Republic v.
Orbecido III Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
RTC: R may remarry
R married Villanueva and had children. R’s wife left naturalized American acquired a
divorce decree and remarried
Filed with RTC a petition for authority to remarry Article 25 p2.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according
to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. [5] Furthermore,
the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG
posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in
its enactment?
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
DOES THE SAME PRINCIPLE APPLY TO A CASE WHERE
AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
MARRIAGE, THE PARTIES WERE FILIPINO CITIZENS,
BUT LATER ON, ONE OF THEM OBTAINS A FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law
and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice.
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
Garcia-Recio v. Rederderick Garcia The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the petitioners marriage to the respondent
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce 3
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; case.
hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien 4
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in 5
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing
was issued by an Australian family court. a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts. [19]
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate
Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson
and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
was declared as single and Filipino.[8] rest.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior The Courts Ruling
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal The Petition is partly meritorious.
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations First Issue:
secured in Australia.[9] Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction
that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2)
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; [12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for these elements.
the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
down.[13] celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
parties.[16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
resolution.[17] cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order. divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In
RTC: Dissolved bec of 2nd decree nothing to nullify. Not bec of lack of capacity to mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code
remarry allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
Issues obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A divorce
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration: obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
1 provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner. abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
2 to their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court
insufficient. may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
Divorce as a Question of Fact On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent
comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to
Code. These articles read as follows: remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following: the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
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(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
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ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to this matter.
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in
the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no 39[49]of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32] Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34] Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. [35] However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the
fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. [36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. [37]Hence, it remarry.
was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family
Court of Sydney, Australia.[38] We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent,
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their license.
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit
A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
that their marriage was void ab initio. Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick
A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]
at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding
and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence,
we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties
marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila
dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
Sison v. Te Jay Li
Pugeda v. Trias
The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate Administration known as
lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282, 2284,
2378, 2412, 2282, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco de
Malabon estate located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a barn
(camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of strong materials in General Trias,
Cavite and sets of household furniture.
The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the ground that the same
were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted
marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed
Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano
Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of the
plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.
The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos.
273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the
following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No.
2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff
is the owner of one-half of the said interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the
death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said
properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof.
Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as conjugal properties by
the plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given
as share therein of plaintiff.
The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to the
properties described in the complaint, or that said properties had been administered by
the defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by way of special and
affirmative defense they alleged that the properties subject of the complaint had been
inherited by the defendants from their deceased father Mariano Trias and
deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in possession and full enjoyment
thereof for more than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under
a claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that plaintiff is estopped from
claiming or asserting any rights or participation in the said properties. Defendants
Trias also denied for lack of knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his
complaint that he was married to Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage
continued up to the death of the latter in 1934. They further presented a
counterclaim against the plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this amount being what was
contributed by them in support of the candidacies of plaintiff when running for the
office of provincial governor of Cavite. They also filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of
Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in value to the total sum of P50,000
and a counterclaim for P100,000 which is the value of four big parcels of land belonging
to the defendants which the plaintiff had appropriated for his own use.
The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter's claim that the properties
mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were joint properties of the plaintiff and the
defendants. They also allege that the properties had gone to the management and
control of the defendants Trias who should be required to answer for the fruits and
profits thereof during the administration by them of said properties. As cross-claim
against their co-defendants, they allege that they are each entitled to one-eighth of the
properties left by their mother as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as
well as a share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San Francisco de
Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad, Litiit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads
of cattle.
Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the defendants Trias,
answering the cross-claim of their co-defendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations
contained in the answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that the cross-
claim is improper as the same should be the subject of probate proceedings, and the
defendants Pugeda are estopped and barred by prescription from claiming any further
right to the properties left by their deceased mother.
There are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first is the
alleged existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The
second is the claim of the plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar
Lands Estate under certificates of sale issued first in the name of Mariano Trias
and later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in part during the marriage of
plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer. A third but minor issue is the claim for furniture
alleged by plaintiff to have been bought by him and Maria C. Ferrer during the
marriage, which plaintiff claims is in the possession of the defendants.
On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente
testified that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three
Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of the
Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that
accordingly Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses
one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado Prudente, deceased; that after
the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage
contract, and after the witnesses had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the
contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer
was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. Plaintiff and his witnesses
explained that no celebration of the marriage was held inspite of the prominence of the
contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy campaigning for the office of
Member of the Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic copy
of the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of
January, 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed therein; but
this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept
the register forgot tomake an entry of the marriage in the registry.
 officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage plaintiff lived in marriage. (55 C.J.S., p. 900).
the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda
C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue was baptized on was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934,
August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. upon the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the trial court to that effect.
On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of the action were formerly Friar Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
Ferrer. The baptismal certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the issue of province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of sale in the name of Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916.
The different lots, the dates of their acquisition and assignment to said Maria C. Ferrer, widow are set forth in a table appended to this decision as Annex "A".
the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry of said birth was also On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero declared that the lots in question were conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer,
and consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as the latter's share in the conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the rate
submitted and it states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. of 1/6 each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her share in the conjugal properties, to be assigned to her children by both marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the
balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From this judgment the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Ferrer. When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants presented a motion for new trial on the ground that they discovered copies of four documents
namely — Annexes "A", "B" "C," "D" and "E" Record on Appeal, pp. 108-117, (The last document is a copy of a court order issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving the
project of partition in Case No. 860, Intestate estate of Mariano Trias) which if admitted might alter the decision. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded the
case to the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.
It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the deceased wife, Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales who then presided the court, rendered a new decision. Judge Gonzales found that the total
amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer on the lots in question amounts to only P8,911.84, while the installments paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian
as husband and wife, until the death of the latter, publicly and openly as husband and Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that lots 3177 and 3178 were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer in the total sum of P16,557.32.
Judge Gonzales therefore ruled that the two marriages should participate in the ownership of the lands, according to the actual contributions made by each marriage in the
wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition" (Exhibit 5-Trias) was installments in payment of the lands. The dispositive part of the decision, now subject of the appeal, is as follows: .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby renders judgment: .
signed by the parties defendants themselves. The document contains the following 1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816; 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284, 2412, 2682, 273, 2650, 2652, 2680, 271 8, 2764 (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of percentage and indicated in each individual lot;
significant statement or admission: . 2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments for the same were fully paid during the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the couple
Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of the installments for these two lots were paid after the death of Maria C. Ferrer, they do not loss the character of conjugal property for
payments were made from the crops thereof;
3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the payment for the installments of these 21 lots amounting to P8,911.84, half of which must
WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the said be reimbursed in favor of the children or heirs of Mariano Trias to be paid from the mass of the hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to be
distributed among all the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage to be deducted from the mass of her estate;
deceased: Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y 4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the installments for these six (6) lots were fully paid during marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are
hereby declared to be conjugal between them — one half of which must go to the children or heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go to the children or heirs of
Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with Mariano Trias, now deceased; and Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage;
5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which commenced after the death of his mother who died on February 11, 1934, must render an accounting of his
Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer,are the children of her second administration within three (3) months time from the date this judgment has become final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action. (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-156) .
marriage with Fabian Pugeda.. Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-appellants claim that Judge Gonzales had no power or authority to change the decision of Judge Lucero, as it
.... That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that lots Nos. 3177 and 3178 known as the Buenavista property will be administered by one of the parties to be was not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the evidence. They have also assigned before Us a set of errors which may be boiled down to the three main issues set
agreed upon and for said purpose they appoint MIGUEL F. TRIAS, and all earnings, rentals and income or profits shall be expended for the improvement and welfare of the forth above. As the issue of marriage has already been considered we will now pass to the second and more important question as to whether the land subject of the action may
said property and for the payment of all claims and accounts of our deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer, and for the maintenance and education of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y be considered conjugal properties of the first marriage or of the second or of both.
Ferrer. A consideration of the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the various lots is necessary that the issues in the action may be justly determined.
A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120) discloses that the friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual occupants (actual settler and
The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of he testimonial and documental occupants at the time said land are acquired by the Government). (Paragraph 3 of Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act expressly declares that the land are not public land in the
sense in which this word is used in the Public Land Act, and their acquisition is not governed by the provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of Purposes, Id.) .
evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows: .
Sec. 12. — .... When the costs thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall
Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out not only by the set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at
the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the United States or its equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the payment of the final
chain of circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which
shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. ...
celebration of the marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact Sec. 13. — The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate shall be considered as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the installments
and at the interest specified in the certificate, and he shall by such acceptance become a debtor to the Government in that amount together with all accrued interest. .... Provided
that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and wife however, That every settler and occupant who desires to purchase his holding must enter into the agreement to purchase such holding by accepting the said certificate and
executing the said receipt whenever called on so to do by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, and a failure on the part of the settler and occupant to comply with this
for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is a strong presumption that they were requirement shall be considered as a refusal to purchase, and he shall be ousted as above provided and thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as in case of unoccupied
lands: ....
actually married. Sec. 15. — The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold under the provisions of this Act until the full payment of all installments of purchase
money and interest by the purchaser has been made, and any sale or incumbrance made by him shall be invalid as against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be
in all respects subordinate to its prior claim.
Sec. 16. — In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the
On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the marriage we cite Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of law
for the purchase of the same. In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate shall
the following authority: . descend and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected before the death of the holder of the
certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the
Art. 53. — As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of land before having complied with all the conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of the holder of the certificate upon
presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for registration. (Vol. III, Public Laws, pp. 315-316).
the record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the
ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale
kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the certificates were made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his death they were assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the law provides that when the buyer does
not leave a widow, the rights and interests of the holder of the certificate of sale are left to the buyer's heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the
marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind. (p. 27, Civil Code) . Director of Lands, et al. vs. Ricardo Rizal, et al., G.R. No. 2925 prom. December 29, 1950, this court thru Mr. Justice Montemayor held: .
... All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the purchaser, even before the payment of the full price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, is
considered by the law as the actual owner of the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of a mere
lien holder or mortgagee.
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and ... In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act 1120, pending payment in full of the purchase price, altho the Government reserves
mother, while the latter wasin articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the title thereto, merely for its protection, the beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any accretion received by the lot even before payment of the last installment
belongs to the purchaser thereof.
We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different from a sale of public lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case of public
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, lands, a person who desires to acquire must first apply for the parcel of land desired. Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an applicant or to a
qualified bidder the successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the land and cultivate and improve it (Secs. 22-28, Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after satisfying
since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its the requirements of cultivation and improvement of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is given a sales patent (Sec. 30).
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon
validity were not present, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies and his widow remarries both she and the second husband are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same
right as his wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before the payment of the price in full, the sale
not being one of said requisites. (Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1) . certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does not leave a widow, the right to the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs at law.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of the action none was paid for in full during the marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the Ferrer, and that payments in installments continued to be made even after the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said
marriage the certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments for the lots after said marriage continued in the name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who paid as installments for the lots were taken from the fruits of the properties themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda himself, thus: .
Mr. Viniegra:
Q —De los productos de pesos terrenos, durante la administracion por los demandados, recibia Vd. su participation?
A —No, señor.
Q —Nunca? .
A —Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of Lands, and I have been informed that the obligations have been paid annually from the products of the
land.
Q —Therefore, from the products of these lands - the proceeds - the obligations to the Bureau of Lands are being discounted from the said proceeds and after the remainder,
as in palay, are equally divided, is that what you mean to say ? .
A —Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products of the lands the obligations to the Bureau of Lands would be paid.
Court: .
Q —Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna participation?
A —No señor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the obligations to the Bureau of Lands were being paid from the products of the lands.
Mr. Viniegra: .
Q —You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products after paying the Bureau of Lands? .
A —How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to the Bureau of Lands - that was until the Japanese time, and I knew some obligations were not paid, as
a result of which the sales certificates of some big lots were cancelled.
Court:
Q —Como se mantenia Vd.? .
A —Mi madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My mother helped me. (Session of November 20, 1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp. 259-261, Matro.) (Brief
for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49-51).
There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case at bar, and that is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August 1915, the inventory of the estate left by said deceased included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and
the project of partition in said special proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties,
the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.
The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the friar lands purchased as above described and paid for, had the character of conjugal
properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling legal reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on said
nature of the lands in question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was appointed administratrix of the estate of her
deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias,
dated January 15, 1929, was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project of partition of the properties was submitted. The project includes the friar lands subject of the
action, and in accordance with it one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half adjudicated to
Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This project of partition was approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran
in an order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to the Court of Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.
The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Mariano Trias must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It does
not appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever appeared in said proceedings to claim participation in the properties subject of the proceedings. His failure to
intervene in the proceedings to claim that the friar lands or some of them belonged to himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that the said friar
lands actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that he had no interest therein. The project of partition was approved as late as 1929, by which
time plaintiff and defendant had already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiff's failure to assert any claim to the properties in the said intestate proceedings during its
pendency now bars him absolutely from asserting the claim that he now pretends to have to said properties.
We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's claim that the lands in question had, through the joint effort of himself and his wife, increased in productivity from 900 cavans to
2,400 cavans of rice because of the introduction therein of improvements such as a system of irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the installments
remaining unpaid were taken from the produce or the yield of the said lands and if it be taken into account that one-half of said lands already belonged to the children of the
first marriage, to whom the lands were adjudicated in the settlement of the estate of their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias, the only portion of the products or produce of
the lands in which plaintiff could claim any participation is the one-half share therein produced from the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer. How much of said produce
belonging to Maria C. Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of the lands is not shown, but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in continuous political campaigns, ever since
his marriage in 1916 (he had devoted most of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to politics), portions of the products of the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer
must have been used in these political campaigns as well as in meeting the expenses of the conjugal partnership. The value of the useful improvements introduced on the lands,
joint properties of Maria C. Ferrer and her children, was not proved in court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old Civil Code, to the effect that useful
expenditures for the benefit of the separate properties of one of the spouses are partnership properties, cannot be applied. But even if such useful improvements had been
proved, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff' action to recover his share therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the present action was instituted by plaintiff
only in the year 1948. After the death of Maria C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was not heard from for 14 years, that is, until he instituted this action
in 1948. His claim for the improvements, if any, is therefore also barred. 1äwphï1.ñët
The above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the improvements in the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer is barred, is also applicable to the claim
of the plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to have been made and the furniture supposedly bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the character
of conjugal partnership property of said spouses. In the year 1935, defendants herein presented a project of partition to plaintiff for his signature (the project of partition is
dated March, 1935 and is mark Exhibit "5"-Trias). In this project of partition of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, mention is made of the participation of the
plaintiff's children with the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of any participation that plaintiff had or could have as usufruct or otherwise, or in any
building or improvement. This deed of partition was shown to plaintif but the latter did not sign it.
The express omission of the name of plaintiff here in the above deed of partition as one of the heirs of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that
defendants had intended to deprive him of any share or participation in the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him. But
in spite of his knowledge of this fact no action was taken by him until February, 1948 when plaintiff demanded his share in the properties and later brought this action.
The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before plaintiff instituted this action. Consequently, whatever rights he may have had to any portion of the estate left by the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be deemed to have prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge Lucero granting to the plaintiff
herein one-ninth share in the estate of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct should be set aside and the objection to the grant of such share to plaintiff on the ground of
prescription is sustained.
Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to consider the cross-claim of his children, namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda. Judge
Lucero decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Pugeda, be divided among her children, including the two cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda,
and decreed one-ninth of the properties of the said deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with the plaintiff and assigning also to the plaintiff one-ninth
share in the said estate left by her in usufruct.
In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate of his wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the statute of limitations, the decree entered by
Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into nine parts, one part belonging to each heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating the
share in usufruct of the plaintiff therein and increasing the share of each of her heirs to one-eighth.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio
C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of
her properties be divided among her eight children at the rate of one-eight per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

Vilar v. Paraiso
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V.
Paraiso were among the candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of
Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso
garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter
as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that
Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a
candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the
present quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume
office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also
prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of
respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as
minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his
resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo,
Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office,
petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor,
being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null and
void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so. from this election both parties have appealed, respondent from that
portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be
declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court
found that while petitioner raises in his brief only questions of law respondent raises
both questions of law and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in that they pertain to
only one case, that court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of
sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory that one of the appeals
is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.
The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is
ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code,
or whether he actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and
his resignation duly accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As
may be noted, this is a question of fact the determination of which much depends upon
the credibility and weight of the evidence of both parties.
The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of
the Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to
solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to 1950
he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without
interruption and has been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by
the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on April 19, 1950, respondent
transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been assigned to
work in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951,
respondent applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the
Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952;
that said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor
respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly
known as minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his
certificate of candidacy a copy of his alxleged resignation as minister.
The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to show that while he was
formerly a minister of the United of Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed his
resignation as such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage in
politics; that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special
meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951; that respondent turned over his
chapel and his office to the elder members of his religious order on August 21, 1951,
and since then he considered himself separated from his order and in fact he has
refrained ever since from conducting any religious services pertaining to that order.
Which of these versions is correct?
After careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility and
probative value, we have not found any reason for deviating from the finding of the trial
court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged
and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the
elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law
regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if
respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious
organization to which he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why did
he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered
with the Bureau of Public Libraries.1 The importance of resignation cannot be
underestimated. THE PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION IS TWO-FOLD:
TO INFORM THE PUBLIC NOT ONLY OF THE AUTHORITY OF
THE MINISTER TO DISCHARGE RELIGIOUS FUNCTIONS, BUT
EQUALLY TO KEEP IT INFORMED OF ANY CHANGE IN HIS
RELIGIOUS STATUS. This information is necessary for the protection of the
public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages,
the registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil
Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite
resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or
upon the official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for
such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty
of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he
failed to do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy
of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by
law to run for a municipal office.
It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting as evidence certain documents purporting to show the alleged resignation and its acceptance by the
cabinet of his church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951, but, considering said documents in the light of the shortcomings we have pointed out above, one cannot help but
brand them as self-serving or as documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his disqualification under the law. And this
feeling appears strengthened if we examine the so-called minute book wherein, according to witness Jose Agpalo, are entered the minutes of all the meeting of the church,
because upon an examination thereof one would at once get the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness and solemnity that should
characterize the religious activities of a well established religious order. As the trial court aptly remarked "All these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the supposed
resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is disqualified to hold the
office of mayor as found by the trial court.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second place in the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has
already declared that this cannot be done in the absence of an express provision authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but
apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what we said in at least two cases where we laid down a ruling which is decisive of the present case.
. . . . In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since
the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52
Phil., 645.)
Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee is declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed
it may be gathered that the law contemplates no such result, because it permits the filing of the contest by any registered candidate irrespective of whether the latter occupied the
next highest place or the lowest in the election returns. (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)
 Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their
marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships
Aranes v. Occiano
and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding
2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on
initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage
17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage.
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to
inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application
that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts
nor Orobia claimed it.
and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it
has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise,
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the
Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract
Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar
complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of
of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T.
Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that
Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan
due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then
requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
he acceded.
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a
duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the
parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the
We agree.
marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas
of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence
license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,
in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his
act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded
the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted
in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend
upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which
involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the
integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Martinez v. Tan
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant
were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice of the peace,
Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It
is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace,
dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in
which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage
before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage.
Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace,
by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states
the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where
actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named; that they ratified
under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there
asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the
presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness
for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace
and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September,
1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the
justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the
parties were legally married on the day named. The evidence in support of that
decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she
signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and said
plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named, together with the
witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document above
mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named
witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared
before the justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The
evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of
Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified that
the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace
were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she
never appeared before the justice of the peace and never was married to the
defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that
she signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the
defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent of
her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which
we think, when properly considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the
time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there for
about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff
never left the house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination
that she herself went to school every morning and that on one occasion the
plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its
force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of
the defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store
of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she
asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to
her own house for the purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave
her consent and the two rights left the store, but instead of going to the house of the
witness they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony
took place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the
mother was approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice
and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of
the peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain
statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony
of the witnesses for the defendant.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant
in his brief. It appears that during her first examination she was seized with an hysterical
attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned to a future
day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel
that her collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in
stating the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the municipal building,
when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies the
claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the
peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts
substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was
not telling the truth when she said she did not appear before the justice of the peace.
This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all written by
the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The
authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9 is as follows:
ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of
the house.
Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5
or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.
The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.
Yours, ROSAL.
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7
is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to
the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have
been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist
on being married I must do it right.
Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to
give it, then we shall do what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must request his consent.
Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified,
however, that she had no communication with the defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival
in Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring the cancellation of the certificate of
marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the
peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even
admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal
marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must
declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each
other as husband and wife.
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the
justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was signed and then
addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married."
The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement
that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the
peace to solemnize the marriage.
The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that
witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates
gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and
wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified
to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so
states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that
they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the
justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain
previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that
relating to the condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant was
again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will
be seen that this second amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but by
reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the court
allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She
proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.
Madridejo Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been acknowledged by
his parents Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, under any of the provisions above
Half brother quoted.
To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to show that he has voluntarily acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as his son, except the registry certificate of birth,
Exhibit B. This, of course, is not the record of birth mentioned in the law, for it lacks the requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It, no doubt, is a public instrument,
CFI: P next of kin of Domingo De Leon, orders R to deliver property but it has neither been executed nor signed by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he acknowledges Melecio Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro
Madridejo testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan with necessary data for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo, and although said official inscribed the
Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin, data thus given in the civil registry of births, this is not sufficient to bring it under the legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public document.
As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data set forth in the civil registry of births, Exhibit B, or in the baptismal register, where of Exhibit 2 is a
and hereby orders the defendants in case No. 5258 to restore and deliver the ownership certificate, and which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and not of the kinship or parentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350). Furthermore,
church registers of baptism are no longer considered public documents (United States vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil., 215).
and possession of the property described in the complaints filed in the aforesaid case, to
Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo
Melecio Madridejo, without cost. So ordered.
or Flaviana Perez, either before or after their marriage. 1awph!l.net
In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as
Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son, by
committed by the trial court, to wit:
compulsion?
1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro Madridejo and
The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of the Civil
Flaviana Perez is valid.
Code, and by the mother according to article 136, requires that the natural child take
2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the subsequent
judicial action against the father or mother, or against the persons setting themselves up
marriage of his parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a natural child, was
as the heirs of both, for the purpose of compelling them to acknowledge him as a
legitimated. Because of lack of marriage certificate
natural son through a judgment of the court.
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de
In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not
Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915.
demanded to be acknowledged as a natural child, which is the condition
During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The
precedent to establishing his legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his
registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a
right to the estate of his uterine brother, Domingo de Leon, but he has not even
child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio
impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs of his mother, Flaviana
Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June
Perez, in order that the court might have authority to make a valid and effective
17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no
pronouncement of his being a natural child, and to compel them to acknowledge
mention being made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez,
him as such.
being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants' answer amounts to an admission that he is indeed Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the
burden of proving that his mother acknowledged him as a son before her marriage. Such an admission would have been affective if the present action had been brought for the
age, by the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July purpose of compelling Flaviana Perez or her heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her son.
9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff- In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been
appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by
Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928. compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of legitimate him.
Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the
send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not defendants absolved with costs against the appellee without prejudice to any
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential right he may have to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural son
requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.
Touching the second assignment of error, there has been no attempt to deny that Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is the natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, The only question to be decided is whether the subsequent marriage of his parents legitimated him.

Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof.

According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be effective as a legitimation, the natural children born out of wedlock must have been acknowledged
by the parents either before or after its celebration. The Civil Code has established two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary. Article 131 provides for the
voluntary acknowledgment by the father or mother as follows:
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document.
Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by the father, thus:
Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself of that of his
family.
3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal Code with regard to the acknowledgment of the issue, shall be observed.
Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by the mother, reads:
Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural child:
1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the cases mentioned in the next preceding article.
2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully proven.
Macua
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been
validly married to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de
Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased
Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to
Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated
by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is
evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were
destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children,
namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on
23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr.,
born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his
whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that
Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura
Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by
the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for
being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the
properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio
who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated
on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case
was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir
of Eustaquio.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and
Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic)
Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by
the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the
Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa,
Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were
actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in
1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest
of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World
War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot
furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco
Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to
spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina. 15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that
took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of
Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not
the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio. 16 Peregrina likewise set
forth documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for
damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the
date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when
he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with
one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio,
Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the
Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in
bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir
of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
RTC: Denied respondents petition
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent
PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED. 22
CA: Null and void 2nd marriage
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed
the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30
September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence Rules of Court.
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in
of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:
has disregarded.24 While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises the his parents.
following legal issues: The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of
overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage; Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
best evidence, the original document; instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the
contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
and xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce
the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this
presented to the witness stand.26
issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that
"marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Our Ruling
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by
ESSENTIALLY, THE QUESTION BEFORE US IS WHETHER OR NOT
the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL PROVES THE
parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE OF TECLA TO EUSTAQUIO.
execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made
Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the
any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument
period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the
[has] indeed [been] lost."
National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that: IN THE PRESENT CASE, DUE EXECUTION WAS ESTABLISHED BY
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the
latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of THE TESTIMONIES OF ADELA PILAPIL, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING
the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27
THE MARRIAGE CEREMONY, AND OF PETITIONER HERSELF AS A
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the
PARTY TO THE EVENT. THE SUBSEQUENT LOSS WAS SHOWN BY
testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving
THE TESTIMONY AND THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE OFFICIATING
assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce
PRIEST, MONSIGNOR YLLANA, AS RELEVANT, COMPETENT AND
her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. SINCE THE DUE EXECUTION AND THE
130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the
LOSS OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT WERE CLEARLY SHOWN BY
existence of the first marriage.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, SECONDARY EVIDENCE–
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful
TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY–MAY BE ADMITTED TO PROVE
marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband
THE FACT OF MARRIAGE.
and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO
trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-
was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be
Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the
event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon,
Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact
of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant
evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses
to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the
fact of marriage."
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for
the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the
rationale behind the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always
presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by
the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications
of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner
Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared
NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
Abbas Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11,
CA: Reversed 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
RTC: Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. 11
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a
Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria. Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case. the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage
license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the
in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and
Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he
around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and
2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony
held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three
days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev.
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the
that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her
went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof. 27 She and her
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their
house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to
license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the
previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows: celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31

11 July 2003 RTC: No marriage license.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: CA: It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS
MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993. state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted,
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve. 7 and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of down by law.
his counsel.8 It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract.
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to for bigamy.
Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other document.
as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it
administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
xxxx The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter. certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could
the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the not be given probative value.
marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. THE Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
RESOLUTION OF THIS CASE, THUS, HINGES ON WHETHER OR NOT sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking,
A VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE HAD BEEN ISSUED FOR THE COUPLE. relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
THE RTC HELD THAT NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE HAD BEEN stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did
ISSUED. THE CA HELD THAT THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically
LICENSE—YES. stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical
declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy apply.
thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative
requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof
132 of the Rules of Court, which reads: does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office her office.
contain no such record or entry. It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held: Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona,
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the
and such other relevant data.44 license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
the issuance of a marriage license. as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin,
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a
license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further
weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
 that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be
case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the
been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008
be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of
proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of No costs.
the alleged marriage license. SO ORDERED.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria
and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of
legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his
name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing
appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members
of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-
C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee
more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that
said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a
second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and
give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit
and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the
license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and
thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well
be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be
Borja v. Sanchez
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound
by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against
respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For
this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he
knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and
wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in
their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was
married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano)
could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack
of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
OCA: guilty of gross ignorance.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal
of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention
of the Court to two separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were
allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits,
both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and
had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge
alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the
time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least
five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their
marriage.[6]
NOT ALL OF THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE
AT BAR. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
LUZVIMINDA PAYAO EXPRESSLY STATED THE FACT OF THEIR
PRIOR EXISTING MARRIAGE. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is
a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was
married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And
respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous
marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses
for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses
who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does
not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true
all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven
years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized
a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has
special application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.[9] And when
the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of
ignorance of the law.[10] affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
Nial v. Bayadog institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
his marriage after his death? permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment."[13]
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, [14] referring to the
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code. There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma
was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and
insufficient" to resolve the following issues: that we now desire to marry each other."[16] THE ONLY ISSUE THAT NEEDS
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the TO BE RESOLVED PERTAINS TO WHAT NATURE OF COHABITATION
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her IS CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 76 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial WARRANT THE COUNTING OF THE FIVE YEAR PERIOD IN ORDER
is already dead; TO EXEMPT THE FUTURE SPOUSES FROM SECURING A MARRIAGE
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is LICENSE.
null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second SHOULD IT BE A COHABITATION WHEREIN BOTH PARTIES ARE
marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death. [1] CAPACITATED TO MARRY EACH OTHER DURING THE ENTIRE FIVE-
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null YEAR CONTINUOUS PERIOD OR SHOULD IT BE A COHABITATION
and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy WHEREIN BOTH PARTIES HAVE LIVED TOGETHER AND
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could EXCLUSIVELY WITH EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE DURING
initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this THE ENTIRE FIVE-YEAR CONTINUOUS PERIOD REGARDLESS OF
Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m WHETHER THERE IS A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO THEIR BEING
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, LAWFULLY MARRIED, WHICH IMPEDIMENT MAY HAVE EITHER
of the 1997 Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. [4]
DISAPPEARED OR INTERVENED SOMETIME DURING THE
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
COHABITATION PERIOD?
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, [6] the
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground
to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should
be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are
about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local
civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x
x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge
of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his
findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited
the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same
period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the
having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to their wedding day. FROM THE TIME PEPITOS FIRST MARRIAGE
WAS DISSOLVED TO THE TIME OF HIS MARRIAGE WITH
RESPONDENT, ONLY ABOUT TWENTY MONTHS HAD ELAPSED.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PEPITO AND HIS FIRST WIFE HAD
SEPARATED IN FACT, AND THEREAFTER BOTH PEPITO AND
RESPONDENT HAD STARTED LIVING WITH EACH OTHER THAT
HAS ALREADY LASTED FOR FIVE YEARS, THE FACT REMAINS THAT
THEIR FIVE-YEAR PERIOD COHABITATION WAS NOT THE
COHABITATION CONTEMPLATED BY LAW. IT SHOULD BE IN THE
NATURE OF A PERFECT UNION THAT IS VALID UNDER THE LAW
BUT RENDERED IMPERFECT ONLY BY THE ABSENCE OF THE
MARRIAGE CONTRACT. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when
he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the
filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code [20] cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second
ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane
spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as
to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having
never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can
never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action
or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal
effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,
the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and
the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is
deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. [29] Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary

to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even
if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
Republic v. Albios marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.
CA: Affirmed On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand
RTC: Void that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the
beginning.
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City review on certiorari.
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3 Ruling of the Court
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 THE RESOLUTION OF THIS CASE HINGES ON THIS SOLE QUESTION
of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they OF LAW: IS A MARRIAGE, CONTRACTED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any ACQUIRING AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN CONSIDERATION OF
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital $2,000.00, VOID AB INITIO ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF CONSENT?
obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and The Court resolves in the negative.
void ab initio . Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing Marriage Fraud in Immigration
on the merits ensued. The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the
Ruling of the RTC United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads: common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. 12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression immigration status.14
that she remains the wife of respondent. In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases.
xxxx It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage
SO ORDERED.6 of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose
of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on
limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a
divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is
not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing
States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be
married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus,
(Italics supplied)
ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the
United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
inception. Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have
Ruling of the CA
generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
Hence, this petition.
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
Assignment of Error
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT
Respondent’s marriage not void
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8 understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties
only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage.
and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24Consent must also be conscious
or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding
 for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid.
the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
drugs, or hypnotism.26 dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. ONLY THE CIRCUMSTANCES LISTED
and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired UNDER ARTICLE 46 OF THE SAME CODE MAY CONSTITUTE FRAUD,
their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios
as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have
no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution
be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore,
into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs
of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no
06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any
way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in

jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to
further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple
to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might
have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that
the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure
their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages entered into
Perido v. Perido
CA: Affirm
CFI:
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His
first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael,
and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had
five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in
1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still
living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia,
Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora
Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons,
Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely:
Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is
dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely:
Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido,
Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is
survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of
Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and
Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos.
458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of
Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second
thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February
22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the
so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another
partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone.
They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to
execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and
fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that
the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate
and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died
in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
RTC: Declaration of heirship annulled. Children of 2nd marriage valid therefore
legitimate
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the
partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that
the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were
legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio
Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on
the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of
Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and
were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support of
their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three
children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by
petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as
shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido
married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established
through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence
to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This
finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance,
Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of
their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued
to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not
conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat.
Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons
living together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption,
especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be
overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy.
In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind this
presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation,
an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the
presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted
that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the
uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The
reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina
Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew
it because "during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they)
got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not
even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five
children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and,
therefore, legitimate.
People v. Mendoza
CFI: Guilty of bigamy SC: Acquitted Mendoza
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis
were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first
marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2,
1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another
marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to
his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and
void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with
Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to
Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy
because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General,
however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga
Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a
previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People
vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not
controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas,
impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the
Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga
Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de
Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), IN FORCE AT THE TIME
THE APPELLANT CONTRACTED HIS SECOND MARRIAGE IN 1941,
provides as follows:
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted
being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that
appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first
spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
competent court
People v. Aragon
CFI: Bigamy
On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu
(Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the
accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria
Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an
employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio
Tomesa, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and
complainant Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol
established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he
commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where
he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939
(Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu,
the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-
nurse.
It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in
Cebu, for it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes
because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953,
the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing
treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third
marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.
(See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga,
Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous
marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for
the fact of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of
the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one
of the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria
Faicol. (See Exhibits "A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express
provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial
declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally
contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his
marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial
declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly
makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his
first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable
marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga
Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent
for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said
marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case
above-quoted But this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle
of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may
not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza.
Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain
and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been
within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or
should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict
interpretation already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second
wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the
first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last
marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this
marriage can not prosper.
Tolentino v. Paras
CA: Dismissed
The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with
private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1,
1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino,
celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting (Annex "A", Petition).
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, which Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced
him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence
imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25,
1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria
Clemente."
In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to
correct the name of the surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente"
to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of
the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed
proceeding,
Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was
convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital
status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than
the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The second
marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his
first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can
be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court
below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased
Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the
Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer be
discussed.
In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage
with private respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding local register is
thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. 8 While document such as death and birth
certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption
is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their
inaccuracy.

Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the
Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving
spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. In an Order, dated
October 21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the
case, stating:

Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon
by respondent Court in ordering dismissal.
We rule for petitioner.

First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry
contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she
initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the
deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death
certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary
character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted
against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual
most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend
her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The publication
required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not
absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required
to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against
the right sought to be established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding
under Rule 108, it was the Court that was caned upon to order the publication, 3 but it
did not. in the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the form of
actions as with their substance. 4
Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy Donato v. Luna

Supra

In an action, filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia
Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on
June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the
existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void,
she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said
marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the
status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties):
was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of
the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present
evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of
force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of the respondent
Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the
case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present
evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be
void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since
no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was
still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is
VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
Terre v. Terre On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and
Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy complainant in the following manner:
B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows:
"grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with she and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates
another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito
remained subsisting. Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status
(ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were
successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum
the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not be found University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time
nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she
after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was
noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's void ab initiosince she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12);
Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and
practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage
him" in the instant license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as
case. her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no
need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July
and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B,
contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent]
representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance
married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason
Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; for his disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma
that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for
and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was
believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case
he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy
against respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Pangasinan, where a prima faciecase was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26);
Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent with the
evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was considered
further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically
as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F;
avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent
Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There
hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy. is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married
Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into,
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action
instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7
July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another
hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered
her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in
more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered
respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab
Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious
defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the
basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place,
that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant
into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and
void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was
free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre,
being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter
to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan
Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be
deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be
regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by
other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to
Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry
him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage,
respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant,
with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished
his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the
complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own
child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but
likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice
Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick
played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her
to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping
his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a
second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The
Court will correct this error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to
STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be
spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office.
A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.
Republic v. Granada declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice
to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
CA: Affirmed
RTC: Petition for declaration of presumptive death. We affirm the CA ruling.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada
(Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada. present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her sufficient.
brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
whereabouts, to no avail. paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530. Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a
dead. summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Family Law. Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such
Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a applicable.
summary judicial proceeding, Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of
in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable. the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[3] the CA ruled In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[6] the Republic likewise appealed the CAs affirmation of
that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties. the RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a
Resolution dated 3 April 2009.[4] Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are immediately
that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of final and executory.
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG should
have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,[7] issued a few months later.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under
the Rules of Court,[8] a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this Court
for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to enable her to
the evidence that respondent presented contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioners action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court. Considering that this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did
not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety
of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
Our Ruling was intended to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar.
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v.
Tango:[9]
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous
decisions thereon.
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court
ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.[13] The Civil Code
cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable. (Emphasis supplied.) spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads: comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a well-founded belief that the
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:
be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. and
To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence presumptive death of the absentee.
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a well-
of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors States v. Biasbas,[14] which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required in
which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of searching for a missing spouse.
judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that that he only had
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had not been able to prove a well-founded belief that his spouse was already dead. The
Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code:
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics Notice of spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en
Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately final and executory and, motivos racionales.
hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be
the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth.
Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the
evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their
dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic v. disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the
Nolasco,[10] United States v. Biasbas[11] and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro[12] as ultimate question of his death.
authorities on the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of the RTCs The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving birth to absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted
their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner on a well-founded belief of
Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
to establish circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and
his well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead, as required by Article 41 of the the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts
of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate
Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information
from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she
did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the
Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her well-
founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The
same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
Republic v. Cantor
CA: Affirmed
RTC: Presumptively dead
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by:
(1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would
have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s
father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance,
the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of
presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a
well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from
her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and
friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point
to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest
efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in
court.
The Ruling of the RTC
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition
The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final
orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial
courts in summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed
immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family
Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief
to justify the declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the
respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing
husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s attention to the attendant
circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search conducted
and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41
of the Family Code.
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown
that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of
the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden
of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under
Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for
purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the
issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil
Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief "
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same observation in Republic v.
Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family Code
and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to
four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to
enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either
that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law),
lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or
general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This
conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon
the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement
of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead.
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends,
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she
the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s
a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts
spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that
already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of the following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16 had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was
already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following: and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that
(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her; the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on
(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his free time; uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI. conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made
inquiries and only reported his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC. well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19 drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition.
In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the absent spouse and the natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present
the police nor seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse, as
follows: spouse."
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her
brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s Strict Standard Approach Is
testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the
Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Consistent with the State’s Policy
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21 to Protect and Strengthen Marriage
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to
find her consisted of: ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England; allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and emphasized that:
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to form a basis In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by
that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of
she was dead. the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who
cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature
iv.The present case of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.24 Since marriage
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged serves as the family’s foundation25 and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale –to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of
"earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following: Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
friends; and Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’ Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present
directory, hoping to find Jerry. spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she
would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively
established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons: negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.
Final Word
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.1âwphi1 It can be As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the
lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of
inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41
of the Family Code.
patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008
search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to
of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the
look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F.
that her husband is dead.
Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid
of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with
the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present
conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been
missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to
the police.
Jones v. Hortiguela

The principal question upon the resolution of which depends that of the others,
is whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escaño was
celebrated.

It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones in the
suburban catholic church of San Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918,
Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of
him. In October, 1919, proceedings were institute in the Court of First Instance of
Maasin, Leyte, at the instance of Marciana Escaño, to have her husband judicially
declared an absentee. On the 25th of said month, the court issued an order declaring
Arthur W. Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of
article 186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence
would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers.

Said order directed the publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper
"El Ideal". Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official Gazette during the
month of December, 1919, and January, February, March, April, May and June, 1920.
On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the
declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette
and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño were
married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the
certificate of marriage.
Now, Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be
understood to have been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of
April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the
celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance
with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68, the marriage so contracted by
Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño is null and void. This court does not believe so.
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee.
For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage,
that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the
time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No.
68).
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana
Escaño's former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on
which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said
date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore,
valid and lawful.
Republic v. Molina
CA: Affirmed
RTC: void psychological incapacity
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on
April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel,
as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying
with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them
from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could
no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's
refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's
failure to run the household and handle their finances.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband
could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of
the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation
is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of
this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend
Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during
the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
and clinical psychologists. petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage remains valid.
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective
in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and
apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal
of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
Choa
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the
subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued
with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or
speedy under the circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiffs evidence is utterly and
patently insufficient to prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to
deny the demurrer and to require the defendant to present evidence to controvert a
nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the courts
docket and an assault on the defendants resources and peace of mind. In short, such
denial needlessly delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.
CA: Dismissed.
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two
children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a
Complaint[5] for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098.Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint[6] dated
November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based
on her alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last
witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits[7] dated February 20, 1998.
Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer
to Evidence)[8] dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings
to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order[9] denying petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence. It held that [respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the
[petitioner] must controvert.[10] After her Motion for Reconsideration[11] was denied in
the March 22, 1999 Order,[12] petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition
for Certiorari,[13] docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her Memorandum,[19] petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, is she under obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the
Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when an unfavorable
[verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law, despite the
palpably and patently weak and grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence of the
private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of marriage case, grounded on
psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such
circumstances, can the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be directly and immediately
resorted to by the petitioner; and
2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did the
Court of Appeals wantonly violate, ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the
doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13,
1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA 17)?[20]
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a
demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of
discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent
weakness and gross insufficiency of respondents evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the
immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing the CA,
respondent counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to
certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21] this Court declared that appeal --
not certiorari -- in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse
of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and
allow certiorari when the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxxxxxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. [22]
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.[23]
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.[24] In Cruz
v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:
Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to
challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the
assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of
discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.[25]
Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional
circumstances, this Court is now tasked to determine whether the present case
falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a patent
error or grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the parties in an
action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient
in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue. [26] The
demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. [27] In
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.[28]
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are
convinced that the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly
insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would
warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him
are proof of the latters psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury,[29] false
testimony,[30] concubinage[31] and deportation.[32] According to him, the filing and the
prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not
only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that
this is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her
husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary. [33]
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any
way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity
and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital
obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if
taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that
the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally
erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his
documentary offerings, sufficient to prove petitioners alleged psychological
incapacity. He testified in these words:
Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. What do you mean
by that?
A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she
even want it aborted by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked
the intention of procreative sexuality.[34]
ATTY. CHUA:
And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will
you please elaborate on this what you mean by carefree approximating psychologically
incapacitated?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we better ask the witness what he means by carefree.
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she
wants me to hire an attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when the children
were sick she does not bother to let the children see a doctor.
xxxxxxxxx
STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):
ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did
you notice any characteristic or traits which you consider as psychological incapacity?
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she wont talk to
me when I call her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and
even at the time when I am busy with some other things. So, I think that is all. [
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about
three aspects of petitioners personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention
to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative
sexuality. None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological
incapacity. Far from it.
In Santos v. CA,[37] this Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.[38] Said the
Court:
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of
the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.[39]
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,[40] we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he
and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no
showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems
besetting their marital union.
Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was
grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of
psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.[41]
Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative
sexuality is easily belied by the fact that two children were born during their
union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect was already
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed
expert testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon,
utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true,
was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.Neither did he testify that it
was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony are
quoted thus:
ATTY. CHUA:
 A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.[45]
And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning xxxxxxxxx
Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?
the husband and the wife in the present case have a personality which is normal. That is A. Yes.
Q. Because of the
your conclusion? A. The incompatibility.
Q. Incompatibility.
WITNESS: A. Yes.[46]
They are normal, but they cannot mix together. His testimony established merely that the spouses had an incompatibility, a
Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. We
are not compatible with each other? need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to
A. Yes. establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.
Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on
personality disorder, bordering on abnormality? descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any
A. Yes. psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his
Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly Professional Opinion[47] began with the statement [I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his
match? wife Leni is true, x x x.[48] The expert witness testified thus:
ATTY. CHUA
A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the plaintiff who is the husband?
WITNESS
knows how to handle marriage, that should try to intervene. A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and he said, he doesnt know.
ATTY. CHUA
Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple? Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and written psychological examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you
be willing to do that?
A. Yes. WITNESS
A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile.[49]
Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these
maximum tolerance and give and take, will that serve the purpose?
had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.
suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
Q. Yes?
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
A. Yes.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess
Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?
petitioners character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also
A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally
through the formers at least fifteen hours[50] of study of the voluminous transcript of
disordered. It cannot be harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried professional
records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to
help to take care of their marital problem, it could have been solved.
examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioners psychological
Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?
state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any
As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never been
from Tom, Dick and Harry could handle this. That means from the very beginning they
objected to, the objection raised thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court
have personalities which they were incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they
has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of admissibility of
will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each other. They should not have got
evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence
married.[42]
should be disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value.[51]
xxxxxxxxx
We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not
Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you
a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the
found out that both are normal?
totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity
A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.
adequately. Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was
Q. Normal, simply incompatible.
completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more
A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in
so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
my last page. That they are like oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and water, The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then
have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly
they will not mix. and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the
Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the frequent quarrels had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and
quarrel? an unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.
A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.[43] We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[53] Any
xxxxxxxxx decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.[54]
Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities? There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from the
A. Yes.[44] injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which
xxxxxxxxx would further clog the court dockets with another futile case.[55]
Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile? WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA
A. Yes. Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to Evidence
Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out? is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged
A. Yes. psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
Barcelona v. CA
CA: Affirmed
RTC: denied MTD.
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner
Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.[3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo
filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7
June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471
(second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial
court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First,
the second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum
shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed
Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an
Order (first order) deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their
arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However,
the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997
an Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for
reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the
complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely
from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a
perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated
respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected
petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the
second petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second
petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had
been earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the
Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and
the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE
FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS
TERMINATION AND STATUS.
The Courts Ruling
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is
untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
legal right of the plaintiff.[5] A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.[6]
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.[7] The
petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the
Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract
attached to the petition.The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The
union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28
October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7
March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that
petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their
marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity
subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-compliedmarital
obligations in this manner:
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized
housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters
house or would play tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent
and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually
refused to speak to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina
Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the
latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted
to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner
argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate
respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from
demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy,
the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a
condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the
respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents
favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The
separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present
time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The
extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C
and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity
subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance
with Article 39 thereof.
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.[9] Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of
action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence which establish the material elements.[10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals[12] as well
as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[13] Santos gave life to the phrase
psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in
this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties
in cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. [14]
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set
forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is
defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent
or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave
nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state
the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to
psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new
Rules).[15]Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege
the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not
be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since
the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of
the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and
control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know
about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological
disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are
evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical
manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos
second petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or
omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of
Appeals,[17] the Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause
of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or
allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to
be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA,
supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA
152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197
SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur
v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint.[18] Given the
hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render
judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which does not mention the filing of the first petition and its
dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94.[19] Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 04-94-
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original
pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of
his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding
which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed. [20]
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-forum shopping that he had previously commenced a similar action based on the
same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself
constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of
substantial compliance applies to the contents of the certification.[21]
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same
parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that
would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not
fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings
considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not
present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on
non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules
which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis
pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also amount to res
judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping
in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and
dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo
to keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened
before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the
first petition when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal
without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must
be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the
Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Circular
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[24]
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and protects.[25] In
rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this
issue after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the allegations in
the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to attack by a
motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as
well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
 as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
CA: Affirmed not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
RTC: Void marriage. medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. x x x
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[13] (emphasis supplied)
went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
birth to their child.
in Santos: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability.[14] The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if
became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
resorted to.[15]
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
not bother to see her and their child.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and
support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a
I
trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations,
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
the Molina case.[10]
be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity
Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable
respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
in Molina.
respondent did not do.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.[16] There
the family.[11] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[12]
was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological
context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.[17] There was no
solemnization.
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.[18]
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not apply here because the present case involves a mixed marriage, the husband
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we
find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis
of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision
dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Republic v. Encelan
CA: Affirmed
RTC: Void
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar
and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15,
1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been
having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had
been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity. 8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an
associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically
incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent
abandonment of the family home.10He testified that he continued to provide financial
support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with
Alvin.11
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda
Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita
was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness," 13 but had been "unable
to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some
interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining
her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her
reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship." 16
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to
nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity.
Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent
abandonment of their home,24 as well as his continued financial support to her and their
children even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely mentioned in passing
Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if
true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be
shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to
support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were
manifestations of any psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to
prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact,
established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.28 Dr.
Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our
mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the
time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union
with Cesar.
Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse
cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace
obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts.
While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one
another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of
comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and
submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go
with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship 30 is a
mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this
Court cannot support.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005
amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we
DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.
Lontoc Cruz v. Cruz
CA: Affirmed
RTC: VALID Marriage
Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime in March 1986. They
became steady in August of the same year. Nilo, whose job was then in Hong Kong,
prodded Marivi to marry him so she could join him there soonest. Marivi agreed. The
couple married in a civil ceremony5 on October 21, 1986 followed by a church
wedding6on February 8, 1987. The marriage produced two sons: Antonio Manuel, born
on April 25, 1988, and Jose Nilo, born on September 9, 1992.
On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage7 based on psychological incapacity. She averred that it had been
medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate personality disorder
related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex,"8 while she
herself was found to be suffering from a "personality disorder of the mixed type,
[h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic with immaturity x x x."9
To show that Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary emotional, psychological,
and physical support, Marivi cited the following:
1. His infidelity and his non-commitment to the marriage as he continued to act like a
bachelor;
2. The lack of 'oneness' in the marriage as Nilo would make decisions (on financial
matters) without consulting or considering her suggestions; treating her as a housemate
or a "mayordoma;" keeping from her his whereabouts, when he would come home or
how much his income was;
3. The lack of sexual contact for more than a decade as Nilo made excuses;
4. Putting up a facade that he is a caring, concerned, and loving husband, especially to
his bosses; and
5. Preference towards the company of his peers/friends. 10
In his Answer,11 Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that at the start of
their relationship, both he and Mari vi would exhibit negative personality traits which
they overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi were suffering from
psychological incapacity; and that he was not singularly responsible for the breakdown
of their marriage. He stressed that Marivi also contributed to the deterioration of their
union, to wit:
1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways he was not accustomed to or
inconsistent with his career position;
2. Marivi was jealous of his friends; and would often make hasty conclusions that he was
having an affair with other women;
3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if things did not go her way; would not
admit mistakes, and blame others instead;
4. Marivi would make decisions impulsively, such as changing an item she gets tired of,
or demanding that Nilo change a motor vehicle simply because she did not like it; and
5. She lacked respect for Nilo, and would speak to him degradingly, and even accuse
him of being gay or a homosexual.12
Marivi's Version
Marivi narrated that when they were still going steady, Nilo would only spend Saturdays
and Sundays with her and devote the weekdays to partying with his friends; that even
after their engagement, Nilo would still meet other women and accept invitations to
beauty pageants and cocktails;15 that Nilo was not the type who would kiss passionately;
that Nilo would not engage in foreplay during sex, but wished only to satisfy himself;
that Nilo would engage in anal sex and would only stop when she complained that it
was painful; that Nilo would thereafter sleep, leaving her feeling "used," and that Nilo
was impulsive, daring, and adventurous.16
She also claimed that Nilo would habitually come home late; that Friday nights were
Nilo's boys' night out; that unless she would ask him to take her out on a date, Nilo
would not do so; and that Nilo would call her a "nagger" even if she was merely asking
him to come home early.17
Marivi further narrated that Nilo would engage in extramarital affairs; that a few months
into their marriage, Nilo had an affair with an unmarried female officemate; 18 that Nilo
ended the affair only after she (Mari vi) threatened to tell his
employer/supervisor;19 that Nilo had another affair a few weeks after the birth of their
second son; that when confronted with his womanizing and made to choose between
her and the children or the other women, Nilo replied that he was "confused," 20 which
prompted her to leave and stay in Cebu with her parents; and that she heard from her
friends that while she was in Cebu, Nilo was living a bachelor's life.21
Marivi added that she eventually reconciled with Nilo but despite the reconciliation,
Nilo never really changed, and that he remained indifferent, insensitive, and
unappreciative. According to Marivi, she would instead call up her parents and sisters to
talk about their family problems;22 that while he (Nilo) told people that he was proud of
her, he never gave her the emotional, psychological, and physical support she
needed.23 She felt like she was no more than a mayordoma to him, and that they were just
"housemates." Nilo would come home late on weekdays and preferred to go out with
his friends. Their quarrels were frequent and their conversations were superficial; Nilo
would rather talk about himself, instead of asking Marivi about her day or about their
children. He was controlling and domineering,24 and refused to consider her
suggestions; he would not want his money mingled with her (Marivi's) money. 25 Nilo
would shell out money when he wanted to buy things, but would make excuses when it
came to Mari vi's suggestion for a family vacation.26 Marivi also claimed that Nilo had
no sense of companionship with their children; and that Nilo even told their son that
their brand new house was everything to him.27
Marivi was moreover bothered by Nilo's effeminate ways; he was vain and would have
weekly "beauty" treatments.28Furthermore, they no long had sex after the birth of their
second son. While they tried to have sex twice, Nilo failed to have an erection. After
that, Nilo would refuse to have sex with her which made her (Marivi) question his
sexual orientation, so much so that Nilo physically hurt her when she questioned his
virility.29
Marivi's father, Manuel, likewise stated that Marivi would call them up for help because
Nilo had hurt her during the couple's quarrel; that their marriage was not harmonious
due to Marivi's youth and her unfamiliarity with Nilo's personality and family values. He
considered Nilo only as a provider, not as a husband and a good father to his sons. 30
 She claimed that Nilo's lack of a father figure weakened his masculinity. He cross-identified himself with his mother because his father, a disciplinarian and the thrifty one, was
Marivi's younger sister, Margarita Ledesma (Margarita), who lived for four years with often absent because of his military service. While he was still a teenager, his mother migrated to Canada and their long-time maid acted as his surrogate mother. Nilo sought
from his wife his mother's nurturing qualities, but he felt hostility when Marivi failed to meet his ego ideal. His aggression was in the form of passivity, punishing his wife by not
Nilo and Marivi, claimed to have witnessed how lonely Marivi was. She alleged that Nilo sexually performing.42
Dr. Villegas noted that Nilo would put on a facade, a compensatory mechanism according to social norms. While he was not exactly a homosexual, he covered up his weak
was absent when Marivi gave birth to their second son; that Nilo was short-tempered masculine traits by being a "playboy." Nilo could only comply with the financial obligation of marital life, but not the psychological and emotional parts of it.43 Nilo likewise was
an inadequate father figure to his own two sons, especially the younger, who has already manifested strong feminine traits. 44
when driving; and that the couple would often fight because Nilo would always come Marivi, on the other hand, expected that her interactions with the world would be like that of her own close-knit family, a perception attributable to her parents' prolonged
gratification of her dependency needs. Her father was a dedicated, devoted, and responsible family man who regularly came home to spend time with them, while her mother
home late or because Marivi suspected Nilo of infidelity. Margarita believed that Nilo was a good housewife, who always found time to personally attend to their needs. Dr. Villegas described Marivi’s one with strong mood fluctuations, emotionally immature,
with low self-esteem has difficulty neutralizing the outbreak of negativity in her behavior, is suggestible, egocentric, and impelled by a desire to "extort" from others. To Dr.
did not really want to save the marriage, although he told her that he loves Marivi and Villegas, the couple's respective personality disorders were mutually repelling, their brain waves not being in sync because what Marivi expected from Nilo happened to be Nilo's
weakest point.45
the children.31 Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas' diagnosis. On the basis of Nilo's five-to-six sessions and Marivi's eight bi-weekly psychotherapy sessions with him, Dr. Encarnacion
concluded that there was no chance of a successful marriage in a dysfunctional union when there is double psychological incapacity. He categorically stated that Nilo was
Nilo's Version incapable of being a good husband and a good father. Nilo lacked an individual coherent identity and instead went by the standards of general society, which is driven by the
desire to gain material wealth, power, and control. Nilo did not like close relationships and was incapable of forming some; his social anxiety, associated with paranoid fears, was
Nilo acknowledged his contribution to the breakdown of the marriage because his job manifested by excessive vanity. Nilo projected an image of a wealthy, successful, handsome man surrounded by women, in none of whom, however, he was interested in a long-
term sexual relationship; he saw himself as a performer-provider and was disinterested in spending quality time with his family, in carrying on conversations with members of his
required him to come home late, his inability to sexually perform adequately, his failure family, insensitive, intolerant, and demanding.46
Dr. Encarnacion attributed respondent's psychological disorder to his childhood, in which he did not have fond memories of tender moments and vacation times with his
to be the "ideal husband,"32 and because he had had extramarital affairs in the years family. Nilo grew up very close to his mother who always listened to his complaints and with whom he sympathized, hence his unresolved oedipal issues; even as he patterned
his masculinity strivings after his stingy father, the family provider, but whom he nonetheless described as "unappreciative, undemonstrative, and quite materialistic." At the age
1992, 2002, and 2006.33 At the same time, Nilo insisted that Marivi also contributed to of 18, when his parents migrated to Canada and left him in the Philippines, he then lost his role models, incapacitating him from creating his own identity. Thus, when he began
working at the age of 21, he imbibed the values of his workplace, where feelings and emotional discussions were absent, factors that nonetheless somehow worked to his
the collapse of their union. advantage in his job.47 Dr. Encarnacion opined that Nilo's incapacity was his "rigidity," which drove him into imposing his family upbringing on his mvn family, instead of
adjusting to the modem family setup, i.e., that the modem father should take on new roles and be part of family activities where his family needs him to be, e.g. taking the
According to Nilo, Marivi would always want to know his companions and children to the pediatrician or to the park, camping with the family, or being with them in church, instead of strictly confining himself to being a provider.48
As for Marivi, Dr. Encarnacion found that she exhibited "Histrionic Personality Behaviors and Features" as manifested by her impressionistic speech, her exaggerated
whereabouts; would demand information about his female acquaintances; and would expression of emotions, and her suggestibility. He stated that Marivi's "inflexibility" consisted in her expecting a high standard of faithfulness from all men as exemplified by her
dad, who was also very devoted to her mother. However, because dissatisfied and frustrated by her actual marital situation, she sought attention, externalized blame, displayed
even call up his workplace to ask where he was. Moreover, her conceit and her "prima anger, mistrust, resentment, and self-indulgence.49
donna" attitude embarrassed him. Marivi would order him to act in accordance with RTC: Valid
their stature in life, and would demand that he instruct his office staff to accord her At issue before us is whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under
special treatment as Hewlett Packard's "first lady" during the time that he was Hewlett Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Packard's President. Marivi would also instruct their housemaids to call him "sefiorito;"
and she would make a "big deal" out of her being a "mestiza," and would think of Our Ruling
herself a "trophy wife."34 We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA.
Nilo claimed that Marivi was "unappreciative" of him, had a misdirected sense of self- Article 36 of the Family Code states:
entitlement, and would complain if she did not get her own way, as she was used to, she Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
being her father's favorite daughter; Marivi did not even care about discussing family psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
finances with him as long as she got what she wanted. She also had a violent temper and marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
would hurl things at him during their fights; that she would blame him for everything, solemnization.
and would keep on reciting his past mistakes. Marivi did not understand the demands of We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision. In Republic v.
his job, and unfairly compared his work to her father's job, the operation of which was De Gracia, 55 we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 56 "that psychological
limited to a single area, a compound in a mine site in Cebu. He explained that the incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such
multinational companies he then worked for required him to work beyond the normal that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
office hours because he has to meet "sales quotas in millions of dollars," entertain marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
people from different headquarters, and meet with different clients from areas far from antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
his residence.35 marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
Worse, Nilo was turned off by Marivi's act of broadcasting to her whole clan his cure would be beyond the means of the party involved)." Also, in Republic v. Court of
inadequacies during their intimate sexual relations, which began after he witnessed Appeals, 57 we reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration
Marivi giving birth to their first child. When he confided to Marivi about this, she of nullity of marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 58 viz.:
instead accused him of having another affair. Since then, he did not feel any sexual
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor o f the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complai nt, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
excitement and attraction toward her when they were together. Instead of discussing the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx

problem with him candidly, she accused him of being gay. Nilo stated that the last time
they had sex was in 1997 or in 1998.36
The Clinical Findings
In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Ruben
Encarnacion (Dr. Encarnacion), a clinical psychologist.
Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nilo to have "inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex,"37 while she diagnosed Marivi to
have "personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic, with immaturity x x x." 38
In the March 21, 2005 Psychiatric Report,39 Dr. Villegas stated:
The root cause of the above clinical conditions, on the part of Marivi Cruz, were the overindulgence and over attention of her parents, in a prolonged manner,
carried over to adult adjustments. On the part of Nilo Cruz, his negative identification and resentments towards his father and close attachments to his mother, continued by
his long-time maid, to the point of an oedipal situation led to his inadequacy, along masculine strivings, with difficult assertions of his authority and power.
The above clinical conditions existed prior [to] marriage but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. Both are considered as permanent
in nature, because they started early in their developmental stage, and therefore became so deeply engrained into their personality structures. Both are considered grave in
degree, because they hampered, interfered and disrupted their normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments.40
According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each others' weaknesses and that the incapacities of the parties are grave because they preferred to satisfy their own
needs rather than to give in to the other's needs.41
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage.x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts'
cannot be accepted as root causes.x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the stat e. x x x.
Notably, "mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting personalities' [as
in the present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity."59 "Nor does failure
of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons" amount to
psychological incapacity.60 We further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic61that the
psychological condition should render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the Nor can it be said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time for the family was
basic marital obligations: caused by his "inadequate personality disorder" or "unresolved oedipal
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic complex." Nilo explained that he has a taxing and demanding job, and that
marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital unfortunately, with his working hours eating up his home life, while he was able
obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to to provide his family with an adequate standard of living, the lack of quality time
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must for his wife became attenuated and resulted in severing his bond with Mari vi,
refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and who failed to understand the nature of his job. They were a happy couple during
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the period of courtship, and even during the early years of their marriage. Nilo
the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to testified:
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is ATTY. REVILLA:
Q. x x x What was the reason why you had to stay up late?
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological A. Ma'am, I'm .. .in those I.T. companies that I worked for whether manager or managing director, my companies are ... the companies are
involved in sales and marketing and support so it entails entertainment of clients, entertainment of principals coming from headquarters and
illness.62 entertainment of customers with my staff and other company.
In Marcos v. Marcos, 63 the actual medical examination of the one claimed to have psychological incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what matters is the totality of Q. When you say LT., what does it stand for?
evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological incapacity. While it behooves this Court to weigh the clinical findings of psychology experts as part of the evidence, the A. Information Technology.
court's hands are nonetheless free to make its own independent factual findings. "It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings."64 Q. You also referred to a headquarters. What do you mean by headquarters?
A. Headquarters, if you work in a multinational company like companies I worked for, they have headquarters in Hong Kong, they have
With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties did headquarters in Singapore, they have headquarters in the U.S.
suffer from personality disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses, we find Q. So you had to entertain principals coming from [these] headquarters?
A. As a part of the job as required by the principals who [visit] us.
that the conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly point to Q. How often were you required to stay out late because of your job?
A. Ma'am, it is unpredictable. Sometimes, we were required to stay for dinner and entertainment thereafter. Sometimes, we can go home early also.
the fact that the personality disorders which plague the spouses antedated the Q. Could you not refuse the invitations of going out and just go home and spend time with your family?
marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that A. Sometimes I can refuse, sometimes I cannot. Because it becomes a condition of sale of the clients x x x.
xxxx
these personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties Q. So x x x what's the latest time of the night that you usually come home?
A. My objective as a husband and as a father is to really come as early as I can which I have explained on and on, your Honor. But to meet my
psychologically incapacitated to carry out and carry on their marital duties. What million dollar targets of the country, I have to do things beyond 5 o'clock. In several occasions when I tried to go home early, to my
can be inferred from the totality of evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility. disappointment, my kids are not at home because they were borrowed by my in-laws to have merienda. That's why I complained to my wife that
time that "please tell me if they are going with my in-laws because I don't want to deprive them also of the few times I'm able to go home early."
For a personality disorder to be declared clinically or medically incurable or Q. So, you are saying that you only have few times of coming home early?
A. Well, yes, but not very few.
permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to be reluctant to perform Q. Okay. Have you tried to make an effort to remedy the situation?
his/her marital duties is another.65 A. Well, if I have my way to be able to direct my appointments in the South, my meetings in Amkor Anam, Mamplasan, in Sta. Rosa then that will
allow me to be home at least 5-6 o'clock. But most of my meetings in Makati, Quezon City, Manila especially with government clients [do] allow
Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More than that, me to go home early, your Honor.
x x x x68
too, the evidence on record do not square with the existence of psychological incapacity THE COURT:
as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what brought about What about another fault you mentioned which is staying late, when did this thing happen?
A. When I came back from my assignment in Hong Kong in 1988 when I was given a new job in sales and marketing.
the breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not necessarily attributable to xxxx
THE COURT:
his so-called "psychological disorder" but can be imputed to his work and So before the birth of your children, that is after your marriage with the petitioner, this was not a problem?
marital stress, and his ordinary human failings. A. Because, your Honor, I was assigned in Hong Kong and I was only twelve (12) minutes [away] by [foot] to our office x x x.
xxxx
With regard to his failure to sexually perform "adequately," the same appeared And I was not in [sales] and marketing, I was the Administrative Assistant of the President of IBM in Southeast Asia so it's the ... purely
management administrative work as an administrative assistant so there's [not] much of entertaining done in Hong Kong.
to be a case of "selective impotency," as he was turned off by Marivi's disclosure THE COURT:
of their bed secrets to her family. Furthermore, Nilo testified that the sexual Okay, so in other words, at that time, that was not a problem. It was only a problem when you were appointed to your position in ...
A. IBM.
problem with Marivi did not crop up until the birth of their second son, and that THE COURT:
That was so many years after you got married with your wife
he felt that the blame was invariably and unfairly laid on upon him, thus: A We got married, your Honor, in 1987 then we went back to the Philippines in July 1988 [when] I was given a new marketing and [sales] role as a
THE COURT: manager of general marketing which is ... which encompasses all industries aside [from] the government.
The Court has just some questions with regard to the main issue. During your direct testimony; Mr. Witness, you mentioned some of your faults which [may be] the reason why THE COURT:
the instant case was filed. x x x one of those faults is no sex. When did that happen? x x x
A. If I recall it right, Your Honor; I [had] some challenge[s] immediately after the first birth of my eldest son which I x x x shared with the psychologist or psychiatrist who [had] So you mean to say that this problem of staying late only happened lately?
examined me. xxxx
THE COURT: A The definition, your Honor, of my family... late is when you don't make it at 7:00 o'clock or. .. [with] the family at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. So
But when you got married with your wife that was not a problem until the birth of your last son? ifl don't make it at seven, I considered myself late.
A. Yes, your Honor. THE COURT:
x x x x66
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.: What is the reason why you have been late?
Q. So it is attributable to the petitioner though you claim that it is your fault, is that correct? A Your Honor, my job is not a 9 to 5 job because we ... we call on customers, we entertain customers, partners, principals, we also have fellowship
A. Because, your Honor, that kind of situation, I always get blamed, so for the purpose of settling all these questions, when you make that mistake, you'll always be the one to be with our teams. So, we either have dinner or we have happy hours. We also see friends after. So but, physically I cannot do that everyday, your
blamed although as per the psychologist and the psychiatrist, there's also a reason why I am not able to perform sex to my wife because in those ten (10) years that we were Honor, because I also wake up automatically at 6:00 everyday whether I have a drink, or have dinner, or I worked out in the evening or play[ed]
together, after the first one, [didn't] have any other affairs but I kept being blamed that I [had] just because I [was] not able to perform sex to her. The whole family, her family basketball during that time, I always wake up at six. So if I stayed up late like previously... like 2, 3, it's gonna be a burden for me physically and [I
knows that in that premise because I got, one time, in one of our quarrels x x x told me, ''maybe you're not making love with my daughter because you are having an affair with
another woman." So, I know 1 made a mistake in the past but if I'm x x x kept [being] reminded of it, it's a punishment, your Honor. would be] unable to perform my job well. So, like I mentioned earlier in a hearing, your Honor, many times I tried to be home by 10 to be able to
xxxx watch. Before 10 to be able to watch the 10:00 o'clock news and be able to enjoy my ice cream while watching it.
Q. What you initially said was your fault was ... as you're now talking before this Honorable Court, is really the fault of 1he petitioner; is that what you are saying? THE COURT:
A. There [were] times, your Honor, I would say it was my fault. There [were] times it was caused by her faults as well. H's not one plus one It was hers and one plus one it was Well, one of those faults you mentioned is also working hard, why did you say that it is your fault?
mine, it depends on the situation. We've been dealing with cases before so not all the time it's the fault of Mrs. Cruz. And not all the time it's the fault of Mr. Cruz. It's a A In our industry, your Honor, when you work out, you will definitely end up late several couple of times, but not all the time.
relationship, there are times it's hers, there are times, it's mine but we're able to fix it until this annulment situation came.
x x x x67 xxxx
Your Honor, sometimes, I get all these complaints. But when they saw my picture in the newspaper or in the TV having success stories and
contract signing, they are proud of me.
THE COURT:
When you say "so proud of me," to whom are you referring x x x?
ATTY. REVILLA:
A. My family. They call me, they congratulate me, we have dinners together to celebrate but to get to that, is the working hard and staying away Q. So even without the respondent, Nilo Cruz, petitioner would still be psychologically
from the family.
xxxx incapacitated?
THE COURT: A. I beg to [differ]: from that because the needs were not fulfilled in this particular marriage, it's like a tendency to have cancer, but if you take care of yourself with the right
How long did you court your wife? environment, you will not catch cancer. Those were previous positions, that's why I called them Histrionic Personality Traits Behaviors and Features not a full blown Histrionic
Personality Disorder, the needs were badly unfulfilled in this marriage because she married a man who did not know the language of feeling of showing some attention towards
A. Six (6) months, your Honor. his spouse, meaning, if she is put in a relationship with a man who is able to address these needs, she would be better, she would be better in a marriage.
x x x x69 Q. So this psychological incapacity of the petitioner is only dormant at
THE COURT: the time that she was not yet married?
Could you say that you were a perfect couple at that time? A. Well, it's grave ...
A. When we were starting, your Honor, we [were] happy, and during the time that we were in Hong Kong. But when we went back to Manila, Q. Was it grave already at the time ...
A. Yes, it is, it's grave but. ..
there are times (the witness is in tears) ... adjusting to work and family that is why it affected my relationship to her family and combination of Q. Even before the marriage?
mistakes happened which I admitted. A. ... but not incurable, that is the only adjective, grave, pre-existing ...
THE COURT: Q. Pre-existing?
How would you describe your wife during your first years of marriage? A. Grave and pre-existing, yes, incurable, no, in the sense that if she married properly if her needs were addressed, it would not appear in that marriage.
A. [She was] a very good wife. Q. But because of her marriage to the respondent, are you saying now that her psychological incapacity now…
A. Became an incapacity, yes
THE COURT: Q. ... became incurable?
Did she perform her duties as a wife and as a mother? A. No.
A. Yes, your Honor. xxxx
THE COURT: Q. Okay. I am quite curious about the curability of the personality disorder of the petitioner. Now, if her needs are satisfied with ... in case, assuming the petitioner enters into
And was she that independent from her parents or she was too dependent [on] her parents? another relationship and her needs are satisfied then her incapacity is cured, is that what you're saying?
A. In effect, yes, in effect, yes.
A. On her performing her duties, with the ... as a wife and as a friend, she's independent. When it comes to our problems, she would consult her Q. Would you say, what are these needs of the petitioner that [you're] ... not satisfied of the respondent?
family. A. Need to be paid attention to, need to be valued, need to have an effect on someone, it is a universal need. She was made to feel that she did not have any effect on him and
THE COURT: so are the children, x x x well, the father made the children feel that they, wife and two sons did not have any effect on him, ma'am.
So only those times when you have a problem. Like what problems, Mr. Witness? x x x x73
A. Our relationship, your Honor. Q. One last question. The needs of the petitioner, like you say, do you think she was able to convey, clearly convey her needs to the respondent, properly convey?
A. Very clearly, yes, and then when they were still not being heard, well, iyon na nga eh, yung hostility niya and resentment would get the better of her as a ano ... so it would
THE COURT: become dysfunctional reaction upon reaction. That's a good question.74
But most of the time, you were able to patch up your problems?
A. Yes, your Honor. Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the protagonists in this
x x x x70
Interestingly, when asked if there was no more functional marital life between him and Marivi, Nilo candidly highlighted his different perception
case are in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other's personality
from his estranged wife: differences, and have thus become overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or
ATTY. STA MARIA, JR.:
Q. So, Mr. Witness, well in reality today, Mr. Witness, even the petitioner believes that there is no more functional marital life in this relationship, disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a
would you agree with that?
A. If that's the way she thinks, I...I will have my own way of looking at things because ...
null and void marriage.75
xxxx WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Q. Even ... as I was saying since she was asking for nullity and you were asking for nullity, it's a fact of life as of today, as you speak today that there
is no more functional marital life between the two (2) of you?
A. You see, your Honor, that's why we're different. Her style is conclude and conclude. I have a different style because of my background. I will
only stop till death. I cannot share her legal counsel's statement with my own thinking, your Honor.
x x x x71
Even the psychiatrist Dr. Villegas pinpointed the differences of the estranged couple which led to squabbles -
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
Q. Doctor, from your examination of both respondent and petitioner the obligation of trust and respect for each other, how did it not manifest in
this relationship?
A.The respondent [sees] the petitioner as one who's very negativistic on him or who's very demanding and who is also trying to put him down
because according to him, the petitioner would always see his weak points rather than his strong points.
Q. Are you saying that this developed a non-trust just between them?
A None trust. They do not trust each other anymore.1âwphi1 On the part of the petitioner, because of his womanizing activities and on the part of
the respondent, that the petitioner is always looking at his weak points rather than his strong points.
x x x x72
It is significant to note that Marivi failed to substantiate Nilo's penchant for womanizing
as a manifestation of his psychological incapacity. Aside from her bare allegations,
which were chiefly based on what other people told her, she never presented irrefutable
proof to corroborate her claims of his sexual proclivities, i.e., that these proclivities were
already existing before the marriage and during the first years of their marriage. Nilo, on
the other hand, categorically admitted to having extramarital affairs in 1992, 2002, and
2006, the period when the marriage was already on the rocks. Neither is there evidence
of Nilo's alleged oedipal complex, the manifestations of which were not cited by the
experts, that caused the couple to fall out of love.
Anent Marivi's case, based on her family history as reflected in the experts' clinical
evaluation, she grew up in a well-functioning, supportive, and emotionally healthy
family environment. Even Nilo himself attested that she was a good wife and a good
mother to their children. Her demand for attention, time, love, and fidelity is normal for
a wife. The anger she felt within her is also a legitimate reaction.
Yet the psychologist Dr. Encarnacion himself acknowledged that Marivi's so-
called psychological incapacity is in fact, curable. Thus:
Bakunawa
CA: Valid marriage
Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where they were
students and became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel got
married on July 26, 1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 4
Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they lived
with Manuel's parents. While Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies
to help his father in the family's construction business. Manuel was assigned to
provincial projects and came home only during weekends. This setup continued even as
Nora gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho Manuel (Moncho). However, whenever
Manuel came back from his provincial assignments, he chose to spend his limited time
with friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora resented this and they started
quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel depended on his father and on
Nora for their family's needs.5
In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was during this
period th.at Manuel first observed Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody and
mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus, Manuel became more
irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence. 6
On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in
their relationship. Manuel spent most of his time with friends and engaged in drinking
sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom came home. He eventually left
Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered
themselves separated.7
In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. After
Manuel spent a few nights with them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again
and thereafter gave birth to their third child.8
Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified
that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability
and aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas
diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display
of negative attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with Manuel. Her findings
were based on her interview with Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho, because
Nora did not participate in the psychological assessment.10
Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with his common-law wife and
has a son with her, whereas, Nora lives alone in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City. Their
house and lot was already foreclosed following Nora's failure to pay a loan secured by a
mortgage on the said property.11
I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF
°THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES DESPITE MORE THAN CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES TO
PERFORM THEIR MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; and
II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECONSIDER ITS
DECISION DATED MARCH 27, 2014 DESPITE MORE THAN COMPELLING
REASONS FOR THE REVERSAL THEREOF.18
Ruling of the Court
As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of
his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation
report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder
and that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code,19 is solely based on
her interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA
did not err in not according probative value to her psychological evaluation report and
testimony.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,20 the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can be
proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologist's examination and report."21 In Toring v. Toring, et al.,22 the Court stated
that:
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately
related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers
who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about
the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to
the incapacity already present at the time of marriage. 23
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the
spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a
reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to
Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his
parents were married.
The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on
Manuel despite having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated
should be personally examined by a physician, 24 much less be subjected to psychological
tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality
disorder of Manuel could have been established by means of psychometric and
neurological tests which are objective means designed to measure specific aspects of
people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.25
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree26 of the National Tribunal of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel and Nora,
the Court accords the same with great respect but does not consider the same as
controlling and decisive, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.27
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 98579 are AFFIRMED.
Yaptinchay
The problem posed in this, an original petition for certiorari, is whether or not this Court
in the exercise of its supervisory powers should stake down as having been issued in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the respondent judge's order of
June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873 (Court of First Instance of Rizal) directing petitioner
to deliver to Special Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of the estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the North Forbes Park property hereinafter
described, and to refrain from disturbing or interfering in any manner whatsoever with
the latter's possession thereof, such order having been amended by said respondent
judge's subsequent order of June, 28, 1966 in turn enjoining defendants in said case
(private respondents herein) and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives from
selling, disposing, or otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever
pending the termination of said case. We granted the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for and directed respondents to return the possession of the North
Forbes Park property to petitioner upon a P50,000-bond.
On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as Special Administratrix
and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in
Hongkong on July 7, 1965. This is known in the record as Special Proceedings 1944-P.
Petitioner there alleged that the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her
continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years: from
1946 to 1964 at 1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel
Avenue, Pasay City; that the deceased who died without a will left an estate consisting
of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other places
with an estimated value of about P500,000; that to petitioner's knowledge and
information, the deceased left three daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay
Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay, all of age; that on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties
carted away from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to the deceased
together with others exclusively owned by petitioner. It was averred that in these
circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take custody and care of
the interests of the deceased pending appointment of a regular administrator became an
urgent necessity.
Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued on July 17, 1965 an order appointing
herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix of the state of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond.
To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by Josefina Y.
Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children,
of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay,
not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the
settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as
administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a
number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of
integrity. At the same time, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as special administratrix and of
Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse, as regular administratrix.
To give oppositors an opportunity to be heard, the probate court, on July 19, 1965, set
aside its order of July 17, 1965 appointing petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special
administratrix.
On July 30, 1965, after the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-
petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a
P50,000-bond.1awphil.nêt
On August 18, 1965, the special administratrix submitted a preliminary inventory of the
assets of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay. Included amongst these was
"[a] bungalow residential house with swimming pool, situated at Park corner Talisay
Road, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal" adverted to at the start of this opinion.
It was after respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay had been appointed special
administratrix that herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay made her second move.
That was on August 14, 1965. This time, petitioner filed in another branch (Pasig
Branch) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for replevin and for
liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her
cohabitation with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and for damages. This case was docketed as
Civil Case 8873. 1 Pending hearing on the question of the issuance of the writs of
replevin and preliminary injunction prayed for, respondent judge Guillermo E. Torres
issued an order of August 17, 1965 temporarily restraining defendants therein (private
respondents here) and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in the
complaint and from interfering with plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) rights to, and
possession over, amongst others, "the house now standing at North Forbes Park,
Makati, Rizal."
On August 25, 1965, defendants (private respondents herein) resisted the
action, opposed the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary
injunction, mainly upon these propositions: (1) that exclusive jurisdiction over
the settlement of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was already
vested in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch in the special
proceedings heretofore mentioned (Special Proceedings No. 1944-P); (2) that
the present liquidation case was filed to oust said probate court of jurisdiction
over the properties enumerated in this, the second case (Civil Case 8873); and
(3) that plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy of injunction prayed for, her
alleged right sought to be protected thereby being doubtful and still in dispute.
Said defendants (private respondents before this Court) in turn prayed the court for a
writ of preliminary injunction to direct plaintiff (petitioner here) and all others in her
behalf to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever defendant Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay's possession amongst others of the North Forbes Park house and to
order the removal from the premises of said North Forbes Park house of the guards,
agents and employees installed therein by plaintiff; to enjoin plaintiff and her agents
from entering the aforesaid house and any other real property registered in the name of
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and from interfering with or from disturbing the exercise by
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of her rights and powers of administration over the assets
registered in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and/or in the latter's possession at the
time of his death.
Came the herein disputed order of June 15, 1966 issued in said Civil Case 8873, the
pertinent portion of which reads: "From the pleadings as well as the evidence already
submitted and representations made to the court during the arguments, it appears that
one of the properties in dispute is the property located at the corner of Park Road and
Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal which at the time of the death of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was still under construction and it also appears that after
his death said property was among the properties of the deceased placed under the
administration of the special administratrix, the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.
Information has been given that in the evening of August 14, 1965, the plaintiff was
able to dispossess the special administratrix from the premises in question and that
since then she had been in custody of said house.
While the Court is still considering the merits of the application and counter-application
for provisional relief, the Court believes that for the protection of the properties and
considering the Forbes Park property is really under the responsibility of defendant
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her being appointed Special Administratrix of the
estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction of the plaintiff with respect to the Forbes Park
property and the restraining order issued by this Court is lifted. The Court also orders
the plaintiff to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the
defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.
WHEREFORE, upon defendant's filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00, let a writ
of preliminary injunction is requiring the plaintiff, her representatives and agents or
other persons acting in her behalf to deliver the possession of the property located at
the corner of Park Road and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal to the
Special Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, and to refrain from disturbing interfering
in any manner whatsoever defendant's possession thereof.
Which, as aforestated, was amended by the court order of June 28, 1966, which in part
recites:
Considering that the present case treats principally with the liquidation of an alleged
partnership between the plaintiff and the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and considering
further that said house in North Forbes Park is included among the properties in
dispute, the Court hereby clarifies its Order of June 15, 1966 by enjoining the
defendants and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives from selling,
disposing or otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending
the termination of this case.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the June 15, 1966 order was overturned by respondent
judge's order of August 8, 1966, which recites that:
Considering that defendants, principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical
possession of the said properties which were formerly held by the deceased Isidro
Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue of her appointment and under her authority, as
Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.2
The orders of June 15 and August 8, 1966 triggered the present proceedings in this
Court.
1. Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she was occupying the Forbes Park property at
the time of the death of Isidro Yaptinchay, grave abuse of discretion attended
respondent judge's order issuing an injunctive writ transferring possession of said
property to respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.
A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction is not to
be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession and/or control of a
party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been clearly
established. 3 With this as guidepost, petitioner would have been correct if she were
lawfully in possession of the house in controversy when Civil Case 8873 (where the
injunctive writ was issued) was commenced in the Pasig court, and if respondent special
administratrix, to whom the possession thereof was transferred, were without right
thereto. But the situation here is not as petitioner pictures it to be. It is beyond debate
that with the institution on July 13, 1965 of Special Proceedings 1944-P, properties
belonging not only to the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay but also to the conjugal
partnership of said deceased and his legitimate wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, 4 were
brought under the jurisdiction of the probate court, properly to be placed under
administration.5 One such property is the lot at North Forbes Park. 6
With respect to the Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying versions. In the verified
petition before this Court, petitioner avers "that the construction of said North Forbes
Park property was undertaken jointly by petitioner and the deceased, petitioner
even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor." 7 This is a reproduction of an
allegation in petitioner's June 27, 1966 alternative motion for reconsideration or for
clarification/amendment of the herein controverted order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case
8873. 8 And again, in the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay dated August 3, 1965, she
spoke of the acquisition of properties, real and personal, in her own words, "through
our joint efforts and capital, among which properties are those situated" in "North Forbes
Park." 9 All of which contradict her averment in the amended complaint dated October
25, 1965 — also verified — in said Case 8873 to the effect that she "acquired through
her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as ... the house now standing at
North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal." 10
But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner's claim of complete or
even partial ownership of the house. They maintain that the construction of that house
was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay without her (petitioner's)
intervention and the deceased paid with his own personal funds all expenses incurred in
connection with the construction thereof. 11
It was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the fact that after
the death of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the Forbes Park house "was among the properties of
the deceased placed under the administration of" respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay,
that respondent judge issued the injunction order of June 15, 1966 herein complained
of. Worth repeating at this point is that respondent judge, in his order of August 8,
1966, declared that defendants (private respondents herein), "principally Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession", amongst others, of the North Forbes
Park house — "by virtue of her appointment and under her authority, as Special
Administratrix."
On this score, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for below.
2. As well established is the rule that the grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the
sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere
except in a clear case of abuse. 12
A considerate and circumspect view of the facts and circumstances in this case
obtaining will not permit us to tag the disputed order of June 15, 1966 with the vice of
grave abuse of discretion. It is quite true that, in support of the allegation that the house
in North Forbes Park was her exclusive property, petitioner presented proof in the form
of loans that she had contracted during the period when said house was under
construction. But evidence is wanting which would correlate such loans to the
construction work. On the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented
by petitioner which would tend to indicate that the loans she obtained from the
Republic Bank were for purposes other than the construction of the North Forbes Park
home. And this, we gather from pages 17 to 18 of petitioner's memorandum before this
Court; and the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, Annex A thereof, which states in its
paragraph 4 that she obtained various loans from the Republic Bank "for her own
exclusive account" and that the proceeds thereof "were also used by affiant both for her
business and for the construction, completion and furnishing of the said house at North
Forbes Park", and which cites her seven promissory notes in favor of Republic Bank,
Appendices 1 to 7 of said affidavit. Not one of the promissory notes mentioned reveals
use of the proceeds for the construction of the North Forbes Park house. On the
contrary, there is Appendix 2, the promissory note for P54,000 which says that the
purpose of the loan for "Fishpond development"; Appendix 3 for P100,000 for the
same purpose; Appendix 5 for P50,000, "To augment working capital in buying &
selling of appliances & gift items"; and Appendix 7 for P1,090,000, "For Agricultural
Development". In plain terms, the fact alone of petitioner's indebtedness to the
Republic Bank does not establish that said house was built with her own funds.
It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes
Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima
facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of
his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be
under the control of the special administratrix.
3. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of
Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership." .
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged
in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be
shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One such
condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during
cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such
right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in
controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available
the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence of a clear
positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is
not to protect contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract
right. 16
At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better
safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the hands of the
bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject to
the control of the probate court.
Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein petition for
certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction 17 issued
by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Fujiki v. Maranay
RTC: Dismissed on recognition of decree of absolute nullity of marriage based on lack
of personality of petitioner
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).6
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of
Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese
Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on
the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that
"a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment,
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts
marriage. of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or
Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the
Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki
stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by
motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11- status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
reason behind the petition is bigamy."
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also
of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of
the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime
and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59 of the marriage.71
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a
other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen. III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence. spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62 Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under
the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65 bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in
a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled
that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void.
For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry
of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen
CA: Affirmed.
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. 3 In her Petition docketed as
SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each
other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent,
Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was
alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late
father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at
the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC: Directed issuance of letters
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO
QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though
no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the
law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by
contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties
to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights
would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage
may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or
collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory
heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does
not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for
being bigamous—YES.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate
of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the
Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a
competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no
information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of
the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no
longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely
remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been
dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who
are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration
or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship
with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. 29 Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August
2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
RTC: Granted cancellation of entries by R in her marriage contract.
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for
her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted
said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband;
she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her
alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she
could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed
solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in
Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed
husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to
the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a
receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was
used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she
gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina
Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the
marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but
claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to
fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void
ab initio.11
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY
WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE
CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE
WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN
EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be
cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of
marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and
represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s
personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the
wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the
marriage null and void ab initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by
respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in
the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of
entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage
may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a
pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file
his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall
be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of
Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition
filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties
aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where
the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may
be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of
all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although
the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing
that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting
the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The
latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she
was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that
when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared
that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
I documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence"
n filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent
made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged
husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed
that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied
with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the
petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted
where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the
alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner,
testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the
testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from
respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued
identification cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and,
therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in
her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru
Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage.
A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be
filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by
the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented
to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by
1âwp hi1
overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that
she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where
all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the
parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed
sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect
the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing
the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
Morigo v. People
CA: Affirmed
RTC: bigamy guilty
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-
1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990
at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacionalat Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020
could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article
349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the
first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage
was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from
the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article
15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot
be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that
the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such
as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner
committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the
second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be
doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a
conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies
punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference
between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it
does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 [19] of the Family Code,
a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or
not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed
to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good
faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act
of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we
must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency
of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed
decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never
married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were
never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was
not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In
the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as
void.
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need
not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is now moot and academic.
Tenebro v. CA
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy.
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned.
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of
the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988,
with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were
validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.
RTC: Guilty
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS
ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies
the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity,
retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner
argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays
for his acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral,
to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract
between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the
document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister
of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a
handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas
that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a
certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and
(2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no
record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail
the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to
establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of
Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The
marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence
given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National
Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila
on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as
to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent
for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from
the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony
are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of
the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate
that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the
first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-
existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3,
1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution
to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the
Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely
no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would
be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per
se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10,
1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely
because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks
the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are
classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and
their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) 23 and formal
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein
the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in
the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male
or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least
two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to
note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Capili v. People
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y.
Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a
pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC
of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is
declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as
a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view
of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or
incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on
the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of
the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground
that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared
void by the RTC.
RTC: Granted
CA: Remanded
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of
the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present
when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999.
Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged
with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity
of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when
the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that
the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
[private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case,
even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was
void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and
ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further
held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was
committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second
marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
People v. Odtuhan aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. 27 To be sure, a
motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its
CA: Ordered RTC to give due course to and receive evidence on R’s motion to quash fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed 30 except
petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or
of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with double jeopardy.31
Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the
Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all
Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina. 7She thus filed a the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised Penal Code, to
Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy. wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT (2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION (3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR (4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 33
RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT: Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally
I. married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with
SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
OFFENSE. Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is
II. null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a
FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This
RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion
PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23 to quash.34It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without
The petition is meritorious. the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the
v. Cipriano,24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26 information on the basis of the document presented by respondent.35 With the
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001,
respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the
petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that
her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case. prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006,
petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On admission thereof.
June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent
obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for
bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration,
above cases. As in Antone and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do
on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his
liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court’s
marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, pronouncement in Morigo v. People36where the accused therein was acquitted because
however, reached a different conclusion. the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there
the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Logically, the accused was acquitted.
Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence the matter.1âwphi1 A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 37 It has
been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is
a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. 38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. 39 Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and
the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and
hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him.41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the
information against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of
marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we
cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is
the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission
of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished
as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information is material only for determining prescription.42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for
Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to
the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters
of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence. 43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion
to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No.
108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
Go Bangayan v. Bangayan
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of
a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and
Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally)
who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s
family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against
the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During
the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as
a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy
and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a
non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the
properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for
his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and
for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44
registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside
from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37
properties in her answer.
RTC: No bigamy. 2nd marriage void bec no marriage license. 2 nd marriage not bigamous
CA:
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the
trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present
evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s
presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October
2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed
to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented,
disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence
because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence
on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was
clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to
evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the
parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage
to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null
and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence,
she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin,
Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her
as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in
their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that
Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims
that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally
further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his
children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At
the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the
marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that
there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros
confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the
month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued
for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did
not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from
the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and
absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management
and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J.
Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated
marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and
Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes
that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in
Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did
not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code,
a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no
license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar
of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of
Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated
or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of Appeals
did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.In this
case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37
properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted
that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT
No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the
descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin"
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or
both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in
presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of
Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there
must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this
case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice
against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or
former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and
there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract.
However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the
first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what
was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under
Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of
the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The
daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot,
in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage
license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated
by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23
Jocson v. Robles
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, this proceeding is hereby dismissed,
conformable to Section (a) of Revised Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic
appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
Relations Court an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles (Civ.
Case No. E-00013), on the ground that it was bigamous. It was alleged in the amended
complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles
had contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal
action for Bigamy against the same defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Crim. Case No. 64124). Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that during their cohabitation,
she was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature
birth of their first child, who died three days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged
plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to
contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married
man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963 when
he was finally able to get away and live apart from the plaintiff.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that
no genuine issue of fact is involved in the case. It was claimed that defendant's
contention, that his consent to the marriage was secured by force and intimidation
employed upon his person by the relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly supported by the
joint affidavit of plaintiff's father and brother, dated October 28, 1963, attached to the
motion (pp. 22-32, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted the case
for judgment on the pleadings.
On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied,
the court ruling that before it can pass upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when he contracted
marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage.

The evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was
not met in the motion for summary judgment. Defendant's plea to have his marriage
declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation, was also denied, the
court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the
nullification of said marriage. Reconsideration of this order, sought by defendant, was
denied on January 18, 1964. And, when both parties failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing on March 9, 1964, the court directed the dismissal of the action.
On April 17, 1964, defendant notified the court below of his intention to appeal
to this Court from the abovementioned orders of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964,
and March 9, 1964. The appeal bond and amended record on appeal, dated April 15,
1964, were thereafter approved.
On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations
correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph
of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly
prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation
of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for
summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by
the Civil Code.
Tolentino v. Villanueva
Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July 29, 1963 of the respondent
Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his
marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained
through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that
private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with
her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as
immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her
whereabouts remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she
is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge
Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No,
43347 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen
failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a
motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence.
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in
default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his
report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a negative
finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence;
and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the
complaint and such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and
guidance.
On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy
of his complaint.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to
petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other
documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at 10:00 A.M.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose
that he could not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his
evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the
respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of his evidence on the ground that
the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty (60)
days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner
unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to
report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of
the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City
Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New
Civil Code.
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied on
July 29, 1963 and on April 11, 1964, petitioner now files his petition to annul said
order of July 29, 1963 and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his
evidence.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the
rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation
based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in
case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if
none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent
fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2,
shall be observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines,
direct that actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless
the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of
Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1964 Revised Rules,
with "legal separation" being substituted for "divorce", obviously because the present
Civil Code does not authorize absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that
the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the
concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital
interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition
against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more
than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails
to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the
State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds (De Ocampo
vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 38-40; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia de
Cardenas vs. Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79; Roque vs. Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil.
643, 646).
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit.
WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY
AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH COSTS
AGAINST PETITIONER.
Aquino v. Delizo
CA: Affirmed
CFI: Dismissed annulment
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the
ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo,
herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando
Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she was
pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after
their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child
was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to
prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant
neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by her
counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court — noting that NO BIRTH CERTIFICATE was
presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage
between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by
the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage —
dismissed the complaint.
Through a verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff
tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the defendant
on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier
and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was
denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable
neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth
certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception
of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff
and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child
could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or
even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court,
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered,
or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for
new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following
documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's
brother, with whom defendant was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and married
her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from her first
born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he is the father of defendant's
first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy
from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her pregnancy by
Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from plaintiff before and up to the
time of their marriage;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and
defendant lived together as husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date of
plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of
birth to be April 26, 1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant
with Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar
Aquino and defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her NATURAL PLUMPNESS as early as 1952
to as late as November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show
defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four months old at the time
the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo
and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing the Government, to
answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial
until after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an
answer, and stating that it "does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion
and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From
that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition
for certiorari.
GRANT ANNULMENT.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is
ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the
case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which
was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's
claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be
unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement, however,
cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only
more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that
stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent,
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement
of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is
limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if
noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only
on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen
more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by
plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know,
merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage
more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs.
Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives
her subjective and objective symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy
in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery,
etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be
their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or
justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken
together with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to
sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have
denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her
answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion,
especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government
precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and
its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the
circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.
Anaya v. Palaroan
JDR: Dismissed.
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora
and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando
filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered
therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the
validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV)
while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment,"
Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had
pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to
her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely
wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly
commenced . . . frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the
Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them
constituted `FRAUD’, in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of
Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegations in paragraph IV of the
complaint and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he
averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from
her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he
denied having committed any fraud against her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause
of action and estoppel, for her having prayed in Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of
the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been granted her. He
counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did
not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the
alleged moral damages."cralaw virtua1aw library
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she
alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and
pretended to shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so but
because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could evade
marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members of her family were
threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative);
"(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not
because he loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the
marital duties and obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made
up his mind not to live with her;
"(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely
concretized for him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of
the family of the first girl (referent being the close relative) and to convince them of his
intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a courtship with a third girl with whom,
after gaining the latter’s love cohabited and had several children during the whole range
of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated between them (parties);"
(Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26
August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expediente, the court
realized that Aurora’s allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her
marriage, and, on the authority of Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168,
holding:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the
courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation,
or annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no
such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record." —
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be
dismissed. Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the
court found it inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the
dismissal of the complaint; it also denied reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of
his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in
marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the
Civil Code, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;"
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or
species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows
"ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.
Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply,
because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of
action as set forth in his complaint (Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445), there is more reason
not to allow such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply.
Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.

"No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of intention on the husband’s part not to perform his marital duties must have been
marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based
on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as appellant’s wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only
ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one
given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable
marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article
85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for
annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with
"fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating
the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, nondisclosure of a previous
conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to
exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of
the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library

Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is

not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article,
providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-
disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her
consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her
consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which
society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker’s intent being plain, the
Court’s duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.

But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-
divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her husband
with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her
reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying
with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with
her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in ignoring these allegations
in her reply.

This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and
absence of intention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional
"cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations is
"apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the Complaint . . ." (Record on
Jimenez v. Canizares
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the
plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court
of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was
to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the
condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one
day after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a
copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to
the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of
Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see
that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17
December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a
physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity
for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical
certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted
additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with
warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required
doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that
judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage.
In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from
taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court
show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country
are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing
violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with
any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. 1 "Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in
favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.

After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court
entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26
April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus
entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not
been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been
physically examined because she had refused to be examined; that instead of
annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and
that the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who
want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging
impotency of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife
be subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city
attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for
reconsideration was denied.

The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled

on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and
testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint,
was absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested.
The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is
the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about
of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction.
The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law
Lukban v. RP
This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration
that Petitioner is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be
dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not
authorized by law. After Petitioner had presented her evidence, the court sustained the
opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.
Lourdes G. Lukban, Petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on
December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same
year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard
from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his
parents and friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no
knowledge if he is still alive, his last known address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila.
She believes that he is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty
years, and because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined
in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case
of Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 243, wherein it was held that a petition
for judicial declaration that Petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead cannot
be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot
be made in a special proceeding similar to the present, much less can the court
determine the status of Petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity
depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare upon
proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai
Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup. 243).
Appellant also claims that the present petition can be entertained because article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, in defining bigamy, provides that a person commits that crime
if he contracts a second marriage “before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” and, it
is claimed, the present petition comes within the purview of this legal provision. The
argument is untenable for the words “proper proceedings” used in said article can only
refer to those authorized by law such as those which refer to the administration or
settlement of the estate of a deceased person (Articles 390 and 391, new Civil Code).
That such is the correct interpretation of the provision in question finds support in the
case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil., 179, wherein this Court made the following
comment:
“For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has
been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of
the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).”
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in
a proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said
that “A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be
a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot
be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. It is, therefore,
clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.”

Appellant claims that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the present
proceedings because in the case of Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880, it was declared
that a special proceeding is “an application or proceeding to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact”; but, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the
purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the husband, and not, as in the
present case, to establish a presumption of death. If it can be satisfactorily proven
that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a declaration to that effect
as has been intimated in the case of Nicolas Szartraw, supra.
Gue v. Republic
CFI: Dismissed
On November 20, 1957, Angelina L. Gue filed a petition in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Civil Case No. 34303, alleging that she was married to William Gue; that they
had a child named Anthony L. Gue; that January 5, 1946, her husband left Manila
where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China, but since then, he had
not been heard of, neither had he written to her, nor in anyway communicated
with her as to his whereabouts; that despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to
locate him; and that they had not acquired any property during the marriage. She asked
the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of William Gue, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
. From January, 1949, the petitioner had sent letters to her husband in Shanghai, but she
never received any reply thereto. She made inquiries from the Bureau of Immigration in
1955 and 1958 as to whether her husband had already returned to the Philippines and
she received Exhibit D and Exhibit E from said Office, which gave no information as
to the whereabouts of her husband. It was also established by petitioner's testimony that
no properties have been acquired by said spouses during their union, and during which
they begot two children, named Eugeni and Anthony, surnamed Gue.
With this evidence on record and considering the allegations in the petition, it is clear
that no right had been established by the petitioner upon which a judicial decree may be
predicated, and this action is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee, as it is
clear that he did not leave any.
In the case of "Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw", 81 Phil., 461,
a case similar to the present, the Supreme Court held:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does
not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had
acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the
latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is
dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, whether in
an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for
decision to, a special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is
there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner for the final determination of his
right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus,
42 Phil., 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at
securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be
granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is established by law. A
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide
finally the controversy the right or status of a party or established finally a particular
fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such
controversy is decided by a final judgment or such right or status is determined, then
the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of
a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no
collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is,
therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because
he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof cannot reach the state of finality or become final. Proof of
actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven
years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had
not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such a
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for
such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a
superfluous and meaningless act.
"Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as the one prayed for by the
petitioner, if granted, may make or lead her to believe that the marital bonds which
binds her to her husband are torn asunder, and that for that reason she is or may feel
free to enter into a new marriage contract. The framers of the rules of court, by the
presumption provided for in the rule of evidence in question, did not intend and mean
that a judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may be made. A petition
for a declaration such as the one filed in this case may be made in collusion with the
other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be obtained or
granted under the provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be secured
by means of a judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be
presumptively dead. This is another strong reason why a petition such as the one
presented in this case should not be countenanced and allowed. What cannot be
obtained directly under the provisions of the Divorce Law could indirectly be secured
under the provisions of Rule 123, section 69 (x). Obviously, the latter must not be made
to prevail over the former."
In her appeal, Angelina invoked the provisions of the Article 390 of the New Civil
Code, which for purpose of reference, we reproduce below.
ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening this succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
She contends that under Article 191 of the Old Civil Code, which reads:
After thirty years have elapsed since disappearance of the absentee, or since he was last
heard from, or ninety years from his birth, the judgment upon the petition of any party
lawfully interested, shall make an order declaring that such absentee is presumed to be
dead.
a person could be declared presumptively dead, but that said legal provision was
repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure and continued to be repealed by the Rules of
Court. Consequently, only a mere disputable presumption of death was available to any
party, and that the case of Nicolai Szatraw, cited by the trial court, was decided on the
law then existing, namely, the Code of Civil Procedure, and later the new Rules of
Court. However, according to appellant, with the promulgation of the New Civil Code
in 1950, particularly, Article 390 thereof, the Courts are now authorized to declare
persons presumptively dead.
In answer to her contention, the Solicitor General, as appellee herein, correctly cites our
decision in the recent case of Lourdes G. Lukban vs. Republic of the Philippines, 98
Phil., 574; 52 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1441, decided long after the New Civil Code went into
effect, wherein we reiterated the doctrine laid own in Nicolai Szatraw, supra. We quote
the pertinent portions of our decision in that case:
This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration that
petitioner is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead
and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not
authorized by law. After petitioner had presented her evidence, the court sustained the
opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.

We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case
of Nicolai Szatraw, 46 Off. Gaz. 1st Sup. 243, wherein it was held that a petition for
judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made
in a special proceedings similar to the present, much less can the court determine the
status of petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact
of death of the husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to
decree that he is merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szatraw, 48 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup.
243).
The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in
a proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said
that "A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be
a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot
be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass .. It is,
therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because
he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final."
We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The appealed order
dismissing the petition is hereby affirmed, with costs.