelled her
to speak, a true mental and moral catharsis that religion
and psychology recognize to have salutary effects on the
soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain
silent or to counsel is simply irrelevant.
The accused makes a final argument against her
conviction by contending that she did not get effective
legal representation from her former counsel who was
already old and feeble when the case was being heard. In
fact, the records show, her counsel died during the
pendency of the case, an octogenarian at that. One can
truly make a case from one's lack of a competent and
independent counsel, but we are not prepared to say that
the accused was so poorly represented that it affected her
fundamental right to due process. Except for the several
postponements incurred by her counsel, there is really no
showing that he committed any serious blunder during the
trial. We have read the transcripts of the trial and failed to
get this impression. The evidence against the accused
was simply too overwhelming. We may take note that
once, the trial court admonished the accused to replace
her counsel due to his absences, but she did not. She must
live by that. 5
Considering that the foregoing explanation by the CA was justly
supported by the records, and that her investigation as a bank
employee by her employer did not come under the coverage of
the Constitutionally-protected right against self-incrimination,
right to counsel and right to due process, we find no reversible
error committed by the CA in affirming the conviction of the
petitioner by the RTC.
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through
falsification of a commercial document was established beyond
reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the
bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their
passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their
knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she
signed, and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that
the signatures had been verified in due course. Her
misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive
the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She thereby
committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family
Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the
bank accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a
commercial document, by forging the signatures of Matuguina
and Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the
depositor concerned had signed the respective slips in order to
enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were
complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been
consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal slips. DcTaEH
SO ORDERED.
||| (De Castro v. People, G.R. No. 171672, [February 2, 2015])
REYES, J : p
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC's
finding that the required notice of dishonor from FWCC was
received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that
her personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently
established, considering that only a written copy of the letter and
the registry return receipt covering it were presented by the
prosecution.
The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation
of registry return receipts that cover registered mail was not
sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been
sent to or served on issuers of checks. The authentication by
affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by
registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of
notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second
element of the offense. 14
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court,
however, considers Campos' defense that she exerted efforts to
reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks
which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI
Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that,
"[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good
faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her
obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the
checks."15 Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she
actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The
evidence referred to in her statement were receipts 16 dated
January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998 and May 26,
1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various amounts
ranging from P2,500.00 to P15,700.00. Campos would not have
entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996
until May 1998 if she had not received a notice of dishonor from
her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her
funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks. CSaHDT
2014])
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J : p
DECISION
PERALTA, J :p
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of Appeals,
and on June 30, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision
affirming in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied per Resolution dated January
4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that
jurisprudence dictates the dismissal of the criminal case against
him on the ground that he has fully paid the amount of the
dishonored checks even before the Informations against him
were filed in court. Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith v. Court of
Appeals. 6 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise
recommends the acquittal of petitioner, opining that Griffith 7 is
applicable to the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the
fact that two years before the filing of the Information for
violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the
complainant an amount greater than the value of the bounced
checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances in Griffith are
dissimilar from those in the present case. The Court disagrees
with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present case, because
the checks subject of this case are personal checks, while the
check involved in Griffith was a corporate check and, hence,
some confusion or miscommunication could easily occur
between the signatories of the check and the corporate
treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the present
case are not exactly the same as those in Griffith, it should be
noted that the same kind of confusion giving rise to petitioner's
mistake very well existed in the present case. Here, the check
was issued by petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to
Castor's candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was Castor who
instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two
checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks
were used as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner
relied on Castor's word and complied with his instructions, as it
was Castor who was supposed to take delivery of said materials.
Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the mistake of
readily complying with the instruction to stop payment since he
believed Castor's word that there is no longer any valid reason to
pay complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon.
Nevertheless, two months after receiving the demand letter from
private complainant and just several days after receiving
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a
replacement check which was successfully encashed by private
complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of
the checks only after receiving the subpoena from the Office of
the Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was
motivated to pay not because he wanted to settle his obligation
but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is
tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even
voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather, the
complainant was paid from the proceeds of the invalid
foreclosure of the accused's property. In said case, the Court did
not differentiate as to whether payment was made before or after
the complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. It
only mattered that the amount stated in the dishonored check
had actually been paid before the Information against the
accused was filed in court. In this case, petitioner even
voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks. The Court,
therefore, sees no justification for differentiating this case from
that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffith and in this
case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks
before the filing of the Informations in court. Verily, there is no
reason why the same liberality granted to the accused
in Griffith should not likewise be extended to herein petitioner.
The precept enunciated in Griffith is herein reiterated, to wit:
ECTIHa
CLARITA ESTRELLADO-
MAINAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J :
p
CONTRARY TO LAW. 9
In its decision 10 dated December 27, 2006, the MTCC
found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of other
forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced her to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor.
The MTCC essentially ruled that the petitioner
"represented to the complainant that the property is free from
lien and encumbrance." 11 It added that Naval relied on the first
page of the title that had been shown to him, and that the
petitioner deliberately did not inform him of the fact that she
(petitioner) no longer owned the area sold.
Accordingly, the MTCC directed the petitioner to pay the
following amounts to the offended party: (a) P123,000.00 fine
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; (b)
P123,000.00 civil indemnity; (c) P65,755.45 as actual expenses
incurred and proven; (d) P10,000.00 attorney's fees; and (e)
P10,000.00 moral damages.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16,
Davao City, affirmed the MTCC decision in toto. 12 The RTC
essentially adopted the factual findings and the conclusions of
the MTCC.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the
RTC denied her motion in its Order of May 29, 2007.
The petitioner challenged the RTC rulings before the CA
via a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. In
its resolution 13 dated August 16, 2007, the CA directed the
petitioner to "show cause why the petition should not be
dismissed for its failure to: (1) allege the date of receipt of the
assailed decision in the petition; (2) allege the date of receipt
of the denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration with
the court a quo; and (3) attach Exhibits "03" to "05" referred to
on pages 8 and 9 of the petition."
In her Compliance and Manifestation, 14 the petitioner
specified the date when her counsel's messenger received the
assailed RTC decision and order. She, however, manifested
that her petition for review bore no Exhibits "03" to "05" on
pages 8-9.
In its resolution of November 28, 2007, 15 the CA dismissed
the petition for the petitioner's failure to attach the exhibits
that would support the allegations of her petition in violation of
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the
CA denied her motion in its resolution dated July 29, 2008.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
In the present petition, 16 the petitioner claimed that the
CA erred in dismissing her petition for review on mere
technicalities. She further argued that the courts a quo erred
in convicting her of violation of Article 316, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code because the Information charged her
with violation of paragraph 1 of the same article. The
petitioner also maintained that she did not misrepresent the
subject land to be free from any lien or encumbrance. acEHCD
OUR RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition.
Noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of
due process, but merely a statutory privilege to be exercised
only in accordance with the law. As the appealing party, the
petitioner must comply with the requirements of the relevant
rules; otherwise, she loses the statutory right to appeal. We
emphasize that the procedures regulating appeals as laid
down in the Rules of Court must be followed because strict
compliance with them is indispensable for the orderly and
speedy disposition of justice. 17
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Form and contents. — The petition shall
be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts
or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
indicate the specific material dates showing that it was
filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the
matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of
errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the
Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied
upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the
judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified
correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court,
the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition. (emphasis
ours)
Corollarily, Section 3 of this Rule states that "[t]he failure
of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding, among others, the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."
We note that the CA exercised liberality in its treatment
of the petitioner's petition for review when — instead of
dismissing it outright — it still directed her to show cause why
hear petition should not be dismissed for failing to strictly
comply with Section 2 of Rule 42, particularly for failure to: (1)
allege the date of receipt of the assailed decision in the
petition; (2) allege the date of receipt of the denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration; and (3) attach exhibits
"03" to "05" referred to on pages 8 and 9 of the petition. 18
Instead of complying with the third directive, however, the
petitioner stated that the petition had no exhibits "03" and
"05" on pages 8-9. An examination of the records revealed that,
indeed, exhibits "03" to "05" were stated on pages 4 to 5. The
CA itself admitted that it inadvertently stated in its directive
that exhibits "03" to "05" were on pages 8 and 9, instead of on
pages 4 to 5.
Notwithstanding the CA's inadvertence, the petitioner
ought to have complied with the latter's third directive,
considering that there could have been no other exhibits "03"
to "05" referred to other than those mentioned on pages 4 and
5 of the petition, namely TCT No. T-364319 (Exh. "03");
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Renunciation of
Shares, Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "04"); and
Agreement to Buy and Sell (Exh. "05").
Without doubt, these documents would have supported
the material allegations in the petitioner's petition for review.
The petitioner should have been more prudent and vigilant in
pursuing her petition, instead of capitalizing on the CA's
misquotation of the pages. The CA already gave the petitioner
the opportunity to rectify the procedural infirmities in her
petition, but the latter did not take advantage of this liberality
by exerting utmost diligence to comply with the CA's
directives.
The records likewise showed that the petitioner did
attach Exhibits "03" to "05" in her motion for reconsideration
before the CA. The CA, nonetheless, disregarded these annexes
due to the petitioner's failure to offer any explanation why she
did not attach these documents to her petition. While the CA
could have stretched the limits of its liberality a bit more, we
could not fault it for ruling the way it did at that point since the
petitioner did not even bother to offer any explanation why she
did not attach these relevant documents to her petition. As the
CA held:
Despite petitioner's second attempt to rectify the
procedural infirmities in the motion for reconsideration
by attaching therein the exhibits, yet, petitioner did not
even proffer any explanation why she failed in the first
instance to attach the same in the petition.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, concomitant to petitioner's plea for liberal
application of the rules of procedure is her obligation to
exert her utmost to comply therewith. Sadly, petitioner is
wanting of the traits that could qualify her to invoke
liberality in the application of the Rules. 19
What constitutes a good and sufficient cause that will
merit a reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition is a
discretionary call by the CA, and the Court will not interfere
with the exercise of this prerogative unless there has been a
grave abuse of discretion. Following the clear provisions of
Section 2, in relation with Section 3, of Rule 42, we hold that
the CA did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
manner that amounted to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law.
The petitioner's improper conviction
under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC
Notwithstanding the petitioner's noncompliance with
Section 2, Rule 42, we resolve the substantive issue raised by
the petitioner in the interest of justice. This Court has, on
occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of
procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
among other instances, are at stake. It has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural
defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The
strict and rigid application of rules that tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice must always be
avoided.20
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in
the Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the
Information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by
the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or
designation of the offense contained in the caption of the
Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the
offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. 21
To recall, the prosecution charged the petitioner with the
crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which punishes
"[a]ny person who, pretending to be the owner of any real
property, shall convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the same."
The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner under
Article 316, paragraph 2 which punishes the act of any person
who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose
of the same, although such encumbrance is not recorded.
The elements of other forms of swindling under Article
316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1)
that the thing disposed of be real property; (2) that the
offender knew that the real property was encumbered,
whether the encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there
must be express representation by the offender that the real
property is free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of
disposing of the real property be made to the damage of
another. 22
The Information in the present case, aside from expressly
indicating in its caption that it is charging the petitioner under
Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, alleged
that the petitioner "with deceit and intent to defraud,"
pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter
portion of a lot covered by TCT No. T-19932 despite her
knowledge that the entire property had already been sold and
was owned by JS Francisco. Notably, it had not been alleged
that the petitioner expressly represented to Naval that the
subject property was free from any encumbrance.
In Naya v. Abing, 23 the Court set aside the petitioner's
conviction for estafa under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code since there had been no allegation in the Information
that he (petitioner) expressly represented in the sale of the
subject property to William Po that the said property was free
from any encumbrance. We explained that the gravamen of the
crime is the disposition of legally encumbered real property by
the offender under the express representation that there is no
encumbrance thereon; and that the accused must make an
express representation in the deed of conveyance that the
property sold or disposed of is free from any encumbrance for
one to be criminally liable. The Court explained that:
. . . there is no allegation in the Information that
petitioner expressly represented in the sale of the
subject property to William Po that the said property was
free from any encumbrance. Irrefragably, then, petitioner
was not charged with estafa under Article 316, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code.Hence, the trial court
committed a reversible error in finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under said provision
and that the Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming
the decision of the trial court on appeal. 24
We reiterate that the Information in the present case did
not allege that the petitioner made an express representation
that the property sold is free from any encumbrance. This
Information was crafted in such a way that only one particular
crime was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1), and the
alleged manner through which such offense was committed
(that is, by pretending to be the lawful owner . . .) did not
constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may
be committed even by the owner of the property.
Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the
petitioner and Naval also did not contain any representation by
the petitioner that the property being sold was free from any
encumbrance.
It is not disputed that TCT No. T-19932 bore the following
annotations:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry No. 1131326 — AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM
— filed by J.S. Francisco and Sons, Inc. represented by
Joselito Franscisco affecting the property covered by
this Certificate of Title which is the subject of Deed of
Sale executed between the said corporation and the
registered owner. This instrument was executed before
Notary Public of Davao City Francis Arnold de Vera, as
Doc. No. . . .
Date of instrument : Oct. 28, 1998;
Date of inscription : Oct. 29, 1998 at 8:10 a.m.
At any rate, paragraph 2 of Article 316 does not prohibit
the sale of an encumbered property; the vendor must have
represented to the buyer that the property was free from
encumbrance. 25 What brings about criminal liability is the
deceit in selling the property. Corollarily, the deed must have a
statement of warranty that is false in order to commit the
offense. 26 The petitioner's passive attitude regarding the
presence of an adverse claim (she assumed that Naval became
aware of this inscription after showing to him a copy of TCT
No. T-19932 and "never complained") is not sufficient to
constitute fraud within the meaning of the law. The fraud
and/or deceit by misrepresentation contemplated by law must
be the result of overt acts; they cannot be implied or
presumed.
In the light of these considerations, we hold that the trial
courts erroneously convicted the petitioner of other forms of
swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.To uphold the petitioner's conviction for an offense other
than that charged in the Information would be a violation of
her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her. HSAcaE
SO ORDERED.
||| (Estrellado-Mainar v. People, G.R. No. 184320, [July 29, 2015])
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J :
p
347-368)
DECISION
BRION, J : p
666-677)
DECISION
CORONA, J :p
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was
not in any position to oppose or to refuse her father's
orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the
properties sold under the power of attorney
fraudulently secured from my mother, which total
P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for
the same and never delivered the proceeds to
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter
died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to
make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of
the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother's
estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to
refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which
include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida
Carungcong Sato. . . . 3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato's supporting affidavit and the special
power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita
Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached
to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. 4 On appeal, however,
the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution
dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of
Article 315, paragraph 3 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. 5 Thus,
the following Information was filed against Sato in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87: 6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of
ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by
means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years
old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that
said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing
fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all
located at Tagaytay City, as follows:cHCIEA
TITLE 11
[G.R. No. 199100. July 18, 2014.]
DECISION
PEREZ, J :
p
COURT:
All right.
PROSECUTOR SENA: (to witness)
Q: [AAA], in what part of the body of Rosendo can you find
that totoy that you said?
(Witness pointed to her private part)
Q: And that bilalay that you mentioned in what part of your
body can you find that?
(The same, witness pointed to her private part)
Q: Were you able to see that totoy of Rosendo?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And how big was that?
(witness demonstrated the length more or less 5 inches)
Q: About how — the diameter, how big is the diameter?
COURT:
It is not necessary to prove that, the size.
PROSECUTOR SENA:
Just to prove.
(to witness)
Q: When the penis of Rosendo was being tried by Rosendo
to penetrate your vagina[,] what did you feel?ScCEIA
A: Painful, Sir. 13
The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical
findings that the victim suffered from laceration on the upper and
lower part of the introitus. 14
Appellant was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. AAA's abduction was a necessary means to
commit rape. Sexual intercourse with AAA was facilitated and
ensured by her abduction. 15
In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends
on the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually
only the participants are witnesses to their occurrences. The
issue therefore boils down to credibility. Significantly, findings of
fact of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal since
conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie
heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. 16
HTCaAD
RESOLUTION
REYES, J :p
On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus
with her friend Armina Adriano (Adriano) when Cayanan arrived
on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Boy Manalastas. Cayanan then
pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but he
covered her mouth. They alighted somewhere and boarded a jeep.
He brought her to a dress shop in . . ., Bulacan where he asked
someone to give her a change of clothes as she was in her school
uniform and later to a Jollibee outlet. He then brought her to his
sister's house in . . . where he raped her inside a bedroom.
Afterwards, a certain couple Putay and Tessie talked to Cayanan
and she was brought to thebarangay office where she was asked
to execute a document stating that she voluntarily went with
Cayanan. It was the latter's mother and sister-in-law who brought
her home later that evening. She told her mother and brother of
the incidents only after her classmate Adriano informed her
family of what happened in school and of the rape incidents. AAA
testified that she did not immediately tell her family because she
was still in a state of shock. 5
Adriano and the victim's mother corroborated her testimony. A
resident psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental Health
also testified that AAA was suffering from mental depressive
symptoms/chronic symptoms and presence of sexual abuse. 6
Cayanan interposed the sweetheart defense. The RTC, however,
did not give credit to his defense, ruling that it is a weak defense
and does not rule out the use of force given the prosecution's
evidence. He also failed to establish the genuineness and
authenticity of the love letters allegedly written by AAA. 7
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC. 8
Moreover, the claim that they were sweethearts does not justify
the commission of the crimes. For the Court to even consider
giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must be proven by
compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present
testimonial evidence in support of the theory. Independent proof
is required — such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. 9 And
while Cayanan produced two love letters allegedly written by
AAA, the CA correctly sustained the finding of the RTC that these
letters were unauthenticated and therefore, bereft of any
probative value.
The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only
of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. Forcible
abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of
the accused is to rape the victim. 10 In this case, circumstances
show that the victim's abduction was with the purpose of raping
her. Thus, after Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her
to several places until they reached his sister's house where he
raped her inside the bedroom. Under these circumstances, the
rape absorbed the forcible abduction. 11
Finally, the CA did not commit any reversible error in increasing
the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001, and in awarding additional
P75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal cases, as
these are in accord with prevailing jurisprudence. 12
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 14, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04256 is MODIFIED in that accused
appellant Marvin Cayanan is found guilty of Qualified Rape in
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. In all other respects, the CA
Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
imposed on all the damages awarded, to earn from the date of
the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. 13IAETDc
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 200080 (Resolution), [September
|||
TITLE 12
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
264)
DECISION
PERALTA, J :p
349-360)
DECISION
LEONEN, J :p
118-134)
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA,
insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally
married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license,
affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally
married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not
established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal
intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of the
honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage. 19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged
decision, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the
appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED. 20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review
on certiorari. 21 He argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly
applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, 22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of
the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before
one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in
this purely criminal prosecution; 23 that even if Article 40 of
the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted
because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being
without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in
Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code; 24 that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e.,
that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; 25 and that his
good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve
him of criminal liability. 26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall
be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. cTaDHS
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the
offender has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-
appellant Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was
void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an
affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding
ceremony could not have validated the void marriage.
Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage
in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites
of a valid marriage should be present. One of these
requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There
having been no marriage license nor affidavit of
cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as
a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner
should have first secured a judicial declaration of the
nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo
before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that
but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he
violated the law on bigamy.
Accused's reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95
Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced
because the ruling in these cases have already been
abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel v.
Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v.
Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the
Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap's ruling too had
been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and
by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals,
supra.
Regarding accused-appellant's defense of good faith, the
same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248
SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed
Decision is correct in all respect. 28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing
elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of
the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a
subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to
wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
(n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v.
People: 29
. . . The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil
Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now
the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral. DSAEIT
735-748)
DECISION
BRION, J :p
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the
couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other as
husband and wife. 8 Days after the wedding, she went to the
municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with
Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate
that no marriage license was issued to the couple. 9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony,
denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a
solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. 10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a P200.00 fine
pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner's act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage
ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. 11 It further ruled
that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple's
marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of
the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No.
3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of
the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any
of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the
regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides
the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws,
the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
P200.00. 12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing"
the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the
prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the
petitioner's negative statements. 13 The RTC, however, ruled that
the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44,
of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. The CA observed
that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards
in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. 14 According to
the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added
that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement
in a marriage ceremony. 15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner's criminal liability
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on
whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
350 of the same Code. 16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the
imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it
covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following
grounds: SDHITE
First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not
define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those
enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of
the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration
that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a
marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which
is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer. 17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the
prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife. 18
Second, under the principle of separation of church and State,
the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert
the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony." 19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the
"blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to
the couple. 20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in
violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the
filing of the present case against him. 21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for
a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of
the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22
THE COURT'S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime
punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1)
authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an
illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority
to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is
whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to
the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically
define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal"
performance, Articles 3 (3) and 6 of theFamily Code are clear on
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 23 of
the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 24 of
the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments.
Article 6 25 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form
or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties
to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife." 26
Pertinently, Article 3 (3) 27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and
particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of
religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum
requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there
should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each
other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the
parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to
the petitioner's allegation, the prosecution has proven, through
the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife. cDSAEI
219)
TITLE 13
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J :
p
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p
The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or
brought to the attention and notice of other persons other than
the offended party, there was publication; and that the element
of identity was also established since the letter was intended for
respondent. It rejected petitioner's stance that the libelous letter
resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly
admitted that he had to reply to respondent's letter to Mrs.
Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of
petitioner's association.
The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory
damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory
imputation was to impair respondent's reputation although no
actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also awarded moral
damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of
the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a
reckless disregard for the rights of respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA
which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its
entirety the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for
and defamatory in character as they impeached the good
reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It
rejected petitioner's claim that the letter is a privileged
communication which would exculpate him from liability since he
failed to come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to
resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer to the extent of
ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called "duty"
in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was
publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified as
privileged.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated March 13, 2000.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner, raising the following issues:
A. CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING
URBAN POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL, DEFENDING
A MEMBER OF AN ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF
EJECTMENT FROM HER DWELLING PLACE?
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE
OF THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE
(sic) COMMUNICATION?
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT: THE PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE
TO ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID IS
A CRIME? 6
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of
the People and respondent filed his own Comment praying for the
affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us, the parties
submitted their respective memoranda.
The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is
guilty of the crime of libel.
In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply
the ruling in People v. Velasco 7 that "if the act/matter charged as
libelous is only an incident in [an] act which has another
objective, the crime is not libel;" when he made his reply to
respondent's letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her to
vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent that
Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the Rodriguez
estate which is claiming ownership over the area of Brgy.
Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of
the administrator of the Rodriquez estate; communication in
whatever language, either verbal or written of a lawyer under
obligation to defend a client's cause is but a privileged
communication; the instant case is a qualified privileged
communication which is lost only by proof of malice, however,
respondent failed to present actual proof of malice; the existence
of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that
petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there was
ill will or ill feeling between them which existed at the time of the
publication of the defamatory imputation which were not at all
indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to the findings
of the CA, there was justifiable motive in sending such a letter
which was to defend the vested interest of the estate and to
abate any move of respondent to eject Mrs. Quingco. cASIED
Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous
letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is justification for
the use of those words, to wit: "lousy but inutile threatening
letter . . . using carabao English" was due to the fact that the
demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not
serve its purpose as respondent's client has no legal right over
the property and respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that
respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he
is stupid; that the words "Yours in Satan name" is only a
complementary greeting used in an ordinary communication
letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person
being communicated and which is just the reverse of saying
"Yours in Christ".
We deny the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must
concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it
must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. 8
The last two elements have been duly established by the
prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication
means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known
to someone other than the person against whom it has been
written. 9 Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that the
same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had
dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of
the libel complained of has communicated it to a third
person. 10Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was
open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject
letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.
We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to
whether the imputation is defamatory and malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words
used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in
their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense. 11
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication
alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v.
Reyes, 12 to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109
Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this
point: "In determining whether the specified matter is
libelous per se, two rules of construction are
conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be
adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as
is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
which the public would naturally understand what was
uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous
must be construed as a whole."
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel,
the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious
explanation offered by the publisher on being called to
account. The whole question being the effect the
publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they
not having been assisted by the offered explanation in
reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of
removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in
the publication. 13
Gauging from the above-mentioned tests, the words used in the
letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is
defamatory. In using words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao
English", "stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written,
casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of
respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said,
these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public
ridicule as even his own family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang
gago dito." 14
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and,
under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need
not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the
law already presumes that petitioner's imputation is malicious
(malice in law). 15 A reading of petitioner's subject letter-reply
showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing
such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the
said letter which showed petitioner's good intention and
justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the
legal inference of malice. EcSCAD
SO ORDERED.
(Buatis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 142509, [March 24, 2006], 520
|||
PHIL 149-167)
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J : p
The Facts
On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau
of Customs, four (4) separate informations were filed on
September 8, 1999 with the Regional Trial Court in (RTC) Pasay
City. These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged
petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as
managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo,
as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo
Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the
crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles
in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May
12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999. 1 The four
informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-1598
That on or about the 11th day of May, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher
and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the
Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or
dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said
complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication
on May 11, 1999, its daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted
hereunder, to wit:
PINAKAMAYAMAN SA CUSTOMS
Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng
Bureau of Customs and [sic] pinakamayaman na yata
na government official sa buong bansa sa
pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.
Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas
daw ito sa Iglesia ni Kristo.
Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata
ang pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro nito.
Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing
simbahan dahil sa mga kalokohan mo.
Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an
extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated,
with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion. 2
Criminal Case No. 99-1599
That on or about the 12th day of May, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher
and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the
Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or
dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said
complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication
on May 12, 1999, in daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted
hereunder, to wit:
SI ATTY. SO NG BOC
"LINTEK" din sa pangungurakot itong Ding So ng
Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit sa South Harbor.
Daan-daang libong piso ang kinikita ng masiba at
matakaw na si So sa mga importer na ayaw ideklara
ang totoong laman ng mga container para makaiwas
sa pagbayad ng malaking customs duties at taxes.
Si So ang nagpapadrino sa mga pag-inspection ng
mga container na ito. Siyempre-binibigyan din niya ng
salapi yung ibang mga ahensiya para pumikit na lang
at itikom ang kanilang nga [sic] bibig diyan sa mga
buwayang taga BOC.
Awang-awa ako sa ating gobyerno. Bankrupt na nga,
ninanakawan pa ng mga kawatan tulad ni So.
Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So, bakit hindi na lang
tumayo ng sarili niyang robbery-hold-up gang para
kumita ng mas mabilis. TEDHaA
The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports
contemplated by the provision. They provide no details of the
acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and
simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one
unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to
substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before
publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the character of
the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his religion
and the legal profession. As none of the elements of the
second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC is present in Tulfo's
articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are qualified
privileged communications under the RPC.
Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms
"fair" and "true", Tulfo's articles do not meet the standard.
"Fair" is defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and
honesty". 35 "True" is defined as "conformable to fact; correct;
exact; actual; genuine; honest." 36 Tulfo failed to satisfy these
requirements, as he did not do research before making his
allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were
baseless. The articles are not "fair and true reports", but
merely wild accusations.
Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are
covered by the shield of qualified privileged communication,
this would still not protect Tulfo.
In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified
privileged communication, Tulfo argues that the presumption
of malice in law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present,
placing upon the prosecution the burden of proving malice in
fact. He then argues that for him to be liable, there should have
been evidence that he was motivated by ill will or spite in
writing the subject articles.
The test to be followed is that laid down in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 37 and reiterated in Flor v. People, which
should be to determine whether the defamatory statement was
made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. 38
The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and
published the subject articles with reckless disregard of
whether the same were false or not, as proven by the
prosecution. There was the finding that Tulfo failed to verify
the information on which he based his writings, and that the
defense presented no evidence to show that the accusations
against Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot argue that because he
did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there was no
malice attendant in his articles. The test laid down is the
"reckless disregard" test, and Tulfo has failed to meet that
test.
The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting
respondent Atty. So can be considered as further evidence of
malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo, 39wherein publication after
the commencement of an action was taken as further evidence
of a malicious design to injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent
nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to
continue defaming respondent Atty. So. This is a clear
indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost,
and is proof of malice.
Leaving the discussion of qualified privileged
communication, Tulfo also argues that the lower court
misappreciated the evidence presented as to the identity of
the complainant: that Tulfo wrote about Atty. "Ding" So, an
official of the Bureau of Customs who worked at the South
Harbor, whereas the complainant was Atty. Carlos So who
worked at the NAIA. He claims that there has arisen a cloud of
doubt as to the identity of the real party referred to in the
articles.
This argument is patently without merit.
The prosecution was able to present the testimonies of
two other witnesses who identified Atty. So from Tulfo's
articles. There is the certification that there is only one Atty.
So in the Bureau of Customs. And most damning to Tulfo's case
is the last column he wrote on the matter, referring to the libel
suit against him by Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. In this
article, Tulfo launched further attacks against Atty. So, stating
that the libel case was due to the exposés Tulfo had written on
the corrupt acts committed by Atty. So in the Bureau of
Customs. This last article is an admission on the part of Tulfo
that Atty. So was in fact the target of his attacks. He cannot
now point to a putative "Atty. Ding So" at South Harbor, or
someone else using the name of Atty. So as the real subject of
his attacks, when he did not investigate the existence or non-
existence of an Atty. So at South Harbor, nor investigate the
alleged corrupt acts of Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. Tulfo
cannot say that there is doubt as to the identity of the Atty. So
referred to in his articles, when all the evidence points to one
Atty. So, the complainant in the present case.
Having discussed the issue of qualified privileged
communication and the matter of the identity of the person
referred to in the subject articles, there remains the petition of
the editors and president of Remate, the paper on which the
subject articles appeared.
In sum, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all
claim that they had no participation in the editing or writing of
the subject articles, and are thus not liable.
The argument must fail.
The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the
persons responsible for libel:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who
shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for
the defamations contained therein to the same extent as
if he were the author thereof.
The claim that they had no participation does not shield
them from liability. The provision in the RPC does not provide
absence of participation as a defense, but rather plainly and
specifically states the responsibility of those involved in
publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter
of whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing
the subject articles, because the law simply so states that
they are liable as they were the author.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability
for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply
saying they had no participation in the preparation of the
same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the
publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared,
when they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the
newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the
publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because
he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the other
petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because
they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and
publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has
active charge and control of its management, conduct, and
policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for
the publication therein of a libelous article. 40 On the theory
that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control
the contents of the paper, 41 it is held that said person cannot
evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to
employees, 42 so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor
or manager knew the contents of the publication. 43 In Fermin
v. People of the Philippines, 44 the Court held that the publisher
could not escape liability by claiming lack of participation in
the preparation and publication of a libelous article. The Court
cited U.S. v. Ocampo, stating the rationale for holding the
persons enumerated in Art. 360 of the RPC criminally liable,
and it is worth reiterating:IDCHTE
TITLE 14
[G.R. No. 172716. November 17, 2010.]
DECISION
CARPIO, J :
p
The Case
The petition seeks the review 1 of the Orders 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower
court's ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause
to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite
the accused's previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner
Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent
Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the
charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence. SICDAa
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J :p
In this appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilt for any crime
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, and claims that
Ferdinand's injuries were the result of a mere accident. He insists
that he lacked criminal intent; that he was not negligent in
driving his pick-up truck; and that the CA should have
appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance in
his favor.
AEITDH
Ruling
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:
Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5)
to six (6) meters behind the jeep of Ferdinand, as he
allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that
Ferdinand's body was thrown four (4) meters away from his
jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a
fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is
worthy to note that Reynaldo admitted that he has known
Ferdinand and the latter's family since 1980 because they
have a store where he used to buy things. As aptly
observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should have foreseen the
possibility that Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and
go inside the house of his mother where the store is also
located.
xxx xxx xxx
As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is
moving beyond the normal rate of speed and within the
control of the driver's hands could have caused
Ferdinand's injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative
of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise
ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered, which
will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control
and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held
inPeople v. Garcia:
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due
reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is
responsible for such results as anyone might foresee
and for acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-
beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of
danger and injury." TIDHCc
463)
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
DECISION
REYES, J :p
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the
witnesses' narrations of the accident credible and worthy of
belief, their accounts were also consistent and tallied on all
significant and substantial points. 36 These witnesses'
testimonies are as follows:
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the
accident at Aglayan. He made the following findings in his
accident report: the pick-up owned and driven by Toor, Sr.,
together with his family and a househelper as his passengers,
was turning left along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle
position by a Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner. He noted
skid marks made by the bus and explained that the petitioner
was overtaking but was not able to do so because of the pick-
up. The petitioner could not swerve to the left to avoid the
pick-up because there was a ten-wheeler truck. He swerved to
the right instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The
investigator clearly testified that, on the basis of data
gathered, the collision was due to the error of the bus driver
who was driving too fast, as evinced by the distance from the
skid marks towards the axle. 37
Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.'s pick-up turn
left along Aglayan. He also saw a big truck and a Super 5 bus
both coming from Malaybalay. The truck was running slowly
while the Super 5 bus was running fast and overtaking the big
truck from the right side. The bus crashed into the pick-up and
pushed the smaller vehicle due to the force of the impact. He
went nearer the area of collision and saw that the four
passengers of the pick-up were unconscious. 38
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards
the center of Aglayan on board her employer's pick-up, she saw
a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from the right side. Their
vehicle was hit by the bus. She was thrown out of the pick-up
and hit her head on the ground. 39
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at
the corner of the center of Aglayan, a Super 5 bus, moving fast,
overtook a big truck from the right side. The bus then hit the
pick up, injuring him and all his passengers. 40
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses
conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus was moving fast;
(2) the bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly from
the right side; and (3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up
truck turning left, he applied the brakes but because he was
moving fast, the collision became inevitable.
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the a trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great
weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
significance and influence. This rule is based on the fact that
the trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor
and the conduct of the witnesses." 41 The Court finds in the
instant case that there is no reason for this Court to deviate
from the rule.
The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not
biased. There was no evidence of ill motive of the witnesses
against the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a
traffic violation and thus, he should be the one blamed for the
incident. The Court finds this without merit.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus
driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on the right shoulder
of the road and overtook another south-bound ten-wheeler
truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously to give way to
another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was
impossible for him not to notice that the ten-wheeler truck in
front and traveling in the same direction had already slowed
down to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then
negotiating a left turn to Aglayan public market. Seeing the
ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the
bus in order to allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn.
Instead, he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to
swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake the
truck, entering the intersection and directly smashing into the
pick-up. In flagrantly failing to observe the necessary
precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to other
persons and things, the petitioner was recklessly imprudent in
operating the Super 5 bus. 42 EcTCAD
DECISION
REYES, J : p