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TITLE 10 – CHAPTER 1

[G.R. No. 212932. January 21, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


ARNEL BALUTE y VILLANUEVA, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-


appellant Arnel Balute y Villanueva (Balute) assailing the
Decision 2 dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05649 which affirmed the Decision 3 dated
June 11, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18
(RTC) in Crim. Case No. 03-211951, finding Balute guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
The Facts
On November 22, 2002, an Information was filed before the RTC
charging Balute of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined
and penalized under Article 294 (1) 4 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, the accusatory portion of which reads: 5
Crim. Case No. 03-211951
"That on or about March 22, 2002, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together with one whose true name, real
identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and
mutually helping each other, with intent to gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then
and there poking a gun at one SPO1 RAYMUNDO B.
MANAOIS, forcibly grabbing and snatching his Nokia 3210
cellular phone, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away the same valued at
P6,000.00 against his will, to the damage and prejudice of
the said SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS in the aforesaid
amount of P6,000.00 Philippine Currency; thereafter
shooting said SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS with an
unknown caliber firearm, hitting him at the back, and as a
result thereof, he sustained mortal gunshot wound which
was the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
According to the prosecution, at around 8 o'clock in the evening
of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois (SPO1 Manaois)
was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita and
daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila.
While the vehicle was on a stop position at a lighted area due to
heavy traffic, two (2) male persons, later on identified as Balute
and a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either
side of the jeepney, with Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1
Manaois and saying "putang ina, ilabas mo!" Thereafter, Balute
grabbed SPO1 Manaois's mobile phone from the latter's chest
pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois
reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his
vehicle, but he was unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to
the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he
died despite undergoing surgical operation and medical
intervention. 6
aCcHEI

In his defense, Balute denied having any knowledge of the


charges against him. He maintained, inter alia, that on March 22,
2002, he was at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol (Nicol)
wherein he worked as a pedicab welder from 8:00 o'clock in the
morning until 10:00 o'clock in the evening, and did not notice any
untoward incident that day as he was busy working the entire
time. Nicol corroborated Balute's story, and imputed liability on
Blaster and a certain Intoy. 7
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 8 dated June 11, 2012, the RTC found Balute guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, in lieu of the death penalty, as well
as ordered him to pay the heirs of SPO1 Manaois the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P6,000.00 as compensatory
damages for the value of the stolen mobile phone, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, with interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum (p.a.) from the filing of the Information. 9
It found that the prosecution was able to establish the existence
of all the elements of Robbery with Homicide, as it proved that
Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois's side, took his mobile
phone, and shot him, resulting in the latter's death. In this
relation, the RTC gave credence to Cristita and Blesilda's positive
identification of Balute as the assailant, as compared to the
latter's mere denial and alibi. 10
Aggrieved, Balute appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 11 dated February 3, 2014, the CA affirmed Balute's
conviction with modification in that: (a) the aggravating
circumstance of treachery was no longer considered as the
prosecution failed to allege the same in the Information; 12 (b) the
civil indemnity was increased to P75,000.00 in view of existing
jurisprudence; (c) the P6,000.00 compensatory damages,
representing the value of the mobile phone, was deleted in the
absence of competent proof of its value, and in lieu thereof,
actual damages in the aggregate amount of P140,413.53
representing SPO1 Manaois's hospital and funeral expenses was
awarded to his heirs; and (d) all the monetary awards for
damages are with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a.
from the date of finality of the CA Decision until fully paid. 13
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The lone issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly upheld Balute's conviction for Robbery with Homicide.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
It must be stressed that in criminal cases, factual findings of the
trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on
appeal, especially when such findings are supported by
substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material
and relevant matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and evaluate
the factual findings of the court below. 14 Guided by the foregoing
principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTC's
factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.SEDaAH

In People v. Ibañez, 15 the Court exhaustively explained that "[a]


special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place
when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: ( 1)
the taking of personal property belonging to another; ( 2) with
intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against
a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main
purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery." 16 Homicide is said to have been committed
by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was
committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the
loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;
or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. 17
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC's finding
that the prosecution was able to establish the fact that Balute
poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter's mobile phone,
and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical
and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and
Blesilda's positive identification of Balute as the one who
committed the crime as opposed to the latter's denial and alibi
which was correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as
weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that "alibi and denial
are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical,
consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the
[eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter." 18 This is especially true
when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim — such as
Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1
Manaois, respectively — since "[t]he natural interest of
witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the
conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from
implicating persons other than the true culprits." 19
In sum, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted Balute of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 294 (1) of the RPC, as amended. However, the Court
deems it appropriate to adjust the award of moral damages from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 in order to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence. 20Further, the Court also awards exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in favor of the heirs of
SPO1 Manaois due to the highly reprehensible and/or outrageous
conduct of Balute in committing the aforesaid crime. 21
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05649 finding accused-appellant Arnel
Balute y Villanueva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article
294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, and is ordered to pay the heirs of SPO1 Raymundo B.
Manaois the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P140,413.53 as actual damages, and P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Balute y Villanueva, G.R. No. 212932, [January 21,
|||

2015])

[G.R. No. 209227. March 25, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


CHARLIE OROSCO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J : p

On appeal is the Decision 1 dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of


Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05171 which affirmed the
Decision 2 dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 10 finding the accused-appellant Charlie
Orosco guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Appellant, along with Abner Astor, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe,"
were charged with Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2006, in the City of
Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain
and by means of violence, did then and there [willfully],
unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly enter the store owned
by one Lourdes Yap situated at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis,
Legazpi City, and once inside said store, take, steal and
carry away cash money, to the damage and prejudice of
said Lourdes Yap, and by reason of or on occasion of said
robbery, and for the purpose of enabling them to take,
steal and carry away the aforesaid cash money in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and feloniously and taking advantage
of their superior strength and with intent to kill, attack,
assault and stab the aforesaid Lourdes Yap, thereby
inflicting upon her injury which directly caused her
untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of her legal
heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The factual scenario presented by the prosecution is based on
the eyewitness account of Albert M. Arca (Arca), the postmortem
findings of Sr. Pol. Chief Insp. Dr. James Margallo Belgira who
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, and the
victim's grandson, Ryan Francis Yap.
Arca testified that on May 16, 2006, about one o'clock in the
afternoon, he went to the store of Lourdes Yap (Yap) at Purok 4,
Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was buying ice but it was not
yet hardened (frozen) so he went home. At around two o'clock, he
was again sent on errand to buy ice at the same store. After
purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between
Yap and two male customers. The men were arguing that they
were given insufficient change and insisting they gave a P500 bill
and not P100. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered
the store. From outside the store and thru its open window grills,
he saw one of the men placed his left arm around the neck of Yap
and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man
was at her back restraining her hands. He recognized the man
who was holding the hands of Yap as Charlie Orosco (appellant),
while he described the man who covered her mouth as thin, with
less hair and dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the
center of her chest. When they released her, she fell down on the
floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the
religious icon or "santo" at the altar infront of the store's window,
after which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled together with
two other men outside who acted as lookouts. Arca went near
the bloodied victim but also left and went home afraid because
he was seen by one of the lookouts. 4 aATHIE

Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was
declared dead on arrival. Later, at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District office, Arca gave
descriptions of the faces of appellant and the dark thin man who
stabbed Yap ("John Doe"). From a surveillance digital photo and
video clip shown to him, Arca positively identified Abner Astor
(Astor) as one of the two men sitting beside the store as
lookouts. Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against
appellant and Astor. But only appellant was arrested as Astor,
John Doe and Peter Doe remained at large.
Dr. Belgira affirmed the findings in his Medico-Legal
Report 5 stating:
TRUNK:
1) Stab wound, left anterior costal region, measuring
2 x 0.5 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline, 9
cm deep. The wound tract is directed
posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards,
cutting the sixth anterior thoracic rib and
piercing the heart.
CONCLUSION:
The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to a
stab wound of the trunk.
He explained that it was possible that the lone stab wound
caused by a sharp object, such as a knife, was inflicted while the
victim was standing, and found no other injuries such as defense
wounds. 6
For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of
the incident, he was at his house in Bigaa taking care of his
three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes. He
stayed in the house until his wife finished the laundry at past
3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his co-accused Astor. While
he admitted that he was a resident of Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his
family transferred to their other house at Bigaa. He denied
knowing Arca and he does not know of any motive for Arca to
testify against him. He worked in a copra company in Lidong but
stopped reporting for work after May 16, 2006 as he was selling
fish. He was arrested by the police at the rotunda in Legazpi
when he was buying medicine for his sick child. 7
Appellant's wife, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified to
confirm that at the time of the incident he was at their house
while she was doing the laundry just adjacent to their house. On
cross-examination, she was asked the distance between their
place and Bgy. Rawis and she replied that it will take less than
one hour from Bigaa to Rawis. 8
On June 24, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
appellant of the crime charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Court
hereby finds accused Charlie Orosco GUILTY of the crime
of robbery with homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of
Lourdes Yap P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of
death, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Insofar as the other accused is concerned, the case is
hereby sent to the archives, pending their eventual
arrest.HAICTD

So Ordered. 9

Appellant went to the CA but his appeal was dismissed. The CA


upheld his conviction as it found no compelling reason to deviate
from the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court.
In this petition, appellant reiterates the arguments he raised
before the CA that the trial court erred in giving credit to the
uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca who could not
point to him during the trial, and that even granting that criminal
charges may be imputed against him, it should only be robbery
and not the complex crime of robbery with homicide considering
the fact that it was not him who stabbed Yap.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such
that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness
could be sufficient to convict an accused. The testimony of a
sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court,
is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are
reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the
truth or that his observation had been inaccurate. 10
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the
testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing
notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating the incident
to the court and that he initially desisted from physically pointing
to appellant as the one who held Yap's hands from behind and
took her money at the store after she was stabbed by appellant's
cohort (John Doe).
In his direct examination, Arca named appellant as one of those
who robbed and killed Yap but refused to pinpoint him in open
court, thus:
ACP NUQUI
xxx xxx xxx
Q. This person who was holding the hands of Lourdes Yap,
were you able to identify him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the name of this person?
A. Yes, sir. He is Charlie.
Q. Do you know the family name?
A. Orosco, sir.
Q. If this Charlie Orosco whom you said was then holding
the hands of Lourdes Yap, if he is in Court, would you
please point to him?
WITNESS (answering)
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please look around you and point at him.
A. He is here.
Q. If he is in Court, please point at him.
Q. Why can't you point at him?
COURT INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is somewhat trembling.
ACP NUQUI
Oh, you see.
ATTY. BAÑARES
The witness can not answer.
ACP NUQUI
By the look of the witness, Your Honor, he is afraid.
Perhaps . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
ACP NUQUI (continuing)
Q. Please point at him. AScTaD

ATTY. BAÑARES
We have already foreseen the witness to pinpoint at
anyone.
ACP NUQUI
No. He said that the . . . .
ATTY. BAÑARES
Then, let him voluntarily do it.
ACP NUQUI
Okay.
ATTY. BAÑARES
Your Honor, I move that the prosecutor will transfer to
another question because we keep on waiting
already.
ACP NUQUI
Your Honor, it is understandable that even he is slow, he
keeps on glancing at the person.
COURT
Observations are all noted.
xxx xxx xxx
ACP NUQUI
At this point, Your Honor, I would like to make of record
that when it comes to the person of Charlie Orosco,
Your Honor, he stopped and did not say — he did not
nod or do anything of what he has been doing when
the other persons were identified.
COURT
Okay. Noted. 11

Arca continued with his testimony on how Yap was stabbed by


appellant's companion and appellant taking the thick wad of
P1,000 bills before fleeing along with the two lookouts. When
asked for the fourth time to pinpoint appellant, Arca was still
hesitant:
Q. Now, is this Charlie Orosco here in Court?
A. Yes, sir, he is around.
Q. This person who took the money or Charlie Orosco you
said "he is in Court," will you please look at him.
xxx xxx xxx
ACP NUQUI (continuing)
Q. Is he now in Court?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please point at him.
ATTY. BAÑARES
The same observation, Your Honor.
COURT
Oh, the same observation?
ACP NUQUI
Yes, Your Honor, he is hesitant. It is understandable
because he is afraid.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT (to the witness)
Q. Why can you not point at Charlie Orosco who according
to you he is inside the Court?
WITNESS (answering)
A. I can't afford to point at him.
ACP NUQUI (to the witness)
Q. Why? aHSTID

A. I am afraid.
COURT
He can not because he is afraid. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
At the next hearing, Arca was recalled to the witness stand and
this time he was able to pinpoint appellant as among those
persons who robbed and killed Yap, thus:
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q. You mentioned that you saw two (2) persons talking to
Lourdes Yap. Who are these persons you are referring
to?
ATTY. CHAN
Your Honor please, we are again registering our objection.
COURT
Witness may answer.
WITNESS
A. Charlie Orosco and a certain thin person.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q. Why are you able to say that Charlie Orosco was one of
the persons talking, how long have you known
Charlie Orosco?
A. He always go with a fisherman and act as helper and
because of that I know him.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q. You mentioned that you have long known Charlie
Orosco. Will you look around and point to him if he is
in Court?
INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man wearing
a yellow T-shirt with handcuff and when asked
answered by the name of Charlie Orosco.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
No further questions Your Honor. 13
Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court
concluded that he had positively identified appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap, viz.:
Here, Albert Arca, the prosecution's main witness,
positively identified accused Orosco as one of [the] two
men who robbed and killed Lourdes Yap on that fateful
day. As observed by the trial court during the bail
hearings, when asked to identify one of the men who
robbed and killed the victim, Arca was trembling and
constantly looking towards the direction of accused
Orosco. Though simple-minded, Arca was well-aware of the
possible consequences his testimony could trigger. To the
Court's mind, Arca's act of constantly looking towards
Orosco's direction whenever he was asked to point out
one of the culprits, is a mute but eloquent manner of
identifying Orosco as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
As such, Arca's act is sufficient identification already.
Later, when Arca was recalled to the stand to answer
some additional questions, he was able to gather enough
courage to point out to Orosco as the man who held the
hands of Lourdes Yap while his companion stabbed her.
Arca stated that he was hesitant to identify and point out
accused earlier because he feared what Orosco might do
to him. Incidentally, both Orosco and his wife stated that
they do know neither Albert Arca nor Lourdes Yap. Thus, it
appears that there is no reason whatsoever for Arca to lie
and attribute the crime to Orosco. Following settled
jurisprudence, Arca's positive identification of Orosco
prevails over the latter's alibi. 14
IECcAT

We find no compelling or cogent reason to deviate from the


findings of the trial court on its evaluation of Arca's testimony.
The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial court's
findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without any
clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could
affect the result of the case. 15
Appellant repeatedly harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to
him at the trial. However, as the trial court's firsthand
observation of said witness' deportment revealed, Arca's fear of
appellant sufficiently explains his initial refusal to point to him in
open court during his direct examination. Arca was finally able to
point to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and
killing of Yap during his additional direct examination when he
had apparently mustered enough courage to do so.
Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides in part:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons — Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the
taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by
reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used
in its generic sense) is committed. 16 Homicide is said to have
been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is
committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
(c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d)
to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime. 17 In
robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may
take place before, during or after the robbery. 18
Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery as appellant and John Doe had to kill Yap
to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The
earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have paid a
greater amount and asked for the correct change was just a ploy
to get inside the store where the victim kept her earnings. To
verify whether the cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill,
the victim let them enter the store but once inside they got hold
of her and stabbed her. Appellant, however, argues that if he had
committed any offense, it was only robbery since Arca testified
that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who
stabbed the victim.
We disagree.
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that
appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused. Appellant and
John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting victim in a verbal
altercation until she allowed them to enter the store. Upon
getting inside, they held the victim with John Doe wrapping his
arm around her neck while appellant held her hands at the back.
With the victim pressed between the two of them, John Doe
stabbed her once in her chest before releasing her. Once she fell
down, appellant quickly took the money placed at the altar inside
the store and fled together with John Doe and the two lookouts
outside the store. All the foregoing indicate the presence of
conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused in the
perpetration of robbery and killing of the victim.
It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the
killing of the victim to facilitate the robbery. He was behind the
victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck.
His act contributed in rendering the victim without any means of
defending herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the
chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, appellant
is equally liable for the killing of Yap.
As we held in People v. Baron 19

The concerted manner in which the appellant and his


companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond
reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a
homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether
they actually participated in the killing, unless there is
proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the
killing. There was no evidence adduced in this case that
the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus,
regardless of the acts individually performed by the
appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic
principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of
all," the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result,
the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused
are one and the same. (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of appellant
for robbery with homicide. Appellant was positively identified by
prosecution eyewitness Arca as among those who perpetrated
the robbery and killing of Yap at the latter's store on May 16,
2006 in Bgy. Rawis, Legazpi City. This positive identification
prevails over accused's defense of alibi. As pointed out by the
trial court, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at
the scene of the crime considering the presence of many public
conveyances which would drastically cut the one hour walk from
Bigaa to Rawis to only a "couple of minutes". 20
On the award of damages, the trial court was correct in
sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the fact of death and P75,000.00 as moral damages,
conformably with prevailing jurisprudence. 21 We also find the
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 proper
due to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength, though these were not
alleged in the information. While an aggravating circumstance
not specifically alleged in the information (albeit established at
trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of
the accused, the established presence of one or two aggravating
circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the offended party
to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil
Code because the requirement of specificity in the information
affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil
liability. 22
The aforesaid sums shall earn the legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full
payment.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05171 affirming the Decision dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10 in Criminal Case No. 10916
is AFFIRMED. The sums awarded as civil indemnity (P75,000.00),
moral damages (P75,000.00) and exemplary damages
(P30,000.00) shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the finality of judgment until full payment.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Orosco, G.R. No. 209227, [March 25, 2015])

[G.R. No. 173479. July 12, 2007.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


JUAN CABBAB, JR., accused-appellant.

DECISION

GARCIA, J : p

Before the Court on automatic review is the decision 1 dated


February 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00968 which affirmed, with modification, an earlier decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in
Criminal Case No. 687, finding appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
and Attempted Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo 2 which
modified the provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they
provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was earlier 3 referred to
the CA, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01978,
for appropriate action and disposition.
The Case
In the court of origin, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., along with his
cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, was charged with the crimes of
Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery in an
Information 4 alleging, as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1988, in Sitio Kayawkaw,
Barangay Kimmalasag, Municipality of San Isidro, Province
of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, while
armed with a firearm (not-recover), conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and shot from ambush WINNER AGBULOS and
EDDIE QUINDASAN, consequently inflicting thereby
multiple gunshot wounds on the different parts of their
bodies, killing Winner Agbulos on the spot and causing the
death of Eddie Quindasan shortly thereafter, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, shot William Belmes, said accused having commenced
the execution of Murder by overt acts but were unable to
perform all the acts of execution, which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence thereof,
due to alertness of victim William Belmes to roll and poor
marksmanship of the accused thus prevented his death,
then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously,
with the intent of gain, take, steal and carry away the
money of Winner Agbulos in the amount of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), Philippine currency. CAaEDH

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating


circumstance of: (1) uninhabited place.
On arraignment, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and accused
Segundino Calpito separately entered their pleas of "Not Guilty"
to the crimes charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in
the course of which the prosecution presented the oral
testimonies of M/Sgt. Godofredo Tubadeza, a police investigator
at Camp Villamor, Bangued, Abra; PO William Belmes, a member
of the Integrated National Police at the Villaviciosa Police
Station; Vidal Agbulos, father of the victim Winner Agbulos; Dra.
Leona Garcia-Beroña, medico-legal officer who conducted an
autopsy on the body of Winner Agbulos; and Dr. Godofreco Gasa,
a physician at the Abra Provincial Hospital.
For its part, the defense presented the appellant himself;
accused Segundino Calpito; and George de Lara, a Forensic
Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The Evidence
The People's version of the incident is succinctly summarized by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Appellee's
Brief, 5 to wit:
In the morning of 22 April 1988, father and son Vidal
Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie
Quindasan, Felipe Abad and Police Officer (PO) William
Belmes, went to Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra to
attend a "fiesta" celebration. Upon arrival in the area, they
found out that the fiesta celebration was already over,
thus, they decided to go home in Villaviciosa, Abra. Since
it was already lunchtime, the group took their lunch at
Sitio Turod, located in the same area of Barangay
Kimmalasag. After taking their lunch and on their way
home, they were met by accused-appellant Juan Cabbab,
Jr. and Segundino Calpito who invited them to play
"pepito," a local version of the game of "russian poker." cHaCAS

Only Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan played "pepito"


with the group of accused-appellant. Winner Agbulos
played the dealer/banker in the game while accused-
appellant and Segundino Calpito acted as players therein.
Around 3:00 o'clock p.m., PO William Belmes told Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan that they should be going
home after three (3) more deals. About 3:30 p.m., Winner
Agbulos's group wrapped-up the game and were set for
home together with his group. Winner Agbulos won the
game.
While walking on their way home from Sitio Turod, PO
William Belmes, who was behind Winner Agbulos and Eddie
Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw
accused-appellant, accused Segundino Calpito and a
companion running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots
and saw Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were
then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire.
By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save
himself from the continuous gunfire of accused-appellant.
PO William Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe
Abad, who were walking behind the group, and informed
the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were
ambushed by accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito.
The three (3) proceeded to the crime scene where they
saw the dead body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie
Quindasan whom they mistook for dead. The three sought
help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned
to the scene of the crime where they found Eddie
Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it
was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who
ambused * them and took the money, estimated at
P12,000.00, of Winner Agbulos which he won in the
card game. Eddie Quindasan was brought to the Abra
Provincial Hospital but died the following day.
Postmortem examination of Winner Agbulos showed that
the cause of his death was "cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot
wounds." On the other hand, Eddie Quindasan's cause of
death was "cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hypovolemic shock due to multiple gunshot wounds."
For the defense, appellant himself took the witness stand
claiming that in the morning of April 22, 1988, he went to Palao,
Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends Romeo, Demetrio and
Restituto, all surnamed Borreta. He stayed there almost the
entire day and left only at around 5:00 p.m. He arrived home in
Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra at around 5:30 p.m. He declared
that his co-accused Calpito was not with him that day. He
likewise averred that he did not know prosecution witnesses PO
William Belmes and Vidal Agbulos nor did he know of any motive
for them to testify against him.cTSHaE

Appellant's co-accused Calpito denied having committed the


crimes charged. He testified that at around 8:30 a.m. of April 22,
1988, he went fishing at Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra until 4:00
a.m. of the following day.
George de Lara, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that he
conducted an examination on the paraffin cast taken from
appellant to determine the presence of gunpowder residue or
nitrates on appellant's hands. The results of the said examination
showed that appellant was negative of nitrates. He opined that
certain factors may affect the result of the test such as
perspiration, wind velocity, humidity or the type of gun used. He
also theorized that a paraffin test would yield a negative result if
fertilizers or cosmetics are applied to the hands before the cast
is taken.
The Trial Court's Decision
In a decision 6 dated August 26, 1997, the trial court acquitted
Segundino Calpito but found appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty of
two crimes, i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2)
attempted murder. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Juan Cabbab, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with
robbery or better put, robbery with double homicide and
attempted murder as defined in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Art. 294 of the same Code or
robbery with double homicide defined and penalized under
Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Same Code with
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place with no
mitigating circumstances and sentences him with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the killing of
Winner Agbulos and for robbing the said victim after killing
him and for the killing of Eddie Quindasan. The court
likewise finds the accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the attempted murder defined and
penalized in Art. 48 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised
Penal Code. These offenses attended by the aggravating
circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating
circumstances and sentence him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum. ESHcTD

He is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims


P50,000.00 for each of them plus P20,000.00 also for each
of them as actual expenses and finally, the amount of
P100,000.00 also for each of them as moral and exemplary
damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
Accused Segundino Calpito is acquitted for insufficiency
of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
The records of the case were then transmitted to this Court on
automatic review. As stated at the onset hereof, the Court, in its
Resolution 7 of January 17, 2006 and pursuant to its ruling
in People v. Mateo, 8 referred the case and its records to the CA
for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it was docketed
as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968.

In a decision dated February 22, 2006, the CA modified the trial


court's decision and found appellant guilty of the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposed upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA also affirmed
appellant's conviction, as well as the penalty imposed, for the
separate crime of attempted murder.
From the CA, the case was then elevated to this Court for
automatic review. In its Resolution 9 of September 20, 2006, the
Court resolved to require the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs.
In a Manifestation dated November 16, 2006, the OSG, in behalf of
appellee People, informed the Court that it is no longer filing a
supplemental brief and was merely adopting its appellee's brief
before the CA as its supplemental brief.
Appellant, on the other hand, filed on December 18, 2006 his
supplemental brief on the lone assigned error, that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
VERSION IS MORE CREDIBLE AND SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE.
Insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, appellant pleads for acquittal. He avers that
the witnesses for the prosecution failed to positively identify him
as the perpetrator of the crime as they did not actually see him
shoot the victims. Appellant also relies on the results of the
paraffin test showing that he was negative of gunpowder
nitrates.TSADaI

The appeal must fail.


Appellant's contention that the witnesses for the prosecution
failed to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime is belied by
the testimony of PO William Belmes, who was with the victims
when the incident happened. We quote from the transcripts of the
stenographic notes:
William Belmes on Re-direct Examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. Mr. Witness, when you gave your statement on April 30,
1988, exactly eight (8) days after the incident when
the incident wherein you were investigated upon still
very very fresh in your mind (sic). Now, in your
statement which you gave to the investigator, Pat.
Tubadeza, you stated that you saw the persons shot
at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan and after the
two (2) had fell down then you also likewise saw
them shot at you at the time you were rolling to the
ground. Do you affirm and confirm this statement of
yours which you subscribed before Fiscal Ricarte
Valera?
ATTY. YANURIA:
Your Honor, it is misleading, we object, in so far as the
shooting of Eddie Quindasan and Winner Agbulos was
not seen. He only saw the persons who were firing at
him namely: Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito.
COURT:
In his testimony before the court he testified before the
court that he saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino
Calpito shot at Eddie Quindasan and Winner Agbulos.
Reform the question. cACEHI

FISCAL FLORES:
Q. However, you saw these two (2) accused, Juan Cabbab
and Segundino Calpito shoot at you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell the court if how far were these two (2)
accused when they were firing at you?
A. Eight (8) meters, sir.
Q. And therefore what time is it when they were firing at
you?
A. If I'm not mistaken it was 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. 10
xxx xxx xxx
William Belmes on cross-examination
ATTY. YANURIA:
Q. In other words, it was you being shot out by Segundino
Calpito and Juan Cabbab but you did not see them
shoot at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan?
A. I saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino fire at Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan (the witness using the
word "banat") and when they already fell down, they
continued firing attempt and in my case I rolled and
they also fired at me. 11
The above testimony adequately showed that Belmes was able to
look at and see appellant at the time he perpetrated the crime. To
our mind, Belmes could not have made a mistake with respect to
appellant's identity, what with the fact that just a few hours
before the incident, it was even appellant himself who invited
Belmes and his group to play poker. For sure, Belmes had a face-
to-face encounter with appellant before the assault and thus
would be able to unmistakably recognize him especially because
at the time of the attack, Belmes was just eight (8) meters away
from appellant and conditions of visibility were very good at the
time of the incident as it was only around 4:00 in the afternoon.
Jurisprudence recognizes that it is the most natural reaction of
victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the
perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the
crime was committed. 12 cSEAHa

Belmes' testimony was corroborated by that of Vidal Agbulos who


was also with the group when the robbery and shooting took
place. Again, we quote from the transcripts of stenographic
notes:
Vidal Agbulos on direct examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. What did you do next when Felipe Abad informed you
again that your son was already killed and Eddie
Quindasan was injured?
A. Even if he told me about that I just went ahead.
Q. What happened next when he told you that?
A. When I went ahead I saw Juan Cabbab took the wallet
from my son.
COURT:
Q. At that time, Winner Agbulos was already prostrate on
the ground?
A. Yes, sir, my son was lying on the ground facing down. 13
Clearly, then, Vidal Agbulos positively identified appellant as the
person who robbed his son, Winner, of his winnings. Just like
Belmes, Agbulos could also not have been mistaken as to
appellant's identity considering that it was appellant who
personally approached Agbulos' group and invited them to play
poker just a few hours prior to the commission of the crime.
Further, Agbulos testified that he was familiar with appellant as
he would often see him in a cockpit in San Isidro, Abra.
To be sure, the trial court which had the unique opportunity to
observe at first hand the demeanor of witnesses Belmes and
Agbulos and assess whether they are telling the truth or not,
gave full faith and credence to their testimonies. Finding no facts
and circumstances of weight and substance that would
otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the Court accords the
highest respect to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
these witnesses.
Appellant likewise capitalizes on the results of the paraffin test
showing that both his hands yielded no trace of gunpowder
residue. Unfortunately for appellant, the results of the paraffin
test would not exculpate him. The negative findings of said test
do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a
firearm at the time the crime was committed. This Court has
observed that it is quite possible for a person to discharge a
firearm and yet exhibit no trace of nitrates: when, e.g., the
assailant fired the weapon while wearing gloves or where the
assailant thoroughly washes his hands thereafter. 14 As George de
Lara of the NBI stated in his testimony before the trial court, if a
person applies cosmetics on his hands before the cast is taken,
gunpowder residue would not be found in that person's hands. He
also testified that certain factors could contribute to the
negative result of a paraffin test such as perspiration, humidity or
the type of firearm used. In fine, a finding that the paraffin test
on the person of the appellant yielded negative results is not
conclusive evidence to show that he indeed had not fired a
gun. EICDSA
Too, appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on
the part of prosecution witnesses Belmes and Agbulos that would
have driven them to falsely testify against him. In fact, appellant
himself declared that he did not know of any reason why Belmes
and Agbulos would implicate him in the crime. Where there is
nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath
deserve full faith and credence. 15
Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claiming that he went
to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends in the
morning of April 22, 1988 and returned home only at around 5:30
p.m. For alibi to prosper, however, the hornbook rule requires a
showing that the accused was at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. 16 Where there is even the least chance for the
accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi
will not hold water. 17
Here, the evidence shows that Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra
where appellant allegedly visited his friends was only 30 minutes
drive from Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra where the
crime was committed. In short, appellant failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the physical impossibility of his
presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of its
commission.
The weakness of appellant's alibi is heavily underscored by the
fact that appellant was positively identified by witnesses Belmes
and Agbulos who were with the victims at the time of the
incident. For sure, appellant's positive identification as the
perpetrator of the crime renders his defense of alibi unworthy of
credit. 18
The crime committed by appellant was correctly characterized
by the appellate court as Robbery with Homicide under Article
294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which reads:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons — Penalties.— Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.ETaHCD

To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide,


the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the
following elements:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with


violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo
lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof,
homicide is committed. 19
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is
to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It
is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or
that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or
that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the
felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide. 20
Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant, having lost to Winner Agbulos in the game of
poker, intended to divest Agbulos of his winnings amounting to
P20,000.00. In pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of his winnings,
appellant shot and killed him as well as his companion, Eddie
Quindasan.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article
294 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty
Law), is reclusion perpetua to death. In the application of a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, like that for
Robbery with Homicide, Article 63 of the RPC provides that
"when in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied."
In this case, the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended
the commission of the crime, as appellant's attack on the victims
who were then unsuspectingly walking on their way home was
sudden and done without any provocation, thus giving them no
real chance to defend themselves.
However, considering that the crime was committed in 1988 or
prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, 21 the trial court and the
CA correctly imposed upon appellant the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The Court feels, however, that the two courts below erred in
convicting appellant of the separate crime of attempted murder
for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or
attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the
robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains
fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides
or injuries committed in connection with the robbery. 22 TaSEHC

We now come to the award of damages.


Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan are each entitled to civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00, 23 to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, 24 and to exemplary damages in the sum of
P25,000.00. 25
With respect to actual damages, Winner's father, Vidal Agbulos,
testified that he spent a total of P50,000.00 as burial expenses
but he failed to present receipts therefor. In People v.
Abrazaldo, 26 we laid down the doctrine that where the amount of
actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined
because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate
damages may be awarded in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus, in
lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of Winner because
although the exact amount was not proved with certainty, it was
reasonable to expect that they incurred expenses for the coffin
and burial of the victim. We, however, cannot grant the same to
the heirs of Eddie Quindasan for their failure to testify on the
matter. Finally, appellant is obliged to return to the heirs of
Winner Agbulos the amount of P20,000.00 he had taken from
Winner.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 22, 2006 of the CA
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
2. Appellant is hereby ordered to return to the heirs of
Winner Agbulos the amount of P20,000.00
representing the amount stolen from him. He is
likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Winner
Agbulos the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages, (c)
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c)
P25,000.00 as temperate damages. ATICcS

3. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of


Eddie Quindasan P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
another P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. For reasons herein stated, appellant is ACQUITTED
of the separate crime of attempted murder
against the person of PO William Belmes.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Cabbab, Jr., G.R. No. 173479, [July 12, 2007], 554 PHIL
|||

459-477)
[G.R. No. 195244. June 22, 2015.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-


appellee, vs. ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA, accused-
appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The


party challenging the child's competency as a witness has the
burden of substantiating his challenge.
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 23,
2010, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the conviction of the appellant for the composite
crime of robbery with homicide handed down by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, in Mandaluyong City through its
judgment rendered on January 27, 2006. 2
Antecedents
The information charged the appellant with robbery with
homicide, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in
the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed
weapon, by means of force and violence, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away cash money amounting to P13,000.00
belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter; that by reason or on
occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with the said bladed weapon said JOSEPHINE
CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical
injuries which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The CA adopted the RTC's summation of the evidence of
the Prosecution, to wit:
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim,
testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger
sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping
on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant,
whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her
mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a
chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor,
there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed,
his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out
of his mother's lower chest. His father then brought her
to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a
neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who
stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related
that the assailant took money from his father's pocket.
He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the
perpetrator because there was no light (TSN, February
24, 2004, pp. 3, 11-23, 28, 30-32).
HcDSaT

Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated


that although there was no light when his mother was
stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was
light at their second floor, which illumined the ground
floor through the stairway (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp.
33-34).
Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that
the cause of the victim's death was hemorrhagic shock
due to stab wound. The wound was located at the
epigastric region, measuring 2.8 x 0.5 cm, 4 cm from left
of the anterior midline, 13 cm deep, directed posterior
and upward, piercing the right ventricle of the heart,
thoracic aorta and lower lobe of the left lung (TSN, April
21, 2004, pp. 1, 6; Exh. "I," Records, p. 103).
Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim.
He narrated that he and the victim were married for nine
years before the incident and that they have four
children: Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old;
Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about
9 p.m. on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were
sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their baby, while
their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3
by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl woke up
crying and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen
to thirty minutes later, he heard someone
shout "magnanakaw!" [H]e turned on the light and saw
that their door was open. He got their bolo and ran
outside. When he did not see anybody, he returned and
heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her
and saw blood on her back. He shouted for help and his
brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the hospital
where she eventually died. He spent P23,000.00 for the
funeral and P44,500.00 for the wake and burial. On cross-
examination, he admitted that he has no personal
knowledge as to who stabbed his wife since he did not
actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who
saw the appellant (TSN, August 25, 2004, pp. 3-12;
October 6, 2004, pp. 5-6; November 17, 2004, pp. 3-4).
Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she
and her husband were sleeping upstairs when they were
roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22,
2003 by Dennis' cry for help. She saw that there was
blood on the victim's chest. After the victim was brought
to the hospital, she noticed that the victim's children
were trembling in fear and were crying. They got outside
and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She
took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl
said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone
but she did not see who it was since there were many
people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether
he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes
and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also
said that the person who stabbed his mother was
present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and
said "siya po yung pumasok sa bahay namin." As a
resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall
and sometimes watches the television at the house of
the victim (TSN, February 9, 2005, pp. 3-14).
PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported
to him that there was a stabbing incident, he went to the
hospital then to the crime scene and interviewed the
persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and positively
identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his
mother and robbed them of their money. Appellant was
arrested and brought to the police station (TSN, March
16, 2005, pp. 2, 5-6).
PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was
questioning people in the area, Carl pointed to them the
suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were
asking Carl questions when he suddenly blurted out that
it was appellant who entered their house and stabbed his
mother. They invited the appellant to the police station
but the latter denied having committed the crime. On
cross-examination, the witness admitted that their basis
in arresting appellant was the information relayed by
Carl (TSN, April 27, 2005, pp. 2, 12-17; June 15, 2005, p.
5). 4
In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to
him, he had frequented the victim's billiard hall, which was
situated only four houses away from where he lived, and, on
the evening in question, he had been the last to leave the
billiard hall at 11 o'clock p.m. and had then gone home. He
recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for
help around two o'clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother
for the key to the door; that he had then gone outside where he
learned of the killing of the victim; that police officers had
later on approached him to inquire what he knew about the
killing because they told him that Carl, the young son of the
victim, had pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the
primary suspect; that he had replied that he had had nothing to
do with the crime; and that he had assured the police officers
that he had never been involved in any wrongdoing in his years
of living in the neighborhood.
The appellant's mother corroborated his version. 5

Judgment of the RTC


As mentioned, the RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of
the crime charged under its judgment rendered on January 27,
2006, 6 disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the
accused ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA @
"NONOY" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE under Article 293 and
punished under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
the court hereby sentences him to Reclusion
Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of JOSEPHINE
CASTRO y BARRERA as follows: ASTcaE

1) P50,000.00 civil indemnity;


2) P57,500.00 as actual damages;
3) P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 7

Decision of the CA
On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite
crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony
of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be
the product of his imagination. 8
On July 23, 2010, however, the CA, giving credence to the
child witness, and opining that his inconsistencies did not
discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the
appellant, 9 ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision dated January 27, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 211 of Mandaluyong City in
Crim. Case No. MC03-7597, is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION in that the award of P57,500.00 as
actual damages should be DELETED and in lieu thereof,
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should
be AWARDED the heirs of Josephine Castro y Barrera.
SO ORDERED. 10

Issues
In this appeal, the appellant posits that the adverse
testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being filled with
inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that unlike
him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of the
house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to Carl's
recollection, the place was not even dark when the stabbing
attack on the victim occurred because his father said that he
had turned the light on upon hearing somebody
shouting "Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten
his bolo, and gone outside the house. 11
Moreover, the appellant maintains that the Prosecution
did not prove that violence or intimidation was employed in the
course of the robbery. He argues that he could not be held
liable for robbery by using force upon things considering that
the culprit had neither broken any wall, roof, floor, door or
window to gain entry in the house nor entered the house
through an opening not intended for entrance. If at all, he
could be liable only for the separate crimes of theft and
homicide, not of the composite crime of robbery with
homicide. 12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
the evidence showed that the appellant's principal intent had
been to rob the victim's house, with the homicide being
perpetrated as a mere incident of the robbery; and that Carl
positively identified the appellant as the person who had
stabbed the victim, his identification bearing "all the earmarks
of credibility especially when he has no motive for lying about
the identity of the accused." 13
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The most important task of the State in the successful
prosecution of the accused is his credible and competent
identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, this
appeal turns on whether or not the identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was
credible and competent considering that the identifying
witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony
positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the
person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and
killed his mother.
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability
to relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards
that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Courtmakes clear who may
and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. —
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome
of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification. (18 a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. — The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of
their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception
to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to
render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
(19a)
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a
relevant event or incident, and can communicate such
awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a
witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a
person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of
the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with
which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent,
for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not
grounds for disqualification. 14cDSAEI

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for


disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has
long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is
now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging
the child's competency. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate
the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or
on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a
child. 15
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within
the province of the trial court. 16 All questions bearing on the
credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court
by virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment while
testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court
because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge
has the unique advantage of actually examining the real and
testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the
witnesses. Hence, the trial judge's assessment of the
witnesses' testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great
respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to
justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and
conclusion, like when no significant facts and circumstances
are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings.
The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court
has concurred with the trial court. 17
The appellant did not object to Carl's competency as a
witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to challenge
such competency by showing that the child was incapable of
perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or
that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent
witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct
examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct
testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was
to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once
did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right
from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception
to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against the
appellant.
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly
incurred by Carl. That is apparently not disputed. However, it
seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred
in his testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or
the elements of the composite crime charged but related only
to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his
testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the
inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of
the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout
to seek help upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed
his mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he
could not be expected to act and to react to what happened
like an adult. Although children have different levels of
intelligence and different degrees of perception, the
determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability
to communicate their perception to the courts still pertained
to the trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and
should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong
showing of mistake or misappreciation on the part of the trial
court. 18
It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one
opens the record of the trial bare and open. Even so, the
finding of facts by the trial court are still entitled to great
respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA. 19 This
great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial court's
direct and personal access to the witnesses while they testify
in its presence, giving them the unique opportunity to observe
their manner and decorum during intensive grilling by the
counsel for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were
fidgeting and prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy. With
both the RTC and the CA sharing the conviction on Carl's
credibility, his capacity to perceive and his ability to
communicate his perception, we cannot depart from their
common conclusion. Moreover, according credence to Carl's
testimony despite his tender age would not be unprecedented.
In People v. Mendiola, 20 the Court considered a 6-year-old
victim competent, and regarded her testimony against the
accused credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals, 21 the testimony
of the three-year-old victim was deemed acceptable. As such,
Carl's testimony was entitled to full probative weight.
Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit
during the investigation and during the trial. Worthy to note is
that the child could not have been mistaken about his
identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity with the
appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained
by the child's family. Verily, the evidence on record
overwhelmingly showed that the appellant, and no other, had
robbed and stabbed the victim.
The appellant contends that robbery was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt; that to sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proven as
conclusively as the other essential element of the crime; and
that it was not established that the taking of personal property
was achieved by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person or by using force upon things.
The contention lacks persuasion.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
Prosecution must prove the concurrence of the following
elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of
violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) the crime of
homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. 22 A conviction requires
certitude that the robbery is the main objective of the
malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. 23
The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-
bladed weapon. The fact that the appellant was armed with
the long-bladed weapon, which was undoubtedly a deadly
weapon, competently proved the presence of violence or
intimidation against persons that qualified the offense as
robbery instead of theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the
appellant was originally to commit robbery, with the homicide
being committed only in the course or on the occasion of the
perpetration of the robbery. As the records show, Dennis was
awakened by someone shouting "Magnanakaw!" The shout was
most probably made by the victim, whom the appellant then
stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering that the
original criminal design to rob had been consummated with
the taking of the money amounting to P13,000.00, the killing of
the victim under the circumstances rendered the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. EDCcaS

Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known


as a special complex crime. It is composed of two or more
crimes but is treated by law as a single indivisible and unique
offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a
specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and is
to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 24 A composite crime is
truly distinct and different from a complex or compound crime.
In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed
by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the combination
of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave
and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to
commit the other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the
specified combination of crimes is specific, but in a complex
or compound crime the penalty is that corresponding to the
most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A
light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or
compound crime may be made the subject of a separate
information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite
crime is absorbed.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime
are not appreciated to raise the penalty to be imposed
because the information did not specifically allege them. But
they should be appreciated in order to justify the grant of
exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P30,000.00 in accordance with relevant jurisprudence. 25 Under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
granted if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance for
this purpose need not be specifically alleged in the
information, and can be either a qualifying or attendant
circumstance. As expounded in People v. Catubig: 26
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the
Civil Code,the law not having specified otherwise, is to
be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one
on the public as it breaches the social order and the
other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively,
the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused
and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of
the Civil Code.27
In line with current jurisprudence, 28 we increase the civil
indemnity to P75,000.00, and the moral damages to
P75,000.00.
In addition to the damages awarded by the CA, the
appellant should be liable to pay the heirs of the victim
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary
awards for damages from the date of the finality of this
decision until the awards are fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on July 23, 2010 subject to
the MODIFICATIONS that then accused-appellant ALVIN
ESUGON yAVILA shall pay to the heirs of the late Josephine
Castro y Barrera civil indemnity of P75,000.00; moral damages
of P75,000.00; exemplary damages of P30,000.00; temperate
damages of P25,000.00; and interest at the legal rate of
6% per annum on all monetary awards for damages reckoned
from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards
are fully paid, plus the costs of suit.
The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Esugon y Avila, G.R. No. 195244, [June 22, 2015])

[G.R. No. 170191. August 16, 2006.]


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RODOLFO
SUYU @ RUDY, WILLY SUYU, FRANCIS CAINGLET and
ROMMEL MACARUBBO @ ROMMEL
BARIUAN, appellants.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J :p

On appeal is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.


CR No. 01238 affirming, with modification, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City in Criminal Case
No. 7177 convicting petitioners Rodolfo Suyu, Willy Suyu, Francis
Cainglet and Rommel Macarubbo of robbery with rape.
The Antecedents
An Information was filed with the RTC of Tuguegarao City
charging appellants with robbery with rape. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:
That on or about January 13, 1996, in the Municipality of
Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
Rodolfo Suyu alias Rudy, Rommel Macarubbo y Licawan
alias Rommel Bariuan, Francis Cainglet y Gargolla and
Willy Suyu, armed with guns and sharp-pointed bladed
instrument with intent to gain by the use of threat,
violence and intimidation of persons, conspiring together
and helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away
against the will of the owner, the following items:
I — TAKEN FROM CLARISSA B. ANGELES
a) A pair of gold earrings valued at P1,500.00
b) A gold ring valued at 1,000.00
c) Cash money in the amount of 10.00
––––––––
TOTAL P2,510.00
II — TAKEN FROM WILLIAM C. FERRER
a) A wallet containing cash money
in the amount of P150.00
all belonging to Clarissa B. Angeles and William C. Ferrer
with a total value of P2,510.00 and P150.00, respectively,
to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid owner,
Clarissa B. Angeles and William C. Ferrer in the aforesaid
amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TEN
(P2,510.00) PESOS and ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (P150.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, respectively; that on the same
occasion of the robbery, the above-named accused,
likewise, armed with their aforesaid arms, with lewd
design and by the use of force, violence, threat and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously conspiring together and helping one another,
have sexual intercourse with the aforesaid party, Clarissa
B. Angeles, against her will.
Contrary to law. 2

Appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime


charged when arraigned.
The Case for the Prosecution
At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, Clarissa
Angeles, a third-year student of St. Paul University, was with her
boyfriend, William Ferrer. They were eating snacks inside a pick-
up truck parked in a vacant lot near the Office of the Commission
on Audit (COA) and the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) [now DepEd] in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, about fifteen
meters from the highway. Momentarily, a tricycle passed by the
truck on its way to the COA Building. 3 Clarissa was seated on the
passenger's side, while William was behind the wheel. The two
were alarmed when they saw shadows of persons near the truck.
Clarissa suggested to William that they leave. The latter opened
the window on his side halfway to check if there were persons
outside. Suddenly, a man, who turned out to be Rommel
Macarubbo, appeared in front of the truck, pointed a gun at them
and said: "This is a holdup. If you will start the engine of the car, I
will shoot you." Thereafter, another man, who turned out to be
Willy Suyu, lifted the lock on William's side and entered the pick-
up. Clarissa told William to give everything so that they would not
be harmed. Willy Suyu then took Ferrer's wallet which contained
around P150.00. A third man, who turned out to be Francis
Cainglet, took Clarissa's jewelry valued at around P2,500.00 and
cash amounting to P10.00. Thereafter, Willy Suyu clubbed William
and dragged him out of the truck. Fortunately, William was able
to escape and immediately went to the police station to report
the incident.DaScAI

Meanwhile, Willy Suyu lifted the lock of the pick-up truck at


Clarissa's side. Macarubbo then opened the door. The two and
Cainglet dragged the girl to a hilly place, not far away. Macarubbo
and Willy Suyu held her by the arms, while Cainglet poked a fan
knife at her. She pleaded for mercy as she was brought to a
house near a muddy place. At that point, a man, who turned out
to be Rodolfo Suyu, the half-brother of Willy Suyu, came out of the
house. Willy Suyu, Cainglet and Macarubbo pushed Clarissa
towards Rodolfo Suyu. The latter pushed Clarissa and said: "You
stay there because I will be the first one." Rodolfo Suyu then
started embracing and kissing Clarissa and fondling her breast.
When Rodolfo Suyu removed her pants, the ring she kept hidden
inside her pants fell to the ground. She felt a knife, flashlight and
pliers at the perpetrator's back. Pretending that she was
submitting to him, she suddenly reached for the knife. They
briefly struggled and Clarissa kicked his groin. Cursing, Rodolfo
Suyu loosened his grip on her. And she tried to run, but she
stumbled and she was grabbed by the hair. He then punched her
stomach twice. She pleaded to the three others for help, but the
three did nothing.
Rodolfo Suyu passed Clarissa to Cainglet. Clarissa again pleaded,
"Please do not hurt me, do not kill me and do not rape me. I am
willing to join your group." She further begged, "Just give me the
knife and I will be the one to kill myself." Cainglet kissed her but
she pushed him away. He continued to kiss her and then pushed
his tongue inside her mouth. She bit hard at his tongue, causing it
to bleed down her shirt. She was cursed anew.
Then the three others came shouting, "They are coming." A beam
of light illumined them. Cainglet and Rodolfo Suyu then brought
her to the top of the hill near the Capitol. She attempted to shout
but she feared for her life as a knife was thrust against her. She
was forced to lie down on her back. Willy Suyu and Macarubbo
served as lookouts, as Cainglet punched her on the thighs.
Cainglet pinned her hands on the ground as Rodolfo Suyu
removed her pants and undergarments. Rodolfo Suyu then spread
her legs apart, removed his pants and undergarments, and went
on top of her. Rodolfo Suyu then tried to insert his fully erected
penis inside her vagina but the girl kicked him. He rolled down
but was able to recover immediately. He resumed molesting her.
Clarissa uttered, "It is better that you will just kill me and not
rape me." Rodolfo Suyu insisted "Ipitem (sic) met lang e. Anyway,
this is just for a few minutes." When he pushed his tongue inside
her mouth, Clarissa bit it so hard that her teeth went through it.
As the blood dripped on her shirt, he uttered, "I will let the blood
drip on your shirt, mahirap na." Rodolfo Suyu inserted two fingers
inside her. He then commented to Cainglet, who was still pinning
her down, "Pare, this is still a virgin." Thereafter, with the aid of
his two fingers, he inserted his penis inside her vagina.
Afterwards, Rodolfo Suyu told Cainglet, "You will be next."
Cainglet then climbed on top of Clarissa while Rodolfo Suyu held
her by the hands. She again pleaded for help from Willy Suyu and
Macarubbo. But all her pleas fell on deaf ears. She kicked
Cainglet, who then let go one of her hands. When one of her
hands was briefly freed, she placed the crucifix pendant of her
necklace on her mouth and uttered, "Lord, I offer you my soul."
Rodolfo Suyu remarked, "We do not have God (sic), we do not
believe in God." Cainglet continued to move on top of her. The
two lookouts, Willy Suyu and Macarubbo, on the other hand,
shouted, "They are coming." Rodolfo Suyu then helped her to sit
down. Cainglet then spoke to her saying, "Put your pants. We will
not give you your panty because we will have your panty be
'makulam' and tomorrow, we will display your panty on the gate
of St. Paul with a dedication 'to Marie Sanchez'," the name she
gave them. Cainglet was able to insert half an inch of his penis
into her vagina. 4
Cainglet suggested that she be released for ransom. The two
lookouts again yelled, "They are coming." Then a beam of light
illumined them and engines from vehicles became audible.
Thereafter, two vehicles arrived from about 10 to 15 meters away
from the pick-up truck. After pleading for mercy and promising
not to report them to the police authorities, she was allowed by
the culprits to leave.
Clarissa fled to a house illumined with a fluorescent light and
climbed over its gate. She went around the house and knocked on
the door. An old man answered the door. Blood-stained and
covered in mud, she then pleaded to be let in. At first, the old
man got a piece of wood to club her, but because one of his
children recognized her, she was allowed inside. Thereafter,
the barangay tanod was summoned. After 15 minutes, two police
jeeps arrived and took her to the Cagayan Valley Regional
Hospital (CVRH). The nurses there, however, merely examined her
bruises.
At the Don Domingo Police Station, Clarissa saw William. The
authorities asked her if she had been sexually abused, she
declared that there was merely an attempt to rape her. At that
time, she was ashamed to admit in front of her boyfriend that she
had been abused. 5
On January 17, 1996, Clarissa submitted herself to a physical and
gynecological examination at the CVRH. The examining
physician, Dr. Elsie A. Pintucan, found hematoma and contusions,
which she diagnosed to have been sustained five days before.
Furthermore, she made the following findings:
xxx xxx xxx
Genitalia: external examination = abundant pubic hair,
nulliparous outlet, no bleeding note.
= hymen (+) complete, old healed laceration at 4 and
7 o'clock.
speculum = vaginal wall no erosions/laceration.
cervix = pinkish, (+) whitish discharge.
Internal examination = admits 1 finger with ease,
cervix = closed, small midline, firm, non-tender on
wriggling,
uterus = small,
adnexae = negative for tenderness. 6

On January 19, 1996, Clarissa signed and filed a criminal


complaint for robbery and rape against Rodolfo Suyu, Willy Suyu,
Francis Cainglet and Rommel Bariuan (also known as Rommel
Macarubbo) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tuguegarao
City. Appended to her complaint was her sworn statement
executed on the same date. She later gave supplemental
statements on January 25, 1996. 7
Accused Macarubbo, who was born on August 24, 1978, then, still
a minor, moved to be released on recognizance. Upon the
recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare and
Services, he was released on recognizance. 8
Meanwhile, Macarubbo, accompanied by an old woman, arrived at
Clarissa's boarding house. The woman offered that her son,
Macarubbo, would testify for her case. Clarissa was amenable to
the idea because the authorities had earlier advised her to agree
to Macarubbo being a state witness. The old woman pleaded that
Clarissa pity Macarubbo, who then worked as a part-time
newspaper vendor to help his parents. 9 Moreover, Macarubbo did
not rape her.TaEIcS

On April 2, 1996, Macarubbo, assisted by his counsel Atty. Gabriel


O. Valle and his mother, Angelina, signed a sworn statement, in
the form of questions and answers before Municipal Judge
Elpidio Atal. He confessed to his participation and implicated
Rodolfo and Willy Suyu, and Cainglet, in the robbery and the rape
of Clarissa. 10
The Case for the Accused
Rodolfo Suyu denied the charge against him. He also interposed
the defense of alibi. He declared that, on January 13, 1996, he
was in their house at Alimannao, Tuguegarao City, taking care of
his three young children, the youngest of whom was five months
old. 11 His wife was in Manila with her sister-in-law who had just
given birth. He never left their house in the evening. 12
At 3:00 p.m. on January 16, 1996, he left his house and gathered
cogon at the Bassig Resort, which was about a kilometer away.
He was shot on the left thigh, but he did not know who shot him;
neither did he bother to ascertain the identity of the
perpetrator. 13 He managed to escape and arrived home at 7:00
p.m. 14 His wound was treated by his neighbor and eldest
child. 15 While away, his 9-year-old eldest child took care of his
five-month-old baby. He did not report the shooting incident to
the police.
On January 18, 1996, policemen led by SPO4 Teodulfo Cudal
arrested him and brought him to the hospital where his wound
was treated. He was later brought to the Sto. Domingo Police
Substation where he was detained. He was told to join a police
line-up. SPO4 Cudal told Clarissa to point to him as one of the
culprits. 16
Cainglet declared that he was employed as a security guard
inspector by the Night Hawk Security Investigation Agency with
principal office in Quezon City. At about 7:15 p.m. on January 13,
1996, he was in the company of Nestor, an employee of the
security agency, conducting a roving inspection at the Corinthian
Gardens. At 8:00 p.m. on January 21, 1996, he boarded a Victory
Liner passenger bus and arrived in Tuguegarao City at 7:30 a.m.
the next day, January 22, 1996. He intended to seek financial
help from his mother since his wife needed money for her
placement fee. A neighbor told him that his mother had left for
Mindanao. He opened the door of the house with a duplicate key.
After lunch, 12 armed men, led by SPO4 Cudal, barged inside and
searched the house without any warrant. The armed men took his
wedding ring and that of his wife, his wallet with cash of
P2,150.10, and his Seiko watch. The personal properties taken
from him were worth P10,000.00. 17
He was tortured, hogtied with a nylon cord, and boarded in an
owner-type jeep with only his underwear on. He was brought to
the police headquarters for investigation for robbery with
rape. 18 When the policemen failed to secure a confession from
him, SPO4 Cudal took out a knife from his table. He was ordered
to bring out his tongue and when he did, another policeman held
out his tongue while SPO4 Cudal pointed the knife to his tongue.
When he turned his face to the left, his tongue was injured. 19 He
was brought to the CVRH where he saw Rodolfo Suyu. When
SPO4 Cudal told Rodolfo Suyu that Cainglet was one of his
companions, Rodolfo Suyu told SPO4 Cudal that he did not know
him. 20
At 7:30 a.m. the next day, he was ordered to join a line-up,
including two persons he knew only while in detention, namely,
Rodolfo Suyu and Rommel Macarubbo. 21Clarissa arrived and was
ordered by SPO4 Cudal to point to him as one of those who raped
her. She failed to point at him at first, but when ordered anew by
SPO4 Cudal, she finally pointed to him. 22 She also pointed to
Rodolfo Suyu and Rommel Macarubbo. From the time Cainglet
was arrested and while detained, he had no counsel. HcISTE

Macarubbo testified that he was born on August 24, 1978. 23 He


denied knowing any of his co-accused before his arrest on
January 17, 1996. He declared that he was a native of Cagayan,
Tuguegarao City, and went to San Pablo, Isabela on January 12,
1996 to visit his aunt Emma Pagulayan. He arrived in San Pablo at
7:00 a.m. 24 On January 17, 1996, he visited his friend Joel Iringan
in San Pablo for a drinking spree. One of the guests created
trouble and shot him on his right leg. 25 He was brought to
Tumauini District Hospital but was transferred to the CVRH in
Tuguegarao City. The next day, the policemen, led by Capt.
Salvador, 26 maltreated him. He was forced to confess to the
crime in Carig. 27 After his wounds were treated at the hospital,
he was brought to the police station where he was detained. He
never left San Pablo from January 12, 1996 until his arrest on
January 17, 1996. 28
Willy Suyu testified that on the day of the alleged robbery and
rape, he was in their house at Dodan, Peñablanca, Cagayan,
about 45 minutes by tricycle from Centro, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. 29 At 6:00 a.m., he and his wife went on foot to a place
called Hot Spring to gather firewood. They arrived at the place at
around 11:00 a.m., had their lunch at the house of his wife's
niece, Lanie Tuliao, gathered firewood, then proceeded back
home to Dodan. By 6:00 p.m., they were already at their house.
They had their dinner at 8:00 p.m. Before going to bed, their
neighbor, James Taccad, invited him for a bottle of beer. He went
back home at around 8:20 p.m., and went to bed with his wife at
9:00 p.m. He worked as a tricycle driver, but he did not go out the
following day, as the piston ring of the tricycle he was driving
was broken. 30
James Taccad, Willy's neighbor, and Eduardo Dalin, Willy's
brother-in-law, were presented to corroborate Willy's testimony. 31

Willy Suyu further testified that on February 12, 1996, he was


arrested and detained. 32 At the police station in Tuguegarao City
where he was brought, he was maltreated by policemen. After 3
or 4 days in detention, Clarissa, whom he met for the first time,
went to the station and asked for the person named Willy Suyu.
The other detainees pointed to him and Clarissa said, "So you are
the person named Willy Suyu." She asked him to show his tongue.
He did so and Clarissa said, within the hearing distance of the
other detainees, that he was not the one. 33
Willy, moreover, admitted that Rodolfo Suyu was his half-brother.
He, however, denied having known Macarubbo and Cainglet prior
to his detention as he met them only in jail. He also saw Clarissa,
for the first time, at the police station when she asked for
him. 34 Rodolfo Suyu used to stay at their father's house in Capitol
Hills (near the place where the robbery and rape happened), but
stayed at Barangay Gosi, Tuguegarao, most of the time where he
helped in the farming. 35
Accused Rodolfo Suyu and Macarubbo presented SPO4 Cudal as
their witness. The police officer testified that, as gleaned from
the police blotter, at 9:30 p.m. on January 13, 1996, Clarissa
failed to identify the culprits and to declare that she was raped.
However, she insisted that in the event that she saw the culprits
again, she can identify them. 36 Cainglet was a mere caretaker of
the house where he was arrested. 37 It was the owner of the
house who informed the police officers that he was hiding in the
house. 38 He noticed a bite mark on the tongue of Cainglet when
he viewed it. 39
On cross-examination, SPO4 Cudal declared that Macarubbo,
assisted by his counsel, executed an extrajudicial statement on
April 2, 1996, in the presence of his mother. 40
SPO1 Alexander Tamang, the investigator assigned at the
Domingo Police Substation on the evening of January 13, 1996,
was presented by Willy's counsel and testified, among others,
that the blotter, as written, did not state the name of the
malefactors, their features or characteristics, or the unlawful
taking of personal property; and that the blotter did not state a
sexual abuse but only that Clarissa bit the tongue of one of the
suspects and kicked the sex organ of the other accused. 41 He,
however, added that he did not write the word rape because what
he understood from Clarissa's statement was the biting of the
tongue and the kicking of the sex organ. 42
The prosecution presented SPO4 Cudal as rebuttal witness and
testified that accused Macarubbo gave an extrajudicial
confession on April 2, 1998 while detained at the jail, and that he
signed his extrajudicial confession before Judge Atal. 43 The
prosecution wanted to present Atty. Gabriel Valle as rebuttal
witness because the judge was already dead; but, after an off-
the-record conference between the court, the counsel of the
accused and the prosecution, the plan of the prosecution did not
materialize. 44 The court admitted the extrajudicial confession of
Macarubbo 45 only as part of the testimony of SPO4 Cudal
because, according to the court, the prosecution failed to
present Judge Atal. 46

On February 10, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape.
The RTC gave credence and probative weight to Clarissa's
testimony and rejected the defenses of denial and alibi of the
accused. The court ruled that the latter's testimonies were full of
inconsistencies and were not in accord with human experience.
The RTC further ruled that the four accused conspired in the
robbery with rape. The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
(1) Finding RODOLFO SUYU, WILLY SUYU, FRANCIS
CAINGLET and ROMMEL MACARRUBO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape and
hereby sentence each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua;
(2) Ordering the accused to pay, jointly and severally, the
amount of P1,510.00 representing the value of the jewelry
(earring) and cash belonging to Clarissa Angeles; and
(3) Ordering the accused to indemnify, jointly and
severally, Clarissa Angeles the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED. 47

The accused appealed the decision to the Court. After the parties
submitted their respective briefs, the Court ordered the transfer
of the case to the CA pursuant to its ruling in People v. Mateo. 48
The CA rendered judgment affirming, with modification, the
decision of the trial court. The fallo of the decision of the CA
reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the
decision dated 10 February 2003 of the court a quo is
perforce AFFIRMED but with the modification that insofar
as the accused-appellant ROMMEL MACARUBBO is
concerned, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to
Fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, in its medium
period, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 49

Hence, the present petition, where the appellants raise the


following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT CLARISSA ANGELES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS
INADMISSIBLE THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROMMEL
MACARUBBO. 50
Appellants assert that Clarissa was not able to identify any of
them at the city jail and succeeded in identifying them only after
she was coached by SPO4 Cudal. They contend that Clarissa was
declared by Dr. Pintucan to be ambulatory and coherent with no
signs of cardio-respiratory distress, proof that she was not
forcibly and sexually assaulted. It was also discovered that there
was no evidence of forcible assault despite the insertion of one
finger on her cervix. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in
admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant
Macarubbo. HEASaC

Appellants, moreover, aver that the testimony of Clarissa is


postmarked with inconsistencies. She executed no less than five
sworn statements before the MTC. These statements were
substantially inconsistent. In her January 13, 1996 statement
made immediately after the alleged commission of the crime, she
declared to the police investigator that appellants attempted to
rape her, but she actually succeeded in thwarting all
attempts. 51 In her second sworn statement dated January 18,
1996, she maintained the said story. The police blotter did not
even carry an allegation of rape. However, in her January 19, 1996
statement, Clarissa declared that she had been
raped. 52 Appellants, thus, argue that the alleged victim has the
propensity to lie and withhold valuable information in her
affidavits. 53
We are not persuaded. To begin with, the rule is that, in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight
and substance, which would have affected the result of the case,
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal. 54 The stringency with which appellate tribunals have
observed this rule is predicated on the undisputed vantage of the
trial court in the evaluation and appreciation of testimonial
evidence. 55
The trial court found Clarissa's testimony to be
consistent, 56 believable, 57 and credible, 58 hence, is worthy of full
faith and credit. 59 The CA reviewed Clarissa's testimony and
found the same to be clear, sincere and could have only come
from the mouth of a victim. During the grueling cross-
examination conducted by three separate counsels of appellants,
she remained steadfast in her testimony that she was raped. The
credibility of complainant's testimony is a primordial
consideration in rape cases for the accused may be convicted
solely on the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. 60 When the testimony of a rape victim is
simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigorous cross-
examination and unflawed by any serious inconsistency or
contradiction, the same must be given full faith and credit. 61
While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to the
authorities the fact that she was raped after the robbery, this
does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon for a
rape victim right after her ordeal to remain mum about what
really transpired. Jurisprudence has established that delay in
revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a
fabricated charge, and the same is rendered doubtful only if the
delay was unreasonable and unexplained. 62 Besides, Clarissa
sufficiently explained her initial reluctance on cross-examination,
thus:
Atty. Morales:
Q: And what did you tell these policemen at the Don
Domingo police station?
A: Naturally (sic) I told them what transpired to me, Sir.
Q: Will you please tell now before this court what exactly
were those things that you reported to the police
station?
A: At that time, Sir, I was then trembling because of fear
so that I told them that there was only an attempted
rape to me (sic) because I was then ashamed to the
policemen and infront (sic) of my boyfriend.
Q: As a matter of fact when you arrived at the CVRH you
also informed the nurses that what was committed
was only an attempted rape, is that correct?
A: I did not talk to the nurse but it was only the policemen
who told the nurse.
Q: You heard these policemen informed the nurses that
what was committed is an attempted rape, is that
correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Your boyfriend was present when you went to the Don
Domingo police station?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And your boyfriend also accompanied you when you
went to the CVRH?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you heard these policemen mentioned to the
nurses that what was committed was attempted
rape (sic) you did not try to call the attention of the
policemen (sic) and correct them that what actually
happened (sic) you were allegedly raped?
A: Because I was ashamed, Sir. 63
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Salud:
Q: You stated that at first you did not divulge that you
were sexually molested, did you?
A: At first, Sir, what I have stated is that they held my
breast, the different parts of my body and they also
fingered me, Sir. But I did not state that their penis
were inserted to my vagina.
Q: So all that you have divulged at first was that your
breast was held and so with the different parts of
your body?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: To whom did you divulge that? AEIDTc

A: To Sir Cabildo, Sir.


Q: That was the first time you divulged it to any person?
A: At first, Sir, I divulges (sic) that to the PNP Substation
at Don Domingo, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, then to my
parents, to my classmates and lastly to Sir Cabildo,
Sir.
Q: Whom (sic) for the first time did you disclose that you
were raped?
A: To Sir Cabildo, Sir.
Q: When?
A: January 19 in the afternoon, Sir.
Q: Are you very certain that you first divulges (sic) it (sic)
that you were raped to Cabildo on January 19, 1996
in the afternoon?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You are certain in the sense that there can be no
probability that you have committed mistake (sic) in
remembering that you divulged for the first time to
Mr. Cabildo that you were rape (sic) in the afternoon
of January 19, 1996?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Is it not a fact that you executed a second sworn
statement before a police officer named SPO2
Marcelo R. Cabildo on January 18, 1996?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And still you are sure that on January 18, 1996 on the
occasion of the taking of your sworn statement by
SPO2 Marcelo R. Cabildo inside the investigation
room of the Tuguegarao Police Station, you did not
disclose to him that you were raped?
A: I was investigated on the 18th day of January and I have
not yet divulge (sic) to SPO2 Cabildo that I was
fingered and I was raped because I was then
ashamed at that time. Because this policeman
Cabildo is from Baggao, he might have (sic) divulged
what had happened to me in our town of Baggao,
Sir. 64
Understandably, Clarissa was reluctant to reveal, while at the
police station, the fact that she was raped, considering that her
boyfriend was present when she made her first statement before
the police investigator. Further, one of the investigating officers
was her townmate. Indeed, the fear of social humiliation
prevented Clarissa from revealing, at the time, the details of her
defilement. She was in a state of trauma, impelled by her natural
instinct to put out of her mind such a painful and disturbing
experience. Oftentimes, victims would rather bear the ignominy
and the pain in private than reveal their shame to the world. 65 In
her desire for justice, she, nonetheless, later revealed the true
events that happened on that fateful night of January 13, 1996,
thus:

Pros. Sagucio:
Q: Now, you said that when you were first investigated by
the police or at the CVRH that you are (sic) not raped
which is half true (sic) and now when you were again
investigated you said you were raped, what made
you changed (sic) your mind? ACaTIc

A: I finally thought of filing a case of rape because of the


fact that I am helping other people whom (sic) might
be the next victim and (sic) aside from the fact that I
did not owe anything to them, I did not owe any
obligation to anybody else and finally I want justice
that (sic) will prevail of (sic) what they have done to
me. 66
Certainly, no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that
she was ravished and her honor tainted unless such were true,
for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor and obtain
justice for the wicked acts committed upon her. 67
Appellants, likewise, contend that Clarissa was coached by SPO4
Cudal during the police line-up, while Rommel had to be pointed
by the other detainees. She even asked them to show their
tongues so that she could ascertain whether they were the ones
who molested her. 68
The arguments of appellants do not persuade. The victim
recounted that there were lights emanating from the nearby
DECS (now DepEd) and COA buildings, and several
residences. 69 The place was bright enough for her to see the
faces of her assailants, only that she did not know their
names. 70 Familiarity with the physical features of a person is an
acceptable way for proper identification. 71 Indeed, We agree with
the following ruling of the trial court, thus:
Defense' contention that they were not sufficiently
identified cannot be taken seriously. Accused did not
resort to any disguise. There could be no doubt as to their
identities. Besides, it appears that the accused stayed
with Clarissa for a couple of hours so that there was
ample time and opportunity for her to see and observe
their features. 72
Appellants, in their brief, further fault the trial court in not
declaring as inadmissible the alleged extrajudicial confession of
Macarubbo, as it was not affirmed in open court and the latter
even denied having executed the statement. 73
The contention of appellants has no merit. The trial court never
admitted Macarubbo's sworn statement for the purpose offered
by the prosecution, 74 but only as part of the testimony of SPO4
Cudal. Appellants were not convicted based on the said sworn
statement, but rather on the credible testimony of the
victim, 75 and her positive identification of the culprits. 76
The claim of appellants that their arrest was irregular, which
consequently rendered their detention illegal, cannot be
considered in this appeal as the matter was not raised at the
opportune time. Records reveal that warrants for the appellants'
arrest were indeed issued on January 19, 1996 and February 1,
1996. 77 Appellants, likewise, entered their pleas 78 without moving
for the quashal of the information. As we held in People v.
Bongalon, 79 in such case, the defect of the arrest and detention
are cured thereby:
Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move to
quash the information against him before his arraignment.
Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Even in the
instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived
where the person arrested submits to arraignment without
objection. The subsequent filing of the charges and the
issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest against a
person illegally detained will cure the defect of that
detention. 80
Appellants also assert that the medical report issued by Dr.
Pintucan does not conclusively suggest that Clarissa was raped,
for during the examination, her deportment was not of that of a
rape victim and the examination of her cervix did not even
suggest forcible assault. 81
The said argument is, however, without merit. Hymenal
lacerations which are usually inflicted when there is complete
penetration are not essential in establishing the crime of rape as
it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the penis into the
lips of the vagina takes place. 82 Partial penile penetration is as
serious as full penetration; the rape is deemed consummated in
either case. 83 Dr. Pintucan further found contusion and
hematoma on the victim, which bolsters Clarissa's recount that
she was dragged, forced to lie down, and raped. CSHEca
The common defense of alibi used by the appellants cannot,
moreover, prevail over Clarissa's clear and convincing narration
of the events that transpired and her positive identification of her
assailants. It is a time-honored rule that alibi is a weak defense
when unsubstantiated by credible and plausible testimonies. 84 To
merit approbation, clear and convincing evidence must be
adduced that the accused was in a place other than the situs of
the crime at the time the crime was committed, such that it was
physically impossible for him to have committed the crime.
Willy Suyu, a tricycle driver, relied solely on his testimony to
prove his alibi that he and his wife were in Hot Spring, had lunch
with the spouses Tuliao, and arrived home at 6:00 p.m. He and his
wife had dinner at 8:00 p.m., he drank beer in the house of his
neighbor James Taccad, and finally went to bed at 9:00 p.m.
However, appellant failed to present his wife, and the spouses
Tuliao to corroborate his testimony, and he gave no justification
for his failure to present any of them as witnesses. The records
show that the distance from Willy Suyu's house to Capitol Hills
can be negotiated in 15 minutes by tricycle; hence, it was not
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
Macarubbo testified that he left Tuguegarao City on January 13,
1996; and arrived in the house of his aunt, Emma Pagulayan and
worked in her farm; he was shot at the thigh on January 17, 1996.
However, appellant Macarubbo failed to present his aunt and his
friend, Joel Iringan, to corroborate his alibi. Moreover, it is
incredible that Macarubbo did not even know who shot him
despite his claim that the perpetrator was known to his friend,
Iringan. Rodolfo Suyu's claim that he was in his house in
Alimannao, Tuguegarao City on the night in question is equally
weak, for he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for
him to be near the DECS (now DepEd) and COA buildings in the
city.
For his part, appellant Cainglet failed to present any record from
the Night Hawk Security Agency to prove that on January 13,
1996, at 7:15 p.m., he was conducting a roving inspection at the
Corinthian Gardens in Quezon City, as he claimed; neither did he
present the driver of his employer who was purportedly with him
at the time.
After going over the voluminous records, We find no error in the
aforesaid observations of the trial court as affirmed by the CA.
Courts generally view the defenses of denial and alibi with
disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can
concoct them to suit his defense. 85 Again, these weak defenses
cannot stand against the positive identification and categorical
testimony of a rape victim. 86 Clarissa, in this case, as aforesaid,
passed the test of credibility in her account of her ordeal;
positively identified her assailants; and had no ill-motive to
falsely implicate them to the commission of a crime, other than
her desire to seek justice for a wrong. Where an alleged rape
victim says she was sexually abused, she says almost all that is
necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her person,
provided her testimony meets the test of credibility. 87
Conspiracy to commit the crime was also correctly appreciated
by the trial court. Indeed, "at the time of the commission of the
crime, accused acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill
their common design to rob the victim and although only two of
them, through force and intimidation, raped Clarissa, the failure
of Macarubbo and Willy Suyu to prevent its commission although
they were capable would make their act to be the act of all." 88 We
have previously ruled that once conspiracy is established
between several accused in the commission of the crime of
robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape
committed by any of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless
any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from
committing rape. 89
The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined
and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code is correct. The law provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons — Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements
must concur: (1) the taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent
to gain or animus lucrandi; (4) the robbery is accompanied by
rape. 90
The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the
intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by
rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of
the robbery. We note that aside from raping the victim, appellant
Rodolfo Suyu inserted his finger in her sexual organ. Appellant
Suyu, thus, committed sexual assault as defined and penalized in
Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353. 91 Also, aside
from Rodolfo Suyu, Cainglet raped the victim. Nevertheless, there
is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and
any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible
felony of robbery with rape. 92

As to the damages, the RTC only awarded actual damages of


P1,510.00 and civil indemnity of P50,000.00 to Clarissa. In line
with settled jurisprudence, however, this Court rectifies the same
and orders all appellants to, jointly and severally, pay Clarissa
Angeles P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the rape by Rodolfo Suyu; P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the rape by
Francis Cainglet; and P30,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the sexual assault by Rodolfo
Suyu. 93
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that all the appellants are
also ordered to, jointly and severally, pay Clarissa Angeles
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the rape by Rodolfo Suyu; P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the rape by Francis Cainglet;
and P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the sexual assault by Rodolfo Suyu. No costs. SETaHC

SO ORDERED.
(People v. Suyu, G.R. No. 170191, [August 16, 2006], 530 PHIL
|||

569-597)

[G.R. No. 198020. July 10, 2013.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


JOSEPH BARRA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p

Before this Court is an appeal of the February 11,


2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04155 2 affirming with modification the August 24,
2009 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, San
Jose, Camarines Sur in Crim. Case No. T-2678 and finding
appellant Joseph 4 Barra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted robbery with homicide instead of special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On March 21, 2004, an information 5 for the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide was filed against appellant, to
wit:
That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, at
Barangay Tinawagan, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and within
the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a firearm, after gaining
entrance into the residence of his victim, with intent to
gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal
money from Elmer Lagdaan y Azur; that on the occasion of
the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to
take and steal the money, the herein accused, with intent
to kill, did then and there feloniously shoot said Elmer
Lagdaan, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound which
caused his death, to the prejudice of his heirs. (Emphases
deleted.)
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. 6 Trial ensued
thereafter.
Dr. Peñafrancia N. Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, examined the corpse of Elmer Lagdaan and
stated in her Postmortem Report: 7 ESaITA

Findings:
1. Gunshot wound, point of entry, 0.5 x 0.5 cms,
circular, with inverted edges at the mid left
frontal area. Hematoma formation is noted at
the site of entry.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HE[M]ORRHAGE SECONDARY [TO] GUNSHOT
WOUND
Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound
due to the circular and inverted edges of the point of entry. She
concluded that since there was no point of exit, the victim was
shot at close range. 8
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for a long
time. He stated that he was on his way home to the
neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9,
2003, in the light of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter the
house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to
the victim's right forehead and demanded money. De la Peña hid
behind a tree ten meters away. When the victim stated that the
money was not in his possession, appellant shot him. He went
home and reported the incident the following morning. 9
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on
his way to the victim's house to collect his daily wage when he
saw appellant in the yard of the victim's house. He inquired from
appellant if the victim was around. Appellant responded that the
victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was in
his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning
that he learned that the victim died. Asor then proceeded to
report the incident. 10
EASIHa

The victim's mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for
funeral and burial expenses in the amount of P33,300.00.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him.
Appellant claimed that he was in Batangas City, with his brother
Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to
Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of "robbery with
murder." 11 Appellant's brother, Benjamin, tried to corroborate his
testimony. 12
The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence
presented, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the affirmative
testimony of the prosecution's witnesses deserved more weight
than the appellant's defense of denial and alibi. Thus, finding the
prosecution's witnesses to be credible and that the killing of the
victim to be by reason of the robbery, the RTC decision's decretal
portion read:EcSCAD

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby


rendered finding the accused, Joseph Barra GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 291(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. To pay the surviving
heirs of Elmer Lagdaan, the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for his death, as actual damages in the amount
of Php55,579.80, as moral damages in the sum of
Php50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The accused is entitled to the full credit of his preventive
imprisonment if he abides by the disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners during his confinement,
otherwise he shall only be entitled to four-fifths (4/5)
thereof. 13
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found appellant
guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. It stated that:
Regarding the trial court's finding that accused-appellant
is responsible for the death of Lagdaan, WE will not
disturb the same as it is well supported by the evidence
on record and in accord with prevailing law and
jurisprudence. However, WE disagree with its
determination of the nature of the crime that accused-
appellant committed. Instead of robbery with homicide at
its consum[m]ated stage, accused-appellant should have
been declared guilty only of attempted robbery with
homicide.
As correctly observed by the OSG, the only evidence
14

introduced by the government to establish robbery is


the statement of De la Peña that when accused-
appellant reached the victim's place, the latter
barged into the said residence, poked a gun at the
victim's forehead, demanded money and when the
victim refused to accede to his demand, fired a gun
and shot the victim. Indeed, no iota of evidence was
presented to establish that accused-appellant took
away the victim's money or any property, for that
matter. ECSHAD

The fact of asportation must be established beyond


reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly
established, accused-appellant should be held liable only
for the crime of attempted robbery with homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 297 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides —
"When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted
or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the
person guilty of such offenses shall be punished
byreclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide
committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the
provisions of this Code."
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide
only when he commenced the commission of robbery
directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce robbery by reason of some
causes or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be
convicted only of the crime of homicide is bereft of merit.
The killing of the victim herein was by reason of or on the
occasion of robbery.
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-
appellant's intent to rob the victim. That motive was
manifested by accused-appellant's overt act of poking a
gun at the victim's forehead demanding money from the
latter. When the victim refused to accede to the demand,
accused-appellant shot the former. The killing was an
offshoot of accused-appellant's intent to rob the victim.
Accused-appellant was bent on resorting to violent means
to attain his end. Due to the victim's failure to give his
money, the crime of robbery was, however, not
consummated. 15 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated: AEcIaH

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed


Judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows —
1) Accused-appellant is adjudged GUILTY of the
crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA,
2) Accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of
Elmer Lagdaan the following:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate
damages;
d) the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and
e) the cost of suit. 16
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2011. 17

After appellant's confinement was confirmed, both the OSG and


appellant manifested that they would adopt the pleadings filed in
the Court of Appeals in lieu of supplemental briefs. 18
Appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime
was not sufficiently established by the prosecution. Appellant
stated that the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses were
rife with inconsistencies. Moreover, appellant argued that the
elements for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
were not proven particularly the element of taking of personal
property.ETHaDC

We affirm the February 11, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals


with modification on the award of damages.
In People v. Bocalan and Gatdula 19 we stated that:
[F]indings of facts of the trial court, its calibration and
assessment of the probative weight of the testimonial
evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on
its findings are accorded by the appellate court high
respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique
advantage of the trial court in observing at close range
the demeanor, conduct and deportment of the said
witnesses as they testify, unless the trial court ignored,
misunderstood and misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances which if considered will change the
outcome of the case. . . . . (Citation omitted.)
In the present case, while appellant questions the credibility of
the prosecution's witnesses, he does not present any sufficient
evidence to prove that the RTC indeed ignored, misunderstood
and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances of the case. We
also found, after reviewing the records, nothing that would
indicate any misinterpretation or misapprehension of facts on the
part of the appellate court that would substantially alter its
conclusions.
Appellant in this case was charged with robbery with homicide
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons — Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when
by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
In People v. Quemeggen, 20 this Court gave the requisites to be
proven by the prosecution for appellant to be convicted of
robbery with homicide, to wit: HDTISa

1. The taking of personal property is committed with


violence or intimidation against persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof,
homicide is committed. (Citation omitted.)
In the case before us, appellant's intention was to extort money
from the victim. By reason of the victim's refusal to give up his
personal property — his money — to appellant, the victim was
shot in the head, causing his death. We, however, agree with the
Court of Appeals that the element of taking was not complete,
making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as
opposed to the crime appellant was convicted in the RTC.
Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of theRevised
Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by the RTC.
Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed
under certain circumstances. — When by reason or on
occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide
is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed
shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this
Code.
The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed
in People v. Macabales, 21 to wit:
SEAHID

The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in


Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) There is an
attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is
committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained
unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to
appellant and no personal property was shown to have been
taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant
can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide,
thus punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal
Code.Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals found appellant's
crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Anent the awards of damages by the Court of Appeals, after a
careful review of existing rules and recent jurisprudence, we find
the same to be in order and need not be disturbed. 22
However, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the
monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 23
WHEREFORE, the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04155 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages shall be
increased to P30,000.00 and all monetary awards for damages
shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, [July 10, 2013], 713 PHIL 698-
|||

707)

[G.R. No. 197562. April 20, 2015.]


AURORA ENGSON
FRANSDILLA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by


armed persons and robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons was committed when the accused,
who held firearms, entered the residential house of the victims
and inflicted injury upon the victims in the process of
committing the robbery. Hence, the penalty is that imposed for
the robbery in an inhabited house, the more serious crime. All
the accused are liable because the act of one is the act of
all.
ATICcS

The Case
Aurora Engson Fransdilla (Fransdilla), the lone appellant,
seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on February 28,
2011, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her
conviction and that of her co-accused for robbery on the basis
of conspiracy, with modifications as to the penalty imposed,
under the decision rendered on September 15, 1999 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, in Quezon City. 2
Antecedents
As factual background, the CA adopted the summary
rendered by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
appellee's brief, viz.:
On February 20, 1991 between 3 o'clock and 4
o'clock in the afternoon, at private complainants'
residence at No. 24, Mabait St., Teachers Village, Quezon
City, private complainant Lalaine Yreverre saw appellant
Aurora Engson in front of their gate. Upon noticing
Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what
is their purpose, as there were four (4) of them. Aurora
then inquired about Cynthia Yreverre, n Lalaine's sister.
The latter replied that Cynthia was in the Japanese
Embassy and asked Aurora if there was any other person
whom she wanted to talk to. It was then that Aurora told
Lalaine that she was from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA). It was upon said pretension
that Lalaine offered herself to instead talk to her and
allowed her to enter their house. When they were already
having a conversation, Aurora asked Lalaine if she could
use the telephone, which the latter acceded to and
handed her a cordless telephone. Lalaine noticed that
Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone and even
said that the person she was calling did not know how to
use the telephone. But still, Aurora kept on dialing the
telephone.
Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette.
After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the four (4) other
men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly
came inside the house. The four (4) men stood behind
Aurora who was still dialing the telephone. When Aurora
told that she could not contact the person she was
calling, she asked Lalaine if she could use the comfort
room, which the latter again permitted. Aurora stood up,
put down the telephone, got her bag and went to the
comfort room. When Aurora came back, she sat down
again but in crossed-legs as she said she was having a
menstrual period. Upon saying that, Lalaine's attention
was focused on her. At this juncture, accused Edgardo
Cacal poked a gun at Lalaine's neck and announced that
it was a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo Cacal was
poking a gun at Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang
and the two (2) other men proceeded to the kitchen. In
the kitchen, Danilo and his two (2) other companions
herded their maids, private complainant's niece and
cousin inside the bodega.
Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at
Lalaine's neck, thereafter, pulled Lalaine's hair and
dragged her upstairs and brought her inside Cynthia's
room. The gun still being poked at Lalaine, Cacal looked
around the room and when he spotted upon the vault he
dropped Lalaine, opened the door and called for his
companions to come along. Accused Cuanang came up
and the two (Cacal and Cuanang) carried the vault and
brought it downstairs. But before they went downstairs,
they threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to just
stay in the room, but Lalaine opened the door and
followed them.
When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused
Cacal turned his back and saw her. Accused Cacal then
brought her inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal
pushed her towards her bed and she fell. Cacal told her
to just stay, and then he searched the room. Lalaine
managed to stand up but Cacal slapped her. While sitting,
accused Cuanang came and tied her arms at her back.
While she was being tied, appellant Aurora Fransdilla
peeped inside the room. It was also at the time that
accused Cacal and Cuanang searched the entire room
and took all the jewelries and things they saw. TIADCc

When Cuanang and Cacal left the room, Lalaine


followed them. While in the middle downstairs, she saw
Cacal, Cuanang and their two other companions tucking
their guns around their waists. Appellants and their co-
accused then left the house on board two (2) cars that
were waiting for them just outside the house, and one of
which, a black Colt Mirage, was driven by accused
Manuel Silao, together with appellant Edgardo Silao who
was seated at the front passenger seat.
At this point, Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a
relative came by to help and untied her. Lalaine then
called her sister Cynthia and related the incident.
Cynthia reported the incident to the police authorities.
Not too long thereafter, the police investigated the
incident.
In relation thereto, Lalaine executed her sworn
statement on February 20, 1991 (Exhibit "J"). After said
investigation, Lalaine underwent medical examination at
the East Avenue Medical Center as her hands were
bruised when she was tied by her hands and her face
being slapped by one of the accused. A medical
certificate was issued in relation thereto (Exhibit "N").
Thereafter, Lalaine went to Camp Karingal at
Sikatuna, Quezon City where there were at least fifteen
(15) person(s) presented before her in the police line-up,
but she was not able to identify any of the accused
among said line-up.
After which, she went to the Station Investigation
Division (SID) Station 4, Quezon City where she was
shown about fifty (50) pictures in order for her to identify
the robbers, but she was not able to identify any of them.
Since she failed to identify any of the malefactors,
she proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), Manila. She was referred to a cartographer for the
sketch of herein appellants and their co-accused as the
malefactors in robbing their house (Exhibits "B", "C" and
"D").
Thereafter, Lalaine proceeded to the Western Police
District, Manila. There, she went to the rogues gallery
where a picture of about (5) persons were shown to her.
After carefully examining the pictures, Lalaine was able
to pinpoint the picture of accused Danilo Cuanang as one
of the robbers. She was also able to identify Manuel
"Sonny" Silao in a group picture where she identified
accused Cuanang (Exhibits "E" and "F"). It was also in
said rogues gallery that they were able to get accused
Cuanang's address at Iriga, Cubao, Quezon City.
Lalaine, together with her police officers
companions, proceeded to Cuanang's indicated address.
Upon arrival thereat, they inquired from the security
guard of the townhouse if Danilo Cuanang was residing
there, which the latter confirmed.
On the following day Lalaine and her police
companions went back to Cuanang's house. Lalaine
knocked at the door and accused
Cuanang himself opened the door. When Lalaine
confronted him and told him that he was one of those
who entered their house, the latter did not answer.
Lalaine asked Cuanang if he could come with them at the
PNP-SID, Station 4, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City and
the latter acceded.
On their way to the police station, Lalaine inquired
on Cuanang about their lady companion (herein appellant
Fransdilla), but the latter just bowed his head. When
Lalaine threatened him that if he would not tell the
whereabouts of their lady companion (herein appellant
Aurora) he would be answerable for all the things stolen,
the latter replied that they had no share in the stolen
items. Lalaine then asked the name of their lady
companion and the latter said that her name was Jessica
Engson (also known as Aurora Engson Fransdilla) and she
was living in Antipolo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Cuanang
also volunteered himself to accompany them to Aurora's
house provided that they should not hurt him. Agreeing
thereto, the group of Lalaine, accompanied by Cuanang,
proceeded to Aurora's house at the given address. Upon
arrival thereat, Lalaine inquired from a child if Aurora
was awake, and upon asking, she saw appellant Aurora
who was trembling at that time. Lalaine noticed that
Aurora was nervous and even told her that Lalaine was
able to remember her face. Appellant even voluntarily
told Lalaine that she would tell her the whole truth. She
(Aurora) told that she was instructed by her companions
Edgar (Silao), Sonny (Manuel Silao) and Danilo Cacal.
Lalaine even confronted her when she implicated her
cousins (Sonny and Edgar). AIDSTE

Upon reaching PNP Station 4, SID, Kamuning,


Quezon City, Lalaine and her police companions rested
for a while before they proceeded to 921 Adelina St.,
Sampaloc, Manila, where accused Manuel "Sonny" Silao
lived. Upon reaching the said address, Lalaine knocked
at the gate, and a maid opened the same and allowed
them to enter the house. In the house, Lalaine asked the
maid where Sonny's room was and the latter said it was
on the third floor. When Lalaine and her police
companions were going upstairs, they passed by the
second floor and saw accused Cacal sitting on a folding
bed. She then told her police companions that that man
(Cacal) was among those who entered and robbed their
house, Cacal just remained silent. Thereafter, the group
proceeded to the third floor of the house, knocked at the
door and it was Manuel's (a.k.a. Sonny) wife who opened
it. At this point, Manuel (a.k.a. Sonny) was lying on the
bed and holding his gun, thus, Pat. Randy Quitoriano
immediately handcuffed him. Lalaine's group invited
Manuel and Danilo to go with them at the police station;
both acceded.
On March 21, 1991, Lalaine went back to the PNP
Station 4, SID, Kamuning, Quezon City, where she was
informed that they (Rod Fortaleza's group) were able to
recover some money (dollar bills) from appellant Edgardo
Silao. When these dollar bills were shown to her, she
recognized that these were the same dollar bills
withdrawn by her sister Cynthia from the RCBC Bank as
the bills bear red markings (Exhibits "M" to "M-5"). 3
Fransdilla and her co-accused were eventually charged
with robbery under the following information, to wit:
That on or about the 20th day of February, 1991, in Quezon City
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
gain, and by means of violence and intimidation upon person rob the residence of
CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y PANGANIBAN located at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's
Village, Quezon City, this City, by pretending to be from PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY (POEA) and once inside took, rob, and carried away the
following items therefrom, to wit:

nine (9) pieces of expensive jewelry P1.5 M


$30,000.00 (U.S. Dollars equivalent 900,000.0
to) 0

belonging to CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y


PANGANIBAN.

P10,000.0
two (2) pairs of gold earrings
0
180,000.0
one (1) gold necklace with pendant
0
one (1) Louie Viton Brown
11,000.00
Leather (sic)
one (1) Gucci Ladies watch 13,000.00
two (2) gold earrings w/diamond
80,000.00
pendant
CASH MONEY 7,000.00

belonging to LALAINE YREVERRE Y Panganiban, all in


the total amount of PhP2,701,000.00, Philippines
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party in the aforementioned sum and in such
other amounts as maybe awarded under the provisions of
the Civil Code.
SDAaTC

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated as
follows:
1. The identity of all the accused as indicated in the
information.
2. The accused Manuel Silao and Edgar Silao are brothers
and first cousins of private complainant Cynthia
Yreverre and prosecution witness Lalaine Yreverre.
3. The accused Manuel Silao had entered the house of
complainant on several occasions to visit relatives.
4. The accused Edgardo Cacal is the driver of Manuel Silao
and knows Manuel's brother accused Edgar Silao.
5. The accused Manuel Silao has a pending criminal case
for illegal possession of firearms before the RTC,
Manila.
6. The accused Manuel Silao is the owner of one Cal. 9mm
Springfield bearing Serial No. 64624 with one
magazine containing eight (8) ammunitions, although
only 4 were delivered to the Court.
7. The accused were all investigated in connection with
the instant case, without the assistance of counsel.
8. The person depicted in the picture marked as Exhibit
"E" is accused Manuel Silao while the one in the
photograph marked as Exhibit "D" is accused Danilo
Cuanang.
9. On February 20, 1991, Edgar Silao was in Quezon City. 5

The prosecution presented complainants Lalaine Yreverre


and Cynthia Yreverre, NBI Illustrator Amando Mendoza, SPO2
Randolf Quitoriano, RCBC Manager Ma. Teresa Jamir, Joel
Yreverre and Dr. Richard Pascual as its witnesses during the
trial on the merits. On its part, the defense relied on Celia
Syquian, Edgardo Y Silao, Dominador Pilar, Lourdes Samson
Lopez, and Danilo Cuanang as witnesses.
As stated, the RTC convicted Fransdilla and her co-
accused of robbery, decreeing in its decision of September 15,
1999, viz.:
AaCTcI

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds


accused AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA, EDGARDO
CACAL Y SANCHEZ, DANILO CUANANG Y VALDEZ,
MANUEL SILAO Y YREVERRE and EDGARDO SILAO Y
YREVERRE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
crime of Robbery punished under Article 299 of
theRevised Penal Code and in the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby
sentences said accused to imprisonment of TWELVE (12)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and
EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Said accused are likewise ordered to
indemnify the herein private complainants the amount of
TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, the
value of the property taken less the amount recovered,
and to pay the amount of PhP200,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED. 6

As to Fransdilla, the RTC ruled that several facts and


circumstances either proved by the Prosecution or admitted by
the Defense established her having conspired with her co-
accused in committing the offense charged. 7
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of all of the
accused, but modified the penalty imposed by the RTC, as
follows: 8
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 15,
1999 of the trial court is affirmed subject to the
modification that accused-appellants and accused are
sentenced to an imprisonment ranging from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Rejecting the claim of insufficiency of the proof of
conspiracy raised by Fransdilla, the CA observed that the clear
and categorical testimony of Lalaine positively showed that
Fransdilla's acts demonstrated her common design with the
other accused to commit the robbery, 9 stressing that "it is a
common design which is the essence of conspiracy, though
the conspirators may act separately and on different manner
but always leading to the same unlawful result." It adverted to
Fransdilla's various acts as evincing her role in the concerted
resolve to commit the robbery, such as introducing herself to
Lalaine as a representative of the POEA in order to gain
access into the house; trying to distract Lalaine by using the
telephone, asking for a cigarette, going to the bathroom, and
pretending that she was then having her menstrual period in
order to have her cohorts enter the house; and peeping inside
the bedroom when her co-accused were tying Lalaine up to
enable themselves to search for and take away jewelry and
other valuables inside the latter's bedroom without hindrance.
Issue
The accused still insists on her innocence, protesting
that the CA erred in affirming the conviction despite the failure
to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as a co-
conspirator in robbery. 10
Ruling of the Court
The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA.
1.
Conspiracy of Fransdilla with
her co-accused was established
beyond reasonable doubt
It bears stressing that Fransdilla opted not to present
evidence in her defense during the trial. On appeal, the core of
her contentions in the CA was that the Prosecution did not
establish her having conspired with the other accused in
committing the robbery. She reiterates such contentions here,
stating that the State's formal offer of evidence did not include
any reference to any evidence specifically incriminating her.
The Court rejects Fransdilla's contentions.
Our review of the records of the trial reveals that contrary
to Fransdilla's contentions, the State competently and credibly
established her active participation in the execution of the
robbery through Lalaine's testimony detailing her specific
acts, as follows:
Q Miss Yrreverre, do you recall if there was any unusual
incident that happened on that particular date and
time on February 20, 1991 between 3:00 o'clock to
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was it?
A On February 20, 1991, between 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon while I was resting at our sala I saw
them and I met them at the gate and I asked the lady
because there were four of them I asked the lady to
come in.
Q How did the lady come in?
A When I saw the lady I asked the lady what is her
purpose and she said I am from the POEA and she is
looking for my sister Cynthia Yrreverre, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A When she inquired about my sister I told her that my
sister Cynthia Yrreverre is in Japan embassy and she
said if there is any other person she could talked to.
Q What was your answer?
A When she said that she is from POEA I recommended
myself to her and I said you can talk to me and I
allowed her to enter our house, sir.
Q After you allowed that lady who represented herself to
you that she is from the POEA to enter, what
happened next?
A I let her enter our house and I inquired and asked from
her who are the persons she know in POEA, sir.
Q And what happened next after that?
A She mentioned a name whom according to her from the
POEA but I do not remember anymore, sir.
Q What happened next after that?
A While we were chatting or conversing for a while she
asked if she can use our telephone, sir.
Q And what was your answer to that?
A I said yes and I handed to her the cordless telephone,
sir.
Q What happened after you gave the telephone to the lady
who represented herself that she is from the
POEA? EcTCAD

A After I gave the cordless telephone she keep on dialing,


dialing and dialing and according to her she
constantly dialing the number and she even
remarked: "the person she is calling does not know
how to use the telephone" . . .
Q What happened after that remarks?
A She still kept on dialing and she remarked that she did
not know how to use the phone . . .
Q What happened after that?
A After that, she asked for a cigarette sir.
Q Did you give to the lady who represented herself that
she is from the POEA a cigarette?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next after that?
A After I gave the cigarette the four (4) men entered
suddenly and came in our house.
Q Where did they come from?
A I do not know, sir.
Q From what direction of the house they came from Miss
Witness, do you know?
A They came from the outside of the gate, sir, and
suddenly entered our house, sir.
Q When for the first time did you see that lady who
represented herself that she is from the POEA and
the four (4) men burged (sic) in your house?
A Last February 20, 1991 only, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. COPE:
Q Miss Yrreverre, would you look around the courtroom
and pinpoint if that lady who represented herself
from the POEA is here present?
A Witness is pointing to a lady wearing black and when
asked by the interpreter she answered to the name
of Aurora Engson Fransdilla.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Miss Yrreverre, what happened after four (4) men
suddenly entered your residence on that particular
date and time you mentioned earlier?
A As I was looking on the lady dialing, kept on dialing the
number in the telephone I saw the four (4) men
standing behind the lady, sir.
Q And when you saw the lady, you are referring to Aurora
Engson Fransdilla?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A When we were in the sala we were talking Aurora
Engson Fransdilla remarked she can not really
contact the number as it was busy, sir.
Q What happened next after that?
A And Aurora Engson Fransdilla after which asked if she
can use the comfort room to which I agreed, sir.
Q What happened next?
A She stood up and put down the cordless telephone and
took her bag because she wanted to get a napkin as
she said she still has to call up before going to the
comfort room, sir.
Q What happened next?
A After which she sat down again and crossed legs and
remarked that she had a monthly period so my
attention was focused on her, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A While my attention was with Aurora Engson Fransdilla,
Cacal approached me and poked the gun on my neck,
sir.
Q What happened after that?
A And he announced hold-up.
Q Who announced that hold-up?
A Cacal, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A While Cacal poked a gun at my neck Cuanang and the
two other men went to the kitchen to which I could
see very well in my position from where I stood, sir.
COURT:
Q How many men went to the kitchen?
A The three (3) others went to the kitchen, sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q What happened next?
A While Cacal was poking the gun at my neck, I saw
Cuanang and the two (2) men herded our maids my
one cousin and my niece, sir in the bodega, sir.
Q What happened next?
A And our maids and my niece and my cousin were locked
inside the bodega, sir.
Q Where is this bodega located Miss Witness?
A In our kitchen, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A While Cacal who was still poking the gun at my neck
held and pulled the tail of my hair and dragged me
upstairs and brought me upstairs to the room of my
sister Cynthia Irreverre, sir.
Q What happened next?
A While I was at the room of my sister Cynthia and while
the gun was still poked at my neck and still held by
Cacal he looked around the room, sir.
Q What happened after that? HSAcaE

A While I was looking around the room he saw the vault of


my sister Cynthia Yrreverre, sir.
Q What happened next then?
A Suddenly he dropped me and opened the door and
shouted that one (1) of your should come up.
Q What happened after that?
A While they carried the vault of my sister downstairs
Cuanang came up and Cuanang carried the vault
with Cacal and before they went down they told me,
Cacal told me that you should not follow us. You
should stay here.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. COPE:
Q Miss Yrreverre, will you please describe the vault which
Cuanang and Cacal got from the room of your sister
Cynthia Yrreverre?
A Witness is demonstrating the size of the vault it is a
small one it is as small television.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Can we measure that Your Honor.
COURT:
You agree on the size.
WITNESS:
A Witness is pointing half of the area of the table which is
more or less 1 1/2 x 1 1/2 cubic feet.
ATTY. COPE:
Q After Cuanang and Cacal brought out the vault from the
room and you were told by Cacal to stay from the
room and not to get out, what did you do?
A When the two (2) got out I just stay and they
simultaneously closed the door, sir.
Q What happened next then?
A When they closed the door I got the courage to open the
door and followed them, sir.
Q What happened then?
A I went down the stairs when I was at the middle of the
stairs Cacal turned his back and he saw me and
came after me and brought me up to my room, sir.
Q How far was your room to the room of your sister
Cynthia Yrreverre?
A Just near sir, the dividing portion for the room of my
niece is so near.
Q What happened after Cacal brought you to your room?
A While I was in my room he pushed me towards my bed,
sir.
Q What happened after that?
A So when he pushed me and I was felt on my back he
said to me just stay right there and he searched my
room (naghalughog), sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. COPE:
Q How did you fall Miss Witness?
A When he pushed me I felt at my back sir and Cacal
searched my room, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A While Cacal was searching (naghahalughog) I stood up
when Cacal saw me stood up he slapped me, sir.
Q What happened when you were slapped by Cacal?
A He said (putang ina mo matigas ang ulo mo) son of a
bitch you are hard headed.
Q And what happened after that? AScHCD

A While I was sitting Cuanang came inside my room and


he tied my hands at my back, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A While I was being tied by Cuanang at my back Aurora
Engson Fransdilla peeped inside my room, sir.
Q Is that Aurora Engson Fransdilla the lady who
represented to you from the POEA?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened after that while you were hogtied by
Cuanang and Aurora Fransdilla peeped into your
room?
A While my hands was (sic) tied, that was the time Cacal
and Cuanang took my jewelries, sir.
COURT:
Q Where did she get those pieces of jewelry?
A In my room at the headboard of my bed, sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q What else if there were any taken by Cacal and
Cuanang?
A Many sir.
Q What are those?
A They took the following: two pairs of gold earrings, one
gold necklace with pendant, one Loui(s) Vuitton
brown leather, one Gucci Ladies watch, two gold
earrings with diamond pendant and cash money of
SEVEN THOUSAND (P7,000.00) PESOS.
ATTY. COPE:
Q This one gold necklace with pendant how much did you
buy this?
A I bought that for P180,000.00, sir.
COURT:
How many karats this gold necklace?
WITNESS:
That is 18 karats gold, sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q Miss Yrreverre, how about the two gold earrings with
diamond pendant, how much did you buy this?
A I bought that for EIGHTY THOUSAND (P80,000.00)
PESOS.
COURT:
Q Do you know the karats of this diamond? How big is
this?
A It is as big as big mongo, sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q This two pairs of gold earrings, how much did you buy
this, how much is this?
A TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, sir.
Q What else?
A One gold necklace with pendant, sir.
Q How much is this?
A ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (P180,000.00)
PESOS, sir.
Q How about this Louie Vitton brown leather bag, how
much did you buy this?
A I bought that for ELEVEN THOUSAND (P11,000.00)
PESOS, sir.
Q This Gucci ladies watch, how much did you buy this?
A THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00) PESOS, sir.
COURT:
What kind of Gucci is this, US Gucci or Hongkong?
WITNESS:
I do not remember anymore, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q How much did you buy this?
A I bought that for THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00)
PESOS, sir. 11
The State thus discharged its burden to produce before
the trial court sufficient evidence against all the accused,
including Fransdilla, that would warrant a judgment of
conviction. Fransdilla's non-presentation of her defense,
despite her being directly incriminated by Lalaine, denied the
Court her explanation for her specific overt acts of complicity
in the robbery and thus rendered the incriminating evidence
unrefuted. By this the Court simply means that Fransdilla did
not discharge her burden of evidence, which is "the duty of a
party to start and continue giving evidence at any stage of the
trial until he has established a prima faciecase, or the like duty
of the adverse party to meet and overthrow that prima
facie case thus established." 12
As such, the prosecution successfully discharged its
burden of proof against Fransdilla.
In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. 13For an
accused to be validly held to have conspired with her co-
accused in committing the crime, her overt acts must evince
her active part in the execution of the crime agreed to be
committed. The overt acts of each of the conspirators must
tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely
passive conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the
conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such conspirator is
the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was satisfactorily shown not
to have been a mere passive co-conspirator, but an active one
who had facilitated the access into the house by representing
herself as an employee of the POEA. In that respect, it is not
always required to establish that two or more persons met and
explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the crime by
laying down the details of how their unlawful scheme or
objective would be carried out. 14 Conspiracy can also be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is
perpetrated, or can be inferred from the acts of the several
accused evincing their joint or common purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest. 15 Once
conspiracy is established, the act of each conspirator is the
act of all.
In establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct
as well as circumstantial evidence. Lalaine's testimony
against Fransdilla constituted both kinds of evidence. Lalaine's
direct testimony showed the latter's overt participation in the
execution of the robbery, while the following circumstances
indicated the unity of action and common purpose or design to
commit the robbery among Fransdilla and her co-accused,
specifically: (1) Fransdilla and her co-accused went together to
the complainants' house at around 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. of
February 20, 1991; (2) she talked to Joel to solicit information
on the whereabouts of Cynthia; (3) upon learning that Cynthia
was not home, she stepped outside the gate and talked to two
men sitting inside a vehicle parked outside the house; (4) she
pretended to be an employee of the POEA in order to gain entry
into the house; (5) she performed acts purposely aimed to
distract Lalaine in order to give her cohorts the opportunity to
enter the house and commit the robbery; (5) during the
robbery, she was not tied up like the household members, but
moved freely around the house, and at one point Lalaine
spotted her peeping into the bedroom where Lalaine was then
being held; and (7) she and the others fled together in two
separate vehicles after the robbery.
In light of the foregoing, the CA justly concluded that the
State established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt for of all
the accused, including Fransdilla, for the robbery.
2.
Correction of the Indeterminate Sentence
was necessary to conform to the letter and spirit
the Indeterminate Sentence Law
That the trial judge fixed the indeterminate sentence at
"imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion
temporal as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum" was a patent elementary error. Such
fixing contravened the letter and spirit of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Section 1 of which reads:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense
is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended
by Act No. 4225)
The CA justifiably deemed it necessary to correct the
indeterminate sentence. Under Section 1, supra, the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence is a penalty "within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the [Revised
Penal] Code for the offense," and the maximum is "that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code." Considering that
the clear objective of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to
have the convict serve the minimum penalty before becoming
eligible for release on parole pursuant to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, 16 both the minimum and the maximum
penalties must be definite, not ranging. This objective cannot
be achieved otherwise, for determining when the convict
would be eligible for release on parole would be nearly
impossible if the minimum and the maximum were
as indefinite as the RTC fixed the indeterminate sentence.
Indeed, that the sentence is an indeterminate one relates only
to the fact that such imposition would leave the period
between the minimum and the maximum
penalties indeterminate "in the sense that he may, under the
conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said
period in whole or in part." 17
3.
Crime committed was the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
Citing Napolis v. Court of Appeals, 18 the CA ruled that all
the accused, including Fransdilla, were guilty of committing
the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under
Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation
or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code.Thus, it held
that the penalty for the complex crime under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code was that for the more serious offense,
to be imposed in its maximum period. Taking into
consideration that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
were present, it set the indeterminate sentence of 12 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
We concur with the CA.
In Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the Court abandoned the
doctrine adopted in United States v. De los Santos 19 that when
the felonies of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299
of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against
or intimidation of a person under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code are committed, the penalty for the latter crime
(although the lighter one) should be imposed because the
violence against or intimidation of a person was the
"controlling qualification," on the theory that "robbery which is
characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is
evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force
upon things, because where violence or intimidation against
the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order
of society and the security of the individual." Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion observed:
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable
to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking
a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house
and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence
against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable under
Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Codewith reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in
previous decisions, if, aside from performing said acts,
the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing
any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries
mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the
same Code, the imposable penalty — under paragraph (5)
thereof — shall be much lighter. To our mind, this result
and the process of reasoning that has brought it about,
defy logic and reason.AcICHD
The argument to the effect that the violence
against or intimidation of a person supplies the
"controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to justify
said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery
with "violence or intimidation against the person is
evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by
force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We
cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the
cases above cited — reduction of the penalty for the
latter offense owing to the concurrence of violation or
intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to
our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies
only where robbery with violence against or intimidation
of a person takes place without entering an inhabited
house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of
theRevised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as
We do, when the elements of both provisions are present,
that the crime is a complex one, calling for the
imposition — as provided in Art. 48 of said Code — of the
penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum
period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporalin
its maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be
imposed in its maximum period — from nineteen (19)
years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal — owing to the presence of
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. . . . . 20
Napolis v. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case. To
start with, the information fully alleged the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal
Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under Article
294, Revised Penal Code by averring that "the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to gain, and by means of violence and
intimidation upon person rob the residence . . . ." And,
secondly, the Prosecution competently proved the commission
of the complex crime by showing during the trial that the
accused, after entering the residential house of the
complainants at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon
City, took away valuables, including the vault containing
Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the process committed
acts of violence against and intimidation of persons during the
robbery by slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her up,
and herding the other members of the household inside
the bodega of the house.
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation
of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when
by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed. 21
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if
by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the
physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263
shall have been inflicted; Provided, however, that when
the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with a
use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As
amended by PD No. 767).
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical
injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have
been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the
violence or intimidation employed in the commission of
the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly
unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when
the course of its execution, the offender shall have
inflicted upon any person not responsible for its
commission any of the physical injuries covered by sub-
divisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in
other cases. (As amended by R.A. 18).
Paragraph 5, supra, is the relevant provision, under which
the penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period.
On the other hand, Article 299 of the Revised Penal
Code states:
Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public
building or edifice devoted to worship. — Any armed
person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house
or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship,
shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of
the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if:
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or
building in which the robbery was committed, by any of
the following means:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or
egress.
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking
any door or window.
3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the
exercise of public authority.
Or if —
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or
any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or
receptacle;
2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken
or forced open outside the place of the robbery.
When the offenders do not carry arms, and the
value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.
The same rule shall be applied when the offenders
are armed, but the value of the property taken does not
exceed 250 pesos.
When said offenders do not carry arms and the
value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos,
they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two next
preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period.
If the robbery be committed in one of the
dependencies of an inhabited house, public building, or
building dedicated to religious worship, the penalties
next lower in degree than those prescribed in this article
shall be imposed.
Relevant are paragraph (a) 4 (because Fransdilla
pretended to be from the POEA) and paragraph (b) 2 (because
the accused brought the vault down from Cynthia's upstairs
bedroom and forced it open outside the place where the
robbery was committed), supra. The penalty for the crime
is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
for the complex crime is that for the more serious felony,
which, in this case, was the robbery in an inhabited house by
armed men punishable by reclusion temporal, to be imposed in
the maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four months and one day to
20 years). Hence, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence
of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four
months of reclusion temporal, must be corrected to 17 years,
four months and one day of reclusion temporal.
4.
Exemplary damages to be deleted
for lack of legal basis
The CA affirmed the order of the RTC for the accused to
return the value of the articles stolen totaling P2,250,000.00
and to pay to the complainants P200,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes the grant of
exemplary damages as part of the civil liability in crimes only
when one or more aggravating circumstances were present in
the commission of the crime. With the conceded absence of
any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime,
therefore, we delete the P200,000.00 as exemplary damages
for lack of legal basis. However, interest of 6% per
annum should be imposed on the P2,250,000.00, 22 to be
reckoned from the filing of the information until full payment
because the value of the stolen articles, which the information
individually averred, could be established with reasonable
certainty. 23
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari and AFFIRMS in all respects the conviction of
accused AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA for the complex crime
of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men under Article
299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence
against and intimidation of persons under Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS, namely: (1) she shall suffer the
indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; (2) the award of P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal basis; and (3)
and the actual damages of P2,250,000.00 shall earn interest of
6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the information until
full payment. TAIaHE

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.


SO ORDERED.
||| (Fransdilla v. People, G.R. No. 197562, [April 20, 2015])

TITLE 10 – CHAPTER II
[G.R. No. 160188. June 21, 2007.]

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner, vs.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J :
p

This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal
law jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively concedes having
performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead
insists that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated
theft only, not the felony in its consummated stage of which he
was convicted. The proposition rests on a common theory
expounded in two well-known decisions 1 rendered decades ago
by the Court of Appeals, upholding the existence of frustrated
theft of which the accused in both cases were found guilty.
However, the rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed
by this Court.
As far as can be told, 2 the last time this Court extensively
considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or
consummated theft was in 1918, in People v. Adiao.3 A more
cursory treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People
v. Sobrevilla, 4 and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC. 5 This petition now
gives occasion for us to finally and fully measure if or how
frustrated theft is susceptible to commission under the Revised
Penal Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems
from an Information 6 charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela
(petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft.
On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon
were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within
the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago
(Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the
open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who
was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of
detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded
these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was
waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and
after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide
Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in
the open parking space. 7
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He
boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where
Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these
acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was
leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a
receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by
fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow
security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise
recovered. 8 The filched items seized from the duo were four (4)
cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and
three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an
aggregate value of P12,090.00. 9
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security
office before they were transferred on the same day to the Baler
Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon City, for
investigation. It appears from the police investigation records
that apart from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons
were apprehended by the security guards at the scene and
delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in
connection with the incident. However, after the matter was
referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only
petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant
City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the
day after the incident. 10
CaAcSE

After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner


and Calderon both claimed having been innocent bystanders
within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon of 19
May 1994 when they were haled by Lago and his fellow security
guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station.
Calderon alleged that on the afternoon of the incident, he was at
the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account,
accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. 11 As the queue
for the ATM was long, Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy
snacks inside the supermarket. It was while they were eating
that they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, leading them to head
out of the building to check what was transpiring. As they were
outside, they were suddenly "grabbed" by a security guard, thus
commencing their detention. 12 Meanwhile, petitioner testified
during trial that he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, 13 had
been at the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex
and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw the
security guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and the
other people at the scene to start running, at which point he was
apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office.
Petitioner claimed he was detained at the security office until
around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought
to the Baler Police Station. At the station, petitioner denied
having stolen the cartons of detergent, but he was detained
overnight, and eventually brought to the prosecutor's office
where he was charged with theft. 14 During petitioner's cross-
examination, he admitted that he had been employed as a
"bundler" of GMS Marketing, "assigned at the supermarket"
though not at SM. 15
In a Decision 16 promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both
petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. They
were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years
of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision
mayor as maximum. 17 The RTC found credible the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on
the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the
crime.
Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal, 18 but only
petitioner filed a brief 19 with the Court of Appeals, causing the
appellate court to deem Calderon's appeal as abandoned and
consequently dismissed. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner
argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since
at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a
position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. 20 However, in its
Decision dated 19 June 2003, 21 the Court of Appeals rejected this
contention and affirmed petitioner's conviction. 22 Hence the
present Petition for Review, 23 which expressly seeks that
petitioner's conviction "be modified to only of Frustrated Theft." 24
Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner
effectively conceded both his felonious intent and his actual
participation in the theft of several cases of detergent with a
total value of P12,090.00 of which he was charged. 25 As such,
there is no cause for the Court to consider a factual scenario
other than that presented by the prosecution, as affirmed by the
RTC and the Court of Appeals. The only question to consider is
whether under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as
consummated or merely frustrated.
II.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft,
petitioner cites 26 two decisions rendered many years ago by the
Court of Appeals: People v. Diño 27 andPeople v. Flores. 28 Both
decisions elicit the interest of this Court, as they modified trial
court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and
involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present case.
Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of
Appeals, yet the appellate court did not expressly consider the
import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short
shrift to the Diño and Flores rulings since they have not yet been
expressly adopted as precedents by this Court. For whatever
reasons, the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated
theft has not come to pass before us. Yet despite the silence on
our part,Diño and Flores have attained a level of renown reached
by very few other appellate court rulings. They are
comprehensively discussed in the most popular of our criminal
law annotations, 29 and studied in criminal law classes as
textbook examples of frustrated crimes or even as definitive of
frustrated theft.aECTcA

More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to


the fanciful scenarios that populate criminal law exams more
than they actually occur in real life. Indeed, if we finally say
that Diño and Flores are doctrinal, such conclusion could
profoundly influence a multitude of routine theft prosecutions,
including commonplace shoplifting. Any scenario that involves
the thief having to exit with the stolen property through a
supervised egress, such as a supermarket checkout counter or a
parking area pay booth, may easily call for the application
of Diño and Flores. The fact that lower courts have not hesitated
to lay down convictions for frustrated theft further validates
that Diño and Flores and the theories offered therein on
frustrated theft have borne some weight in our jurisprudential
system. The time is thus ripe for us to examine whether those
theories are correct and should continue to influence
prosecutors and judges in the future.
III.
To delve into any extended analysis of Diño and Flores, as well as
the specific issues relative to "frustrated theft," it is necessary
to first refer to the basic rules on the three stages of crimes
under our Revised Penal Code. 30
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated,
frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony is consummated
"when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present." It is frustrated "when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator."
Finally, it is attempted "when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance."

Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a "subjective


phase," or that portion of the acts constituting the crime
included between the act which begins the commission of the
crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with
prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. 31 After that
point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the
objective phase begins. 32 It has been held that if the offender
never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is
merely attempted. 33 On the other hand, the subjective phase is
completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such
instances, "[s]ubjectively the crime is complete." 34
Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and
frustrated felonies on one hand, and attempted felonies on the
other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of
execution despite commencing the commission of a felony, the
crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Since the specific
acts of execution that define each crime under the Revised Penal
Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of
ascertaining whether a crime is attempted only would need to
compare the acts actually performed by the accused as against
the acts that constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or
consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the
acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The
critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was
actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of
whether the felony was "produced" after all the acts of execution
had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition
of the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes
the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while
the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of
execution and accompanying criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea" supplies an important characteristic of a crime, that
"ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to
be a crime," and accordingly, there can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting. 35 Accepted in this jurisdiction as
material in crimesmala in se, 36 mens rea has been defined before
as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
intent," 37 and "essential for criminal liability." 38 It follows that the
statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to
supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S.
Supreme Court has comfortably held that "a criminal law that
contains no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally
protected rights." 39 The criminal statute must also provide for the
overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our
legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must
also be an actus reus. 40 TEcADS

It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find
expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As
a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws,
it is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly
provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision,
disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question
whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the
undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary
is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately,
our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From
the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term
is embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the
acts of execution. For example, the statutory definition of murder
or homicide expressly uses the phrase "shall kill another," thus
making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the
victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code, its elements are spelled out as
follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft . — Theft is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter's
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall
fail to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged
the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or object of the damage
caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a
field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of
its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or
shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm
products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three
alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be
committed. 41 In the present discussion, we need to concern
ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it
that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and
sustained. On the face of the definition, there is only one
operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft — the
taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the
provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft,
there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that
the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or
violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without
the consent of the owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft
as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely:
(1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. 42
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the
definition of theft, which under early Roman law as defined by
Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass "any kind of
physical handling of property belonging to another against the
will of the owner," 43 a definition similar to that by Paulus that a
thief "handles (touches, moves) the property of
another." 44 However, with the Institutes of Justinian, the idea had
taken hold that more than mere physical handling, there must
further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus:
"[f]urtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel
ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve." 45 This requirement
of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was maintained in both the
Spanish and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since been
abandoned in Great Britain. 46
In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded
with apoderamiento, or "unlawful taking," to characterize theft.
Justice Regalado notes that the concept ofapoderamiento once
had a controversial interpretation and application. Spanish law
had already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was
constitutive ofapoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled
with "the intent to appropriate the object in order to
constitute apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive
the lawful owner of the thing." 47 However, a conflicting line of
cases decided by the Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that
there must be permanency in the taking 48or an intent to
permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property; 49 or that
there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent,
as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance
of the proprietary rights of the owner already
constituted apoderamiento. 50 Ultimately, as Justice Regalado
notes, the Court adopted the latter thought that there was no
need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his
property to constitute an unlawful taking. 51DHTECc

So long as the "descriptive" circumstances that qualify the


taking are present, including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento,
the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal
property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression
went beyond the attempted stage. As applied to the present
case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the
cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure
motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict
violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things,
and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales
Club, petitioner forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for
only attempted theft would have afforded him.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or
frustrated theft, we are obliged to apply Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision, the
theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed
by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a
consequence, "do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator." There are clearly two
determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not
"produced," and that such failure is due to causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends
on the evidence at hand in each particular case. The first,
however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the
individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code 52 as to when a
particular felony is "not produced," despite the commission of all
the acts of execution.

So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or


frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the
felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory
definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer
provided in the language of the law — that theft is already
"produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another
without the latter's consent."
U.S. v. Adiao 53 apparently supports that notion. Therein, a
customs inspector was charged with theft after he abstracted a
leather belt from the baggage of a foreign national and secreted
the item in his desk at the Custom House. At no time was the
accused able to "get the merchandise out of the Custom House,"
and it appears that he "was under observation during the entire
transaction." 54 Based apparently on those two circumstances,
the trial court had found him guilty, instead, of frustrated theft.
The Court reversed, saying that neither circumstance was
decisive, and holding instead that the accused was guilty of
consummated theft, finding that "all the elements of the
completed crime of theft are present." 55 In support of its
conclusion that the theft was consummated, the Court cited
three (3) decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the discussion
of which we replicate below:
The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit
from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking the
fruit[,] he was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear
that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but
sometime later. The court said: "[. . .] The trial court did
not err [. . .] in considering the crime as that of
consummated theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch
as nothing appears in the record showing that the
policemen who saw the accused take the fruit from the
adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented
him from taking full possession of the thing stolen and
even its utilization by him for an interval of time."
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 14,
1898.)
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while
the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on
account of the solemnity of the act, although noticing the
theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently,
however, while the defendant was still inside the church,
the offended party got back the money from the
defendant. The court said that the defendant had
performed all the acts of execution and considered the
theft as consummated. (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house
and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the
case took a small box, which was also opened with a key,
from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales
and 20 centimos, and then he placed the money over the
cover of the case; just at this moment he was caught by
two guards who were stationed in another room near-by.
The court considered this as consummated robbery, and
said: "[. . .] The accused [. . .] having materially taken
possession of the money from the moment he took it from
the place where it had been, and having taken it with his
hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all
the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was
thereby produced; only the act of making use of the thing
having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to
make the elements of the consummated crime." (Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain, June 13, 1882.) 56
CTAIHc

It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish
decisions cited therein, that the criminal actors in all these
cases had been able to obtain full possession of the personal
property prior to their apprehension. The interval between the
commission of the acts of theft and the apprehension of the
thieves did vary, from "sometime later" in the 1898 decision; to
the very moment the thief had just extracted the money in a
purse which had been stored as it was in the 1882 decision; and
before the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen from the
building where the theft took place, as had happened
in Adiao and the 1897 decision. Still, such intervals proved of no
consequence in those cases, as it was ruled that the thefts in
each of those cases was consummated by the actual possession
of the property belonging to another.
In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an
accused was guilty only of frustrated rather than consummated
theft. The case is People v. Sobrevilla, 57where the accused, while
in the midst of a crowd in a public market, was already able to
abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the
latter, perceiving the theft, "caught hold of the [accused]'s shirt-
front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a struggle,
he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who
was afterwards caught by a policeman." 58 In rejecting the
contention that only frustrated theft was established, the Court
simply said, without further comment or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is groundless. The
[accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-book, and that
determines the crime of theft. If the pocket-book was
afterwards recovered, such recovery does not affect the
[accused's] criminal liability, which arose from the
[accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book. 59
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish
Supreme Court cases cited in the latter, in that the fact that the
offender was able to succeed in obtaining physical possession of
the stolen item, no matter how momentary, was able to
consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited
therein contradict the position of petitioner in this case. Yet to
simply affirm without further comment would be disingenuous, as
there is another school of thought on when theft is
consummated, as reflected in the Diño and Floresdecisions.
Diño was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years
after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The accused therein, a
driver employed by the United States Army, had driven his truck
into the port area of the South Harbor, to unload a truckload of
materials to waiting U.S. Army personnel. After he had finished
unloading, accused drove away his truck from the Port, but as he
was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was
stopped by an M.P. who inspected the truck and found therein
three boxes of army rifles. The accused later contended that he
had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the
agreement that they were to meet him and retrieve the rifles
after he had passed the checkpoint. The trial court convicted
accused of consummated theft, but the Court of Appeals
modified the conviction, holding instead that only frustrated theft
had been committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident
intent of the accused was to let the boxes of rifles "pass through
the checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as the truck had
already unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it would be allowed
to pass through the check point without further investigation or
checking." 60 This point was deemed material and indicative that
the theft had not been fully produced, for the Court of Appeals
pronounced that "the fact determinative of consummation is the
ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if
it were more or less momentary." 61 Support for this proposition
was drawn from a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated
24 January 1888 (1888 decision), which was quoted as follows:
Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa
sustraida sea determinate de la consumacion del delito de
hurto es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que
permitan al sustractor la libre disposicion de aquella,
siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente, pues de
otra suerte, dado el concepto del delito de hurto, no puede
decirse en realidad que se haya producido en toda su
extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de tomar la
cosa ajena. 62
Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then
concluded:
This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order
to make the booty subject to the control and disposal of
the culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed
through the M.P. check point, but since the offense was
opportunely discovered and the articles seized after all
the acts of execution had been performed, but before the
loot came under the final control and disposal of the
looters, the offense can not be said to have been fully
consummated, as it was frustrated by the timely
intervention of the guard. The offense committed,
therefore, is that of frustrated theft. 63
CHDaAE
Diño thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to
freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of apprehension is
determinative as to whether the theft is consummated or
frustrated. This theory was applied again by the Court of Appeals
some 15 years later, in Flores, a case which according to the
division of the court that decided it, bore "no substantial
variance between the circumstances [herein] and in
[Diño]." 64 Such conclusion is borne out by the facts in Flores. The
accused therein, a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring
Company, issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea van to the
truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto
his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck
driver proceeded to show the delivery receipt to the guard on
duty at the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on
inspecting the van, and discovered that the "empty" sea van had
actually contained other merchandise as well. 65 The accused was
prosecuted for theft qualified by abuse of confidence, and found
himself convicted of the consummated crime. Before the Court of
Appeals, accused argued in the alternative that he was guilty
only of attempted theft, but the appellate court pointed out that
there was no intervening act of spontaneous desistance on the
part of the accused that "literally frustrated the theft." However,
the Court of Appeals, explicitly relying on Diño, did find that the
accused was guilty only of frustrated, and not consummated,
theft.

As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found "no


substantial variance" between Diño and Flores then before it. The
prosecution in Flores had sought to distinguish that case
from Diño, citing a "traditional ruling" which unfortunately was
not identified in the decision itself. However, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that the said "traditional ruling" was qualified by the
words "is placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of
its contents at once." 66 Pouncing on this qualification, the
appellate court noted that "[o]bviously, while the truck and the
van were still within the compound, the petitioner could not have
disposed of the goods 'at once'." At the same time, the Court of
Appeals conceded that "[t]his is entirely different from the case
where a much less bulk and more common thing as money was
the object of the crime, where freedom to dispose of or make use
of it is palpably less restricted," 67 though no further qualification
was offered what the effect would have been had that alternative
circumstance been present instead.
Synthesis of the Diño and Flores rulings is in order. The
determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was
produced is the ability of the actor "to freely dispose of the
articles stolen, even if it were only momentary." Such conclusion
was drawn from an 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
which had pronounced that in determining whether theft had
been consummated, "es preciso que so haga en circunstancias
tales que permitan al sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea mas o
menos momentaneamente." The qualifier "siquiera sea mas o
menos momentaneamente" proves another important
consideration, as it implies that if the actor was in a capacity to
freely dispose of the stolen items before apprehension, then the
theft could be deemed consummated. Such circumstance was
not present in either Diñoor Flores, as the stolen items in both
cases were retrieved from the actor before they could be
physically extracted from the guarded compounds from which the
items were filched. However, as implied in Flores, the character
of the item stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to
whether there could have been "free disposition," as in the case
where the chattel involved was of "much less bulk and more
common . . ., [such] as money . . . ." 68
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following
pointed observation on the import of the Diño ruling:
There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is
consummated when the thief is able to freely dispose of
the stolen articles even if it were more or less momentary.
Or as stated in another case [ 69 ], theft is consummated
upon the voluntary and malicious taking of property
belonging to another which is realized by the material
occupation of the thing whereby the thief places it under
his control and in such a situation that he could dispose of
it at once. This ruling seems to have been based on
Viada's opinion that in order the theft may be
consummated, "es preciso que se haga en
circumstancias . . . [ 70 ]" 71
In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding
from Adiao and other cases, also states that "[i]n theft or robbery
the crime is consummated after the accused had material
possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same,
although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated." 72
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at
seeming variance with the Diño and Flores rulings. People v.
Batoon 73 involved an accused who filled a container with gasoline
from a petrol pump within view of a police detective, who
followed the accused onto a passenger truck where the arrest
was made. While the trial court found the accused guilty of
frustrated qualified theft, the Court of Appeals held that the
accused was guilty of consummated qualified theft, finding that
"[t]he facts of the cases of U.S. [v.] Adiao . . . and U.S. v.
Sobrevilla . . . indicate that actual taking with intent to gain is
enough to consummate the crime of theft." 74
In People v. Espiritu, 75 the accused had removed nine pieces of
hospital linen from a supply depot and loaded them onto a truck.
However, as the truck passed through the checkpoint, the stolen
items were discovered by the Military Police running the
checkpoint. Even though those facts clearly admit to similarity
with those in Diño, the Court of Appeals held that the accused
were guilty of consummated theft, as the accused "were able to
take or get hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that
was frustrated, which does not constitute any element of theft, is
the use or benefit that the thieves expected from the commission
of the offense." 76
In pointing out the distinction between Diño and Espiritu, Reyes
wryly observes that "[w]hen the meaning of an element of a
felony is controversial, there is bound to arise different rulings as
to the stage of execution of that felony." 77 Indeed, we can discern
from this survey of jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar
as frustrated theft is concerned is muddled. It fact, given the
disputed foundational basis of the concept of frustrated theft
itself, the question can even be asked whether there is really
such a crime in the first place. ITSacC

IV.
The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was
guilty of frustrated, and not consummated, theft. As we
undertake this inquiry, we have to reckon with the import of this
Court's 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC. 78
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had
espied four (4) persons in the premises of his plantation, in the
act of gathering and tying some coconuts. The accused were
surprised by the owner within the plantation as they were
carrying with them the coconuts they had gathered. The accused
fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized, and were
subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to
the police. After trial, the accused were convicted of qualified
theft, and the issue they raised on appeal was that they were
guilty only of simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was
qualified, following Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, 79 but
further held that the accused were guilty only of frustrated
qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of
whether the theft was consummated or frustrated was raised by
any of the parties. What does appear, though, is that the
disposition of that issue was contained in only two sentences,
which we reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified
theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the felony
as a consequence. They were not able to carry the
coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely
arrival of the owner. 80
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment,
whether Diño, Flores or the Spanish authorities who may have
bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed evident problems with
this formulation in Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the
actors "were not able to perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the felon as a consequence." 81 However,
per Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is frustrated
"when the offender performs all the acts of execution," though
not producing the felony as a result. If the offender was not able
to perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted,
provided that the non-performance was by reason of some cause
or accident other than spontaneous
desistance. Empelis concludes that the crime was frustrated
because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to
the timely arrival of the owner. However, following Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, these facts should elicit the conclusion that
the crime was only attempted, especially given that the acts
were not performed because of the timely arrival of the owner,
and not because of spontaneous desistance by the offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we
consider the present petition. Even if the two sentences we had
cited actually aligned with the definitions provided in Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code, such passage bears no reflection that it
is the product of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal
or jurisprudential thought. Instead, the passage is offered as if it
were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so settled it
required no further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or
even cited as authority on theft. Indeed, we cannot see
how Empelis can contribute to our present debate, except for the
bare fact that it proves that the Court had once deliberately
found an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Even if Empelis were
considered as a precedent for frustrated theft, its doctrinal value
is extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that
inform it, and also by the fact that it has not been entrenched by
subsequent reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable
given that frustrated theft is viable in this jurisdiction.
Considering the flawed reasoning behind its conclusion of
frustrated theft, it cannot present any efficacious argument to
persuade us in this case. Insofar as Empelis may imply that
convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this
jurisdiction, that decision is subject to reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the
1870 Codigo Penal de España was then in place. The definition of
the crime of theft, as provided then, read as follows:
Son reos de hurto:
1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o
intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas,
toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de
su dueño.

2. Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo


quién es su dueño se la apropriaren co intención de
lucro.
3. Los dañadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u
objeto del daño causado, salvo los casos previstos
en los articulos 606, núm. 1.0; 607, núms, 1.0, 2.0 y
3.0; 608, núm. 1.0; 611; 613; Segundo párrafo del 617
y 618.EHSIcT

It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the
aforecited Spanish Supreme Court decisions were handed down.
However, the said code would be revised again in 1932, and
several times thereafter. In fact, under the Codigo Penal Español
de 1995, the crime of theft is now simply defined as "[e]l que, con
ánimo de lucro, tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad
de su dueño será castigado." 82
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal
code of Spain, "la libre disposicion" of the property is not an
element or a statutory characteristic of the crime. It does appear
that the principle originated and perhaps was fostered in the
realm of Spanish jurisprudence.
The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in
his 1926 commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal de España.
Therein, he raised at least three questions for the reader whether
the crime of frustrated or consummated theft had occurred. The
passage cited in Diño was actually utilized by Viada to answer
the question whether frustrated or consummated theft was
committed "[e]l que en el momento mismo de apoderarse de la
cosa ajena, viéndose sorprendido, la arroja al suelo ." 83Even as
the answer was as stated in Diño, and was indeed derived from
the 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, that decision's
factual predicate occasioning the statement was apparently very
different from Diño, for it appears that the 1888 decision involved
an accused who was surprised by the employees of a
haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of clothing off a
mannequin, and who then proceeded to throw away the garment
as he fled. 84
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated
theft, and willingly recites decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain that have held to that effect. 85 A few decades later, the
esteemed Eugenio Cuello Calón pointed out the inconsistent
application by the Spanish Supreme Court with respect to
frustrated theft.
Hay frustración cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por
las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del carro
que los conducia a otro que tenían preparado, 22 febrero
1913; cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto por la
intervención de la policia situada en el local donde se
realizó la sustracción que impidió pudieran los reos
disponer de lo sustraído, 30 de octubre 1950. Hay "por lo
menos" frustración, si existe apoderamiento, pero el
culpale no llega a disponer de la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay
frustración "muy próxima" cuando el culpable es detenido
por el perjudicado acto seguido de cometer la
sustracción, 28 febrero 1931. Algunos fallos han
considerado la existencia de frustración cuando,
perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento de
llevar los efectos hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889,
22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo 1921; esta doctrina no es
admissible, éstos, conforme a lo antes expuesto, son
hurtos consumados. 86
Ultimately, Cuello Calón attacked the very idea that frustrated
theft is actually possible:
La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que
el hurto se consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la
disposición del agente. Con este criterio coincide la
doctrina sentada últimamente porla jurisprudencia
española que generalmente considera consumado el hurto
cuando el culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y ésta quede
por tiempo más o menos duradero bajo su poder. El hecho
de que éste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es
indiferente. El delito no pierde su carácter de consumado
aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o
fuere recuperada. No se concibe la frustración, pues es
muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la
consumación del hurto no lo consume efectivamente, los
raros casos que nuestra jurisprudencia, muy vacilante,
declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos
consumados. 87 (Emphasis supplied)
Cuello Calón's submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike
Viada, who was content with replicating the Spanish Supreme
Court decisions on the matter, Cuello Calón actually set forth his
own thought that questioned whether theft could truly be
frustrated, since "pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es
necesario para la consumación del hurto no lo consume
efectivamente." Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee
how the execution of all the acts necessary for the completion of
the crime would not produce the effect of theft. SCADIT

This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no


weighted force in scholarly thought that obliges us to accept
frustrated theft, as proposed in Diño andFlores. A final ruling by
the Court that there is no crime of frustrated theft in this
jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic pariah, for such a
submission is hardly heretical in light of Cuello Calón's position.
Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the
Court to look at the question from a fresh perspective, as we are
not bound by the opinions of the respected Spanish
commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept that theft is
capable of commission in its frustrated stage. Further, if we ask
the question whether there is a mandate of statute or precedent
that must compel us to adopt the Diño and Flores doctrines, the
answer has to be in the negative. If we did so, it would arise not
out of obeisance to an inexorably higher command, but from the
exercise of the function of statutory interpretation that comes as
part and parcel of judicial review, and a function that allows
breathing room for a variety of theorems in competition until one
is ultimately adopted by this Court.
V.
The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter
is that it lies in the province of the legislature, through statute, to
define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It
is the legislature, as representatives of the sovereign people,
which determines which acts or combination of acts are criminal
in nature. Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned
with what was the evident legislative intent, as expressed
primarily in the language of the law as it defines the crime. It is
Congress, not the courts, which is to define a crime, and ordain
its punishment. 88 The courts cannot arrogate the power to
introduce a new element of a crime which was unintended by the
legislature, or redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew to
the statutory language. Due respect for the prerogative of
Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to
refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow
interpretation" is appropriate. "The Court must take heed of
language, legislative history and purpose, in order to strictly
determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids." 89
With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with
the Diño/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to freely
dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the
crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308,
whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as
the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this
Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as
provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that
there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use
of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. 90
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft,
which is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property of
another without the latter's consent. While
the Diño/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the
offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the
perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender,
compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the
victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of
commission in the frustrated stage, the question is again, when
is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with
intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to
the product of the felony that the offender, once having
committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to
freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from
the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution.
This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquino's
commentaries, as earlier cited, that "[i]n theft or robbery the
crime is consummated after the accused had material
possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same,
although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated." 91
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely
dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of "taking"
itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains
such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were
correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its
attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not
all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking
not having been accomplished." Perhaps this point could serve
as fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is
whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such
consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question.
Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular
case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking
by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain,
he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent
for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these
off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these
onto a taxicab. aDCIHE

Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking,


or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same. 92 And long ago, we asserted
in People v. Avila: 93
. . . [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is
the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the physical
power of the thief, which idea is qualified by other
conditions, such as that the taking must be
effected animo lucrandi and without the consent of the
owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does
not require that the taking should be effected against the
will of the owner but merely that it should be without his
consent, a distinction of no slight importance. 94
Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is
most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the
deprivation of one's personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time,
without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could
only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
Neither Diño nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to
consider that once the offenders therein obtained possession
over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced
as there has been deprivation of property. The presumed inability
of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not
negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of
their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.
Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule —
that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen
property frustrates the theft — would introduce a convenient
defense for the accused which does not reflect any legislated
intent, 95 since the Court would have carved a viable means for
offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under applied
circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. It is
difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item
is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would this depend on
the psychological belief of the offender at the time of the
commission of the crime, as implied in Diño?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual
circumstances such as the size and weight of the property, the
location of the property, the number and identity of people
present at the scene of the crime, the number and identity of
people whom the offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing
with the stolen property, the manner in which the stolen item had
been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more. Even
the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into
account, relevant as that would be on whether such property is
capable of free disposal at any stage, even after the taking has
been consummated.
All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that
beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was indeed deprived of
property by one who intended to produce such deprivation for
reasons of gain. For such will remain the presumed fact if
frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of
execution, including the taking, have been completed. If the facts
establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar
circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the
attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been
performed. But once all these acts have been executed, the
taking has been completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of
property, and ultimately the consummation of the theft.
Maybe the Diño/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in
common sense. Yet they do not align with the legislated
framework of the crime of theft. The Revised Penal Code
provisions on theft have not been designed in such fashion as to
accommodate said rulings. Again, there is no language in Article
308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the "free disposition
of the items stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the
crime of theft has been produced. Diño itself did not rely on
Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the
later Flores was ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for
legal support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare
decisis, and even if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our
law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. The same holds
true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has not since
found favor from this Court.
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no
crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success of
his appeal on our acceptance of theDiño and Flores rulings, his
petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in
our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to
recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised
Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this
conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised
Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our
deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative
intent.cIHSTC

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.


SO ORDERED.
(Valenzuela y Natividad v. People, G.R. No. 160188, [June 21,
|||

2007], 552 PHIL 381-419)

[G.R. No. 182648. June 17, 2015.]

HERMAN MEDINA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, * J :
p

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of


the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
January 7, 2008 Decision 1 and April 21, 2008 Resolution 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29634, which
affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal
Case No. 35-4021 convicting petitioner Herman Medina
(Medina) of the crime of simple theft, defined and penalized
under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, Paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Information 4 filed against Medina states:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 2002 and for
sometime thereafter, in the City of Santiago, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal,
and carry away the following to wit: one (1) unit
alternator worth Php5,000.00, Starter worth Php5,000.00,
battery worth Php2,500.00[,] and two (2) sets of tire 2.75
x 15 with mugs worth Php10,000.00 all valued at
Php22,500.00, owned by HENRY LIM, represented by
PURITA LIM[,] to the damage and prejudice of the owner
thereof in the total amount of Php22,500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW[.]
The factual antecedents appear as follows:
Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City,
Isabela. He is the registered owner of a Sangyong Korando
Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207, which was involved in an
accident that caused damage to its roof and door. On April 27,
2002, he engaged the services of Medina, who is a mechanic
and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City,
Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina's shop, it
was still in running condition and serviceable because the
underchassis was not affected and the motor engine, wheels,
steering wheels and other parts were still functioning.
A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on
the jeep. So, in the morning of September 4, 2002, Purita Lim
(Purita), Lim's sister, instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran) to
retrieve the jeep from Medina's shop on the agreement that he
would instead repair the vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran,
however, was not able to get the jeep since its alternator,
starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth P5,000.00,
P5,000.00, P2,500.00, and P10,000.00, respectively, could not
be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took and
installed them on Lim's another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up,
which was also being repaired in the shop. Beltran went back
in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep,
but without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it
to his own repair shop. Before placing the jeep therein, he
reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully
repaired and put back in good running condition.
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint 5 for simple
theft was filed by Purita, representing her brother. The City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict
Medina. 6 Subsequently, an Information was filed before the
court a quo.
In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty. 7 No
settlement, stipulation or admission was made by the parties
during the pre-trial. 8 During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim
were presented as witnesses for the prosecution, while
Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a former barangay
kagawad of Buenavista, Santiago City, testified for the
defense. Eventually, the case was submitted for decision, but
without the formal offer of evidence by the defense. 9
The trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of the March 31, 2005
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and
considering the absence of mitigating [or] aggravating
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, six (6) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum. The accused is
likewise ordered to indemnify Henry Lim the total amount
of P22,500.00. No imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED. 10

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Medina.


While the trial court was not convinced with Medina's
justification that he installed the jeep's missing parts to the
pick-up also owned by Lim, the CA opined that his excuse is
"so lame and flimsy." The CA agreed with the lower court's
findings that Medina admitted that the jeep is more valuable
than the pick-up; that unlike the pick-up, the needed repairs on
the jeep is only minor in nature; that Medina failed to prove
that the pick-up was completely repaired and was placed in
good running condition; and that he failed to prove that the
pick-up is owned by Lim. The CA also held that the positive
testimony of Beltran deserves merit in contrast with the self-
serving testimony of Medina. Finally, no credence was given to
Medina's assertion that the missing auto parts were turned
over to Crispin Mendoza, who is alleged to be an employee of
Lim. For the CA, the trial court correctly ruled that such claim
was unsubstantiated in view of Medina's failure to formally
offer in evidence the purported acknowledgment receipt.
Assuming that the exception in Mato v. CA 11 is taken into
account, the receipt could not still be considered because it
was not incorporated in the records of the case.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Medina
filed this petition which alleges the following errors:
I.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PROSECUTION ONLY PRESENTED CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. WORST, IT
SPECIFICALLY ADVANCED ONLY ONE SINGLE
CIRCUMSTANCE[,] THAT IS[,] THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS DANILO BELTRAN THAT THE
STARTER, [ALTERNATOR], BATTERY[,] AND TWO (2)
PIECES [OF] TIRES WITH MUGS (MAG WHEELS) OF THE
KORANDO JEEP WERE SIMPLY MISSING, THUS[,] NOT
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 4, RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF COURT. SCaITA

II.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION RELIED
NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE BUT ON THE
WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE
RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN PHILIPPINES VS.
ALVARIO.
III.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT [AFFIRMED] THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE [THE] FACT [THAT] THERE WAS NO
FURTIVE TAKING OR UNLAWFUL ASPORTATION, IN THE
CRIMINAL SENSE, CONSIDERING THAT THE TAKING, IF
AT ALL, WAS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND
ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT
IN ABUNDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL., AND THE
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE RECEIPT MARKED AS EXHIBIT "2"
FOR THE DEFENSE, LIKEWISE MARKED AS EXHIBIT "C"
FOR THE PROSECUTION (COMMON EVIDENCE) NOT
FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DUE TO THE GROSS
NEGLIGENCE OF THE FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONER IN THE GREATER INTEREST OF JUSTICE,
ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN SARRAGA, SR. VS. BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK. 12
We deny.
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons
nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter's consent. 13 As defined and penalized, the
elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking
was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the
consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished
without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons
or force, upon things. 14 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an
internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the
offender of the thing subject of asportation. 15 Although proof
as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of
the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain is the usual
motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful
property appertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. 16 As to the concept of "taking" —
The only requirement for a personal property to be
the object of theft under the penal code is that it be
capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of
"asportation," which is defined as "carrying away."
Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft
provision of the penal code does not require asportation
or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner
of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised Penal
Code includes any act intended to transfer possession
which . . . may be committed through the use of the
offenders' own hands, as well as any mechanical device .
. . . 17
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the
taking of the jeep's alternator, starter, battery, and two tires
with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were
installed in the pick-up owned by Lim. 18 With such admission,
the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the
missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the
transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds that Medina
unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind
the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through
the presentation of supporting documentary evidence or
corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the
owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were
exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim
consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts;
and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from
the jeep and their placement to the pick-up. Neither did Medina
adduce any justifying 19 or exempting 20 circumstance to avoid
criminal liability.
On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he
entrusted to Medina the jeep's repair it was still in running
condition and complete with alternator, starter, battery, and
tires, which went missing by the time the vehicle was
recovered from the auto shop. 21 Likewise, the testimony of
Beltran is definite and straightforward. He declared that he
was not able to get the jeep in the morning of September 4,
2002 because its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with
rims could not be found, and that when he asked Medina as to
their whereabouts the latter told him that he took them, placed
the starter in Lim's pick-up while the alternator was in the
repair shop. 22 Medina informed him that the jeep's missing
parts were actually installed to Lim's other vehicle which was
also being repaired at the time. 23However, Beltran did not know
or had not seen other vehicles owned by Lim at Medina's
shop. 24 In the afternoon of the same day, he was able to get
the jeep but not its missing parts. 25 He concluded that they
were lost because he inspected the jeep. 26
Abundo v. Sandiganbayan, 27 which was relied upon by
Medina, does not apply. In said case, the element of lack of
owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent
since the records showed that Abundo made a request in
writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among the
pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A
memorandum receipt was issued and signed. Pursuant thereto,
the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking or
unlawful asportation. The physical and juridical possession of
the junk chassis was transferred to Abundo at his request,
with the consent or acquiescence of the owner, the
Government, represented by the public officials who had legal
and physical possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft
implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there can be no
theft when the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of
the thing. The Court agreed with the observation of the
Solicitor General that a thief does not ask for permission to
steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the consent or
acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious. 28
Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported
acknowledgment receipt 29 that he and Tumamao identified
during their presentation as witnesses for the defense.
According to his testimony, Mendoza came to his (Medina's)
place and saw the subject auto parts while being transferred
from the jeep to the pick-up and that, relative thereto, Medina
even called barangay officials and let them signed a document
to bear witness on the matter. 30 The document, dated July 25,
2002, which was marked as Exhibit "2," was signed by
Mendoza, Jovy Bardiaga (said to be Lim's chief mechanic),
Mario Pascual (said to be Medina's helper), and Rosalina
Bautista and Tumamao (said to be barangay kagawads).
Ostensibly, they signed the document while facing each other
in front of Medina's house. 31
aTHCSE

In Mato v. CA, 32 which referred to People v. Napat-


a, 33 citing People v. Mate, 34 We relaxed the application of
Section 34, Rule 132 35 of the Rules of Court by allowing the
admission of evidence not formally offered. To be admissible,
however, two essential conditions must concur: first, the same
must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the
records of the case. 36
As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was
not considered by the trial court because it was not formally
offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense
testimony that was duly recorded, the receipt itself was not
incorporated in the case records. For its part, the CA opined
that nowhere from the case records does Medina's
acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet, upon examination, it
appears that the July 25, 2002 acknowledgment receipt was
attached as Annex "3" of Medina's Appellant's
Brief. 37 Accordingly, the CA should have mulled over this piece
of document, especially so since the prosecution even prayed,
and was granted, during the trial proper that said receipt be
marked as Exhibit "C." 38
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the
acknowledgment receipt, the same would still not exonerate
Medina. This is due to his admission that Bardiaga, Pascual,
and Bautista did not actually see him remove the alternator,
starter, battery, and tires with rims from the jeep and put the
same to the pick-up. 39Likewise, while Medina asserted that
Mendoza came to his place and was shown that the missing
auto parts were transferred from the jeep to the pick-up, the
latter was not presented as a hostile witness to confirm such
expedient claim.
As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, Medina's mere denials cannot prevail
for being self-serving and uncorroborated. Denial is considered
with suspicion and always received with caution because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, easily fabricated and
concocted.40
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not
prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact. Thus,
courts — both trial and appellate — have generally
viewed the defense of denial in criminal cases with
considerable caution, if not with outright rejection. Such
judicial attitude comes from the recognition that denial
is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an
excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to
make. To be worthy of consideration at all, denial should
be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The
accused cannot solely rely on her negative and self-
serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and
has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 41
Further, Medina did not demonstrate any evidence of ill
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely
testify against him. In the absence of any evidence that the
prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives,
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
shall not be interfered with by this Court. 42
There being no compelling reason to disregard the same,
the Court yields to the factual findings of the trial court, which
were affirmed by the CA. This is in line with the precept that
when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and
binding upon Us. 43 It is only in exceptional circumstances,
such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters, that We will recalibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below. 44 As held in Co Kiat v. Court of
Appeals: 45
It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that
factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and authority (Macua vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 155 SCRA 29) and that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals, is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of
law imputed to it, its findings of facts being conclusive
(Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737).
In a petition for review of decisions of the Court of
Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to
reviewing questions of law, unless the factual findings
are totally bereft of support in the records or are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion (Canete, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA
13).
Except in criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, appeals to the
Supreme Court are not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion and are allowed only on questions of
law and only when there are special and important
reasons, which we do not find in this case ( Balde vs.
Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365). 46
Now on the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial
court:
Under Article 309 of the RPC, an accused found guilty of
simple theft when the value of the stolen property exceeds
P22,000.00 shall be sentenced to:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft
shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but
if the value of the thing stolen exceed the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayoror reclusion temporal, as
the case may be. 47
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into
consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the RPC. 48 As the value of the auto parts stolen
from Lim is in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable is
the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by Article 309,
which is the maximum of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. Since the penalty prescribed is composed of
only two periods, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division
into three equal portions the time included in the penalty,
forming one period of each of the three portions. Thus, the
minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the penalty
prescribed are:
Minimum — 6 years and 1 day to 7 years and 4
months
Medium — 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8
years and 8 months
Maximum — 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day to
10 years
The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. 49 In this case, the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the offense is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, or anywhere from Two (2) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day to Six (6) years.
Thus, the trial court did not err when it sentenced Medina
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) years, Six (6)
months and Twenty-One (21) days ofprision correccional, as
minimum, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum. 50
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is DENIED. The January 7, 2008 Decision and April 21, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29634,
which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela, in
Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting Herman Medina for the
crime of simple theft, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Medina v. People, G.R. No. 182648, [June 17, 2015])

[G.R. No. 176298. January 25, 2012.]

ANITA L. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF


THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J : p

Petitioner Anita L. Miranda appeals the January 11, 2007


Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the
judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
20, convicting her of qualified theft.
Petitioner was charged with qualified theft in an
Information dated November 28, 2002. The Information reads:
That in or about and during the period comprised between
April 28, 1998 and May 2, 2002, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
take, steal and carry away the total amount of P797,187.85
belonging to VIDEO CITY COMMERCIAL, INC. and VIVA
VIDEOCITY, INC. represented by MIGUEL Q. SAMILLANO, in
the following manner, to wit: by making herself the payee
in forty-two pre-signed BPI Family Bank checks in the
account of Video City Commercial and Jefferson Tan (the
latter as franchise[e]) and encashing said checks in the
total amount of P797,187.85, for her personal benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid
amount of P797,187.85, Philippine Currency.
That the said accused acted with grave abuse of
confidence, she being then employed as bookkeeper in the
aforesaid firm and as such was privy to the financial
records and checks belonging to complainant and was
actually entrusted with the said financial records,
documents and checks and their transactions thereof in
behalf of complainant. 3
DICSaH

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial


thereafter ensued.
Summarily, the prosecution proved the following facts:
Video City Commercial, Inc. (VCCI) and Viva Video City, Inc.
(Viva) were sister companies which managed a chain of stores
known as Video City. These stores, some company-owned
while others were operated in joint ventures with franchisees,
were engaged in the sale and rental of video-related
merchandises. During the period of April 28, 1998 to May 2,
2002, petitioner was the accounting clerk and bookkeeper of
VCCI and Viva. One of her duties was to disburse checks for
the accounts she handled. She was assigned to handle twelve
(12) Video City store franchise accounts, including those of
Tommy Uy, Wilma Cheng, Jefferson Tan and Sharon Cuneta. As
regards the franchisee Jefferson Tan, who was out of the
country most of the time, Tan pre-signed checks to cover the
store's disbursements and entrusted them to petitioner. The
pre-signed checks by Jefferson Tan were from a current
account maintained jointly by VCCI and Jefferson Tan at BPI
Family Bank, Sta. Mesa. There was also an existing agreement
with the bank that any disbursement not exceeding P20,000.00
would require only Tan's signature. 4
Taking advantage of Tan's constant absence from the
country, petitioner was able to use Tan's joint-venture bank
account with VCCI as a clearing house for her unauthorized
transfer of funds. Petitioner deposited VCCI checks coming
from other franchisees' accounts into the said bank account,
and withdrew the funds by writing checks to her name using
the checks pre-signed by Tan. It was only after petitioner went
on maternity leave and her subsequent resignation from the
company in May 2002 that an audit was conducted since she
refused to turn over all the financial records in her possession.
The audit was made on all the accounts handled by petitioner
and it was discovered that she made unauthorized withdrawals
and fund transfers amounting to P4,877,759.60. 5
The prosecution, in proving that petitioner had unlawfully
withdrawn P797,187.85 for her own benefit, presented as its
witness Jose Laureola, the assistant manager/acting cashier
of BPI Family Bank, Sta. Mesa Branch. Laureola presented a
microfilm of the checks, the encashed checks and deposit
slips. He also presented the bank statement of VCCI which
showed the encashment of forty-two (42) checks from the
account of VCCI and Jefferson Tan amounting to P797,187.85.6
In the face of the prosecution's evidence, petitioner
chose not to present any evidence during trial.
On October 7, 2005, the RTC found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft. The RTC sentenced
her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years, two (2) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to pay VCCI P797,187.85 plus
costs. 7
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish
that the checks deposited to the joint account of VCCI and
Jefferson Tan at BPI Family Bank were unlawfully withdrawn
by the petitioner without VCCI's consent. Petitioner took
advantage of her position with VCCI and her access to the
checks and its bank accounts. SDHacT

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The


CA held that contrary to petitioner's claim that the prosecution
failed to show who was the absolute owner of the thing stolen,
there was no doubt that the personal property taken by
petitioner does not belong to her but to Jefferson Tan and his
joint venture partner VCCI. Thus, petitioner was able to gain
from taking other people's property without their consent.
More, she was able to perpetrate the crime due to her position
in VCCI which gave her access to the joint venture account of
VCCI and Jefferson Tan, both of whom reposed trust and
confidence in her. She exploited said trust and confidence to
their damage in the amount of P797,187.85.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari before this Court, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED
THEFT.
1-a. WHETHER THE PHRASE ". . . SHALL TAKE THE
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF ANOTHER WITHOUT THE
LATTER'S CONSENT . . ." IN ARTICLE 308 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 310 OF THE SAME CODE WOULD REQUIRE
AS AN ELEMENT OF "QUALIFIED THEFT" AN
ESTABLISHED PROOF OF "OWNERSHIP" OF THE
PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN?
1-b. WHETHER IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE DUE
EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE ALLEGED
SIGNATURES OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CHECKS BE
FULLY ESTABLISHED AND IDENTIFIED AND IF NOT
SO ESTABLISHED AND IDENTIFIED, THE SAME
WOULD BE A FATAL FLAW IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION WHICH INEVITABLY WOULD LEAD TO
ACCUSED'S ACQUITTAL?
1-c. WHETHER THE FAILURE TO ESTABLISH AND
AUTHENTICATE OR IDENTIFY THE SIGNATURES OF
THE ACCUSED ANNIE MIRANDA AND JEFFERSON
TAN CONSTITUTED A FATAL FLAW IN PROVING THAT
THE ACCUSED AND JEFFERSON TAN WERE THE
AUTHORS OF SAID SIGNATURES?
1-d. [WHETHER THE] CONCLUSION OF FACTS BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
1-e. WHETHER THE CHECKS AND VOUCHERS
PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE NOT IN THEIR ORIGINALS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED ADMISSION BY THE
COURT A QUO, THERE BEING NO SUFFICIENT FACTS
ADDUCED TO JUSTIFY THE PRESENTATION OF
XEROX COPIES OR SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 8
Essentially, the issue for our resolution is whether the CA
correctly affirmed petitioner's conviction for qualified theft.
aCTHEA

Petitioner insists that she should not have been convicted


of qualified theft as the prosecution failed to prove the private
complainant's absolute ownership of the thing stolen. Further,
she maintains that Jefferson Tan's signatures on the checks
were not identified by any witness who is familiar with his
signature. She likewise stresses that the checks and vouchers
presented by the prosecution were not original copies and that
no secondary evidence was presented in lieu of the former.
The appeal lacks merit.
A careful review of the records of this case and the
parties' submissions leads the Court to conclude that there
exists no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the CA. We
note that the arguments raised by petitioner in her petition are
a mere rehash of her arguments raised before, and correctly
resolved by, the CA.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in
Article 308 9 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that
there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. 10 Theft becomes qualified when any of the
following circumstances under Article 310 11 is present: (1) the
theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is
committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property
stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4)
the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken
from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. 12
Here, the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the amount of P797,187.85 taken does
not belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that petitioner took it
without VCCI's consent and with grave abuse of confidence by
taking advantage of her position as accountant and
bookkeeper. The prosecution's evidence proved that petitioner
was entrusted with checks payable to VCCI or Viva by virtue of
her position as accountant and bookkeeper. She deposited the
said checks to the joint account maintained by VCCI and
Jefferson Tan, then withdrew a total of P797,187.85 from said
joint account using the pre-signed checks, with her as the
payee. In other words, the bank account was merely the
instrument through which petitioner stole from her employer
VCCI.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the above findings of
the trial court which were affirmed by the CA and fully
supported by the evidence on record. Time and again, the
Court has held that the facts found by the trial court, as
affirmed in toto by the CA, are as a general rule, conclusive
upon this Court 13 in the absence of any showing of grave abuse
of discretion. In this case, none of the exceptions to the
general rule on conclusiveness of said findings of facts are
applicable. 14 The Court gives weight and respect to the trial
court's findings in criminal prosecution because the latter is in
a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses in person and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. 15 Absent any showing that
the lower courts overlooked substantial facts and
circumstances, which if considered, would change the result
of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court's
appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses. CaESTA

Moreover, we agree with the CA when it gave short shrift


to petitioner's argument that full ownership of the thing stolen
needed to be established first before she could be convicted of
qualified theft. As correctly held by the CA, the subject of the
crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another.
Hence, as long as the property taken does not belong to the
accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial
whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere
possessor, or even a thief of the property. 16 In any event, as
stated above, the factual findings of the courts a quo as to the
ownership of the amount petitioner stole is conclusive upon
this Court, the finding being adequately supported by the
evidence on record.
However, notwithstanding the correctness of the finding
of petitioner's guilt, a modification is called for as regards the
imposable penalty. On the imposition of the correct
penalty, People v. Mercado 17 is instructive. Pursuant to said
case, in the determination of the penalty for qualified theft,
note is taken of the value of the property stolen, which is
P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00,
the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods to be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be
added to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is
deducted from P797,187.85, which yields a remainder of
P775,187.85. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00,
disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The end result
is that 77 years should be added to the basic penalty. However,
the total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed
20 years. Thus, had petitioner committed simple theft, the
penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the
penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the trial court,
as well as the appellate court, should have imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the January 11, 2007 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29858 affirming the conviction of
petitioner Anita L. Miranda for the crime of qualified theft
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is
increased to reclusion perpetua.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(Miranda v. People, G.R. No. 176298, [January 25, 2012], 680
|||

PHIL 126-137)

[G.R. No. 200308. February 23, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


MERA "JOY" ELEUTERIO NIELLES, @ MERA NIELLES
DELOS REYES, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles @ Mera Nielles Delos Reyes


was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft in an Information
that reads as follows:
That on or about and sometime in July, 2004 in the City of
Makati, Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the cashier of complainant Juanita J. Flores and as
such enjoying the trust and confidence reposed upon her
by the said complainant, with intent to gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, with
grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away
collected money in the total amount of P640,353.86 to the
damage and prejudice of the complainant, in the
aforementioned amount of P640,353.86. EHcaDT

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
In an Order 2 dated January 18, 2005, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132, ordered appellant's release
from confinement after having posted a bond in the amount
P100,000.00 undertaken by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance
Company, Inc. under Bond No. 8385. Appellant was thereafter
arraigned where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. 3 Trial on
the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that private complainant Juanita
Flores (Flores) was engaged in the business of guaranteeing
purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and
disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration.
Appellant initially worked as Flores' househelp but was
eventually hired to work at Flores' office performing clerical jobs
like sorting invoices. When Flores' business grew, appellant was
assigned to bill and collect from sub-guarantors, and to encash
and deposit checks. On July 15, 2004, appellant collected
P640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. However, appellant did not
remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in her (Flores') account.
Instead, she issued 15 personal checks totaling P640,353.86 and
deposited them to Flores' account. All the checks were
dishonored upon presentment due to "account closed." Appellant
thereafter absconded.
For her part, appellant denied having stolen the amount of
P640,353.86.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
In a Judgment 4 dated March 26, 2008, the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 132, found appellant guilty of the crime of qualified theft,
thus:
Given the foregoing, accused Nielles took P640,353.86
belonging to private complainant Juanita J. Flores,
without the latter's consent. The taking was done with
intent to gain because when the accused's checks
bounced, she failed to remit or return the amount. The
accused's act was accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, but rather by the use of abuse of confidence
reposed [by] private complainant [upon] her. Thus, the
elements of theft, as well as the circumstances that made
the same as qualified theft, are present in the instant
case. AHDacC

Accused Nielles, on the other hand, denied having stolen


and carried away P640,353.86. Aside from her bare denial,
she did not present any evidence to support this claim. In
fact, she did not deny that the checks were issued and
deposited by her. Furthermore, she did not provide any
reason or motive why Juanita would file the present case
against her. Accordingly, her denial has no basis and
deserves no consideration. 5
The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Mera "Joy"
Eleuterio Nielles a.k.a. Mera Nielles Delos Reyes, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft
and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) years of prision correccional, as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. She is ordered to pay private complainant
Juanita J. Flores P640,353.86 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED. 6

Aggrieved, appellant filed a notice of appeal. At the same time,


she submitted a Renewal Certificate 7 of her bond effective for
the period January 18, 2008 to January 18, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In her Brief, appellant asserted that since private complainant
Flores was abroad on July 15, 2004, she could not have
personally known whether appellant indeed collected amounts
from the sub-guarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the
15 checks is not proof that she received/collected payments from
the sub-guarantors or that she failed to remit the monies
belonging to Flores. She insisted that the prosecution failed to
establish that she indeed collected monies from the sub-
guarantors amounting to P640,353.86. Appellant also theorized
that she might have issued the checks in favor of the sub-
guarantors for whatever transactions they have between them;
and that thereafter, when she went to these sub-guarantors to
collect their dues for private complainant, these sub-guarantors
used the same checks she previously issued as their payment for
private complainant. For that reason her personal checks were
deposited in private complainant's account. aEDCAH

The CA, however, in its Decision 8 dated May 26, 2011, was not
impressed by appellant's protestations. It held that the fact that
Flores was out of the country during the commission of the
offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has satisfactorily
established that upon her arrival in the Philippines, she
immediately investigated the matter and talked to the sub-
guarantors. Flores also confirmed that indeed appellant issued 15
personal checks in lieu of the amounts collected and deposited
the same to Flores' account but were all dishonored upon
presentment. Significantly, the CA noted that aside from her bare
denial, appellant did not present any evidence to support her
claim that she did not steal the amount of P640,353.86 from
Flores. In fine, the CA found all the elements for the crime of
qualified theft to be present.
Thus, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial
court, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is
hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed 26 March 2008
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
132 in Criminal Case No. 04-3643 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. She is further
ordered to pay Private Complainant the amount of
P640,353.86.
SO ORDERED. 9 SDHCac

Hence, this appeal. In a Resolution 10 dated April 18, 2012, we


required both parties to file their Supplemental Briefs. The Office
of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing its
supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant maintains in her
Supplemental Brief 11 that the prosecution failed to establish that
she unlawfully took the amount of P640,353.86 belonging to
Flores. She claims that mere issuance of the checks does not
prove unlawful taking of the unaccounted amount. She insists
that, at most, the issuance of the checks proves that the same
was issued for consideration. On February 5, 2013, appellant
furnished this Court her bond renewal certificate 12 issued by Far
Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. effective for the period
January 18, 2013 to January 18, 2014.
Our Ruling
We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the prosecution satisfactorily established all the
elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal property;
2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking
was done with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the
owner's consent; 5) that it was accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things;
and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of confidence. 13As
correctly found by the appellate court: aEHASI

Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took


the amount of P640,353.86 from her without her consent
by failing to turn over the amount she collected from the
former's sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15)
personal checks and deposited the same to Private
Complainant's account which however, all bounced for the
reason "account closed". The taking of the amount
collected by Accused-appellant was obviously done with
intent to gain as she failed to remit the same to Private
Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of
unlawful taking. Further, the unlawful act was
accomplished by Accused-appellant without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, [or] of force upon
things as the payment to her of the said amount was
voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she
was known to be entrusted with the collection of
payments.
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made
the same as qualified theft was also proven. Accused-
appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions
and responsibilities include billings and collections from
their agents and making of deposits and withdrawals in
behalf of Private Complainant. Moreover, when the
payment for the purchase orders or gift checks becomes
due, she would fill up the four (4) blank checks given by
the sub-guarantor with the knowledge and consent of
Private Complainant. It is beyond doubt that an employee
like a cashier who comes into possession of the monies
she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her
employer, as in the instant case. 14
We are one with the trial court and the appellate court in finding
that the element of taking of personal property was satisfactorily
established by the prosecution. During her cross-examination,
private complainant Flores testified that upon having been
apprised of the unremitted collections, she conducted an
investigation and inquired from her sub-guarantors who admitted
making payments to appellant. 15 She also testified during cross-
examination that when appellant arrived from Hongkong, the
latter went to Flores' office and admitted to having converted the
collections to her personal use. 16 Interestingly, when it was her
turn to testify, appellant did not rebut Flores' testimony. During
her direct examination, appellant only testified thus: CDScaT

Atty. Regino — Question:


Madam Witness, you are being charged here with taking,
stealing and carrying away collected money in the
total amount of P640,353.86, that is owned by
Juanita J. Flores. What can you say about this
allegation?
Witness:
That is not true, sir.
Atty. Regino — Question:
What is your basis in stating that?
Witness:
I never took that six hundred forty thousand that they are
saying and, I never signed any document with the
sub-guarantors that I [took] money from them. 17
Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that
she talked to the sub-guarantors who admitted having made
payments to appellant, the latter's counsel no longer made
further clarifications or follow-up questions. Thus, Flores'
testimony on this fact remains on record unrebutted. Clearly, it is
futile on the part of the appellant to belatedly claim in her Brief
before the appellate court that the prosecution should have
presented these sub-guarantors so they could be cross-
examined. 18 There is likewise no merit in her contention that the
prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence when they did
not present these sub-guarantors 19simply because the defense,
on its own initiative, could very well compel, thru the compulsory
processes of the court, the attendance of these sub-guarantors
as witnesses. 20 Moreover, we note that appellant did not even
attempt to discredit the testimony of Flores to the effect that
upon her arrival from Hongkong, appellant went to Flores' office
and admitted to having committed the offense. HDATSI

Significantly, when appellant was placed on the witness stand,


she did not even make any attempt to explain her issuance of the
15 checks. In fact, during her entire testimony, she never made
any mention about the personal checks that she issued and
deposited in Flores' account. It was only in her
Memorandum 21 filed with the trial court and her Brief 22 submitted
to the appellate court that the same was discussed. However, her
explanation as to its issuance is so convoluted that it defies
belief. All that appellant could claim is that the issuance of the
checks only proves that the same was for a consideration — but
omitted to explain what the consideration was. She also
theorized that she might have issued the checks to the sub-
guarantors for her personal transactions but likewise failed to
elaborate on what these transactions were. In any event, if
indeed appellant did not steal the amount of P640,353.86
belonging to Flores, how come she issued 15 personal checks in
favor of the latter and deposited the same in her account, albeit
they were subsequently dishonored? Besides, we note that in
appellant's Counter Affidavit 23 dated August 20, 2004 subscribed
before 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Hannibal S. Santillan of
Makati City, she already admitted having taken without the
knowledge and consent of private complainant several purchase
orders and gift checks worth thousands of pesos. She claimed
though that she was only forced to do so by Edna Cruz and
cohorts.
We also concur with the findings of the trial court and the CA
that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
the amount of P640,353.86 actually belonged to Flores; that
appellant stole the amount with intent to gain and without Flores'
consent; that the taking was accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things;
and that it was committed with grave abuse of confidence.
Anent the penalty imposed, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code state:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:CIAHaT

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium


periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if
the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding articles,
if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion
of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.HCITAS

Based on the foregoing, since the amount taken is P640,353.86,


then the imposable penalty shall be the maximum period
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, adding
one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00. Thus, from
P640,353.86, we deduct P22,000.00, giving us a balance of
P618,353.86 which we divide by P10,000.00. We now have sixty-
one (61) years which we will add to the basic penalty of eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
However, as stated in Article 309, the imposable penalty for
simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty (20) years. Thus,
if appellant had committed only simple theft, her penalty would
be twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Considering however
that in qualified theft, the penalty is two degrees higher, then the
appellate court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. 24
Finally, we note that appellant has not yet been committed to
prison. In view thereof and based on our foregoing discussion,
appellant must be ordered arrested and committed to prison to
start serving her sentence.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed May 26, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31635 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 132 isDIRECTED to issue a warrant
for the arrest of appellant and to order her commitment at the
Correctional Institution for Women, and to submit to this Court a
Report of such commitment, all within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Resolution. The Superintendent, Correctional Institution
for Women is DIRECTED to confirm to this Court the confinement
of appellant within ten (10) days therefrom. DHITcS

SO ORDERED.
(People v. Nielles, G.R. No. 200308 (Resolution), [February 23,
|||

2015])

[G.R. No. 170863. March 20, 2013.]

ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE


OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J :
p

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by


petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta, challenging the June 27,
2005 decision 2 and the November 24, 2005 resolution 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369. The CA decision
affirmed the January 12, 2004 decision 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 20109-
R, convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft. The CA
resolution denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the
petitioner, together with Concordio O. Loyao, Jr., with the crime
of qualified theft, committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of October, 2001, in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the]
Honorable Court, . . . accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA,
being then the Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building
Construction, a project being undertaken then by the
Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A.
Mojica Construction and General Services, with the duty
to manage and implement the fabrication and erection of
the structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building
including the receipt, audit and checking of all
construction materials delivered at the job site — a
position of full trust and confidence, and CONCORDIO O.
LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN", a telescopic crane operator of
ANMAR, Inc., conspiring, confederating, and mutually
aiding one another, with grave abuse of confidence and
with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the Porta
Vaga project site along Session road, Baguio City, wide
flange steel beams of different sizes with a total value of
P2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and consent of the
owner ANMAR, Inc., represented by its General Manager
LORNA LEVA MARIGONDON, to the damage and prejudice
of ANMAR, Inc., in the aforementioned sum of
P2,269,731.69, Philippine Currency. 5
Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of
"not guilty." 6 Loyao remains at-large.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral
testimonies of Danilo Bernardo, Edgardo Cano, Roberto Buen,
Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr. Lorna Marigondon, and
Apolinaria de Jesus, 7 as well as documentary evidence
consisting of a security logbook entry, delivery receipts,
photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits. The prosecution's
pieces of evidence, taken together, established the facts recited
below.
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General
Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga building
construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted
the fabrication and erection of the building's structural and steel
framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon family. Anmar
ordered its construction materials from Linton Commercial in
Pasig City. It hired Junio Trucking to deliver the construction
materials to its project site in Baguio City. It assigned the
petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties,
including the receiving, custody, and checking of all building
construction materials. 8AHcDEI

On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed


Bernardo, Junio Trucking's truck driver, and about 10 Anmar
welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10 to 15
pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar's
alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway, Baguio City.
Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again instructed
Bernardo and several welders, including Cano and Buen, to
unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide
flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini
Street, Baguio City. 9
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS' project
manager, informed Engr. Marigondon that several wide flange
steel beams had been returned to Anmar's warehouse on October
12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard's logbook.
Engr. Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the return,
but the latter simply denied that the reported return took place.
Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to
conduct an inventory of the construction materials at the project
site. Marcelo learned from Cano that several wide flange steel
beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway. There, Marcelo
found and took pictures of some of the missing steel beams. He
reported the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters and
contacted Anmar to send a truck to retrieve the steel beams, but
the truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could
no longer be found. The stolen steel beams amounted to
P2,269,731.69. 10
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge
against him. He claimed that AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him,
and his plan to build his own company had been Engr.
Marigondon's motive in falsely accusing him of stealing
construction materials. 11
The RTC's Ruling
In its January 12, 2004 decision, 12 the RTC convicted the
petitioner of qualified theft. It gave credence to the prosecution
witnesses' straightforward and consistent testimonies and
rejected the petitioner's bare denial. It sentenced the petitioner
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and 3
months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, to indemnify
Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001
until full payment, and to pay Engr. Marigondon P100,000.00 as
moral damages. cHSIAC

The CA's Ruling


On appeal, the petitioner assailed the inconsistencies in the
prosecution witnesses' statements, and reiterated his status as
an AMCGS employee. 13
In its June 27, 2005 decision, 14 the CA brushed aside the
petitioner's arguments and affirmed the RTC's decision
convicting the petitioner of qualified theft. It found that the
prosecution witnesses' testimonies deserve full credence in the
absence of any improper motive to testify falsely against the
petitioner. It noted that the petitioner admitted his status as
Anmar's employee and his receipt of salary from Anmar, not
AMCGS. It rejected the petitioner's defense of denial for being
self-serving. It, however, deleted the award of moral damages to
Engr. Marigondon for lack of justification.
When the CA denied 15 the motion for reconsideration 16 that
followed, the petitioner filed the present Rule 45 petition.
The Petition
The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him
for acts committed "sometime in the month of October, 2001," he
was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e.,
November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. He further argues that the prosecution failed to establish
the fact of the loss of the steel beams since the corpus
delicti was never identified and offered in evidence.
The Case for the Respondent
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, counters that the issues raised by the
petitioner in the petition pertain to the correctness of the
calibration of the evidence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
which are issues of fact, not of law, and beyond the ambit of a
Rule 45 petition. In any case, the respondent contends that the
evidence on record indubitably shows the petitioner's liability for
qualified theft.
cDCSET

The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a
reversible error in affirming the RTC's decision convicting the
petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the
commission of the crime
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays
down the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of a complaint
or information, provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person,
all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the
commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise date the offense was committed except when it is
a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the
complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be
proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the
proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within
the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action. DIEAHc

In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge
of qualified theft since the information stated the approximate
date of the commission of the offense through the
words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner
could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with
which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the
information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he
needed to know about the charge to enable him to prepare his
defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise
date when the offense was committed, as to be inclusive of the
month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material
element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft
could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. 17 Clearly, the
month of November is the month right after October.
The crime of qualified theft was
committed with grave abuse of discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in
relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to
gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of
the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e.,
with grave abuse of confidence. 18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution's
evidence proved, through the prosecution's eyewitnesses, that
upon the petitioner's instruction, several pieces of wide flange
steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once
in November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street,
Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took
construction materials from the project site, without the
authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the
construction materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission
of the crime
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because
the alleged stolen beams or corpus delicti had not been
established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged
stolen beams in court was fatal to the prosecution's cause.cTCADI

The petitioner's argument fails to persuade us.


"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal
sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered" or,
in this case, to the stolen steel beams. "Since the corpus
delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has
ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if
credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence." 19 "[I]n theft, corpus delicti has two
elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner,
and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking." 20
In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record
fully established the corpus delicti. The positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, particularly Bernardo, Cano and Buen,
stating that the petitioner directed them to unload the steel
beams along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street on the pretext of
a new Anmar project, were crucial to the petitioner's conviction.
The security logbook entry, delivery receipts and photographs
proved the existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a
different location other than the project site.
Proper Penalty
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and three
months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, and to indemnify
Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001
until full payment. Apparently, the RTC erred in failing to specify
the appropriate name of the penalty imposed on the petitioner.
We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ
the proper legal terminology in the imposition of penalties
because of the substantial difference in their corresponding legal
effects and accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the
penalty must be specified as under the scheme of penalties in
the RPC, the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific
duration and corresponding accessory penalties. 21 Thus, the
courts must employ the proper nomenclature specified in
the RPC, such as "reclusion perpetua" not "life imprisonment," or
"ten days of arresto menor" not "ten days of imprisonment." In
qualified theft, the appropriate penalty is reclusion
perpetua based on Article 310 of the RPC which provides that
"[t]he crime of [qualified] theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in
[Article 309]." 22cSTCDA

To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen


steel beams, which is P2,269,731.69. Based on Article 309 of
the RPC, since the value of the items exceeds P22,000.00, the
basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, to be imposed in the maximum period, which is eight
years, eight months and one day to 10 years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct
P22,000.00 from P2,269,731.69, which gives us P2,247,731.69.
This resulting figure should then be divided by P10,000.00,
disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. We now have 224
years that should be added to the basic penalty. However, the
imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of 20
years. Therefore, had petitioner committed simple theft, the
penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty
for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the correct imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with
the corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The June 27, 2005
decision and the November 24, 2005 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369
areAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Anthony V.
Zapanta is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, [March 20, 2013], 707 PHIL
|||

23-34)

[G.R. No. 97471. February 17, 1993.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-


appellee, vs. ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias
"Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias
"Enry,"accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.


Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE AND INTENT; INVALUABLE AIDS IN
DETERMINING THE LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. — It is worth
recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held
liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of
variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the
modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are
invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate
conclusion thereon.
2. ID.; KIDNAPPING; INTENT TO DEPRIVE THE OFFENDED PARTY
OF HER LIBERTY; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case
at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any
motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the
wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other
esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his
need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along
the way 'Mam (sic) Corina was telling me 'Beloy, I know your
family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why
are you doing this?' I told her 'Mam (sic), because I need money
and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances
from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic) . . . ."
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the
charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the
proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to
exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of
the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty, and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was
merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United
States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has
been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the
victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time
but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds
the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses
they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation
of the victims liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious
illegal detention. That appellants in this case had no intention
whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal
liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional
testimony of appellant Puno.
3. ID.; ID.; "RANSOM"; DEFINED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. —
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as
equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the
immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant
personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price
or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. It can
hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash
and checks demanded from her at gunpoint, what she gave under
the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnappings. These were merely
amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the
occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by
appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed
is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however,
reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the
highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential
Decree No. 532.
4. ID.; "HIGHWAY ROBBERY" (P.D. NO. 532); MODIFIES ARTS. 306
AND 307 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; CONSTRUED.
— Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is
evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which
treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the
alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as
"highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our
previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that
highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. Presidential Decree No 532 did introduce
amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code
by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the
offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and
without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed.
Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least
four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the
presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they
use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But,
and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under
the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are
directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived
victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on
the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same
as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential
Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its
aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under
the old Brigandage Law. Erroneous advertence is nevertheless
made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said
amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway.
Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the
absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily
puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of
that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal
interpretation that any unlawful taking of properly committed on
our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule
of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law
should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may
appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he
who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin
deep into its meaning, and the fundamental rule that criminal
justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of
doubt.
5. ID.; ID.; BRIGANDAGE AND ROBBERY, DISTINGUISHED. — The
following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery
are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of
continuing validity: "The main object of the Brigandage Law is to
prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the
offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three
armed persons for the purpose indicated in art 306. Such
formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It
would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a
member or members of the band actually committed robbery or
kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The
crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band
are shown to be such as are contemplated by art. 306. On the
other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members
were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing
robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage,
but only robbery . Simply because robbery was committed by a
band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it
was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art.
306, it is required that the band 'sala a los campos para
dedicarse a robar.'" In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter
alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants. The martial law
legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No.
532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been
unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the
same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion
is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction,
since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances
under which the decree to be construed originated.
Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and
strongest in the law. Further, that Presidential Decree No.
532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and
not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single
act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused
as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the
"innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another," and which single act of depredation would be
capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the
people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries,"
and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people," such
that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CONVICTION; NO
PROCEDURAL OBSTACLE THEREON WHEN THE ELEMENTS OF
THE OFFENSE PROVED IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE
OFFENSE CHARGED; CASE AT BAR. — We further hold that there
is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the
crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with
kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been
proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which
they are charged. For the former offense, it is sufficient that the
elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof
shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain
(animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information
where it is charged that there was unlawful taking
(apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things
subject of the robbery. These foregoing elements are necessarily
included in the information filed against appellants which, as
formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such
allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary
implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's
money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was
unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot
be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom
does not include but could negate the presence of any of the
elements of robbery through intimidation of persons.
DECISION

REGALADO, J : p

The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-


appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by
the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense
of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-
57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for
ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:
"That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private
individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one
MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC ** for the
purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice
of the said offended party in such amount as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code." 1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2 appellants went to trial
which ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on
September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree
No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY
as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a
highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both
sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.LLphil
"The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and
severally the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M.
Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and
P3,000.00 as temperate damages." 3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a
quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No.
532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein;
(2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
since the charge under said presidential decree is not the
offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. 4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval
the following counter-statement of facts in the People's
brief 5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo,
documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of
the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial
divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
"This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly
done on January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8,
1990, p. 7).
"Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in
Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and
Pastries She has a driver of her own just as her husband
does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
"At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the
accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at
the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her driver Fred
had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad
befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his
place (Id., pp. 8-9).
"Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig
came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her
husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car
turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped.
A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car
beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
"Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of
the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was
seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
"Isabelo, who had earlier told her that Enrique is his
nephew announced, 'ma'm, you know, I want to get money
from you.' She said she has money inside her bag and they
may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained
P7,000 00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
"Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00
more Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they
drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where
the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area.
Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed
Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft
bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA
and threatened her (Id., p. 15).
cdrep

"The car sped off north towards the North superhighway.


There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to
issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She
drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30
thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her
to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
"Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later,
he changed his mind and turned the car again towards
Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of
the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she
was finally able to flag down a fish vendor's van. Her dress
had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell
down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out
of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
"On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter
to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
"Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was
arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check
at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)" 6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute
said narrative of complainant, except that, according to appellant
Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed
complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down
as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a
ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe
while running across the highway. 7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedes Benz
car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a
barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant
and divided their loot. 8 Much later, when he took the stand at the
trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by
explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication
of his ulcers. 9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this
opinion, three theories have been advanced as to what crime was
committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the
submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping
for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law
that in the determination of the crime for which the accused
should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of
the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with
regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his
motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of
are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and
accurate conclusion thereon. LibLex

Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be


relevant or essential to determine the specific nature of the
crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the
furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the
former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for
committing the murder independent of his membership in the
rebellious movement in which case rebellion and murder would
constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were
inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual
performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender
assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the
previous performance of official duties by the person in authority,
the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be
physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that
appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the
extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without
any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant
Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his
predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony,
"(w)hile we were along the way `Mam (sic) Corina was telling me
'Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not
(a) bad person, why are you doing this?' I told her `Mam (sic),
because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been
getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give
me any bale (sic) . . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the
charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the
proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to
exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of
the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action
was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United
States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it
has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of
the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of
time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them,
holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other
offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental
deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute kidnapping
or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to
kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is
clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of
appellant Puno:
"Q — At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the
bag containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A — Santo Domingo Exit.
Q — And how about the checks, where were you already
when the checks was (sic) being handed to you?
A — Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the
checks.
Q — If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it
that you still did not allow her to stay at Sto.
Domingo, after all you already received the money
and the checks?
A — Because we had an agreement with her that when she
signed the checks we will take her to her house at
Villa (sic) Verde.
Q — And why did you not bring her back to her house at
Valle Verde when she is (sic) already given you the
checks?
A — Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came
to my mind that if we reach Balintawak or some
other place along the way we might be apprehended
by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I
told her `Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow
you to get out of the car.'" 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as
equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the
immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant
personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price
or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It
can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the
cash and checks demanded from her at gunpoint, what she gave
under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was
in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnappings. These were
merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the
occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by
appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed
is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however,
reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the
highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential
Decree No. 532. LexLib

The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:


The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also
clear from the allegation in the information that the victim
was carried away and extorted for more money. The
accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from
Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They
likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma.
Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at
the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more
cash, drew out three checks. . . .
"In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that
the crimes committed is that punishable under P.D. 53Z
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under
which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by
extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua." 18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant
to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No.
532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 267 which are inconsistent with it." 19 Such
opinion and complementary submission consequently
necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and
the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not
aware that any definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential
Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of
Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact
that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway
robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and
synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling,
and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers
(ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage
(bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon in the
proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands,
also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of
ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during
the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving
bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such
moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and
robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and
are of continuing validity:
"The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the
formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense
consists in the formation of a band by more than three
armed persons for the purpose indicated in art 306. Such
formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306.
It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under
it, that a member or members of the band actually
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose
attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the
organization and purpose of the band are shown to be
such as are contemplated by art. 306. On the other hand,
if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were
not primarily organized for the purpose of committing
robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage, but only robbery . Simply because robbery was
committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it
would not follow that it was committed by a band of
brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that
the band 'sala a los campos para dedicarse a
robar.'" 22 (Emphasis ours.)
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate
highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the
crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four
armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that
distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there
being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed
by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one
drawn from the time when and the circumstances under which
the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on
Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is
evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
"WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal
that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent
and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and
tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and
social progress of the people;
"WHEREAS, such acts or depredations constitute . . .
highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries;
"WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations
by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end
in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the
people;" (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery
against a particular person chosen by the accused as their
specific victim could be considered as committed on the
"innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another," and which single act of depredation would be
capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the
people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries,"
and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people," such
that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous. prcd

True, Presidential Decree No 532 did introduce amendments to


Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated
therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice
to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the
decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons
forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that
said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no
longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly
underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime
of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only
against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against
any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and
whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of
brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in
the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in
the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to
the fact that the crime of robbery committed by appellants
should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it
was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been
stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which
thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview
and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd
to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of
properly committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It
is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or
intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof.
Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument
goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule
that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability
in case of doubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a


highway would be the determinant for the application
of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be far-fetched to
expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our
substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio
ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the
aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the
desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid
absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary
or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gunpoint by the
accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the
location of the vehicle at` the time of the unlawful taking
necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential
Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the
scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful
asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded
along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set
upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No.
532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental
fact that the robbery in the present case was committed inside a
car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating
on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section
2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that
particular provision precisely defines "highway
robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the
single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in
this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage. prcd

Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is


simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under
Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy
as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of
thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their
respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of
craft 29shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of
abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant
Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them.
At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a
firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as
decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the
conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an
information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the
former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in
the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former
offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with
intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of the
owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the
case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be
alleged in an information where it is charged that there was
unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the
offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the
information filed against appellants which, as formulated, allege
that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and
extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not
expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly
convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks
(inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to
gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that
such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but
could negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery
through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby
SET ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-
appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno
of robbery as punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation
to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each
of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to jointly and severally pay
the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts
of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages, with costs. LexLib

SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Puno y Guevarra, G.R. No. 97471, [February 17, 1993])

[G.R. No. 199208. July 30, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. TRINIDAD


A. CAHILIG, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J : p

The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01381 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 137, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207
finding her guilty of thirty (30) counts of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December
1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI. 1
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig
made withdrawals from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated
the same for her personal benefit. 2Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president
and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of
WPESLAI's bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other
bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check
payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This
procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to
another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However,
Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it
appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made
into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to
simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital
contribution. 3
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of qualified
theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI'S funds a total of P6,268,300.00, broken
down into the following amounts:

Criminal Case No. 03- P200,000.0


2178 0
Criminal Case No. 03- P250,000.0
2179 0
Criminal Case No. 03- P200,000.0
2180 0
Criminal Case No. 03-
P55,000.00
2181
Criminal Case No. 03-
P55,000.00
2182
Criminal Case No. 03-
P85,000.00
2183
Criminal Case No. 03- P350,000.0
2184 0
Criminal Case No. 03- P250,000.0
2185 0
Criminal Case No. 03-
P20,000.00
2186
Criminal Case No. 03- P250,000.0
2187 0
Criminal Case No. 03-
P60,000.00
2188
Criminal Case No. 03- P150,000.0
2189 0
Criminal Case No. 03-
P50,000.00
2190
Criminal Case No. 03-
P46,300.00
2191
Criminal Case No. 03- P205,000.0
2192 0
Criminal Case No. 03- P200,000.0
2193 0
Criminal Case No. 03-
P25,000.00
2194
Criminal Case No. 03- P500,000.0
2195 0
Criminal Case No. 03- P500,000.0
2196 0
Criminal Case No. 03-
P30,000.00
2197
Criminal Case No. 03- P400,000.0
2198 0
Criminal Case No. 03- P300,000.0
2199 0
Criminal Case No. 03- P500,000.0
2200 0
Criminal Case No. 03-
P65,000.00
2201
Criminal Case No. 03-
P47,000.00
2202
Criminal Case No. 03- P500,000.0
2203 0
Criminal Case No. 03- P40,000.00
2204
Criminal Case No. 03- P400,000.0
2205 0
Criminal Case No. 03-
P35,000.00
2206
Criminal Case No. 03- P500,000.0
2207 0

All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon


agreement of the parties, only three of the 30 cases went thru
trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a written
stipulation of facts, on the basis of which these were submitted
for resolution. The stipulation stated, among others:
That for purposes of efficient and speedy administration
of these cases, the parties herein agreed, during the pre-
trial conference and approved by the Honorable Court,
that the actual trial and presentation of evidence will be
done only on the first three (3) counts of the cases, i.e.,
on Cases Numbers 03-2178 to 03-2180, with the
understanding and agreement that after the termination
of the hearing on said three (3) cases, the parties shall
adopt the results thereof in the remaining twenty-seven
(27) counts, considering that all the cases arose from
similar transactions with the same methods or modus
operandi used in committing the crime charged, and
involving the same accused and the same offended
party[.] 4
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision
dated 16 June 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court
hereby finds Trinidad Cahilig guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of qualified theft in each of the
informations, and sentences her to suffer the penalty of:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P200,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2179, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P250,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 03-2180, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P200,000.00;
4. In Criminal Case No. 03-2181, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P55,000.00;
5. In Criminal Case No. 03-2182, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P55,000.00;
6. In Criminal Case No. 03-2183, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P85,000.00;
7. In Criminal Case No. 03-2184, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P350,000.00;
8. In Criminal Case No. 03-2185, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P250,000.00;
9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one (1)
days (sic) as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum
and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P20,000.00;
10. In Criminal Case No. 03-2187, reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P250,000.00;
11. In Criminal Case No. 03-2188, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P60,000.00; ETIDaH

12. In Criminal Case No. 03-2189, reclusion perpetua and


to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P150,000.00;
13. In Criminal Case No. 03-2190, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P50,000.00;
14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one (1)
day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P4[6],300.00;
15. In Criminal Case No. 03-2192, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P205,000.00;
16. In Criminal Case No. 03-2193, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P200,000.00;
17. In Criminal Case No. 03-2194, ten (10) years and one (1)
day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P25,000.00; ECaTDc

18. In Criminal Case No. 03-2195, reclusion perpetua and


to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P500,000.00;
19. In Criminal Case No. 03-2196, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P500,000.00;
20. In Criminal Case No. 03-2197, ten (10) years and one (1)
day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P30,000.00;
21. In Criminal Case No. 03-2198, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P400,000.00;
22. In Criminal Case No. 03-2199, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P300,000.00;
23. In Criminal Case No. 03-2200, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P500,000.00; cEaDTA

24. In Criminal Case No. 03-2201, reclusion perpetua and


to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P65,000.00;
25. In Criminal Case No. 03-2202, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P47,000.00;
26. In Criminal Case No. 03-2203, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P500,000.00;
27. In Criminal Case No. 03-2204, ten (10) years and one (1)
day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and to
indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P40,000.00;
28. In Criminal Case No. 03-2205, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P400,000.00;
29. In Criminal Case No. 03-2206, ten (10) years and one
(1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P35,000.00;
30. In Criminal Case No. 03-2207, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P500,000.00.
Costs against accused in each of the above numbered
cases.
SO ORDERED. 5

The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted


trust and confidence by the key officers of the association. The
RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial
records of the association, a circumstance that understandably
facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds which she converted to
her personal use in the manner heretofore described.
Undoubtedly, she betrayed the trust and confidence reposed
upon her by her employer." 6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18
February 2011, the CA denied her appeal and affirmed the RTC's
Decision. The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft
were present in every charge:
. . . First, there was taking of personal property, when
accused-appellant took the proceeds of the WPESLAI
checks issued in her name as cashier of the association
which are supposed to be redeposited to another account
of WPESLAI. Second, the property belongs to another,
since the funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third,
the taking was done without the consent of the owner,
which is obvious because accused-appellant created a
ruse showing that the funds were credited to another
account but were actually withdrawn from her own
personal account. Fourth, the taking was done with intent
to gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit,
took the funds by means of a modus operandi that made it
appear through the entries in the ledgers that all
withdrawals and deposits were made in the normal course
of business and with the approval of WPESLAI. Fifth, the
taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation
against the person [or] force upon things. And finally, the
acts were committed with grave abuse of confidence
considering that her position as cashier permeates trust
and confidence. 7acCDSH

The Court's Ruling


The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by
the trial court in six of the 30 cases are incorrect and, therefore,
must be modified.
Qualified Theft
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal
Code defines the crime of Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft . — The crime of theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding
articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken
on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or
civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft . — Theft is committed
by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail
to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the
property of another, shall remove or make use of the
fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a
field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt
or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or
other forest or farm products. cSIADH

Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave


abuse of confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner's consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 8

It is clear that all the elements of Qualified Theft are present in


these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking
advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of
a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit
the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft,
"must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence,
guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the
offended party that might create a high degree of confidence
between them which the appellant abused." 9
Cahilig's position was one reposed with trust and confidence,
considering that it involves "handling, managing, receiving, and
disbursing" money from WPESLAI's depositors and other funds of
the association. Cahilig's responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier
required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into
her care.cHaADC

However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled


the board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money
that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that
Cahilig did not deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred in the penalty imposed in Criminal
Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-
2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are
P20,000.00, P46,300.00, P25,000.00, P30,000.00, P40,000.00, and
P35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by
the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding article." Article 309, in turn,
states:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but
if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be. ScTIAH

xxx xxx xxx


In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below
P12,000.00. Hence, if the crime charged had been simple theft,
the penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at
least, prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it
was established that the crime was qualified by grave abuse of
confidence, Article 310 provides that the penalty to be imposed
shall be the one "next higher by two degrees," which in this case
is reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the penalty in these six cases
should be reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01381 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In lieu of the
penalties meted out by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 03-
2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant
Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified theft in the
aforesaid cases. The judgment to indemnify the amounts in each
of the corresponding charges stands.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Cahilig, G.R. No. 199208, [July 30, 2014])

[G.R. No. 163437. February 13, 2008.]

ERNESTO PIDELI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
REYES, R.T., J :
p

ON appeal via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is


the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming that 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Baguio City, convicting petitioner
Ernesto Pideli of theft in the amount of P49,500.00 belonging to
his brother's business partner. The appeal zeroes in on the
questions of ownership, unlawful taking and intent to gain. In
short, is it estafa or theft?
The Facts
Sometime in March 1997, Placido Cancio (Placido) and Wilson
Pideli (Wilson) entered into a verbal partnership agreement to
subcontract a rip-rapping and spillway project at Tongcalong,
Tinongdan Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet. Placido and Wilson
agreed to undertake the project in favor of ACL Construction
(ACL), the contractor awarded the development project by the
Department of Public Works and Highways. 3
Petitioner Ernesto Pideli (petitioner), brother to Wilson and
neighbor and friend to Placido, offered the duo the use of his
credit line with the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH)
in La Trinidad, Benguet. Petitioner was an employee of the
Provincial Planning and Development Office of Benguet, likewise
based in La Trinidad. With the said arrangement, Wilson and
Placido, with the assistance of petitioner, were able to secure an
assortment of construction materials for the rip-rap and spillway
contract. 4
On November 17, 1997, after the completion of the project, ACL
summoned all its subcontractors to a meeting. Placido, Wilson
and petitioner were in attendance. At the meeting, ACL
management informed Placido and Wilson that the final payment
for the work that they have done would be withheld. It was
learned that they failed to settle their accountabilities with the
MTFSH. 5
Placido, Wilson and petitioner made representations with the
accountable ACL personnel, a certain Boy Candido, to facilitate
the release of their payment. They assured Boy that the matter of
the unpaid obligations to MTFSH has been resolved. Boy acceded
to the request and proceeded to release the final payment due to
Placido and Wilson, amounting to P222,732.00. 6
Consequently, Placido, Wilson and petitioner computed their
expenses and arrived at a net income of P130,000.00. Placido, as
partner, claimed one-half (1/2) or P65,000.00 of the net amount as
his share in the project. Petitioner, however, advised the two to
first settle their accountabilities for the construction materials
taken from the hardware store. Placido and Wilson did as told and
entrusted the full amount to petitioner, with express instructions
to pay MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance to them. 7
The following day, or on November 18, 1997, Placido attempted
but failed to contact petitioner. He had hoped to obtain his share
of the partnership income. Placido got hold of petitioner the next
morning. Unexpectedly, petitioner informed Placido that nothing
was left of the proceeds after paying off the supplier. 8 Despite
repeated demands, petitioner refused to give Placido his share in
the net income of the contract. 9 CAIHaE

Alarmed over the sudden turn of events, Placido lodged a


complaint for theft against petitioner Ernesto Pideli. Eventually,
an Information bearing the following allegations was instituted
against petitioner:
The undersigned accuses ERNESTO PIDELE (sic) of the
crime of THEFT, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1977, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent of gain (sic) and without the knowledge and consent
of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, cash
money in the amount of P65,000.00, belonging to PLACIDO
CANSIO (sic) y TALUKTOK, to the damage and prejudice of
the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of SIXTY-
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P65,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 10
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
Then, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the People portraying the foregoing facts was
supplied by private complainant Placido, the lone prosecution
witness.
Petitioner's defense founded on denial is summarized by the trial
court as follows:
Ernesto Pideli, 43 years old, married, government
employee and a resident of Km. 4, La Trinidad, Benguet. He
is a government employee at the Provincial Planning and
Development Office, Capitol, La Trinidad, Benguet. He was
first employed at the Provincial Engineer's Office on April
11, 1978. Sometime in 1980, he was appointed as Project
Development Officer of the Provincial Planning and
Development Office and continuously up to the present.
Wilson Pideli is his brother. In 1997, his brother Wilson had
a construction project along Tinongdan, Itogon, Benguet.
His brother asked him if he knows of a hardware which
can extend him credit for construction materials. He
approached the manager of Mt. Trail Farm Supply and
Hardware, Mrs. Editha Paayas, who then said that they
could extend credit to his brother. As of 1997, his brother
owed the hardware the amount of P279,000.00 for the
construction materials supplied by the hardware, namely:
reinforcement bars, cement, tire wires and other
construction materials. This amount was paid to the
hardware by installment. The first installment was paid in
June 1997 when the main contractor paid his brother. His
brother gave him P179,000.00 at his residence and he was
the one who paid the hardware which issued him a receipt
(Exhibit 1-C). After the project was completed, his brother
gave him P100,000.00 on November 18, 1997 while he, his
brother and Placido Cancio were at the Rose Bowl
Restaurant. He went to the hardware but the manager was
not there. One of the staff then informed him that the
manager will still have to compute the interest of their
loan credit and so he deposited P75,000.00 which was
covered by a receipt (Exhibit 1-B). Their account was
finally computed in December 1997 and so he paid their
balance of P25,000.00. All in all, he paid the hardware the
amount of P279,000.00. CAIaHS

When his brother tendered to him the P100,000.00 at the


Rose Bowl Restaurant, Placido Cancio was also there
discussing the expenses. The money which his brother got
from the main contractor, Boy Cupido, the partner of the
late Engineer Lestino, was being held by his brother and
not Placido Cancio.
The total cost of the materials taken by his brother from
the Mt. Trail Farm Supply is P279,000.00. On June 10, 1997,
he paid the initial payment of P179,000.00 covered by
Exhibit 1-C issued by the sales boy Cris. The second partial
payment was made on November 18, 1997 in the amount of
P75,000.00 covered by Exhibit 1-B issued by Mrs. Editha
Paayas. The last time that he paid was on December 18,
1997 in the amount of P25,000.00. This was not yet the full
payment because according to Mrs. Paayas she still has to
compute for the interest. (TSN, May 2, 2000, pp. 19-20).
Aside from the amount of P279,000.00 representing the
materials taken by his brother, he still has an outstanding
account with Mt. Trail Farm Supply charged in his name.
This is the reason why in the receipt it was noted as part
payment (TSN, May 2, 2000, p. 21).
On cross-examination, Ernesto Pideli said that he was
never a partner of his brother. It was only in 1997 that his
brother sought his assistance to look for a hardware
where he can buy construction materials on credit. All
materials ordered by Wilson for the project were placed in
his account because it was easier for the hardware to
contact him at their office which is nearer. After the
project in Itogon, Wilson stopped his construction
project. He denies having taken the P65,000.00. He does
not also know where the amount went (TSN, May 2, 2000,
p. 18).
STIHaE

On redirect, he said that when he tendered the first


payment of P179,000.00, a statement of account was
prepared by the salesboy of Mt. Trail Farm Supply and
Hardware (Exhibit 1-D). He was furnished a copy of the
statement of account. After the first and second payment,
other materials were obtained by his brother, this is the
reason why they still have a balance of P20,000.00 to be
settled within the hardware. 11 (Underscoring supplied)
RTC and CA Dispositions
On March 13, 2001, the RTC handed down a judgment of
conviction, disposing in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered
CONVICTING the accused of the crime of theft and hereby
sentences him after applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, to suffer imprisonment from 4 years of prision
correccional medium as minimum, to 12 years ofprision
mayor maximum as maximum (applying Art. 309(1) of the
Revised Penal Code) and to reimburse the private
complainant the amount of P49,500.00 plus interest
thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from date of filing of
the complaint up to the time it is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 12

In convicting petitioner of theft, the trial court ratiocinated:


. . . Upon evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses,
the court finds the lone testimony of the private
complainant more credible than the testimony of the
defense witnesses. The testimony of the private
complainant is positive and credible, sufficient to sustain
a conviction even in the absence of corroboration. The
testimony of defense witness Wilson Pideli was glaringly
inconsistent and contradictory on material points. At the
initial stages of his (Wilson Pideli) testimony on direct
examination, he categorically stated that it was he and his
laborers who implemented the project (rip rap project
along Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet) awarded to him by
ACL Construction. The private complainant had no
participation in the project (TSN, October 18, 1999, pp. 9-
10). Later, in his narration of what actually transpired
between him, his brother Ernesto Pideli and private
complainant at the Rose Bowl Restaurant on November 17,
1997, he said that after computing their expenses, he
entrusted to the private complainant the following
amounts: 1. P15,000.00 to be given by the private
complainant to the laborers who excavated for the project;
2. P500.00 to be given by the private complainant to Mr.
Apse as payment for the cement test; 3. P10,500.00
because he (private complainant) was pestering him (TSN,
October 18, 1999, pp. 14-16). The question is, if the private
complainant had no real participation in the project
subject of this case, why would Wilson Pideli be entrusting
such amounts to the former. If really private complainant
has no involvement whatsoever in the project, why was he
present at the: 1. Mido Restaurant where Josephine
Bentres was disbursing final payments to the
subcontractors of the project, and 2. At the Rose Bowl
Restaurant when the Pideli brothers were computing the
expenses incurred in the project and also presenting his
list of expenses (Exhibit B, Exhibit 2). Later, in his
testimony on direct, Wilson Pideli said that when he
started the project, private complainant asked him to join
him and he (Wilson Pideli) agreed provided the private
complainant share in the expenses. Private complainant
did not, however, share in the expenses nor did he provide
any equipment (TSN, October 18, 1999; p. 13) yet he
entrusted the aforementioned amounts to Cancio. On
cross-examination, Wilson Pideli admitted that he gave
private complainant P10,500.00 despite the fact that he
did not share in the expenses for the implementation of
the project (TSN, November 22, 1999, pp. 5-6). Such act is
abnormal and contrary to human behavior and experience.
The only plausible and logical conclusion is, private
complainant and Wilson Pideli were partners in a joint
venture. Just as private complainant did, in fact, stated,
he was the one who provided the laborers and some
equipments used in the project. Thus, it is only logical that
the money for the payment of the wages and the cement
test were entrusted to him because it was his
responsibility/obligation to pay them and not because they
were his neighbors as the defense would like this court to
believe. The reason propounded by Wilson Pideli to explain
his actuations is too flimsy for this court to believe.
Furthermore, Wilson Pideli admitted on cross that while
the case was filed by private complainant against his
brother Ernesto Pideli, he submitted an affidavit with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. In Paragraph 1
of the said affidavit which was read into the records of the
case, he (Wilson Pideli) alleged that "Placido Cancio was
his companion in the project at Dalupirip Road, Itogon,
Benguet which he subcontracted for ACL Construction."
When asked by the Public Prosecutor what he meant by
his statement, Wilson Pideli categorically admitted that
Placido Cancio (the private complainant) is his partner in
the endeavor along Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet (TSN,
November 22, 1999, p. 8). The testimony of Wilson Pideli,
instead of being corroborative, in effect, weakened the
cause of the defense. The rule is that witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. It has not been uncommon to
reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of
a single witness (People v. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408). Truth
is established not by the number of witnesses but by the
quality of their testimonies (People v. Ferrer, 255 SCRA
190).

It is unfortunate that the evidence on record does not


disclose the agreement between the private complainant
and Wilson Pideli with regards to the sharing of the capital
(expenses) and profits on the project. Article 1790 of the
Civil Code, however, provides: "Unless there is stipulation
to the contrary, the partners shall contribute equal shares
to the capital of the partnership." Paragraph 1 of Article
1797 of the same code further provides: "The losses and
profits shall be distributed in conformity with the
agreement. If only the share of each partner in the profits
has been agreed upon, the share of each in the losses
shall be in the same proportion." Thus, it is safe for the
court to conclude that as a partner in the joint venture,
Placido Cancio is entitled to 1/2 share in the net
proceeds, i.e. P130,000.00 + 2 = P65,000.00.
The accused insists that private complainant and his
brother were not partners in the subcontract project.
According to him, he merely acted as guarantor of his
brother so the latter can withdraw construction materials
on credit from the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware. As
the guarantor, he was also the one who paid his brother's
credit when his brother was able to collect payment. Thus,
denying the charges filed against him. Denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a
negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters (People v. Paragua, 257 SCRA 118).
Affirmative testimony is stronger than a negative one. As
between positive and categorical testimony which has a
ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other
hand, the former is generally held to prevail (People v.
Tuvilla, 259 SCRA).
Finding the testimony of the private complainant to be
more credible than that of the accused and his witnesses,
the court rules that the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by law in favor of the accused has been
overturned and must be convicted of the crime charged.
Article 309(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any
person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than P12,000.00, but does not exceed
P22,000.00; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of the code the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be." . . .
The penalty imposed upon those guilty of theft depends on
the amount stolen. Accused carted away P65,000.00
representing private complainant's share in the next
proceeds of the project. Accused's brother, Wilson Pideli,
however, gave the private complainant and this was
admitted by the latter the amount of P10,500.00 when the
latter kept on pestering him at the Rose Bowl Restaurant
and P5,000.00 at the initial (first) payment. Thus, the
amount of P10,500.00 and P5,000.00 should be deducted
from his net share of P65,000.00 leaving a balance of
P49,500.00 which is now the basis for the construction of
the penalty. 13 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner appealed to the CA. In a decision promulgated on April
30, 2003, the CA affirmed 14 the trial court disposition.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the adverse judgment. The motion
was, however, denied with finality through a Resolution dated
March 9, 2004. 15
Issues
In this petition, petitioner imputes to the CA triple errors, viz.:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY
ALLEGEDLY STOLEN WAS OWNED BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THAT THERE WAS AN UNLAWFUL TAKING
OF PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THAT THE ALLEGED TAKING BY THE
PETITIONER WAS ATTENDED WITH INTENT TO
GAIN. 16(Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, the thrust of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 is the resolution only of questions of law. 17 Any
peripheral factual question addressed to this Court is beyond the
ambit of this mode of review. 18 Indeed, well-entrenched is the
general rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the CA is limited to reviewing or revising errors of
law. 19
The petition at bench raises not only questions of law but also of
facts. We are asked to recalibrate the evidence adduced by the
parties and to reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. On this
ground alone, the petition is dismissible.
We, however, deem it proper to delve into the merits of the
present petition considering that an appeal in a criminal case
throws the whole case wide open for review.20
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the concept of
the crime of theft, viz.:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter's
consent. . . .
Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows:
1. That there be taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. 21
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner
received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson
under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH.
Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for
the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the
partners their respective shares. He, however, failed to give
private complainant Placido what was due him under the
construction contract.
In an effort to exculpate himself, petitioner posits that he cannot
be held liable for theft of the unaccounted funds. The monies
subject matter of the complaint pertain to the partnership. As an
agent of partner Wilson, intent to gain cannot be imputed against
petitioner.
The CA correctly debunked petitioner's postulation in the
following tenor:
We likewise find no merit in appellant's contention that
the money did not belong to the private complainant as
the latter was only claiming for his share of P65,000.00;
that it was owned by the partnership and was for payment
of materials obtained from the supplier. Complainant's
share in the amount of P65,000.00 manifestly belonged to
and was owned by the private complainant.
Appellant's argument that since the money belonged to
the partnership, hence, cannot be the object of the crime
of theft as between the partners, and that appellant as
their agent acted in good faith and without intent to gain,
holds no water. Parenthetically, this argument is
inconsistent with the assertion of the defense witnesses
that complainant had no participation at all in the project,
and, hence, had no right to a share in its payment. In any
case, appellant was not complainant's partner but his
brother. As for his alleged acting in good faith and without
intent of gain, it is jurisprudentially settled that intent is a
mental state, the existence of which is made manifest by
overt acts of the person. The intent to gain is presumed
from the taking of property appertaining to another.
Appellant presented a receipt dated November 18, 1997
allegedly evidencing his payment of P75,000.00 to Mt. Trail
Farm Supply and Hardware store. Grantingarguendo that
appellant paid P75,000.00 to the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and
Hardware (which the trial court did not grant credence),
the same still does not exculpate him from liability. The
net income earned and disbursed to the partnership of
private complainant and Wilson Pideli was P130,000.00
and a balance of P55,000.00 still remained despite the
alleged payment, which should be divided into two (2) or
P27,000.00 for each of them. However, not a single centavo
of this amount was received by private complainant.
When appellant received the disbursement, he had only
physical custody of private complainant's money, which
was supposed to be applied to a particular
purpose,i.e. settle the account with the supplier.
Appellant's failure to do so or to return the money to the
private complainant renders him guilty of the crime of
theft. This is in line with the rulings of the Supreme Court
in the case of United States vs. de Vera, 43 Phil. 1000
(1929) that the delivery of money to another for a
particular purpose is a parting with its physical custody
only, and the failure of the accused to apply the money to
its specific purpose and converting it to his own use gives
rise to the crime of theft. The basic principles enunciated
in the de Vera case was reiterated in the recent case
of People vs. Tan, 323 SCRA 30, an Anti-Carnapping case,
where the High Court ruled that the unlawful taking or
deprivation may occur after the transfer of physical
possession and, in such a case, "the article (is considered
as being) taken away, not received, although at the
beginning the article was, in fact, given and received." We
agree with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that
appellant had but the material/physical or de
facto possession of the money and his act of depriving
private complainant not only of the possession but also
the dominion (apoderamiento) of his share of the money
such that he (the appellant) could dispose of the money at
will constitutes the element of "taking" in the crime of
theft. 22(Underscoring supplied)

Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was


correctly found guilty of theft. As early as U.S. v. de Vera, 23 the
Court has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation
is estafa. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his commentary on
the Revised Penal Code, succinctly opined:
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in
theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused
receives the property and converts it to his own use or
benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused
has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only
with the material or physical (natural) or de
factopossession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same
constitutes embezzlement or estafa. 24
In de Vera, the accused, Nieves de Vera, received from Pepe, an
Igorot, a bar of gold weighing 559.7 grams for the purpose of
having a silversmith examine the same, and bank notes
amounting to P200.00 to have them exchanged for silver coins.
Accused appropriated the bar of gold and bank notes. The Court
ruled that the crime committed was theft and not estafa since
the delivery of the personal property did not have the effect of
transferring the juridical possession, thus such possession
remained in the owner; and the act of disposal with gainful intent
and lack of owner's consent constituted the crime of theft.
In People v. Trinidad, 25 defendant received a finger ring from the
offended party for the purpose of pledging it as security for a
loan of P5.00 for the benefit of said offended party. Instead of
pledging the ring, the defendant immediately carried it to one of
her neighbors to whom she sold it for P30.00 and appropriated
the money to her own use. The Court, citing de Vera, similarly
convicted defendant of theft.
In People v. Locson, 26 this Court considered deposits received by
a teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the material
possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with equal
force to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a
business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is
only material possession. Juridical possession remains with the
bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the above-cited
cases, beginning with People v. de Vera, if the teller appropriates
the money for personal gain then the felony committed is theft
and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of
confidence, and the bank places money in the teller's possession
due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of
qualified theft would be committed.
In People v. Isaac, 27 this Court convicted a jeepney driver of theft
and not estafa when he did not return the jeepney to its owner
since the motor vehicle was in the juridical possession of its
owner, although physically held by the driver. The Court reasoned
that the accused was not a lessee or hirer of the jeepney
because the Public Service Law and its regulations prohibit a
motor vehicle operator from entering into any kind of contract
with any person if by the terms thereof it allows the use and
operation of all or any of his equipment under a fixed rental basis.
The contract with the accused being under the "boundary
system," legally, the accused was not a lessee but only an
employee of the owner. Thus, the accused's possession of the
vehicle was only an extension of the owner's.
The doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Roque v.
People. 28
Now, on the penalty. Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
penalizes theft in the following tenor:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed the
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. 29 (Underscoring supplied)
The record bears out that private complainant originally claimed
P65,000.00 as his share in the partnership. However, he admitted
receiving the total amount of P15,500.00, on two separate
occasions, from Wilson Pideli. Verily, only P49,500.00 is due
private complainant.
Hence, the imposable penalty is the maximum period of prision
mayor minimum and medium prescribed in the abovequoted first
paragraph of Article 309. That period ranges from six (6) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years, plus one (1) year for every
additional ten thousand pesos in excess of P22,000.00, which in
this case is two (2) years for the excess amount of P27,500.00.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term
could be twelve (12) years while the minimum term would fall
under the next lower penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years), to be imposed in any of its periods.
Both the trial court and the CA sentenced petitioner to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision
correccional medium, as minimum term, to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor maximum, as maximum term. We sustain it.
Petitioner's civil liability is likewise maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
(Pideli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, [February 13, 2008], 568 PHIL
|||

793-809)

[G.R. No. 187044. September 14, 2011.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


RENATO LAGAT y GAWAN a.k.a. RENAT GAWAN and
JAMES PALALAY y VILLAROSA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p

This appeal was filed by accused-appellants Renato Lagat


y Gawan (Lagat), also known as Renat Gawan, and James
Palalay y Villarosa (Palalay) to challenge theCourt of
Appeals' October 8, 2008 Decision 1 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02869, for affirming with modification the March 19,
2007 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21,
Santiago City, wherein they were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Qualified Carnapping in Criminal Case No.
21-4949.
Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with
the crime of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 and
penalized under Section 14 3 of Republic Act No. 6539. The
accusatory portion of the Information, 4 reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
conniving with each other, and mutually helping one
another and with intent to gain and without the consent of
the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) unit
YASUKI tricycle bearing Engine No. 161FMJ41535420 and
Motor No. LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and owned by
JOSE BIAG, valued at P70,000.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner thereof.
That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on
occasion thereof, the above-named accused, conspiring,
conniving confederating and helping each other, and with
intent to kill, did then and there assault, attack and wound
the said JOSE BIAG with sharp and pointed instrument
directing blows against the vital parts of the body of the
latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab and
hacking wounds which directly caused the death of the
said JOSE BIAG. ACTISE

Lagat pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on June 16,


2005. 5 Palalay, on the other hand, did not enter any plea;
hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the RTC for him. 6
On August 1, 2005, both accused proposed to plead guilty
to a lesser offense. 7 In their plea-bargaining proposal, 8 they
asked that they be allowed to plead guilty to the crime of
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and that
the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and/or no
intention to commit so grave a wrong be considered in their
favor. They also asked that damages be fixed at P120,000.00.
This proposal was rejected 9 by the prosecution; thus, the pre-
trial conference proceeded. The pre-trial Order contained the
following facts as admitted by the parties:
1. That the cadaver of Jose Biag was recovered along
Angadanan and Sn. Guillermo road by members of the
police together with Barangay Captain Heherson Dulay
and Chief Tanod Rumbaoa, Sr.
2. That the two accused were arrested in possession of
palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
3. That the cause of death of Jose Biag was multiple stab
and hack wounds as described in the Autopsy Report and
death certificate which shall be submitted during trial. 10
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution first presented Florida Biag (Florida), the
wife of the victim Jose Biag (Biag), to testify on the
circumstances leading to Biag's disappearance and the
discovery of his body, the recovery of Biag's tricycle, and the
expenses she incurred and the income she had lost as a result
of her husband's death. Florida testified that her husband was
a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver. 11 On April 12,
2005, at around two o'clock in the morning, her husband left to
operate his tricycle for public use. It was around 11:00 a.m. of
April 13, 2005, when news reached her that their tricycle was
with the Philippine National Police (PNP) of the Municipality of
Alicia and that her husband had figured in an accident. After
learning of the incident, Florida sought the help of their
Barangay (Brgy.) Captain, Heherson Dulay, who immediately
left for Angadanan without her. At around 2:00 p.m., Brgy.
Captain Dulay informed 12 Florida of what had happened to her
husband. 13 Florida then presented in court the
receipts 14 evidencing the expenses she had incurred for her
husband's wake and funeral and for the repair of their tricycle,
which was recovered with missing parts. She also testified as
to the income Biag was earning as a farmer, a tanod, and a
tricycle driver, and claimed that his death had caused her
sleepless nights. 15
aTEScI

The second witness for the prosecution was the


Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe Rumbaoa, Sr. (Rumbaoa).
He testified that on April 13, 2005, after he and Brgy. Captain
Dulay received Florida's report, they immediately went to the
Alicia Police Station, wherein they found Biag's tricycle. The
PNP of Alicia showed them the identification card recovered in
the tricycle and told them that the tricycle was used in
stealing palay from a store in Angadanan, Isabela that
belonged to a certain Jimmy Esteban (Esteban). Rumbaoa and
Brgy. Captain Dulay were also told that the owner of the
tricycle was killed and dumped along the Angadanan and San
Guillermo Road. They were thereafter shown the two suspects
and the place where Biag's body was dumped. Rumbaoa said
that he was able to identify the body as Biag's, which was
almost unrecognizable because it was bloated all over, only
because Biag had a mark on his right shoulder, which
Rumbaoa knew of. 16
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the
PNP in Alicia, took the witness stand next. He testified that on
April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with other colleagues at
the Alicia PNP Station, when they received a report from
Esteban that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at
Alice Palay Buying Station in Alicia, Isabela, in a tricycle
commandeered by two unidentified male persons. PO2
Salvador said that upon receipt of this report, their Chief of
Police composed a team, which included him, PO2 Bernard
Ignacio, and PO2 Nathan Abuan, to verify the veracity of the
report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle
described to them by their chief, with the cavans of palay, and
the two accused, Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that
he and his team were about to approach the tricycle when the
two accused "scampered" 17 to different directions. After
"collaring" the two accused, they brought them to the Alicia
PNP Station together with the tricycle and its contents. PO2
Salvador asseverated that when they reached the station, they
asked the two accused if they had any papers to show for both
the tricycle and the palay, to which the two accused did not
answer. They allegedly kept silent even after they were
informed of their rights not only to remain as such, but also to
have counsel, either of their own choosing, or to be assigned
to them if they cannot afford one. PO2 Salvador then continued
that when they unloaded the tricycle, they discovered
bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar. He also personally
found a wallet containing the tricycle's Certificate of
Registration and Official Receipt 18 issued by the Land
Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag. When they
asked the two accused about their discoveries, Lagat and
Palalay voluntarily answered that the name in the papers is
that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped
along Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when they
carnapped his tricycle. PO2 Salvador alleged that upon hearing
this revelation, they again informed Lagat and Palalay that
anything they say would be used against them, and that they
had a right to counsel. Thereafter, they coordinated with the
PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together with the two
accused, they proceeded to Angadanan-San Guillermo Road,
where they found Biag's body in a ravine just after the bridge
near the road. 19
The prosecution's last witness, PO2 Ignacio corroborated
PO2 Salvador's testimony on the events that led them to the
tricycle, the palay, the two accused, and the body of Biag. He
also confirmed PO2 Salvador's claim that they had informed
the two accused of their rights but the latter just ignored
them; hence, they continued with their investigation. 20 PO2
Ignacio added that the two accused also told them how they
killed Biag, to wit:
A-They rented a tricycle from Santiago to Alicia but they
proceeded to Angadanan. And upon arrival at the
site, they poked a knife to the driver and the driver
ran away. They chased him and stabbed him, sir. 21
Upon cross-examination, PO2 Ignacio averred that they
were not able to recover the murder weapon despite diligent
efforts to look for it and that they had questioned the people at
Alice Palay Buying Station and were told that the two accused
had no other companion. PO2 Ignacio also admitted that while
they informed Lagat and Palalay of their constitutional rights,
the two were never assisted by counsel at any time during the
custodial investigation. 22
HCITcA

The prosecution also submitted the Post-Mortem Autopsy


Report 23 on Biag of Dr. Edgar Romanchito P. Bayang, the
Assistant City Health and Medico-Legal Officer of Santiago
City. The Report showed that Biag was likely killed between
12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m. of April 12, 2004, and that he had
sustained three stab wounds, an incise wound, two hack
wounds and an "avulsion of the skin extending towards the
abdomen." 24
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a
Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence 25 without leave of
court 26 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lagat and Palalay averred that
their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were
grossly violated as they were interrogated for hours without
counsel, relatives, or any disinterested third person to assist
them. Moreover, the admissions they allegedly made were not
supported by documentary evidence. Palalay further claimed
that Rumbaoa's testimony showed that he had a "swelling
above his right eye" and "a knife wound in his left arm," which
suggests that he was maltreated while under police
custody. 27
The accused also claimed that the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient to
convict them. They averred that aside from the alleged
admissions they had made, the prosecution had nothing else:
they had no object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly
found in the tricycle; the murder weapon was never found; and
no eyewitness aside from the police officers was presented to
show that they were in possession of the tricycle at the time
they were arrested. Lagat and Palalay argued that the
prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of events
that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, thus, they
were entitled to enjoy the constitutional presumption of
innocence absent proof that they were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. 28
As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without
leave of court, they in effect waived their right to present
evidence, and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution. 29
On March 19, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations
the Court finds the accused Renato Lagat y Gawan and
James Palalay y Villarosa GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each
of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also
ORDERED TO PAY Florida Biag the sum of Twelve thousand
three hundred pesos (P12,300.00) as actual damages plus
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for death indemnity and
another Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for moral
damages. 30 CSIDEc

After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented,


the RTC agreed with the accused that their rights were
violated during their custodial investigation as they had no
counsel to assist them. Thus, whatever admissions they had
made, whether voluntarily or not, could not be used against
them and were inadmissible in evidence. 31
However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an
eyewitness, the prosecution was able to establish enough
circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay
committed the crime, to wit:
1. The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in
possession of Biag's tricycle, loaded with
stolen palay;
2. The accused ran immediately when they saw the
Alicia PNP approaching them;
3. The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the tricycle
and Biag's wallet with documents to prove that
Biag owned the tricycle;
4. The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of Santiago City
to inquire about a Jose Biag, and this was how
the barangay officials of Santiago City and
Florida found out that Biag's tricycle was with
the Alicia PNP;
5. Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and never
returned home;
6. The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP and
Barangay Captain Dulay and Rumbaoa to where
they dumped Biag's body. 32
The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of
carnapping, qualified by the killing of Biag, which, according to
the RTC, appeared to have been done in the course of the
carnapping. 33
Lagat and Palalay asked the RTC to reconsider its
Decision on the grounds that it erred in giving full credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and in relying
on the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution. 34
On May 29, 2007, the RTC denied 35 this motion, holding
that the testimonies of the witnesses were credible and
supported by the attending facts and circumstances, and that
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the
accused. ITcCSA

Lagat and Palalay went 36 to the Court of Appeals,


asserting that their guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. 37 They averred that circumstantial
evidence, to be sufficient for a judgment of conviction, "must
exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with
innocence," 38 which was allegedly not the case in their
situation. They elaborated on why the circumstantial evidence
the RTC enumerated could not be taken against them:
1. The accused's possession of the tricycle cannot
prove that they killed its owner;
2. Their act of fleeing may be due to the
stolen palay (which is not the subject of this
case), and not the tricycle;
3. No evidence was given that would link the
bloodstains found in the tricycle to Biag himself.
They could have easily been Palalay's, who was
shown to have a knife wound; and
4. The accused's act of pointing to the police and
the barangay officials the ravine where Biag's
body was dumped was part of their interrogation
without counsel, which the RTC itself declared
as inadmissible in evidence. 39
On October 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 19, 2007 of the
RTC, Branch 21, Santiago City, in Criminal Case No. 21-
4949, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y
Villarosa are ordered to pay to private complainant the
increased amount of P14,900.00 as actual damages. 40
CDHAcI

In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of


Appeals held that the elements of carnapping were all present
in this case. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Lagat and
Palalay were in possession of the missing tricycle when they
were apprehended by the Alicia PNP. Moreover, they failed to
offer any explanation as to how they came to be in possession
of the tricycle. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the RTC
that whatever confession or admission the Alicia PNP
extracted out of the accused could not be used in evidence for
having been done without the assistance of counsel. The Court
of Appeals nonetheless affirmed the RTC's judgment as it was
"convinced" that the following circumstantial evidence
supported the conviction of the accused for qualified
carnapping:
1. Biag and his tricycle went missing on April 12,
2005;
2. Lagat and Palalay were found in unauthorized
possession of the tricycle on April 13, 2005;
3. The Alicia PNP, upon inspection of the tricycle,
found traces of blood inside it, together with the
original receipt and certificate of registration of
the vehicle in the name of Jose Biag;
4. Palalay had a stab wound on his left arm when the
Alicia PNP presented him and Lagat to Brgy.
Capt. Dulay and prosecution witness Rumbaoa;
5. Biag bore five (5) hack wounds on his body when
the Alicia PNP recovered his corpse in a ravine;
and
6. Lagat and Palalay failed to account for their
possession of the bloodstained tricycle
immediately after their arrest. 41
The accused are now before us with the same lone
assignment of error they posited before the Court of Appeals,
to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 42
Ruling of the Court
Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of
the crime of qualified carnapping under Republic Act No.
6539 43 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Section 2 of the Act
defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicle" as follows:
"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
or by using force upon things.IDcAHT

"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power


other than muscular power using the public highways, but
excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts,
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public
highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used
exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be
propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be
classified as separate motor vehicle with no power
rating. 44
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized
under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the
offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner
thereof; or that the taking was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of
the vehicle. 45
The records of this case show that all the elements of
carnapping are present and were proven during trial.
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong
to Biag, as evidenced by the registration papers, was found in
Lagat and Palalay's possession. Aside from this, the
prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay
fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at
the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and Palalay failed
to give any reason why they had Biag's tricycle. Their
unexplained possession raises the presumption that they were
responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle. Section 3 (j),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that:
[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of
the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him.ADTEaI

In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales, 46 we said that for such


presumption to arise, it must be proven that: (a) the property
was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the stolen
property was found in the possession of the accused; and (d)
the accused is unable to explain his possession
satisfactorily. 47 As mentioned above, all these were proven by
the prosecution during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat
and Palalay had unlawfully taken Biag's tricycle. In People v.
Bustinera, 48 this Court defined "unlawful taking," as follows:
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the
motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if
he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.49
Lagat and Palalay's intent to gain from the carnapped
tricycle was also proven as they were caught in a palay buying
station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they obviously used
to transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and were
going to sell at the station. In Bustinera, we elucidated on the
concept of "intent to gain" and said:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act,
presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is
the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in
any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which
was taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain. 50
Having established that the elements of carnapping are
present in this case, we now go to the argument of the two
accused that they cannot be convicted based on the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a
moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, is the one who has committed the
crime.aEHTSc

In People v. Mansueto, 51 we said:


Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a
fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. Such evidence is founded on
experience and observed facts and coincidences
establishing a connection between the known and proven
facts and the facts sought to be proved. 52
Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of the accused. 53
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence
presented, excluding those that are inadmissible, show that
the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole,
effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond
reasonable doubt. We considered the following pieces of
evidence as convincing:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the
tricycle the same day that it, together with its owner Biag, was
reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying
station, with the stolen tricycle packed
with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the
tricycle, jumped and ran the moment they saw the Alicia PNP
approaching them. TAECSD

Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia


PNP why they were in possession of Biag's tricycle.
Fifth, Biag's wallet and his tricycle's registration papers
were found in the tricycle upon its inspection by the Alicia PNP.
Sixth, Biag's body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the
post-mortem autopsy done on him, while his tricycle had
traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the
conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in
order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two accused
conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from their
conduct before, during, and after their commission of the
crime that they acted with a common purpose and
design. 54 The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
are consistent with one another and the only rational
proposition that can be drawn therefrom is that the accused
are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.
When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the
occasion of the carnapping, the crime of carnapping is
qualified and the penalty is increased pursuant to Section 14
of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:
Section 14 .Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is
found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not
less than fourteen years and eight months and not more
than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation
of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not
more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or
raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.)
(Emphasis ours) cSaADC

As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in


the commission of the crime, the RTC properly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto for the death
of Jose Biag and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the proven
mental suffering of his wife as a result of his untimely death.
However, when actual damages proven by receipts during trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of
temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount. 55 Thus, an award of P25,000.00
as temperate damages in lieu of the amount of P14,900.00 that
the Court of Appeals awarded as actual damages is proper in
this case.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider
that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the accused are also
jointly and severally liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of Biag and such indemnity should be paid to his
heirs. 56 In People v. Jadap, 57 this Court said:
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-
employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. In this case, no
documentary evidence was presented to prove the claim
of the victim's heirs for damages by reason of loss of
earning capacity. However, the victim's father testified
that at the time of his son's death, he was only 20 years
old and was working as a mason with a monthly income of
P3,000.00. We find the father's testimony sufficient to
justify the award of damages for loss of earning
capacity. 58
Biag's widow, Florida, testified that Biag worked as a
farmer, tanod, and tricycle driver, and that his income
amounted to P40,000.00 per cropping season as a farmer,
P2,000.00 per month as a tanod, and P300.00 per day as a
tricycle driver. However, since the prosecution failed to present
any document pertaining to Biag's appointment as a tanod, or
that he actually worked as a farmer, we shall consider only his
earnings as a tricycle driver. According to the death
certificate 59 submitted by the prosecution, Biag was 56 years
old at the time of his death. TAIDHa

The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is
based on two factors: 1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed; and 2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be
fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3 x 80-age of the deceased at the time of his
death = life expectancy) which is adopted from the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality. 60 Net income is computed by deducting from the amount of the victim's gross
income the amount of his living expenses. As there is no proof of Biag's living expenses, the net
income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income. 61 Thus, the loss of earning capacity
of the deceased is computed as follows:

Net Earning life expectancy x [gross annual income -


=
Capacity living
expenses] 62

2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual


=
income
- 50% of gross annual income]

= 2/3 [80-56] x [P109,500.00 - P54,750.00]

= 16 x P54,750.00
= P876,000.00

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October


8, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02869. Accused-appellantsRenato Lagat y Gawan and James
Palalay y Villarosa are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are
hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Jose Biag the
following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as
moral damages; (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d)
P876,000.00 as loss of earning capacity; and (e) interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Lagat y Gawan, G.R. No. 187044, [September 14,
|||

2011], 673 PHIL 351-372)

[G.R. No. 201092. January 15, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


JOEL AQUINO y CENDANA @ "AKONG," accused-
appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J : p

Before this Court is an appeal from a Decision 1 dated July 29,


2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04265,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Joel Aquino y Cendana alias
"Akong," which affirmed with modifications the Decision 2 dated
September 18, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 12, which convicted appellant Joel
Aquino y Cendana alias "Akong" for the felony of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 483-M-
2003 and for the crime of violation of Republic Act No.
6539 otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 in
Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003.
The pertinent portion of the Information 3 dated December 9,
2002 charging appellant with Murder in Criminal Case No. 483-M-
2003 is reproduced here:
That on or about the 6th day of September, 2002, in San
Jose del Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with an ice pick and with intent to
kill one Jesus O. Lita, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with the said ice pick the said Jesus O.
Lita, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly caused
his death.ACETIa

On the other hand, the accusatory portion of the


Information 4 also dated December 9, 2002 accusing appellant
with violating Republic Act No. 6539 in Criminal Case No. 484-M-
2003 reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September, 2002, in San
Jose del Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with an ice pick and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent [to] gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, take, steal and carry away with them one (1)
tricycle with Plate No. TP-9198 valued at P120,500.00,
belonging to Jesus Lita and Sisinio Contridas, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owners in the said
amount of P120,500.00; and that on the occasion or by
reason of said carnapping, the said accused, pursuant to
their conspiracy and with intent to kill, attack, assault and
stab Jesus Lita, owner and driver of the said tricycle,
hitting him on the different parts of his body which
directly caused his death.
Arraignment for the two criminal cases was jointly held on
February 13, 2004 wherein appellant pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to
both charges. 5
As indicated in the Appellee's Brief, the following narration
constitutes the prosecution's summation of this case: TcDIaA

On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the


victim Jesus Lita, accompanied by his ten[-]year old son,
Jefferson, went out aboard the former's black Kawasaki
tricycle. Upon reaching San Jose del Monte Elementary
School, appellant Joel Aquino together with Noynoy
Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter
Doe boarded the tricycle. Noynoy Almoguera instructed
the victim to proceed to the nipa hut owned by appellant.
Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, appellant and
his companions had a shabu session while Jefferson was
watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera
demanded from the victim to pay Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00), but the victim said that he had no money.
Appellant shouted at the victim demanding him to pay.
Bing suggested to her companions that they leave the nipa
hut. Thus, the victim mounted his tricycle and started the
engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the
tricycle behind the victim while appellant and Rodnal rode
in the sidecar with Jefferson [sitting] at the toolbox of the
tricycle. Inside the tricycle, appellant pointed a knife at
Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the victim's
side. After the victim was stabbed, he was transferred
inside the tricycle while appellant drove the tricycle to his
friend's house where they again stabbed the victim using
the latter's own knife. Then they loaded the victim to the
tricycle and drove to a grassy area where appellant and
his companions dumped the body of the victim. Thereafter,
they returned to appellant's residence. Jefferson told the
sister of appellant about the death of his father but the
sister of appellant only told him to sleep.
The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney
terminal where he rode a jeepney to get home. Jefferson
told his mother, Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita, about the
death of his father.
IDETCA

In the meantime, SPO3 Servillano Lactao Cabading


received a call from Barangay Captain Danilo Rogelio of
Barangay San Rafael IV, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan
thru the two (2) way radio, that the body of a male person
with several stab wounds was found dead on a grassy area
beside the road of the said barangay. Immediately, SPO3
Cabading together with a police aide proceeded to the
area. Thereat, they found the dead body whom they
identified thru his Driver's License in his wallet as Jesus
Lita, the victim. Also recovered were a big stainless ice
pick about 18 inches long including the handle and a
tricycle key. The police officers brought the body of the
victim to the Sapang Palay District Hospital. Thereafter,
they proceeded to the address of the victim.
Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita and Jefferson were about to
leave for the morgue when they met SPO3 Cabading
outside their residence. SPO3 Cabading informed Ma.
Theresa that the body of the victim was found in Barangay
San Rafael IV. Jefferson told SPO3 Cabading that he was
with his father at the time of his death and he brought the
police officers to the place where his father was stabbed
and to the hut owned by appellant. Thereat, the police
officers recovered a maroon colored knife case and the
sandals of the victim. Appellant was invited to the police
station for questioning but he refused alleging that he
does not know anything about the incident. The police
officers were able to obtain a picture of appellant which
was shown to Jefferson and he positively identified the
same as "Akong" one of those who stabbed his father.
Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera alias
"Negro" was shown to Jefferson and he likewise identified
the person in the video footage as the same "Negro" who
also stabbed his father.
Dr. Richard Ivan Viray, medico-legal, who conducted an
autopsy on the victim, concluded that cause of death is
Hemorrhagic Shock due to multiple stab wounds. 6 aITECD

However, appellant held a different version of the events of this


case. In his Appellant's Brief, the succeeding account is entered:
[Appellant] denied the accusations against him. On
September 6, 2002, he was working as a laborer/mason in
the construction of his uncle's (Rene Cendana) house
located at Area C, Acacia Homes, Cavite, together with
Paul Maglaque, Eman Lozada, Raul Lozada and Lorenzo
Cendana. They worked from 7:30 . . . in the morning until
4:30 . . . in the afternoon, with lunch and "merienda"
breaks from 11:30 . . . to 12:00 o'clock noon and 3:00
o'clock to 3:15 . . . in the afternoon, respectively. After
work, they just stayed in their barracks located within
their workplace. They would prepare their food and take
supper at around 7:00 o'clock to 7:30 . . . in the evening,
after which, they would smoke cigarettes. They would go
to bed at around 8:00 o'clock to 9:00 o'clock in the
evening.
He goes home to Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte City,
Bulacan every Saturday. During Mondays, he would leave
their house at around 4:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the
morning and would arrive at his workplace at around 8:00
o'clock or 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
[Appellant] does not know either Ma. Theresa Lita, his son
Jefferson, or the victim Jesus Lita. Also, he does not know
a certain Noynoy Almoguera and alias Rodnal. Likewise, he
denied using illegal drugs (i.e., shabu).
[Appellant] knew SPO3 Cabading because the former had
served as a police aide to him since he was seventeen (17)
years old. He had no misunderstanding with the police
officer. He cannot think of any reason why Ma. Theresa
Lita and Jefferson pointed to him as one of the
perpetrators of the subject crimes.acSECT

Paul Maglague (Paul) corroborated [appellant's] testimony.


On September 6, 2002, a Friday, [appellant] was working
with him, together with Roldan Lozada and Oweng
Cendana, at Area C, Dasmariñas, Cavite, in the
construction of Boy Cendana's house, Paul's brother-in-
law. Paul was the cement mixer while [appellant], being
his partner, carries it to wherever it is needed. Their work
ends at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After their work,
they just stayed in their barracks located within their
workplace. [Appellant] was their cook. They usually sleep
at around 8:00 o'clock to 9:00 o'clock in the evening. They
get their pay only during Saturdays. Hence, they would go
home to Bulacan every Saturday.
At around 6:00 o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
September 7, 2002, they left Cavite and went to their
respective homes in Bulacan.
On the night of September 5, 2002, [appellant] slept
together with Paul and their other co-workers inside their
barracks. Paul woke up in the middle of the night to
urinate and was not able to see whether the accused was
there, as there were no lights in the place where they
were sleeping. The following morning, [appellant] was the
one who cooked their food. 7 (Citations omitted.)
At the conclusion of trial, a guilty verdict was handed down by
the trial court on both criminal charges. The dispositive portion
of the assailed September 18, 2009 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003, the Court
finds the Accused JOEL AQUINO alias "Akong" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. The Court hereby orders the accused JOEL
AQUINO to pay the heirs of Jesus Lita, the expenses
incurred in his burial and funeral services in the total
amount of Sixty Thousand One Hundred (P60,100.00)
Pesos as actual damages, the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003, the Court likewise finds
the accused JOEL AQUINO alias "Akong" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating R.A. 6539, otherwise known
as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment pursuant to
Section 14 of the said R.A. 6539. The said accused is also
ordered to pay the amount of Sixty[-]Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Seventy[-]Five (P65,875.00) Pesos representing
the total installment payments of the Motorcycle. IDcTEA

The accused is also ordered to pay costs of this suit. 8

Insisting on his innocence, appellant filed an appeal with the


Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court upheld the
judgment of the trial court along with some modifications. The
dispositive portion of the assailed July 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals, in turn, reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED,
as follows:
a) In Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003, appellant
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim actual damages in the sum of
P60,100.00, duly proven during the trial,
P75,000.00 civil indemnity, P75,000.00 moral
damages and P30,000.00 exemplary damages.
b) In Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003, appellant
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years and Eight
(8) months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
years and Four (4) months, as maximum and
to pay the sum of P65,875.00 representing the
total installment payments of the
motorcycle. 9
Hence, appellant seeks the Court's favorable action on the
instant appeal. In his Brief, appellant reiterated the following
errors allegedly committed by the trial court when it adjudged
him guilty of the charges leveled against him:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED. HACaSc
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE ALLEGED LONE EYEWITNESS POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE
PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIMES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
TREACHERY ATTENDED THE KILLING. 10
Appellant challenges his conviction by arguing that the trial court
was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because
it only relied on the incredible and inconsistent testimony of
Jefferson Lita — the sole eyewitness presented by the
prosecution. He contends that if Jefferson was indeed present
during the murder of his father, Jesus Lita, then it would be highly
inconceivable that Jefferson would have lived to tell that tale
since he would most likely be also killed by the perpetrators
being an eyewitness to the crime. Furthermore, appellant
maintains that he cannot possibly have committed the crimes
attributed to him because, on the night that Jesus was murdered,
he was asleep in the barracks of a construction site somewhere
in Dasmariñas City, Cavite.
We are not persuaded.
It is settled in jurisprudence that, absent any showing that the
lower court overlooked circumstances which would overturn the
final outcome of the case, due respect must be made to its
assessment and factual findings, moreover, such findings, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court. 11 After a thorough examination of the
records of this case, we find no compelling reason to doubt the
veracity of the findings and conclusions made by the trial
court.CAIHTE

With regard to appellant's inquiry into the credibility of the lone


eyewitness of the prosecution, we depend upon the principle that
the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility of
a witness. In People v. Vergara, 12 we elaborated on this premise
in this wise:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness,
settled are the guiding rules some of which are that (1)
the [a]ppellate court will not disturb the factual findings of
the lower [c]ourt, unless there is a showing that it had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case, which showing is absent
herein; (2) the findings of the [t]rial [c]ourt pertaining to
the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect
since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as
he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can
discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on
cross-examination is a credible witness. 13
Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a
candid and straightforward manner, there is no room for doubt
that the witness is telling the truth. 14 A perusal of the testimony
of Jefferson indicates that he testified in a manner that satisfies
the aforementioned test of credibility. More importantly, during
his time at the witness stand, Jefferson positively and
categorically identified appellant as one of the individuals who
stabbed his father.
We quote the relevant portions of Jefferson's detailed testimony:
[PROSECUTOR CARAIG]
Q Why do you know that your father died on the early
morning of September 6, 2002, in Sapang Palay, San
Jose del Monte? aSIATD

xxx xxx xxx


A Because we left the house together at 8:30 in the
evening, and my father looked at the calendar.
Q You said you were with your father. Do you know where
were you going at that time?
A To the house of Akong.
Q And what mode of transportation did you take, as you
said, you were going to the house of Akong?
A Our tricycle, sir.
Q Do you know the trade mark of that tricycle of your
father?
A Kawasaki, sir.
Q Do you know the color of that tricycle?
A Black, sir.
Q While on your way to the residence of Akong, could you
please tell us if there was any unusual incident that
took place?
A Yes, sir, there was.
Q What was that?
A My father was being stabbed.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you see who stabbed your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many? CaEIST

A There were three (3) of them.


Q If you will see those three (3) persons again, can you
still identify them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are they inside the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around and point to them.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to accused Joel Aquino inside the
courtroom.
[PROSECUTOR CARAIG]
Q Who else?
A The others are not here.
Q Now, prior to the stabbing incident and you were able to
recognize the three, one of them you identified here
inside the courtroom. What was Joel Aquino doing
when you first saw him?
A He was inside our tricycle sitting.
Q You are referring to the sidecar of your tricycle?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said a while ago that you and your father were only
the one[s] on board the tricycle. Why was he, that
Joel, now inside the tricycle? AEScHa

A They rode in our tricycle.


Q You are referring to Aquino together with his two (2)
companions?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where in particular did these three (3) persons ride in
your tricycle?
A Joel Aquino was inside the sidecar of our tricycle while
the other two (2) rode at the back of my father.
Q At that precise moment, where were you seated?
A Also inside the sidecar, sir.
Q You are sitting side by side with Aquino? Is that what
you mean?
A No, sir.
Q While inside the tricycle, what did Aquino do, if any?
A He pointed his knife at me.
Q What else?
A Nothing else.
Q What about the two (2) companions, what did they do, if
any?
A Inunahan nila agad ang Tatay ko sa tagiliran.
Q What do you mean by "inunahan"? aICHEc

A They stabbed my father on his side.


Q Did you see what part of the body of your father was
stabbed?
COURT:
Witness pointing to the right side of his stomach.
[PROSECUTOR CARAIG]
Q What happened to your father when he was stabbed?
A He appeared dizzy and he was placed inside the sidecar.
Q And who brought your father inside the sidecar?
A The two (2) other persons previously at the back of my
father.
Q And at that time, what did Joel do?
A He started driving the tricycle.
Q Did Aquino drive the tricycle after he started it?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And did you come to know where did Joel Aquino
proceed?
A To their house, sir. ACcDEa

Q How far was that house of Aquino from the place where
your father was stabbed?
A Quite far, sir.
Q Were you able to reach the house of Joel Aquino?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Aquino and these two (2) persons do to your
father when you reached his house?
A They brought him down from the tricycle.
Q Where did these three (3) persons bring your father?
A They brought my father to their friend.
Q Did you come to know who was that friend where your
father was brought?
A I do not know the name of their friend.
Q What happened to your father when he was brought to
their friend?
A My father was already dying and they went back to him
and stabbed him several times. IcaHTA

Q How many times was your father stabbed at that time?


A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you see who stabbed him again?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A The three (3) of them.
Q Do you mean to say that Aquino at that time stabbed
your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you see what kind of weapon did these three (3)
persons use in stabbing your father?
A My father's own knife.
Q Who among the three (3) used your father's knife?
A Akong po.
Q That Akong was the friend of the three (3) persons to
where these three (3) persons brought your father?
A No, sir.
Q You are referring to one of the two (2) companions of
Joel?
A Yes, sir. SaCIAE

Q And after that what else transpired next?


A They boarded my father to the tricycle.
Q How about you?
A While they were boarding my father to the tricycle,
Akong pointed his knife at my stomach.
Q Were the three (3) persons able to board your father
inside your tricycle?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did the three (3) persons do after your father
was already inside the tricycle?
A They started the tricycle.
Q And then what happened next?
A After they started the motorcycle, they drove the
tricycle and threw away my father.
Q Did you see the act of these three (3) persons throwing
your father away from the tricycle?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far were you from them when they threw your
father?
A More or less about 5 to 6 meters, sir.
Q Describe the place where your father was thrown.
A It was a grassy area. CacTIE

Q The grass are tall?


A Short grass, sir.
Q And after your father was thrown away, what did the
three (3) persons do?
A They started our tricycle and left my father. 15

In the face of this serious accusation, appellant puts forward the


defense of alibi. We have held that for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
delicti or within its immediate vicinity. 16 These requirements of
time and place must be strictly met. A review of the evidence
presented by appellant reveals that it falls short of the standard
set by jurisprudence. Appellant failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to
be at San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan when Jesus was
murdered. His own testimony revealed that the distance between
the locus delicti and Dasmariñas City, Cavite is only a four to five
hour regular commute. 17 Thus, it would not be physically
impossible for him to make the round trip between those two
points from dusk till dawn of September 5-6, 2002 and still have
more than enough time to participate in the events surrounding
the murder of Jesus. CIDcHA

Furthermore, the only person that could corroborate appellant's


alibi is his friend and former co-worker, Paul Maglaque. However,
we have consistently assigned less probative weight to a defense
of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives since we
have established in jurisprudence that, in order for corroboration
to be credible, the same must be offered preferably by
disinterested witnesses. 18 Clearly, due to his friendship with
appellant, Maglaque cannot be considered as a disinterested
witness.
Nevertheless, it is jurisprudentially settled that positive
identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be
fabricated and is inherently unreliable. 19 It is likewise settled
that where there is nothing to indicate that a witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is
that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit. 20 In the case at bar, no allegation was made nor
proven to show that Jefferson had any ill motive to falsely testify
against appellant.
With regard to appellant's argument that Jefferson would surely
have also been killed by his father's murderers had he indeed
witnessed the crime, we can only surmise and speculate on this
point. Whatever may be the killers' motivation to spare
Jefferson's life remains a mystery. Nonetheless, it does not
adversely affect what has been clearly established in this case
and that is the cold-blooded murder of Jesus by a group of
assailants which includes herein appellant.
According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder, the
following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any
of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor
infanticide. 21
TICDSc

Contrary to appellant's assertion, the qualifying circumstance of


treachery did attend the killing of Jesus. We have consistently
held that treachery is present when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. 22 On this point, we quote
with approval the Court of Appeals' discussion of this aspect of
the case, to wit:
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even
when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by
the group on the lateral part of his body while he was
under the impression that they were simply leaving the
place where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice
can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on
the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level
of the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed
to the passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence,
there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the
intended stabbing of his body both from the people
seated in the side car and those seated behind him.
Thus, the trial court's finding of treachery should be
affirmed. There is treachery when the means, methods,
and forms of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such
means, methods, and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person. What is decisive in an
appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself. 23(Citations omitted.)aIHSEc

However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial


court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot consider abuse of
superior strength as an aggravating circumstance in this case. As
per jurisprudence, when the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the
latter. 24Since there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
present, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance
with Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, 25 it being
the lesser penalty between the two indivisible penalties for the
felony of murder which is reclusion perpetua to death. CHDTIS

However, we concur with the modification made by the Court of


Appeals with respect to the penalty of life imprisonment for
carnapping originally imposed by the trial court. Life
imprisonment has long been replaced with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659.
Furthermore, the said penalty is applicable only to the special
complex crime of carnapping with homicide which is not
obtaining in this case. Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the
special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must
be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but
also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 26 The appellate court
correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify the
carnapping into a special complex crime because the carnapping
was merely an afterthought when the victim's death was
already fait accompli. Thus, appellant is guilty only of simple
carnapping.
It is enshrined in jurisprudence that when death occurs due to a
crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; and (5) temperate damages. 27
There being no aggravating circumstance since, as discussed
earlier, abuse of superior strength is absorbed in the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the award of P75,000.00 as moral
damages should be decreased to P50,000.00. Such an amount is
granted even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victim's heirs. 28
EaSCAH

Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity in


the amount of P75,000.00 29 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00 30 is correct. The amount of actual
damages duly proven in court in the sum of P60,100.00 is
likewise upheld. Finally, we impose interest at the rate of 6% per
annum on all damages from the date of finality of this ruling until
fully paid. 31
With regard to appellant's conviction for simple carnapping, we
affirm the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the Court of
Appeals which is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as
maximum. Likewise, we uphold the order upon appellant to pay
the sum of P65,875.00 representing the total amount of the
installment payments made on the motorcycle.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 29,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04265,
affirming the conviction of appellant Joel Aquino y Cendana alias
"Akong" in Criminal Cases No. 483-M-2003 and 484-M-2003, is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The amount of moral damages to be paid by appellant Joel
Aquino y Cendana alias "Akong" in Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003,
is decreased from Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and
(2) Appellant Joel Aquino y Cendana alias "Akong" is ordered to
pay interest on all damages at the legal rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs. cEDIAa

SO ORDERED.
(People v. Aquino y Cendana, G.R. No. 201092, [January 15,
|||

2014], 724 PHIL 739-759)

[G.R. No. 190475. April 10, 2013.]

JAIME ONG y ONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
SERENO, C.J :p

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 18 August


2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the
Decision 2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime
Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree
No. (P.D.) 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information 3 dated 25 May 1995 as
follows:
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, with intent of gain for
himself or for another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from
unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth
P65,975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and
thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to
have been derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the
merits ensued, and the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that
the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused
JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-
Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with
accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED. 4

Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a


review of the records, the RTC's finding of guilt was affirmed by
the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009. SDHacT

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.


THE FACTS
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA,
is as follows:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four
(44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20 by
14. He acquired the same for the total amount of
P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and
marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's
acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565
dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List
acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described
by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the
tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the
warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St.,
Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned
by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's
caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires.
After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January
1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the
warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from
caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires
were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was
forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with
caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern
Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant
canvassed from numerous business establishments in an
attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995,
private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a
store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by
appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was
selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14
ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the
affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the
description, which private complainant recognized as one
of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk
marking and the serial number thereon. Private
complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such
tires in stock, which was again answered in the
affirmative. Private complainant then left the store and
reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of
the Southern Police District.ADHaTC

On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed


a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant's
store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6)
members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by
Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's
companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-
buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team,
in coordination with the Western Police District,
proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team
arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-
buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of
the team posted themselves across the street. Atienza
asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by
14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately
produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought
for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more
in stock. Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out
twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was
located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires
were brought in, private complainant entered the store,
inspected them and found that they were the same tires
which were stolen from him, based on their serial
numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged
signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires in
appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the
warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged
signal, the buy-bust team went inside appellant's store.
However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the
confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by
representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer.
Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the evening when
appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the
police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the
buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires,
including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito
Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant
as stolen from his warehouse. 5
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging
that he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling
tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any
knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He
further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go
(Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly
from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought
all the tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice
dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link
Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link). 6 TADaES

Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the
twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the
displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires.
Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated
the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen
tires. 7
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established
that all thirteen (13) tires found in the possession of Ong
constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to
overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. 8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification
by reducing the minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1)
day to six (6) years of prision correcional. 9
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2 (a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known
to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1)
a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused,
who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that
the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
(4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself
or for another. 10
aEcHCD

We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met
the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all the
elements of fencing are present in this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar
(Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal — the
caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen — testified that the crime of robbery had been committed
on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the
tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565 11 dated 10 November 1994
and an Inventory List. 12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise
testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by
their Sinumpaang Salaysay 13 taken at the Southern Police
District at Fort Bonifacio. 14 The report led to the conduct of a
buy-bust operation at Jong Marketing, Paco, Manila on 27
February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the
perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact that thirteen
(13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do
not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice
in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38)
missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that
the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in
Ong's possession. 15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the
said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of P45,500
where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980. 16
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should
know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty
to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that
such fact exists. 17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell
of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, 18 ought to have known
the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown
seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the
thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership
of the tires. 19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy
until the delivery of tires happened in just one day. 20 His
experience from the business should have given him doubt as to
the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his
first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if
Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets. DSacAE

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC, 21 this Court had enunciated that:


[C]ircumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a
reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale may
have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft.
Such circumstances include the time and place of the
sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual
practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the
goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly
engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise
suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should
caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any
goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing" — a presumption that is, according to
the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical
inference can arise from the established fact of . . .
possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft.". . . . 22
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second
hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments
or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article,
item, object or anything else of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the
Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store,
establishment or entity is located before offering the item for
sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of
obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires
he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was
remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have
exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to
him by Go. Logically, and for all practical purposes, the issuance
of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction
and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however,
that defense is disputable. 23 In this case, the validity of the
issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was
able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. 24 Ong
failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution
and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was
unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5
of P.D. 1612.
DTcASE

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering


that during the buy-bust operation, Ong was actually caught
selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima
facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the
accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a
higher penalty based on the value of the property. 25
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty
based on P5,075 for each tire recovered, or in the total amount of
P65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44)
tires from Philtread in the total amount of P223,401.81. 26 Section
3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides a
disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair
and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary
course of business is not overturned in the absence of the
evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between
Azajar and Philtread.
In fine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence
adduced by the parties, we do not find sufficient basis to reverse
the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong
for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty
imposed by reducing it to six (6) years of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is herebyAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
(Ong y Ong v. People, G.R. No. 190475, [April 10, 2013], 708 PHIL
|||

565-575)

[G.R. No. 181184. January 25, 2012.]

MEL DIMAT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J : p

This case is about the need to prove in the crime of


"fencing" that the accused knew or ought to have known that
the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery.
The Facts and the Case
The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law 1 before the Manila Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-202338.
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and
police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified in
substance that in December 2000 Delgado's wife, Sonia,
bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate
number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the
vehicle's engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis
number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the
Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on
E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate
number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they
discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136
and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the
particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They
brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned
that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose
Mantequilla.HDIaST

Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari


that carried plate number JHM-818, which he mortgaged to
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was
carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria's parking
area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.
For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know
Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith
and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of
sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its
chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the
vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan
Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers
took into custody had the same plate number, they were not
actually the same vehicle.
On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him to an imprisonment
of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years
of reclusion temporal. The court also ordered him to pay
P850,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, as well as the costs of suit.
On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in
CA-G.R. CR 29794 2 the RTC decision but modified the penalty
to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum,
thus, the present appeal.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA
correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia
Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped
from Mantequilla.
The Ruling of the Court
The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has
been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the
robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or
theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the
thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he
makes to gain for himself or for another. 3
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla's Nissan Safari on
May 25, 1998. Two years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it
to Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimat's defense is that the Nissan
Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had
engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60-
YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those
transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the
other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis
number CRGY60-YO3111.
But Dimat's defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari
Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and
inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and
chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla.
This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct
numbers of the vehicle's engine and chassis. AHcCDI

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main


defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and,
therefore, its violation is regarded asmalum
prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. 4 Of course,
the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should
have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold
to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he
intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn
Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as
collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old
certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle
and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration
and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged
on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino's failure to deliver
the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could not produce any certificate of registration or
official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the
Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said
that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and
official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because,
the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no
documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good
on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly
confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit
source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who
apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her
purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no
moment since she did not stand accused in the case.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR 29794.
SO ORDERED.
(Dimat v. People, G.R. No. 181184, [January 25, 2012], 680 PHIL
|||

233-238)

[G.R. No. 182424. September 22, 2014.]

NENITA CARGANILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we review the


decision 1 and the resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29371 which denied the appeal of Nenita
Carganillo (petitioner). The CA affirmed, with modification as to
penalty, the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
30, Cabanatuan City, convicting the petitioner of the crime
of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
THE CASE
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal,
Nueva Ecija, gave the petitioner the amount of P132,000.00 for
the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who was alleged to
be an "ahente" or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to
deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before
November 28, 1998. According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the
petitioner, the parties agreed that for every kilo of palay bought
the petitioner shall earn a commission of twenty centavos
(P0.20). But if no palay is purchased and delivered on November
28, the petitioner must return the P132,000.00 to Teresita within
one (1) week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the P132,000.00 on November
28 and one (1) week thereafter, respectively, Teresita made oral
and written demands to the petitioner for the return of the
P132,000.00 but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed
an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the petitioner before the
Fiscal's Office. Thereafter, an Information 4 for the crime
of estafa was filed in court.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime and denied that
she entered into a "principal-agent" agreement with, and
received the P132,000.00 from, Teresita. She alleged that she
owed Teresita a balance of P13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice
that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996, 5 and that, in
November 1996, she was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that
reflected no written date and amount. 6 She likewise denied
personally receiving any written demand letter from Teresita. 7
In a decision dated November 19, 2004, the RTC convicted the
petitioner of the crime of estafa and sentenced her to suffer,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imprisonment ranging
from four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. 8 Also, the RTC ordered the petitioner to indemnify
Teresita the sum of P132,000.00 representing the amount
embezzled and to pay the costs of suit. 9
On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction. 10 The CA
held that the prosecution properly established the elements of
the crime of estafa. In debunking petitioner's claim that her
agreement with Teresita was merely a money loan, the CA stated
that:
In this case, the Kasunduan dated September 23, 1998,
which accused-appellant admittedly signed, is clear in its
tenor and the failure to comply therewith makes out a
case for estafa. Accused-appellant's insistence that she
signed the said Kasunduan in blank is belied by her
admission of "the existence or authenticity of the
documentary exhibits . . ." during the prosecution's formal
offer of evidence and her own testimony . . . .
Further, the CA ruled as immaterial the petitioner's defense that
she did not personally receive a written letter of demand from
Teresita. The CA held that even a verbal query as to the
whereabouts of the money suspected to be misappropriated is
already tantamount to a demand, and that the petitioner failed to
refute Teresita's claim that she went to the petitioner's house to
ask for the palay and/or the return of the P132,000.00. 11
The CA, however, found error in the RTC's computation of the
penalty and imposed upon the petitioner an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 (in
excess of P22,000.00), equivalent to eleven (11) years, or a total
of nineteen (19) years. 12
The petitioner elevated her judgment of conviction to the Court
by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. DaHSIT

THE PETITION
In her petition, the petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the
CA erred in affirming (with modification) the judgment of
conviction against her, despite the prosecution's failure to prove
her guilt of the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner maintains that she is not engaged in the business
of buying and selling palay and that the "Kasunduan" between
her and Teresita does not contain their real agreement of a
simple money loan. She argues that the prosecution failed to
establish all the elements of estafa because she never received
the P132,000.00 from Teresita; that an element of the crime is
that "the offender receives the money, or goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to
return, the same."
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the present petition. The CA did not commit any
reversible error in its decision of September 10, 2007.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the offense of estafa committed with abuse of
confidence requires the following elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same[;]
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. 13

We find that all the elements of estafa are present in this case:
that the petitioner received in trust the amount of P132,000.00
from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and misappropriated
it when she failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon
demand.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief
the "Kasunduan" presented in evidence by the prosecution that
was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the
terms of agreement between her and Teresita. This document
clearly stated that the petitioner received in trust the amount of
P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay with
the corresponding obligations to (1) deliver the palay to the
Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998, and
(2) return the P132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November
28 in the event that the petitioner failed to
make palay purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties
is the formal expression of the parties' rights, duties, and
obligations and is the best evidence of the parties' intention.
Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement. 14 However, this rule, known as theParol
Evidence Rule, admits of exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to
a written agreement may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading the following:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties
or their successors in interest after the execution of
the written agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, the petitioner alleges that the
subject "Kasunduan" failed to express the real agreement
between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan
agreement and not that of a principal-agent relationship in the
buy-and-sell of palay. The documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by the petitioner, however, fail to support her claims.
The RTC found that the receipts presented by the petitioner to
prove her loan obligation with Teresita were vague, undated and
unsigned. 15 Also, the RTC observed that the witnesses who
testified that they saw the petitioner sign the "Kasunduan" were
not even certain of the real transaction between the petitioner
and Teresita. 16 These findings of fact and evidence, which were
affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect and finality by this
Court. Where the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals, there is great reason not to disturb
these findings and to regard them not reviewable by this Court. 17
Also, we cannot sustain the petitioner's claim that she had been
the victim of a fraud because Teresita deceived her into signing a
blank document; that she signed the "Kasunduan," even if it had
no date and amount written on it, because Teresita led her to
believe that the document would be used merely for show
purposes with the bank. 18
For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the
causal (dolo causante) inducement to the making of the
contract, 19 and must be serious in character.20 It must be
sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into
error, taking into account the circumstances of each case. 21
In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the
petitioner. In her Memorandum 22 to this Court, she narrated that
after she signed the "Kasunduan," Teresita subsequently made
her execute a deed of sale over her property, which deed she
refused to sign. 23 This statement negates the petitioner's self-
serving allegation that she was tricked by Teresita into signing a
blank "Kasunduan," as she was fully aware of the possible
implications of the act of signing a document.
We affirm the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as it
is fully in accordance with the law. We explained in People v.
Temporada 24 that:
"The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par.
2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds
P22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the
penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión
correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). . . .
DaScHC

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the


prescribed penalty of prisión correccional maximum
to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1
year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not
exceed 20 years. . . . To compute the maximum period of
the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum
to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three
equal portions of time each of which portion shall be
deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65
of the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period
of prisión correccional maximum toprisión mayor minimum
is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The
incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years,
at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount
defrauded shall be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the
difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a
year shall be discarded as was done starting with the case
of People v. Pabalan in consonance with the settled rule
that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the
accused. . . ." 25
In the recent case of Lito Corpuz v. People of the
Philippines, 26 we recognized the "perceived injustice" brought
about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to
impose on crimes against property, such as estafa, committed
today based on the amount of damage measured by the value of
money eight years ago in 1932. This Court, however, cannot
modify these range of penalties in our decisions, as such action
would be an impermissible encroachment upon the power of the
legislative branch of government and would constitute proscribed
judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack
of merit. We AFFIRM the decision dated September 10, 2007 and
the resolution dated March 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 29371, finding petitioner Nenita
Carganillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Carganillo v. People, G.R. No. 182424, [September 22, 2014])
[G.R. No. 180016. April 29, 2014.]

LITO CORPUZ, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J :p

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule


45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner
Lito Corpuz (petitioner),seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated
September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA),which affirmed
with modification the Decision 3 dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding
the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code. TADIHE

The antecedent facts follow.


Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the
Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990.
Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending
money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had
some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on
May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said
pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant
agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet,
with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt
of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items,
within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of
jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner,
the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the
said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of
estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City
of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having
received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond
ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00, one (1) three-baht men's
bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies'
bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of
Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00),Philippine
currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said
accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said
items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once
in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and
with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from
complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit
the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale
thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed
and refused to return the said items or to remit the
amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00),Philippine currency, to the damage and
prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the
lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense
presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be
summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of
Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of
extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made,
they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant. However, he admitted
obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he
was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same
receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against
him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of
jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary
mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of
FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS
of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo
Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the
appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed
Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando
City (P),Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that
accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty
of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1
year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years.
The rest of the decision stands.TEIHDa

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration,
filed with this Court the present petition stating the following
grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE
LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING
ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS
THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY
DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE
OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE IN THAT —
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD
WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY
SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY
TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991
WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE
TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND
TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF
UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD — AN
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE — WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH —
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO
(2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER — ACCUSED
IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL,
CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN
AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as
petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it
sufficiently established the designation of the offense and
the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements
of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are
conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms
the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. 4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in
affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to
this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the
trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991
marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same
was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The
CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise
an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of
evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The
established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a
timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5 TCcSDE

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the


formally defective Information filed against him. He contends
that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces
of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when
the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by
private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not
err in finding that the Information was substantially complete
and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and
substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner 6 and that the time of occurrence is not a
material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the
period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as
reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective. The CA ruled:
. . . An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly
states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a
reading of the subject Information shows compliance with
the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the
offense was stated as "on or about the fifth (5th) day of
July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a
statement of the precise time only when the same is a
material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of
the commission thereof is not an essential element of the
crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to
specify the exact date does not render the
Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is
also near the due date within which accused-appellant
should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said
[pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence,
there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-
appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that
he was not properly apprised of the charges preferred
against him. 7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the
crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC,
which reads: TSacID

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall


defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same, even though such obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; ...
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by
the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that
there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a
demand by the offended party on the offender, was not proved.
This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant
narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two
(2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked
petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay
them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ:
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and
this transaction could have been finished on 5 July
1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the
deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation
and I asked him where the items are and he
promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to
collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir. 9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was
demand. 10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be
verbal. 11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to
show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged,
since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in
this case, property],would be tantamount to a demand. 12 As
expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the
CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be
formal or written. The appellate court observed that the
law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa
under Art. 315 1(b),thus: cSDHEC

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify.


Should a written demand be necessary, the law
would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand"
should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to present a written
demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally
inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, we
held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
...[T]he law does not require a demand as a condition
precedent to the existence of the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to
account, upon demand for funds or property held in
trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
The same way, however, be established by other
proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. 14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the
prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements
of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt
dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same
within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation
when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of
jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same
pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite
demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the
latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is
questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is
the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court
gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had
the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied
the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the
case. 15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and
binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such
finding is affirmed by the CA. 16 Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for
in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. 17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was
deliberating on this case, the question of the continued validity of
imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came
up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the
value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the
Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached
no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first
impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en
banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici
curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously
complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M.
Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were
later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc,with Atty.
Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on
the matter, this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the
range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes
against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in
1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of
penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What
the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties
provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this
Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power
of another branch of the government. This, however, does not
render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5,
which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which
should be repressed but which are not covered by the law,
and in cases of excessive penalties. —Whenever a court
has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons
which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense. 18
DACTSa
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for
acts borne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the
court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the
proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act
should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is
that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any
penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for
the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The
remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the
execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive
the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked
to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a
legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal
Code, 19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of
the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal
provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum
crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can
exist no punishable act except those previously and
specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making
body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its
perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will
be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot
suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that
the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the
Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter
to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which
it believes to be harsh. 20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence,
retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate
Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book,The Revised Penal
Code, 21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the
humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered
with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with
the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by
law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law
upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are
too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to
which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is
the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator
in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty
falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or
cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency
should be addressed to the Chief Executive. 22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes
against property be based on the current inflation rate or at
the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00. However, it would be
dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to
the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered
that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the
penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties
will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending
law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should
have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited
Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the
present legislature has not made any moves to amend the
subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For
all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties
in order to deter the further commission of those punishable acts
which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in
recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to
broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the
crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of
P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to
P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the
threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may
apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the
present penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the
proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft,
the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:HICEca

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and


medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen
is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not
exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, if the value of
the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not
exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is
over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos,
if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article and the value of the thing stolen does not
exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount,
the provision of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing
stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall
have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or
the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support
of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the
above-provision states that the penalty is prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months).Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing
stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum
period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would
seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost
the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the
minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the
minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to
maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the
offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said
minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover,
under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying
theIndeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum
period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2
months) is not too far from the minimum period under the
existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty
imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also
true in the crime of Estafa. 23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100,as suggested to the value
of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused
in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the
maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty
imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act
committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage
caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft,
the value would be modified but the penalties
are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will
become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,punished
by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium
(6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will
become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,punished
by prision correccional medium and to prision
correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will
become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00,punishable
by prision correccional minimum to prision
correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months). SEcTHA

4. P50.00 to P200.00 will


become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00,punishable
by arresto mayor medium to prision
correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will
become P500.00 to P5,000.00,punishable by arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00,punishable by arresto
mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.
xxx xxx xxx.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of
Estafa, the value would also be modified but the
penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00,will
become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,punishable
by prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will
become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,punishable
by prision correccional minimum to prision
correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will
become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00,punishable
by arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00,punishable
by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6
months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our
esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided
under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals,
which is determined according to a valid classification. The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness, 27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty
Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as P10,000.00
may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today,
which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that
those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive
heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a
person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty
as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the
second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3,
considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the
time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist
today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno
and declares the incremental penalty in Article 315
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what
then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of
the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It
seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers,
which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate
remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise
their inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares
the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental
penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional
because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and
cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to
impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ...if this Court will
declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ...the void should
be filled by Congress. AIHTEa

JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at
One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ...(interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in
excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos
you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1)
year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of
statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal
wording of the law ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ...(interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
...then ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as
unconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
...as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in
excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
...and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one
(1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you. DIHETS

xxx xxx xxx 29

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v.
Helm, 30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal
Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar
Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form.
The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide
whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.;(1)
Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness
of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction,i.e.,whether more serious
crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the
present case, because in Solem what respondent therein deemed
cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota
after it took into account the latter's recidivist statute and not
the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally,
the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five
years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless,
respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole under South Dakota's recidivist statute
because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual
antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true
that the imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless,
the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a
domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime,
the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing
the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon
such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer's
loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is
so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher
penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of the crime
and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious
implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the
penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed
by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property;
Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take
or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment
or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not
exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount involved is more
than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if
the amount involved is more than six thousand
pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium
and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than twelve thousand pesos but is less thantwenty-
two thousand pesos.If the amount exceeds the latter,
the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also
suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the
funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. DAaEIc

The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the


Government loses money due to the unlawful acts of the offender.
Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed
is P200.00 (under the existing law),the amount now
becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of
embezzlement of P20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by
public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically
Section 3, 31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not
generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years
and 1 month to 15 years) 32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now
become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime
of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public
position to embezzle the fund or property of the government
entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with
force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of
the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the
bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief,
where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the
cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited),if we
increase the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in
the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value
of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force
employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an
inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling
under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is
punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not
exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is
1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or
intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty.
Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is
punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12
years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine
despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the
basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329,
the highest penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months)
if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under
the proposal, the value of the damage will now
become P100,000.00 (1:100),and still punishable by arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).And, if the value of the
damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty
isarresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does
not exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the
proposal, P200.00 will now become P20,000.00,which simply
means that the fine of P200.00 under the existing law will now
become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will
now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact
that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a
light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC. 33 Unless we also amend
Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the
penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision,
either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and
constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in
the RPC that may also be affected by the proposal, such as those
that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the
value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the
property of the National Library and National Museum) ,Article
312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property),Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks) ,Article
316 (Other forms of swindling),Article 317 (Swindling a
minor),Article 318 (Other deceits),Article 328 (Special cases of
malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging
statues, public monuments or paintings).Other crimes that
impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article
213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar
offenses),Article 215(Prohibited Transactions),Article
216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer) ,Article
218 (Failure of accountable officer to render accounts) ,Article
219(Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts
before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under
the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are punishable by
special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section
68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended. 34 The law treats
cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other
forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. 35 Under the law, the
offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 36 of the Revised Penal Code, which
means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based
on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the
offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of
Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended
also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is
dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in
the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not
in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and other related
provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough
study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There
may be some provisions of the law that should be amended;
nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the
intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely
making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in
the present times. Such is not within the competence of the
Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct
public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who,
after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to
revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new
legislation which will adopt to the times. AaECSH

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to


amend the Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments,
counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-
six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the
Revised Penal Code, 37 each one proposing much needed change
and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago
when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far
different from today's conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law
in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or
under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which
is repugnant to its terms. 38 The Court should apply the law in a
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially
when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put,
the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary
function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this
would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation
of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not
a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when
appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall
be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in
every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability
not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according
to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an
heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of
testate or intestate succession, may demand support from
the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended
party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the
victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by
the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of
money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to
the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the
value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the
imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the
reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in
some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain
the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from
Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for
awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not
provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the
award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as
civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages
under Article 2220 39 of the Civil Code also does not fix the
amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon
the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of
the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not
exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the
offense committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However,
all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature.
Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment
is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative
of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and
not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly
written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio
Carpio's opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should
be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only
impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00,
regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As
suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended
by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by
the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of
the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the
proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the
application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs
counter to what the law provides. aEHTSc

It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the


dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by
virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 40 in December 1993. The said law
has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no
punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time
the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by
Republic Act No. 9346, 41 the Court did not impede the imposition
of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment"
within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of
the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress
suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its
non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the
Court cannot declare the provision of the law from which the
proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action.
Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State
and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to
comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and
not collaterally, 43 more so in the present controversy wherein the
issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character
of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration
or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment
has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at
the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking
on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. 44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to
the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed
in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community." 45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to
amend the law and adapt it to our modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by
merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present
value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are
other factors and variables that need to be taken into
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said
values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on
the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic
impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and
weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of
us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the
Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient
personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and
surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal
Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to
Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to
wit:
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order
to determine the value of Peso you have to take into
consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes. SEDICa

JUSTICE PERALTA:
...and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine
those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the
Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of
those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I don't think it is within the power of the Supreme
Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred
(P100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
...One (P100.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
...has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to
in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a
power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you. 46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.


Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to
dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice.
Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the
Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three
years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply
compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the
past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or
"significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not
delving into the validity of the substance of a statute. The issue
is no different from the Court's adjustment of indemnity in crimes
against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light
of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja. 47 Besides,
Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the
Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately
lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious
and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers
of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to
Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-
cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before,
this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party
as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of
money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier
stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but
on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the
maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the
minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity
is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current
conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the
CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's
ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People 48 is highly instructive, thus:
CSTEHI
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only
two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the
same Code requires the division of the time included in
the penalty into three equal portions of time included in
the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the
three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the
maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty
prescribed are:
Maximum — 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium — 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8
months, 20 days
Minimum — 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5
months, 10 days 49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum
should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which
portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with
Article 65 50 of the RPC. 51 In the present case, the amount
involved is P98,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the
maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum
period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision
mayor.Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be
added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in
excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which
may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more
than the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for
each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would
be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed
penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against petitioner
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayorminimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to
perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not
pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and
enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a
short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the
Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE,the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED.
Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN
DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this
Decision be furnished the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
(Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, [April 29, 2014], 734 PHIL
|||

353-498)

[G.R. No. 152065. January 29, 2008.]

BELEN REAL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J :p

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 125 of the Revised
Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 45 thereof, is the August 3,
2000 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13885,
which affirmed the June 23, 1992 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, in Criminal Case No. 4116 finding
petitioner guilty of swindling (estafa) under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The facts appearing from the record are as follows:
Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant
Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business. On several occasions, Uy
entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on
the part of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to
return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of
time.
On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy's
house at Nueva Villa Subdivision, Barangay Alangilan, Batangas
City and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of jewelry as she
had a buyer at that time. Because petitioner is
his "kumadre", since Uy was one of the sponsors in the wedding
of petitioner's daughter, and because petitioner was his agent for
quite a time, Uy agreed. He showed petitioner some pieces of
jewelry and allowed the latter to select from them. ACHEaI

Petitioner selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a


receipt for the items selected by petitioner and handed the same
to the latter. After checking the receipt, petitioner wrote the
name Benjamin Uy at the upper portion thereof and affixed her
signature at the lower portion including her address. The receipt
reads:
KATIBAYAN
PINATUNAYAN KO na aking tinanggap kay Benjamin Uy,
ang mga sumusunod na alahas: No. 1449
Bilang Kalakal Halaga
1 Collar Emerald Cut Diamond P155,000.00
1 Pendant Solo Diamante 4 kts 55,000.00
1 Set Solo Marquez Lequids 50,000.00
1 Set 3 Stones Diamante Lequids 47,000.00
1 Domino 12 Stones Men's ring 35,000.00
1 Set Blue Pearl with Lequids 25,000.00
1 Set Corrales with broach 4,500.00
KABUUANG HALAGA P371,500.00
nasa mabuting kalagayan upang ipagbili ng KALIWAAN
lamang sa loob ng 10 araw mula ng aking paglagda; kung
hindi ko maipagbili ay isasauli ko ang lahat ng alahas loob
ng taning na panahong nakatala sa itaas; kung maipagbili
ko naman ay dagli kung [isusuli] at ibibigay ang buong
pinagbilhan sa [may-ari] ng mga alahas. Ang aking
gantimpala ay ang mapapahigit na halaga sa nakatakdang
halaga sa itaas ng bawat alahas; HINDI AKO
pinahihintulutang [ipautang] o ibigay na hulugan ang alin
mang alahas; ilalagak, ipagkakatiwala, ipahihiram,
isasangla o ipananagot kahit sa anong paraan ang alin
mang alahas sa ibang tao.
NILAGDAAN ko ang kasunduang ito ngayon
ika- 10 ng January, 1989 sa Batangas City.
(Sgd.) Belen Real Aplaya, Bauan, Bats.
LAGDA NG TAO NA TUMANGGAP TINITIRHAN 3

NG NASABING ALAHAS SA ITAAS NITO


Ten days thereafter, Uy went to petitioner's house at Aplaya,
Bauan, Batangas and asked about their transaction. Petitioner
informed Uy that the pieces of jewelry were already sold but the
payment was in the form of check. Petitioner showed Uy five (5)
pieces of checks all dated January 31, 1989 and requested the
latter to collect on said date. Uy acceded, but when he returned
on January 31, 1989, petitioner again requested him to return the
following day as she had not encashed the checks yet. Uy again
agreed but when he demanded the payment the following day,
petitioner called him "makulit" and "could not sleep for that
matter". Petitioner further remarked that the more she would not
pay Uy.
Constrained, Uy brought the matter to his lawyer, Atty.
Dimayacyac, who thereafter sent a demand letter to petitioner.
Despite receipt thereof, petitioner failed to make good her
obligation. Consequently, Uy lodged a criminal complaint against
petitioner before the City Prosecutor of Batangas. cSaCDT

On April 13, 1989, an Information for estafa under Article 315, par.
1 (b) of the RPC was filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Amelia
Perez-Panganiban against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas City.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty".
While admitting to have had several dealings with private
complainant Uy, petitioner claimed that her last transaction with
him was on December 22, 1988. She denied the truth of
the Katibayan, alleging that there was a time, prior to January 10,
1989, when she got pieces of jewelry from Uy that she was
required by him to sign in a blank piece of paper. CITcSH

On June 23, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision, 4 the


decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds
accused Belen Real guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under the
provisions of Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify Benjamin Uy in the amount of
P371,500.00, to pay the costs, and to suffer all the
accessories of the law.
SO ORDERED. 5

The trial court ratiocinated:


From the evidence adduced during the trial of this case, it
has been clearly established that all the elements of the
crime of estafa with abuse of confidence are present in
the commission of the offense and that the guilt of the
accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Undoubtedly, accused had received the seven (7) pieces of
jewelry from Benjamin Uy on January 10, 1989 at around
8:30 o'clock in the morning at Nueva Villa Subdivision,
Alangilan, Batangas City in trust or on commission[,] with
the obligation on her part to return the said pieces of
jewelry if unsold, or to deliver the proceeds of the sale, if
sold within ten (10) days from receipt. This agreement is
clearly embodied in the receipt dated January 10, [1989]
signed by the accused. ISDHcT

That there was misappropriation or conversion of such


money or property by the accused is very evident in this
case. The fact that the accused had failed to deliver the
proceeds of the sale of said jewelry items nor had she
returned the same jewelry items when demanded to do so
by the private complainant shows that accused had
misappropriated or converted to her personal use the
amount of P371,500.00. In fact, she even required the
private complainant to return to her house for several
times so that she could remit the proceeds of the sale to
him. However, accused did not comply with her
obligation.DTaSIc

In a litany of cases, the Supreme Court held that the


failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held
in trust is a circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
In an agency for the sale of jewelry, it [is] the agent's duty
to return the jewelry upon demand by the owner and the
failure to do so is evidence of that conversion of the
property by the agent.
It was also established that there was a demand made by
the private complainant from the accused, verbal and
written[,] as shown by the letter of demand which was
received by the accused.
Notably in the instant case[,] accused enjoyed the full
trust and confidence of Benjamin Uy when the latter
entrusted the pieces of jewelry to the accused, it being a
fact that the latter is a "kumadre" of Benjamin Uy, the
latter having been a sponsor in marriage of a daughter of
the accused, aside from the fact that previous to January
10, 1989 there had been transaction between Benjamin Uy
and accused involving a great amount of money.
Obviously, accused abused the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by Benjamin Uy when she refused and
failed to comply with her obligation. Her intention to
defraud Benjamin Uy of P371,500.00 is[,] therefore,
definitely clear.
The defense of the accused that she had not transacted
with Benjamin Uy on January 10, 1989 and that her last
transaction with the [latter] was on December 22, 1988
deserves not even a scant consideration in the face of the
positive declaration made by Benjamin Uy and his witness
and supported by the receipt, [Exhibit "A"], embodying
their agreement. TDcHCa
On the allegation of the accused that she was required by
Benjamin Uy to sign blank receipts [the same] is also
unbelievable considering the fact that accused had
reached third year in college and had been a sales agent
of private complainant for quite a time before January 10,
1989. 6
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, on
August 3, 2000, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. 7 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also
denied. 8aCASEH

Petitioner now raises the following points:


1. That one element of estafa under Article 315, par. 1
(b) of the RPC does not exist, hence, acquittal
from the crime charged is proper; and
2. That the courts below erred in imposing a penalty
that contravenes the imperative mandate of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 9
Petitioner argues that a reading of the trial court's decision
reveals its total silence on the presence of damage or prejudice
caused to private complainant Uy; ergo, she could not be held
guilty of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. Moreover,
petitioner advances that instead of imposing a straight penalty of
twenty (20) years ofreclusion temporal, the trial court should
have imposed a penalty with minimum and maximum periods in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The petition is in part meritorious.
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC 10 are
as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another. 11
Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage
was caused to private complainant Uy, it cannot be denied that
there exists a factual basis for holding that petitioner's refusal to
account for or return the pieces of jewelry had prejudiced the
rights and interests of Uy. Certainly, disturbance of property
rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the
RPC. 12 In this case, Uy, who is a businessman, not only failed to
recover his investment but also lost the opportunity to realize
profits therefrom. Anxiety also set in as he ran the risk of being
sued by the person who likewise entrusted him the same pieces
of jewelry. To assert his legal recourse, Uy further incurred
expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case. cDCaTH

While sustaining the conviction of petitioner of the crime


charged, this Court rules, however, that the penalty imposed by
the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was improper.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 13 in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the RPC or its amendments,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the RPC for the offense. The penalty next lower should be
based on the penalty prescribed by the RPC for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant
to the commission of the crime. The determination of the
minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the
court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in
the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence. 14
Specifically, the penalty provided in the RPC for estafa is as
follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Art. 315 above-quoted is composed of
two periods; hence, to get the maximum period of the
indeterminate sentence, the total number of years included in the
two periods should be divided into three. Article 65 of the RPC
requires the division of the time included in the prescribed
penalty into three equal periods of time included in the penalty
imposed, forming one period for each of the three portions. Thus,
the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty
prescribed for estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are: aCTHDA

Minimum — 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and


10 days
Medium — 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and
20 days
Maximum — 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years 15

In the present case, as the amount involved is P371,500, which


obviously exceeds P22,000, the penalty imposable should be the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
of prision mayor. However, Art. 315 further states that a period of
one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional
P10,000 defrauded in excess of P22,000 but in no case shall the
total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years. The
amount swindled from Uy exceeds the amount of P22,000 which,
when translated to the additional penalty of one year for every
P10,000 defrauded, goes beyond 20 years (close to additional 35
years to be exact). Hence, under the law, the maximum penalty to
be imposed to petitioner should be 20 years of reclusion
temporal.
On the other hand, the minimum period of the indeterminate
sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. In this case, the
penalty next lower to prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum is prision correccional minimum (6 months and 1
day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision correccional medium (2
years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Therefore,
the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. 16
Considering the attendant factual milieu as well as the position
of the Office of the Solicitor General in the present case, this
Court is convinced that the appropriate penalty to be imposed
upon petitioner, which is in accordance with law to best serve
the ends of justice, should range from four (4) years and two (2)
months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusión temporal, as maximum. TCaEIc

WHEREFORE, the August 3, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals


in CA-G.R. CR No. 13885, which affirmed the June 23, 1992
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed.
Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusión
temporal as maximum. IaDTES

Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. of the Court of Appeals is


hereby required to explain why he concurred in the decision
aforementioned applying the wrong penalty, the explanation to be
submitted in thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this
Decision, which copy is hereby directed to be furnished upon him
forthwith upon finality of this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Real v. People, G.R. No. 152065, [January 29, 2008], 567 PHIL
|||

14-25)

[G.R. No. 174113. January 13, 2016.]

PAZ CHENG y CHU, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the


Decision 2 dated March 28, 2006 and the Resolution 3 dated
June 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
24871, which affirmed the conviction of petitioner Paz
Cheng y Chu (Cheng) for three (3) counts of the crime
of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). HTcADC

The Facts
The instant case arose from the filing of three (3)
separate Informations 4 charging Cheng of the crime
of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of
the RPC before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
226 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75440, Q-98-
75441, and Q-98-75442. According to the prosecution, private
complainant Rowena Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng entered
into an agreement whereby Rodriguez shall deliver pieces of
jewelry to Cheng for the latter to sell on commission basis.
After one month, Cheng is obliged to either: ( a) remit the
proceeds of the sold jewelry; or ( b) return the unsold jewelry to
the former. On different dates ( i.e., July 12, 1997, July 16, 1997,
and August 12, 1997), Rodriguez delivered various sets of
jewelry to Cheng in the respective amounts of P18,000.00,
P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon delivery of the last batch of
jewelry, Cheng issued a check worth P120,000.00 as full
security for the first two (2) deliveries and as partial security
for the last. When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to
return the unsold jewelry on due date, Rodriguez presented the
check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored due to
insufficient funds. Upon assurance of Cheng, Rodriguez re-
deposited the check, but again, the same was dishonored
because the drawee account had been closed. Rodriguez then
decided to confront Cheng, who then uttered "Akala mo,
babayaran pa kita?" Thus, Rodriguez was constrained to file
the instant charges. 5
In defense, Cheng denied receiving any jewelry from
Rodriguez or signing any document purporting to be contracts
of sale of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a usurious
moneylender. She then admitted having an unpaid loan with
Rodriguez and that she issued a check to serve as security for
the same, but was nevertheless surprised of her arrest due to
the latter's filing of Estafa charges against her. 6
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 7 dated December 7, 2000, the RTC found
Cheng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts
of Estafa and, accordingly, sentenced her as follows: ( a) for the
first count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to
six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to
eight (8) years of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period (maximum); ( b) for the
second count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year,
eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods to six (6)
years, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8)
years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (maximum); and (c) for the third
count, Cheng is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, eight (8)
months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods to four (4) years, two (2) months,
and one (1) day to five (5) years, five (5) months, and ten (10)
days of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (minimum). 8
The RTC found that the prosecution has sufficiently
proven through documentary and testimonial evidence that: ( a)
Rodriguez indeed gave Cheng several pieces of jewelry for the
latter to either sell and remit the proceeds or to return said
jewelry if unsold to the former; and (b) Cheng neither returned
the jewelry nor remitted their proceeds to Rodriguez within the
specified period despite the latter's demands. In contrast,
Cheng failed to substantiate her claims through the
documentary evidence she presented while her testimony was
deemed to be incredible and not worthy of belief. 9
Aggrieved, Cheng appealed 10 to the CA. aScITE

The CA Ruling
In a Decision 11 dated March 28, 2006, the CA affirmed
Cheng's conviction for three (3) counts of Estafa, with
modification as to the penalties, as follows: ( a) for the first
count of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is
P257,950.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) for the
second count of Estafawhere the amount misappropriated is
P36,000.00, Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9)
years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third count
of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P18,000.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum. 12
The CA agreed with the RTC's findings that the
prosecution had sufficiently established Cheng's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, pointing out that Rodriguez's testimony was
"'more candid, credible and straightforward' and that 'her
demeanor in the witness stand is worthy of belief'" as opposed
to that of Cheng which is highly self-serving and
uncorroborated. 13 Further, the CA found that a modification of
Cheng's penalties is in order to conform with prevailing law
and jurisprudence on the matter. 14
Undaunted, Cheng moved for reconsideration 15 but was
denied in a Resolution 16 dated June 26, 2006; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
the CA correctly affirmed Cheng's conviction for three counts
of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of
the RPC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be[.]
xxx xxx xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property; HEITAD

xxx xxx xxx


The elements of Estafa under this provision are as
follows: (1) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or property received,
or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the
offender return the money or property received. 17 In the case
of Pamintuan v. People, 18 the Court had the opportunity to
elucidate further on the essence of the aforesaid crime, as
well as the proof needed to sustain a conviction for the same,
to wit:
The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return
should be made. The words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting
it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver
the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold
and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts. 19 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, a judicious review of the case records
reveals that the elements of Estafa, as defined and penalized
by the afore-cited provision, are present, considering that: ( a)
Rodriguez delivered the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of
selling them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required to
either remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry
after one month from delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what was
required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; ( d)
Rodriguez attempted to encash the check given by Cheng as
security, but such check was dishonored twice for being drawn
against insufficient funds and against a closed account; ( e)
Rodriguez demanded that Cheng comply with her undertaking,
but the latter disregarded such demand; ( f) Cheng's acts
clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its
value.
In a desperate attempt to absolve herself from liability,
Cheng insists that Rodriguez admitted in her own testimony
that the transaction between them is not an agency on
commission basis, but a plain sale of jewelry with Rodriguez as
the seller and Cheng as the buyer. As such, Cheng's non-
payment of the purchase price of the jewelry would only give
rise to civil liability and not criminal liability. 20 The pertinent
portion of Rodriguez's testimony is as follows:
Q. After the delivery of these several items totaling
P257,950.00, what happened next?
A. She issued a check worth P120,000.00.
Q. What check is that?
A. PDCP Bank, sir.
Q. What is this check for, Ms. Witness?
A. As payment for the first and second transactions, sir,
for P18,000.00 and P36,000.00 and the excess
amount is applied for the third transaction.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So, all in all, you have sixty (60) days period with
respect to this item, and the first delivery expired I
am referring to July 12, 1997 worth P18,000.00 which
will mature on September 11, so, from September 11,
what happened?
A. These were considered paid because she issued me a
check for the period of August 13, so I was expecting
that. 21 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Essentially, Cheng posits that since Rodriguez "admitted"
in her testimony that the check issued by the former in the
amount of P120,000.00 constituted full payment for the first
and second batch of jewelry and partial payment for the last
batch, the transactions entered into by the parties should be
deemed in the nature of a sale. ATICcS

Cheng is sadly mistaken.


The foregoing "admission" on the part of Rodriguez did
not change the fact that her transactions with Cheng should
be properly deemed as an agency on a commission basis
whereby Rodriguez, as the owner of the jewelry, is the
principal, while Cheng is the agent who is tasked to sell the
same on commission. In the eyes of the Court, Rodriguez
merely accepted the check as full security for the first and
second batches of jewelry and as partial security for the last
batch. It was only when Cheng defaulted in her undertaking
pursuant to their agreement that Rodriguez was constrained to
treat the check as the former's remittance of the proceeds of
the sale of jewelry — albeit deficient — by presenting it for
encashment on October 20, 1997, or more than two (2) months
after the delivery of the last batch of jewelry. 22 However, the
check was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient
funds. 23 This notwithstanding and with the assurance from
Cheng that the check will be cleared, Rodriguez presented
such check for the second time on November 4, 1997; but it
was again dishonored — this time for being drawn against a
closed account. 24 As such, the fact that Rodriguez loosely
used the words "payment" and "paid" should not be taken
against her and should not in any way change the nature of her
transactions with Rodriguez from an agency on a commission
basis to a full-fledged sale. Moreover, even Cheng does not
consider such check as payment for the jewelry, but rather, as
security for the loan she allegedly obtained from Rodriguez.
Indisputably, there is no reason to deviate from the
findings of the RTC and the CA as they have fully considered
the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense,
and they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary
reasons in concluding that Cheng is indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa by
misappropriation defined and penalized under Article 315 (1)
(b) of the RPC. It is settled that factual findings of the RTC,
when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive
when supported by the evidence on record, 25 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
March 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24871 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, petitioner Paz Cheng y Chu is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa defined and
penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
and is SENTENCED as follows: (a) for the first count
of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P257,950.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; (b) for the second count
of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P36,000.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years
of prision mayor, as maximum; and (c) for the third count
of Estafa where the amount misappropriated is P18,000.00,
Cheng is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro and Perez, JJ., concur.
Bersamin, J., I dissent.

Separate Opinions
BERSAMIN, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The State did not establish beyond reasonable


doubt the culpability of the accused for the crimes charged. HTcADC

Based on the assailed decision of the CA, the following


were the factual and procedural antecedents, viz.:
Accused-Appellant was charged with 3 counts of
Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code.Similarly worded except as to the date of the
commission of each estafa, the number of pieces of
jewelry, and the amount involved, the 3
Informations charged as follows:
That on or about the ____ day of ____,
1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud ROWENA
RODRIGUEZ in the following manner, to wit:
the said accused received in trust from said
complainant ______ pieces of Jewelry worth
P__________, Philippine Currency, for the
purpose of selling the same on commission
basis, under the express obligation on the part
of said accused of turning over the proceeds
of the sale to said complainant if sold, or of
returning the same if unsold to said
complainant, but the said accused, once in
possession of the said items, far from
complying with her obligation as aforesaid,
with intent to defraud, unfaithfulness and
grave abuse of confidence, failed and refused
and still fails and refuses to fulfill his
aforesaid obligation despite repeated
demands made upon her to do so and instead
misapplied, misappropriated and converted
the same or the value thereof, to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said ROWENA RODRIGUEZ in the
aforesaid amount of _______ Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Private Complainant testified as follows:
Private Complainant and Accused-Appellant
entered into various and numerous transactions. At
times, Accused-Appellant acquired loans from Private
Complainant or acted as the latter's sales agent.
On July 12, 1997, Private Complainant delivered 2
pieces of jewelry amounting to P18,000.00 for Accused-
Appellant to sell on commission basis. Both agreed that
Accused-Appellant shall remit to Private Complainant the
proceeds of the sale, or return the jewelry if unsold after
1 month. The parties entered into a similar transaction
on July 16, 1997, but this time involving 3 pieces of
jewelry valued at P36,000.00. The agreement on these
transactions were written in one document.
On August 12, 1997, Private Complainant delivered
another set of jewelry amounting to P257,950.00
reflected in a written agreement executed between the
parties. Accused-Appellant likewise issued a check worth
P120,000.00 as security for the first two deliveries and
as partial payment for the last delivery.
When Accused-Appellant failed to return the unsold
jewelries (sic) on due date, Private Complainant
presented the check for encashment. However, the check
was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Consequently, Accused-Appellant promised to pay
Private Complainant on the first week of November.
However, when Private Complainant re-deposited
the check on November 4, 1997, the check was again
dishonored because the account was closed. When
confronted, Accused-appellant refused to pay Private
Complainant and instead uttered: "AKALA MO,
BABAYARAN PA KITA?"
Private Complainant filed criminal charges for
estafa against the Accused-Appellant.
The Defense presented Accused-Appellant and
Virginia Araneta, who testified as follows:
Accused-Appellant denied receiving any jewelry
from Private Complainant or entering into any agreement
for her to sell said jewelry on commission basis.
Accused-Appellant denied signing the 2 written
agreements presented by Private Complainant purporting
to be contracts for the sale of jewelries. (Sic)
aScITE

Accused-Appellant claimed that Private


Complainant is a usurious money lender engaged in what
is otherwise known as "5-6." It was Private Complainant
who loaned her part of the capital for her vegetable
business.
On one occasion, Virginia Araneta accompanied
Accused-Appellant to borrow money from Private
Complainant. Accused-Appellant pledged some pieces of
jewelry as collateral for the loan and signed a written
contract. Unfortunately, Accused-Appellant failed to ask
a copy of the written contract from Private Complainant.
Private Complainant also requested Accused-Appellant to
issue a check to serve as a security for said loan but
promised not to deposit the same on due date.
Accused-Appellant admitted that her loan with
Private Complainant remained unpaid but she,
nevertheless, was surprised of her arrest. It was only
when she was at the Quezon City Jail that she was
informed by Private Complainant that Estafa cases were
filed against her.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 226, in Quezon
City found and declared the petitioner guilty of three counts
of estafa in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75440, Criminal Case No. Q-
98-75441 and Criminal Case No. Q-98-75442, all entitled People
of the Philippines v. Paz Cheng y Chu , through the judgment
rendered on December 7, 2000, 1 decreeing thusly:
In view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 3 counts of
estafa, defined and penalized under Art. 315, 1 (b) of
theRevised Penal Code.
On the first count, accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years 2 months and
1 day to 6 years 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (maximum).
On the second count, accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 months and 1 day
to 1 year 8 months and 20 days of prison correccional in
its minimum and medium periods to 6 years 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period
(Maximum).
On the third count, accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 months 1 day to 1
year 8 months and 20 days of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods to 4 years 2 months and 1
day to 5 years 5 months and 10 days of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period (minimum).
The sentence shall be served successively; and the
accused is ordered to indemnify the private complainant
Rowena Rodriguez in the amount of P257,950.00,
P36,000.00 and P18,000.00 and to pay the costs of the
suit.
SO ORDERED. 2

On appeal, the petitioner submitted that:


I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE THREE (3) COUNTS OF ESTAFA. 3
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner with modification of the penalties, 4 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision, dated December 7, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, in
Criminal Case No. Q-98-75440-2, is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. On the first count, Accused-Appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of Prision Correccional, as MINIMUM, to
20 years as MAXIMUM;
2. On the second count, Accused-Appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and
2 months of Prision Correccional, as MINIMUM,
to 9 years as MAXIMUM;
3. On the third count, Accused-Appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of Prision Correccional, as MINIMUM, to
6 years, 8 months and 20 days, as
MAXIMUM. HEITAD

SO ORDERED.
The CA later denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration on June 26, 2006. 5
In her present appeal, the petitioner urges the Court to
consider and resolve the following issues, namely:
I
WHETHER THE PETITIONER COMMITTED THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PARAGRAPH 1(B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
MERITS OF THE PETITIONER'S DEFENSE. 6
In its comment, 7 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that the petitioner hereby seeks the review of the
facts and the evidence; that the appeal should be rejected
because it urges a departure from the general rule that the
CA's findings of fact, which have affirmed the factual findings
of the trial court, should be accorded great respect, even
finality; that this case did not constitute an exception to
warrant the re-evaluation of the unanimous findings of fact of
the lower courts; that the Prosecution established the guilt of
the petitioner by sufficiently showing the concurrence of all
the essential elements of the offense charged; and that her
bare denial, being negative in nature, did not prevail over the
positive evidence presented against her.
Submission
I vote to acquit the petitioner on the ground that the
State did not establish her guilt for estafa through
misappropriation beyond reasonable doubt. I insist that in
every criminal prosecution, the State must discharge the duty
to establish the guilt of the accused by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the accused is entitled to
acquittal.
The felony of estafa through misappropriation is defined
and penalized in Article 315, 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,
viz.:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud
is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period if
such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if
such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any
of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property. (bold
emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of estafa through misappropriation are: (a)
that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration or under any other circumstances involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion
or diversion of such property by the person who has so
received it or a denial on her part that she received it; ( c) that
such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another;
and (d) that there be demand for the return of the property. 8
According to the CA, the Prosecution established the
petitioner's commission of estafa through misappropriation, to
wit:
All these elements were duly proven by the
Prosecution.
The 2 written agreements stipulated that the
pieces of jewelry were delivered to Accused-Appellant to
be sold on commission basis or to be returned if unsold
within 1 month. Clearly, the jewelry delivered to Accused-
Appellant was for a specific purpose, that is, for
Accused-Appellant to sell them, and in the event that it
cannot be sold, to return the same to Private
Complainant.
Accused-appellant, however, insisted that the
Prosecution "failed to prove the existence of
misappropriation" as there was no proof that the
accused-appellant kept the proceeds of the sale."
We disagree.
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" as used
in Article 315 connote an act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own or of devoting
it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
"misappropriate" a thing of value for one's own use or
benefit, not only the conversion to one's personal
advantage but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without a right. Misappropriation or
conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Failure to
account, upon demand, for funds or property held in
trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
Demand need not be formal. It may be verbal. A
query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the
one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount to a
demand. In this case, despite repeated demands from
Private Complainant, Accused-Appellant still failed to
return the jewelry or to remit the proceeds of the sale to
the prejudice of Private Complainant. Accused-
Appellant's failure to account for the jewelry entrusted to
her by Private Complainant constitutes misappropriation.
Accused-Appellant is, thus, liable for conversion under
Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
xxx xxx xxx 9

The Majority concur with the CA.


However, I cannot join my distinguished Brethren in the
conclusion that the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner. My assiduous and thorough review of the records of
the trial convinces me that the real agreement between the
parties was a sale of the items of jewelry, not the supposed
agency to sell such items on commission basis as the RTC and
the CA concluded. ETHIDa

It is conceded that the text of Exhibits A, Exhibit A-1 and


Exhibit A-2 — the documents evidencing the transactions —
seemed to allude to the petitioner's obligation as one of
agency to sell the items of jewelry on commission basis. Under
ordinary circumstances, the literal terms of such documents
would control and be regarded as the manifestation of the true
intention of the parties. But to give outright credence to the
interpretation of the evidence as the CA did would be to ignore
and disregard what complainant Rowena Rodriguez had herself
declared to be the true nature of the transactions with the
petitioner.
Rodriguez testified as follows:
Q. After the delivery of these several items totaling
P257,950.00, what happened next?
A. She issued a check worth P120,000.00.
Q. What check is that?
A. PDCP Bank, sir.
Q. What is this check for, Ms. Witness?
A. As payment for the first and second transactions, sir,
for P18,000.00 and P36,000.00 and the excess
amount is applied for the third transaction. 10
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So, all in all, you have sixty (60) days period with
respect to this item, and the first delivery expired. I
am referring to July 12, 1997 worth P18,000.00 which
will mature on September 11, so, from September 11,
what happened?
A. These were considered paid because she issued me a
check for the period of August 13, so I was expecting
that. 11
xxx xxx xxx
By stating that the check issued by the petitioner was
"payment for the first and second transactions, sir, for
P18,000.00 and P36,000.00 and the excess amount is applied
for the third transaction," Rodriguez revealed that she had
sold the pieces of jewelry to the latter. Thus, the petitioner
was the buyer of Rodriguez, not an agent on commission basis.
The right to a commission only establishes the relation of
principal and agent, with the agent coming under the
obligation to turn over to the principal the amount collected
minus such commission. If the agent should retain more than
the commission, she would be guilty of estafa through
misappropriation. 12 Yet, because the transaction between
Rodriguez and the petitioner was a sale, the former effectively
transferred to the latter the possession and the ownership of
the items of jewelry. 13 Once the ownership of the jewelry
became vested in the latter, 14 she could not misappropriate
the items of jewelry.
The foregoing excerpts of testimony further showed
Rodriguez to have "considered [the items of jewelry] paid" by
the petitioner. We should consider and regard such express
declaration as a confirmation of the true nature of her
agreement with the petitioner as a sale of the jewelry. The CA
erroneously ignored the testimony despite its being a
forthright judicial admission in the context of Section 4, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court. 15
Although Rodriguez had described the petitioner's PDCP
Check No. 003626 for P120,000.00 (Exhibit B) as
the security for the items of jewelry listed under Exhibits A and
Exhibit A-1, and as the partial payment for the last delivery
listed under Exhibits A-2, her presenting the check to the
drawee bank for payment or collection of the entire amount of
the check indicated that the check was always intended as
payment. This finding is still consistent with holding the
transactions as sales of the items of jewelry. Indeed, the
presentment of the check to the drawee bank as the person
primarily liable was antithetical to the notion of having the
check serve as mere security.
Clearly, the CA had no basis to hold the written text of
Exhibit A, Exhibit A-1 and Exhibit A-2 as controlling. In
contracts the intent of the parties always prevails over the
written form. cSEDTC

Did the dishonor of PDCP Check No. 003626 affect the


character of the transactions between the petitioner and
Rodriguez as sales of the items of jewelry?
I submit that the dishonor did not alter the character of
the transactions as sales but only rendered Rodriguez an
unpaid seller. The relationship between them resulting from
the dishonor was that of a creditor-and-debtor. In a purely
debtor-and-creditor relationship, the debtor who merely
refuses to pay or denies the indebtedness cannot be held
liable for estafa by misappropriation. The reason is readily
apparent. To convict a person of estafa under Article 315, par 1
(b) of theRevised Penal Code, the State must prove that she
has the obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods
or personal property received. 16 Considering that the petitioner
already became the owner of the pieces of jewelry, she could
dispose of the same, and her disposal of them would not
amount to the misappropriation thereof. 17 In short, the
petitioner did not thereby violate any trust or other obligation
to account for the items of jewelry that she already owned.
Considering that the Prosecution did not establish the
petitioner's guilt for the crimes of estafa through
misappropriation beyond reasonable doubt, she was entitled to
acquittal, 18 for it is always indispensable for the valid
conviction of the accused that the State shall prove the
existence of all the essential elements of the offense charged
beyond reasonable doubt. With less than all the elements of
the offense charged having been established, it is unwarranted
and unjust to still find her criminally liable.
||| (Cheng y Chu v. People, G.R. No. 174113, [January 13, 2016])

[G.R. No. 176114. April 8, 2015.]

GRACE SAN DIEGO y TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. THE


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J : p

For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review, dated


January 23, 2007, of petitioner Grace San Diego which seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution, 2 dated
March 6, 2006 and December 14, 2006, respectively, of the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirming with modification the Decision 3 dated
August 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 17, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified theft.
AECcTS

The following are the antecedent facts as found in the records.


Petitioner Grace San Diego had been the accountant of Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from
January 1993 to March 11, 1997. Petitioner was in charge of
accounting all business transactions of the cooperative and
performed the functions of cashier and teller, granted loans and
did check discounting and trading. She also recorded and
reported the cash in bank transactions and summarized the bank
transactions for the day and was also entrusted with a set of
blank checks pre-signed and was authorized to fill up the checks,
particularly the date, the amount in words and in figures, and the
payee.AIHTEa

That from November 18, 1996 to January 6, 1997, petitioner acted


as cashier when Teresita Gonzales was on maternity leave and
acted as teller from January 13-30, 1997 when Flordeliza Ocampo
was on her honeymoon. She then, on both occasions, had
complete access to the cash vaults and filing cabinets of the
cooperative where its documents were kept.
On March 12, 1997, petitioner stopped reporting for work. Narciso
Correa, the General Manager of the cooperative, then instructed
the bookkeeper, Angelita Dimapelis, to prepare bank book
balance based on the cash transactions during the day at the
office. They tried to establish the accountability of San Diego by
comparing the cash position she prepared and certified as
correct against the balances of the bank. Dimapelis asked the
different depository banks for their bank balances since their
savings account passbooks and bank statements were missing
at that time. 4
It was only after Corres and Dimapelis reconciled the cash
position with the bank balances that they discovered the
discrepancies in petitioner's report. The audited figure showed
the cash on hand in bank to be Php3,712,442.80 as of March 11,
1997. However, petitioner reported and certified the cash on hand
of the cooperative with the total amount of Php9,590,455.17 to be
correct. Dimapelis reported the said discrepancies to Correa and
the Board of Directors. It was then that they decided to file a
criminal complaint against San Diego. 5
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of
qualified theft, 6 which reads as follows:
That [on] or about the period from January 1996 up to
March 1997 in the [M]unicipality of Obando, [P]rovince of
Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
employed as accountant, cashier and teller of Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) and
as such had access to the books, cash vaults and bank
deposits of the Cooperative and with grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge
and consent of Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., take, steal and carry away with her cash
amounting to Php6,016,084.26, to [the] damage and
prejudice of the said Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., in the said amount of
Php6,016,084.26. aDHCAE

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
Upon arraignment on December 11, 1987, the accused, then
assisted by counsel de oficio for arraignment only, entered a plea
of not guilty. The pre-trial having been waived, trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the
testimonies of Alfonso Piscasio, its expert witness, Narciso
Correa, Angelita Demapilis, Teresita Gonzales, Noel Hilario and
Santiago Panganiban. The testimonies of Dante Liwanag, Cecilia
Sayo and Jessybelle San Diego were dispensed with. The
defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Alberto
C. Gonzales and Criselda Sarmiento-Oplas. The testimony of
Oplas, the defense's expert witness, can be summarized as
follows:
Oplas stated that she went over the bank reconciliation
statements for the whole year of 1996 and January to March
1997, the financial statements called financial conditions and the
financial operations of the company for the years ending
December 1996 and March 1997. She noticed that one of the
recording items stated "overstatement of deposit" or
overrecording of deposit so that it was deducted from the book.
Another reconciling item stated "understatement deposit" and it
was added. In "overstatement of deposit," she found a notation
"shortage" but did not find that the amount added in the case of
understatement of deposit was offset against the shortage or the
amount deducted from the book in case of overstatement of
deposit. 8
Consequently, the RTC rendered a Decision dated August 20,
2001, finding petitioner Grace San Diego guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing findings, the Court
hereby finds accused GRACE SAN DIEGO y TRINIDAD
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED
THEFT as defined and penalized under Article 310, in
relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code,
and accordingly, sentences her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for forty years without pardon before
the lapse of 40 years and with the accessory penalties of
death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code, and to
indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., in the amount of Php6,016,084.26.SCaITA

SO ORDERED. 9

Due to the nature of the judgment, petitioner filed her appeal


with this Court. However, in accordance with the ruling in People
v. Mateo, 10 the appeal was transmitted to the CA for intermediate
review. The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC, with
modification that she indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. in the amount of Php2,080,000.00. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
trial court appealed from which found accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
ofQUALIFIED THEFT is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that she is to indemnify the Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. in the amount
of Php2,080,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 11

Petitioner, after the CA denied her motion for reconsideration,


filed with this Court the present petition stating the following
grounds:
a) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE PROOF
ADDUCED BY THE PEOPLE SUFFICES TO
OVERTURN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
b) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OFFENSE ALLEGED
TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED, AND IN
CONSEQUENCE, COMMITTED [A] GRAVE LEGAL
ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE PROOF
ADDUCED CONGRUES WITH THE OFFENSE WITH
WHICH APPELLANT WAS CHARGED; AND TcaAID

c) THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE COMMITTED A


GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN THE MATTER OF THE
PENALTY IMPOSED.
In its comment dated April 18, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) stated that impleading the CA is procedurally
improper. It was stressed that the petition was an offshoot of a
criminal case, thus, the real party-respondent-in-interest is the
People of the Philippines. The OSG prayed that the petition be
dismissed outrightly.
This Court finds the present petition partially with merit.
It is settled that absent any showing that the findings are totally
devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, the factual
findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and
carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of
the trial court. 12Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in
affirming the factual findings of the RTC. She insists that the
prosecution was not able to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt because there was no proof in the audit that the
cooperative had really so much funds and that in consequence
there was deficiency of some Php6,000,000 when compared to
pertinent bank statements. As such, petitioner asserts that it is
essential for a successful prosecution for theft that the
existence of the personality stolen be established by qualitative
evidence, so the prosecution must fail if no such proof of good
quality was adduced. 13
This Court disagrees. HAaScT

The CA did not err when it ruled that the proof adduced by the
prosecution is sufficient to prove petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution presented the testimony of its
expert witness, Alfonso Piscasio, the cooperative's independent
auditor since 1992. He stated that his audit was based on
standard and generally accepted auditing procedures. 14 The audit
report, duly offered and presented in the trial, was supported by
certifications by several depository banks of the cooperative
indicating its balance on its account. Records are bereft of any
showing that the audit report made by the independent auditor is
erroneous and unsupported by documents and bank statements.
Thus, there lies no reason for this Court not to accord full faith
and credit to his report. aDSHCc

Petitioner's own expert witness, Criselda Sarmiento Oplas, failed


to dispute the audit report presented. She admitted to focusing
her review on bank reconciliation made by Piscasio. 15 It was only
upon cross-examination that she saw the daily cash flow that
petitioner prepared and certified. 16 She did not go over the
primary books of accounts of the cooperative like the ledgers,
journals and vouchers nor its commercial documents such as
invoices, returned checks including account deposits. She limited
herself to the monthly conciliation reports. 17
Petitioner also asserts that the People did not present any
witness who categorically testified that petitioner ran away with
the supposed missing funds. She claimed that the demonstration
that some checks of varying amounts not recorded in petitioner's
books notwithstanding their return or dishonor, only proved her
incompetence in the performance of her assigned task and not
necessarily criminal authorship.
This Court does not agree. It was held in People v. Ragon that
resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable when there are no
eyewitnesses to a crime. 18 Direct evidence of the commission of
a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw
its conclusion and finding of guilt. 19 The courts are allowed to
rule on the bases of circumstantial evidence if the following
requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 20 The corollary
rule is that the circumstances established must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person. 21
In the instant case, the following facts were established in the
trial court, which the CA later affirmed:
1) Petitioner was the accountant of the cooperative. She
had custody of the cooperative's checks which were
pre-signed by its Manager and Chairman of the Board
of Directors. She was likewise in charge of cash in
bank. She had custody of the documents pertaining
to the withdrawal of the cooperative's deposits with
its depository banks.
DTAHEC

2) Petitioner completed said checks by filling in all the


details inclusive of the date, name of payee and the
amount of the check in words and in figures but
exclusive of the signatures.
3) From November 18, 1996 to January 6, 1997, she acted
as cashier when Teresita Gonzales was on maternity
leave and acted as teller from January 13-30, 1997
when Flordeliza Ocampo went into her honeymoon.
She then, on both occasions, had complete access to
the cash vaults and filing cabinets of the cooperative
where its documents were kept.
4) Petitioner prepared a certification that the amount of
Php9,653,527.06 represented the total cash balance
of the cooperative its depository banks as of March
11, 1997. Upon actual verification, it was shown that
the total cash balance was only Php3,637,442.80,
indicating that there was a difference of
Php6,016,084.25 and the loss of which were
unexplained.
5) Petitioner admitted in a letter to her father that she
withdrew Php200,000 from his account and
Php20,000 from her sister-in-law's account in the
cooperative.
6) Petitioner deposited Php1,050,000 and Php250,000 to
her account with PCI Bank on August 13, 1996 and
May 28, 1996, respectively.
7) Petitioner stopped reporting for work since March 12,
1997. 22
In view of the foregoing circumstances and based on records,
such created an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the petitioner, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person.
Petitioner then insists that the proof adduced plausibly indicates
commission of estafa and not qualified theft. Petitioner argued
that if the thing is not taken away, but received and then
appropriated or converted without the consent of the owner, the
crime committed is estafa. 23
This Court is not persuaded by her argument. One of the
elements of estafa 24 with abuse of confidence is that the money,
goods or other personal property be received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the
same. When the thing is received by the offender from the
offended party in trust or in commission or for administration, the
offender acquires both material or physical possession and
juridical possession of the thing received. 25
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the
transferee a right over the thing transferred and this he may set
up even against the owner. 26 It was established in the trial that
petitioner never received the sum of money in trust, or on
commission or for administration. Correa outlined the procedure
followed by the cooperative in the deposit of its funds with the
cooperative's depository banks, thus:
A: There were cash summarized for the day and the
checks collected during the day for the different
depository banks are summarized and prepared by Grace
San Diego and this (sic) were being brought to the
different depository banks and sent through our liaison
office Mr. Al Gonzales. 27
xxx xxx xxx
When asked how said funds were withdrawn from said
banks by the cooperative, Correa answered:
A: Normally, withdrawals are made by checks and if there
are no cleared checks in the bank the accountant because
she knew the cash position in the bank if there is a need
of cash, a check is converted into cash in the depository
bank and sent through the liaison officer and handed to
the chief accountant because she was the one
responsible. 28
xxx xxx xxx
As to how checks were prepared as far as withdrawals
were concerned was, Correa's answer was:
A: Because we have so many things to do, we were busy
we were preoccupied, we prepared set of blank check
resigned and we entrusted this to Ms. Grace San Diego
and she filled up the checks particularly the date, the
words, the amount in words and in figure numbers, sir. 29
Clearly, the above testimonies show that petitioner did not have
juridical possession of the sum of money. She did not have the
right over the sum of money she may have received in the course
of her functions as accountant, teller and cashier of the
cooperative. The CA was correct when it described the
possession of the petitioner was akin to that of a receiving teller
of funds received from third persons paid to the bank. Payment
by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the
teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and
has no independent, autonomous right to retain the money or
goods received in consequence of the agency, as when the
principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and
indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault. 30
Anent the issue of penalty, the penalty for the crime of qualified
theft based on Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the
penalty next higher by two (2) degrees than those respectively
specified in Article 309 of the RPC, thus:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value
of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. cDCaTS

From the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the
penalty that is two (2) degrees higher than prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods. In view, however, of the
incremental penalty in simple theft under Article 309 of the RPC,
which is likewise applicable to the crime of qualified theft, when
the value of the thing stolen is more than P22,000.00, the penalty
shall be imposed in its maximum period with an additional period
of one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. In
the case at bar, the value of the property stolen as determined by
the RTC and modified by the CA is P2,080,000.00. Deducting
P22,000.00 to the amount, the difference of P2,058,000.00 will
then be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than
P10,000.00, we will have two hundred five (205). Thus, 205 years
is the incremental penalty. Since the imposable penalty for
qualified theft is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods to be imposed in its maximum period which is eighteen
(18) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days to twenty
(20) years, if we add the incremental penalty of two hundred five
(205) years, then the range of the penalty is two hundred twenty-
three (223) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days to
two hundred twenty-five (225) years. However, such penalty
cannot be imposed because the maximum penalty that can be
imposed is only up to 40 years, which is the maximum period
of reclusion perpetua. cCAIaD

Unlike in Simple Theft where the maximum penalty cannot


exceed twenty (20) years, in Qualified Theft such limitation does
not exist. Nonetheless, inasmuch as the penalty imposable in the
case at bar exceeds twenty (20) years, logically, the penalty that
should be imposed is reclusion perpetua, which is the penalty
one degree higher than reclusion temporal.
There is now a need to modify the penalty imposed by the lower
court and affirmed by the CA. Verily, the proper penalty
imposable is, thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but it was
incorrect for the RTC to sentence the accused to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for forty (40) years without pardon because
that would be a limitation on the part of the power of the Chief
Executive. The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary
in the President and may not be controlled by the legislature or
reversed by the court, save only when it contravenes the
limitations set forth by the Constitution. 31 Interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum is likewise imposed from date of
finality of this Decision until full payment pursuant to Nacar
v. Gallery Frames. 32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Consequently, the Decision
and Resolution, dated March 6, 2006 and December 14, 2006,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification
the Decision dated August 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft under Article 310,
in connection with Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Grace San
Diego y Trinidad is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all its
accessory penalties and to indemnify the Obando Fisherman's
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. in the amount of
Php2,080,000.00, plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from finality of judgment until full satisfaction. AHCaES

SO ORDERED.
||| (San Diego y Trinidad v. People, G.R. No. 176114, [April 8, 2015])

[G.R. No. 190970. November 24, 2014.]

VILMA M. SULIMAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the


Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 21, 2009, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 30693 which denied herein petitioner's Motion to
Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the
appellate court's Resolution 2 dated January 8, 2010, which
likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Resolution dated July 21, 2009.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
In six (6) Informations, 3 all dated June 6, 2003, herein petitioner
and one Luz P. Garcia were charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila with two (2) counts of illegal recruitment
under Section 6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act No.
8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as four (4) counts of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Only petitioner was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia,
eluded arrest and remained at-large despite the issuance of a
warrant for her arrest.
The six cases were consolidated and, after trial, the RTC of
Manila, Branch 21, rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment
and three (3) counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision, 4 dated June 7, 2006, reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds as
follows:aTADcH

1) In Crim. Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189, accused


VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crimes charged and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS each
and to pay fine of P200,000.00 for each count.
2) In Crim. Case No. 03-216190, accused VILMA SULIMAN
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime
charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWO (2) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) and to indemnify
Anthony Mancera y Rey the amount of P120,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the costs.
3) In Crim. Case No. 03-216191, accused VILMA SULIMAN
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime
of Estafa and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correctional (sic) and to indemnify private complainant
Perlita A. Prudencio the amount of P132,460.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.SACTIH

4) In Crim. Case No. 03-216192, for failure of the


prosecution to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused VILMA SULIMAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
5) In Crim. Case No. 03-216193, accused VILMA SULIMAN
is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correctional (sic) and to indemnify Jimmy
Tumabcao the amount of P21,400.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in cases of insolvency and to pay the cost.
Accordingly, the bond posted for her provisional liberty is
hereby CANCELLED.
Considering that the accused Vilma Suliman was detained
from January 6, 2003 to July 23, 2004 prior to her posting
bond for her provisional liberty, her period of detention
shall be credited in the service of her sentence.
Considering that Luz Garcia has not been apprehended nor
voluntarily surrendered to date, let warrant be issued for
her arrest and let the case against her be ARCHIVED to be
reinstated upon her apprehension.
SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 6 but the RTC denied


it in its Order 7 dated January 23, 2007 for lack of merit.
Petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA.
On May 21, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
appeal filed in this case is hereby DENIED and
consequently, DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
June 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, in the
City of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-216188, 03-
216189, 03-216190, 03-216191 and 03-216193 are
hereby AFFIRMEDwith the following modifications:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189 for
illegal recruitment, the Court sentences accused-
appellant VILMA SULIMAN to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) for each count.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-216190 for estafa involving
private complainant Anthony Mancera, the Court
sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer a
minimum period of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional to a maximum term of fifteen (15)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
ofreclusion temporal.
3. In Criminal Case No. 03-216191 for estafa involving
private complainant Perlita A. Prudencio, the Court
sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the
minimum period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional to maximum term of seventeen
(17) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
ofreclusion temporal.
4. In Crim. Case No. 03-216193 for estafa involving
private complainant Jimmy Tumabcao, the Court
sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the
minimum term of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional to maximum term of six years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor.
SO ORDERED. 8

Petitioner's counsel received a copy of the above CA Decision on


May 26, 2009. 9 However, neither petitioner nor her counsel filed a
motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period
for filing the said motion. Hence, on June 11, 2009, the subject
CA Decision became final.
On July 3, 2009, petitioner, through her new collaborating
counsel, filed a Motion to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration 10 praying that the same be admitted in the
higher interest of "substantial justice and due process."
Petitioner contended that her former counsel committed gross
and inexcusable neglect of his duty as counsel in failing to
immediately inform petitioner about his receipt of the subject CA
Decision, thereby depriving petitioner of her right to file a motion
for reconsideration which, in turn, is a violation of her right to
due process.
On July 21, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner's
Motion to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 11 but the CA denied
it in its Resolution dated January 8, 2010.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ADMITTING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THE PETITIONER
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING [THAT] PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE BOUND
BY THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF ATTY. MAYO IN NOT
INFORMING HER ABOUT HIS RECEIPT OF THE DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ADVERSE TO HER ON MAY
26, 2009 OR IN NOT FILING A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND
INTEREST OF THE PETITIONER 12
The petition lacks merit. cASEDC

The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that she


should not be bound by her counsel's gross neglect of duty in not
informing her of the adverse decision of the CA. The Court agrees
with the observation of the CA that petitioner is not entirely
blameless as she was not vigilant in monitoring the progress of
her case. Evidence of her negligence is the fact that she did not
make any effort to personally follow up her appeal with her
counsel. Instead, she merely relied on a certain Conrad Lucero,
the person who referred her to her counsel, regarding updates of
her appeal with the CA. In this respect, the Court's ruling
in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People 13 is instructive, to wit:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's
acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural
technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel,
once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts
necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that
any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the
authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or
omission of the client himself. A recognized exception to
the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the
counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the
exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should
not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or
malice, considering that the client has the duty to be
vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-
to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the
client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is
rendered against him.
Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the
status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of
his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the
client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to
time in order to be informed of the progress and
developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the
bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being
taken care of is not enough. 14
It may not be amiss to add that this Court notes the propensity of
petitioner and her counsel to disregard the Rules and directives
of the Court. In a Resolution 15 issued by this Court on March 14,
2011, petitioner's counsel was admonished for his failure to file
petitioner's Reply to Comment which was required in an earlier
Resolution issued by this Court.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provision of law. 16 An appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the
Rules cannot be tolerated. 17 The rationale for this strict attitude
is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to
facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. 18 In an age
where courts are bedevilled by clogged dockets, the Rules need
to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. 19 Their
observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of
appellants. In the instant case, petitioner remained obstinate in
her non-observance of the said Rules. Such obstinacy is
incongruous with her late plea for liberality in construing the
Rules. On the above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant
petition is dismissible.
In any case, even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present
petition, as it appears that petitioner assails not only the denial
by the CA of her motion to admit her belated Motion for
Reconsideration but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction
for illegal recruitment and estafa, the Court still finds no cogent
reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. Indeed, after
a careful and thorough review of the evidence on record, the
Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in
convicting petitioner of the crimes of illegal recruitment
and estafa.
At this point, it bears reiterating that in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the factual
findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
generally held binding and conclusive on the Court. 20 We
emphasize that while jurisprudence has provided exceptions 21 to
this rule, the petitioner carries the burden of proving that one or
more exceptional circumstances are present in the case. 22 The
petitioner must additionally show that the cited exceptional
circumstances will have a bearing on the results of the case. 23 In
the instant case, the Court finds that none of the exceptions are
present. Thus, there is no cogent reason to depart from the
findings of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Section 6 of RA
8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides as follows:
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. — For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring
workers and includes referring, contact services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-
holder of authority contemplated under Article 13 (f)
of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines. Provided, that
such non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise
include the following acts, whether committed by any
persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount
greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable
fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount
greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or
document in relation to recruitment or employment; IESAac

(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or


document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the
purpose of securing a license or authority underthe
Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already
employed to quit his employment in order to offer him
another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a
worker from oppressive terms and conditions of
employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or
entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for
employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers
in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to dignity
of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly
authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment,
placement vacancies, remittances of foreign exchange
earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such
other matters or information as may be required by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker,
employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor and Employment from the time of
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including
the period of the expiration of the same without the
approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement
agency to become an officer or member of the Board of
any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be
engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a
travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant
workers before departure for monetary or financial
considerations other than those authorized underthe
Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as
determined by the Department of Labor and Employment;
and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the
workers in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where
the deployment does not actually take place without the
worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as
offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are
the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of
juridical persons, the officers having control, management
or direction of their business shall be liable. 24
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the
prosecution has established that petitioner and her co-accused
committed the acts enumerated under the provisions of Section 6
(a), (l) and (m) of RA 8042 when: (1) they separately charged the
private complainants the amounts of P132,460.00, P120,000.00
and P21,400.00 as placement fees; (2) they failed to actually
deploy the private complainants without valid reasons, and; (3)
they failed to reimburse the said complainants after such failure
to deploy.
As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the instant
case is penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC,
wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud
another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is committed
by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. The
elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a)
that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation
as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense
or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or
property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage. 25
In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was
proven beyond reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and her co-accused
misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity
to deploy the private complainants for employment either in
South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The misrepresentation
was made prior to private complainants' payment of placement
fees. It was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made by
petitioner and her co-accused that induced the private
complainants to part with their money. As a result of such false
pretenses and misrepresentations, the private complainants
suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never
materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were
never recovered.
Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable because she
was not privy nor was she aware of the recruitment activities
done by her co-accused. Petitioner avers that when her co-
accused received several amounts of money from the private
complainants, she acted in her personal capacity and for her own
benefit without the knowledge and consent of petitioner. The
Court is not persuaded. As owner and general manager, petitioner
was at the forefront of the recruitment activities of Suliman
International. Undoubtedly, she has control, management or
direction of the business of the said company. Petitioner's denial
is an intrinsically weak defense, especially in the face of positive
assertions made by the private complainants who had no ill
motive to falsely testify against her. Indeed, of marked relevance
is the absence of any showing that the private complainants had
any ill motive against petitioner other than to bring her to the bar
of justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment. Besides,
for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most
serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be
against human nature and experience. 26 Where there is nothing to
show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on
the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full
faith and credence. 27 In any case, petitioner cannot deny
participation in the recruitment of the private complainants
because the prosecution has established that petitioner was the
one who offered the private complainants an alleged alternative
employment in Ireland when their original deployment did not
materialize.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, dated July 21, 2009 and January 8, 2010 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 30693, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Suliman v. People, G.R. No. 190970, [November 24, 2014])

[G.R. No. 198012. April 22, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-


appellee, vs. ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO AND VICENTA
LAPIZ y MEDINA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J :p

This is an appeal from the February 17, 2011 Decision 1 of


the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02366, which
denied the appeal brought therewith and affirmed the May 31,
2006 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 40 in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-176598 and 99-176599 to
603. The RTC convicted Angel Mateo y Jacinto (Mateo) and
Vicenta Lapiz y Medina (Lapiz) a.k.a. "Vicky Mateo"
(appellants) of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
underRepublic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042), otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and of
five counts of estafa.
Factual Antecedents
Sometime during the period from January to March 1998,
the five private complainants, namely, Abel E. Balane (Abel),
Emilio A. Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D. Flordeliza (Victorio),
Manuel Oledan (Manuel) and Virgilio N. Concepcion (Virgilio),
met appellants on separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon,
Malate, Manila to apply for overseas employment. Appellant
Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with some
Japanese firms, promised them employment in Japan as
conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. Appellants
also promised that they could facilitate private complainants'
employment as direct hires and assured their departure within
three weeks. However, after the private complainants paid the
required fees ranging from P18,555.00 to P25,000.00,
appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for them.
Appellants likewise failed to return private complainants'
money. This prompted Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) where he was issued a
Certification 3 stating that appellants are not licensed to
recruit applicants for overseas employment. Thereupon, the
private complainants filed their Complaint and executed their
respective affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). The NBI referred the charges to the Department of
Justice which subsequently found probable cause against
appellants for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa 4 and
accordingly filed the corresponding Informations 5 for the same
before the RTC of Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo
claimed that he is a legitimate car importer and not a
recruiter. Lapiz, on the other hand, denied knowing any of the
private complainants whom she claimed to have met for the
first time at the Prosecutor's Office.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC disposed of the cases in its Decision 6 rendered
on May 31, 2006 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for
Illegal Recruitment, this Court finds both accused ANGEL
MATEO y JACINTO and VICENTA LAPIZ y MADINA a.k.a.
"VICKY MATEO" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment in large scale and hereby sentences
each of them to life imprisonment and to pay
P500,000.00 fine each as well as to indemnify private
complainants (1) Manuel Oledan the sum of P25,000.00,
and (2) Emilio A. Cariaga, (3) Abel E. Balane, (4) Virgilio N.
Concepcion and (5) Victorio D. Flordeliza the sum of
P18,555.00 each.
This Court finds both accused also GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-176599, 99-
176600, 99-176601, 99-176602 and 99-176603 for five (5)
counts of Estafa and each accused is hereby sentenced
in each case to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty
one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
The [Philippine] Overseas and Employment
Administration (POEA) shall be furnished with certified
copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED. 7

Ruling of the Court of Appeals


In their appeal before the CA, appellants essentially
claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of
the crimes for which they were charged. They contended that
Abel has not shown any receipt to prove that they received
money from him; that there is likewise no proof that Virgilio
borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which money he, in
turn, gave to them; that the testimony of Emilio that appellants
were holding office inside the van of Abel cannot be easily
accepted; and that their transactions with Manuel and Victorio
were limited to the processing of their travel documents.
The CA, however, denied appellants' appeal in its
Decision 8 dated February 17, 2011, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 40, dated May 31, 2006 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 9

Hence, the present appeal.


Per Resolution 10 dated September 19, 2011, the Court
required both parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. Appellants filed their Supplemental Brief, 11 while
appellee People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, opted not to file any and just adopted the
appellee's brief it filed before the CA. 12
The Court's Ruling
The appeal utterly lacks merit.
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the
following elements: (1) the person charged undertook any
recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2)
accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused
committed the same against three or more persons
individually or as a group. 13 These elements are obtaining in
this case. First, the RTC found appellants to have undertaken a
recruitment activity when they promised private complainants
employment in Japan for a fee. This factual finding was
affirmed by the CA. "The time-tested doctrine is that the
matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial
judge." 14 And when his findings have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court. 15 Second, the Certification issued by
the POEA unmistakably reveals that appellants neither have a
license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment. Notably, appellants never assailed this
Certification. Third, it was established that there were five
complainants. Clearly, the existence of the offense of illegal
recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the prosecution.
Appellants' argument that there was no proof that they
received money from the private complainants deserves no
credence. Suffice it to say that money is not material to a
prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the
definition of "illegal recruitment" under the law includes the
phrase "whether for profit or not." Besides, even if there is no
receipt for the money given by the private complainants to
appellants, the former's respective testimonies and affidavits
clearly narrate the latter's involvement in the prohibited
recruitment. 16
Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that
a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the [law] may,
for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements
of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or
a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation." 17 All these elements are likewise
present in this case. As aptly held by the CA:
Here, the appellants Mateo and Lapiz committed
deceit against the private complainants by making it
appear as though they had the authority and resources to
send them to Japan for employment; that there were
available jobs for them in Japan for which they would be
hired although, in truth, there were none; and, that by
reason or on the strength of such assurance, the private
complainants parted with their money in payment of the
placement fee, documentation and hotel
accommodations. All these representations were
actually false and fraudulent and thus, the appellants
must be made liable under par 2(a), Art. 315 of
the Revised Penal Code.18
With this ratiocination, Lapiz's defense of not knowing
any of the complainants must necessarily fail. As noted by the
RTC and the CA, she was present in all of the transactions,
serving as runner of Mateo and was even the one keeping the
money entrusted by the private complainants to appellants.
She would also often pacify the private complainants'
uneasiness about the absence of receipts for each of the
amounts given and repeatedly assure them they would be
deployed to Japan. In short, she was an indispensable
participant and effective collaborator of Mateo in the illegal
recruitment of the private complainants.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the lower
courts' conviction of appellants for the crimes charged.
It must be noted, however, that both the RTC and the CA
failed to award interest on the money judgment in Criminal
Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
Following prevailing jurisprudence, the Court, therefore,
imposes interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each of the
amounts awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
dated February 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02366 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
amounts ordered restituted in Criminal Case No. 99-176598
shall each earn an interest of 6% per annum from the finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Mateo y Jacinto, G.R. No. 198012, [April 22, 2015])

[G.R. Nos. 209655-60. January 14, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


PALMY TIBAYAN and RICO Z. PUERTO, accused-
appellants.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

Assailed in this ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-appellants


Palmy Tibayan (Tibayan) and Rico Z. Puerto (Puerto) (accused-
appellants) is the Decision 2 dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669,
33939, and 34398 which modified the Decisions dated December
4, 2009, 3 June 24, 2010, 4 August 2, 2010, 5 August 5,
2010, 6 January 21, 2011, 7 and August 18, 2011 8 of the Regional
Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 198 (RTC) and convicted
accused-appellants of the crime of Syndicated Estafa, defined
and penalized under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC)in relation to Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1689. 9
The Facts
Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end
investment company registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 21, 2001. 10 Sometime
in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and its
subsidiaries. In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was
selling securities to the public without a registration statement
in violation of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as "The
Securities Regulation Code," and that TGICI submitted a
fraudulent Treasurer's Affidavit before the SEC. Resultantly, on
October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked TGICI's corporate registration
for being fraudulently procured. 11
The foregoing led to the filing of multiple criminal cases 12 for
Syndicated Estafa against the incorporators and directors of
TGICI, 13 namely, Jesus Tibayan, Ezekiel D. Martinez, Liborio E.
Elacio, Jimmy C. Catigan, Nelda B. Baran, and herein accused-
appellants. 14 Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued
against all of them; however, only accused-appellants were
arrested, while the others remained at large. 15
According to the prosecution, private complainants Hector H.
Alvarez, Milagros Alvarez, Clarita P. Gacayan, Irma T. Ador, Emelyn
Gomez, Yolanda Zimmer, Nonito Garlan, Judy C. Rillon, Leonida D.
Jarina, Reynaldo A. Dacon, Cristina Dela Peña, and Rodney E.
Villareal 16 (private complainants) were enticed to invest in TGICI
due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance
that they will recover their investments. After giving their money
to TGICI, private complainants received a Certificate of Share
and post-dated checks, representing the amount of the principal
investment and the monthly interest earnings,
respectively. 17 Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored,
as the account was already closed, prompting private
complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to
demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees took the
said checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement
receipts, and reassured that their investments, as well as the
interests, would be paid. However, the TGICI office closed down
without private complainants having been paid and, thus, they
were constrained to file criminal complaints against the
incorporators and directors of TGICI. 18
TCEaDI

In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired


with the other TGICI incorporators to defraud private
complainants. Particularly, Puerto claimed that his signature in
the Articles of Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since
January 2002, he was no longer a director of TGICI. For her part,
Tibayan also claimed that her signature in the TGICI's Articles of
Incorporation was a forgery, as she was neither an incorporator
nor a director of TGICI. 19
The RTC Rulings
On various dates, the RTC issued six (6) separate decisions
convicting Tibayan of 13 counts and Puerto of 11 counts
of Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in
relation to PD 1689, to wit: (a) in a Joint Decision 20 dated
December 4, 2009, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa,
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of 20 years of reclusion temporal for each count and
ordering them to pay the amounts of P1,500,000.00 to Hector H.
Alvarez, and P119,405.23 and P800,000.00 to Milagros
Alvarez; 21 (b) in a Joint Decision 22 dated June 24, 2010, the RTC
acquitted Puerto of all the charges, but found Tibayan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Estafa, sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years
of reclusion temporal for each count, and ordering her to pay the
amounts of P1,300,000.00 and US$12,000.00 to Clarita P.
Gacayan and P500,000.00 to Irma T. Ador; 23 (c) in a Joint
Decision 24 dated August 2, 2010, the accused-appellants were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Estafa,
and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of 20 years of reclusion temporal for each count, and
ordered to pay the amounts of P1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer
and P556,376.00 to Nonito Garlan; 25 (d) in a Joint
Decision 26 dated August 5, 2010, the RTC found the accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count
of Estafa, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal and ordering them
to pay Emelyn Gomez the amount of P250,000.00; 27 (e) in a
Decision 28 dated January 21, 2011, accused-appellants were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count
ofEstafa each, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal and
ordered to pay Judy C. Rillon the amount of
P118,000.00; 29 and (f) in a Joint Decision 30 dated August 18, 2011,
accused-appellants were each convicted of four (4) counts
of Estafa, and meted different penalties per count, as
follows: (i) for the first count, they were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a period of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay
Reynaldo A. Dacon the amount of P100,000.00; (ii) for the second
count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for a period of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to pay Leonida D. Jarina the amount of
P200,000.00; (iii) for the third count, they were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years
of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay Cristina
Dela Peña the amount of P250,000.00; and (iv) for the last count,
they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay Rodney E.
Villareal the amount of P100,000.00. 31
In the aforesaid decisions, the RTC did not lend credence to
accused-appellants' denials in light of the positive testimonies of
the private complainants that they invested their money in TGICI
because of the assurances from accused-appellants and the
other directors/incorporators of TGICI that their investments
would yield very profitable returns. In this relation, the RTC found
that accused-appellants conspired with the other
directors/incorporators of TGICI in misrepresenting the company
as a legitimate corporation duly registered to operate as a
mutual fund to the detriment of the private
complainants. 32 However, the RTC convicted accused-appellants
of simple Estafa only, as the prosecution failed to allege in the
informations that accused-appellants and the other
directors/incorporators formed a syndicate with the intention of
defrauding the public, or it failed to adduce documentary
evidence substantiating its claims that the accused-appellants
committed Syndicated Estafa. 33
Aggrieved, accused-appellants separately appealed the foregoing
RTC Decisions to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063,
33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398. Thereafter, the CA
issued a Resolution 34 dated February 19, 2013 ordering the
consolidation of accused-appellants' appeals.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 35 dated June 28, 2013, the CA modified accused-
appellants' conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa, and
accordingly, increased their respective penalties to life
imprisonment for each count. 36 The CA also increased the
amount of actual damages awarded to private complainant
Clarita P. Gacayan from P1,300,000.00 to P1,530,625.90, apart
from the award of US$12,000.00. 37
It held that TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi
scheme which relied on subsequent investors to pay its earlier
investors — and is what PD 1689 precisely aims to punish.
Inevitably, TGICI could no longer hoodwink new investors that led
to its collapse. 38 Thus, the CA concluded that as
incorporators/directors of TGICI, accused-appellants and their
cohorts conspired in making TGICI a vehicle for the perpetuation
of fraud against the unsuspecting public. As such, they cannot
hide behind the corporate veil and must be personally and
criminally liable for their acts. 39 The CA then concluded that
since the TGICI incorporators/directors comprised more than five
(5) persons, accused-appellants' criminal liability should be
upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa, and their respective
penalties increased accordingly. 40
Undaunted, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal. SaHIEA

The Issue Before the Court


The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Item 2
(a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants.
Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall
defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business, or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under this provision
are the following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or
fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means
and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that,
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 41
In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines
Syndicated Estafa as follows:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall
commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death
if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate
consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation
results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives,
"samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general
public.
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other
forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC,
is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results
in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders,
or members of rural banks, cooperative, " samahang nayon(s)," or
farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. 42
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals
TGICI's modus operandi of inducing the public to invest in it on
the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a
very high monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a
half percent (3%-5.5%). 43 Under such lucrative promise, the
investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However,
as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that
TGICI is operating without any paid-up capital and has no clear
trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its
investors, 44 they cannot comply with their guarantee and had to
simply abscond with their investors' money. Thus, the CA
correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other
accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi
scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that
involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors
from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often
solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in
opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no
risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting
new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage
investors to create the false appearance that investors are
profiting from a legitimate business. 45 It is not an investment
strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as long as
there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the
scheme. 46 It is difficult to sustain the scheme over a long period
of time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later
investors to continue paying the promised profits to early
investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the "con-
man" collects his money from his second or third round of
investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to
collect. Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months
at the most. 47CIDcHA

In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa,


committed through a Ponzi scheme, are present in this case,
considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-
appellants, made false pretenses and representations to the
investing public — in this case, the private complainants —
regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with
TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false
pretenses and representations were made prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the
same, private complainants invested their hard earned money
into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up
running away with the private complainants' investments,
obviously to the latter's prejudice.
Corollary thereto, the CA correctly upgraded accused-appellants'
conviction from simple Estafa to Syndicated Estafa. In a criminal
case, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review.
Issues whether raised or not by the parties may be resolved by
the appellate court. 48 Hence, accused-appellants' appeal
conferred upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and rendered
it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law. 49
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562,
33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, accused-appellants Palmy Tibayan and Rico Z.
Puerto are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of 13 and 11
counts, respectively, of Syndicated Estafa and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for each count. Accused-
appellants are further ordered to pay actual damages to each of
the private complainants in the following
amounts: (a) P1,500,000.00 to Hector H. Alvarez; (b) P119,405.23
and P800,000.00 to Milagros Alvarez; (c) P1,530,625.90 and
US$12,000.00 to Clarita P. Gacayan; (d) P500,000.00 to Irma T.
Ador; (e) P1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer; (f) P556,376.00 to
Nonito Garlan; (g) P250,000.00 to Emelyn Gomez; (h) P118,000.00
to Judy C. Rillon; (i) P100,000.00 to Reynaldo A.
Dacon; (j) P200,000.00 to Leonida D. Jarina; (k) P250,000.00 to
Cristina Dela Peña; and (l)P100,000.00 to Rodney E. Villareal.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Tibayan, G.R. Nos. 209655-60, [January 14, 2015])

[G.R. No. 183345. September 17, 2014.]

MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, petitioners, vs.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari 1 under


Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny
Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the Court of
Appeals' (CA) decision 2 dated February 28, 2006 and
resolution 3 dated June 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289. These
CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 2004 4 and July 26,
2004 5 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which
respectively denied the petitioners' motion to defer arraignment
and motion to lift warrant of arrest. 6
Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel
Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal complaint against the petitioners
and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
in relation with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689. 7
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank,
Binondo Branch where Ngo was the manager. Because of their
good business relationship, Dy took Ngo's advice to deposit his
money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of
return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also
known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented herself as an officer of
various reputable companies and an incorporator of State
Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the
recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment
return. 8
Relying on Ngo and Gracia's assurances, Dy initially invested in
State Resources the approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the promised
interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his
investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several
checks he issued in the name of State Resources. 9 In return,
Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his
earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total
amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six
Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos
(P114,286,086.14). All these checks 10 were subsequently
dishonored when Dy deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount
of the dishonored checks. Ngo promised assistance, but after a
few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from
Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he
confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks. He
eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the
construction and realty business of Gracia's husband, Danny
Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never
returned Dy's money. ScEaAD

On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in


the criminal complaint Chester De Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha
Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas — all incorporators
and/or directors of State Resources. 11
On the basis of Dy's complaint 12 and supplemental affidavit, 13 the
public prosecutor filed an information 14 for
syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-
accused. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952
and was raffled to respondent RTC of Manila, Branch 40.
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the
petitioners and the other accused. Consequently, petitioners
immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift
warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence
of probable cause against them and the pendency of their
petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). 15
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the
petitioners' twin motions. 16 The petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26,
2004 order.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
The CA's Ruling
The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners' motion to defer
arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, a judge is mandated to personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. 17 The CA noted
that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his
personal examination of the facts and circumstances of the case.
Since the judge complied with the Rules, the CA concluded that
no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to him. 18
In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on
record and the assertions in Dy's affidavits only show probable
cause for the crime of simple estafa, not syndicated estafa.
Under PD No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafa to exist, the
swindling must have been committed by five or more persons,
and the fraud must be against the general public or at least a
group of persons. In his complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated that
he relied on the petitioners' false representations and was
defrauded into parting with his money, causing him
damage. 19 Since there was no evidence that State Resources
was formed to defraud the public in general or that it was used to
solicit money from other persons aside from Dy, then the offense
charged should only be for simple estafa. 20
Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners as there was still probable cause to
believe that the petitioners committed the crime of
simple estafa. 21
The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dy's affidavits
shows inconsistencies in his cited factual circumstances. These
inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the
existence of probable cause against them for the crime charged.
The petitioners also contend that it was only Ngo who enticed Dy
to invest his money. As early as August 1995, State Resources
had already been dissolved, thus negating the assertion that Dy
advanced funds for this corporation. 22 They question the fact that
it took Dy almost five years to file his complaint despite his
allegation that he lost almost P100,000,000.00. 23
Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued
against them were null and void. Contrary to the trial court's
findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD
1689 was inapplicable to their case. There was no evidence to
show that State Resources was formed to solicit funds not only
from Dy but also from the general public. Since simple estafa and
syndicated estafa are two distinct offenses, then the warrants of
arrest issued to petitioners were erroneous because these
warrants pertained to two different crimes. 24
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to DENY the petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CA's decision and
resolution on the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed with
that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave abuse of
discretion against the trial court for the denial of their twin
motions to defer arraignment and to lift warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in
the case of Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation 25 where we
faced the question of how to review a Rule 45 petition before us,
a CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case
the kind of review that this Court should undertake given the
distinctions between the two remedies. In Rule 45, we consider
the correctness of the decision made by an inferior court. In
contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on jurisdictional errors.
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision from
the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
and not on the basis of whether the trial court's denial of
petitioners' motions was strictly legally correct. In question form,
the question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine whether
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners' motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of
arrest? DCIEac

Probable Cause for the Issuance of


a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution 26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 27 a judge is mandated to personally determine the
existence of probable cause after hispersonal evaluation of the
prosecutor's resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime
charged. These provisions command the judge to refrain from
malting a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and
to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances
presented by both parties.
Section 5 (a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon
the filing of the criminal complaint or information. He may: a)
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds
probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause. 28
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of
arrest to the petitioners and their co-accused. To be valid, these
warrants must have been issued after compliance with the
requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the
judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely
determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the
accused. In doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing; he
only needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial
determination and see if it is supported by substantial
evidence. 29
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal
determination of the existence of probable cause to support the
issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present
any evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its
February 26, 2004 order:
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to
surrender practically resulted in the suspension of
arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from
the filing of co-accused De Joya's motions, which may be
considered a petition for review, and that of co-accused
Spouses Hao's own petition for review. This is not to
mention the delay in the resolution by the Department of
Justice. On the other hand, co-accused De Joya's motion
to determine probable cause and co-accused Spouses
Hao's motion to lift warrant of arrest have been rendered
moot and academic with the issuance of warrants of
arrest by this presiding judge after his personal
examination of the facts and circumstances strong
enough in themselves to support the belief that they are
guilty of the crime that in fact happened. 30 [Emphasis
ours]
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not
arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. As
stated by him, the warrants were only issued after his personal
evaluation or the factual circumstances that led him to believe
that there was probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for
their commission of a criminal offense.
Distinction between Executive and
Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two
stages. The first is at the executive level, where determination is
made by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation,
before the filing of the criminal information. The second is at the
judicial level, undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial
determination of probable cause. In order to properly resolve if
the CA erred in affirming the trial court's issuance of the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to
scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether committed as a simple
offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of
the RPC. In these provisions, the different modes by
which estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding
penalties for each are outlined. One of these modes is estafa by
means of deceit. Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC defines how this
particular crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the
existence of a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud; 3) the reliance by the offended party on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him
to part with his money or property; and 4) as a result, the
offended party suffered damage. 31
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced
him to invest with State Resources and promised him a higher
rate of return. 32 Because of his good business relationship with
Ngo and relying on Gracia's attractive financial representations,
Dy initially invested the approximate amount of P10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by
Gracia to invest more so that he eventually advanced almost
P100,000,000.00 33 with State Resources. Gracia's succeeding
checks representing the earnings of his investments, however,
were all dishonored upon deposit. 34 He subsequently learned that
the petitioners used his money for Danny's construction and
realty business. 35 Despite repeated demands and the petitioners'
constant assurances to pay, they never returned Dy's invested
money and its supposed earnings. 36
These cited factual circumstances show the elements
of estafa by means of deceit. The petitioners induced Dy to invest
in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy,
what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used
in Danny's construction and realty business. The petitioners'
deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their petition
that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been
dissolved. 37 This admission strengthens the conclusion that the
petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State
Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money for
investment with an inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners'
deceit. "Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations,
or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives or is intended to deceive another, so that he shall
act upon it to his legal injury." 38
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners' false representations
and promises, Dy would not have placed his money in State
Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us
to the conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest
the petitioners for the crime of estafa by means of deceit. HADTEC

We now address the issue of whether estafa in this case was


committed through a syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, 39 there is syndicated estafa if the
following elements are present: 1) estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was
committed; 2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a
syndicate of five or more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or
farmers associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. 40
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the
first and second elements of syndicated estafa are present; there
is probable cause for violation of Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC
against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy's supplemental
complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated against
him was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also
by the other officers and directors of State Resources. The
number of the accused who allegedly participated in defrauding
Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the
existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The
funds fraudulently solicited by the corporation must come from
the general public. In the present case, no evidence was
presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through
State Resources, also sought investments from other people. Dy
had no co-complainants alleging that they were also deceived to
entrust their money to State Resources. The general public
element was not complied with. Thus, no
syndicatedestafa allegedly took place, only simple estafa by
means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in
affirming the trial court's denial of the petitioners' motion to lift
warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal
evaluation of the facts and circumstances is convinced that
probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense was committed by the person sought to be
arrested. 41 This must be distinguished from the prosecutor's
finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper
criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is
determined to address the necessity of placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. 42
In People v. Castillo and Mejia, 43 we explained the distinction
between the two kinds of probable cause determination:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of
probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has
been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of
the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter
that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the
judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant. 44 [Emphasis ours]
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of
simple estafa and that the petitioners have probably committed
it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest against
the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to
go scot-free would defeat rather than promote the purpose of a
warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in the court's
custody to avoid his flight from the clutches of justice. AHcCDI

Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are


not two entirely different crimes. Simple estafa is a crime
necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is
necessarily included in another offense when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter. 45
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed
information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court 46 is
necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners
should not be nullified since probable cause exists for
simple estafa.
Suspension of Arraignment
Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, an
arraignment may be suspended if there is a petition for review of
the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the
Office of the President. However, such period of
suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the
DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since this petition had not been
resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be
suspended indefinitely.
We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his
arraignment suspended is not an unqualified right. In Spouses
Trinidad v. Ang, 47 we explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment,
the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60
days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny
the motion to defer arraignment. 48
As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's
delay in resolving the petitioners' petition for review had already
exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners'
arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules,
the petitioners' motion to suspend completely lacks any legal
basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had
long been delayed because of the petitioners' refusal to submit to
the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the
Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners'
commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now
ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where the
merits of both the parties' evidence and allegations may be
weighed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition
and AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision
and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao
and Danny Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315 (2)
(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and be arraigned for
this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Hao v. People, G.R. No. 183345, [September 17, 2014])

[G.R. No. 157943. September 4, 2013.]


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GILBERT REYES WAGAS, accused-appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be


presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to
overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is
required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the
elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the
offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden,
then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it
becomes the Court's constitutional duty to acquit him.
The Case
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the
decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years
of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
Antecedents
Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for
sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did
not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of
Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto Ligaray
of that circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter, did
then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands Check
No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the amount of
P200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an
obligation, but which check when presented for
encashment with the bank, was dishonored for the reason
"drawn against insufficient funds" and inspite of notice
and several demands made upon said accused to make
good said check or replace the same with cash, he had
failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Alberto
Ligaray in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty, 2 the pre-trial was held,
during which the Defense admitted that the check alleged in the
information had been dishonored due to insufficient funds. 3 On
its part, the Prosecution made no admission. 4
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto
Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray testified that on April 30,
1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the
telephone; that he and his wife would not agree at first to the
proposed payment of the order by postdated check, but because
of Wagas' assurance that he would not disappoint them and that
he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business
and money in the bank, they relented and accepted the order;
that he released the goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the
same time received Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check
No. 0011003 for P200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May
8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his
depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds; 5 that he called Wagas about the matter,
and the latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu;
and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him. 6 cTEICD

On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not


personally meet Wagas because they transacted through
telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to
Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the
delivery receipt upon receiving the rice. 7
After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the
following: (a) BPI Check No. 0011003 in the amount of
P200,000.00 payable to "cash;" (b) the return slip dated May 13,
1997 issued by Solid Bank; (c) Ligaray's affidavit; and (d) the
delivery receipt signed by Cañada. After the RTC admitted the
exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its case. 8
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having
issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Cañada, his brother-in-law, not
to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any
dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended
as payment for a portion of Cañada's property that he wanted to
buy, but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore
fund the check. 9
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a
letter dated July 3, 1997 apparently signed by him and addressed
to Ligaray's counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray
P200,000.00 for goods received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June
23, 1997 which is self-explanatory. It is worthy also to
discuss with you the environmental facts of the case for
your consideration, to wit:
1. It is true that I obtained goods from your client
worth P200,000.00 and I promised to settle the
same last May 10, 1997, but to no avail. On this
point, let me inform you that I sold my real
property to a buyer in Manila, and promised to
pay the consideration on the same date as I
promised with your client. Unfortunately, said
buyer likewise failed to make good with such
obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my promise
resultant thereof. (sic)
2. Again, I made another promise to settle said
obligation on or before June 15, 1997, but still
to no avail attributable to the same reason as
aforementioned.(sic)
3. To arrest this problem, we decided to source some
funds using the subject property as collateral.
This other means is resorted to for the purpose
of settling the herein obligation. And as to its
status, said funds will be rele[a]sed within
thirty (30) days from today.
In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and
promise to settle said obligation on or before August 15,
1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention
to shy away from any financial obligation. SaDICE

xxx xxx xxx


Respectfully yours,
(SGD.) GILBERT R. WAGAS 10

Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who
had transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter
only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged
him to assume the responsibility. 11 On redirect examination,
Wagas declared that Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the
country; that he signed the letter only to accommodate the pleas
of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing Cañada's
application for overseas employment. 12 The Prosecution
subsequently offered and the RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal
evidence. 13
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11,
2002, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged and
he is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve
(12) years of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to
thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua as
maximum;
2. To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in
the sum of P200,000.00; CAHaST
3. To pay said complainant the sum of P30,000.00 by
way of attorney's fees; and
4. the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 14

The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements constituting the crime of estafa,
namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment
for an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover
the check despite having been informed that the check had been
dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt
of the postdated check and upon Wagas' assurance that the
check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, 15 arguing that the Prosecution did not establish
that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had
negotiated the check to the latter; that the records showed that
Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray's
testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not
reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar
with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of the case
based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the
testimony of Cañada who could not testify during the trial
because he was then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray's
testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration, opining that the evidence Wagas desired
to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and
that there was no compelling ground to reverse its decision. 16 DSAEIT

Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal. 17

Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a


petition for admission to bail pending appeal. The RTC granted
the petition and fixed Wagas' bond at P40,000.00. 18 Wagas then
posted bail for his provisional liberty pending appeal. 19
The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on
the grant of Wagas' application for bail. On November 17, 2003,
the Court required the RTC Judge to explain why Wagas was out
on bail. 20 On January 15, 2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the
Court a so-called manifestation and compliance which the Court
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report, and recommendation. 21 On July 5, 2005, the
Court, upon the OCA's recommendation, directed the filing of an
administrative complaint for simple ignorance of the law against
the RTC Judge. 22 On September 12, 2006, the Court directed the
OCA to comply with its July 5, 2005 directive, and to cause the
filing of the administrative complaint against the RTC Judge. The
Court also directed Wagas to explain why his bail should not be
cancelled for having been erroneously granted. 23 Finally, in its
memorandum dated September 27, 2006, the OCA manifested to
the Court that it had meanwhile filed the administrative
complaint against the RTC Judge. 24
Issues
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither
friends nor personally known to one other; that it was highly
incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a
transaction with him involving a huge amount of money only over
the telephone; that on the contrary, the evidence pointed to
Cañada as the person with whom Ligaray had transacted,
considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by
Cañada, indicated that the goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT
CAÑADA," that the goods had been received by Cañada in good
order and condition, and that there was no showing that Cañada
had been acting on behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the check
to Cañada upon a different transaction; that Cañada had
negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the element of deceit
had not been established because it had not been proved with
certainty that it was him who had transacted with Ligaray over
the telephone.AcHSEa

The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution


establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the
elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the
identity of the perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of
the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the
bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall
be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act.ICaDHT

In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the


act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that
the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the
offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether
dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show
that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have
parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of
the check by the offender. 25
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check
is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to
cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. 26 It is the
criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is
punishable, not the non-payment of a debt. 27 Prima
facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer
of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods
to Cañada because of the postdated check the latter had given to
him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for
payment because of the insufficiency of funds.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the
offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. 28 In that regard, the Prosecution did
not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who
had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally
meet the person with whom he was transacting over the
telephone, thus:
Q: On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a
transaction with the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from
me.
Q: How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)
A: He talked with me over the phone and told me that he
would like to purchase two hundred bags of rice and
he will just issue a check. 29
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally
see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had
made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him
only over the telephone, to wit:
Q: After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do
next?STcaDI

A: I made a demand on them.


Q: How did you make a demand?
A: I called him over the phone.
Q: Who is that "him" that you are referring to?
A: Gilbert Wagas. 30

Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to


cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check
was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere
delivery without the need of an indorsement. 31 This rendered it
highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray,
but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then
negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did
not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and
thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for
and received the stocks of rice was Cañada.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as
charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the
complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not
the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be
held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check
used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show
that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray
by means of the check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the
rice from him and who delivered the check to him. Considering
that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then
acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal
bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for
Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so
obtained despite Wagas being Cañada's brother-in-law.
Finally, Ligaray's declaration that it was Wagas who had
transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable because
he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom
he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he
had not yet met or known before then. We deem it essential for
purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone
conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer
of rice to be first authenticated before it could be received in
evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness
conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by
voice recognition or any other means. 32 Without the
authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to
the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this
respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of
the caller, or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of the
caller would have sufficed. 33 The identity of the caller could also
be established by the caller's self-identification, coupled with
additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone
call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns,
and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of
knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller. 34
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first
before a telephone communication is accorded probative weight.
The identity of the caller may be established by direct or
circumstantial evidence. According to one ruling of the Kansas
Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence
where they are relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and
admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence
concerning face-to-face conversations except the party
against whom the conversations are sought to be used
must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the
witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to
identify the person with whom the conversation was had,
provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of
the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party
calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, in
the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to
render the conversation admissible. However,
circumstances preceding or following the conversation
may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The
completeness of the identification goes to the weight of
the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the
responsibility lies in the first instance with the district
court to determine within its sound discretion whether the
threshold of admissibility has been met. 35 (Bold
emphasis supplied) CHTcSE

Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or


offer any proof to definitely establish that it had been Wagas
whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. The
Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to
how he had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the
Prosecution sought to elicit from him was whether he had known
and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as follows:
Q: Do you know the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If he is present inside the courtroom [. . .]
A: No, sir. He is not around.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is
an ex-mayor of Compostela. 36
During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another
opportunity to show how he had determined that his caller was
Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing, to
wit:
Q: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused
entered into [a] transaction of rice selling,
particularly with these 200 sacks of rice subject of
this case, through telephone conversation? SIcCEA

A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused
whom you are talking with?
A: I know it was him because I know him.
Q: Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you
had a transaction with the accused through
telephone conversation, and as a consequence of
that alleged conversation with the accused through
telephone he issued a check in your favor?
A: No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
Q: But still through the telephone?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see
you personally regarding the 200 bags rice
transaction?
A: No. It was through telephone only.
Q: In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200
bags of rice through the accused himself?
A: Yes. It was through Robert.
Q: So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200
sacks of rice through somebody other than the
accused?
A: Yes, sir. 37

Ligaray's statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had
ordered the rice because he "know[s]" him was still vague and
unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and
should not support a finding of Ligaray's familiarity with Wagas as
the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray's answers that
Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray's prior to the
transaction. Thus, the RTC's conclusion that Ligaray had
transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual
basis, the RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the
identification of the buyer to be Wagas. DIESHT

The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was


the person who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place
the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the
State's rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of
Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice;
hence, it could be considered and appreciated only for that
purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider
evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, 38not for
any other purpose. 39 Fairness to the adverse party demands such
exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of
Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his sister and
her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for
granted.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State
carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei
incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, 40 and as a means of
respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or
woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the
burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the
author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the
offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts
must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the
strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of
the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak
is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to
discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The
presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution
to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish
innocence. 41 Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent,
carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this
reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime
but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the
commission of the crime can be established, without competent
proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
there can be no conviction. 42
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude
a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any
evidentiary force. 43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of
the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the
rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the
proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the
accused's constitutional right of presumption of innocence until
the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an
acquittal, 44 even though his innocence may be doubted. 45
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still
be held civilly liable where the preponderance of the established
facts so warrants. 46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check
was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in
due course. 47 Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully
liable to pay the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58,
in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime
of estafa on the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to
pay Alberto Ligaray the amount of P200,000.00 as actual
damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision.LLpr

No pronouncement on costs of suit.


SO ORDERED.
(People v. Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, [September 4, 2013], 717
|||

PHIL 224-243)

[G.R. No. 163662. February 25, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

Under review is the decision promulgated on May 25,


2004, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the judgment rendered on January 24, 2002 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, in Makati City convicting
Julie Grace K. Villanueva of estafa as defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal
Code. 2 The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting
accused appellant Julie Grace K. Villanueva of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Codeis AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposed as hereinabove indicated. The Resolution of
January 15, 2004 granting her bail pending appeal
isREVOKED and her proffered bail bond is REJECTED.
Pursuant to Section 13, second paragraph, Rule 124 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the case,
inclusive of the entire record thereof,
is CERTIFIED and ELEVATED to the Supreme Court for
review. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. 3

Antecedents
Villanueva stands charged with estafa as defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal
Code under the information that reads:
That on or about the 16th day of August 1994, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of deceit, false pretenses
and fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud, following PNB checks, [to] wit:

Check No. Date Amount

P185,000.
031526 9-02-94
00
185,000.0
031527 9-17-94
0
185,000.0
031528 10-02-94
0
185,000.0
031529 10-17-94
0
031532 9-16-94 85,000.00
031533 10-16-94 85,000.00
031534 11-16-94 85,000.00
as payment for various jewelries (sic) purchased
to (sic) the said complainant, the accused well knowing
that at the time of issue thereof, the said checks have no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover
the amount of the said checks, neither will said checks be
honored or paid upon presentment, the bank dishonored
and returned the said checks for the reason "account
closed" or "stopped payment" or should have been
dishonored for insufficiency of funds had not the said
accused, without any valid reason, ordered her drawee
bank to stop payment and despite repeated demands
accused failed and refused to deposit the amount
necessary to cover the aforesaid check or to pay the value
thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the aforesaid amounts.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Version of the Prosecution
In August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Villanueva through a
townmate. The latter was interested in buying jewelry. Being then
engaged in the business of selling jewelry, Madarang went to
Villanueva's residence at the Galeria de Magallanes, and was
able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth
P1,010,000.00. 5 Villanueva made out nine checks drawn against
Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated.
Villanueva signed a receipt reading as follows: 6
August 16, 1994
Received from MRS. LORETO A. MADARANG the following jewelries (sic) with the
corresponding amount DHEcCT

1 set diamond — 70,000


1 set South Sea Black
w/ necklace & bracelet - 220,000
1 set heart shape
diamond
w/ pendant (4.56 cts) - 450,000
1 set marquee . . . dia. 2
- 220,000
cts.
1 bracelet diamond - 50,000
––––––––––
P1,010,00
0
========
=

paid by the following checks issued by me

PNB #031501 - August 6, 1994 P5,000


August 19,
PNB #031531 - 10,000
1994
PNB #031526 - Sept. 2, 1994 185,000
PNB #031527 - Sept. 17, 1994 185,000
PNB #031528 - Oct. 2, 1994 185,000
PNB #031529 - Oct. 17, 1994 185,000
PNB #031532 - Sept. 16, 1994 85,000
PNB #031533 - Oct. 16, 1994 85,000
PNB #031534 - Nov. 16, 1994 85,000
––––––––––
P1,010,000
=========

with a total of One Million Ten Thousand pesos.


(sgd)
JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA
Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva's assurance
that they would all be honored upon presentment. 7 However, the
drawee bank paid only PNB Check No. 031501 and PNB Check No.
131531, the remaining seven checks being dishonored either by
reason of Account Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds. 8Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva at her
residence to inform her of the dishonored checks, but Madarang
was barred by security guards from reaching
Villanueva. 9 Madarang resorted to sending demand letters, but
her effort to contact Villanueva proved futile. 10 After Villanueva
did not settle her obligations, Madarang brought the criminal
complaint for estafa, 11 and the corresponding information
for estafa was ultimately filed in court on September 4, 1995. On
arraignment, Villanueva pleaded not guilty. 12
Version of the Defense
Villanueva denied the accusation. She claimed that she met
Madarang three times. The first was at the residence of Cheng
Diaz Davis; where Madarang was then selling jewelry. The second
time was at her residence in the Galeria de Magallanes where
Madarang arrived without prior notice at around 7:00 or 7:30 in
the evening. Madarang was persistent that Villanueva buy jewelry
on credit, and even assured Villanueva that she could replace the
same if she was dissatisfied with her purchase. Madarang
prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces of jewelry, for which she
issued six checks as payment, five of which were postdated. On
August 16, 1994, Villanueva saw Madarang for the last time to
have the jewelry replaced. Villanueva retrieved the checks she
had previously issued and replaced them with another set of
postdated checks that were the subject of the criminal case
against her. Villanueva maintained that the second set of checks
were issued as guarantee under the agreement that they were
not to be deposited until Villanueva advised Madarang of the
sufficiency of funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that she
did not receive any notice from Madarang regarding the dishonor
of the checks. 13
Ruling of the RTC
On January 24, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment finding
Villanueva guilty as charged, 14 viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing this Court finds
accused Julie Grace K. Villanueva GUILTY of the crime of
estafa as punished under Art. 315 par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 818, said
crime having been committed in the manner described in
the information filed on September 4, 1995.
As a consequence of this judgment, accused shall suffer
the penalty of punishment for a period of Fourteen Years
Eight Months and One Day to Twenty Years which is within
the range of Reclusion Temporal in its medium and
maximum periods.
She is also ordered to pay the private complainant Mrs.
Loreto Madarang the sum of Nine Hundred Ninety Five
Thousand Pesos (P995,000.00) plus interest at the legal
rate of 12% per annum until the amount is fully paid with
said interest accruing at the time the information was
filed on or October 25, 1995.
The period of accused's detention shall be credited in her
favor conformably with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
She shall serve her entire sentence at the Correccional
Institute for Women at Mandaluyong City.
SO ORDERED. 15

Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:
Nonetheless, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the
trial court, which is 14 years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, both of reclusion temporal, is
erroneous. Said court did not pay obeisance to the
teaching of People v. Hernando, viz.:
Presidential Decree No. 818 provides:
"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another
by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as
defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal of the amount
of fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under
theRevised Penal Code, the penalty shall be
termed reclusion perpetua;
xxx xxx xxx."
"xxx xxx xxx
Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty two
thousand pesos, the penalty of reclusion temporal is
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos but the total
penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be
termed reclusion perpetua. As used herein, reclusion
perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense. It
merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account
of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty
two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos.
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, such
as estafa, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of theRevised Penal Code, and the minimum
term of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense." "The penalty next lower should be
based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is
left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it
can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into
which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition
of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence." DaTICE

Here, complainant was defrauded in the amount of seven


hundred [thousand] (P700,000.00) pesos. The fact that the
amount involved in the instant case exceeds P22,000.00
should not be considered in the initial determination of the
indeterminate penalty; instead the matter would be so
taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the
imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate
sentence. This accords with the rule that penal laws are
construed in favor of the accused.
Applying the above-cited provision, accused shall be
meted an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which
shall be taken from the maximum period of the basic
penalty, that is, reclusion temporal, to be imposed in its
maximum period, plus one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00 of the amount of the fraud, but the total
penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years.
On the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance nor the incremental penalty for the amount
of the fraud in excess of twenty two thousand (P22,000.00)
pesos. Such penalty is prision mayor, with a duration of six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years."
Accordingly, the accused-appellant in the case at bar
should be, as she is hereby, sentenced to suffer the
penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as minimum, to THIRTY (30) YEARS of reclusion
perpetua as maximum.
xxx xxx xxx. 16

The CA then certified the case to the Court pursuant to Section


13 of Rule 124, Rules of Court.
Issues
Villanueva submits the following errors for our consideration:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD PRIOR TO OR
SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT
POST-DATED CHECKS.
IV
WHETHER THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, OF ESTAFA. 17
Villanueva insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the
postdated checks, averring that: (a) the checks were issued as
replacement; (b) the checks could only be deposited or encashed
after Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of funds;
and (c) the receipt presented by the Prosecution failed to embody
the real intention of the parties. 18 She argues that estafa under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code was not
committed because the checks were not executed prior to or
simultaneous with the alleged fraud; and because Madarang had
instigated her to issue the checks. 19
Did Villanueva commit estafa punishable under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code in issuing the seven
postdated checks?
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the conviction.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow . . .:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3)
days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said check has been dishonored
for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
The estafa charged in the information may be committed,
therefore, when: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check
in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the
postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance
of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds
deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check;
and (3) the payee has been defrauded. 20 The deceit should be the
efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be prior to,
or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud. 21
All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was
admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the
checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had
purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the
checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be
funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not
have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to
Villanueva whom she barely knew unless Villanueva gave such
assurance to her. The second element was likewise established
because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to
insufficiency of funds or because the account was already
closed. The third element was also proved by the showing that
Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from
Villanueva the balance of P995,000.00.
In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with
Madarang whereby the latter would deposit or encash the checks
only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in
Villanueva's account. Villanueva posits that the receipt the
Prosecution presented in evidence did not embody such
agreement.
This defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule
that estafa will not lie when the parties waive the negotiable
character of the check, and instead treat the same as proof of an
obligation. For instance, when there is an agreement between the
parties at the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks
that the obligee shall not encash or present the same to the
bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the
element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was informed that
the checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith
or estafa shall not arise. 22
DHaEAS

Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she


did not present proof of the supposed agreement. The receipt
signed by her proved the transaction and her issuance of the
postdated checks by listing the items bought and the postdated
checks issued as payment. If the parties really agreed for
Madarang to deposit the checks only after notice of the
sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have been
incorporated in the receipt as an integral part of the transaction,
or simply written in another document with Madarang's express
conformity for Villanueva's protection. We simply cannot accept
that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not including the
supposed agreement that would shield her from probable
criminal prosecution. In that regard, her being a
businesswoman 23 presumably made her aware of the
consequences of issuing unfunded checks. 24 All that she is
claiming here is that the receipt did not express the true
intention of the parties, implying that no written document
substantiated her alleged defense. She did not claim at all that
she had been coerced or intimidated into signing the receipt as
written. Her self-serving statements on the agreement were
entirely inadequate to establish her assertions, for they were not
proof. 25
Under Article 315 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by P.D. 818, the penalty for estafa when the total value of the
checks exceed P22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period (i.e., 17 years, four months and one day to 20 years), plus
one year for each additional P10,000. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be from six years and one
day to 12 years of prision mayor. In imposing the indeterminate
sentence of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to thirty years of reclusion perpetua as maximum, the
CA correctly applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law. It is well
to state that reclusion perpetua merely describes in this instance
the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the
fraud involved. 26
We note, however, that the CA affirmed the imposition by the RTC
of 12% interest accruing from the time that the information was
filed until the full satisfaction of the obligation in the amount of
P995,000.00. Conformably with the ruling in Nacar v. Gallery
Frames 27 applying Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), said amount should earn
interest of 12% per annum from the filing of the information on
September 4, 1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
May 25, 2004 by the Court of Appeals, subject to
the MODIFICATION that the amount of P995,000.00 shall earn
interest 12% per annum from the filing of the information on
September 4, 1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 163662, [February 25, 2015])

[G.R. No. 171672. February 2, 2015.]

MARIETA DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex


crimes in strict observance of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. In estafa through falsification of commercial documents,
the court should impose the penalty for the graver offense in the
maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed is invalid,
and will not attain finality.
Antecedents
The petitioner, a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI
Family) at its branch in Malibay, Pasay City, appeals the
affirmance of her conviction for four counts of estafa through
falsification of a commercial document committed on separate
occasions in October and November 1993 by forging the
signatures of bank depositors Amparo Matuguina and Milagrosa
Cornejo in withdrawal slips, thereby enabling herself to withdraw
a total of P65,000.00 and P2,000.00 from the respective savings
accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo.
The antecedent facts were summarized in the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA), 1 as follows:
As culled from the evidence, Matuguina and Cornejo left
their savings account passbooks with the accused within
the space of a week in October-November 1993 when they
went to the bank's Malibay branch to transact on their
accounts. Matuguina, in particular, withdrew the sum of
P500 on October 29 and left her passbook with the
accused upon the latter's instruction. She had to return
two more times before the branch manager Cynthia
Zialcita sensed that something wrong was going on.
Learning of Matuguina's problem, Zialcita told the accused
to return the passbook to her on November 8. On this day,
the accused came up with the convenient excuse that she
had already returned the passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita
reviewed Matuguina's account and found three withdrawal
slips dated October 19, 29 and November 4, 1993
containing signatures radically different from the
specimen signatures of the depositor and covering a total
of P65,000. It was apparent that the accused had
intervened in the posting and verification of the slips
because her initials were affixed thereto. Zialcita
instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a
visit to Matuguina, a move that led to the immediate
exposure of the accused. Matuguina was aghast to see the
signatures in the slips and denied that the accused
returned the passbook to her. When she went back to the
bank worried about the unauthorized withdrawals from her
account, she met with the accused in the presence of the
bank manager. She insisted that the signatures in the slips
were not her, forcing the accused to admit that the
passbook was still with her and kept in her house.
Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who
posted and released the November 4 withdrawal. When
she was asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora
readily pointed to the accused as the person who gave to
her the slip. Since she saw the accused's initials on it
attesting to having verified the signature of the depositor,
she presumed that the withdrawal was genuine. She
posted and released the money to the accused.
On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to
visit another depositor, Milagrosa Cornejo, whom they
feared was also victimized by the accused. Their worst
expectations were confirmed. According to Cornejo, on
November 3, she went to the bank to deposit a check and
because there were many people there at the time, she
left her passbook with the accused. She returned days
later to get it back, but the accused told her that she left
it at home. Misa now showed to her a withdrawal slip
dated November 4, 1993 in which a signature purporting to
be hers appeared. Cornejo denied that it was her
signature. As with the slips affecting Matuguina, the
initials of the accused were unquestionably affixed to the
paper.
Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors.
The accused initially denied the claims against her but
when she was asked to write her statement down, she
confessed to her guilt. She started crying and locked
herself inside the bathroom. She came out only when
another superior Fed Cortez arrived to ask her some
questions. Since then, she executed three more
statements in response to the investigation conducted by
the bank's internal auditors. She also gave a list of the
depositors' accounts from which she drew cash and which
were listed methodically in her diary.
DHSCTI

The employment of the accused was ultimately


terminated. The bank paid Matuguina P65,000, while
Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused. In the
course of her testimony on the witness stand, the accused
made these further admissions:
(a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H
which contained the fake signatures of Matuguina and
Cornejo;
(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K;
(c) She wrote the answers to the questions of the branch
cluster head Fred Cortez Exhibit L, and to the auditors'
questions in Exhibit M, N and O;
(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank. 2

Judgment of the RTC


On July 13, 1998, the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City (RTC)
rendered its judgment, 3 finding the petitioner guilty as charged,
and sentencing her to suffer as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, involving the withdrawal
of P20,000.00 from the account of Matuguina, the
indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and
10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
years, eight months and 20 days of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay BPI Family P20,000.00 and the
costs of suit;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving the withdrawal
of P2,000.00 from Cornejo's account, the
indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight months
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI
Family P2,000.00 and the costs of suit;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving the withdrawal
of P10,000.00 from the account of Matuguina, the
indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days
ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11
months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay BPI Family P10,000.00 and the
costs of suit; and
(d) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, involving the withdrawal
of P35,000 from Matuguina's account, the
indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and
10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI
Family P35,000.00 and the costs of suit.acCDSH

Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended in the CA that: (1) her
conviction should be set aside because the evidence presented
against her had been obtained in violation of her constitutional
right against self-incrimination; (2) her rights to due process and
to counsel had been infringed; and (3) the evidence against her
should be inadmissible for being obtained by illegal or
unconstitutional means rendering the evidence as the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision 4 affirming
the judgment of the RTC, to wit:
In summary, we find no grounds to disturb the findings of
the lower court, except the provision of the dispositive
portion in case 94-5525 requiring the accused to pay BPI
Family P2,000. This must be deleted because the accused
had already paid the amount to the depositor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of
P2,000 to the complainant in case 94-5525 be deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner still insists that her conviction was
invalid because her constitutional rights against self-
incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied. In
behalf of the State, the Office of the Solicitor General counters
that she could invoke her rights to remain silent and to counsel
only if she had been under custodial investigation, which she was
not; and that the acts of her counsel whom she had herself
engaged to represent her and whom she had the full authority to
replace at any time were binding against her.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
We first note that the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact
about the transactions that gave rise to the accusations in court
against her for four counts of estafathrough falsification of a
commercial document. She raised no challenges against such
findings of fact here and in the CA, being content with limiting
herself to the supposed denial of her rights to due process and to
counsel, and to the inadmissibility of the evidence presented
against her. In the CA, her main objection focused on the denial
of her right against self-incrimination and to counsel, which
denial resulted, according to her, in the invalidation of the
evidence of her guilt.
Debunking the petitioner's challenges, the CA stressed that the
rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under
the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation of
a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any
investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents.
Instead, she underwent an administrative investigation as an
employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being
conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give
evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply
broke down bank when depositors Matuguina and Cornejo
confronted her about her crimes. We quote with approval the
relevant portions of the decision of the CA, viz.:
The accused comes to Us on appeal to nullify her
conviction on the ground that the evidence presented
against her was obtained in violation of her constitutional
right against self-incrimination. She also contends that her
rights to due process and counsel were infringed. Without
referring to its name, she enlists one of the most famous
metaphors of constitutional law to demonize and exclude
what she believes were evidence obtained against her by
illegal or unconstitutional means — evidence
constituting the fruit of the poisonous tree. We hold,
however, that in the particular setting in which she was
investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an
accused to counsel and against self-incrimination are not
apposite.
The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are
peculiarly rights in the context of an official proceeding
for the investigation and prosecution for crime. The right
against self-incrimination, when applied to a criminal trial,
is contained in this terse injunction — no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words,
he may not be required to take the witness stand. He can
sit mute throughout the proceedings. His right to counsel
is expressed in the same laconic style: he shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel . This means
inversely that the criminal prosecution cannot proceed
without having a counsel by his side. These are the
traditional rights of the accused in a criminal case. They
exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal
indictment and trial for a criminal offense. But
sinceMiranda vs. Arizona 384 US 436, the law has come to
recognize that an accused needs the same protections
even before he is brought to trial. They arise at the very
inception of the criminal process — when a person is
taken into custody to answer to a criminal offense. For
what a person says or does during custodial investigation
will eventually be used as evidence against him at the
trial and, more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his
eventual conviction. His trial becomes a parody if he
cannot enjoy from the start the right against self-
incrimination and to counsel. This is the logic behind what
we now call as the Miranda doctrine. cCHITA
The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise
words the occasion for the exercise of the new right and
the protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an
individual is subjected to police interrogation while in
custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in a significant way. It is when custodial
investigation is underway that the certain procedural
safeguards takes over — the person must be warned prior
to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning.
We must, therefore, be careful to note what
the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was never intended
to hamper the traditional law-enforcement function to
investigate crime involving persons not under restraint.
The general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding
process, as the US Supreme Court recognizes, which is
not preceded by any restraint on the freedom of the
person investigated, is not affected by the holding, since
the compelling atmosphere inherent in in-custody
interrogation is not present.
The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source
of a provision in our 1987 bill of rights that any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel, a
provision identical in language and spirit to the earlier
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. People vs.
Caguioa 95 SCRA 2. As we can see, they speak of the
companion rights of a person under investigation to
remain silent and to counsel, to ensure which the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine had also to be
institutionalized by declaring that any confession or
admission obtained in violation of these rights is
inadmissible. But to what extent must the rights to remain
silent and to counsel be enforced in an investigation for
the commission of an offense? The answer has been
settled by rulings of our Supreme Court in Caguoia and in
the much later case of Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan 234
SCRA 175 incorporating in toto the Miranda doctrine into
the above-cited provisions of our bill of rights. Thus, the
right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only
in the context in which the Miranda doctrine applies —
when the official proceeding is conducted under the
coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There
are no cases extending them to a non-coercive setting.
In Navallo, the Supreme Court said very clearly that the
rights are invocable only when the accused is under
custodial investigation. A person undergoing a normal
audit examination is not under custodial investigation and,
hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law
enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.
By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may
not be said to be under custodial investigation. She was
not even being investigated by any police or law
enforcement officer. She was under administrative
investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in
purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her
freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There
was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say
anything. It was an act of conscience that compelled her
to speak, a true mental and moral catharsis that religion
and psychology recognize to have salutary effects on the
soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain
silent or to counsel is simply irrelevant.
The accused makes a final argument against her
conviction by contending that she did not get effective
legal representation from her former counsel who was
already old and feeble when the case was being heard. In
fact, the records show, her counsel died during the
pendency of the case, an octogenarian at that. One can
truly make a case from one's lack of a competent and
independent counsel, but we are not prepared to say that
the accused was so poorly represented that it affected her
fundamental right to due process. Except for the several
postponements incurred by her counsel, there is really no
showing that he committed any serious blunder during the
trial. We have read the transcripts of the trial and failed to
get this impression. The evidence against the accused
was simply too overwhelming. We may take note that
once, the trial court admonished the accused to replace
her counsel due to his absences, but she did not. She must
live by that. 5
Considering that the foregoing explanation by the CA was justly
supported by the records, and that her investigation as a bank
employee by her employer did not come under the coverage of
the Constitutionally-protected right against self-incrimination,
right to counsel and right to due process, we find no reversible
error committed by the CA in affirming the conviction of the
petitioner by the RTC.
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through
falsification of a commercial document was established beyond
reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the
bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their
passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their
knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she
signed, and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that
the signatures had been verified in due course. Her
misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive
the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She thereby
committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family
Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the
bank accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a
commercial document, by forging the signatures of Matuguina
and Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the
depositor concerned had signed the respective slips in order to
enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were
complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been
consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal slips. DcTaEH

Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.


According to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, 6 the penalty
for a complex crime is that corresponding to the most serious
crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Otherwise,
the penalty will be void and ineffectual, and will not attain
finality.
In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification
of commercial documents is punished with prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years,
four months and one day to six years) and a fine of P5,000.00. 7 In
contrast, the estafa is punished according to the value of the
defraudation, as follows: with the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period (i.e., four years, two months and one day to eight
years) if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00, and if such amount exceeds P22,000.00, the
penalty is imposed in the maximum period, adding one year for
each additional P10,000.00, but the total shall not exceed 20
years, in which case the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be, in connection
with the accessory penalties that may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of the Revised Penal Code; with
the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods (i.e., six months and one day to four years and two
months) if the amount of the fraud is over P6,000.00 but does not
exceed P12,000.00; with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
(i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months) if
the amount of the fraud is over P200.00 but does not exceed
P6,000.00; and with the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods (i.e., two months and one day to six
months) if the amount of the fraud does not exceed P200.00. 8
In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, estafa was the graver felony
because the amount of the fraud was P20,000.00; hence, the
penalty for estafa is to be imposed in its maximum period.
However, the RTC and the CA fixed the indeterminate sentence of
two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years, eight months and 20 days of prision
mayor, as maximum. Such maximum of the indeterminate penalty
was short by one day, the maximum period of the penalty being
six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years. Thus, the
indeterminate sentence is corrected to three years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days
of prision mayor, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving P2,000.00, the estafa is
punished with four months and one day of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to two years and four months of prision
correccional in its minimum period. The falsification of
commercial document is penalized with prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months
and one day to six years) and a fine of P5,000.00. The latter
offense is the graver felony, and its penalty is to be imposed in
the maximum period, which is from four years, nine months and
11 days to six years plus fine of P5,000.00. The penalty next
lower in degree is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months and one day
to two years and four months). Thus, the indeterminate sentence
of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and
eight months of prision correccional, as maximum that both the
RTC and the CA fixed was erroneous. We rectify the error by
prescribing in lieu thereof the indeterminate sentence of two
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine
months and 11 days ofprision correccional plus fine of P5,000.00,
as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving P10,000.00, the RTC and
the CA imposed the indeterminate sentence of four months and
20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11 months
and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum. However, the
penalty for the falsification of commercial documents is higher
than that for theestafa. To accord with Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for falsification of commercial
documents (i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of P5,000.00) should be imposed in the
maximum period. Accordingly, we revise the indeterminate
sentence so that its minimum is two years and four months
of prision correccional, and its maximum is five years of prision
correccional plus fine of P5,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, where the amount of the fraud was
P35,000.00, the penalty for estafa (i.e., prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or four
years, two months and one day to eight years) is higher than that
for falsification of commercial documents. The indeterminate
sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as
maximum, was prescribed. Considering that the maximum period
ranged from six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years,
the CA should have clarified whether or not the maximum of eight
years of prision mayoralready included the incremental penalty of
one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. Absent
the clarification, we can presume that the incremental penalty
was not yet included. Thus, in order to make the penalty clear
and specific, the indeterminate sentence is hereby fixed at four
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one year
incremental penalty. In other words, the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence is seven years, eight months and 21 days
of prision mayor. STaHIC

The CA deleted the order for the restitution of the P2,000.00


involved in Criminal Case No. 94-5525 on the ground that such
amount had already been paid to the complainant, Milagrosa
Cornejo. There being no issue as to this, the Court affirms the
deletion.
The Court adds that the petitioner is liable to BPI Family for
interest of 6% per annum on the remaining unpaid sums reckoned
from the finality of this judgment. This liability for interest is only
fair and just.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by
the Court of Appeals on August 18, 2005, subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, the petitioner shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of three years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years,
eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, as
maximum;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, the petitioner shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of two years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to four
years, nine months and 11 days of prision
correccional plus fine of P5,000.00, as
maximum;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, the petitioner shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of two years
and four months of prision correccional, as the
minimum, to five years of prision
correccional plus fine of P5,000.00, as the
maximum; and
(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, the petitioner shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven
years, eight months and 21 days of prision
mayor, as maximum.
The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BPI Family Saving
Bank interest of 6% per annum on the aggregate amount of
P65,000.00 to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment until
full payment.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit. TICDSc

SO ORDERED.
||| (De Castro v. People, G.R. No. 171672, [February 2, 2015])

[G.R. No. 187401. September 17, 2014.]

MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF


THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST WOMEN'S CREDIT
CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION

REYES, J : p

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by


petitioner Ma. Rosario P. Campos (Campos) to assail the
Decision 1 dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated February 16,
2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468, which
affirmed the conviction of Campos for fourteen (14) counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known
as The Bouncing Checks Law.
On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First Women's
Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of P50,000.00. She issued several postdated checks in
favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments. 3 Fourteen of these checks drawn against
her Current Account No. 6005-05449-92 with BPI Family Bank-Head Office, however, were dishonored
when presented for payment, particularly:

Check No. Date Amount

138609 August 15, 1995 P3,333.33


138610 August 30, 1995 P3,333.33
138611 September 15, 1995 P3,333.33
138612 September 30, 1995 P3,333.33
138613 October 15, 1995 P3,333.33
138614 October 30, 1995 P3,333.33
138615 November 15, 1995 P3,333.33
138616 November 30, 1995 P3,333.33
138617 December 15, 1995 P3,333.33
138618 December 31, 1995 P3,333.33
138619 January 15, 1996 P3,333.33
138620 January 31, 1996 P3,333.33
138621 February 15, 1996 P3,333.33
138622 February 28, 1996 P3,333.33
––––––––––
P46,666.62
=========

The checks were declared by the drawee bank to be drawn


against a "closed account." 4 SIAEHC
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with
FWCC despite demand, she was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with violations of B.P.
22. Campos was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court
proceedings after being arraigned. 5
On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision with
dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the accused is
hereby CONVICTED of fourteen (14) counts of violations
of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment for each
violation and to indemnify the complainant the sum of
P46,666.62 representing the total value of the checks, plus
legal interest from date of default until full payment.
With costs.
SO ORDERED. 6

Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court


(RTC). On July 30, 2007, the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 108
rendered its decision upholding Campos' conviction. A motion for
reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of merit. 7
Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which
rendered on July 21, 2008 its decision 8 affirming the ruling of the
RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her motion was
denied via a Resolution 9 dated February 16, 2009. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari which cites the following
issues:CSHDTE

1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT


THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL IS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY
THE REQUIREMENTS OF [B.P. 22] AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF
THE FACT OF THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
2. WHETHER OR NOT [CAMPOS'] WANT OF INFORMATION
OF THE FACT OF THE CHECKS' DISHONOR AND HER
SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR PAYMENT
[ARE] TANTAMOUNT TO GOOD FAITH SO AS TO PERSUADE
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS
EQUITY POWERS AND TO LEND SUCCOR TO [CAMPOS']
CASE. 10
Campos argues that the crime's element requiring her knowledge
at the time of the check's issuance that she did not have
sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon presentment was not established by the
prosecution. She denies having received a notice of dishonor
from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the
MeTC's reliance on a supposed notice of dishonor that was sent
to her by FWCC through registered mail. She also invokes good
faith as she allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the
payment of her obligation after the subject checks were
dishonored.
The petition lacks merit.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential
elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance
of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge
of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment. 11SCEHaD

The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An


issue being advanced by Campos through the present petition
concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter
from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were
issued. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the
importance of proof of receipt of such notice of
dishonor, 12 although not as an element of the offense, but as a
means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of
insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank
dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense
and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element
involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2
of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds, 13 as it reads:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The
making, drawing, and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within
ninety days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds
or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements
for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five
(5) banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee. aIcETS

In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC's
finding that the required notice of dishonor from FWCC was
received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that
her personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently
established, considering that only a written copy of the letter and
the registry return receipt covering it were presented by the
prosecution.
The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation
of registry return receipts that cover registered mail was not
sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been
sent to or served on issuers of checks. The authentication by
affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by
registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of
notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second
element of the offense. 14
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court,
however, considers Campos' defense that she exerted efforts to
reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks
which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI
Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that,
"[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good
faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her
obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the
checks."15 Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she
actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The
evidence referred to in her statement were receipts 16 dated
January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998 and May 26,
1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various amounts
ranging from P2,500.00 to P15,700.00. Campos would not have
entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996
until May 1998 if she had not received a notice of dishonor from
her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her
funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks. CSaHDT

Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts


due on the checks or making arrangements for payment in full
within five (5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately for
Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant
case. She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged
arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that the same had been
fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the amounts
covered by the subject checks. Moreover, documents to prove
such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during
the trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia, and thus
waived her right to present evidence. While Campos blamed her
former counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be
present during the trial, 17 it is settled that the negligence of
counsel binds his or her client. Given the circumstances, the
Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA
which affirmed the conviction of Campos.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21,
2008 and Resolution dated February 16, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468 areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
(Campos v. People, G.R. No. 187401 (Resolution), [September 17,
|||

2014])

[G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002.]

GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs.


HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A.
VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE MANUEL D.L. VILLAMAYOR
and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC., respondents.

Padilla Jimenez Kintanar & Asuncion Law Offices for petitioner.


Solicitor General for public respondent.
Severino D. Corpuz and Manuel L. Orallo for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith was convicted of two


counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of six months on
each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court convicting appellant of the crime charged. Hence, the
present petition. Petitioner pointed out that he communicated to
private respondent Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher
attached to the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded
at the time of their issuance. Petitioner contended that good faith
on his part negated any intent to put worthless checks in
circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Petitioner
also asserted that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through
the proceeds of the notarial foreclosure and auction sale
extinguished his criminal liability.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted petitioner.
The Court noted that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps
Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were corporate
checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid
reason duly communicated to the payee. The Court also stressed
that by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale,
Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two
checks, totaling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned
by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks.
This was the situation when, almost two years after the auction
sale, petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of B.P.
22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to
Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though
respondentCourt of Appeals called the payment thereof as
involuntary. That the money value of the two checks signed by
petitioner was already collected, however, could not be ignored in
appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal charges against
petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps
Dodge was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln
Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
69, which became final after it was affirmed by the
appellate court. Holding the debtor's president to answer for a
criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection,
was no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations, the creditor having collected already more than a
sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, via auction sale.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22); TO UPHOLD


PETITIONER'S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE WOULD RUN
AFOUL OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OFFAIRNESS AND JUSTICE;
CASE AT BAR. — The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to
safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account user." It was not designed to favor or
encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through
manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.
Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has
expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P.
22 violations rather than imprisonment to "best serve the
ends of criminal justice." Moreover, while the philosophy
underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school
that imposes penalties for retribution, such retribution should be
aimed at "actual and potential wrongdoers." Note that in the two
criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the
checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard
allegedly failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to
the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through
a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially
declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerard's property for cash
amounting to P1,120,540 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid
rentals. Said property was already in Phelps Dodge's custody
earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was moving into the
leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps
Dodge for said rentals was only P301,953.12. Thus, by resorting
to the remedy offoreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was
able to collect the face value of the two checks, totalling
P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard
valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This was the
situation when, almost two years after the auction sale,
petitioner was charged with two counts ofviolation of B.P. 22. By
that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps
Dodge Phils., Inc. was no longer subsisting, though
respondent Court of Appealscalls the payment thereof as
involuntary. That the money value of the two checks signed by
petitioner was already collected, however, could not be ignored in
appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal charges against
petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps
Dodge was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln
Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
69, which became final after it was affirmed by the
appellate court. We cannot, under these circumstances, see how
petitioner's conviction and sentence could be upheld without
running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For
Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already exacted its proverbial
pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale as its chosen
remedy. THCSEA

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; HOLDING PETITIONER TO ANSWER FOR A


CRIMINAL OFFENSE UNDER B.P. 22 IS NO LONGER TENABLE NOR
JUSTIFIED BY LAW OR EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS AFTER THE
COMPLAINANT ALREADY COLLECTED MORE THAN A SUFFICIENT
AMOUNT TO COVER THE VALUE OF THE CHECKS FOR
PAYMENT OFRENTALS VIA AUCTION SALE. — While we agree with
the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is
the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their
presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws
mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is
consistent with the purposeof and reason for the law. Ratione
cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases,
the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law
also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a
debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in
fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a
sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the
debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P.
22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor
justified by law or equitable considerations. In sum, considering
that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has
already been effectively paid two years before the informations
against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that
petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or
sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks
issued determines the numberof violations of B.P. 22, or whether
there should be a distinction between postdated and other
kinds of checks need no longer detain us for being immaterial
now to the determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence of petitioner.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J : p

Assailed in this petition is the decision 1 dated March 14,


1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 19621, affirming
the Regional Trial Court's decision 2 finding petitioner Geoffrey
F. Griffith guilty on two counts for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment for a period of six months on each count, to be
served consecutively. Also assailed is the Court of Appeals'
resolution 3 dated July 8, 1997 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory
building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a term of two years at a
monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc., incurred
rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as
president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued the following checks:
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075065,
dated April 15, 1986 for P100,000.00, payable to Phelps
Dodge Phils. Inc.; and
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075066,
dated May 1, 1986 for P115,442.65, payable to Phelps
Dodge Phils. Inc. 4
The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:
These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this
Corporation to be given not later than May 30, 1986.
Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:
However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not
given before May 30, 1986, Phelps Dodge, Phils. shall
present the cheques for payment. This is final and
irrevocable. 5
On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the
said checks for payment on May 30, 1986 because they could not
be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had earlier
paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard. 6
Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through
its treasurer Ricardo R. Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard that it
was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard warehouse in
the leased premises since a new tenant was moving in. Phelps
Dodge told Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be placed "in
our compound and under our custody." 7
On June 2, 1986, 8 when no further communication was received
from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge presented the two checks for
payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge
sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith of the
dishonorof the checks and asking him to fund them within the
time prescribed by law. 9 Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the
checks but Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining
Lincoln's inability to fund said checks due to the
strike. 10 Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified
Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps
Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on June
20, 1986, 11 despite Lincoln Gerard's protest. 12

On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P.


22 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 73260 and 73261 were filed
against petitioner before the Regional TrialCourt. The motion for
reconsideration filed by Griffith was dismissed, and so were his
petition for review filed before the Department of Justice and
later on his motion to quash filed before the RTC. Griffith then
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that was
likewise denied.
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a
complaint for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 55276 before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, against Phelps
Dodge and the notary public who conducted the auction
sale. 13 On July 19, 1991, the trial court ruled that the foreclosure
and auction sale were invalid, but applied the proceeds thereof to
Lincoln Gerard's arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to
return to Lincoln Gerard the P1,072,586.88 as
excess. 14 The courtstated:
The evidence shows that defendant corporation had
already received the amount of P254,600 as a result of the
invalid auction sale. The latter amount should be applied
to the rental in arrears owed by the plaintiff corporation to
the defendant corporation (P301,953.12). Thus, the plaintiff
corporation still owes the defendant corporation the
amount of P47,953.12 as rental arrears. In order to get the
true and real damages that defendant corporation should
pay the plaintiff corporation, the balance of the rental
arrears should be deducted from the
amount of P1,120,540.00, the total value of the items
belonging to the plaintiff corporation and sold by the
defendant corporation at a public auction. The net result is
P1,072,586.88. 15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and
this became final and executory. 16
On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending
before the RTC were remanded to the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No. 7691that
expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and
41679, found Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of B.P.
22, 17 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six months on
each count, to be served consecutively. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the
accused GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH,
GUILTY OF VIOLATION of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law on
two counts.
The accused is therefore hereby sentence (sic) to suffer
imprisonment for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal
Case No. 41678 and another SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal
Case No. 41679, both of which shall be served
consecutively. IEcaHS

Considering that the civil aspect of these cases has


already been decided by the Regional Trial Court Branch
69, Pasig, regardless of its finality, of which this court has
no record, this Court shall not resolve the same because
they are either "Res Judicata" or "Pendente Litis."
SO ORDERED. 18

On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.


Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
In a consolidated decision dated March 14, 1997, the
appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE, absent any prima facie merit in it, the
Petition for Review under consideration is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 19

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision but this


was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated July 8,
1997. 20 Hence, this petition seeking reversal of the CA decision
and resolution on the criminal cases, anchored on the following
grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH
1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE
CONTRARY TO THE RULING
IN MAGNO V. COURT OFAPPEALS, WHERE THIS
HONORABLE COURT LAID DOWN THE DOCTRINE
THAT A CONVICTION UNDER B.P. 22 CANNOT BE
BASED ON AN INVERSE APPLICATIONOF THE
ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH
1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997
RESULT IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF B.P. 22.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH
1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997
STATING THAT PAYMENT THROUGH NOTARIAL
FORECLOSURE BEFORE THE FILING OF THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS UNDER B.P. 22 DOES NOT
ABATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, ARE ERRONEOUS AND
RESULT IN THE INIQUITOUS
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH
1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN A RELATED CASE (CA-G.R. NO.
20980) INVOLVING THE SAME PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AND THE SAME TRANSACTION
SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH
1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997
WHICH RELIED ON THE RULING IN THE
CASE OF LIM V.COURT OF APPEALS ON VENUE TO
JUSTIFY ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS
COMMITTED TWO COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF B.P. 22,
ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. 21
Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge
through a note on the voucher attached to the checks, the fact
that said checks were unfunded at the timeof their issuance.
Petitioner contends that this good faith on his part negates any
intent to put worthless checks in circulation, which is what B.P.
22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as regards the second check that
was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be any
violation of B.P. 22 with said check since the
element ofknowledge of insufficiency of funds is absent.
Petitioner could not have known at the time of its issuance that
the postdated check would be dishonored when presented for
payment later on. ACTISD

Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be


violative of the constitutional proscription against imprisonment
for failure to pay a debt, since petitioner would be punished not
for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but for failing to pay an
obligation when it fell due.
Petitioner also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard
through the proceeds of the notarial foreclosure and auction sale
extinguished his criminal liability.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that all the
elements that comprise violation of B.P. 22 are present in this
case. Moreover, the payment in this case was made beyond the
five-day period, counted from notice of dishonor, provided by the
law and thus did not extinguish petitioner's criminal liability.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard
assured Phelps Dodge, through the note on the voucher attached
to the checks, that said checks would be covered with sufficient
funds by May 30, 1996, which assurance was "final and
irrevocable." 22 The OSG also argues that B.P. 22 does not
distinguish between a check that is postdated and one that is
not, for as long as the drawer issued the checks with
knowledge of his insufficient funds and the check is dishonored
upon presentment.
There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt
in this case, since according to the OSG, what B.P. 22 penalizes is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check that is
dishonored upon presentation for payment, not the failure to pay
a debt. 23
The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from
Phelps Dodge's notarial foreclosure of Lincoln Gerard's
properties could not bar prosecution under B.P. 22, since damage
or prejudice to the payee is immaterial. Moreover, said payment
was made only after the violation of the law had already been
committed. It was made beyond the five-day period, from
notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22.
The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Geoffrey
F. Griffith, president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., has been erroneously
convicted and sentenced for violation ofthe Bouncing Checks
Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22). His conviction on two counts and
sentence of six months imprisonment for each count by the
respondent MTC Judge Manuel Villamayor was upheld by
respondent RTC Judge Edwin Villasor and affirmed by the
respondent Court of Appeals. But private respondent appears to
have collected more than the value of the two checks in question
before the filing in the trial court of the case for violation of B.P.
22. Hence, petitioner insists he has been wrongfully convicted
and sentenced. To resolve this issue, we must determine whether
the alleged payment of the amount of the checks two years prior
to the filing ofthe information for violation of B.P. 22 justifies his
acquittal.
Whether there is an unconstitutional application of the
provisions of B.P. 22 in this case, however, does not appear to us
an appropriate issue for consideration now. A purported
constitutional issue raised by petitioner may only be resolved if
essential to the decision of a case and controversy. But here we
find that this case can be resolved on other grounds. Well to
remember, courts do not pass upon constitutional questions that
are not the very lis mota of a case. 24
In the present case, the checks were conditionally issued for
arrearages on rental payments incurred by Lincoln Gerard, Inc.
The checks were signed by petitioner, the president of Lincoln
Gerard. It was a condition written on the voucher for each check
that the check was not to be presented for payment without
clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to be given at a specific date.
However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance
owing to a labor strike that paralyzed its business and resulted to
the company's inability to fund its checks. Still, Phelps Dodge
deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher attached thereto
that if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard
before May 30, 1986, the checks would be presented for payment.
"This is final and irrevocable," according to the note that was
written actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner.
The checks were dishonored and Phelps Dodge filed criminal
cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing
took place only after Phelps Dodge had collected the
amount of the checks, with more than one million pesos to spare,
through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerard's
properties earlier impounded by Phelps Dodge.

In our view, considering the circumstances of the case, the


instant petition is meritorious.
The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the
interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking
account user." 25 It was not designed to favor or encourage those
who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and
circumvention of the purpose of the law. 26 Noteworthy,
in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a
policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations
rather than imprisonment to "best serve the ends of criminal
justice."
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans
toward the classical school that imposes penalties for
retribution, 27 such retribution should be aimed at "actual and
potential wrongdoers." 28 Note that in the two criminal cases filed
by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were
corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for
a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears
repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a notarial foreclosure and
auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln
Gerard's property for cash amounting to P1,120,540 29 to satisfy
Phelps Dodge's claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was
already in Phelps Dodge's custody earlier, purportedly because a
new tenant was moving into the leased premises. The
obligationof Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals was
only P301,953.12. 30 Thus, by resorting to the
remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able
to collect the face value of the two checks, totalling P215,442.65.
In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in
excess of the debt or the checks. This was the situation when,
almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged
with two counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil
obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was
no longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls
the payment thereof as involuntary. 31 That the money valueof the
two checks signed by petitioner was already collected, however,
could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two
criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid
foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or return
P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional
TrialCourt of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was
affirmed by the appellate court. We cannot, under these
circumstances, see how petitioner's conviction and sentence
could be upheld without running afoul of basic
principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in our
view, already exacted its proverbial pound offlesh through
foreclosure and auction sale as its chosen remedy.
That is why we find quite instructive the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals earlier rendered in deciding the
petition for Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros
Caguioa, CA-G.R. SP No. 20980, in connection with the
petitioner's motion to quash the charges herein before they were
tried on the merits. 32
Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices
Reynato S. Puno and Asaali S. Isnani:
" . . . We are persuaded that the defense has good and
solid defenses against both charges in Criminal Cases
Nos. 73260-61. We can even say that the decision rendered
in Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 55276, well-written as it is,
had put up a formidable obstacle to any conviction in the
criminal cases with the findings therein made that the
sale by public auction of the properties of Lincoln was
illegal and had no justification under the facts; that also
the proceeds realized in the said sale should be deducted
from the account of Lincoln with Phelps, so that only
P47,953.12 may only be the rentals in arrears which
Lincoln should pay, computed at P301,953.12 less
P254,600.00; that out of what had happened in the case as
the trial court had resolved in its decision, Phelps is duty
bound to pay Lincoln in damages P1,072,586.88 from
which had been deducted the amount of P47,953.12
representing the balance of the rental in arrearages; and
that consequently, there is absolutely no consideration
remaining in support of the two (2) subject checks." 33
Petitioner's efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges
against him was frustrated on procedural grounds because,
according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not certiorari was the
proper remedy. 34 In a petition for certiorari, only
issues of jurisdiction including grave abuse of discretion are
considered, but an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire
case for review.
While we agree with the private respondent that the
gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless
checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment,
we should not apply penal laws mechanically. 35 We must find if
the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and
reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the
reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter
alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is
especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would
not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor
having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover
the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale,
we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a
criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is
no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks
issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years
before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in
this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly
and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether
the number ofchecks issued determines the
number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a
distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks need no
longer detain us for being immaterial now to the
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19621 dated
March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated July 8, 1997, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is
ACQUITTED of the charges of violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
(Griffith v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129764, [March 12, 2002],
|||

428 PHIL 878-892)

[G.R. No. 190834. November 26, 2014.]


ARIEL T. LIM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J :p

This is to resolve the petition for review on certiorari seeking the


reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 30, 2009, and its
Resolution2 dated January 4, 2010. The CA affirmed the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), convicting petitioner
of one (1) count of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 in
Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check
Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated June 30, 1998 and July 15,
1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for each check. He gave
the checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as his campaign donation
to the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor
who ordered the delivery of printing materials and used
petitioner's checks to pay for the same. Claiming that the printing
materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to
issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks. Thus, the
checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order and
during trial, when the bank officer was presented on the witness
stand, he admitted that said checks were drawn against
insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee
sent two demand letters to petitioner, dated July 20, 1998 and
July 23, 1998 and, subsequently, private complainant filed a
complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Prosecutor.
After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the
demand letters, and after receiving the subpoena from the Office
of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check dated
September 8, 1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee was
able to encash said replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after
petitioner had paid the amount of the bounced checks, two
Informations were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (MeTC), to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on account or for
value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013814 dated
July 15, 1998, payable to Cash in the amount of
P100,000.00 said accused knowing fully well that at the
time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same would have
been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the
accused, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the
amount of the said check or to make arrangement for
payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days
after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327139-CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 committed as follows: HIETAc

That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of


Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on account or for
value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013813 dated
June 30, 1998 payable to Cash in the amount of
P100,000.00 said accused knowing fully well that at the
time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but the same would have
been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the
accused, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the
amount of the said check or to make arrangement for
payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days
after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision
finding petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (RTC), and on July 20, 2007, the RTC issued a Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court therefore modifies the lower court
decision with respect to criminal case no. 327138 (07-
249931), because the lower court of Manila has no
jurisdiction to try and decide cases where the essential
ingredients of the crime charged happened in Quezon City.
The decision of the lower court with respect to criminal
case no. 327138 (07-249931) is ordered vacated and set
aside for lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that accused is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of BP 22 with
respect to criminal case no. 07-24992 is affirmed and is
ordered to pay a fine of P100,000.00 plus costs. No
findings as to civil liability because the court agrees with
the lower court that the check was paid, is affirmed and
there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. In case of
failure to pay fine, the accused shall undergo subsidiary
imprisonment of not more than six (6) months.
SO ORDERED. 5

A petition for review was then filed with the Court of Appeals,
and on June 30, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision
affirming in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied per Resolution dated January
4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that
jurisprudence dictates the dismissal of the criminal case against
him on the ground that he has fully paid the amount of the
dishonored checks even before the Informations against him
were filed in court. Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith v. Court of
Appeals. 6 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise
recommends the acquittal of petitioner, opining that Griffith 7 is
applicable to the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the
fact that two years before the filing of the Information for
violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the
complainant an amount greater than the value of the bounced
checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances in Griffith are
dissimilar from those in the present case. The Court disagrees
with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present case, because
the checks subject of this case are personal checks, while the
check involved in Griffith was a corporate check and, hence,
some confusion or miscommunication could easily occur
between the signatories of the check and the corporate
treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the present
case are not exactly the same as those in Griffith, it should be
noted that the same kind of confusion giving rise to petitioner's
mistake very well existed in the present case. Here, the check
was issued by petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to
Castor's candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was Castor who
instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two
checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks
were used as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner
relied on Castor's word and complied with his instructions, as it
was Castor who was supposed to take delivery of said materials.
Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the mistake of
readily complying with the instruction to stop payment since he
believed Castor's word that there is no longer any valid reason to
pay complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon.
Nevertheless, two months after receiving the demand letter from
private complainant and just several days after receiving
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a
replacement check which was successfully encashed by private
complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of
the checks only after receiving the subpoena from the Office of
the Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was
motivated to pay not because he wanted to settle his obligation
but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is
tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even
voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather, the
complainant was paid from the proceeds of the invalid
foreclosure of the accused's property. In said case, the Court did
not differentiate as to whether payment was made before or after
the complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. It
only mattered that the amount stated in the dishonored check
had actually been paid before the Information against the
accused was filed in court. In this case, petitioner even
voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks. The Court,
therefore, sees no justification for differentiating this case from
that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffith and in this
case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks
before the filing of the Informations in court. Verily, there is no
reason why the same liberality granted to the accused
in Griffith should not likewise be extended to herein petitioner.
The precept enunciated in Griffith is herein reiterated, to wit:
ECTIHa

While we agree with the private respondent that the


gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of
worthless checks that are dishonored upon their
presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws
mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is
consistent with the purpose of and reason for the
law.Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for
the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone
but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is
especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization
would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it.
The creditor having collected already more than a
sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding
the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense
under B.P. 22 two years after said collection is no longer
tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two
checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively
paid two years before the informations against him were
filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner
herein could not be validly and justly convicted or
sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. . . . 8(Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial
International Bank, 9 the foregoing principle articulated
in Griffith was the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the
accused in said case. Therein, the Court enumerated the
elements for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 being "(1) The accused
makes, draws or issues a check to apply to account or for value;
(2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she
does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment ; and (3)
The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment." 10 To facilitate proving the
second element, the law created a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is
established when it is shown that the drawer of the check was
notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter,
failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements
for its full payment. If the check, however, is made good or the
drawer pays the value of the check within the five-day period,
then the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential
elements of the violation is no longer present and the drawer may
no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. Said payment within the
period prescribed by the law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored
check during the five-day grace period would exculpate the
accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court
further elaborated in Tan:
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the
creditor had collected more than a sufficient amount to
cover the value of the checks representing rental
arrearages, holding the debtor's president to answer for a
criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22 two years after the said
collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or
equitable considerations. In that case, the Court ruled that
albeit made beyond the grace period but two years prior to
the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected
from the proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of
the petitioner's impounded properties, with more than a
million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the
petitioner.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial
pound of flesh by receiving and keeping in possession the
four buses — trust properties surrendered by petitioner in
about mid 1991 and March 1992 pursuant to Section 7 of
the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was
"about P6.6 million." It thus appears that the total amount
of the dishonored checks — P1,785,855.75 —, . . . was
more than fully satisfied prior to the transmittal and
receipt of the July 9, 1992 letter of demand. In keeping
with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such
payment of the dishonored checks to have obliterated the
criminal liability of petitioner.
It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. And since penal laws should not be applied
mechanically, the Court must determine whether the
application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose
and reason of the law. . . . 11 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if
made beyond the 5-day period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would
normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned
cases show that the Court acknowledges the existence of
extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime
or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove
to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like
in Griffith and in Tan, 12 petitioner should not be penalized
although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to
be present. The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid
the value of the dishonored check after having received
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have
forestalled the filing of the Information in court. The spirit of the
law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and
stability of the banking system, would not be served by
penalizing people who have evidently made amends for their
mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges
have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the
checks before the filing of the informations has already attained
the purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the
bounced check after the information has been filed in
court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused
from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from
the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is
no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every
intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his
issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and
compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case,
the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.EcAISC
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this
case should be well differentiated from cases where the accused
is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised
Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a
check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said
case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of
the offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in
committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the
dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability.
It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the
criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated
from the imposition of penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he
had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6)
months before the filing of Informations with the court. Such a
course of action is more in keeping with justice and equity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June
30, 2009, in CA-G.R. CR No. 31725, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Ariel T. Lim isACQUITTED in Criminal Case No.
07-249932.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lim v. People, G.R. No. 190834, [November 26, 2014])

[G.R. No. 184320. July 29, 2015.]

CLARITA ESTRELLADO-
MAINAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
BRION, J :
p

Before this Court is the Petition for Review


on Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Clarita Estrellado-Mainar
assailing the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)dated
November 28, 2007, 2 and July 29, 2008, 3 respectively, in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00429.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale
to Eric Naval (Naval) portions of land located in Matina Aplaya,
Davao City. During the negotiations for this sale, the petitioner
told Naval that the title to the land she was selling had no
problems. The petitioner also informed Naval that the area
subject of the proposed sale would "still be segregated from
the mother title." 4
On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to
Buy and Sell 5 where the petitioner agreed to sell to Naval a
200-square meter portion of the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-19932 representing a portion of
the petitioner's share in the estate of her deceased father,
Nicolas Estrellado. 6Naval paid a down payment totaling
P100,000.00, 7 and then asked permission from the petitioner if
he could construct his house on the land he bought. After the
petitioner issued an Authorization dated March 24, 2003, Naval
built his house on the subject land.
On June 3, 2005, representatives from JS Francisco &
Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco) demolished Naval's house. It was only
then that Naval discovered that the lot sold to him had been
the subject of a dispute between the petitioner's family and JS
Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner the return of
the amount he paid for the land, as well as to pay the value of
the house demolished, but the latter refused to heed these
demands.
The prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of
other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City 8 in an
Information that provides:
That sometime in February 2005, in the city of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, with
deceit and intent to defraud, pretending to be the lawful
owner of a two hundred (200) square meters lot portion
of a lot covered by TCT-19932 located at Cogon, Matina
Aplaya, this City, with deceit and intent to gain, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in selling the same
to one Eric C. Naval for which the said Eric C. Naval paid
to the accused the total amount of P123,000.00, as
partial payment of the said lot when in truth and in fact
and despite her knowledge that the entire property
covered by TCT No. 19931 [sic] had been sold and was
already owned by JS Francisco and Sons, Inc., thereby
defrauding the said Eric C. Naval in the aforesaid amount
of P123,000.00. AaCTcI

CONTRARY TO LAW. 9
In its decision 10 dated December 27, 2006, the MTCC
found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of other
forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced her to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor.
The MTCC essentially ruled that the petitioner
"represented to the complainant that the property is free from
lien and encumbrance." 11 It added that Naval relied on the first
page of the title that had been shown to him, and that the
petitioner deliberately did not inform him of the fact that she
(petitioner) no longer owned the area sold.
Accordingly, the MTCC directed the petitioner to pay the
following amounts to the offended party: (a) P123,000.00 fine
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; (b)
P123,000.00 civil indemnity; (c) P65,755.45 as actual expenses
incurred and proven; (d) P10,000.00 attorney's fees; and (e)
P10,000.00 moral damages.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16,
Davao City, affirmed the MTCC decision in toto. 12 The RTC
essentially adopted the factual findings and the conclusions of
the MTCC.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the
RTC denied her motion in its Order of May 29, 2007.
The petitioner challenged the RTC rulings before the CA
via a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. In
its resolution 13 dated August 16, 2007, the CA directed the
petitioner to "show cause why the petition should not be
dismissed for its failure to: (1) allege the date of receipt of the
assailed decision in the petition; (2) allege the date of receipt
of the denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration with
the court a quo; and (3) attach Exhibits "03" to "05" referred to
on pages 8 and 9 of the petition."
In her Compliance and Manifestation, 14 the petitioner
specified the date when her counsel's messenger received the
assailed RTC decision and order. She, however, manifested
that her petition for review bore no Exhibits "03" to "05" on
pages 8-9.
In its resolution of November 28, 2007, 15 the CA dismissed
the petition for the petitioner's failure to attach the exhibits
that would support the allegations of her petition in violation of
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the
CA denied her motion in its resolution dated July 29, 2008.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
In the present petition, 16 the petitioner claimed that the
CA erred in dismissing her petition for review on mere
technicalities. She further argued that the courts a quo erred
in convicting her of violation of Article 316, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code because the Information charged her
with violation of paragraph 1 of the same article. The
petitioner also maintained that she did not misrepresent the
subject land to be free from any lien or encumbrance. acEHCD
OUR RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition.
Noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of
due process, but merely a statutory privilege to be exercised
only in accordance with the law. As the appealing party, the
petitioner must comply with the requirements of the relevant
rules; otherwise, she loses the statutory right to appeal. We
emphasize that the procedures regulating appeals as laid
down in the Rules of Court must be followed because strict
compliance with them is indispensable for the orderly and
speedy disposition of justice. 17
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Form and contents. — The petition shall
be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts
or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
indicate the specific material dates showing that it was
filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the
matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of
errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the
Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied
upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the
judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified
correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court,
the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition. (emphasis
ours)
Corollarily, Section 3 of this Rule states that "[t]he failure
of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding, among others, the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."
We note that the CA exercised liberality in its treatment
of the petitioner's petition for review when — instead of
dismissing it outright — it still directed her to show cause why
hear petition should not be dismissed for failing to strictly
comply with Section 2 of Rule 42, particularly for failure to: (1)
allege the date of receipt of the assailed decision in the
petition; (2) allege the date of receipt of the denial of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration; and (3) attach exhibits
"03" to "05" referred to on pages 8 and 9 of the petition. 18
Instead of complying with the third directive, however, the
petitioner stated that the petition had no exhibits "03" and
"05" on pages 8-9. An examination of the records revealed that,
indeed, exhibits "03" to "05" were stated on pages 4 to 5. The
CA itself admitted that it inadvertently stated in its directive
that exhibits "03" to "05" were on pages 8 and 9, instead of on
pages 4 to 5.
Notwithstanding the CA's inadvertence, the petitioner
ought to have complied with the latter's third directive,
considering that there could have been no other exhibits "03"
to "05" referred to other than those mentioned on pages 4 and
5 of the petition, namely TCT No. T-364319 (Exh. "03");
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Renunciation of
Shares, Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "04"); and
Agreement to Buy and Sell (Exh. "05").
Without doubt, these documents would have supported
the material allegations in the petitioner's petition for review.
The petitioner should have been more prudent and vigilant in
pursuing her petition, instead of capitalizing on the CA's
misquotation of the pages. The CA already gave the petitioner
the opportunity to rectify the procedural infirmities in her
petition, but the latter did not take advantage of this liberality
by exerting utmost diligence to comply with the CA's
directives.
The records likewise showed that the petitioner did
attach Exhibits "03" to "05" in her motion for reconsideration
before the CA. The CA, nonetheless, disregarded these annexes
due to the petitioner's failure to offer any explanation why she
did not attach these documents to her petition. While the CA
could have stretched the limits of its liberality a bit more, we
could not fault it for ruling the way it did at that point since the
petitioner did not even bother to offer any explanation why she
did not attach these relevant documents to her petition. As the
CA held:
Despite petitioner's second attempt to rectify the
procedural infirmities in the motion for reconsideration
by attaching therein the exhibits, yet, petitioner did not
even proffer any explanation why she failed in the first
instance to attach the same in the petition.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, concomitant to petitioner's plea for liberal
application of the rules of procedure is her obligation to
exert her utmost to comply therewith. Sadly, petitioner is
wanting of the traits that could qualify her to invoke
liberality in the application of the Rules. 19
What constitutes a good and sufficient cause that will
merit a reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition is a
discretionary call by the CA, and the Court will not interfere
with the exercise of this prerogative unless there has been a
grave abuse of discretion. Following the clear provisions of
Section 2, in relation with Section 3, of Rule 42, we hold that
the CA did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
manner that amounted to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law.
The petitioner's improper conviction
under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC
Notwithstanding the petitioner's noncompliance with
Section 2, Rule 42, we resolve the substantive issue raised by
the petitioner in the interest of justice. This Court has, on
occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of
procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
among other instances, are at stake. It has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural
defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The
strict and rigid application of rules that tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice must always be
avoided.20
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in
the Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the
Information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by
the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or
designation of the offense contained in the caption of the
Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the
offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. 21
To recall, the prosecution charged the petitioner with the
crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which punishes
"[a]ny person who, pretending to be the owner of any real
property, shall convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the same."
The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner under
Article 316, paragraph 2 which punishes the act of any person
who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose
of the same, although such encumbrance is not recorded.
The elements of other forms of swindling under Article
316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1)
that the thing disposed of be real property; (2) that the
offender knew that the real property was encumbered,
whether the encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there
must be express representation by the offender that the real
property is free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of
disposing of the real property be made to the damage of
another. 22
The Information in the present case, aside from expressly
indicating in its caption that it is charging the petitioner under
Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, alleged
that the petitioner "with deceit and intent to defraud,"
pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter
portion of a lot covered by TCT No. T-19932 despite her
knowledge that the entire property had already been sold and
was owned by JS Francisco. Notably, it had not been alleged
that the petitioner expressly represented to Naval that the
subject property was free from any encumbrance.
In Naya v. Abing, 23 the Court set aside the petitioner's
conviction for estafa under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code since there had been no allegation in the Information
that he (petitioner) expressly represented in the sale of the
subject property to William Po that the said property was free
from any encumbrance. We explained that the gravamen of the
crime is the disposition of legally encumbered real property by
the offender under the express representation that there is no
encumbrance thereon; and that the accused must make an
express representation in the deed of conveyance that the
property sold or disposed of is free from any encumbrance for
one to be criminally liable. The Court explained that:
. . . there is no allegation in the Information that
petitioner expressly represented in the sale of the
subject property to William Po that the said property was
free from any encumbrance. Irrefragably, then, petitioner
was not charged with estafa under Article 316, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code.Hence, the trial court
committed a reversible error in finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under said provision
and that the Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming
the decision of the trial court on appeal. 24
We reiterate that the Information in the present case did
not allege that the petitioner made an express representation
that the property sold is free from any encumbrance. This
Information was crafted in such a way that only one particular
crime was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1), and the
alleged manner through which such offense was committed
(that is, by pretending to be the lawful owner . . .) did not
constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may
be committed even by the owner of the property.
Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the
petitioner and Naval also did not contain any representation by
the petitioner that the property being sold was free from any
encumbrance.
It is not disputed that TCT No. T-19932 bore the following
annotations:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry No. 1131326 — AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM
— filed by J.S. Francisco and Sons, Inc. represented by
Joselito Franscisco affecting the property covered by
this Certificate of Title which is the subject of Deed of
Sale executed between the said corporation and the
registered owner. This instrument was executed before
Notary Public of Davao City Francis Arnold de Vera, as
Doc. No. . . .
Date of instrument : Oct. 28, 1998;
Date of inscription : Oct. 29, 1998 at 8:10 a.m.
At any rate, paragraph 2 of Article 316 does not prohibit
the sale of an encumbered property; the vendor must have
represented to the buyer that the property was free from
encumbrance. 25 What brings about criminal liability is the
deceit in selling the property. Corollarily, the deed must have a
statement of warranty that is false in order to commit the
offense. 26 The petitioner's passive attitude regarding the
presence of an adverse claim (she assumed that Naval became
aware of this inscription after showing to him a copy of TCT
No. T-19932 and "never complained") is not sufficient to
constitute fraud within the meaning of the law. The fraud
and/or deceit by misrepresentation contemplated by law must
be the result of overt acts; they cannot be implied or
presumed.
In the light of these considerations, we hold that the trial
courts erroneously convicted the petitioner of other forms of
swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.To uphold the petitioner's conviction for an offense other
than that charged in the Information would be a violation of
her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her. HSAcaE

Violation of Article 316, paragraph 1


of the Revised Penal Code not proven
The presented pieces of evidence do not also warrant a
conviction for the crime for which the petitioner had been
charged, that is, Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code.
For a successful prosecution of the crime of swindling
under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following essential elements of this crime must be
established: (1) that the thing be immovable, such as a parcel
of land or a building; (2) that the offender who is not the owner
of said property should represent that he is the owner thereof;
(3) that the offender should have executed an act of
ownership, e.g., selling, leasing, encumbering, or mortgaging
the property; and (4) that the act be made to the prejudice of
the owner or a third person. 27
The presence of the first and third elements are beyond
question, as the parties admitted that the petitioner sold to
Naval a 200-square meter parcel of landlocated in Matina
Aplaya, Davao City. The fourth element is likewise settled, as
the petitioner did not deny that Naval paid her a total of
P123,000.00. The fact of destruction of Naval's house by the
representatives of JS Francisco is also not disputed.
With regard to the second element, we hold that the
prosecution failed to prove the allegation in the Information
that the petitioner pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-
square meter portion of a lot covered by TCT No. 19932.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was one of the nine
(9) children of Nicolas and Narcisa, who was the registered
owner of TCT No. T-19932 entered at the Registry of Deeds of
Davao City on October 31, 1967. The Register of Deeds of
Davao City eventually cancelled TCT No. T-19932 and issued a
new title (TCT No. T-364319) in the name of "Nicolas
Estrellado, married to Narcisa Trono, both of legal age,
Filipinos and residents of Davao City, Philippines." 28
Naval's court testimony showed that he was aware that
the title to the land being sold to him was still under the name
of Nicolas, thus:
ATTY. PERCY JANE ABIAN-FUÑE:
Q: Mr. Naraval (sic), how long have you known the accused
Clarita Mainar?
ERIC NAVAL:
A: We knew each other in 1999 for three years.
Q: And you personally know that she is the daughter of the
late Mr. Nicolas Estrellado?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And that you approached sometime in February, you
said you approached her and made known your intent
to buy the property?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And that you knew that the property that you are buying
will still be segregated from the mother title?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And at that time the accused had shown you copy of
the owner's duplicate of title?
A: Correct.
Q: Under the name of the late Nicolas Estrellado?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And at that time you knew you were buying a titled
property, right?
A: Correct.
Q: And at that time you did not verify with the Register of
Deeds?
A: Yes, I did not.
Q: Because you have already seen the duplicate copy of
the title, right?
A: I just seen [sic] the front page of the title.
Q: And knowing that you have only seen the front title, you
did not check with the Register of Deeds?
A: I did not.
Q: And did you find any other burden on the property other
than what is stated in the title?
A: None. 29

xxx xxx xxx


In Naval's own complaint-affidavit, he stated that the
petitioner informed him during the negotiations for the sale
"that the area that I will buy would still be segregated from the
mother title." 30 In this same complaint-affidavit, Naval also
stated that he caused the property to be surveyed in order to
determine the boundaries of the area he bought, and to
separate it from the mother title. These statements were
corroborated by Naval's wife, Josephine, who stated in her
own affidavit that the petitioner told her and Naval that the
subject property was still part of the mother title. In addition,
stipulation no. 3 of the Agreement to Buy and Sell provides
that ". . . the SELLER shall cause the subdivision of the title
and take out two hundred (200) square meters portion of the
BUYER from the SELLER's nine hundred thirty six (936) square
meters share."
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the
petitioner did not pretend to be the owner of the property sold.
From the very start, the petitioner made it clear to Naval that
the subject property was still under the name of her
(petitioner's) father; and that the area subject of the sale
would still be segregated from the mother title. Naval also
admitted that he saw the front page of the land's title showing
Nicolas to be its registered owner. The element of deceit —
central to prosecutions for swindling — is therefore wanting.
We additionally point out that Nicolas' heirs (Narcisa and his
nine legitimate children) eventually executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Renunciation of Shares, Donation
and Deed of Absolute Sale 31 where they agreed, among others,
to give a portion (totalling 1,236-square meters) of the land
covered by TCT No. T-364319 to the petitioner.
In the light of these considerations, we cannot hold the
petitioner liable for other forms of swindling under Article 316,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Codeabsent a finding that
she employed fraud or deceit in the form of false pretenses
with regard to her ownership of the real property sold.
We are aware that a decision 32 (attached to the records)
had been issued by the MTCC, Branch 3, Davao City, on April
26, 1999, in Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98, where the trial court
ruled in favor of JS Francisco (plaintiff) against Nicolas
Estrellado and Narcisa Trono-Estrellado (Estrellado spouses).
In this case, the MTCC ordered the Estrellado spouses, their
successors-in-interest, and other persons acting on their
behalf, to immediately vacate Lot 377-A-1-B-4-B (LRC) Psd-
78004 (covered by TCT No. T-19932) and to restore its peaceful
possession to the plaintiff.
This MTCC decision, however, bears no relevance on the
issue whether the petitioner misrepresented to be the owner
of the property covered by TCT No. T-19932. We point out that
this case arose from an action for forcible entry filed by J.S.
Francisco against the petitioner's parents, the Estrellado
spouses. The issue in an ejectment case is the right to
physical possession of the premises or possession de facto,
and the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine
the question of possession especially if the former is
inseparably linked with the latter. Corollarily, a party who can
prove prior possession de facto may recover the
possession even from the owner himself, since such cases
proceed independently of any claim of ownership. HESIcT

In its April 26, 1999 decision in Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98,


the MTCC merely resolved the issue of prior physical
possession or possession de facto, and did not resolve the
issue of ownership of the disputed property. The MTCC, in fact,
recognized that the title (TCT No. T-19932) to the disputed
property was registered under the name of Nicolas.
We also point out that the petitioner sought the
assistance of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao to
require the Register of Deeds of Davao City to produce the
deed of absolute sale between Nicolas and JS Francisco
referred to in the affidavit of adverse claim. While the Register
of Deeds could not yet certify with finality as to the
nonexistence of this deed, 33 the petitioner's act of seeking the
aid of the Ombudsman shows her honest and earnest desire to
protect her family's interest over the subject property (she
claims that the deed of sale between her father and JS
Francisco was spurious), and that she had no intention to
deceive Naval. Naval and Josephine, in fact, lived on the
subject property for two years, more or less, before their house
was destroyed by the representatives of JS Francisco.
Josephine even intimated that she had been hoping that the
petitioner's family would be able to settle the dispute with JS
Francisco over the subject property while she (Josephine) and
Naval were living there.
On a final note, we stress that it is the prosecution who
determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and
factual elements in the case shall be utilized as components of
the information. Fairness demands that the petitioner should
not be convicted of a crime which she has not been charged
with or which is not necessarily included therein.
WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations,
we GRANT the petition, and SET ASIDE the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2007, and July 29, 2008,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. Accordingly,
we ACQUIT petitioner Clarita Estrellado-Mainar of the crime of
other forms of swindling under Article 316 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. AcICHD

SO ORDERED.
||| (Estrellado-Mainar v. People, G.R. No. 184320, [July 29, 2015])

[G.R. No. 163938. March 28, 2008.]

DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO


BUEBOS, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J :
p

THE law on arson has always been a constant source of


confusion not only among members of the bar, but also among
those of the bench. The bewilderment often centers on what
law to apply and what penalty to impose.
In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine
whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or arson of an
inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion
perpetua.
Before the Court is a petition to review
on certiorari under Rule 45 the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that 2 of the Regional
Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners Dante Buebos
and Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.
The Facts
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o'clock in the morning,
Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at Hacienda San Miguel,
Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child. 3She was lying
down when she heard some noise around the house. She got
up and looked through the window and saw the four accused,
Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio
Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. 4 When she went
out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She
shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate succor,
the four fled. 5
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina
scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito Borbe
to celebrate New Year's Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the
place and saw a number of people jumping over the fence.
When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify
Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. 6 He
also saw Rolando Buela running away. 7
On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito
Buebos, together with Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr.,
were indicted for arson in an Information bearing the following
accusations:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at
3:00 o'clock in the Barangay Hacienda, Island of San
Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another. With intent to
cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of
the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter's damage
and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts
was principally supplied by private complainant Adelina Borbe
and Olipiano Berjuela.
Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main
exculpating line of petitioners and their co-accused. The trial
court summed up the defense evidence in the following tenor:
The defense contended that the accused were at
different places at the time of the incident: Rolando
Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel,
Tabaco, Albay as there was a novena prayer at his
parents' house on occasion of the death anniversary of
his late grandfather; Dante Buebos also claimed to have
been at Romeo Calleja's having gone there in the evening
of December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 o'clock
noontime of January l, 1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted
that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay, Hacienda,
San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident
happened and that he never left his house; Antonio
Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at his residence at
Añgas after having visited his in-laws; that he only came
to know of the accusation five (5) days after the incident
happened when he visited his parents at Malictay;
witnesses were likewise presented by the accused to
corroborate their testimonies. 9
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of arson. The dispositive part of the
judgment of conviction reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court
finds accused ROLANDO BUELA, DANTE BUEBOS,
SARMELITO BUEBOS and ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged;
accordingly, each of the accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 10

Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the


matter to the appellate court. In their appeal, they contended
that (1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime
of arson; (2) that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy;
and (3) the trial court erred in failing to give weight and
credence to their defense of denial and alibi.
On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision
penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos, the CA
disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Each of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to
ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 11

In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the


accused could only be convicted of simple arson, punishable
by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house,
which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate
court, the information failed to allege with specificity the
actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should be found
liable only for arson in its simple form. 12
Issues
Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted
to the present recourse. The following arguments are now
raised for the Court's consideration:
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON
THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT
BAR. 13
Our Ruling
Overview of the law on arson
The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by
the dearth of annotation on this part of our penal law.
Certainly, the law on arson is one of the least commented in
this jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench and bar, a brief
legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in order.
Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine
different articles of the Revised Penal Code: Article 320
(destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article
322 (cases of arson not included in the preceding articles),
Article 323 (arson of property of small value), Article 324
(crimes involving destruction), Article 325 (burning one's own
property to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property
exclusively owned by the offender, Article 326-a (in cases
where death resulted as a consequence of arson), and Article
326-b ( prima facie evidence of arson).
On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede
the successful enforcement and prosecution of arsonists, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D)
No. 1613. P.D. 1613 supplanted the penal code provisions on
arson. The pertinent parts of the said presidential issuance
read:
SEC. 1. Arson. — Any person who burns or sets fire
to the property of another shall be punished by prision
mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person
sets fire to his own property under circumstances which
expose to danger the life or property of another.
SEC. 2. Destructive Arson. — The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any
of the following:
1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments
where explosives, inflammable or combustible
materials are stored;
2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or
any edifice devoted to culture, education or
social services;
3. Any church or place of worship or other building
where people usually assemble;
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or
watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of
persons or property;
5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any
legislative, judicial, administrative or other
official proceedings;
6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house,
housing tenement, shopping center, public or
private market, theater or movie house or any
similar place or building;
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not,
situated in a populated or congested area.
SEC. 3. Other Cases of Arson. — The penalty
of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or
any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or
mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop,
grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central;
and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or
warehouse.
SEC. 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in
Arson. — The penalty in any case of arson shall be
imposed in its maximum period:
1. If committed with the intent to gain;
2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property
burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is
committed by a syndicate if it is planned or
carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons.
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson . — If by
reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
SEC. 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson . — Any of the
following circumstances shall constitute prima
facie evidence of arson:
1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one
part of the building or establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or
materials are stored within the building not
necessary in the business of the offender nor
for household use.
3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other
flammable or combustible substances or
materials soaked therewith or containers
thereof, or any mechanical, electrical,
chemical, or electronic contrivance designed to
start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the
foregoing are found in the ruins or premises of
the burned building or property.
4. If the building or property is insured for
substantially more than its actual value at the
time of the issuance of the policy.
5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire
insurance policy more than two fires have
occurred in the same or other premises owned
or under the control of the offender and/or
insured.
6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of
the effects insured and stored in a building or
property had been withdrawn from the
premises except in the ordinary course of
business.
7. If a demand for money or other valuable
consideration was made before the fire in
exchange for the desistance of the offender or
for the safety of other person or property of the
victim.
SEC. 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. — Conspiracy
to commit arson shall be punished by prision mayor in its
minimum period.
SEC. 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson . — The
building which is the object of arson including the land
on which it is situated shall be confiscated and
escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can
prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of
such arson despite the exercise of due diligence on his
part.
On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again
revisited via P.D. No. 1744. The new law expanded the definition
of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code. The amendatory legislation also paved
the way for the reimposition of the capital punishment on
destructive arsonists.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the
Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes) was passed on
December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a revision. As
it now stands, Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code is worded,
thus:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. — The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent
to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several
or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership,
devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a
definite purpose such as, but not limited to,
official governmental function or business,
private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely
incidental to a definite purpose such as but not
limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings,
public conveyances or stops or terminals,
regardless of whether the offender had
knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire
and regardless also of whether the building is
actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or
airplane, devoted to transportation or
conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or
leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and
any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted
to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the
purpose of concealing or destroying evidence
of another violation of law, or for the purpose of
concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors
or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above
enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed
when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or
more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of
whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the
building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in
the commission or another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military
powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,
storehouse, archives or general museum of the
Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of
inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of
the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on
June 24, 2006 through R.A. No. 9346, arson is no longer a
capital offense. 14
We proceed to the crux of the petition.
Circumstantial evidence points to
petitioners' culpability
Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson
based on circumstantial evidence. They argue that the
inference that they were responsible for the burning of private
complainant's hut was not duly proven by the People.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that
"indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which
the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Resort
thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would
result in setting a felon free." 15
At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on
which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that
form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or
impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a
conviction. 16 Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. 17
The following are the requisites for circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient for a conviction: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has
committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances
must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 18
After a careful review of the evidence presented by both
parties, We find that the circumstantial evidence extant in the
records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the authors of
the burning of the hut of private complainant Adelina Borbe:
1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from
outside her house at around 3:00 a.m.;
2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private
complainant saw petitioners, together with their two other co-
accused, standing in front of the house;
3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;
4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private
complainant desperately shouted for help.
The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have
been proved through positive testimony. 19 Evidently, these
circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to
one fair conclusion — the culpability of petitioners for the
burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that the
circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner
perpetrated the arson.
Conspiracy evident from coordinated
action of petitioners
Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously
appreciated by both the trial and appellate courts. They posit
that the finding of conspiracy was premised on speculation
and conjecture.
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide
to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct
evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not
necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is
to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon
proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing
his part to fulfill the common design. In such a case, the act of
one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will
thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. 20
In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the
coordinated movements of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito
Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of private
complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making
boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together
while the roof of Adelina's house was ablaze. These acts
clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of
interest.
We quote with approval the CA observation along this
line:
Accused-appellant's assertion that conspiracy has
not been established is belied by the accounts of the
prosecution witness. The manner by which the accused-
appellants behaved after the private complainant
shouted for help clearly indicated a confederacy of
purpose and concerted action on the part of the
accused-appellants. Even if there is no direct evidence
showing that all of the accused had prior agreement on
how to set the roof of the house on fire, the doctrine is
well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Very
seldom such prior agreement be demonstrable since, in
the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only
rarely documented by agreements in writing. 21
Crime committed and the penalty
The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six (6) years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. On appeal,
the CA reduced the sentence to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. The CA ratiocinated:
The information charges accused-appellants with
"violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the particular
provision breached. The information having failed to
allege whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, and
not having been established that the house is situated in
a populated or congested area, accused-appellants
should be deemed to have only been charged with plain
arson under Section 1 of the decree. Under Section 1 of
the decree, the offense of simple arson committed is
punishable by prision mayor.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances in the case at bar accused-appellants
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision
mayorin its medium period as provided under Article 321,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
by Presidential Decree No. 1613. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty
should be anywhere within the range of prision
correctional. 22
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners
of arson is Section 3, paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1613. The said
provision of law reads:
SEC. 3. Other Cases of Arson. — The penalty
of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling. 23 Admittedly, there is a
confluence of the foregoing elements here. However, the
information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned
was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
state:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint
or information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation . — The acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as
well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for
the court to pronounce judgment.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must
state the designation of the offense given by the statute and
specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances.
Otherwise stated, the accused will not be convicted of the
offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in
the information.24
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the
house intentionally burned by petitioners and their cohorts
was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that
"accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof
of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter's damage and
prejudice." 25
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000,
while the petitioners were convicted by the RTC on April 7,
1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary that
rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application
insofar as they benefit the accused. 26
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson,
under Section 1, paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable
by prision mayor.
This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a
number of occasions, modified the RTC and CA judgments for
having applied the wrong law and penalty on arson. In People
v. Soriano, 27 the accused was found guilty of destructive
arson, then a capital offense. On automatic review, the Court
held that he should be held liable only for simple arson. The
explanation:
However, we believe that the applicable provision of
law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for
other cases of arson as the properties burned by
accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the
aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second
Amended Information particularly refer to the structures
as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The
applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD
1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case
of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-
settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against
the government, and literally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD
1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished
from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed
under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting
Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes
"for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and
which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed
under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with
a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the
law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words,
Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be
converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-
appellant neither appears to be heinous nor represents a
greater degree of perversity and viciousness as
distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320
of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance
was established to convert the offense to Destructive
Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that
accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property burned"
cannot be appreciated in the present case where it
appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of
anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred
that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego.
Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a
disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances
that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus,
accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson
penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of
intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling. 28
An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this
Court in the more recent case of People v. Malngan. 29 Said the
Court in Malngan:
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is
accused-appellant guilty of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2)
categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive
arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended byRepublic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple
arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said
classification is based on the kind, character and
location of the property burned, regardless of the value
of the damage caused, 48 to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended
by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning
of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by
any person or group of persons. The classification of this
type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason
for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and
deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent
the destruction of properties and protect the lives of
innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration
leaves only destruction and despair in its wake; hence,
the State mandates greater retribution to authors of
this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe punishment
imposed for this crime takes into consideration the
extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious
burning of these structures; the danger to property
resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is
normally difficult to adopt precautions against its
commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the
perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the social,
economic, security and political fabric of the nation.
[Emphasis supplied]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of
the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should result,
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts.
321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the
governing law for Simple Arson. This decree
contemplates the malicious burning of public and private
structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as
amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of
arson. These include houses, dwellings, government
buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus
stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments. Although the purpose of the law on
Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and
other crimes involving destruction, protect the national
economy and preserve the social, economic and political
stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be
meted to offenders. This separate classification of
Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity
of punishment commensurate to the act or acts
committed, depending on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied]
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished
from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed
under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended)
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as
heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are
crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty.
In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with
less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson. However,
acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be
converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]
Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-
vis the description of the crime as stated in the
accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident
that accused-appellant was charged with the crime
of Simple Arson — for having "deliberately set fire upon
the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA
and family . . . knowing the same to be an inhabited
house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a
consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the
said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining
residential houses, were razed by fire." [Emphasis
supplied]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to
the facts of the case of People v. Soriano. The accused in
the latter case caused the burning of a particular house.
Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5)
neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused
guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo,
however, declared that:
". . . [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec.
3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty
of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other
cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-
appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under
the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the
second Amended Information particularly refer to the
structures as houses rather than as buildings or
edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec.
3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the
Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of
penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be
construed strictly against the government, and
liberally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD
1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the
case at bar."
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-
appellant was charged with having intentionally burned
the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said
conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7)
adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was
proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced
accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the
case "notwithstanding the error in the designation of the
offense in the information, the information remains
effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the
crime alleged therein." "What is controlling is not the
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violate, . . . but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited."
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty
imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No.
1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be
imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson . — If by
reason of or on the occasion of arson death results,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed. [Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, there being no aggravating
circumstance alleged in the Information, the imposable
penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua. 30
Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should range
from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day
to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence
is prision correctional, which has a range of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.
The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence.
We sustain it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed
judgment is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
(Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, [March 28, 2008], 573 PHIL
|||

347-368)

[G.R. No. 188708. July 31, 2013.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALAMADA


MACABANDO, appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing


the February 24, 2009 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision affirmed in
toto the August 26, 2002 judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, finding the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive arson, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on
December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on the road while
holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even
("manabla ko"). 3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his
house. 4
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his
neighbors shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio went out of
his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant's
house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the
fire. 5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10
meters from that of the appellant, ran to
the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric
approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a
traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant
then fired three (3) shots in the air. 6 The appellant also told the
people around that whoever would put out the fire would be
killed. 7
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save
his nephews and nieces. 8 Eric also returned to his house to save
his belongings. 9
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao
conducted a spot investigation of the incident, and concluded,
among others, that the fire started in the appellant's house; and
that it had been intentional. 10 Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas
stated that the fire gutted many houses in his barangay, and that
he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department
personnel in assessing the damage. 11
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of
the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the
two-storey house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, which was
owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal. 12 He admitted that he
felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one
of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen. 13 The appellant
claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio
cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up.
He denied making a threat to burn his house, and maintained that
he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his
neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he
intended to use during the New Year celebration. 14
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant's cousin, stated, among
others, that he did not see the appellant carry a revolver or fire a
shot on December 21, 2001. 15 Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant's
brother-in-law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the same
house, and that the latter was asleep in his room at the ground
floor before the fire broke out. 16
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of
destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC. 17 The appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge on arraignment. 18 In its judgment dated
August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave
weight to the RTC's factual findings since these findings were
based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The
CA held that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence
led to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the crime
charged.
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the
appellant and the penalty imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire
to his house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, Cagayan de Oro
City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to
circumstantial evidence since there was no direct evidence to
prove the appellant's culpability to the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that:
"(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty
that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who
has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must
be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of the accused." 19
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain that leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the
appellant, to the exclusion of others,set fire to his
house: first, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted
violently and broke bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of
December 21, 2001;second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the
appellant stated that he would get even, and then threatened to
burn his own house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the
appellant's room approximately two hours after the appellant
returned to his house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio,
Eric, and several other people from putting out the fire in his
house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then
threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his
house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire;
and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire marshals of
the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the
appellant's house, and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no
other conclusion than that the appellant set fire to his house. We
find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent
his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten
to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The
first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to save his
loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature,
reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart and
prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By
carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed
his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important
to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag
during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate planning
and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise
contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his house
when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when
he woke up. Clearly, the appellant's indifferent attitude to his
burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to
put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning
house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant failed
to impute any improper motive against the prosecution witnesses
to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no
misunderstanding with them prior to the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article
320 of the RPC, as amended, which reads:
Article 320. Destructive Arson. — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to
one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several or
different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to
the public in general or where people usually gather
or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but
not limited to, official governmental function or
business, private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely
incidental to a definite purpose such as but not
limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public
conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are
persons in said building or edifice at the time it is
set on fire and regardless also of whether the
building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or
airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance,
or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any
appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the
service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another
violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing
bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect
from insurance.
xxx xxx xxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or
fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives
or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of
inflammable or explosive materials.
In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of
structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices,
trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government
or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons." 20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, 21 on the other hand, currently
governs simple arson. Section 3 of this law provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. — The penalty
of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of
its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine
shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain
field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
[italics and emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and
private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320
of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 22 This law
punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts
that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political, and national security
implications than destructive arson. 23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3 (2) of P.D. No.
1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these
elements have been proven in the present case. The Information
alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the
fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were
established during trial through the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found
credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of
Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses
were residential, and that the fire had beenintentional. Moreover,
the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development
Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used
as dwellings.The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-
story house was used as a residence. That the appellant's act
affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive
arson, since the appellant's act does not appear to be heinous or
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when
compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC.
The established evidence only showed that the appellant
intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to
the neighboring houses.
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People 24 is particularly
instructive, thus:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from
Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of
the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320
of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson
are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are
crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other
words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson.
The Proper Penalty
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable
penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal, which has a range
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion
perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum
term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years, and whose maximum should be the medium
period of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen
(16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, taking into
account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.
Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on the
appellant the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts'
findings that the records do not adequately reflect any concrete
basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To
seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the
actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable. 25
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson under
Section 3 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613;
and
(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, [July 31, 2013], 715 PHIL
|||

666-677)

[G.R. No. 181409. February 11, 2010.]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE


CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX
CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM
SATO, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J :p

Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:


ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No
criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following
persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants,
or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property
which belonged to the deceased spouse before
the same shall have passed into the possession
of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be
applicable to strangers participating in the commission of
the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the
relationship by affinity created between the husband and the
blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the
blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one
spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such
relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of
Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification?ACTEHI

Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly


appointed administratrix 1 of petitioner intestate estate of her
deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed
a complaint-affidavit 2 for estafa against her brother-in-law,
William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit
read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of
legal age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory
Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after
being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-
23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of
the Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is
hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part
hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only
to preserve the properties of the Intestate Estate of
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to
recover such funds and/or properties as property
belonging to the estate but are presently in the
possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able
to confer with some of the children of my sister
Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our
mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died
in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato
and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24
respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the
death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24,
1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent
misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature
and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of
Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who
was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her
attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable
pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of
Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of
the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and
thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato
told her that the documents she was being made to
sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was
completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10)
years prior to November, 1992. CSDAIa

5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was


signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy, my
other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana
Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later
became the second wife of my sister's widower
William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my
mother signed the document in the belief that they
were in connection with her taxes, not knowing,
since she was blind, that the same was in fact a
Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay
properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of
Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property
and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three
(3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng
(Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of
Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc.
No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of
Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee
Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of
1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). . . .
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the
considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute
sale were not the true and actual considerations
received by her father William Sato from the buyers
of her grandmother's properties. She attests that
Anita Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3148 and P7,034,000.00 for the
property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid
proceeds were turned over to William Sato who
undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to
my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for the
property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-
0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned
over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of
sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has
actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the
buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the
signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s]. DAHCaI

11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was
not in any position to oppose or to refuse her father's
orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the
properties sold under the power of attorney
fraudulently secured from my mother, which total
P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for
the same and never delivered the proceeds to
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter
died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to
make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of
the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother's
estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to
refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which
include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida
Carungcong Sato. . . . 3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato's supporting affidavit and the special
power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita
Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached
to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. 4 On appeal, however,
the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution
dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of
Article 315, paragraph 3 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. 5 Thus,
the following Information was filed against Sato in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87: 6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of
ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by
means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years
old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that
said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing
fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all
located at Tagaytay City, as follows:cHCIEA

1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One


(1,871) square meters more or less and covered
by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or
less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No.
7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or
less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No.
7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters
more or less with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-
1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong, and once in the possession of the said
special power of attorney and other pertinent documents,
said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3)
Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of
Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for
P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for
P650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of
the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who
died in 1994.
Contrary to law. 7

Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment


of the Information so as to increase the amount of damages
from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale,
P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato. caIETS

Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming


that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his
relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased
Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting
circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato's motion in an opposition
dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006, 8 the trial court granted
Sato's motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor's contention is that the death of the
wife of the accused severed the relationship of affinity
between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the
mantle of protection provided to the accused by the
relationship is no longer obtaining.DcITHE

A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the


Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the
correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is
true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has
extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not
erase the fact that accused and Zenaida's mother, herein
complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and
they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond
the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit
and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil
liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of
theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by . . . 1) spouses, ascendants and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to]
Revised Penal Code, preserves family harmony and
obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and
malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a
stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his
grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal
liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente
Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp.
63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
STcDIE

Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.


WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original
Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED and, as
prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution's motion for reconsideration 10 was
denied in an order dated June 2, 2006. 11
Dissatisfied with the trial court's rulings, the intestate
estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals 12which, however, in a
decision 13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death
of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity
between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her
mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the
exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the
Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or
existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner
that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship
by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato,
and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and
that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private
respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita,
and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further
pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for
estafa against private respondent Sato already created
havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato
families as private respondent's daughter Wendy Mitsuko
Sato joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y
Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private
respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the
side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries
elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it
is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the
crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as
son-in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in
the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We
cannot draw the distinction that following the death of
Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the
son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from
the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic
is the rule in statutory construction that where the law
does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
There should be no distinction in the application of law
where none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish
where there are facts or circumstances showing that the
lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a
case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver's
intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret
and apply the law does not include the power to correct by
reading into the law what is not written therein. CcSTHI

Further, it is an established principle of statutory


construction that penal laws are strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code's simple language is most
favorable to Sato. 14
The appellate court denied reconsideration. 15 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not
reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites the commentary
of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the
rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting
the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is
that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the
property between the offender and the offended party. Here,
the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by
Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato's
wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became
a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three
parcels of land could have arisen only after her mother's
death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no
such right came about and the mantle of protection provided
to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that
the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of the
spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus,
while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with
Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law
relationship between Sato and Zenaida's mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is
covered by the exemption from criminal liability provided under
Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports
petitioner's claim that Zenaida's death dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the
criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members
of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be
particularly avoided by Article 332's provision exempting a
family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief
from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil
aspect only. TIEHDC
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls for
the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on
the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse
and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the
extent of the coverage of Article 332.
EFFECT OF DEATH ON RELATIONSHIP
BY AFFINITY AS ABSOLUTORY CAUSE
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause 16 in the
crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It
limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and
frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to
the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first
paragraph, it has been held that included in the exemptions
are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children. 17 By
virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather
who commits malicious mischief against his stepson; 18 by the
stepmother who commits theft against her stepson; 19 by the
stepfather who steals something from his stepson; 20 by the
grandson who steals from his grandfather; 21 by the accused
who swindles his sister-in-law living with him; 22 and by the son
who steals a ring from his mother. 23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood
relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage. 24 It is a fictive
kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the
institution of marriage and family relations. DCTSEA

If marriage gives rise to one's relationship by affinity to


the blood relatives of one's spouse, does the extinguishment of
marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship
by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with
the issue that confronts us in this case. That is why the trial
and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of
jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast,
in the American legal system, there are two views on the
subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of
the spouses, there are conflicting views. There are some
who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated
whether there are children or not in the marriage ( Carman
vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view
supported by most judicial authorities in other
jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or
children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by
affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by
affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which
produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec.
288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is
continued despite the death of one of the spouses where
there are living issues or children of the marriage "in
whose veins the blood of the parties are commingled,
since the relationship of affinity was continued through
the medium of the issue of the marriage" ( Paddock vs.
Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333). 25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that
relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the
marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the
relationship of affinity between the parties. 26 Under this view,
the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and
coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is
indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that
created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage
subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the
relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased
spouse's blood relatives. SacTAC

The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by


affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when
there is a surviving issue. 27 The rationale is that the
relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the
marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is
commingled. 28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains
that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and
the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the
death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not. 29 Under this view, the
relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of
the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of
the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that,
where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-
relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people
and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as
terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. 30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative
merits of the two views, we hold that the second view is more
consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in
cases of jury disqualification and incest. 31 On the other hand,
the continuing affinity view has been applied in the
interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or
in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article
332 (1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within
the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing
affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332 (1) which speaks
of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is couched in general
language. The legislative intent to make no distinction
between the spouse of one's living child and the surviving
spouse of one's deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or
daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law) 32 can
be drawn from Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and
strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous social
institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of
the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family. 33 Congress
has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts
shall preserve the solidarity of the family. 34 In this connection,
the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and
obviate scandal. 35 The view that relationship by affinity is not
affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that
created it is more in accord with family solidarity and
harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in
interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of
the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the
accused. 36 This is in consonance with the constitutional
guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless
and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. 37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the
rule of lenity. 38 The rule applies when the court is faced with
two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that its
prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him.
The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is
more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case
is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by
providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332 (1)
is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an
application or interpretation that is more favorable to the
accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing
affinity view.ICacDE

Thus, for purposes of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal


Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created between
the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased
spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage
which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the
justifying circumstance of defense of one's relatives under
Article 11 [2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense
committed against one's relatives under Article 13[5] of the
same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of
accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the
State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said
crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to
hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to
the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and
unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime,
such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification. 39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa.
However, the real nature of the offense is determined by the
facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the
offense. 40 What controls is not the title of the Information or
the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in
the Information. 41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of
the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the
offense, that determines the crime being charged in the
Information. 42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say
what the crime is or what it is named. 43 The determination by
the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime
committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the
Court. 44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals
that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but with
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by
means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed
as follows:aDSTIC

(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was


already blind at that time) and induced her to
sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document
was in connection with her taxes when it was in
fact a special power of attorney (SPA)
authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell,
assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of
Manolita's properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato's inducement and representation,
Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA in
favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third
parties but he neither delivered the proceeds to
Manolita nor accounted for the same and;
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused
to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the
estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita (who
participated in the execution of the document) statements
other than those in fact made by her. Manolita's acts of signing
the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were
the very expression of her specific intention that something be
done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the
affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only
signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she
could not have read) because of Sato's representation that the
document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking
the document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted
the representations of Sato as to what the document was all
about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and
thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato's
proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it
appear that Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special
power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning,
transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita's Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief
that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the
SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to
Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA. DaCEIc

Moreover, the allegations in the Information that:


(1) "once in the possession of the said special power
of attorney and other pertinent documents,
[Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three
(3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of
the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his
own personal use and benefit"
raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the
falsified document and the one who benefited therefrom, was
the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution
moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase
the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This
was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended
Information would now state that, while the total amount of
consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only
P1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of
P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita's
properties. 45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which
were public documents) were also falsified by making
untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration
stated in the deeds.EICSTa

Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially


charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to
falsification of public documents (particularly, the special
power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means
to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was
not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of
the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code in his favor.
EFFECT OF ABSOLUTORY CAUSE UNDER
ARTICLE 332 ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be
held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two
crimes of estafa and falsification of public document is
required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document. That is the
ruling in Gonzaludo v. People. 46 It means that the prosecution
must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of
a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime
of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and
application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code and of the
nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from
criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, simply because the accused
may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of
the absolutory cause under Article 332. acCTIS

The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to


address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all
other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by
the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply
the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for
the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is
to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to
apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat
the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the
component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly
consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and
falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the
single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State
waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and
considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as
a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The
waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably
intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the
integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For,
in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the
property right of a family relation but a paramount public
interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony
and obviate scandal. 47 Thus, the action provided under the
said provision simply concerns the private relations of the
parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect
between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is
committed through falsification of a public document, however,
the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes
beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members
among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an
act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public
documents as a means to violate the property rights of a
family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of
the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, it would be wrong to consider the component
crimes separately from each other. While there may be two
component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents),
both felonies are animated by and result from one and the
same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal
liability. 48 That is the concept of a complex crime. In other
words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as
one, subject to a single criminal liability.
EaHDcS

As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical


right or interest is violated ( e.g., homicide which violates the
right to life, theft which violates the right to property), 49 a
complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical
rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a
simple crime in itself. 50 Since only a single criminal intent
underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are
considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime.
This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as
treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a
formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same criminal
intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a
complex crime for which there is only one criminal
liability. 51 (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document falls under this category.) This is different
from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different
criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which
the accused incurs criminal liability. 52 The latter category is
covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by
Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal
plurality of crimes (concursus delictuorum or concurso de
delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the
imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two
or more crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a
single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes
constituting the same are more conveniently termed as
component crimes. 53 (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are
actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the
eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in
the case where an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only
one. 54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through
falsification of public document requires that the elements of
both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the
criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered
independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of
estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate
crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of
estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be
criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should
be considered separately from the liability for falsification of
public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of
a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the
distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as it
improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public document as a mere
material plurality where the felonies are considered as
separate crimes to be punished individually. HcaATE

FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE


A NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING
ESTAFA EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315
(3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a
document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party
sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document
and;
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, the law does not require that the document be falsified
for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the
falsification of the document cannot be considered as a
necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision. DIESaC

The phrase "necessary means" does not connote


indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a
"necessary means" to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient
thereof. 55 In People v. Salvilla, 56 the phrase "necessary means"
merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and
insure the commission of the other. 57 In this case, the crime of
falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
"necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate
and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle his
mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the
Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.

When the offender commits in a public document any of


the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another
crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a
complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. 58 The
falsification of a public, official or commercial document may
be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent
to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of a public, official or commercial document. 59 In
other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to
the consummation of the crime of estafa. 60 Actually utilizing
the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud
another is estafa. 61 The damage to another is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document. 62
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations
in the Information show that the falsification of public
document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-
made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of
her intention in connection with her taxes. While the
falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA,
the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later
utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the
properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the
sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the
falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the
property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign
the document) but by the subsequent use of the said
document. That is why the falsification of the public document
was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary
means for) the commission of the estafa. aAIcEH

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the


same inducement, had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of
the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In
that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at
exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not
prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have
been the simple crime of estafa. 63 On the other hand, absent
any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one
who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be
prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for
her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the
simple crime of falsification. 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
decision dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated
January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to
the trial court which is directed to try the accused with
dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents.
SO ORDERED.
(Intestate Estate of Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No.
|||

181409, [February 11, 2010], 626 PHIL 177-211)

TITLE 11
[G.R. No. 199100. July 18, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


ROSENDO AMARO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J :
p

For consideration is the appeal by appellant Rosendo Amaro from


the Decision 1 dated 30 March 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 02801, affirming the 26 February 2007
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 50, which found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape.
On 26 May 1998, appellant was charged with the crime of forcible
abduction with rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1998 at more or
less 5:00 in the afternoon in front of Boots & Maya located
at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of deceit at the beginning and
of force and intimidation later and with lewd designs, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct
one [AAA], 3 a seven (7) year old girl, by forcing her and
took her to his house at Bgy. Tagburos, Puerto Princesa
City and without any justifiable reason, accused detained
and deprived her of her liberty for a period of twenty eight
(28) [sic] days; that while she is being detained accused
ROSENDO AMARO had carnal knowledge of said AAA all
committed against her will. 4
Appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded.
AAA, who was then only 7 years old, testified that she was
walking on her way home from school when she passed by Boots
& Maya store. She met a man, whom she later identified in court
as the appellant, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After buying
the cigarettes and handing it to appellant, the latter gave her
bread and banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly became
dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought to the house of appellant.
When she regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked.
Appellant then undressed her, kissed her on the lips and neck,
and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain.
AAA cried but appellant covered her mouth with his hand. AAA
was detained for six (6) days and was raped five (5) times by
appellant. AAA clarified that appellant's penis touched the outer
portion of her vagina.
During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily
went with appellant because the latter promised to bring her
home. 5
On the last day of her detention, AAA and appellant went out of
the house. On their way to San Jose, a certain Aunt Ruthie saw
AAA walking and immediately picked her up and brought her to
the police station. Appellant noticed AAA being taken away but
he did nothing. 6
IcaEDC

The prosecution also presented AAA's mother, BBB, to


corroborate her daughter's testimony. BBB narrated that on 26
March 1998, she was in the house when AAA came home at
around noon time to eat. Thereafter, AAA told BBB that she had
to go back to school. At around 5:00 p.m. when AAA had not
come home, BBB went to the school to look for her. When the
teacher told BBB that the school children had already been sent
home, she proceeded to the police station to report her missing
daughter. After six (6) days, AAA was found by BBB's former
employer who brought her to the police. Upon receiving a call
from the police, BBB immediately went to the police station and
saw her daughter. BBB observed that AAA was still in shock and
could not walk properly so she was brought to the doctor on the
following day. She only learned that her daughter was raped after
the medical examination.
Appellant testified on his behalf. He denied abducting and raping
AAA but admitted that he brought the latter to his house when
AAA approached him asking for bread first, before begging him to
take her with him because she was always being scolded by her
parents. Upon reaching his house, appellant entrusted AAA to the
care of Florante Magay's sister. Appellant then went back to town
to attend to his work as a mason. He only decided to go back
home when he heard his name on the radio in connection with
the disappearance of a girl. He picked up the child
in Barangay Tagburos and brought her to her house in Buncag.
AAA walked alone towards her house. 7
On 26 February 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused ROSENDO AMARO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape, as defined and penalized under
Article 342 and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 8353 in relation to Article 48 thereof. The
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs. He is
likewise ordered to pay the complainant-victim [AAA] the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as civil
indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as
moral damages. 8 DTaSIc

The trial court found AAA's testimony as credible and


straightforward and supported by medical findings.
From the aforesaid decision, appellant appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
On 30 March 2011, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision
affirming the ruling of the RTC.
Both parties opted not to file their Supplemental Briefs and
instead adopted their Briefs filed before the appellate court. 9

In this appeal, appellant contends that the prosecution's


evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. According to
appellant, he did not rape AAA because the latter was not in his
custody at the time said incident allegedly happened. Appellant
adds that he entrusted AAA to the custody of Florante Magay's
sister because he was working. Appellant also insists that AAA
voluntarily went with him to his house.
Thus, the resolution of this case hinges on whether or not the
prosecution was able to establish from the testimony of the
complainant the guilt of the accused for the crime of forcible
abduction with rape beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in
Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person
abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the
abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under
Article 266-A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2) when the woman is
deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is under
twelve years of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this
case. The victim, AAA was a seven (7) year-old girl who was
taken against her will by appellant who told her that he knew her
mother and that he would bring her home. 10 At her tender age,
AAA could have easily been deceived by appellant. The
employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible
taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl.
It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them
easy culprits of deceiving minds. 11 The presence of lewd designs
in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the
victim. 12
TIcAaH

During the direct examination, AAA recounted the rape incident


and positively identified appellant as the perpetrator, thus:
Q: When Rosendo undressed himself what happened next?
xxx xxx xxx
A: He undressed me.
PROSECUTOR SENA: (to witness)
Q: And after you were undressed by Rosendo what
happened next?
A: He kissed me.
Q: Where were you kissed by Rosendo?
A: In lips, Sir.
Q: Only your lips was kissed by Rosendo?
A: On my neck.
Q: Aside by being kissed by Rosendo, what else did he do
to you?
A: He inserted his penis to my vagina.
Q: What do you mean by "totoy"?
(No answer)
PROSECUTOR SENA: (to Court)
May I change the question, Your Honor. TAaEIc

COURT:
All right.
PROSECUTOR SENA: (to witness)
Q: [AAA], in what part of the body of Rosendo can you find
that totoy that you said?
(Witness pointed to her private part)
Q: And that bilalay that you mentioned in what part of your
body can you find that?
(The same, witness pointed to her private part)
Q: Were you able to see that totoy of Rosendo?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And how big was that?
(witness demonstrated the length more or less 5 inches)
Q: About how — the diameter, how big is the diameter?
COURT:
It is not necessary to prove that, the size.
PROSECUTOR SENA:
Just to prove.
(to witness)
Q: When the penis of Rosendo was being tried by Rosendo
to penetrate your vagina[,] what did you feel?ScCEIA
A: Painful, Sir. 13
The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical
findings that the victim suffered from laceration on the upper and
lower part of the introitus. 14
Appellant was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. AAA's abduction was a necessary means to
commit rape. Sexual intercourse with AAA was facilitated and
ensured by her abduction. 15
In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends
on the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually
only the participants are witnesses to their occurrences. The
issue therefore boils down to credibility. Significantly, findings of
fact of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal since
conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie
heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. 16
HTCaAD

Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and


credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended
party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her
relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. 17 Moreover, AAA testified in a straightforward manner.
On the other hand, appellant set-up the defense of denial and
alibi. It is jurisprudential that denial and alibi are intrinsically
weak defenses which must be buttressed by strong evidence of
non-culpability to merit credibility. Mere denial, without any
strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive
declaration by the child-victim of the identity of the appellant and
his involvement in the crime attributed to him. 18 Alibi is evidence
negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more
credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who
testify on clear and positive evidence. 19 HAEIac

The appellate court is correct in affirming the imposition of the


penalty of reclusion perpetua by ratiocinating, to wit:
The presence of lewd intentions is established by the
conduct of the accused during the abduction. When the
girl is defiled, the forcible abduction becomes the means
to commit the rape, and since rape is the more serious
offense, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is
committed and penalized by reclusion perpetua, the
penalty proper to rape. 20
For clarity, the lower courts should have emphasized
that reclusion perpetua as the proper penalty for the crime of
statutory rape was imposed in lieu of death penalty pursuant
to Republic Act No. 7659. When Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited
the imposition of death penalty, persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty will now be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. And in line with our recent ruling in People v.
Gambao 21 where we order an increase in the amount of damages
to P100,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages, we deem it necessary to increase the amount of
damages accordingly.
In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed
on all damages awarded from date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid. 22 SEDICa

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 30 March


2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02801
is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATIONthat ROSENDO
AMARO shall pay P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
interest of 6% per annum on the amount of damages, reckoned
from the finality of this decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, [July 18, 2014])
[G.R. No. 200080. September 18, 2013.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


MARVIN CAYANAN, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J :p

Accused-appellant Marvin Cayanan (Cayanan) seeks a review of


the Decision 1 dated July 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04256 affirming with modifications the
Consolidated Decision 2 dated June 16, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 77. The RTC
decision convicted Cayanan of the crimes of Qualified Rape
(Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001) and Forcible Abduction with
Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001), and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each crime
without eligibility for parole.
The CA, however, increased the award of damages originally
awarded by the RTC: (1) in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001, from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (2) in Criminal
Case No. 1498-M-2001, from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA also awarded an additional P75,000.00 as moral damages
in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001 and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages in both criminal cases. 3
The prosecution established that Cayanan took advantage of 15-
year old AAA 4 on February 1, 2001 while the victim was alone
inside her house in . . ., Bulacan. Cayanan is the victim's brother-
in-law, being married to her older sister, and the couple lived in a
nearby house. AAA was asleep when she felt someone caressing
her. It turned out to be Cayanan. He then started kissing her and
told her to remove her shorts. When she refused, Cayanan forcibly
took it off and after the latter took off his own undergarment, he
inserted his organ into her genitalia. Cayanan, who had a knife
with him, threatened to kill AAA if she resisted and informed
anybody of the incident.cHCIDE

On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus
with her friend Armina Adriano (Adriano) when Cayanan arrived
on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Boy Manalastas. Cayanan then
pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but he
covered her mouth. They alighted somewhere and boarded a jeep.
He brought her to a dress shop in . . ., Bulacan where he asked
someone to give her a change of clothes as she was in her school
uniform and later to a Jollibee outlet. He then brought her to his
sister's house in . . . where he raped her inside a bedroom.
Afterwards, a certain couple Putay and Tessie talked to Cayanan
and she was brought to thebarangay office where she was asked
to execute a document stating that she voluntarily went with
Cayanan. It was the latter's mother and sister-in-law who brought
her home later that evening. She told her mother and brother of
the incidents only after her classmate Adriano informed her
family of what happened in school and of the rape incidents. AAA
testified that she did not immediately tell her family because she
was still in a state of shock. 5
Adriano and the victim's mother corroborated her testimony. A
resident psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental Health
also testified that AAA was suffering from mental depressive
symptoms/chronic symptoms and presence of sexual abuse. 6
Cayanan interposed the sweetheart defense. The RTC, however,
did not give credit to his defense, ruling that it is a weak defense
and does not rule out the use of force given the prosecution's
evidence. He also failed to establish the genuineness and
authenticity of the love letters allegedly written by AAA. 7
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC. 8

A review of the CA decision shows that it did not commit any


reversible error in affirming Cayanan's conviction. Record shows
that Cayanan forced AAA to have sex with him on February 1,
2001 and threatened her and her family with physical harm. The
testimony of Adriano, meanwhile, corroborated AAA's testimony
that Cayanan forcibly took her by the school campus gate on
February 26, 2001 and thereafter raped her. The defense failed to
show any reason why the prosecution's evidence should not be
given weight or credit.HEScID

Moreover, the claim that they were sweethearts does not justify
the commission of the crimes. For the Court to even consider
giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must be proven by
compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present
testimonial evidence in support of the theory. Independent proof
is required — such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. 9 And
while Cayanan produced two love letters allegedly written by
AAA, the CA correctly sustained the finding of the RTC that these
letters were unauthenticated and therefore, bereft of any
probative value.
The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only
of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. Forcible
abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of
the accused is to rape the victim. 10 In this case, circumstances
show that the victim's abduction was with the purpose of raping
her. Thus, after Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her
to several places until they reached his sister's house where he
raped her inside the bedroom. Under these circumstances, the
rape absorbed the forcible abduction. 11
Finally, the CA did not commit any reversible error in increasing
the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001, and in awarding additional
P75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal cases, as
these are in accord with prevailing jurisprudence. 12
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 14, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04256 is MODIFIED in that accused
appellant Marvin Cayanan is found guilty of Qualified Rape in
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. In all other respects, the CA
Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
imposed on all the damages awarded, to earn from the date of
the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. 13IAETDc

SO ORDERED.
(People v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 200080 (Resolution), [September
|||

18, 2013], 718 PHIL 168-172)

TITLE 12

[G.R. No. 183805. July 3, 2013.]

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF


THE PHILIPPINES and SHIRLEY TISMO-
CAPILI, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of


the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated
February 1, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of
bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an
Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-
Capili and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
Contrary to law. 3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings


alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of
nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City
filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage
is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge
of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the
RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision
declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the
ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband
during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and
Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been
declared void by the RTC. EHaASD

In an Order 4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted


petitioner's Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case
should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1,
2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043
(entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P.
Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage
between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and
said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the
motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised
in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the
issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution
of the issues in said civil case would not determine
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and
arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble
opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed
by the accused as it appears that the second marriage
between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had
already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-
existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second
marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no
more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision 5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC's decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07
July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said
decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution 7 dated July
24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review
on certiorari alleging that:
1. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE
THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370
GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF
BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE
ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE
FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-
6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE
PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES
THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES . . .,
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES
WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID. CSaHDT

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED


ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-
6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN
NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF
THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER,
WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS
FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY
TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE,
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3
IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY
G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL
INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI
AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL
AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID
DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY
RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE. 8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent
declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the
crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
SaHIEA

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the


offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. 9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime
of bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June
28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during
the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and
Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably,
the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of
the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage
for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused
may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so
long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People, 10 the Court affirmed the accused's conviction
for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on
the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioner's assertion would only
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for
the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage
was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled. 11DEICTS

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the


aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches
to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from
that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law. 13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was
committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second
marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner's second marriage does not
impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
(Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, [July 3, 2013], 713 PHIL 256-
|||

264)

[G.R. No. 191566. July 17, 2013.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.


EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J :p

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the


Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against
respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision 1 dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution 2 dated March
4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The assailed decision granted
the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due
course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash
and resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. TaCIDS
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina
(Modina). 3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A.
Alagon (Alagon). 4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Modina. 5 On February 23, 1999,
the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent's petition
and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license. 6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In
the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn
Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent's previous marriage with
Modina. 7 She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit 8 charging
respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information 9 for
Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused being then legally married to
JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage
with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law. 10

On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus


Motion 11 praying that he be allowed to present evidence to
support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that
the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the
information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not
charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished. 12
On September 4, 2008, the RTC 13 issued an Order 14 denying
respondent's Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts
alleged in the information — that there was a valid marriage
between respondent and Modina and without such marriage
having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second
marriage with Alagon — constitute the crime of bigamy. The
trial court further held that neither can the information be
quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal
liability. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied in an Order 15 dated February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action
on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 16 before the CA,
assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information
despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared
null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case. 17 TADIHE

On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision,


the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27,
Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and receive
evidence on the petitioner's motion to quash and resolve
the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED. 18

The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v.


People, 19 and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the
motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would
establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one
essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking. 20 The
appellate court further held that respondent is even better off
than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine,
considering that respondent contracted the second marriage
after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the
complaint for bigamy was filed against him. 21 The CA thus
concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
respondent's motion to quash the information, considering that
the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense. 22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court in this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on
the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FORCERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION
DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT
OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE
ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT
DECLARING RESPONDENT'S FIRST MARRIAGE
VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH
RESPONDENT'S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH
ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID
JUDGMENT. 23 aHATDI

The petition is meritorious.


The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by
this Court in Montañez v. Cipriano, 24 Teves v.
People, 25 and Antone v. Beronilla. 26
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976,
but during the subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983,
respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition
for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of
psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On
May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against
respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the
information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that
her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior
to the filing of the bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992.
During the subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001,
he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a
declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the
ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with
her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for
Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually
convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the
subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a second
marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a
declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became
final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the
prosecution filed an information for bigamy against respondent
which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual
antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone and Montañez,
respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that
the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his
criminal liability has been extinguished both because of the
declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to
quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however,
reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode
by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint
or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in
the information. The fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is
whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the
information are not to be considered. 27 To be sure, a motion to
quash should be based on a defect in the information which is
evident on its fact. 28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the
court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. 29 If
the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that
another complaint or information be filed 30 except when the
information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal
liability or double jeopardy. 31
DcSACE

An examination of the information filed against respondent,


however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to
constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of
the crime as provided for in Article 349 32 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
(1)  That the offender has been legally married;
(2)  That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
(3)  That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and
(4)  That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. 33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that
respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such
marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second
marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. Respondent's evidence
showing the court's declaration that his marriage to Modina is
null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a
marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a
fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a first valid
marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second
marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters
of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. 34 It is not
proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset
without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller
examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at
this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the
basis of the document presented by respondent. 35 With the
presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out
which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations
of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.
Respondent's motion to quash was founded on the trial court's
declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and void ab
initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements
of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information
do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such
court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent
and the CA heavily relied on the Court's pronouncement
in Morigo v. People 36 where the accused therein was acquitted
because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In
said case, the first marriage was declared null and void, because
the parties only signed the marriage contract without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage,
the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the
accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused
was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity
of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. 37 It has been held in a number of
cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral. 38IDScTE

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he


contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. 39 Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy. 40 If we allow respondent's line of defense and the
CA's ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply
evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a
complaint against him. 41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to
quash the information against him, because he obtained the
declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the
complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such
contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule
that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense and from that instant, liability
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the
time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material
only for determining prescription. 42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts
alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute
an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to
quash by way of exception to the established rule that
facts contrary to the allegations in the information are
matters of defense which may be raised only during the
presentation of evidence. 43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition
for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow
him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated
March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, [July 17, 2013], 714 PHIL
|||

349-360)

[G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.]

CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. RICARDO T.


SANTOS, respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J :p

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death


obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J.
Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's
judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared
petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after
her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. 1 Ricardo remarried on
September 17, 2008. 2
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death,
Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment
somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila, after they had gotten
married on June 18, 1980. 3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac
City. They were engaged in the buy and sell business. 4
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. 5 As a result,
Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper
in Hong Kong. 6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's
insistence, he allowed her to work abroad. 7 She allegedly applied
in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She
left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again. 8 caCTHI

Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate


Celerina. 9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City,
but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. 10 He
also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no
one gave him any information. 11
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his
Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that
she had passed away. 12
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only
sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedies. 13
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
judgment 14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was
deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of
her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a
resident of Tarlac City. 15 According to Celerina, her true
residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue,
Quezon City. 16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's
conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. 17 As
a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any
notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead. 18
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. 19 She also
never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. 20 Neither did
she go to an employment agency in February 1995. 21 She also
claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12
years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal
dwelling in Quezon City. 22 It was he who left the conjugal
dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. 23 Celerina
referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support
her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his
petition. 24
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a
newspaper. 25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies
of Ricardo's petition. 26
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28,
2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment
for being a wrong mode of remedy. 27According to the Court of
Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before
the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Article 42 of the Family Code. 28 cADSCT

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of


Appeals' resolution dated November 28, 2008. 29 The Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution
dated March 5, 2009. 30
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for
being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment
declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under
Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the
spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration
of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the
spouse's death. 31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file
an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first
place. 32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is
proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
fraudulently. 33
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance
under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient
remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the
judgment declaring her presumptive death. 34
In Ricardo's comment, 35 he argued that a petition for annulment
of judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be
availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could
always file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the
subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals'
ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of
the Family Code is the appropriate remedy.
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
"remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner." 36
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. 37 This court defined extrinsic fraud
in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi: 38
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it
has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original
action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or
could have been litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral when
a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents
a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all
of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that
there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations
in the court with respect to her residence. 40 Ricardo also falsely
claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no
publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a
newspaper of general circulation. 41 Celerina claimed that
because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to
oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively dead. 42 HTaIAC

Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition


for declaration of presumptive death were false. 43 Celerina
further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition. 44
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals
sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment 45 on
November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the July
27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a
month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The
petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed
by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred
by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of
jurisdiction. 46
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina
at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with
them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a
spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded
belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already
dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage. 47
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in
danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse
when he or she reappears. Thus:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage
at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being
judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead
spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage
by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the
part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present
spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the
termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is
subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2)
recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to
the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of
the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the
fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined. SDHacT

The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does


not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead
spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage
only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are
present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the
absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the
first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a
nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not
recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses'
residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or
(4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of
law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming such fact of
reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the
first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is
legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of
the marital relations with the first spouse. 48 The second
marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. 49 The burden
of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly
dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second
marriage. 50
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as
a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage in Social
Security System v. Vda. de Bailon. 51 This court noted 52 that mere
reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if
the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was
"no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either
by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court
action[.]" 53 "Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law." 54
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of
determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities
of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse
was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However,
a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when
the following are present:cECTaD
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse. 55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was
contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks
the requirement of a well-founded belief 56 that the spouse is
already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of
a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void. 57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in
bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his
subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition
against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies. 58
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed
his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he
contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be
considered void for being bigamous under Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the
element of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family
Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against
bigamous marriages to apply. 59
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to
effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not
preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact,
recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated
by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of
the subsequent marriage." 60
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not
a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the
subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration
of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage
under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
"children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and
the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be
the same as in valid marriages." 61 If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage
conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate. 62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death
is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. 63
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of
the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the
subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of
children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for
bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." 64 This
means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands
to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify
the second marriage, 65 this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent
marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of
an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice
to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
CAIaHS

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for


determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for
nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the
petition.
SO ORDERED.
(Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, [October 8, 2014], 745 PHIL
|||

118-134)

[G.R. No. 159031. June 23, 2014.]

NOEL A. LASANAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having


a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage,
albeit on its face void and inexistent for lack of a marriage
license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized by Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on
August 29, 2002, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his
conviction for bigamy under the judgment rendered on October
30, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 49808 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1968, 2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal
Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of
accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo 3without the benefit
of a marriage license. 4 The records show that Lasanas and
Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse
the lack of the marriage license. 5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas
and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious
ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in
Iloilo City. 6 They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation for that purpose. 7 Both ceremonies were evidenced
by the corresponding marriage certificates. 8In 1982, Lasanas and
Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable
differences. 9
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with
Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon
Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage
certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single. 10
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of
marriage and damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo
City, 11 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to
Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had
employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his
consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches,
psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him
to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation
warranting the award of damages. In support of his complaint, he
further alleged, among others, that: DHAcET

He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968


which marriage was officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar,
Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo. Machine copy of the
Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Exhibit "A" and
made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a
wedding at San Jose Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980
and registered at the office of Iloilo City Registrar.
Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith
attached as Annex "B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no
properties except some personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967
at the house of Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in Burgos Street,
Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the purpose of their meeting was
for the plaintiff to consult and seek treatment by the
defendant because the latter was a "babaylan";
Plaintiff was treated by the defendant and the subsequent
treatments were performed by the defendant at her
residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment
made being on a continuing basis;
xxx xxx xxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to
come with her to Iloilo City. They went to Dainty
Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several
persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to sign
the marriage contract, which was null and void for lack of
marriage license and based on a false affidavit of
cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to
Barangay Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which marked the start of a
married life rocked with marital differences, quarrels and
incompatibilities, without love, but under the
uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall him should
he not follow her;
xxx xxx xxx
During the period the parties are living together defendant
would nag the plaintiff, fabricate stories against him and
displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect her marital
obligations even committed infidelity, which psychological
incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the
petitioner to live separately from defendant since 1982 up
to the present. 12
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City. 13 After due
proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under
the information filed on October 20, 1998 in the RTC, viz.:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the
City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, said accused, Noel Lasanas being previously united
in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or
annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage
with Josefa Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 14
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was
raffled to Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo City. The accused
pleaded not guilty at his arraignment, 15 and trial ensued in due
course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39)
rendered its judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the
accused's complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring
the marriage between him and Socorro valid and legal, as
follows:cTCaEA

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby


rendered dismissing the complaint filed by the plaintiff
Noel Arenga Lasanas against the defendant, Socorro
Patingo, considering that the marriage between them is
valid and legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give
monthly support to his wife, the defendant in this case,
Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of P3,000.00 a month,
from the time that she filed her answer with counterclaim
on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family
Code and every month thereafter. Costs against the
plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. 16

The accused appealed to the CA. 17

Ruling of the RTC


On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed
decision in Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of BIGAMY
punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years
and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him
under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED. 18

Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA,
insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally
married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license,
affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally
married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not
established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal
intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of the
honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage. 19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged
decision, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the
appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED. 20

Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review
on certiorari. 21 He argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly
applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, 22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of
the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before
one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in
this purely criminal prosecution; 23 that even if Article 40 of
the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted
because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being
without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in
Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code; 24 that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e.,
that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; 25 and that his
good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve
him of criminal liability. 26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall
be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. cTaDHS

The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the
offender has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-
appellant Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was
void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an
affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding
ceremony could not have validated the void marriage.
Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage
in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites
of a valid marriage should be present. One of these
requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There
having been no marriage license nor affidavit of
cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as
a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner
should have first secured a judicial declaration of the
nullity of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo
before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that
but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he
violated the law on bigamy.
Accused's reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95
Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced
because the ruling in these cases have already been
abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel v.
Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v.
Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the
Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap's ruling too had
been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and
by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals,
supra.
Regarding accused-appellant's defense of good faith, the
same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248
SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed
Decision is correct in all respect. 28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing
elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of
the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a
subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to
wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
(n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v.
People: 29
. . . The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil
Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now
the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral. DSAEIT

If petitioner's contention would be allowed, a person who


commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision
is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him. We note that in petitioner's case the
complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared
a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was
overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. Following petitioner's argument, even assuming
that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case,
the offender can still escape liability provided that a
decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing
of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do
so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the
ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to
immediately act on complaints and eventually file
Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner's strained reading
of the law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused's conviction for bigamy is
affirmed. The crime of bigamy was consummated from the
moment he contracted the second marriage without his marriage
to Socorro being first judicially declared null and void, because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage
to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such
marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction. 30 "What makes a person criminally liable
for bigamy," according to People v. Odtuhan: 31
. . . is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
The accused's defense of acting in good faith deserves scant
consideration especially because the records show that he had
filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro
prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him but
after he had already contracted his second marriage with Josefa.
But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC
(Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage
after the information for bigamy had already been filed against
him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro.
Considering that the accused's subsequent marriage to Josefa
was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was
established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa
was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was
he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent
marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 32 the Court has
explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity
of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. . . . A plain reading of
[Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage." 33 The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v.
People: 34
. . . Nollora may not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to
Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal
liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to
allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage
ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals: cDCSTA

There is therefore a recognition written into the law


itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
bigamy is prision mayor. With neither an aggravating nor a
mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the
crime, the imposable penalty is the medium period of prision
mayor, 35 which ranges from eight years and one day to 10 years.
Applying theIndeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should be within the range of prision
correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the
offense, which is from six months and one day to six years.
Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum, as imposed by the RTC,
was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
(Lasanas v. People, G.R. No. 159031, [June 23, 2014], 736 PHIL
|||

735-748)

[G.R. No. 182438. July 2, 2014.]

RENE RONULO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J :p

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by


petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008
decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that 3 Joey Umadac and Claire
Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003
at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed
officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the
marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed
in barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together
with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the
Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan
priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage
certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the
couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the
presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests. 4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. 5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime
charged on arraignment.
The prosecution's witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere,
testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil
sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle.
She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each
other, and sign a document. 6 She heard the petitioner instructing
the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter,
they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw
the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation
given to her by Joey. 7
STHDAc

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the
couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other as
husband and wife. 8 Days after the wedding, she went to the
municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with
Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate
that no marriage license was issued to the couple. 9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony,
denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a
solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. 10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a P200.00 fine
pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner's act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage
ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. 11 It further ruled
that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple's
marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of
the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No.
3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of
the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any
of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the
regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides
the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws,
the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
P200.00. 12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing"
the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the
prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the
petitioner's negative statements. 13 The RTC, however, ruled that
the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44,
of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. The CA observed
that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards
in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. 14 According to
the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added
that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement
in a marriage ceremony. 15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner's criminal liability
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on
whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
350 of the same Code. 16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the
imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it
covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following
grounds: SDHITE

First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not
define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those
enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of
the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration
that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a
marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which
is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer. 17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the
prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife. 18
Second, under the principle of separation of church and State,
the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert
the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony." 19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the
"blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to
the couple. 20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in
violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the
filing of the present case against him. 21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for
a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of
the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22
THE COURT'S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime
punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1)
authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an
illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority
to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is
whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to
the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically
define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal"
performance, Articles 3 (3) and 6 of theFamily Code are clear on
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 23 of
the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 24 of
the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments.
Article 6 25 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form
or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties
to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife." 26
Pertinently, Article 3 (3) 27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and
particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of
religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum
requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there
should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each
other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the
parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to
the petitioner's allegation, the prosecution has proven, through
the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife. cDSAEI

The petitioner's allegation that the court asked insinuating and


leading questions to Florida fails to persuade us. A judge may
examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and
to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and
material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or
rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be
taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds
happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of
one party. 28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the
judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from
belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even
the petitioner's admission regarding the circumstances of the
ceremony, support Florida's testimony that there had indeed
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as
husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their
declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear
and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to
show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had
any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of
separation of church and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony.
Contrary to the petitioner's allegation, this principle has been
duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides
that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or
sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital
rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements
of law be observed. CTSHDI

We emphasize at this point that Article 15 29 of the


Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and that our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest
in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the
preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within
its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts
resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner
conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum
requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony
qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as
contemplated by Article 3 (3) of the Family Code and Article 352
of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the
petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3 (3) of the Family Code, one of the essential
requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he
knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted
the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage
ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage
ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner's knowledge of
the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good
faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a
marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present
case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the
requirements provided by Article 3 (3) of the Family Code, as
discussed above. DaAISH

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the


couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the
crime.
The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall
be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage
Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39
and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage. — Any priest
or minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized
by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who,
upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the
authorization in force when called upon to do so by the
parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons
having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister
of any church, religion or sect the regulations and
practices whereof require banns or publications previous
to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization
of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation
of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less
than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of
not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two
thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause. — Any violation of any
provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the
ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the
present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not
include the present case. As correctly found by the MTC, the
petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage
Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the
imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which
is referred to theMarriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls
squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which
provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of
such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of
P200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
(Ronulo v. People, G.R. No. 182438, [July 2, 2014], 738 PHIL 206-
|||

219)

TITLE 13

[G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. November 11, 2005.]

ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF


APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J :
p

This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 25,


2004 filed by Roberto Brillante (Brillante) assailing
the Decision of this Court dated October 19, 2004 which affirmed
his conviction for the crime of libel but reduced the amount of
moral damages he is liable to pay.
Brillante avers that his conviction, without the corresponding
conviction of the writers, editors and owners of the newspapers
on which the libelous materials were published, violates his right
to equal protection. He also claims that he should have been
convicted only of one count of libel because private respondents
were not defamed separately as each publication was impelled
by a single criminal intent. Finally, he claims that there is a
"semblance of truth" to the accusations he hurled at private
respondents citing several instances of alleged violent acts
committed by the latter against his person.
Private respondent Jejomar Binay (Binay) filed a Comment dated
March 3, 2005, maintaining that the equal protection clause does
not apply because there are substantial distinctions between
Brillante and his co-accused warranting dissimilar treatment.
Moreover, contrary to Brillante's claim that he should have been
convicted only of one count of libel, Binay asserts that there can
be as many convictions for libel as there are persons defamed.
Besides, this matter should have been raised at the time the
separate complaints were filed against him and not in this
motion.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
a Comment dated April 4, 2005, stating that the issues raised in
Brillante's motion have already been discussed and passed upon
by the Court. Hence, the motion should be denied.
Brillante filed a Consolidated Reply dated May 26, 2005 in
reiteration of his arguments.
As correctly noted by the OSG, the basic issues raised in the
instant motion have already been thoroughly discussed and
passed upon by the Court in its Decision. For this reason, we
shall no longer dwell on them.
We believe, however, that the penalty of imprisonment imposed
against Brillante should be re-examined and reconsidered.
Although this matter was neither raised in Brillante's petition nor
in the instant motion, we advert to the well-established rule that
an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open
for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties. 1
In Mari v. Court of Appeals, 2 petitioner therein was found guilty of
slander by deed penalized under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal
Code (Penal Code) by either imprisonment or fine. In view of the
fact that the offense was done in the heat of anger and in
reaction to a perceived provocation, the Court opted to impose
the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment.
In this case, Brillante claims that on January 6, 1988, his friend's
house was bombed resulting in the death of three people. This
incident allegedly impelled him, out of moral and social duty, to
call a press conference on January 7, 1988 with the intention of
exposing what he believed were terrorist acts committed by
private respondents against the electorate of Makati City.
We find that the circumstances surrounding the writing of the
open letter on which the libelous publications were based
similarly warrant the imposition of the penalty of fine only,
instead of both imprisonment and fine, in accordance with Art.
355 of the Penal Code. 3 The intensely feverish passions evoked
during the election period in 1988 must have agitated petitioner
into writing his open letter.SEHTAC

Moreover, while petitioner failed to prove all the elements of


qualified privileged communication under par. 1, Art. 354 of the
Penal Code, incomplete privilege should be appreciated in his
favor, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given
to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection
with or relevant to their performance of official duties or against
public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving
them. 4
The foregoing circumstances, in our view, justify the deletion of
the penalty of imprisonment and the retention of the meted fine
only.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 19, 2004 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION consisting of the deletion of the penalty of
imprisonment imposed upon petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571,
|||

[November 11, 2005], 511 PHIL 96-100)

[G.R. No. 142509. March 24, 2006.]

JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR., petitioner, vs. THE


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J.
PIERAZ, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose


Alemania Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the
Decision 1 dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting
him of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the appellate court's
Resolution 2 dated March 13, 2000 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are
as follows:
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty.
Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their
mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open,
not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz' wife put it
on her husband's desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz
came upon the letter and made out its content. It reads:
DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE
Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,
Metro Manila
August 18, 1995
ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario, Pasig City, Metro Manila
Subject: Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile
threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed
to our client; using carabao English.
May we remind you that any attempt on your part to
continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita
Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig
City, Metro Manila — undersigned much to his regrets
shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary
complaint for disbarment against you. aESTAI

You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer


the full consequence of the law. Needless for you to
cite specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a
matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other
than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing
administrative charge against you and all persons
behind these nefarious activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the
undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of
justice, so as we can prove "who is who" once and
for all.
Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding
these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name;
(Signed)
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
Atty-in-Fact of the present
Court Administrator of the entire
Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz,
nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by
registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In
reply, Buatis, Jr. dispatched a second letter dated August
24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr.,
particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao,"
Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-
appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the
knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well
and they all chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang
gago dito."
Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as a result
of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz' frail health
was likewise affected and aggravated by the letter of
accused-appellant.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr.
was denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the
president of the organization "Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng
Mga Taga Manggahan" or NASATAMA, and of a member,
Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his
secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-
complainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall
whether he had signed that letter-comment or if it was
even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember
if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated
August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with
the counter-affidavit which he filed before the Pasig City
Prosecutor's Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its
contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he
had sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated
August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz. 3
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated
April 30, 1997 4 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of
LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of
the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months
and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11)
Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum; to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of
compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and
for moral damages, and another amount of P10,000.00, for
exemplary damages; to suffer all accessory penalties
provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. 5
The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer "inutil", stupid and
capable of using only carabao English, is intended not only for
the consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy
of the libelous letter was furnished all concerned; the letter was
prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an affront to his
standing as a lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed
to him, was representing a client in whose favor he sent a
demand letter to the person represented by petitioner; the letter
is libelous per se since a defect or vice imputed is plainly
understood as set against the entire message sought to be
conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice
from the defamatory imputation contained in the letter; the letter
could have been couched in a civil and respectful manner, as the
intention of petitioner was only to advice respondent that
demand was not proper and legal but instead petitioner was
seething with hate and contempt and even influenced by satanic
intention. HAcaCS

The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or
brought to the attention and notice of other persons other than
the offended party, there was publication; and that the element
of identity was also established since the letter was intended for
respondent. It rejected petitioner's stance that the libelous letter
resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly
admitted that he had to reply to respondent's letter to Mrs.
Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of
petitioner's association.
The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory
damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory
imputation was to impair respondent's reputation although no
actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also awarded moral
damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of
the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a
reckless disregard for the rights of respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC's decision to the CA
which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its
entirety the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for
and defamatory in character as they impeached the good
reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It
rejected petitioner's claim that the letter is a privileged
communication which would exculpate him from liability since he
failed to come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to
resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer to the extent of
ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called "duty"
in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was
publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified as
privileged.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated March 13, 2000.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner, raising the following issues:
A. CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING
URBAN POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL, DEFENDING
A MEMBER OF AN ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF
EJECTMENT FROM HER DWELLING PLACE?
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE
OF THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE
(sic) COMMUNICATION?
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT: THE PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE
TO ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID IS
A CRIME? 6
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of
the People and respondent filed his own Comment praying for the
affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us, the parties
submitted their respective memoranda.
The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is
guilty of the crime of libel.
In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply
the ruling in People v. Velasco 7 that "if the act/matter charged as
libelous is only an incident in [an] act which has another
objective, the crime is not libel;" when he made his reply to
respondent's letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her to
vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent that
Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the Rodriguez
estate which is claiming ownership over the area of Brgy.
Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of
the administrator of the Rodriquez estate; communication in
whatever language, either verbal or written of a lawyer under
obligation to defend a client's cause is but a privileged
communication; the instant case is a qualified privileged
communication which is lost only by proof of malice, however,
respondent failed to present actual proof of malice; the existence
of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that
petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there was
ill will or ill feeling between them which existed at the time of the
publication of the defamatory imputation which were not at all
indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to the findings
of the CA, there was justifiable motive in sending such a letter
which was to defend the vested interest of the estate and to
abate any move of respondent to eject Mrs. Quingco. cASIED
Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous
letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is justification for
the use of those words, to wit: "lousy but inutile threatening
letter . . . using carabao English" was due to the fact that the
demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not
serve its purpose as respondent's client has no legal right over
the property and respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that
respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he
is stupid; that the words "Yours in Satan name" is only a
complementary greeting used in an ordinary communication
letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person
being communicated and which is just the reverse of saying
"Yours in Christ".
We deny the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must
concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it
must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. 8
The last two elements have been duly established by the
prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication
means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known
to someone other than the person against whom it has been
written. 9 Petitioner's subject letter-reply itself states that the
same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had
dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of
the libel complained of has communicated it to a third
person. 10Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was
open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject
letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.
We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to
whether the imputation is defamatory and malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words
used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in
their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense. 11
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication
alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v.
Reyes, 12 to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109
Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this
point: "In determining whether the specified matter is
libelous per se, two rules of construction are
conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be
adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as
is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
which the public would naturally understand what was
uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous
must be construed as a whole."
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel,
the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious
explanation offered by the publisher on being called to
account. The whole question being the effect the
publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they
not having been assisted by the offered explanation in
reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of
removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in
the publication. 13
Gauging from the above-mentioned tests, the words used in the
letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is
defamatory. In using words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao
English", "stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written,
casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of
respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said,
these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public
ridicule as even his own family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang
gago dito." 14
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and,
under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need
not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the
law already presumes that petitioner's imputation is malicious
(malice in law). 15 A reading of petitioner's subject letter-reply
showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing
such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the
said letter which showed petitioner's good intention and
justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the
legal inference of malice. EcSCAD

Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private


communication made in the performance of his moral and social
duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez
estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom
respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the
nature of a privileged communication and not libelous.
We are not persuaded.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true,
if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social
duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the
defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a
qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as
claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or
social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the
one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to
an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in
the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection
sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in
good faith and without malice. 16
While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out
of his social duty to a member of the association which he heads,
and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter's demand
letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the subject letter-
reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation
concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to
the premises as against the claim of respondent's client. The
letter merely contained insulting words, i.e, "lousy" and "inutile
letter using carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", which are
totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingco's right over the
premises. The words as written had only the effect of maligning
respondent's integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as
legal officer in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards
as consultant of the same agency and also a notary public. The
letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in
answering a demand letter which exposed respondent to public
ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious intent on
petitioner's part.
Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made
out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such
statement must be communicated only to the person or persons
who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who
have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of
the statement.17 A written letter containing libelous matter
cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and
circulated among the public. 18 In this case, petitioner admitted
that he dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed
the same and made a print out of the computer. 19 While petitioner
addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed
that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity
is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged
communication. 20 Such publication had already created upon the
minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and
shame to respondent's reputation.
Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is
presumed under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The
presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as
discussed above.
Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming
the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime
of libel.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review
and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found in
the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not. 21 We
find that the award of P20,000.00 as compensatory damages
should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To be entitled to
actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent
proof constituting evidence of the actual amount
thereof. 22 Respondent had not presented evidence in support
thereof.HTcADC

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of


writings or similar means with prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000
pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose
a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to
impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a
penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 23 where petitioners therein were
convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for alternative penalties of
fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we deleted
the prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead
ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to double the amount
of the check. We held:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino
entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national
economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in
all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not
committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they
could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court
and applied for probation to evade prison term. It would
best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the
penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par.
1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming
valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness
with due regard to the protection of the social order. 24
In the subsequent case of Lim v. People, 25 we did the same and
deleted the penalty of imprisonment and merely imposed a fine
for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the
ends of criminal justice.
Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000. On February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular 13-
2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by
stressing that the clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty,
but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties provided for in B.P. 22.
While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons
behind the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment applicable
to petitioner's case of libel. We note that this is petitioner's first
offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the
demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought
his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC
and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising a civil or
moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In fact,
petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term
but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime
thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the
social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic
usefulness and other social ends. 26 Consequently, we delete the
prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine
of six thousand pesos.
This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of
imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of libel.
In Sazon v. Court of Appeals, 27 petitioner was convicted of libel
and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and upon a
petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but
changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment,
the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of
Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. The award of compensatory damages is
DELETED. HEDSCc

SO ORDERED.
(Buatis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 142509, [March 24, 2006], 520
|||

PHIL 149-167)

[G.R. No. 161032. September 16, 2008.]

ERWIN TULFO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161176. September 16, 2008.]

SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, and


PHILIP PICHAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and CARLOS
SO, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J : p

The freedom of the press is one of the cherished


hallmarks of our democracy; but even as we strive to protect
and respect the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be
balanced with responsibility. There is a fine line between
freedom of expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to
determine whether or not that line has been crossed. TAIEcS

The Facts
On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau
of Customs, four (4) separate informations were filed on
September 8, 1999 with the Regional Trial Court in (RTC) Pasay
City. These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged
petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as
managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo,
as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo
Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the
crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles
in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May
12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999. 1 The four
informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-1598
That on or about the 11th day of May, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher
and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the
Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or
dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said
complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication
on May 11, 1999, its daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted
hereunder, to wit:
PINAKAMAYAMAN SA CUSTOMS
Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng
Bureau of Customs and [sic] pinakamayaman na yata
na government official sa buong bansa sa
pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.
Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas
daw ito sa Iglesia ni Kristo.
Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata
ang pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro nito.
Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing
simbahan dahil sa mga kalokohan mo.
Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an
extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated,
with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion. 2
Criminal Case No. 99-1599
That on or about the 12th day of May, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher
and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the
Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or
dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said
complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication
on May 12, 1999, in daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted
hereunder, to wit:
SI ATTY. SO NG BOC
"LINTEK" din sa pangungurakot itong Ding So ng
Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit sa South Harbor.
Daan-daang libong piso ang kinikita ng masiba at
matakaw na si So sa mga importer na ayaw ideklara
ang totoong laman ng mga container para makaiwas
sa pagbayad ng malaking customs duties at taxes.
Si So ang nagpapadrino sa mga pag-inspection ng
mga container na ito. Siyempre-binibigyan din niya ng
salapi yung ibang mga ahensiya para pumikit na lang
at itikom ang kanilang nga [sic] bibig diyan sa mga
buwayang taga BOC.
Awang-awa ako sa ating gobyerno. Bankrupt na nga,
ninanakawan pa ng mga kawatan tulad ni So.
Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So, bakit hindi na lang
tumayo ng sarili niyang robbery-hold-up gang para
kumita ng mas mabilis. TEDHaA

Hoy So.. hindi bagay sa iyo ang pagiging attorney . . .


Mas bagay sa iyo ang pagiging buwayang naka
korbata at holdaper. Magnanakaw ka So!!"
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an
extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated,
with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion. 3
Criminal Case No. 99-1600
That on or about 19th day of May, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher
and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the
Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or
dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said
complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication
on May 19, 1999, in daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted
hereunder, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
"Tulad ni Atty. Ding So ng Bureau of Customs
Intelligence Division, saksakan din ng lakas itong si
Daniel Aquino ng Presidential Anti-Smuggling Unit na
nakatalaga sa South Harbor.
Tulad ni So, magnanakaw na tunay itong si Aquino.
Panghihingi ng pera sa mga brokers, ang lakad nito.
Pag hindi nagbigay ng pera ang mga brokers, maiipit
ang pagre-release ng kanilang kargamento."
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an
extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated,
with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion. 4
Criminal Case No. 99-1597
That on or about 25th day of June, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher
and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid
published daily and of general circulation in the
Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with malicious intent to discredit or
dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" T. SO, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said
complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
write and publish in the regular issue of said publication
on June 25, 1999, its daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted
hereunder, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Nagfile ng P10 M na libel suit itong si Atty. Carlos So
ng Bureau of Customs laban sa inyong lingkod at
ilang opisyales ng Remate sa Pasay City Court.
Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binanatan
ko siya at inexpose ang kagaguhan niya sa BOC.
Hoy, So . . . dagdagan mo pa ang pagnanakaw mo
dahil hindi kita tatantanan. Buhay ka pa sinusunog
na ang iyong kaluluwa sa impyerno.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an
extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated,
with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion. 5
On November 3, 1999, Tulfo, Salao, and Cambri were
arraigned, while Barlizo and Pichay were arraigned on
December 15, 1999. They all pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged.
At pre-trial, the following were admitted by petitioners: (1)
that during the four dates of the publication of the questioned
articles, the complaining witness was not assigned at South
Harbor; (2) that the accused and complaining witness did not
know each other during all the time material to the four dates
of publication; (3) that Remate is a newspaper/tabloid of
general circulation in the Philippines; (4) the existence and
genuineness of the Remate newspaper; (5) the column therein
and its authorship and the alleged libelous statement as well
as the editorial post containing the designated positions of the
other accused; and (6) the prosecution's qualified admission
that it is the duty of media persons to expose corruption. 6 IHCSTE
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Oscar
M. Ablan, Atty. James Fortes, Jr., Gladys Fontanilla, and
complainant Atty. So. The prosecution presented documentary
evidence as well.
Ablan testified that he had read the four columns written
by Tulfo, and that the articles were untrue because he had
known Atty. So since 1992 and had worked with him in the
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service Division of the
Bureau of Customs. He further testified that upon reading the
articles written by Tulfo, he concluded that they referred to
Atty. So because the subject articles identified "Atty. Carlos"
as "Atty. 'Ding' So" of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service Division, Bureau of Customs and there
was only one Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs. 7
Fontanilla, Records Officer I of the Bureau of Customs,
testified that she issued a certification in connection with
these cases upon the request of Atty. So. 8 This certification
stated that as per records available in her office, there was
only one employee by the name of "Atty. Carlos T. So" who was
also known as "Atty. Ding So" in the Intelligence Division of
the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service or in the
entire Bureau of Customs. 9
Atty. Fortes testified that he knew Atty. So as a fellow
member of the Iglesia Ni Kristo and as a lawyer, and that
having read the articles of Tulfo, he believed that these were
untrue, as he knew Atty. Carlos "Ding" So. 10
Atty. So testified that he was the private complainant in
these consolidated cases. He further testified that he is also
known as Atty. "Ding" So, that he had been connected with the
Bureau of Customs since October 1981, and that he was
assigned as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service Division at the Manila
International Container Port since December 27, 1999. He
executed two complaint-affidavits, one dated June 4, 1999 and
the other dated July 5, 1999, for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1598 to
99-1600. Prior to this, he also filed 14 cases of libel against
Raffy Tulfo, brother of petitioner Erwin Tulfo. He testified that
petitioner Tulfo's act of imputing upon him criminality,
assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him dishonor,
discredit, and contempt among his co-members in the legal
profession, co-officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
co-members and peers in the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-officers
and employees and superior officers in the Bureau of Customs,
and among ordinary persons who had read said articles. He
said it also caused him and his family sleepless nights, mental
anguish, wounded feelings, intrigues, and embarrassment. He
further testified that he included in his complaint for libel the
officers of Remate such as the publisher, managing editor, city
editor, and national editor because under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), they are equally responsible and
liable to the same extent as if they were the author of the
articles. He also testified that "Ding" is his nickname and that
he is the only person in the entire Bureau of Customs who
goes by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So or Atty. Carlos "Ding"
So. 11
In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not
write the subject articles with malice, that he neither knew
Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He
testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South
Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a
person by the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South Harbor.
Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use
other people's names to advance their corrupt practices. He
also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor
dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the
Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further
testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So before the
subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his
source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of
Customs, particularly in the South Harbor. 12
Petitioner Salao testified that he came to know Atty.
Carlos "Ding" So when the latter filed a case against them. He
testified that he is an employee of Carlo Publishing House,
Inc.; that he was designated as the national editor of the
newspaper Remate since December 1999; that the duties of
the position are to edit, evaluate, encode, and supervise layout
of the news from the provinces; and that Tulfo was under the
supervision of Rey Briones, Vice President for Editorial and
Head of the Editorial Division. Salao further testified that he
had no participation in the subject articles of Tulfo, nor had he
anything to do with the latter's column. 13
Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate, testified
that she classifies the news articles written by the reporters,
and that in the Editorial Division, the officers are herself;
Briones, her supervisor; Lydia Bueno, as news and city editor;
and Salao as national editor. She testified that petitioner
Barlizo is her subordinate, whose duties and responsibilities
are the typesetting, editing, and layout of the page assigned to
her, the Metro page. She further testified that she had no
participation in the writing, editing, or publication of the
column of Tulfo because the column was not edited. She
claimed that none among her co-accused from
theRemate newspaper edited the columns of Tulfo, that the
publication and editing of the subject articles were the
responsibility of Tulfo, and that he was given blanket authority
to write what he wanted to write. She also testified that the
page wherein Tulfo's column appeared was supervised by
Bueno as news editor. 14 cSEDTC

Petitioner Pichay testified that he had been the president


of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. since December 1998. He
testified that the company practice was to have the
columnists report directly to the vice-president of editorials,
that the columnists were given autonomy on their columns,
and that the vice-president for editorials is the one who would
decide what articles are to be published and what are not. He
further testified that Tulfo was already a regular contributor. 15
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found
petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. The dispositive portion
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN
TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO
and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and penalized by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
or a fine ranging from P200.00 Pesos to P6,000.00 Pesos
or both, under Article 355 of the same Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Court hereby sentences EACH of the accused to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of
prision correccional, as maximum, for EACH count with
accessory penalties provided by law.
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan
Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay
wrote and published the four (4) defamatory articles with
reckless disregard, being, in the mind of the Court, of
whether it was false or not, the said articles libelous per
se, they are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND (P800,000.00)
PESOS, as actual damages, the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages, and an
additional amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00), by way of exemplary damages, all with
subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 16

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals


Before the Court of Appeals (CA), Tulfo assigned the
following errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE
UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT THAT
HE DID NOT CRITICIZE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WORKING AT THE NAIA. HE CRITICIZED ANOTHER
PERSON WORKING AT THE SOUTH HARBOR. HENCE,
THE ELEMENT OF IDENTITY IS LACKING.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE LACK OF
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DISCREDIT OR
DISHONOR, AS DEFINED BY JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THERE WAS NO MALICE AGAINST THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO. 17
His co-accused assigned the following errors:
A
The trial court seriously erred in holding accused
Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip
Pichay liable for the defamations contained in the
questioned articles despite the fact that the trial court
did not have any finding as to their participation in the
writing, editing and/or publication of the questioned
articles.
B
The trial court seriously erred in concluding that
libel was committed by all of the accused on the basis of
its finding that the elements of libel have been
satisfactorily established by evidence on record.
C
The trial court seriously erred in considering
complainant to be the one referred to by Erwin Tulfo in
his articles in question. 18
In a Decision 19 dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of
the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the
trial court. A motion for reconsideration dated June 30, 2003
was filed by Tulfo, while the rest of his co-accused filed a
motion for reconsideration dated July 2, 2003. In a Resolution
dated December 11, 2003, both motions were denied for lack of
merit. 20
AHECcT

Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45


Tulfo brought this petition docketed as G.R. No. 161032,
seeking to reverse the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No.
25318 which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioners
Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay brought a similar petition
docketed as G.R. No. 161176, seeking the nullification of the
same CA decision.
In a Resolution dated March 15, 2004, the two cases were
consolidated since both cases arise from the same set of
facts, involve the same parties, assail the same decision of the
CA, and seek identical reliefs. 21
Assignment of Errors
Petitioner Tulfo submitted the following assignment of
errors:
I
Assuming that the Prosecution presented credible
and relevant evidence, the Honorable CA erred in not
declaring the assailed articles as privileged; the CA
erred in concluding that malice in law exists by the
court's having incorrectly reasoned out that malice was
presumed in the instant case.
II
Even assuming arguendo that the articles
complained of are not privileged, the lower court,
nonetheless, committed gross error as defined by the
provisions of Section 6 of Rule 45 by its misappreciation
of the evidence presented on matters substantial and
material to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. 22
Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay submitted
their own assignment of errors, as follows:
A — The Court of Appeals Seriously Erred In Its
Application of Article 360 Of The Revised Penal Code By
Holding Cambri, Salao And Barlizo Liable For The
Defamatory Articles In The May 11, 12, 19 And June 25,
1999 Issues Of Remate Simply Because They Were
Managing Editor, National Editor And City Editor
Respectively Of Remate And By Holding Pichay Also
Liable For Libel Merely Because He Was The President Of
Carlo Publishing House, Inc. Without Taking Into Account
The Unrebutted Evidence That Petitioners Had No
Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of The
Defamatory Articles In Question.

B — The Court Of Appeals Committed Grave Abuse


Of Discretion In Manifestly Disregarding The Unrebutted
Evidence That Petitioners Had No Participation In The
Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In
Question.
C — The Court Of Appeals Seriously Misappreciated
The Evidence In Holding That The Person Referred To In
The Published Articles Was Private Complainant Atty.
Carlos So. 23
Our Ruling
The petitions must be dismissed.
The assignment of errors of petitioner Tulfo shall be
discussed first.
In his appeal, Tulfo claims that the CA erred in not
applying the ruling in Borjal v. Court of Appeals. 24 In essence,
he argues that the subject articles fall under "qualifiedly
privileged communication" under Borjal and that the
presumption of malice in Art. 354 of the RPC does not apply.
He argues that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove
malice in fact.
This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several
points, the first being that Borjal stemmed from a civil action
for damages based on libel, and was not a criminal
case. Second, the ruling in Borjal was that there was no
sufficient identification of the complainant, which shall be
differentiated from the present case in discussing the second
assignment of error of Tulfo. Third, the subject in Borjal was a
private citizen, whereas in the present case, the subject is a
public official. Finally, it was held in Borjal that the articles
written by Art Borjal were "fair commentaries on matters of
public interest". 25 It shall be discussed and has yet to be
determined whether or not the articles fall under the category
of "fair commentaries".
In passing, it must be noted that the defense of Tulfo's
articles being qualifiedly privileged communication is raised
for the first time in the present petition, and this particular
issue was never brought before either the RTC or the CA. Thus,
neither the RTC nor the CA had a chance to properly consider
and evaluate this defense. Tulfo now draws parallels between
his case and that of Art Borjal, and argues that the prosecution
should have proved malice in fact, and it was error on the part
of the trial and appellate courts to use the presumption of
malice in law in Art. 354 of the RPC. This lays an unusual
burden on the part of the prosecution, the RTC, and the CA to
refute a defense that Tulfo had never raised before them.
Whether or not the subject articles are privileged
communications must first be established by the defense,
which it failed to do at the level of the RTC and the CA. Even
so, it shall be dealt with now, considering that an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. ITSacC

There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public


official, who served as the OIC of the Bureau of Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) at the time of the printing of the
allegedly libelous articles. Likewise, it cannot be refuted that
the goings-on at the Bureau of Customs, a government agency,
are matters of public interest. It is now a matter of
establishing whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as
qualified privileged communication or are defamatory and
written with malice, for which he would be liable.
Freedom of the Press v. Responsibility of the Press
The Court has long respected the freedom of the press,
and upheld the same when it came to commentaries made on
public figures and matters of public interest. Even in cases
wherein the freedom of the press was given greater weight
over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed
that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The
exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible
exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free
license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the rights
of others.
The Journalist's Code of Ethics adopted by the National
Union of Journalists of the Philippines shows that the press
recognizes that it has standards to follow in the exercise of
press freedom; that this freedom carries duties and
responsibilities. Art. I of said code states that journalists
"recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty to
correct substantive errors promptly". Art. VIII states that
journalists "shall presume persons accused of crime of being
innocent until proven otherwise".
In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed
the Journalist's Code of Ethics and exercised his journalistic
freedom responsibly.
In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of
the Bureau of Customs as being involved in criminal activities,
and was using his public position for personal gain. He went
even further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment
to his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at
magnanakaw sa miyembro nito". 26 He accused Atty. So of
stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt
activities. 27 And when Atty. So filed a libel suit against him,
Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So,
saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil
binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya
sa [Bureau of Customs]." 28
In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally
know Atty. So, and had neither met nor known him prior to the
publication of the subject articles. He also admitted that he
did not conduct a more in-depth research of his allegations
before he published them, and relied only on his source at the
Bureau of Customs.
In his defense before the trial court, Tulfo claimed
knowledge of people using the names of others for personal
gain, and even stated that he had been the victim of such a
practice. He argued then that it may have been someone else
using the name of Atty. So for corrupt practices at the South
Harbor, and this person was the target of his articles. This
argument weakens his case further, for even with the
knowledge that he may be in error, even knowing of the
possibility that someone else may have used Atty. So's name,
as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the information
given by his source or even to ascertain the identity of the
person he was accusing.
The trial court found Tulfo's accusations against Atty. So
to be false, but Tulfo argues that the falsity of contents of
articles does not affect their privileged character. It may be
that the falsity of the articles does not prove malice. Neither
did Borjal give journalists carte blanche with regard to their
publications. It cannot be said that a false article accusing a
public figure would always be covered by the mantle of
qualified privileged communication. The portion of Borjal cited
by Tulfo must be scrutinized further:
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are
false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does
not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are
inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and
debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care,
the press should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the
choice of language. There must be some room for
misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by
giving them much leeway and tolerance can they
courageously and effectively function as critical
agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v.
Noel we held —
A newspaper especially one national in reach and
coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate
interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court
by one group or another on criminal or civil charges
for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and
keeps within the standards of morality and civility
prevailing within the general community.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily
accompany strict liability for erroneous statements,
rules governing liability for injury to reputation are
required to allow an adequate margin of error by
protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason
that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability
for defamation of a public official or public figure may
not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice"
on the part of the person making the libelous
statement.29 (Emphasis supplied.) TADaCH

Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press


freedom must be done "consistent with good faith and
reasonable care". This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when
he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or
honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his
responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the
public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error
in the exercise of their profession, but this margin does not
expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they
may make in the furtherance of their profession, nor does this
margin cover total abandonment of responsibility.
Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified
privileged communication beyond the instances given in Art.
354 of the RPC, but this expansion does not cover Tulfo. The
addition to the instances of qualified privileged
communications is reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in
an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it
is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from
the facts. 30 (Emphasis supplied.)
The expansion speaks of "fair commentaries on matters
of public interest". While Borjal places fair commentaries
within the scope of qualified privileged communication, the
mere fact that the subject of the article is a public figure or a
matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the
author from liability.Borjal allows that for a discreditable
imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a
false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. As previously mentioned, the trial court found that
the allegations against Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did
not exert effort to verify the information before publishing his
articles.
Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to
have a source in the Bureau of Customs and relied only on this
source for his columns, but did no further research on his
story. The records of the case are bereft of any showing that
Atty. So was indeed the villain Tulfo pictured him to be. Tulfo's
articles related no specific details or acts committed to prove
Atty. So was indeed a corrupt public official. These columns
were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be
countenanced as being privileged simply because the target
was a public official. Although wider latitude is given to
defamatory utterances against public officials in connection
with or relevant to their performance of official duties, or
against public officials in relation to matters of public interest
involving them, such defamatory utterances do not
automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally
protected speech. 31 Journalists still bear the burden of writing
responsibly when practicing their profession, even when
writing about public figures or matters of public interest. As
held in In Re: Emil P. Jurado:
Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects
a journalist who deliberately prints lies or distorts the
truth; or that a newsman may ecape liability who
publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against a
person or entity, but recognizes no obligation bona
fide to establish beforehand the factual basis of such
imputations and refuses to submit proof thereof when
challenged to do so. It outrages all notions of fair play
and due process, and reduces to uselessness all the
injunctions of the Journalists' Code of Ethics to allow a
newsman, with all the potential of his profession to
influence popular belief and shape public opinion, to
make shameful and offensive charges destructive of
personal or institutional honor and repute, and when
called upon to justify the same, cavalierly beg off by
claiming that to do so would compromise his sources and
demanding acceptance of his word for the reliability of
those sources. 32
The prosecution showed that Tulfo could present no proof
of his allegations against Atty. So, only citing his one unnamed
source. It is not demanded of him that he name his source. The
confidentiality of sources and their importance to journalists
are accepted and respected. What cannot be accepted are
journalists making no efforts to verify the information given by
a source, and using that unverified information to throw wild
accusations and besmirch the name of possibly an innocent
person. Journalists have a responsibility to report the truth,
and in doing so must at least investigate their stories before
publication, and be able to back up their stories with proof.
The rumors and gossips spread by unnamed sources are not
truth. Journalists are not storytellers or novelists who may just
spin tales out of fevered imaginings, and pass them off as
reality. There must be some foundation to their reports; these
reports must be warranted by facts. HEScID

Jurado also established that the journalist should


exercise some degree of care even when writing about public
officials. The case stated:
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of
speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that
matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of
private honor and reputation need to be accommodated
one to the other. And the point of adjustment or
accommodation between these two legitimate interests
is precisely found in the norm which requires those who,
invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which
are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other
public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining
the truth of the statements they publish. The norm
does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of
what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit
the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing
or circulating defamatory statements without anybona
fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm
represents the generally accepted point of balance or
adjustment between the two interests involved is clear
from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law
norms and the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism
profession in the Philippines. 33
Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot
even be considered as qualified privileged communication
under the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which
exempts from the presumption of malice "a fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or any statement, report, or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions."
This particular provision has several elements which must be
present in order for the report to be exempt from the
presumption of malice. The provision can be dissected as
follows:
In order that the publication of a report of an
official proceeding may be considered privileged, the
following conditions must exist:
(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of
a statement, report orspeech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by a
public officer in the exercise of his
functions;cHAIES

(b) That it is made in good faith; and


(c) That it is without any comments or remarks. 34

The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports
contemplated by the provision. They provide no details of the
acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and
simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one
unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to
substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before
publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the character of
the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his religion
and the legal profession. As none of the elements of the
second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC is present in Tulfo's
articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are qualified
privileged communications under the RPC.
Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms
"fair" and "true", Tulfo's articles do not meet the standard.
"Fair" is defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and
honesty". 35 "True" is defined as "conformable to fact; correct;
exact; actual; genuine; honest." 36 Tulfo failed to satisfy these
requirements, as he did not do research before making his
allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were
baseless. The articles are not "fair and true reports", but
merely wild accusations.
Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are
covered by the shield of qualified privileged communication,
this would still not protect Tulfo.
In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified
privileged communication, Tulfo argues that the presumption
of malice in law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present,
placing upon the prosecution the burden of proving malice in
fact. He then argues that for him to be liable, there should have
been evidence that he was motivated by ill will or spite in
writing the subject articles.
The test to be followed is that laid down in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 37 and reiterated in Flor v. People, which
should be to determine whether the defamatory statement was
made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. 38
The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and
published the subject articles with reckless disregard of
whether the same were false or not, as proven by the
prosecution. There was the finding that Tulfo failed to verify
the information on which he based his writings, and that the
defense presented no evidence to show that the accusations
against Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot argue that because he
did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there was no
malice attendant in his articles. The test laid down is the
"reckless disregard" test, and Tulfo has failed to meet that
test.
The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting
respondent Atty. So can be considered as further evidence of
malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo, 39wherein publication after
the commencement of an action was taken as further evidence
of a malicious design to injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent
nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to
continue defaming respondent Atty. So. This is a clear
indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost,
and is proof of malice.
Leaving the discussion of qualified privileged
communication, Tulfo also argues that the lower court
misappreciated the evidence presented as to the identity of
the complainant: that Tulfo wrote about Atty. "Ding" So, an
official of the Bureau of Customs who worked at the South
Harbor, whereas the complainant was Atty. Carlos So who
worked at the NAIA. He claims that there has arisen a cloud of
doubt as to the identity of the real party referred to in the
articles.
This argument is patently without merit.
The prosecution was able to present the testimonies of
two other witnesses who identified Atty. So from Tulfo's
articles. There is the certification that there is only one Atty.
So in the Bureau of Customs. And most damning to Tulfo's case
is the last column he wrote on the matter, referring to the libel
suit against him by Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. In this
article, Tulfo launched further attacks against Atty. So, stating
that the libel case was due to the exposés Tulfo had written on
the corrupt acts committed by Atty. So in the Bureau of
Customs. This last article is an admission on the part of Tulfo
that Atty. So was in fact the target of his attacks. He cannot
now point to a putative "Atty. Ding So" at South Harbor, or
someone else using the name of Atty. So as the real subject of
his attacks, when he did not investigate the existence or non-
existence of an Atty. So at South Harbor, nor investigate the
alleged corrupt acts of Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. Tulfo
cannot say that there is doubt as to the identity of the Atty. So
referred to in his articles, when all the evidence points to one
Atty. So, the complainant in the present case.
Having discussed the issue of qualified privileged
communication and the matter of the identity of the person
referred to in the subject articles, there remains the petition of
the editors and president of Remate, the paper on which the
subject articles appeared.
In sum, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all
claim that they had no participation in the editing or writing of
the subject articles, and are thus not liable.
The argument must fail.
The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the
persons responsible for libel:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who
shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for
the defamations contained therein to the same extent as
if he were the author thereof.
The claim that they had no participation does not shield
them from liability. The provision in the RPC does not provide
absence of participation as a defense, but rather plainly and
specifically states the responsibility of those involved in
publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter
of whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing
the subject articles, because the law simply so states that
they are liable as they were the author.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability
for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply
saying they had no participation in the preparation of the
same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the
publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared,
when they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the
newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the
publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because
he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the other
petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because
they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and
publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has
active charge and control of its management, conduct, and
policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for
the publication therein of a libelous article. 40 On the theory
that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control
the contents of the paper, 41 it is held that said person cannot
evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to
employees, 42 so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor
or manager knew the contents of the publication. 43 In Fermin
v. People of the Philippines, 44 the Court held that the publisher
could not escape liability by claiming lack of participation in
the preparation and publication of a libelous article. The Court
cited U.S. v. Ocampo, stating the rationale for holding the
persons enumerated in Art. 360 of the RPC criminally liable,
and it is worth reiterating:IDCHTE

According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence


of the United States, the printer of a publication
containing libelous matter is liable for the same by
reason of his direct connection therewith and his
cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a
publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the
publisher but also all other persons who in any way
participate in or have any connection with its publication
are liable as publishers.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26
Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St. Rep., 629), the question of the
responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a
newspaper was discussed. The court said, among other
things (pp. 782, 783):
"The question then recurs as to whether the
manager or proprietor of a newspaper can escape
criminal responsibility solely on the ground that the
libelous article was published without his knowledge or
consent. When a libel is published in a newspaper, such
fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to charge
the manager or proprietor with the guilt of its
publication.
"The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we
think ought to be held prima facie criminally for whatever
appears in his paper; and it should be no defense that the
publication was made without his knowledge or
consent, . . . .
"One who furnishes the means for carrying on the
publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management
to servants or employees whom he selects and controls
may be said to cause to be published what actually
appears, and should be held responsible therefore,
whether he was individually concerned in the publication
or not, . . . . Criminal responsibility for the acts of an
agent or servant in the course of his employment
necessarily implies some degree of guilt or delinquency
on the part of the publisher; . . . .
"We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous
article was published in the newspaper without the
knowledge or consent of its proprietor or manager is no
defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor
or manager." CaTcSA

In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107


Mass., 197), this same question was considered and the
court held that in the criminal prosecution of a publisher
of a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is prima
facie presumed to have published the libel, and that the
exclusion of an offer by the defendant to prove that he
never saw the libel and was not aware of its publication
until it was pointed out to him and that an apology and
retraction were afterwards published in the same paper,
gave him no ground for exception. In this same case, Mr.
Justice Colt, speaking for the court, said:
"It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper,
which may be used for the publication of improper
communications, to use reasonable caution in the
conduct of his business that no libels be published."
(Wharton's Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishop's
Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson, 64 Ill.,
195;Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)
The above doctrine is also the doctrine established
by the English courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3
Esp., 21) Lord Kenyon said that he was "clearly of the
opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was
answerable criminally as well as civilly for the acts of his
servants or agents for misconduct in the management of
the paper."
This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice
Powell, and Mr. Justice Foster.
Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and
Slander, said:
"An information for libel will lie against the
publisher of a papers, although he did not know of its
being put into the paper and stopped the sale as soon as
he discovered it."
In the case of People vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court
held that —
"A person who makes a defamatory statement to
the agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both
civilly and criminally, and his liability is shared by the
agent and all others who aid in publishing it." 45
Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the
subject articles, has been found guilty of libel, so too must
Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay.
Though we find petitioners guilty of the crime charged,
the punishment must still be tempered with justice. Petitioners
are to be punished for libel for the first time. They did not apply
for probation to avoid service of sentence possibly in the belief
that they have not committed any crime. In Buatis, Jr. v.
People, 46 the Court, in a criminal case for libel, removed the
penalty of imprisonment and instead imposed a fine as
penalty. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals, 47 the accused was
merely fined in lieu of the original penalty of imprisonment and
fine. Freedom of expression as well as freedom of the press
may not be unrestrained, but neither must it be reined in too
harshly. In light of this, considering the necessity of a free
press balanced with the necessity of a responsible press, the
penalty of a fine of PhP 6,000 for each count of libel, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, should
suffice. 48 Lastly, the responsibilities of the members of the
press notwithstanding, the difficulties and hazards they
encounter in their line of work must also be taken into
consideration.
The award of damages by the lower court must be
modified. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides, "Except as
provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered
by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred
to as actual or compensatory damages." There was no
showing of any pecuniary loss suffered by the complainant
Atty. So. Without proof of actual loss that can be measured,
the award of actual damages cannot stand.
In Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, it was held, as regards
actual and moral damages:
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for
such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not
only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have
emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed,
and courts, in making an award must point out specific
facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne.
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be
awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in
the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in
nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the
injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no
proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral
damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being
left to the sound discretion of the court, it is imperative,
nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by
the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from
any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article
2220 of the Civil Code. A causal relation, in fine, must
exist between the act or omission referred to in the Code
which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or proceeding
on the one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other
hand; i.e. the first must be the proximate cause and the
latter the direct consequence thereof. 49 HIaTDS

It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So,


and for that Atty. So deserves the award of moral damages.
Justification for the award of moral damages is found in Art.
2219 (7) of the Civil Code, which states that moral damages
may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or any other form
of defamation. As the cases involved are criminal cases of
libel, they fall squarely within the ambit of Art. 2219 (7).
Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of
actual or compensatory damages. The fact that no actual or
compensatory damage was proven before the trial court does
not adversely affect the offended party's right to recover moral
damages. 50
And while on the subject of moral damages, it may not be
amiss to state at this juncture that Tulfo's libelous articles are
abhorrent not only because of its vilifying and demeaning
effect on Atty. So himself, but also because of their impact on
members of his family, especially on the children and possibly
even the children's children.
The Court can perhaps take judicial notice that the sense
of kinship runs deeply in a typical Filipino family, such that the
whole family usually suffers or rejoices at the misfortune or
good fortune, as the case may be, of any of its member.
Accordingly, any attempt to dishonor or besmirch the name
and reputation of the head of the family, as here, invariably
puts the other members in a state of disrepute, distress, or
anxiety. This reality adds an imperative dimension to the
award of moral damages to the defamed party.
The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be
justified. Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, "In criminal
offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party." No
aggravating circumstances accompanied the commission of
the libelous acts; thus, no exemplary damages can be
awarded.
Conclusion
The press wields enormous power. Through its
widespread reach and the information it imparts, it can mold
and shape thoughts and opinions of the people. It can turn the
tide of public opinion for or against someone, it can build up
heroes or create villains.
It is in the interest of society to have a free press, to have
liberal discussion and dissemination of ideas, and to
encourage people to engage in healthy debate. It is through
this that society can progress and develop.
Those who would publish under the aegis of freedom of
the press must also acknowledge the corollary duty to publish
responsibly. To show that they have exercised their freedom
responsibly, they must go beyond merely relying on unfounded
rumors or shadowy anonymous sources. There must be further
investigation conducted, some shred of proof found to support
allegations of misconduct or even criminal activity. It is in fact
too easy for journalists to destroy the reputation and honor of
public officials, if they are not required to make the slightest
effort to verify their accusations. Journalists are supposed to
be reporters of facts, not fiction, and must be able to back up
their stories with solid research. The power of the press and
the corresponding duty to exercise that power judiciously
cannot be understated.
But even with the need for a free press, the necessity
that it be free does not mean that it be totally unfettered. It is
still acknowledged that the freedom can be abused, and for
the abuse of the freedom, there must be a corresponding
sanction. It falls on the press to wield such enormous power
responsibly. It may be a cliché that the pen is mightier than
the sword, but in this particular case, the lesson to be learned
is that such a mighty weapon should not be wielded recklessly
or thoughtlessly, but always guided by conscience and careful
thought.
A robust and independently free press is doubtless one of
the most effective checks on government power and abuses.
Hence, it behooves government functionaries to respect the
value of openness and refrain from concealing from media
corruption and other anomalous practices occurring within
their backyard. On the other hand, public officials also deserve
respect and protection against false innuendoes and
unfounded accusation of official wrongdoing from an abusive
press. As it were, the law and jurisprudence on libel heavily tilt
in favor of press freedom. The common but most unkind
perception is that government institutions and their officers
and employees are fair game to official and personal attacks
and even ridicule. And the practice on the ground is just as
disconcerting. Reports and accusation of official misconduct
often times merit front page or primetime treatment, while
defenses set up, retraction issued, or acquittal rendered get no
more, if ever, perfunctory coverage. The unfairness needs no
belaboring. The balm of clear conscience is sometimes not
enough.
Perhaps lost in the traditional press freedom versus
government impasse is the fact that a maliciously false
imputation of corruption and dishonesty against a public
official, as here, leaves a stigmatizing mark not only on the
person but also the office to which he belongs. In the ultimate
analysis, public service also unduly suffers. EcHIAC
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176 are DISMISSED. The CA Decision
dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall
be a fine of six thousand pesos (PhP6,000) for each count of
libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, while
the award of actual damages and exemplary damages is
DELETED. The Decision dated November 17, 2000 of the RTC,
Branch 112 in Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-
1600 is modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN
TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO,
and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences
EACH of the accused to pay a fine of SIX THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP6,000) per count of libel with subsidiary
imprisonment, in case of insolvency.
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan
Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay
wrote and published the four (4) defamatory articles with
reckless disregard whether it was false or not, the said
articles being libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to
pay complainant Atty. Carlos T. So, jointly and severally,
the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (PhP1,000,000) as moral
damages. The claim of actual and exemplary damages is
denied for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
(Tulfo v. People, G.R. Nos. 161032 & 161176, [September 16,
|||

2008], 587 PHIL 64-100)

TITLE 14
[G.R. No. 172716. November 17, 2010.]

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA


ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J :
p

The Case
The petition seeks the review 1 of the Orders 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower
court's ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause
to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite
the accused's previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner
Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent
Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the
charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence. SICDAa

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses


in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition forcertiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the
arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner's motion, the
MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution
denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent
Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed
S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner's
forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from
the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at
the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without
reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively
affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this
proved unavailing. 6HITEaS
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his
petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence
sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants
because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action
seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment
of conviction. 7
Petitioner laments the RTC's failure to reach the merits of
his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner
argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same
offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of
such crime are material only to determine his penalty. CSTcEI

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb


the RTC's decision forfeiting petitioner's standing to maintain
his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Court's attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g., slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g., homicide). Hence, the prosecution was
obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for
the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of
the Solicitor General's motion not to file a comment to the
petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal
party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether
petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803
when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366;
and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner's constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner's non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the
protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner
from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366. ADETca

Petitioner's Non-appearance at the Arraignment in Criminal


Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing to Maintain the
Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant's escape
from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of
Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in
Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.
The RTC's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action
for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on
the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural
rules and jurisprudence. The RTC's reliance on People v.
Esparas 9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the
RTC's ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by
an accused who wassentenced to death for importing
prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and
was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court
in Esparastreated the mandatory review of death sentences
under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of
Rule 124. 10
The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-
appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as
proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a defendant who
absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under
Section 21, Rule 114 11of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant's absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to
cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused
within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should
he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be
convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to
the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact
that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused's status to that of a fugitive without standing.
EScAHT

Further, the RTC's observation that petitioner provided


"no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding" 12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days
before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of
the MeTC's proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of
his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the
MeTC's refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was
released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner's arrest),
petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained
unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his
Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused's negative constitutional right not to be
"twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" 13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information. 14 It is not disputed that petitioner's conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case
No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the
affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the
same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not." 15
We find for petitioner. ITSCED

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,


its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same
facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correctional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. cdrep

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall


have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-
five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall
be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall
exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable:ISDCaT

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or


lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall impose the
penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation
of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished
by prision correctional in its medium and maximum
periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution
displayed in those cases in which the damage impending
to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest. ASTDCH

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in


this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be
in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into
four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the
quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs
1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-
offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial
courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the
definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence"
(paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible," 16 unlike willful offenses which punish theintentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional
crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless
or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that
"reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way
of committing it . . ." 17 on three points of analysis: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to
intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-
crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3)
the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a
lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence:
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth,
criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated
as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification
or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. . . .ACHEaI

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the


commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penally therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when committed
willfully. For each penalty for the willfull offense, there
would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent
variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range
all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the
case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of
crimes. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-
crimes is to state that their commission results in damage,
either to person or property. 19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace
in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to
Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being
limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional
crime conceptually incompatible with the element of
imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law 20 (the normative ancestry
of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated, 21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The
contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller 22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself . . . [but] simply a
way of committing it . . . ," 23 has long been abandoned when
the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in
1939. Quizon rejected Faller's conceptualization of quasi-
crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are
distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of
committing crimes. Fallerfound expression in post-
Quizon jurisprudence 24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law
rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of
intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception
of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-
crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying
the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second
prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act
after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or
omission upon which the second prosecution was based. caADSE

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of


Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365
is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v.
Diaz, 25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
"damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a
prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving,"
arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution
was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever
the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is,
whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the
Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative
in People v. Belga 26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc,
per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero 27 (promulgated in 1959,
unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas 28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva 29 (promulgated in 1962 by the
Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay 30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan 31 (promulgated in 1968 by the
Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C.J.), Buerano v. Court
of Appeals 32(promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per
Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated in
1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the
constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for
"serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence" because of the accused's prior acquittal
of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with
both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect
one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions. 35. . .
(Emphasis supplied) SCaITA

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy


merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning
of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going
against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more
than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36 decided by
the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his
previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from
the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the
second prosecution was based. Estipona's inconsistency with
the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly
overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to
rest in 1982 in Buerano. 37 There, we reviewed the Court of
Appeals' conviction of an accused for "damage to property for
reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight
and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,"
arising from the same act upon which the second charge was
based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We
reversed on the strength of Buan: 38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the
ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs.
Estipona decided on November 14, 1940 . However, in the
case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968),
this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held
that —
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions. acEHSI

xxx xxx xxx


. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by
the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively
overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a
reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the
accused, a fact which did not escape the Court's attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in
his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of
the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioner's plea of double jeopardy and
submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28,
1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner
guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if
double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted
into homicide and physical injuries, then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-
and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost
as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with
any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising
from the same mishap." 40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner's submission that the
lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle
of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more
fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner's case
than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who
was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two
separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of
the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially
denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accused's claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming
the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the
issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga: 42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order
of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely
within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated
in People v. Belga, . . . In the case cited, Ciriaco
Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence
arising from a collision between the two automobiles
driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or
otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints
were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage
to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case
No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles
involved in the collision, and another for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the
accident. Both of these two complaints were filed
against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants
were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim.
Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga
moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against
him by the injured passengers, contending that the
case was just a duplication of the one filed by the
Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted.
The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the
case for damage to property through reckless
imprudence filed by one of the owners of the
vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded
to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose
Belga had waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance
two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court
of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose
Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to
quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of
dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
following language:
The question for determination is whether the
acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his
subsequent prosecution for multiple physical
injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G.R. No. L-6518,
prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in
the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless
driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law, for having driven an automobile in a 'fast and
reckless manner . . . thereby causing an accident.'
After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case
was dismissed in that court 'for failure of the
Government to prosecute'. But some time thereafter
the city attorney filed an information in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused
with damage to property thru reckless imprudence.
The amount of the damage was alleged to be
P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed
a motion, and on appeal by the Government we
affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there
said through Mr. Justice Montemayor — THADEI

The next question to determine is the relation


between the first offense of violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay
City Municipal Court and the offense of damage
to property thru reckless imprudence charged
in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the
tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the
second offense charged necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information (Rule
113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the
evidence which proves one would prove the
other that is to say whether the facts alleged in
the first charge if proven, would have been
sufficient to support the second charge and
vice versa; or whether one crime is an
ingredient of the other. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also
disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution's
contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused
for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge
of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is
not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence which arose
out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of
which the defendant have been previously cleared by
the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us
in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose
of delimiting or clarifying its application." 44 We declined the
invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in
dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy,
upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP
court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless
Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the
Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar,
fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case . . ., upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was
anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for
the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We
find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition
on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are
analogous or similar to those in the present case, will
yield no practical advantage to the government. On one
hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation
or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It
was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the
views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case
of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30,
1959. 45 (Emphasis supplied) DIHETS

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized


Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this
petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent
but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and
Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised
Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies); 46 and (2) when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving
multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty
for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude . . . behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack
of care or foresight . . .," 47 a single mental attitude regardless
of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted
as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly.
Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple
intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences.
However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models — that of
a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-
crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The
ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a
quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48's framework
apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple
(non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to
light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively
alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be
penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under
Article 365? IDTSaC

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of


rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy )
applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its
multiple consequences 48 unless one consequence amounts to
a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on
the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave
felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and,
on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies
and filing the charge with the first level courts. 49 Expectedly,
this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and
respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act
No. 7691, 50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to
impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which
is prision correctional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not
arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365
involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the
resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the
resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts
are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case
Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a
light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and
sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-
crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their
number or severity, 51 penalizing each consequence separately.
Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, 52 we interpreted paragraph three of
Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious
physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, . . . reads as
follows:SCADIT

When the execution of the act covered by this article


shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is
only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there
should be an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for the physical
injuries, and another for the damage to property, . . . .
53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty


scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are
irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one
framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing"
of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into
separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing
under Article 365, discard its conception under
the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional
felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the
prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number
and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article
365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as
crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to
double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases. TaCIDS

A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of


government denying it the power to make laws constrains us
to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-
crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article
48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article
365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand
for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means
for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan,
we rejected the Solicitor General's argument that double
jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the
charge for that offense could not be joined with the other
charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not be joined with the accusation for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the
complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the
case of People vs. [Silva] . . .:
[T]he prosecution's contention might be true. But
neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the
same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this
appellant . . . by the Justice of the Peace . . . of the charge
of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance
of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense. 54(Emphasis
supplied) CDTHSI

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By


prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts,
rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365
should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number
or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the
judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article
365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there
shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court. 55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article
365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage
thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-
prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall
be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This
will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.
CaDSHE

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the


Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. WeDISMISS the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner
Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
(Ivler y Aguilar v. Modesto-San Pedro,
||| G.R. No. 172716,
[November 17, 2010], 649 PHIL 478-510)

[G.R. No. 178145. July 7, 2014.]


REYNALDO S. MARIANO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J :p

The courts of law are hereby reminded once again to exercise


care in the determination of the proper penalty imposable upon
the offenders whom they find and declare to be guilty of the
offenses charged or proved. Their correct determination is the
essence of due process of law.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the
petitioner with frustrated murder for hitting and bumping
Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the latter's jeep in the
information filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, in
Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), viz.:
That on or about the 12th day of September, 1999, in the
municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of the motor
vehicle he was then driving, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, hit, bump and
run over with the said motor vehicle one Ferdinand de
Leon, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries
which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said
Ferdinand de Leon, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of
murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will,
that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Ferdinand de Leon.
Contrary to law. 1

The CA summarized the antecedent events as follows:


At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999,
Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type jeep along
Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his
wife, Urbanita, and their two-year old son, as they just
came from a baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of
Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party and was
driving his owner type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo
Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife,
Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers.
They had just attended a worship service in Barangay
Engkanto.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon
and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got mad, overtook the
pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped
the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his
jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he
and Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo
insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept
quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita
tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis
de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo
"magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan
mo si Ferdinand." Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the
advice of Luis and they went their separate ways. aDATHC

Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray,


Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother's house in San
Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in
front of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom.
However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four
(4) meters away and lost consciousness. Urbanita
shouted, "Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie ." She
identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand
as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.
On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried
to show that the jeep of Ferdinand stopped on the road in
front of the house of the latter's mother about five (5) to
six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped
the pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he
allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand
suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was
sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not
stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that
the bystanders might harm him and his companions. After
bringing his companions to their house in Marungko,
Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S.
Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the
incident.
Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos,
Bulacan, where he stayed for two and a half days and
incurred medical expenses amounting to P17,800.00. On
September 15, 1999, Ferdinand was transferred to St.
Luke's Medical Center in Quezon City, where he stayed
until September 25, 1999 and incurred medical expenses
amounting to P66,243.25. He likewise spent P909.50 for
medicines, P2,900.00 for scanning, P8,000.00 for doctor's
fee and P12,550.00 for the services of his caregivers and
masseur from September 12 to October 31, 1999.
Ferdinand suffered multiple facial injuries, a fracture of
the inferior part of the right orbital wall and subdural
hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as
evidenced by the certification issued by Dr. Hernando L.
Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke's Medical Center. Urbanita, received
the amount of P50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way
of financial assistance, as evidenced by a receipt dated
September 15, 1999. 2
Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 after trial, however,
the RTC convicted the petitioner of frustrated homicide, 3 to
wit:HaTDAE

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby


finds the accused Reynaldo Mariano GUILTY for the lesser
offense of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 50 thereof
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of three (3) years and four (4) months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor as maximum and is hereby directed to
pay the complainant, Ferdinand de Leon, the amount
of P196,043.25 less P50,000.00 (already given) as actual
damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of
the suit.
SO ORDERED. 4

On appeal, the CA promulgated its assailed decision on June 29,


2006, 5 modifying the felony committed by the petitioner from
frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED and
accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano is found guilty of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and
to indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in the amount of
P58,402.75 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED. 6

In this appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilt for any crime
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, and claims that
Ferdinand's injuries were the result of a mere accident. He insists
that he lacked criminal intent; that he was not negligent in
driving his pick-up truck; and that the CA should have
appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance in
his favor.
AEITDH

Ruling
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:
Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5)
to six (6) meters behind the jeep of Ferdinand, as he
allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that
Ferdinand's body was thrown four (4) meters away from his
jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a
fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is
worthy to note that Reynaldo admitted that he has known
Ferdinand and the latter's family since 1980 because they
have a store where he used to buy things. As aptly
observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should have foreseen the
possibility that Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and
go inside the house of his mother where the store is also
located.
xxx xxx xxx
As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is
moving beyond the normal rate of speed and within the
control of the driver's hands could have caused
Ferdinand's injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative
of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise
ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered, which
will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control
and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held
inPeople v. Garcia:
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due
reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is
responsible for such results as anyone might foresee
and for acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-
beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of
danger and injury." TIDHCc

Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed


in overtaking the jeep of Ferdinand, he could have easily
stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of
the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw
that Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and lost his balance,
in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing
his injuries. 7
The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the
findings of both lower courts on the circumstances that had led
to the injuries of Ferdinand fully converged except for the RTC's
conclusion that malicious intent had attended the commission of
the offense. Such findings cannot be disturbed by the Court in
this appellate review, for it is a well-settled rule that the findings
of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding
and conclusive upon the Court. 8
"Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing of n failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place." 9 To constitute the offense of
reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required. 10 The
Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection
between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained
of. In Manzanares v. People, 11 the petitioner was found guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and serious
physical injuries because of the finding that he had driven the
Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a jeepney.
In Pangonorom v. People, 12 a public utility driver driving his
vehicle very fast was held criminally negligent because he had
not slowed down to avoid hitting a swerving car. In the absence
of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA's
observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a
fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so
attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the
latter's injuries.
Contrary to the petitioner's insistence, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in his
favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly
states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall
exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article 64 of theRevised Penal Code. "The rationale
of the law," according to People v. Medroso, Jr.: 13
. . . can be found in the fact that in quasi-offenses
penalized under Article 365, the carelessness, imprudence
or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may
vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and
resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a
fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must
have ample discretion in its imposition, without being
bound by what We may call the mathematical formula
provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.On the
basis of this particular provision, the trial court was not
bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant
case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances
in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to offset
them. IaSCTE

Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty


for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
The error should be avoided because no person should be
condemned to suffer a penalty that the law does not prescribe or
provide for the offense charged or proved. Verily, anyone
judicially declared guilty of any crime must be duly punished in
accordance with the law defining the crime and prescribing the
punishment. Injustice would always result to the offender should
the penalty exceed that allowed by the law. The imposition of the
correct penalty on the offender is the essence of due process of
law.
The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is
based on the gravity of the resulting injuries had his act been
intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code stipulates that had the act been intentional, and would
constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall
be imposed; and if it would have constituted a light
felony, arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is
that to which the law attaches the capital punishment or a
penalty that in any of its periods is afflictive in accordance with
Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that
which the law punishes with a penalty that is correctional in its
maximum period in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the
commission of which a penalty of either arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding P200.00, or both is provided. aIcETS

In turn, Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the


principal afflictive penalties to be reclusion perpetua, reclusion
temporal, and prision mayor; the principal correctional
penalties to be prision correccional, arresto mayor, suspension
and destierro; and the light penalties to be arresto menor and
fine not exceeding P200.00. Under this provision, death stands
alone as the capital punishment.
The Revised Penal Code classifies the felony of serious physical
injuries based on the gravity of the physical injuries, to wit:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who
shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the
crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted, the injured person shall become
insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if in consequence of the physical
injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use
of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have
lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have
lost the use of any such member, or shall have become
incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor
habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed,
or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have
lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated
for the performance of the work in which he as n habitually
engaged for a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the
physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or
incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than
thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of
the persons enumerated in Article 246, or with attendance
of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the
case covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall
be punished by reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision
number 2 by prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case covered
by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods; and the case covered by
subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be
applicable to a parent who shall inflict physical injuries
upon his child by excessive chastisement.
In its decision, 14 the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained
multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right
orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head
trauma; that he had become stuporous and disoriented as to
time, place and person. It was also on record that he had
testified at the trial that he was unable to attend to his general
merchandise store for three months due to temporary amnesia;
and that he had required the attendance of caregivers and a
masseur until October 31, 1999.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind,
his physical injuries did not fall under Article 263, 1, supra.
Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the petitioner's act
as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have
imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period. Instead, the
petitioner's act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it
been intentional, would be a less grave felony under Article 25 of
the Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinand's physical injuries
were those under Article 263, 3, supra, for having incapacitated
him from the performance of the work in which he was habitually
engaged in for more than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the
proper penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, which ranges from one to four months. As earlier
mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are
not applicable in reckless imprudence, and considering further
that the maximum term of imprisonment would not exceed one
year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence
Law inapplicable, 15 the Court holds that the straight penalty of
two months ofarresto mayor was the correct penalty for the
petitioner.
ATEHDc

The Court agrees with the CA's modification of the award of


actual and moral damages amounting to P58,402.75 and
P10,000.00, respectively.
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of
proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. This is because the courts cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be
competent proof of the actual loss suffered, which should be
based on the amounts actually expended by the victim, 16 or other
competent proof. Here, the receipts presented by the Prosecution
proved the expenses actually incurred amounting to P108,402.75,
but such aggregate was reduced by the victim's earlier receipt of
P50,000.00 from the petitioner in the form of financial
assistance. Hence, the victim should recover only the unpaid
portion of P58,402.75.
Moral damages are given to ease the victim's grief and suffering.
Moral damages should reasonably approximate the extent of the
hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 17 Accordingly, the
CA properly reduced to P10,000.00 the moral damages awarded
to Ferdinand.
In addition, we impose an interest of 6% per annum on the actual
and moral damages reckoned from the finality of this decision
until the full payment of the obligation. This is because the
damages thus fixed thereby become a forbearance. The rate of
6% per annum is pursuant to Circular No. 799, series of 2013,
issued by the Office of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, and the pronouncement in Nacar v.
Gallery Frames. 18
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
June 29, 2006, subject to the modifications that: (a) the penalty
to be imposed on the petitioner shall be a straight penalty of two
months of arresto mayor; and (b) the awards for actual and moral
damages shall earn 6% interest rate per annum commencing
from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
(Mariano v. People, G.R. No. 178145, [July 7, 2014], 738 PHIL 448-
|||

463)

[G.R. No. 195671. January 21, 2015.]

ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the


Decision 2 dated September 18, 2009 and the Resolution 3 dated
January 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
00427-MIN, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated July 31, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 9832-99, finding petitioner Rogelio J.
Gonzaga (Rogelio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in
relation to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio
Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his motorcycle along Brgy.
Kiara, Don Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc 5 of the same
municipality, to bring his two (2) minor children, Dionesio Inguito,
Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito 6 (Cherry), to school. 7 While
they were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc on their
proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser
(Land Cruiser) driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the
same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the
horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its
proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. 8 In order to avoid
collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the Land
Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and
collided head-on with the motorcycle. 9
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were
thrown off the motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the
Land Cruiser, 10 while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over
the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the
road, 11 causing injuries to their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry, 12 and
Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing the same road aboard
their own motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the victims
together 13 on the rightmost side of the road facing Brgy.
Bocboc, 14 while Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser. 15
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance,
leaving his two (2) sisters to cater to the victims. 16 Eventually, he
chanced upon Kagawad Nerio Dadivas (Kgd. Dadivas), who had
just opened his store, and informed the latter of the vehicular
accident. After reporting the incident to the police and getting
his vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas proceeded to the site and loaded the
victims to his vehicle with Rolf's assistance. 17 Meanwhile, Rolf
went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio, Sr.'s wife, Clemencia
Inguito (Clemencia), of what had transpired. 18
Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital
of Maramag where they were treated. 19 Operations were
performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio, Sr., but the
latter eventually expired. Cherry's leg was placed in a cast and
she was confined in the hospital, together with Dionesio, Jr., for
more than one (1) month, or until July 26, 1997. 20 All the expenses
were shouldered by Clemencia. 21
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an
Information 22 charging Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property "with the aggravating circumstance that
accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such help
that was in his hands to give" 23 before the RTC. Upon
arraignment, 24 Rogelio entered a plea of not guilty. 25
EIcSTD

In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land


Cruiser on his proper lane along the descending curving road
towards the direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon, when, from a
distance of about 70 meters away, he saw the motorcycles driven
by Dionesio, Sr. and Rolf racing towards the curve from the
opposite direction. 26Dionesio, Sr. was driving his motorcycle in a
zigzag manner on the Land Cruiser's lane while Rolf was on his
proper lane. 27 Undecided which side of the road to take to avoid
collision, Rogelio stopped the Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of
Dionesio, Sr., nonetheless, bumped into it. 28 As a result of the
impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the roof and
the hood of the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on the side of
the road, while Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle were pinned
beneath the land Cruiser. 29 With the use of a jack handle and the
assistance of two (2) persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and Reynaldo
Quidato, who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve both
Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle from beneath the Land Cruiser.
Thereafter, they loaded the victims on board the Land Cruiser so
they may be brought to the hospital, but the vehicle turned out to
have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure
another vehicle instead. 30
The RTC Proceedings
In a Decision 31 dated July 31, 2006 (July 31, 2006 Decision), the
RTC found Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property punishable under
Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC. 32
It held that Rogelio's act of driving very fast on the wrong side of
the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to
the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to
Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Considering further that Rogelio failed to
offer any help to the victims, 33 the RTC sentenced him to suffer a
higher indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months
of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and
ordered him to pay the following civil liabilities: (a) P50,000.00 as
moral damages for the death of Dionesio, Sr.; (b) P30,000.00 as
moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the
family; (c) P200,000.00 for the medical expenses
incurred; (d) P25,000.00 for the expenses incurred during the
wake and the burial; (e)P30,000.00 for the damaged
motorcycle; (f) P60,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity;
and (g) P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. 34
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration 35 which was partly
granted in a Resolution 36 dated February 22, 2007, reducing the
penalty to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, with the same civil liabilities. The
RTC reconsidered its opinion regarding Rogelio's claim of having
extended aid to the victims, concluding that the jack handle that
was used to get the body of Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land
Cruiser could have been his in the absence of showing who
owned the same. 37 Aggrieved, Rogelio appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 38 dated September 18, 2009, however, the CA
reinstated the RTC's July 31, 2006 Decision, thereby imposing on
Rogelio the original indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two
(2) months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as
maximum, and the same civil liabilities, 39 hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
the CA correctly upheld Rogelio's conviction in accordance with
the RTC's July 31, 2006 Decision.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 40 of the RPC,
consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent
operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless
driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence
in the operation of a motor vehicle — a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required. 41 Willful, wanton or
reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of
reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious
choice of a course of action which injures another, either with
knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with
knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution
or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct
which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere
negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law,
without regard to whether the private offended party may himself
be considered likewise at fault. 42
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that
Rogelio's act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road
was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of
Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and
Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a
curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos
were bound and descending towards the opposite direction
where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding,
under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As
a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such
affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate
with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to
keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using
the highway. 43 Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a
driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be
reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the
opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed,
combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of
the accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes
negligence. 44 Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted
recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the
wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the
incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as
well as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting
therefrom. SDTIHA

Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the


proximate cause of the collision was Rogelio's reckless driving,
the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence
of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of
the RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon
the offender who "fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
such help as may be in his hands to give." Based on case law, the
obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in
the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance
that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of
giving; and(b) requires adequate proof. 45
It is well to point out that the RTC's July 31, 2006 Decision found
that Rogelio failed to offer any help to the victims 46 and, thus,
imposed on him the penalty next higher in degree. However, upon
Rogelio's motion, the RTC reconsidered its earlier conclusion,
holding that the jack handle that was used to get the body of
Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the
absence of showing who owned the same and, accordingly,
reduced the penalty. 47 Nothing was said on this point by the CA
which affirmed Rogelio's conviction based on the RTC's July 31,
2006 Decision.
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory
testimonies presented by the prosecution and the defense on this
matter. Considering however, that Cherry herself admitted that
the victims were first loaded on the Land Cruiser before they
were transferred to Kgd. Dadivas's vehicle, 48 the Court is inclined
to sustain Rogelio's claim that he tried to extend help to the
victims, but when he started the engine with the intention to go
to the hospital, he discovered that the vehicle had no
brakes. 49 Hence, in imposing the proper penalty on the accused,
the qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph of Article
365 of the RPC should not be considered.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to
Article 263 50 of the RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of
the RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime, in this case, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide,
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the
use of a motor vehicle results in the death of a person, as in this
case, the accused shall be punished with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 51 the minimum of said penalty
should be taken from arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
Consequently, the Court finds a need to modify the penalty to be
imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in
its minimum, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional in
its maximum, as maximum.
As a final note, the Court clarifies that the order for the payment
of "moral damages" in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of
Dionesio, Sr. should be, properly speaking, denominated as one
for the payment of "civil indemnity" as they were not awarded
under the parameters of the Civil Code relevant thereto, 52 but
was one "given without need of proof other than the fact of death
as a result of the crime and proof of [the accused's]
responsibility for it." 53 This is a palpable legal error which the
Court should correct if only for terminological propriety. With the
private complainant not herein impleaded, the rest of the RTC's
July 31, 2006 Decision with respect to the civil liabilities
awarded should remain undisturbed. Note that, in line with
existing jurisprudence, interest at the rate of six percent (6) per
annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid. 54
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
September 18, 2009 and the Resolution dated January 26, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, finding
petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under
Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the Revised Penal
Code are hereby AFFIRMED with the followingMODIFICATIONS: aHcDEC

(a) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate


penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in
its minimum, as minimum, to six (6) years
ofprision correccional in its maximum, as
maximum; and
(b) The award of P50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio
Inguito, Sr. in favor of his heirs is denominated as
"civil indemnity," instead of "moral damages."
(c) All monetary awards for damages shall bear
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Gonzaga v. People, G.R. No. 195671, [January 21, 2015])

[G.R. No. 204095. June 15, 2015.]

DR. JAIME T. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. FELICISIMO V.


AGAS, JR., respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of


the Rules of Court assails the May 22, 2012 Decision 1 and
October 18, 2012 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. SP No. 111910, which affirmed the March 2, 2007 3 and
September 23, 2009 4 Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
The said resolutions let stand the February 16, 2004 Resolution
of the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City, dismissing the
complaint of petitioner Dr. Jaime T. Cruz (Dr. Cruz) for Serious
Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical
Malpractice against respondent, Dr. Felicisimo V. Agas, Jr. (Dr.
Agas).
The Antecedents
In his Complaint-Affidavit 5 for Serious Physical Injuries
through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice against
Dr. Agas, Dr. Cruz alleged, among others, that sometime in May
2003, he engaged the services of St. Luke's Medical
Center (SLMC) for a medical check-up; that after being
admitted in SLMC on May 28, 2003, he underwent stool, urine,
blood, and other body fluid tests conducted by the employees
and doctors of the said hospital; that on May 29, 2003, he was
sent to the Gastro-Enterology Department for a scheduled
gastroscopy and colonoscopy; that because the specialist
assigned to perform the procedure was nowhere to be found,
he gave the colonoscopy results to the attending female
anesthesiologist for the information and consideration of the
assigned specialist; that, thereafter, he was sedated and the
endoscopic examination was carried out; that when he
regained consciousness, he felt that something went wrong
during the procedure because he felt dizzy, had cold clammy
perspiration and experienced breathing difficulty; that he
could not stand or sit upright because he felt so exhausted
and so much pain in his abdomen; that when he was about to
urinate in the comfort room, he collapsed; that he tried to
consult the specialist who performed the colonoscopy but he
was nowhere to be found; and that his cardiologist, Dra. Agnes
Del Rosario, was able to observe his critical condition and
immediately referred him to the surgical department which
suspected that he had hemorrhage in his abdomen and
advised him to undergo an emergency surgical operation.
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation
and upon waking up at the ICU on May 30, 2003, he found out
that the doctors did an exploratory laparatomy because of the
internal bleeding; that he learned that the doctors cut a
portion of the left side of his colon measuring 6-8 inches
because it had a partial tear of the colonic wall which caused
the internal bleeding; that despite the painkillers, he was
under tremendous pain in the incision area during his recovery
period in the ICU and had fever; and that he had intravenous
tubes attached to his arms, subclavian artery on the left part
of his chest and a nasogastric tube through his nose.
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the
one who performed the colonoscopy procedure but the latter
insisted that nothing went wrong. On June 7, 2003, he was
discharged from SLMC. Nevertheless, he complained that he
had a hard time digesting his food; that he was frequently fed
every two hours because he easily got full; that he had fresh
blood stools every time he moved his bowel; that he had lost
his appetite and had gastric acidity; that he slept most of the
day; and that he was in good physical condition before the
colonoscopy procedure. He asserted that at the time of the
filing of the complaint, he was still weak, tired and in pain.
Defense of Dr. Agas
Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed
to prove the basic elements of reckless imprudence or
negligence. He averred that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear
that he did not know that he would perform the procedure. He
explained that before the start of the colonoscopy procedure,
he was able to confer with Dr. Cruz and review his medical
history which was taken earlier by a fellow gastrointestinal
physician. He claimed that the gastroscopy and colonoscopy
procedures conducted on Dr. Cruz were completely successful
considering that the latter did not manifest any significant
adverse reaction or body resistance during the procedures and
that his vital signs were normal throughout the procedure. 6
Dr. Agas added that certifications and sworn statements
were submitted by the Assistant Medical Director for
Professional Services, the Director of the Institute of Digestive
Diseases, the anesthesiologist, and the hospital nurse
attesting to the fact that the intraperitonial bleeding which
developed after the colonoscopy procedure, was immediately
recognized, evaluated, carefully managed, and corrected; that
he provided an adequate and reasonable standard of care to
Dr. Cruz; that the endoscopist followed all precautionary
measures; that the colonoscopy procedure was done properly;
that he was not negligent or reckless in conducting the
colonoscopy procedure; that he did not deviate from any
standard medical norm, practice or procedure; and that he
exercised competence and diligence in rendering medical
services to Dr. Cruz. 7
Antecedents at the Prosecution Level
On February 16, 2004, the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) issued a resolution dismissing the complaint
for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and
Medical Malpractice. Aggrieved, Dr. Cruz filed a petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the same was
dismissed in its March 2, 2007 Resolution. Dr. Cruz filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the DOJ in its
September 23, 2009 Resolution. 8 aScITE

At the Court of Appeals


Not satisfied, Dr. Cruz filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA questioning the unfavorable DOJ resolutions. On May
22, 2012, the CA rendered a decision affirming the said DOJ
resolutions. The CA explained that, as a matter of sound
judicial policy, courts would not interfere with the public
prosecutor's wide discretion of determining probable cause in
a preliminary investigation unless such executive
determination was tainted with manifest error or grave abuse
of discretion. It stated that the public prosecutor's finding of
lack of probable cause against Dr. Agas was in accordance
with law and that his alleged negligence was not adequately
established by Dr. Cruz.
The CA also declared that Dr. Cruz failed to state in his
Complaint-Affidavit the specific procedures that Dr. Agas failed
to do which a reasonable prudent doctor would have done, or
specific norms he failed to observe which a reasonably
prudent doctor would have complied with. The CA pointed out
that Dr. Agas was able to satisfactorily explain in his Counter-
Affidavit that the complications suffered by Dr. Cruz was not
caused by his negligence or was the result of medical
malpractice. Dr. Agas explained as follows:
That the complication was due to the abnormal
condition and configuration of the digestive system,
colon in particular, of the complainant and not from any
negligent act in connection with the conduct of
colonoscopy. The surgical findings (xxx) revealed marked
adhesions in the sigmoid colon which is not and never
within my control. That the tear in the serosa (the
outermost layer of the colonic wall which has 4 layers)
happened likely because of the marked interloop
adhesions and tortuousity of the sigmoid segment of the
colon. These adhesions that connect the serosa to the
peritoneal lining of each loop detached from the serosa
during the procedure. It is not possible to detect the
presence of marked adhesions prior to the endoscopic
procedure because no clinical findings, laboratory tests
or diagnostic imaging such as x-ray, ultrasound or
computed tomography (CT scan) of the abdomen can
diagnose these conditions. This can only be detected by
surgically opening up the abdomen. Moreover, marked
adhesions and serosal tear, in particular, cannot likewise
be detected by colonoscopy because they are in the
outer wall of the colon and only the inner lining of the
colon is within the view of the colonoscope (camera). 9
The CA further wrote that the counter-affidavit of Dr. Agas
was supported by the sworn affidavit of Dr. Jennifel S. Bustos,
an anesthesiologist at the SLMC and the affidavit of Evelyn E.
Daulat, a nurse at SLMC, both swearing under oath that Dr.
Agas was not negligent in conducting a gastroscopy and
colonoscopy procedure on Dr. Cruz and the certification issued
by the Hospital Ethics Committee which stated that Dr. Cruz
was given an adequate and reasonable standard of care; that
Dr. Agas followed all precautionary measures in safeguarding
Dr. Cruz from any possible complications; and that the
colonoscopy was done properly.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA WAS CORRECT IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE DOJ THAT NO PROBABLE CAUSE
EXISTS FOR FILING AN INFORMATION AGAINST THE
RESPONDENT, THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
NEGLIGENT AND THAT THERE WAS NO DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.
Non-interference with Executive
Determination of Probable Cause
in Preliminary Investigations
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have
no right to directly decide on matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive
Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgment
for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by
the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts
will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an Information, in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.
Medical Negligence and
Malpractice Not Established
In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ
gravely abused its discretion in finding that there was lack of
probable cause and dismissing the complaint against Dr. Agas
for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and
Medical Malpractice.
A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can
present solid proof that the doctor, like in this case, either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor
would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably
prudent doctor would not have done, and such failure or action
caused injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient
must only prove that a health care provider either failed
to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he did something that
a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and
that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply
put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation. 10
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the
negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas. Although there is no
dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to a
tear in the serosa of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it
was caused by Dr. Agas's negligent and reckless conduct of
the colonoscopy procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to
show and explain that particular negligent or reckless act or
omission committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz did
not demonstrate that there was "inexcusable lack of
precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.
Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine
Not Applicable Against Respondent
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for
itself. It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury,
taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation. 11
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing
which caused the injury was under the control and
management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such
that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened
if those who had control or management used proper care; and
(4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the
foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the control and
management of the thing which caused the injury. 12
In this case, the Court agrees with Dr. Agas that his
purported negligence in performing the colonoscopy on Dr.
Cruz was not immediately apparent to a layman to justify the
application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Dr. Agas was able to establish that the internal bleeding
sustained by Dr. Cruz was due to the abnormal condition and
configuration of his sigmoid colon which was beyond his
control considering that the said condition could not be
detected before a colonoscopic procedure. Dr. Agas adequately
explained that no clinical findings, laboratory tests, or
diagnostic imaging, such as x-rays, ultrasound or computed
tomography (CT) scan of the abdomen, could have detected
this condition prior to an endoscopic procedure. Specifically,
Dr. Agas wrote:
On the other hand, in the present case, the
correlation between petitioner's injury, i.e., tear in the
serosa of sigmoid colon, and the colonoscopy conducted
by respondent to the petitioner clearly requires the
presentation of an expert opinion considering that no
perforation of the sigmoid colon was ever noted during
the laparotomy. It cannot be overemphasized that the
colonoscope inserted by the respondent only passed
through the inside of petitioner's sigmoid colon while the
damaged tissue, i.e., serosa, which caused the bleeding,
is located in the outermost layer of the colon. It is
therefore impossible for the colonoscope to touch,
scratch, or even tear the serosa since the said
membrane is beyond reach of the colonoscope in the
absence of perforation on the colon. 13
Dr. Cruz failed to rebut this.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
||| (Cruz v. Agas, Jr., G.R. No. 204095, [June 15, 2015])
[G.R. No. 192914. January 11, 2016.]

NAPOLEON D. SENIT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J :p

Before the Court is a petition for review


on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision 2 dated November 20, 2009 and the Resolution 3 dated
June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
00390-MIN which affirmed with modification the
Decision 4 dated April 26, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10, in Criminal
Case No. 10717-00 convicting Napoleon D. Senit (petitioner)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property.
The Antecedents
The facts as narrated are culled from the Comments 5 of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and from the assailed
decision of the CA:
In the morning of September 2, 2000, private
complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along
Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on board his
Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their three-
year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle
Jane Silayan. He turned left and was coming to the
center of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by
petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south
towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a big truck from the
right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by
swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road
and applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and
could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus
crashed into the right side of private complainant's pick-
up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and
immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital,
Sumpong, Malaybalay City. However, because of lack of
medical facilities, they were transferred to the Bukidnon
Doctor's Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda
Toor sustained an open fracture of the humerus of the
right arm and displaced, closed fracture of the proximal
and distal femur of the right lower extremity which
required two surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a
result of the accident and was unable to return to her job
as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product
Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00
for her treatment and P3,000.00 for Mezelle Jean Silayan,
who suffered frontal area swelling as a result of the
accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a complete fracture
of the scapular bone of his right shoulder while his son
Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained abdominal injury and a
wound on the area of his right eye which required
suturing. The damage sustained by the pick-up reached
P106,155.00. CAIHTE

Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City


Prosecutor of Malaybalay City, charged petitioner with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in an Amended
Information which was filed with Branch 10 of the [RTC]
in Malaybalay City. The information reads:
"That on or about September 2, 2000 in
the morning at [sic] Barangay Aglayan,
Malaybalay City, Province of Bukidnon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally in violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, in negligent,
careless, imprudent manner and without
precaution to prevent accident [to] life and
property, drive a Super Five Nissan Bus, color
white/red bearing plate No. MVD-776 owned by
PAUL PADAYHAG of Rosario Heights, Iligan
City, as a result hit and bumped
the [sic] motor vehicle, Toyota Pick-up color
blue with plate No. NEF-266 driven and owned
by MOHINDER S. TOO[R,] SR., and with his
wife Rosalinda Toor, son Mohinder Toor, Jr., 3
years old and househelp Mezelle Jane Silayan,
17 years old, riding with him. The Toyota pick-
up was damaged in the amount of
[P]105,300.00 and spouses Mohinder Toor[,] Sr.
and Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor[,] Jr[.] and
Mezelle Jane Silayan sustained the following
injuries to wit:
MOHINDER TOOR[,] SR.
= complete fracture of superior scapular bone
right shoulder
MOHINDER TOOR[,] JR.
= MPI secondary to MVA r/o Blunt abdominal
injury
= Saturing [sic] right eye area
ROSALINDA TOOR
= Fracture, open type 11, supracondylar,
humerus right
= Fracture, closed, Complete, displaced,
subtrochanter
= and supracondylar femur right
MEZELLE JANE SILAYAN
= Frontal area swelling 20 vehicular accident
to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant victim in such amount that they
are entitled to under the law.
CONTRARY TO and in Violation of Article
365 in relation to 263 of the Revised Penal
Code. IN RELATION TO THE FAMILY
CODE." 6 (Citations omitted) DETACa

Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the petitioner,


with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
Information in this case. 7
Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of
evidence for the petitioner, he resigned from his employment
and transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly became
unknown so he was not presented as a witness by his new
counsel. 8
On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in
absentia convicting the petitioner of the crime charged.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the
accused NAPOLEON SENIT y Duhaylungsod guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, he is hereby
sentenced to an imprisonment of an indeterminate
penalty of Four [4] months and One [1] day of Arresto
Mayor maximum as minimum and to Four [4] years and
Two [2] months Prision Correc[c]ional medium as
maximum. The accused is further ordered to indemnify
the private complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand
[P50,000.00] Pesos as moral damages, the amount of
Four Hundred Eighty Thousand [P480,000.00] [Pesos] for
the expenses incurred in the treatment and
hospitalization of Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor, Jr[.] and
Mezelle Jean Silayan and the amount of Eighty Thousand
[P80,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the
repair of the damaged Toyota pick-up vehicle.
SO ORDERED. 9

The RTC issued a Promulgation 10 dated August 4, 2006,


which included an order for the arrest of the petitioner.
The petitioner then filed a motion for new
trial via registered mail on the ground that errors of law or
irregularities have been committed during trial that are
allegedly prejudicial to his substantial rights. He claimed that
he was not able to present evidence during trial because he
was not notified of the schedule. Likewise, he mistakenly
believed that the case against him has been dismissed as
private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. (Toor, Sr.) purportedly
left the country. 11
On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor opposed
the motion for new trial filed by the petitioner. 12
On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was denied
by the lower court pronouncing that notices have been duly
served the parties and that the reason given by the petitioner
was self-serving. 13
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed his
Notice of Appeal dated November 6, 2006 by registered mail to
the CA, on both questions of facts and laws. 14
Ruling of the CA
On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC with modification as to the penalty imposed, the
dispositive portion thereof reads:
ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the
petitioner] should suffer the penalty of three (3) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, the Court AFFIRMS in
all other respects the appealed 26 April 2006 Decision of
the [RTC] of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case
No. 10717-00.aDSIHc

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 15

In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the


CA ratiocinated as follows: first, the evidence presented by
OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner as the culprit. A
scrutiny of the records further reveals that the pictures taken
after the accident and the Traffic Investigation Report all
coincide with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
which are in whole consistent and believable thus, debunking
the claim of the petitioner that he was convicted on the mere
basis of allegedly biased and hearsay testimonies which do
not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In addition,
there was no existing evidence to show that there was an
improper motive on the part of the eyewitnesses. 16
Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move
for a new trial as baseless. 17
Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is
the maximum period of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods that is — imprisonment for three (3) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor since the petitioner has, by
reckless imprudence, committed an act which, had it been
intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony, based
on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 18
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the CA, in its Resolution 19 dated June 17, 2010.
As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for
review before this Court, praying that the applicable law on the
matter be reviewed, and the gross misappreciation of facts
committed by the court a quo and by the CA be given a second
look.
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO RE-OPEN
THE SAME IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE ON HIS BEHALF; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE APPARENT FAILURE ON
THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT
OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 20
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The RTC and CA did not err in
denying the petitioner's motion for
new trial or to re-open the same.
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities,
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the petitioner, have been
committed during trial.
The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule
121, Section 2 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The Court shall
grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the
trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced
and admitted would probably change the
judgment. (Emphasis ours) ETHIDa

To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that


there was an error of law or irregularities committed when the
RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and deemed that he
had waived his right to present evidence resulting to denial of
due process, a one-sided decision by the RTC, and a strict and
rigid application of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure against him.
First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already
been arraigned and therefore, the court a quo had already
acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there was already an
initial presentation of evidence for the defense when his
whereabouts became unknown.
The petitioner's claims that he had not testified because
he did not know the schedule of the hearings, and mistakenly
believed that the case had already been terminated with the
departure of Toor, Sr., do not merit our consideration. 21
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. 22 It is established that notices have been served
to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his
counsel of his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to
appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the
petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and
promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of
the constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. 23
In Estrada v. People, 24 the Court ruled that:
Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioner was afforded such
opportunity. The trial court set a hearing on May 14, 1997
for reception of defense evidence, notice of which was
duly sent to the addresses on record of petitioner and
her counsel, respectively. When they failed to appear at
the May 14, 1997 hearing, they later alleged that they
were not notified of said setting. Petitioner's counsel
never notified the court of any change in her address,
while petitioner gave a wrong address from the very
beginning, eventually jumped bail and evaded court
processes. Clearly, therefore, petitioner and her counsel
were given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot
now complain of alleged violation of petitioner's right to
due process when it was by their own fault that they lost
the opportunity to present evidence. 25(Citation omitted)
Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly had
previous notice of the criminal case filed against him and was
given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The
petitioner was not in any way deprived of his substantive and
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all
the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense, but he forfeited this right, through
his own negligence, by not appearing in court at the scheduled
hearings. 26
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case
was already terminated resulting to his failure to attend the
hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has ruled in many cases
that:
It is petitioner's duty, as a client, to be in touch with his
counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. It
is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status
and progress of the case from time to time and cannot
expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await
the outcome of the case. It is also its responsibility,
together with its counsel, to devise a system for the
receipt of mail intended for them. 27 (Citations
omitted) cSEDTC

The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the


petitioner, towards the criminal case against him in which his
liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of the law as
claimed by his counsel rather, lack of concern towards the
incident, and the people who suffered from it. While there was
no showing in the case at bar that the counsel of the petitioner
was grossly negligent in failing to inform him of the notices
served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the
petitioner himself in not exercising diligence in informing his
counsel of his whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that
there is neither rule nor law which specifically requires the
trial court to ascertain whether notices received by counsel
are sufficiently communicated with his client. 28
In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge
Principe, 29 the Court held that:
[W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless,
there is no reason to overturn well-settled jurisprudence
or to interpret the rules liberally in its favor. Where
petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, its
plea that it was not accorded the right to due process
cannot elicit this Court's approval or even sympathy. It is
petitioner's duty, as a client, to be in touch with his
counsel so as to be constantly posted about the
case. . . . 30 (Citations omitted)
Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner anchors his
claim on Section 2 (b) of Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the argument still has no merit.
"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered
evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are
met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that
said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at
the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if
admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is
essential that the offering party exercised reasonable
diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during
trial but nonetheless failed to secure it." 31 The Court agrees
with the CA in its decision which held that "a new trial may not
be had on the basis of evidence which was available during
trial but was not presented due to its negligence. Likewise, the
purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of
the trial against [the petitioner's] substantive rights do not
exist." 32
In Lustaña v. Jimena-Lazo, 33 the Court ruled that:
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote
efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate
attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto
is required. Their application may be relaxed only when
rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial
justice, which is not present here. Utter disregard of the
Rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy
of liberal construction. 34 (Citations omitted and italics in
the original)
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the
procedural rules in order to grant the motion for new trial of
the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for the grant of the
motion for new trial. The Court believes that the petitioner was
given the opportunity to be heard but he chose to put this
opportunity into waste by not being diligent enough to ask
about the status of the criminal case against him and inform
his counsel of his whereabouts.
The RTC did not err in convicting
the petitioner.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of
the RPC, which provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the
failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice;
(4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time, and place. 35
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have
been established in the present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and claims that their testimonies are biased. He
also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when he turned left
without looking for an incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic
rules resulting to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly
appreciated the evidence and testimonies presented in the
instant case. AaCTcI

The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the
witnesses' narrations of the accident credible and worthy of
belief, their accounts were also consistent and tallied on all
significant and substantial points. 36 These witnesses'
testimonies are as follows:
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the
accident at Aglayan. He made the following findings in his
accident report: the pick-up owned and driven by Toor, Sr.,
together with his family and a househelper as his passengers,
was turning left along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle
position by a Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner. He noted
skid marks made by the bus and explained that the petitioner
was overtaking but was not able to do so because of the pick-
up. The petitioner could not swerve to the left to avoid the
pick-up because there was a ten-wheeler truck. He swerved to
the right instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The
investigator clearly testified that, on the basis of data
gathered, the collision was due to the error of the bus driver
who was driving too fast, as evinced by the distance from the
skid marks towards the axle. 37
Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.'s pick-up turn
left along Aglayan. He also saw a big truck and a Super 5 bus
both coming from Malaybalay. The truck was running slowly
while the Super 5 bus was running fast and overtaking the big
truck from the right side. The bus crashed into the pick-up and
pushed the smaller vehicle due to the force of the impact. He
went nearer the area of collision and saw that the four
passengers of the pick-up were unconscious. 38
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards
the center of Aglayan on board her employer's pick-up, she saw
a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from the right side. Their
vehicle was hit by the bus. She was thrown out of the pick-up
and hit her head on the ground. 39
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at
the corner of the center of Aglayan, a Super 5 bus, moving fast,
overtook a big truck from the right side. The bus then hit the
pick up, injuring him and all his passengers. 40
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses
conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus was moving fast;
(2) the bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly from
the right side; and (3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up
truck turning left, he applied the brakes but because he was
moving fast, the collision became inevitable.
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the a trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great
weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
significance and influence. This rule is based on the fact that
the trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor
and the conduct of the witnesses." 41 The Court finds in the
instant case that there is no reason for this Court to deviate
from the rule.
The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not
biased. There was no evidence of ill motive of the witnesses
against the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a
traffic violation and thus, he should be the one blamed for the
incident. The Court finds this without merit.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus
driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on the right shoulder
of the road and overtook another south-bound ten-wheeler
truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously to give way to
another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was
impossible for him not to notice that the ten-wheeler truck in
front and traveling in the same direction had already slowed
down to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then
negotiating a left turn to Aglayan public market. Seeing the
ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the
bus in order to allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn.
Instead, he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to
swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake the
truck, entering the intersection and directly smashing into the
pick-up. In flagrantly failing to observe the necessary
precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to other
persons and things, the petitioner was recklessly imprudent in
operating the Super 5 bus. 42 EcTCAD

In Dumayag v. People, 43 the Court held:


Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all
motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the right side
of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it
should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and
is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while
approaching a curve in the highway, where the driver's
view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of
automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are
charged with a high degree of care and diligence to avoid
collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that
vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not
taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road
upon which they have the right to pass. 44 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not noticing
a fast-approaching bus, as the cited law provides that the one
overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in
the opposite direction know his presence and not the other
way around as the petitioner suggests.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Decision dated November 20, 2009 and the Resolution dated
June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-
MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Senit v. People, G.R. No. 192914, [January 11, 2016])

[G.R. No. 194390. August 13, 2014.]

VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF


THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J : p

Before this Court is a Petition for Review


on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated February 26, 2009 and
the Resolution 3 dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 27925, finding Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla)
guilty of falsification of public documents through reckless
imprudence punished under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
Antecedent Facts
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the
felony of falsification of public document, penalized under Article
171 (4) of the RPC, in an Information,4 which reads:
That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Malabon, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Venancio M. Sevilla, a public
officer, being then a member of the [S]angguniang
[P]anlunsod of Malabon City, having been elected a
[c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage of his official
position and committing the offense in relation to duty, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make a
false statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which
he is legally bound to disclose, by stating in his C.S. Form
212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data Sheet, an official
document, which he submitted to the Office of the
Secretariat, Malabon City Council and, in answer to
Question No. 25 therein, he stated that no criminal case is
pending against him, when in fact, as the accused fully
well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No. 6718-97,
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla
and Artemio Sevilla", for Assault Upon an Agent of a
Person in Authority, pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby perverting the
truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Upon arraignment, Sevilla entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on
the merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his
term as councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla made a false
narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). 6 That in answer to the
question of whether there is a pending criminal case against him,
Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer despite
the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an
agent of a person in authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Malabon City, Branch 55.
Based on the same set of facts, an administrative complaint,
docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was likewise filed against
Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the
Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty
and falsification of official document and dismissed him from the
service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio, 7 the Court, in the Resolution dated
June 23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman as regards Sevilla's administrative liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the
box corresponding to the "no" answer vis-à-vis the question on
whether he has any pending criminal case. However, he averred
that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was
Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually
prepared his PDS. cCTaSH

According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001, since he did not have an


office yet, he just stayed in his house. At around two o'clock in
the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to
accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office
of the City of Malabon before five o'clock that afternoon. He then
instructed Mendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of
his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS
was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that
he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the
entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the
question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza
checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G.
Torres (Torres), a former City Councilor. Torres testified that
Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall
on July 2, 2001; that when the members of Sevilla's staff would
then need to use the typewriter, they would just use the
typewriter inside Torres' office. Torres further claimed that he
saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used
the typewriter in his office.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Decision, 8 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found
GUILTY of Falsification of Public Documents Through
Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of
theRevised Penal Code hereby imposes upon him in the
absence of any modifying circumstances the penalty of
four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2)
years ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days of prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts
from which it could arise do[es] not appear to be
indubitable.
SO ORDERED. 9

The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful


statement in his PDS, which is a public document, and that, in so
doing, he took advantage of his official position since he would
not have accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City
Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla had the
responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the same.
Further, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that there was a legal
obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there
was a pending case against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements
of the felony of falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be
convicted of falsification of public document under Article 171
(4) 10 of the RPC since he did not act with malicious intent to
falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering
that Sevilla's PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which
resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted
Sevilla of falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence under Article 365 11 of the RPC. Thus:
Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on
whether there was a pending criminal case against him
was not the only defect in his PDS. As found by the Office
of the Honorable Ombudsman in its Resolution, in answer
to question 29 in the PDS, accused answered that he had
not been a candidate in any local election (except
barangay election), when in fact he ran and served as
councilor of Malabon from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding
the negative answer in question 29, in the same PDS, in
answer to question 21, he revealed that he was a
councilor from 1992 to 1998. Not to give premium to a
negligent act, this nonetheless shows that the preparation
of the PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is
persuaded that accused did not act with malicious intent
to falsify the document in question but merely failed to
ascertain for himself the veracity of narrations in his PDS
before affixing his signature thereon. The reckless signing
of the PDS without verifying the data therein makes him
criminally liable for his act. Accused is a government
officer, who prior to his election as councilor in 2001, had
already served as a councilor of the same city. Thus, he
should have been more mindful of the importance of the
PDS and should have treated the said public document
with due respect.
Consequently, accused is convicted of Falsification of
Public Document through Reckless Imprudence, as
defined and penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in
relation to Article 365, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code.. . . . 12
Sevilla's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 13 dated October 22, 2010.
Hence, this appeal.
In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan
erred in finding him guilty of the felony of falsification of public
documents through reckless imprudence. He claims that the
Information that was filed against him specifically charged him
with the commission of an intentional felony, i.e., falsification of
public documents under Article 171 (4) of the RPC. Thus, he could
not be convicted of falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which is a
culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him be violated.
Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Court's resolution is whether Sevilla
can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge
against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of
falsification of public document under Article 171 (4) of
the RPC. DTEcSa

Ruling of the Court


The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan's
designation of the felony supposedly committed by Sevilla is
inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless
imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which
resulted into the falsification of a public document. However, the
Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification
of public document through reckless imprudence." The foregoing
designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in
itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses
under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes
and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 14 the Court explained that:
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless
or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we
already sought to bring clarity to this field
by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampangathe proposition that "reckless imprudence is not
a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it . . ." on
three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in
quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the
legislative intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses
(as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different
penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and
merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability
is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are
crimes that by their structure cannot be committed
through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence
in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification
or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. . . .
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the
commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one
actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should be
fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each
crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for
the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But
instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if
the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death,
according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to
the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a
whole class, or series, of crimes. (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege
quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in
damage, either to person or property. 15 (Citations omitted
and emphasis ours)
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, 16 the
Court clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question
of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the
act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what
is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the
confusion has arisen from the common use of such
descriptive phrase as 'homicide through reckless
imprudence', and the like; when the strict technical sense
is, more accurately, 'reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide'; or 'simple imprudence causing damages to
property'."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the
offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the
guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to
precedent." 17 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents and not
falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony
committed by Sevilla, the Court now weighs the merit of the
instant appeal. Sevilla's appeal is anchored mainly on the
variance between the offense charged in the Information that
was filed against him and that proved by the prosecution. The
rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down
under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,viz.:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation
and proof. — When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part
of those constituting the latter. cAHIST

Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and


proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when
the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense
alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution — the
Information charged him with the intentional felony of
falsification of public document under Article 171 (4) of
the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents.
Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is
whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
document is necessarily included in the intentional felony of
falsification of public document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals, 18 has answered the
foregoing question in the affirmative. Thus:
It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be
convicted of the crime of estafa through falsification by
imprudence for the reason that the information filed
against him charges only a willful act of falsification and
contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his
part. Nor can it be said, counsel argues, that the alleged
imprudent act includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the information because a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea
of negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a
wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace
of Bacolor, . . ., but a distinct crime in itself, designated as
a quasi offense, in our Penal Code, it may however be said
that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a
wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes
the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the
present case. Appellant was charged with willful
falsification but from the evidence submitted by the
parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the
falsification which made possible the cashing of checks in
question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but
merely failed to take proper and adequate means to
assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an
ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the
information alleges acts which charge willful falsification
but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is
a case covered by the rule when there is a variance
between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of
the cases decided by this Tribunal. 19 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, Sevilla's claim that his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when
the Information only charged the intentional felony of
falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress,
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the
willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being
the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents
notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act
of falsification of public documents.
In this regard, the Court's disposition in Sarep v.
Sandiganbayan 20 is instructive. In Sarep, the petitioner therein
falsified his appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An
Information was then filed against him for falsification of public
document. Nevertheless, the Court convicted the accused of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document
upon a finding that the accused therein did not maliciously
pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some
person. The Court, quoting the Sandiganbayan's disposition, held
that:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein
with the benefit of the circumstance that he did not
maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of
injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since
he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his
having passed the Regional Cultural Community Officer
(Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment
were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position,
then he should only be held liable for falsification through
reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G.
2937; People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco,
18 Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes
criminal negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes the
middle way between a wrongful act committed with
wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and a
wrongful act committed without any intent which may
entirely exempt the doer from criminal liability. It is the
duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care
and diligence in order that no prejudicial or injurious
results may be suffered by others from acts that are
otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p.
1884). What is penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and
lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude
might have produced several effects or consequences
(People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24, 1966). 21
Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC,
reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of public document
is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period. In this case, taking into
account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of
four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years ten
(10) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as
maximum. DAEICc
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 26, 2009 and
the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Sevilla v. People, G.R. No. 194390, [August 13, 2014])

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