REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY COMMANDER RAYMOND ALPUERTO OF THE NAVAL

BASE CAMILLLO OSIAS, PORT SAN VICENTE, STA. ANA, CAGAYAN, Petitioner, v.REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ,
SR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper object of possession.
Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect one's alleged right of possession over the same.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the June 29, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR. CV No. 89968, which dismissed the appeal therewith and affirmed the July 3, 2007 Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 in Spl. Civil Action Case No. 11-2403.

Factual Antecedents

Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian
and charitable activities, established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente,
Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares
of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan which he, with
the help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in
order to support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works.4

On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military
purposes a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000 hectares of the
southern half portion of the Palaui Island were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the
use of the Philippine Navy, subject, however, to private rights if there be any.

More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation No.
447 declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan
as marine reserve. Again subject to any private rights, the entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate
area of 7,415.48 hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine protected area.

On June 13,2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction5 against Rogelio C. Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as Commanding Officer
of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According to him, some members
of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50-
hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15, 2000, they commanded him and his men, through the
use of force and intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance from the Office of the
Philippine Naval Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened with drastic military action
if they do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained to leave the area. In view of these,
Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Biñas
to restore to him possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the said preliminary writ, if
issued, to be made permanent.

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

After the conduct of hearing on the application for preliminary mandatory injunction6 and the parties'
submission of their respective memoranda,7 the RTC issued an Order8 dated February 21, 2002 granting
the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. However, the same pertained to five
hectares (subject area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev.
Cortez, viz.:cralawlawlibrary

It should be noted that the claim of [Rev. Cortez] covers an area of 50 hectares more or less located at the
western portion of Palaui Island which is within the Naval reservation. [Rev. Cortez] presented what he
called as a survey map (Exh. "H") indicating the location of the area claimed by the Church of the Living
God and/or Rev. Claudio Cortez with an approximate area of 50 hectares identified as Exh. "H-4".
However, the Survey Map allegedly prepared by [a] DENR personnel is only a sketch map[,] not a survey
map as claimed by [Rev. Cortez]. Likewise, the exact boundaries of the area [are] not specifically indicated.
The sketch only shows some lines without indicating the exact boundaries of the 50 hectares claimed by
[Rev. Cortez]. As such, the identification of the area and its exact boundaries have not been clearly defined
and delineated in the sketch map. Therefore, the area of 50 hectares that [Rev. Cortez] claimed to have
peacefully and lawfully possessed for the last 38 years cannot reasonably be determined or accurately
identified.

For this reason, there is merit to the contention of [Biñas] that [Rev. Cortez]' claim to the 50 hectares of
land identified as Exh. ["]H-4" is unclear and ambiguous. It is a settled jurisprudence that mandatory
injunction is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury,
where courts of law cannot afford an adequate and commensurate remedy in damages. The right must
be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process
of injunction. The reason for this doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is determined in the light
of the evidence presented, justice and equity demand that the [status quo be maintained] so that no
advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other. And so it was ruled that unless there is a
clear pronouncement regarding ownership and possession of the land, or unless the land is covered by
the torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner, a writ of preliminary injunction
should not issue to take the property out of possession of one party to place it in the hands of another x
x x.

Admittedly, the documentary exhibits of [Rev. Cortez] tended only to show that [he] has a pending
application of patent with the DENR. Even so, [Rev. Cortez] failed to present in evidence the application
for patent allegedly filed by [him] showing that he applied for patent on the entire 50 hectares of land
which he possessed or occupied for a long period of time. Under the circumstances, therefore, the title of
petitioner to the 50 hectares of land in Palaui Island remains unclear and doubtful, and [is] seriously
disputed by the government.

More significantly, at the time that Proc. No. 201 was issued on May 22, 1967, [Rev. Cortez] has not
perfected his right over the 50 hectares of land nor acquired any vested right thereto considering that he
only occupied the land as alleged by him in 1962 or barely five (5) years before the issuance of the
Presidential Proclamation. Proclamation No. 201 had the effect of removing Palaui Island from the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain and therefore the island, as of the date of [the]
Issuance [of the proclamation], has ceased to be disposable public land. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

However, the court is not unmindful that [Rev. Cortez] has lawfully possessed and occupied at least five
(5) hectares of land situated at the western portion of the Palaui Island identified as Exh "H-4". During the
hearing, Cmdr. Rogelio Biñas admitted that when he was assigned as Commanding Officer in December
1999, he went to Palaui Island and [saw only] two (2) baluga families tilling the land consisting of five (5)
hectares. Therefore, it cannot be seriously disputed that [Rev. Cortez] and his baluga tribesmen cleared
five (5) hectares of land for planting and cultivation since 1962 on the western portion identified as Exhibit
"H-4". The Philippine Navy also admitted that they have no objection to settlers of the land prior to the
Presidential Proclamation and [Rev. Cortez] had been identified as one of the early settlers of the area
before the Presidential Proclamation. The DENR also acknowledged that [Rev. Cortez] has filed an
application for patent on the western area and that he must be allowed to pursue his claim.

Although the court is not persuaded by the argument of [Rev. Cortez] that he has already acquired vested
rights over the area claimed by him, the court must recognize that [Rev. Cortez] may have acquired some
propriety rights over the area considering the directive of the DENR to allow [Rev. Cortez] to pursue his
application for patent. However, the court wants to make clear that the application for patent by [Rev.
Cortez] should be limited to an area not to exceed five (5) hectares situated at the western portion of x x
x Palaui Island identified in the sketch map as Exh. "H-4." This area appears to be the portion where [Rev.
Cortez] has clearly established his right or title by reason of his long possession and occupation of the
land.9chanrobleslaw

In his Answer,10 Biñas countered that: (1) Rev. Cortez has not proven that he has been in exclusive, open,
continuous and adverse possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner; (2) Rev. Cortez has
not shown the exact boundaries and identification of the entire lot claimed by him; (3) Rev. Cortez has
not substantiated his claim of exemption from Proclamation No. 201; (4) under Proclamation No. 447, the
entire Palaui Island, which includes the land allegedly possessed and occupied by Rev. Cortez, was
reserved as a marine protected area; and, (4) injunction is not a mode to wrest possession of a property
from one person by another.

Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.

On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision11 making the injunction final and permanent. In so ruling,
the said court made reference to the Indigenous Peoples' [Fight] Act (EPRA) as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Indigenous [Peoples' Right] Act should be given effect in this case. The affected community belongs
to the group of indigenous people which are protected by the State of their rights to continue in their
possession of the lands they have been tilling since time immemorial. No subsequent passage of law or
presidential decrees can alienate them from the land they are tilling.12

Ultimately, the RTC held, thus:cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.

x x x x

SO DECIDED.13chanrobleslaw

Representing Biñas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Notice of Appeal14 which was given
due course by the RTC in an Order15 dated August 6, 2007.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its brief,16 the OSG pointed out that Rev. Cortez admitted during trial that he filed the Petition for
injunction on behalf of the indigenous cultural communities in Palaui Island and not in his capacity as
pastor or missionary of the Church of the Living God. He also claimed that he has no interest over the
land. Based on these admissions, the OSG argued that the Petition should have been dismissed outright
on the grounds that it did not include the name of the indigenous cultural communities that Rev. Cortez
is supposedly representing and that the latter is not the real party-in-interest. In any case, the OSG averred
that Rev. Cortez failed to show that he is entitled to the issuance of the writ of injunction. Moreover, the
OSG questioned the RTC's reference to the EPRA and argued that it is not applicable to the present case
since Rev. Cortez neither alleged in his Petition that he is claiming rights under the said act nor was there
any showing that he is a member of the Indigenous Cultural Communities and/or the Indigenous Peoples
as defined under the IPRA.

In its Decision17 dated June 29, 2011, the CA upheld the RTC's issuance of a final injunction based on the
following ratiocination:cralawlawlibrary

The requisites necesary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the existence of a clear
and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage. Here, [Rev. Cortez] has shown the existence of a clear and unmistakable right
that must be protected and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Records reveal that [Rev. Cortez] has been in peaceful possession and occupation of the western portion
of Palaui Island, Sitio Siwangag, San Vicente, Sta. Ana[J Cagayan since 1962 or prior to the issuance of
Proclamation Nos. 201 and 447 in 1967 and 1994, respectively. There he built an orphanage and a school
for the benefit of the members of the Dumagat Tribe, in furtherance of his missionary and charitable
works. There exists a clear and unmistakable right in favor [of Rev. Cortez] since he has been in open,
continuous and notorious possession of a portion of Palaui island. To deny the issuance of a writ of
injunction would cause grave and irreparable injury to [Rev. Cortez] since he will be displaced from the
said area which he has occupied since 1962. It must be emphasized that Proclamation Nos. 201 and 447
stated that the same are subject to private rights, if there be [any]. Though Palaui Island has been declared
to be part of the naval reservation and the whole [i]sland as a marine protected area, both recognized the
existence of private rights prior to the issuance of the same.

From the foregoing, we rule that the trial court did not err when it made permanent the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that if after the trial of the action
it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the
court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the
commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory
injunction.18chanrobleslaw

Anent the issue of Rev. Cortez not being a real party-in-interest, the CA noted that this was not raised
before the RTC and therefore cannot be considered by it. Finally, with respect to the RTC's mention of the
IPRA, the CA found the same to be a mere obiter dictum.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premise[s] considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed 3 July 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 in Civil Case No. 11-2403 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.19
chanrobleslaw

Hence, this Petition brought by the OSG on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic).

The Issue

The ultimate issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory
injunction.

The Parties' Arguments

The bone of contention as the OSG sees it is the injunctive writ since Rev. Cortez failed to prove his clear
and positive right over the 5-hectare portion of Palaui Island covered by the same. This is considering that
by his own admission, Rev. Cortez started to occupy the said area only in 1962. Hence, when the property
was declared as a military reserve in 1967, he had been in possession of the 5-hectare area only for five
years or short of the 30-year possession requirement for a bona fideclaim of ownership under the law.
The OSG thus argues that the phrase "subject to private rights" as contained in Proclamation No. 201 and
Proclamation No. 447 cannot apply to him since it only pertains to those who have already complied with
the requirements for perfection of title over the land prior to the issuance of the said proclamations.

Rev. Cortez, for his part, asserts that the arguments of the OSG pertaining to ownership are all immaterial
as his Petition for injunction does not involve the right to possess based on ownership but on the
right of possession which is a right independent from ownership. Rev. Cortez avers that since he has been
in peaceful and continuous possession of the subject portion of Palaui Island, he has the right of
possession over the same which is protected by law. He asserts that based on this right, the writ of
injunction was correctly issued by the RTC in his favor and aptly affirmed by the CA. On the technical side,
Rev. Cortez avers that the Republic has no legal personality to assail the CA Decision through the present
Petition since it was not a party in the appeal before the CA.

The Court's Ruling

We grant the Petition.

For starters, the Court shall distinguish a preliminary injunction from a final injunction.

"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular
act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, [as in this case,] or to refrain from doing a particular
act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction."20 "It may be the main action or merely a provisional
remedy for and as an incident in the main action."21

"The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction."22 A preliminary injunction does not determine the merits of a case or decide controverted
facts.23 Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties are settled.24 "It is usually granted when it is
made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing
an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy
the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case."25 A
preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final
order.26 For its issuance, the applicant is required to show, at least tentatively, that he has a right which is
not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction.27Simply stated, the applicant needs only to
show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.28 On the other hand,
the main action for injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a final injunction.29 A final injunction is one
which perpetually restrains the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of an act,
or in case of mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary mandatory injuction.30 It is
issued when the court, after trial on the merits, is convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the act
or acts complained of permanently enjoined.31 Otherwise stated, it is only after the court has come up
with a definite pronouncement respecting an applicant's right and of the act violative of such right, based
on its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final injunction is issued. To be a basis for a final and
permanant injunction, the right and the act violative thereof must be established by the applicant with
absolute certainty.32

What was before the trial court at the time of the issuance of its July 3, 2007 Decision is whether a final
injunction should issue. While the RTC seemed to realize this as it in fact made the injunction permanent,
the Court, however, finds the same to be wanting in basis.

Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow distinction between a preliminary injunction and a final
injunction. Despite this, the RTC apparently confused itself. For one, what it cited in its Decision were
jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction and/or mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ and not
as a final injunction. At that point, the duty of the RTC was to determine, based on the evidence presented
during trial, if Rev. Cortez has conclusively established his claimed right (as opposed to preliminary
injunction where an applicant only needs to at least tentatively show that he has a right) over the subject
area. This is considering that the existence of such right plays an important part in determining whether
the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction should be confirmed. Surprisingly, however, the said
Decision is bereft of the trial court's factual findings on the matter as well as of its analysis of the same
vis-a-vis applicable jurisprudence. As it is, the said Decision merely contains a restatement of the parties'
respective allegations in the Complaint and the Answer, followed by a narration of the ensuing
proceedings, an enumeration of the evidence submitted by Rev. Cortez, a recitation of jurisprudence
relating to preliminary injunction and/or specifically, to mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ, a short
reference to the IPRA which the Court finds to be irrelevant and finally, a conclusion that a final and
permanent injunction should issue. No discussion whatsoever was made with respect to whether Rev.
Cortez was able to establish with absolute certainty his claimed right over the subject
area.cralawlawlibrary

Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision, judgment or final order determining the merits of
the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based. Pertinently, the Court
issued on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which requires judges to make complete findings
of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusion without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced.33
chanrobleslaw
Clearly, the Decision of the RTC in this case failed to comply with the aforestated guidelines.

In cases such as this, the Court would normally remand the case to the court a quo for compliance with
the form and substance of a Decision as required by the Constitution. In order, however, to avoid further
delay, the Court deems it proper to resolve the case based on the merits.34

"Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the
acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right."35 Thus, it is necessary that
the Court initially determine whether the right asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed,
it is necessary that such right must have been established by him with absolute certainty.

Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive writ based on the right of possession (jus
possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous possession of the subject area since 1962. He avers
that as this right is protected by law, he cannot be peremptorily dispossessed therefrom, or if already
dispossessed, is entitled to be restored in possession. Hence, the mandatory injunctive writ was correctly
issued in his favor.

Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner36 is one of the two concepts of possession
provided under Article 52537 of the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse possession,38 this kind of
possession is one which can ripen into ownership by prescription.39 As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez,
a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a
just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. In the same manner, the law endows every
possessor with the right to be respected in his possession.41

It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated
may be the object of possession.42 The following cannot be appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed:
property of the public dominion, common things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and things
specifically prohibited by law.43

Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public
domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.44 Hence, "[a]ll lands
not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public
lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons."45 To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring
the land as alienable and disposable must be established.46

In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared
alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as
still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject
of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez' claimed right of
possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept
of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot
be lawfully possessed in the first place.

The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201 and Proclamation No. 447 were made subject to private
rights. The Court stated in Republic v. Bacas,47viz.:cralawlawlibrary

Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting 'private rights.' InRepublic v. Estonilo, where
the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4319 was part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation and,
therefore, not registrable, it noted theproviso in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 requiring the
reservation to be subject to private rights as meaning that persons claiming rights over the reserved land
were not precluded from proving their claims. Stated differently, the said proviso did not preclude the LRC
from determining whether x x x the respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property.

As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from the military
reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject properties were alienable or disposable land
of the public domain priorto its withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military
purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is primordial importance because it is
determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the
Torrens system. Without first determining the nature and character of the land, all other requirements
such as length and nature of possession and occupation over such land do not come into play. The
required length of possession does not operate when the land is part of the public domain.

In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the proclamation, the subject
lands were already private lands. They merely relied on such 'recognition' of possible private rights. In
their application, they alleged that at the time of their application, they had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land for at least thirty (30) years and became
its owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation or showing that the government had earlier
declared it open for sale or settlement, or that it was already pronounced as inalienable and
disposable.48chanrobleslaw

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively establish his claimed right
over the subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.

Anent the technical issue raised by Rev. Cortez, i.e, that the Republic has no personality to bring this
Petition since it was not a party before the CA, the Court deems it prudent to set aside this procedural
barrier. After all, "a party's standing before [the] Court is a [mere] procedural technicality which may, in
the exercise of [its] discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised."49

We note that Rev. Cortez alleged that he sought the injunction so that he could continue his humanitarian
works. However, considering that inalienable public land was involved, this Court is constrained to rule in
accordance with the aforementioned.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV
No. 89968 denying the appeal and affirming the July 3, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan-Branch 08 in Spl. Civil Action Case No. 11-2403, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
final injunction issued in this case is ordered DISSOLVED and the Petition for Injunction in Spl. Civil Action
Case No. II-2403, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtu

G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY AKLAN NATIONAL
COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) AND DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, IN HER CAPACITY AS ANCF
SUPERINTENDENT, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, NAMELY: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO
S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L.
SIN, AND CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) AND
DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, IN HER CAPACITY AS ANCF SUPERINTENDENT,Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA
LACHICA SIN, NAMELY: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S.
YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, AND CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO–DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 65244 dated
February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil
Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in
Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the
portion of land being claimed by respondents.

Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade,
in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late
Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington,
Aklan, and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, containing
an approximate area of FIFTY[–]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square meters, more or less,
as per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by Dumlog Creek; on the
East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and on the West by Amado Cayetano and
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701
(1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00.2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against Lucio
Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for recovery of
possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a
41,231–square meter–portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud
of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF
reservation.

The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject
of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land
within the area, which included said portion of private respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation
for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject parcel
of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and Lucio Arquisola,
who retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then
the designated Officer–in–Charge of ANCF.

The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of the enactment
of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first–level courts. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).

Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land from
their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin
acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit “B”), and then developed the same
by planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said
land until her death in 1945.

In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was occupied by ANCF
and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that
they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area
was a swampy land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession, respondents
presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.

On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the owner and possessor
of the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of the same from the
Civil Reservation of the Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated
March 31, 1981.

It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual damages for the
unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when the
same has been converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly
beginning the year 1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in question.

It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php10,000.00 for
attorney’s fees and costs of this suit.3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh. “LL”) shows that
the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the land
covered by Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on December
22, 1960 (Exh. “4–D”). The MCTC observed that the phrase “Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415” was printed
on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. “6”),
indicating that the disputed land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v. Court of Appeals4where it
was pronounced that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.
The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later
included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the
President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all persons to
depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who has settled
thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been
previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are void. (Underscoring from the MCTC, citations
omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to depart from the
reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to private rights if there are any.

The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and their
predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title, which
should be respected and protected.

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.

On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving Appellant Ricardo Andres
from the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. All other details of the appealed decision are affirmed
in toto.5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by private individuals prior
to its issuance on March 31, 1981.

The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on appeal unless the court
below has overlooked some facts of substance that may alter the results of its findings. The RTC, however,
absolved the Superintendent of the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on record that he acted
with malice or in bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074.6

Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as the new
Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review. The
petition was docketed as CA–G.R. SP No. 65244.

On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was likewise declared
a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands adjoining to that of
the private respondents, which are also within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates
of title, the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural, and therefore
disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.

It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the subject property
from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15, 1932, or 28 years
before the said landholding was declared a timberland on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the
possession of the previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed property, it does not
tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property had been privately possessed for more than
30 years before it was declared a timberland. This being the case, the said possession has ripened into an
ownership against the State, albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this
should come under the meaning of “private rights” under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed
segregated from the mass of civil reservation granted to petitioner.7 (Citation omitted.)
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM
TO SUPPOSED “PRIVATE RIGHTS” OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS
CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND
BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO
THEM.8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the Minister of Natural
Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to
private rights, if any there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares, situated
in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines, designated Parcels I and II on the
attached BFD Map CR–203, x x x [.]9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to
the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the above proclamation thereon. Theprivate
right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the
subject property, through their predecessors–in–interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a
timberland on December 22, 1960.

At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a
quo apparently treated respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and
declaration of ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if respondents complied
with the requirements therefor.

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors–in–interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.10

With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable and
disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject land was
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically
objects, alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and
that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held in the fairly recent
case of Valiao v. Republic12:
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter
how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the same province of
Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under
the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 3–82
was issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondents–claimants in said case filed a petition
for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
3–82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes. The respondents claim that through their predecessors–in–interest, they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with this Court,
President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four
hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty–eight and
96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitioner–claimants and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification
of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their “prior vested right” over portions of Boracay
which they allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated with the
petition for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3–82.

This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis–à–vis the right of the claimants to lands they claim to have
possessed since time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only
to those lands which have been “officially delimited and classified.”

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There
must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well–nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.14 (Emphases
in the original; citations omitted.)
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that the
subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to
the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the
presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the conclusion of this Court
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,15 wherein we held:
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public
forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was
furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the members of this Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court were in disagreement as to whether lands declared
alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There
was, however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.

In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and
by their predecessors–in–interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly,
respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as
to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to
reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No.
1181 (4390) for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional
Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New
Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the Aklan National College
of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Civil
Case No. 1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193964, December 02, 2015

ENGINEER BEN Y. LIM, RBL FISHING CORPORATION, PALAWAN AQUACULTURE CORPORATION, AND
PENINSULA SHIPYARD CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HON. SULPICIO G. GAMOSA, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE,
NCIP REGIONAL HEARING OFFICE, REGION IV AND TAGBANUA INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITY
OF BARANGAY BUENAVISTA, CORON, PALAWAN, AS REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO P. AGUIDO, ERNESTO
CINCO, BOBENCIO MOSQUERA, JURRY CARPIANO, VICTOR BALBUTAN, NORDITO ALBERTO, EDENG
PESRO, CLAUDINA BAQUID, NONITA SALVA, AND NANCHITA ALBERTO, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

While we recognize the rights of our Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)
as determined in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), we delineate, in this case, the jurisdiction of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as provided in Section 661 of the IPRA.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98268 which denied the petition for certiorari of petitioners Engr. Ben
Y. Lim, RBL Fishing Corporation, Palawan Aquaculture Corporation, and Peninsula Shipyard Corporation.
Affirmed, then, is the Resolution3 of the NCIP in NCIP Case No. RHO 4-01-2006.

Respondent Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of Barangay Buenavista, Coron, Palawan,

represented by individual respondents Fernando P. Aguido, Ernesto Cinco, Bobencio Mosquera, Jurry
Carpiano, Victor Balbutan, Nordito Alberto, Edeng Pesro, Claudina Baquid, Nonita Salva, and Nanchita
Alberto, filed a petition before the NCIP against petitioners for "Violation of Rights to Free and Prior and
Informed Consent (FPIC) and Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with Prayer for the Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order."4

Thereafter, the NCIP issued an Order dated 20 October 2006 and directing the issuance and service of
summons, and setting the preliminary conference and initial hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order on 22 November 2006 and the conduct of an ocular inspection of the subject
area on the following day, 23 November 2006.

Despite a motion to dismiss being a prohibited pleading under the NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03,
petitioners moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds:

1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition because [petitioners] are not
members of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples;

2) Lack of jurisdiction over the persons of [petitioners], because summons were served by mail
rather than by personal service;
 3) Lack of cause of action, because there is no allegation in the petition or document attached
thereto showing that [respondents] were indeed authorized by the purported Tagbanua
Indigenous Cultural Community, and no Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title has as yet been
issued over the claim; [and]

4) Violation of the rule against forum shopping because [respondents] have already filed criminal
cases also based on the same alleged acts before the Municipal Trial Court of Coron-Busuanga.5
Not contented with their filing of a Motion to Dismiss, petitioners, by way of special appearance, filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings, arguing that "considering the nature of the issues raised [in the Motion
to Dismiss], particularly, the issue on jurisdiction, it is imperative that the [Motion to Dismiss] be resolved
first before other proceedings could be conducted in the instant case."6

On 30 November 2006, the NCIP issued a Resolution7 denying the motion to dismiss. While affirming that
a Motion to Dismiss is prohibited under Section 29 of the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure
before the NCIP, the NCIP squarely ruled that: (1) it had jurisdiction over the petition filed by respondents;
(2) it acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners; (3) it was premature to rule on the issue of lack
of cause of action; and (4) respondents did not violate the rule on forum shopping.8

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the
appellate court, seeking to reverse, annul and set aside the NCIP's twin resolutions for being tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

As previously stated, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the resolutions
of the NCIP. The appellate court echoed the NCIP's stance that from the wording of Section 66 of the IPRA,
the NCIP was bestowed with an all-encompassing grant of jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs and that the requirement in the proviso contained in the section, i.e., obtaining
a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders that the parties had exhausted all remedies provided
under their customary law prior to the filing of an action, applied only to instances where both parties
were members of an ICC/IP.

The NCIP also cited Section 14 of its own Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP
which provides exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under customary
laws, such as where one of the parties is: (1) either a public or private corporation, partnership, association
or juridical person or a public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance
of his official functions; and (2) a non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/ICC. In all, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the NCIP's resolution that when a claim or dispute involves rights of the IPs/ICCs, the
NCIP has jurisdiction over the case regardless of whether the opposing party is a non-IP/ICC.

Adamant, petitioners appeal to us by a petition for review on certiorari, echoing the same issues raised
before the appellate court:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT x x x THE [NCIP HAS] JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION x
x x;
 II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS
IN HOLDING THAT x x x THE [NCIP] ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE
PETITIONERS; and

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT x x x RESPONDENTS HAVE CAUSE/S OF ACTION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.9

Notably, petitioners have dropped their issue that respondents are guilty of forum shopping.

At the outset, we note that none of the petitioners, the NCIP, and the appellate court have proffered an
argument, and opined, on the specific nature of the jurisdiction of the NCIP, whether such is primary and
concurrent with courts of general jurisdiction, and/or original and exclusive, to the exclusion of regular
courts.

In the main, petitioners argue that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the petition filed by
respondents because they (petitioners) are non-IPs/ICCs. Essentially, they interpret the jurisdiction of the
NCIP as limited to claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both opposing parties are
IPs/ICCs.

On the other hand, the NCIP and the appellate court rely mainly on the wording of Section 66 of the IPRA
and the averred purpose for the law's enactment, "to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the
rights of the indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral land and to correct a grave historical
injustice to our indigenous people."10 According to the two tribunals, "[a]ny interpretation that would
restrict the applicability of the IPRA law exclusively to its members would certainly leave them open to
oppression and exploitation by outsiders."11 The NCIP and the appellate court maintain that Section 66
does not distinguish between a dispute among members of ICCs/IPs and a dispute involving ICC/IP
members and non-members. Thus, there is no reason to draw a distinction and limit the NCIP's jurisdiction
over "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs."12 Effectively, even without asseverating it, the
two tribunals interpret the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP as primary, original and exclusive, in
all cases and instances where the claim or dispute involves rights of IPs/ICCs, without regard to whether
one of the parties is non-IP/ICC.

In addition, the NCIP promulgated its rules and regulations such as NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03
dated 9 April 2003, known as the "Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP," and
Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014, known as "The 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples." Sections 5 and 1, respectively of both the 2003 and 2014
Administrative Circular, Rule III, provide for the jurisdiction of the NCIP Regional Hearing Officer (RHO),
thus:
Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation,
enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of
ICCs/IPs;
 c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or
desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

We first dispose of the primordial question on the nature and scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction as provided
in the IPRA. Specifically, the definitive issue herein boils down to whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited
to cases where both parties are ICCs/IPs or primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or original
and exclusive, to the exclusion of the regular courts, on all matters involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

We are thus impelled to discuss jurisdiction and the different classes thereof.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority, conferred by the Constitution and by statute, to hear and decide
a case.13 The authority to decide a cause at all is what makes up jurisdiction.

Section 66 of the IPRA, the law conferring jurisdiction on the NCIP, reads:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be
brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in
the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis supplied).
The conferment of such jurisdiction is consistent with state policy averred in the IPRA which recognizes
and promotes all the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of the constitution. Such is likewise reflected
in the mandate of the NCIP to "protect and promote the interest and wellbeing of the ICCs/IPs with due
regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and[,] institutions".14

In connection thereto, from Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank,15 we learned that the
provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of
quasi-judicial powers an administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency.

Plainly, the NCIP is the "primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation
of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the
recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto."16Nonetheless, the creation of such
government agency does not per se grant it primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction, excluding
the regular courts from taking cognizance and exercising jurisdiction over cases which may involve rights
of ICCs/IPs.

Recently, in Unduran et al. v. Aberasturi et al.,17 we ruled that Section 66 of the IPRA does not endow the
NCIP with primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs. Based on the qualifying proviso, we held that the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and
disputes occur only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. Since two
of the defendants therein were not IPs/ICCs, the regular courts had jurisdiction over the complaint in that
case.

In his concurring opinion in Unduran, Justice Jose P. Perez submits that the jurisdiction of the NCIP ought
to be definitively drawn to settle doubts that still linger due to the implicit affirmation done inThe City
Government ofBaguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al.18 of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one
of the parties are not ICCs/IPs.

In Unduran and as in this case, we are hard pressed to declare a primary and/or exclusive and original
grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs where there is no
clear intendment by the legislature.

Significantly, the language of Section 66 is only clear on the nature of the claim and dispute as involving
rights of ICCs/IPs, but ambiguous and indefinite in other respects. While using the word "all" to quantify
the number of the "claims and disputes" as covering each and every claim and dispute involving rights of
ICCs/IPs, Section 66 unmistakably contains a proviso, which on its face restrains or limits the initial
generality of the grant of jurisdiction.

Unduran lists the elements of the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP: (1) the claim and dispute involve the
right of ICCs/IPs; and (2) both parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws.
Both elements must be present prior to the invocation and exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction.

Thus, despite the language that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs, we cannot be confined to that first alone and therefrom deduce primary sole NCIP jurisdiction
over all ICCs/IPs claims and disputes to the exclusion of the regular courts. If it were the intention of the
legislative that: (1) the NCIP exercise primary jurisdiction over, and/or (2) the regular courts be excluded
from taking cognizance of, claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the legislature could have easily
done so as in other instances conferring primary, and original and exclusive jurisdiction to a specific
administrative body. We will revert to this point shortly but find it pertinent to first discuss the classes of
jurisdiction.

Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and authority vested by the
Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific
competence.19 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents the court from arrogating unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed with special
competence.20 In one occasion, we have held that regular courts cannot or should not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before the
question is resolved by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.21The objective of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question arising in the proceeding
before the court.22

Additionally, primary jurisdiction does not necessarily denote exclusive jurisdiction.23 It applies where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.24 In some instances, the Constitution and statutes grant
the administrative body primary jurisdiction, concurrent with either similarly authorized government
agencies or the regular courts, such as the distinct kinds of jurisdiction bestowed by the Constitution and
statutes on the Ombudsman.

The case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice25delineated
primary and concurrent jurisdiction as opposed to original and exclusive jurisdiction vested by both the
Constitution and statutes26 on the Ombudsman concurrent, albeit primary, with the Department of
Justice.

Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz.:

SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.

does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving
public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly
declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same
Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise
of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.

Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989
to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order
No. 8, dated November 8, 1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any public officer or
employee including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, with an act or omission
alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman case. Such a complaint may be the
subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or both.

For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be
subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts
wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute,
such cases.

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be exercised
by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor
or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and
supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular Courts, the control and
supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The
law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative
agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the authority to
investigate cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell
on the nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is
directed to the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically
provides that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the
provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in 1990, the Court expressly
declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of investigation
including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.

Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act, the
Court held in said case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage from any investigatory agency
of the government, the investigation of such cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the
provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial court.

In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct preliminary investigation
of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of the government duly
authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such
investigation in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.

A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo, pronounced that the Ombudsman, under the
authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed
by a public official, elucidating thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to "act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate
x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient." (Sec. 1[3]). The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned,"
in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official x x x and to
recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 1[3]).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the
public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law
does not distinguish, neither should we.

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to
penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and
through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to
create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether
or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of
their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any
officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).

Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special body to
investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of
minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude
those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is the
investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body,
like the Ombudsman, is greatest.

At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in theCojuangco, Jr. case
and the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court
elucidated on the nature of the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.

In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, that while it may be true that the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official, the authority of
the Ombudsman to investigate is merely a primary and not an exclusive authority,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to investigate and
prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we held only two years ago in the
case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."

Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed the
approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended information here did
not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary
at all. In Deloso v. Domingo; 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to
investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e.; any crime imputed to
a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any
[illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged, i.e.; the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-
involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal
consequence upon the authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or
amended information.

In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice in connection
with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth
cases, may conduct the investigation.

In Natividad v. Felix, a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended that it is the
Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation
over his case for alleged Murder, the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo v. Domagas and Sanchez
v. Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we feel the need for tracing the history of the legislation
relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on
the cases cognizable by the former.

In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the subject matter, has been
in a state of flux.

These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, - the first law on the
Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.

The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows:
'SEC. A. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

. . .

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporation, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000: PROVIDED,

HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law
does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000 shall be tried by
the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4(a)(2) for an offense
to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must
be in relation to his office and than penalty prescribed be higher then prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.

Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been met, the
first requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
would reveal that the crime committed by public officers or employees must be "in relation to their office"
if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree
No. 1468, has been retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can
acquire primary jurisdiction on its power to investigate.

It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pah materia to Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the
1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's
power to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari
materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object,
or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.

It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with
itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent
and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretand," or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and
13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be taken into
consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers had in mind
previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or amendment,
the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute,
specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.

R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D. 1861) likewise
provides that for other offenses, aside from those enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public officers or
employees in relation to their office.

In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating
agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases
against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction[,] take over at any stage.

x x x x
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges
against any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city
prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the
OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's
authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes
under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in
the Natividad case as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate
the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first
place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the
investigation.27 (Emphasis supplied)
In contrast to our holding in Honasan II, the NCIP cannot be said to have even primary jurisdiction over all
the ICC/IP cases comparable to what the Ombudsman has in cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. We do not find such specificity in the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP in Section 66
of the IPRA.

Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

Thus, we revert to the point on the investiture of primary and/or original and exclusive jurisdiction to an
administrative body which in all instances of such grant was explicitly provided in the Constitution and/or
the enabling statute, to wit:
1. Commission on Elections' exclusive original jurisdiction over all elections contests; 28

2. Securities and Exchange Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases enumerated
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A,29 prior to its transfer to courts of general jurisdiction or
the appropriate Regional Trial Court by virtue of Section 4 of the Securities Regulation Code;

3. Energy Regulatory Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases contesting rates, fees,
fines, and penalties imposed by it in the exercise of its powers, functions and responsibilities;30

4. Department of Agrarian Reform's31 primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters, and its exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);32

5. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
involving contracts of construction, whether government or private, as long as the parties agree to submit
the same to voluntary arbitration;33

6. Voluntary arbitrator's or panel of voluntary arbitrator's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining
agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies; 34

7. The National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC's) original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases listed
in Article 217 of the Labor Code involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural; and

8. Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration's primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all
deportation cases.35ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving
rights of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs
and customary law to govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs. In fact, even the IPRA itself recognizes that
customs and customary law cannot be applied to non-IPs/ICCs since ICCs/IPs are recognized as a distinct
sector of Philippine society. This recognition contemplates their difference from the Filipino majority, their
way of life, how they have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory. The ICCs/IPs share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive
cultural traits, which by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-
indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority. ICCs/IPs also
include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been
displaced from their traditional territories, or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.36

In all, the limited or special jurisdiction of the NCIP, confined only to a special cause involving rights of
IPs/ICCs, can only be exercised under the limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.

To effect the IPRA and its thrust to recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of
the Constitution goes hand in hand with the IPRA's running theme of the primary distinctiveness of
customary laws, and its application to almost all aspects of the lives of members of the IPs/ICCs, including
the resolution of disputes among ICCs/IPs. The NCIP was created under the IPRA exactly to act on and
resolve claims and disputes involving the tights of ICCs/IPs.37

Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz, the first challenge to the IPRA,
emphasizes the primacy of customs and customary law in the lives of the members of ICCs/IPs:
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of law.
Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal
provision is applicable. In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom,
when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to
ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and
coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land
registration38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Once again, the primacy of customs and customary law sets the parameters for the NCIP's limited and
special jurisdiction and its consequent application in dispute resolution.39 Demonstrably, the proviso in
Section 66 of the IPRA limits the jurisdiction of the NCIP to cases of claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs where both parties are ICCs/IPs because customs and customary law cannot be made to apply to
non-ICCs/IPs within the parameters of the NCIP's limited and special jurisdiction.

Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to this special and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the
dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a
controversy involving, as well, rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a court of general
jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and non-
members of ICCs ought to be excepted from the NCIP's competence since it cannot determine the right-
duty correlative, and breach thereof, between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the
controversy necessarily contemplating application of other laws, not only customs and customary law of
the ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based
on customs and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law
for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.

In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,40 we delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
specifically paragraph 3 thereof, as all money claims of workers, limited to "cases arising from employer-
employee relations." The same clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it
exists today but the Court ruled that such was a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, thus:
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission is outlined in Article 217
of the Labor Code x x x:
"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission
of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;

3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or

underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees'
compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;

4. Cases involving household services; and

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters."
While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the
entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been
absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the first place, paragraph 3
should not [be] read not in isolation from but rather within the context formed by paragraph 1 (relating
to unfair labor practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and conditions of
employment), paragraph 4 (claims relating to household services, a particular species of employer-
employee relations), and paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities prohibited to employees or to
employers). It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that
is, that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee
relationship. This is, in other words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be [used] in
clarifying the scope of paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended.
We reach the above conclusion from an examination of the terms themselves of Article 217, as last
amended by B.P. Blg. 227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of the Labor Code expressly
brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC "cases arising from employer-employee
relations," which clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today. For
it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their
employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the
regular courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction
of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The court, therefore, believes and so
holds that the "money claims of workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money claims
which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or incident
of such relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable causal
connection with the employer-employee relationship.
Clearly, the phraseology of "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" does not necessarily grant
the NCIP all-encompassing jurisdiction whenever the case involves rights of ICCs/IPs without regard to the
status of the parties, i.e, whether the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs.

In Union Glass & Container Corp., et al. v. SEC, et al.,41 we learned to view the bestowal of jurisdiction in
the light of the nature and the function of the adjudicative body that was granted jurisdiction, thus:
This grant of jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the nature and function of the SEC under the law.
Section 4 of PD No. 902-A confers upon the latter "absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
corporations, partnerships or associations, who are grantees of primary franchise and/or license or permit
issued by the government to operate in the Philippines x x x." The principal function of the SEC is the
supervision and control over corporations, partnerships and associations with the end in view that
investrnent in these entities may be encouraged and protected, and their activities pursued for the
promotion of economic development.

It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of the SEC must be exercised. Thus the law explicitly
specified and delimited its jurisdiction to matters intrinsically connected with the regulation of
corporations, partnerships and associations and those dealing with the internal affairs of such
corporations, partnerships or associations.42ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Drawing a parallel to Union Glass,43 the expertise and competence of the NCIP cover only the
implementation and the enforcement of the IPRA and customs and customary law of specific ICCs/IPs; the
NCIP does not have competence to determine rights, duties and obligations of non-ICCs/IPs under other
laws although such may also involve rights of ICCs/IPs. Consistently, the wording of Section 66 that "the
NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" plus the proviso
necessarily contemplate a limited jurisdiction over cases and disputes between IPs/ICCs.

That NCIP Administrative Circulars44 expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP as original and exclusive in
Sections 5 and 1, respectively of Rule III:
Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation,
enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(A.) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
1.) Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
x x x

5.) Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;

x x x

6.) Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration
of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

x x x

8.) Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

9.) Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

is of no moment. The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a
statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.45

It ought to be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law into effect. The administrative
regulation must be within the scope and purview of the law.46 The implementing rules and regulations of
a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested
in the legislature. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, but must remain consistent with
the law they seek to apply and implement. They are intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify,
the law.47

However, administrative bodies are allowed, under their power of subordinate legislation, to implement
the broad policies laid down in the statute by 'filling in' the details. All that is required is that the regulation
does not contradict, but conforms with the standards prescribed by law.48

Perforce, in this case, the NCIP's Administrative Circulars' classification of its RHO's jurisdiction as original
and exclusive, supplants the general jurisdiction granted by Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 to the trial courts
and ultimately, modifies and broadens the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by the IPRA on the NCIP.
We cannot sustain such a classification.

As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City Government of Baguio City, et al. v. Atty.
Masweng, et al.49 and similar cases where we made an implicit affirmation of the NCIP's jurisdiction over
cases where one of the parties are non-ICCs/IPs. Such holding, however, and all the succeeding exercises
of jurisdiction by the NCIP, cannot tie our hands and declare a grant of primary and/or original and
exclusive jurisdiction, where there is no such explicit conferment by the IPRA. At best, the limited
jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's
general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights
and remedies.50

Jurisprudence has held on more than one occasion that in determining which body has jurisdiction over a
case, we consider the nature of the question that is the subject of controversy as well as the status or
relationship of the parties.51
Thus, we examine the pertinent allegations in respondents' petition:
4. That [respondents] are members of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Communities in the Calamianes
group of islands [in] Coron, Palawan;

5. That Barangay Buenavista, Coron is part of the ancestral domains of the Tagbanuas within Cluster 1 of
the Calamianes group of islands;

6. That prior to the enactment of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), they have already filed
their claim for the recognition of their ancestral domains with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources under DAO-2-93 and DAO No. 61-91;

7. That because of the enactment of the IPRA, the Provincial Special Task Force on Ancestral Domains
(PSTFAD) recommended instead the validation of their proofs and claims with the newly created National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) for the corresponding issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral
Domains Title (CADT).

8. That Sections 3.1 and 11 of the IPRA provided that the State recognizes the rights of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) to our ancestral domains by virtue of their Native Title and that, it was even
optional on their part to request for the issuance of a title or CADT;

9. That as such, it was not even required that they have to obtain first a CADT before their rights to their
ancestral domains be recognized;

10. That furthermore, their free and prior informed consent (FPIC) are required before any person or
entity, whether private or government can enter or undertake any activity within their ancestral domains;

11. That in order to ensure that their rights to FPIC are not violated, Section 59 of the IPRA provides that
the NCIP had to issue first a Certification Precondition (CP) that their consent had been elicited first;

12. That their Free and Prior Informed Consent was not elicited by [petitioners] Engr. Ben Lim, RBL Fishing
Corporation, Palawan Aquaculture Corporation and Peninsula Shipyard Corporation when they unlawfully
entered and occupied portions of their ancestral domains [in] Sitio Makwaw and Sitio Minukbay
Buenavista, Coron, Palawan at a time when the IPRA was already operative;

13. That the workers of the abovenamed persons had destroyed the houses of [their] tribal members,
coerced some to stop from cultivating their lands and had set up houses within the said portions of their
ancestral domains;

14. That the unlawful intrusion and occupation of [petitioners] within the aforesaid portions of their
ancestral domains and their violation of the rights of [respondents] to Free and Prior and Informed
Consent and the criminal acts committed by [petitioners'] workers had cause (sic) incalculable sufferings
among [respondents] x x x.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In their petition before the NCIP, respondents alleged: (1) their status as Tagbanuas, claiming
representation of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Communities in the Calamianes Group of Islands in
Coron, Palawan; (2) the provision in the law which recognizes native title of indigenous cultural
communities and indigenous persons; (3) that they have already filed their claim for the recognition of
their ancestral domains with the DENR; (4) that they have yet to obtain a Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title (CADT) from the NICP which, under the IPRA, is the agency tasked to validate their claim; (5) the
purported violation of petitioners of their rights to free and prior and informed consent; and (6) that
petitioners unlawfully intruded and occupied respondents' ancestral domains.

From their allegations in the petition, such call to the fore: (1) respondents' lack of CADT; and (2) the
status of petitioners as non-ICCs/IPs and petitioners' apparent ignorance that respondents are IPs, and
their claim of ancestral domain over the subject property.

It should be noted that a bare allegation that one is entitled to something is not an allegation but a
conclusion.53 Such allegation adds nothing to the pleading, it being necessary to plead specifically the facts
upon which such conclusion is founded.54 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, entitled "Manner of Making
Allegations in Pleadings" requires in Section 1, as a general rule, for "[e]very pleading [to] contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary
facts."

Respondents' status as Tagbanuas, as indigenous persons or members of an indigenous cultural

community, is not an ultimate fact from which respondents can anchor the rights they claim to have been
violated by petitioners.

In this case, respondents' petition, as written, does not mention ultimate facts that lead to the conclusion
that (1) they are Tagbanuas, and (2) they are the representatives of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural
Community. Neither are there allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on the part of
petitioners which constitute a violation of respondents' rights.

We elucidate.

In this case, respondents allege that prior to the enactment of the IPRA, they have previously applied for
recognition of their ancestral domain with the DENR under DENR Administrative Order No. 2-93 and No.
61-91; and with the advent of the IPRA, it was no longer required that they first obtain a CADT.
However, una voce, they aver that it has been recommended that they validate "their proofs and claims"
with the NCIP for the issuance of a CADT. The allegation itself goes against respondents' conclusions that
they are Tagbanuas.

Such a pronouncement does not contradict the indigenous concept of ownership even without a paper
title and that the CADT is merely a formal recognition of native title.55 This is clear from Section 11 of the
IPRA, to wit:
SEC. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by
virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the
title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.
And along those lines, we have subsequently held in Lamsis, et al. v. Dong-e56 that:
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a
registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one's claim to a particular land and is also in
rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of "officially establishing" one's land as an ancestral
land. Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the
applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his
predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time
57
immemorial. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Nonetheless, the allegation that respondents are Tagbanuas and that they are representatives of the
Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Communities are conclusions of their status not derived from facts that
should have been alleged. Indeed, respondents did not even attempt to factually demonstrate their
authority to represent the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community. This is crucial since intra IPs'
conflicts and contest for representation are not impossible.

In that regard, Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines "customary laws" as "a body of written and/or unwritten
rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by
respective ICCs/IPs" Section 3(i), on the other hand, refers to "indigenous political structures" consisting
of "organizational and cultural leadership systems, institutions, relationships, patterns and processes for
decision making and participation, identified by ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to, Council of Elders,
Council of Timuays, Bodong Holders, or any other tribunal or body of similar nature." To establish their
status as Tagbanuas or their representation as representatives of Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural
Community, respondents, as "plaintiffs" claiming relief under the IPRA, should have alleged the ultimate
facts constitutive of their customs, political structures, institutions, decision making processes, and such
other indicators of indigenous persons nature distinct and native to them.

Truly, respondents should have asserted their identification through a reduction into facts of the
defmition and description of an ICC/IP in the IPRA:
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogenous societies
identified by self ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community
on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time
immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social
and cultural inroads of colonization, non indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of
conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non indigenous religions and cultures, or the
establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural
and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may
have resettled outside their ancestral domains[.]58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Also, the right of ancestral property requires historical proof which, of course, must proceed from
allegations in the petition. As noted in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno inCruz
v. Sec of Environment & Natural Resources,59 the IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs rights over ancestral domains and
ancestral lands where land is the central element of the IPs' existence, viz.:
x x x There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots,
ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The
people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work,
he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and
primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong
to the present generation but the future ones as well.

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and
spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.Customary law has a strong preference
for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are
related by blood or by marriage, or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related
by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from
the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who
are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it
natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-
owned. For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule,
rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual
ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual
ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the
property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code.
Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in
marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family,
or loss of crops. Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-
member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of individual
land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws
and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is
looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under the IPRA, ancestral domains and ancestral lands are two concepts, distinct and different from one
another:
a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any
other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents made no allegation outlining and tracing the history of their indigenous ownership of domain
and land.
To further highlight the necessity of respondents' allegation of their status as Tagbanuas is the
stewardship concept of property which is most applicable to land among the Philippine IP:62
Land is not an individual item which a man owns for himself and by himself. For he secures the rights to
land in two ways: Firstly, as a citizen of the tribe he is entitled to some arable land and building land, and
to the use of public pasturage, fishing waters, and wild products. Secondly, in all tribes except those who
shift their gardens widely and have an abundance of land, he gets rights from membership of a village and
a group of kinsfolk. That is, a man's right to land in the tribal home depends upon his accepting
membership of a tribe, with all its obligations. The right of every subject, while he is a subject, is jealously
safeguarded.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is also significant to note that respondents do not identify themselves with other Tagbanuas who have
been awarded a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim as of 1998.64

Palpably, in the factual milieu obtaining herein, the NCIP does not have ipso facto jurisdiction over the
petition of respondents just by the mere expedient that their petition involves rights of ICCs/IPs.

One other thing jumps out from all the discussions herein: the IPRA does not contain a repeal of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 limiting the general jurisdiction of the trial, courts even as the IPRA purportedly
grants the NCIP jurisdiction over "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs."

Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies Presidential Decree No. 410, Executive Order
Nos. 122B and 122C as expressly repealed. While the same section does state that "all other laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly," such an implied repeal is predicated upon the condition that a substantial and an
irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. The two laws refer to different subject
matters, albeit the IPRA includes the jurisdiction of the NCIP. As such, resolution of conflicts between
parties who are not both ICCs/IPs may still fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts
dependent on the allegations in the complaint or petition and the status of the parties.

There is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of jurisdiction to the NCIP in instances where,
among others, all the parties are ICCs/IPs and the claim or dispute involves their rights, and the specific
wording of Batasang Pambansa Bilang 129, Sections 19-2165 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts, and Sections 33-3566 on the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

We should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and unequivocal
expression of the will of Congress, which is not manifest from the language of Section 66 of the IPRA
which, to reiterate: (1) did not use the words "primary" and/or "original and exclusive" to describe the
jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" and (2) contained a
proviso requiring certification that the parties have exhausted their remedies provided under customary
laws.

We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in some instances the regular courts may
exercise jurisdiction over cases which involve rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of
disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.

All told, we rule that Section 66 of the IPRA, even as it grants jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, requires that the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have
exhausted all their remedies under their customs and customary law before bringing their claim and
dispute to the NCIP. The validity of respondents' claim is another matter and a question that we need not
answer for the moment. Too, we do not resolve herein the other issues raised by petitioners given that
we already declared that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the case of respondents against
petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98268 dated
26 April 2010 and the Resolution of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples in RHO 4-01-2006
dated 30 November 2006 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

The petition in RHO 4-01-2006 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples. Section 1 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014, promulgated on 9
October 2014 declaring the jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer as original and exclusive is
declared VOID for expanding the law. Respondents may refile their complaint against petitioners in a
court of general jurisdiction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirt
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU
MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-
LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN,
DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE
L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-
VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN,
LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G.
ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO
B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN,
RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA,
JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented
by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO
BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.[1] In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on
October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA
and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the
Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of
the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of
the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
 (6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the
areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for
a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of
the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples
shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
 (2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to
cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of
R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted
to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners
do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law,
which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant
to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU
MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-
LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN,
DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE
L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-
VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN,
LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G.
ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO
B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN,
RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI,
MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA,
JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented
by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO
BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.[1] In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on
October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA
and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
 On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the
Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of
the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of
the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the
areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
 nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for
a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of
the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples
shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
 (3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to
cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of
R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted
to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners
do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law,
which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant
to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.

D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

From the record the following facts appear:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the
city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall
is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the
original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the
wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which
had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to
the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment
and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.
The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that,
during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining
lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of
the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties
who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed
the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had
been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that
the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the
same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost
whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name,
more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including
it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the
wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to
see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be
answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that
once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not
be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial
(Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the
result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra);
Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass.,
51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the
world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists
no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are
foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all
parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to
again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would
destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give
the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it
registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate,
in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.
The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or
diminished in acollateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period
prescribed by law.

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under
the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under
conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land
which has been registered in the name of two different persons.

The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is
a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world
are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons
who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the
certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at
present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession.
Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496).
The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance
of the registration.

The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been
adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the
courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general
rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the
earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7
A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R.,
118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction
relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive."
(See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of
Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said:
"Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land,
the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While
the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land,
they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where
two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to
hold the title" (p. 237).

Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned
by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one
year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest.

It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason,
in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of
registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose,
may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a
subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person
could be deprived of his registered title in that way.

We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land
when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil
Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different
persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course,
presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in
such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions
of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto,
yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in
adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which
we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are
of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the
name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.

In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says,
among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to
foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their
failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against
them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in
court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens
titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".

As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If
those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the
registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his
registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years
which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would
be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied,
and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of
the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the
conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was
the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not
complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an
action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his
failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against
him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day
in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity
of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the
land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that
judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the
appellants than to him.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be
applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the
parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The
general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he
acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would
be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the
vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the
vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections
speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an
"innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included
in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue
of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in
his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that
phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake
in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by
him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent
purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in
said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said
sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as
innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate
the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in
said sections.

May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as
an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his
heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued
until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what
it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice
of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely
necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629;
Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351;
McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and
object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof
of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he
was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the
public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the
Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute
would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance
of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to
the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land
released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the
mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said
land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the
rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all
persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact
that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly
that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would
be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second
original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been
registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and
112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser
should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the
facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the
purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another
earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence.
By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original
certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the
difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in
said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a
certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of
the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule,
could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of
the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the
torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the
very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip?
Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the
record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion
that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the
appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should
be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest
the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original
certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had
acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The
purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public
record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the
loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who
was innocent of any act of negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt
to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the
torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system,
supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered
and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can
be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the
law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked.
The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised
by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error
heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor
of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

G.R. No. 200773, July 08, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ANGELINE L. DAYAOEN, AGUST1NA TAUEL,****AND

LAWANA T. BATCAGAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 23, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92584 affirming the September 11, 2008 Amended Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024.

Factual Antecedents

As (determined by the appellate court, the facts are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Appellees Angeline Dayaoen (Angeline), Agustina Taule (Agustina) and Lawana Batcagan4 (Lawana) filed
an Application for Registration5 of three parcels of land located in Barangay Tabangaoen, La Trinidad,
Benguet, described as Lots 1, 6 and 7, each with an area of 994 square meters, 390 sq. m., and 250 sq. m.
respectively, or, a total of 1,634 sq. m. under Survey Plan Psu-1-002413.6chanrobleslaw

The subject parcels of land were originally owned and possessed since pre-war time by Antonio Pablo
(Antonio), the grandfather of Dado Pablo (Dado), husband of appellee Angeline. In 1963, Antonio gave
the parcels of land in question to appellee Angeline and Dado as a wedding gift. From that time on, they
continuously occupied and possessed the properties. In 1976 and 1977, appellee Angeline sold Lots 6 and
7 to co-appellees Agustina and Lawana, pursuant to an Affidavit of Quitclaim and a Deed of Absolute Sale
of a Portion of Unregistered Land, respectively. Since 12 June 1945, appellees and their predecessor-in-
interest have been in public, open, exclusive, uninterrupted and continuous possession thereof in the
concept of an owner. Appellees declared the questioned properties for taxation purposes. There was no
mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the said parcels of land. Neither did any other
person have an interest therein, legal or equitable, or was in possession thereof.
On the scheduled initial hearing, appellees adduced pieces of documentary evidence to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements of notices, posting and publication. Appellee Angeline testified on the
continuous, open, public and exclusive possession of the lands in dispute.

Trial on the merits ensued. In a Decision7 dated 6 November 2007, the court a quogranted appellees'
application for registration. Unflinching, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for
reconsideration but failed to attain favorable relief as itsMotion was denied by the court a quo in
its Order dated 11 September 2008. On even date, the court a quo rendered the assailed Amended
Decision finding appellees to have the registrable title over the subject properties.8
LRC Case No. N-453

Previously, or in 1979, herein respondents Angeline, Agustina and Lawana filed a similar application for
registration of the herein subject property which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-453 before the RTC La
Trinidad, Branch 8. The Republic opposed the application. After trial on the merits, a Decision9dated
December 26, 1994 was rendered dismissing the application on the ground that respondents failed to
prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondents did not appeal the said Decision; thus, it became final and executory.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024

The September 11, 2008 Amended Decision in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 held as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Well settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant
who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land being applied for. x x x
The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer
general statements which are more conclusion of law than factual evidence of possession. Simply put,
facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence, x x x

However, given the foregoing facts, as borne out by competent, reliable, concrete, and undisputed
evidence, the Court cannot conceive of any better proof of applicants' adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted and exclusive possession and occupation in concept of owners. The Court finds
and concludes that the applicants have abundantly shown the specific acts that would show such nature
of their possession. In view of the totality of facts obtaining in evidence on record, the applicants had ably
complied with the burden of proof required of them by law. The Court holds that the established facts are
sufficient proof to overcome the presumption that the lots sought to be registered form part of the; public
domain. Hence, they have fully discharged to the satisfaction of the Court their burden in this proceeding.

Moreover, the Court is mindful of what the Supreme Court said in Director of Lands v. Funtillar x x x that
"The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in
their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy,
be encouraged." For this reason, the Supreme Court limited the strict application of the rule stated in
Heirs ofAmunategui v. Director of Forestry, x x x, that "In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the
applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that
he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing
of his application." Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtillar, the Supreme Court liberalized the aforecited rule
and stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact all laws governing natural
resources is a revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together with the
constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid
manifest unfairness and injustice.

Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances.
A strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) ruling is warranted
whenever a portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other
questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the
enactment of Act 496, as amended, or the Land Registration Act, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, or the Public Land Act, then their provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their
own implementation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, there is no showing that any "portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless
exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices." Instead, it is very evident from applicants'
mass of undisputed evidence that the present application will enhance social justice considerations
behind the Public Land Law and the Land Registration Act, in the light of the incontrovertible fact that
applicant Angeline Dayaoen and her three (3) children have long established their residential houses on
the land subject of the application, which is "the policy of the State to encourage and promote the
distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the social justice ideal
enshrined in the Constitution" (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62680, November 9, 1988).

In the case at bar, the tracing cloth (Diazo Polyester film) of the approved survey plan of the land
embracing the lots subject of the application was adduced in evidence as Exhibit "H" for the applicants.
At its lower left hand corner is a certification. It states in part: "x x x. This Survey is inside the alienable and
disposable areas per Proc. No. 209, Lot-A. The land herein described is outside any military or civil
reservations. x x x" Aside from this certification, it is further certified by Geronimo B. Fernandez, in his
capacity as Supervising Geodetic Engineer I, "that this survey is outside the Mountain State Agricultural
College and it is within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A." Further scrutiny of the tracing cloth plan also
reveals that the survey plan was approved by Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza "For the Director of
Lands."

The Court takes judicial notice of Proclamation No. 20910 Issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay on
October 20, 1955. It provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 83 and 89 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY,
President of the Philippines do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation Nos. 99, 64, 39, 102
and 698, series of 1914, 1919, 1920, 1927 and 1934, respectively, and declare the parcel or parcels of land
embraced therein or portions thereof situated in the Municipality of La Trinidad, Sub-province of Benguet,
Mountain Province, open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, to wit: x x x"
Lot A, mentioned in the aforestated certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh.
"H"), is one of the three (3) lots described in the aforecited Presidential Proclamation No. 209 opened to
"disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act."
The categorical statement of facts in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), in
conjunction with the aforecited Proclamation No. 209, support the certification that the land subject of
the survey is alienable and disposable. The certifications therein attesting that the land, which embraced
Lots 1, 6 and 7 subject of the present application, is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College
reservation, that it is within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A; that the land is alienable and disposable -
pursuant to the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A, and that it is outside any military or civil reservations. [This]
statement of facts in the certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan sufficiently contain
all the essential factual and legal bases for any certification that may be issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the lots subject of the present application are indeed alienable
and disposable. More importantly, the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan was approved by
Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza "For the Director of Lands." As such, the aforecited certifications in the
tracing cloth of the approved survey plan carry not only his imprimatur but also that of the Director of
Lands for whom he was acting. Thus, the approval of the survey plan was in effect the act of the Director
of Lands. Necessarily, the certifications in the approved survey plan were [those] of the Director of Lands,
not only of the Supervising Geodetic Engineer I and Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza. Under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Director of Lands is empowered to issue the approved survey plan and
to certify that the land subject thereof is alienable and disposable (Exh. "H") xxx. The law states the powers
of the Director of Lands, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be the executive officer charged with carrying
out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey,
classifications, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of
the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

Sec. 5. The Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall
prepare and issue such forms, instructions, rules, and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be
necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising
under such provisions.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Therefore, to require another certification to be issued by the Director of Lands attesting to same facts
already certified in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan that the lots subject of the present
application for registration of titles are alienable and disposable is a needless ceremony, a pure act of
supererogation.

It is clear, therefore, that the applicants have satisfactorily complied with their burden of proving "that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable" considering that they have established "the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute." The certifications categorically cited Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A, as the basis in attesting that
the land, which is the subject of the survey and present application, is alienable and disposable because
it is inside Lot A opened by the presidential proclamation "to disposition under the provisions of the Public
Land Act."

The Court finds it significant that the State has not adduced any evidence, in spite of the fact that it has
all the records, resources, and power in its command, to show that the lots subject of the present
application are not alienable and disposable part of the public domain. Having failed to refute the
evidence on the very face of the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), which is a public
document and part of a public record, the presumption that the certifications therein contained, attesting
that the lots subject of the present application for registration are alienable and disposable, are true and
correct have attained the status of concrete facts.

Hence, the Court now turns to resolve the sole issue of whether or not [sic] the herein applicants are
entitled to the confirmation of their titles to the lots subject of their present application.

It has been well established that since pre-war Antonio Pablo had been in possession and occupation of
the land (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005), which is corroborated by evidence that when the land was verbally given to
applicant Angeline Dayaoen and Dado Dayaoen as a wedding gift, the old man Antonio Pablo had already
an old hut thereon (TSN. May 29, 1984, p. 14) where the spouses stayed after their marriage (TSN, Oct.
19, 2005, p. 9), and there were already on the land some fruit trees, and some other plants, consisting of
guavas and avocados already bearing fruits, which he had planted thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, pp. 12-
14). The anterior possession and occupation of Ajitonio Pablo of the land since pre-war should be tacked
to the possession and occupation of applicant Angeline Dayaoen, and the latter's possession and
occupation, in turn, is tacked to the present possession and occupation of her co-applicants, who acquired
titles from her. Consequently, the applicants are entitled to the benefits of Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141, as
amended by R.A. 1942, which provides as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
This section was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which took effect on January 25, 1977
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, August 21,1991). Section 4 thereof
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945
In the present case, it will be recalled that Antonio Pablo commenced possession and occupation of the
land subject of the application for confirmation of title since before the Second World War. Thus, applicant
Angeline Dayaoen was already in possession and occupation of the land under bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for more than thirty (30) years, including the anterior possession and occupation
of Antonio Pablo, when P.D. 1073 amended Sec. 48(b) if C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942. Applicant
Angeline Dayaoen already acquired vested right of ownership over the land and, therefore, already
excluded from the public domain, as it was already a private property over which applicant Angeline
Dayaoen has a confirmable title. Republic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 48327, August 21,1991)
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is important to note that private respondents' application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect
title was filed in 1970 and that the land registration court rendered its decision confirming their long-
continued possession of the lands here involved in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48(c) was
in legal effect. Private respondents' imperfect title was, in other words, perfected or vested by the
completion of the required period of possession prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073. Private
respondents' right in respect of the land they had possessed for thirty (30) years could not be divested by
P.D. No. 1073.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Even if Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141 is applied in the present case in its textual form as amended by P.D. 1073,
still the present applicants are qualified thereunder to have their titles confirmed. They have already been
in possession and occupation of the lots subject of their application for confirmation of titles under bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for more than thirty (30) years since before the Second World War
(or before June 12, 1945) considering that the possession and occupation of x x x Antonio Pablo, the
predecessor-in-interest of the present applicants, should be tacked to their possession and occupation.
Consequently, applicant Angeline Dayaoen had a vested right over the lots subject of the present
application when she conveyed, transferred and delivered Lots 6 and 7, respectively, to her co-applicants.

Under Article 541 of the New Civil Code, which squarely applies to applicants' present application, "A
possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title
and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it." Clearly, therefore, since the applicant Angeline Dayaoen
and her predecessor, Antonio Pablo, have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the land
since before the Second World War and have been exercising acts of ownership thereon, it is incumbent
upon the State, and not the applicants, to show that the land still forms part of the public domain. The
State has utterly failed to overcome the presumption with the sole testimony of Irene Leano Caayas, which
the Court does not even accord any weight and credence.

The tax declaration of applicant Angeline Dayaoen and religious payment of real property taxes lend
strong corroboration to the evidence of the applicants. It is the established jurisprudence that "While it is
true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription
when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property" (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA
533). In the present application, it has been concretely and [indisputably] established that applicant
Angeline Dayaoen and her predecessor Antonio Pablo have been in actual and continuous possession of
the parcel of land embracing the lots subject of the present application.

In fine, therefore, the present applicants are entitled to have their titles confirmed under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. The Court concludes that the applicants have indeed confirmable and
registrable titles over the lots subject of the instant application for confirmation of titles pursuant to either
Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942, or Sec. 48(c) of C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942 and
P.D. 1073.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the herein Application for
Registration of the parcels of land described as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lot 1, Psu-1-002413, in the name of ANGELINE L. DAYAOEN, particularly described as a parcel of land (Lot
1, Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2 by an alley (2.00m. wide); on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris Leano;
on the SE., along line 3-4 by lot 2 of the plan; on the SW., along line 4-1 by Mt. State Agricultural College,
T.C.T. #7179; Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being S. 63 deg. 59'E., 1391.52 m. from Tri. Sta,
"TRINIDAD", La Trinidad, Benguet, thence:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
N. 45 deg. 18'E., 27.25m. to point 2;
S. 40 deg. 37'E., 33.18m. to point 3;
S. 54 deg. 05'W., 37.44m. to point 4;
N. 20 deg. 50'W., 29.94m. to point of beginning.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Containing an area of NINE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR (994) SQ. METERS, more or less.

Lot 6, Psu-1-002413, in the name of AGUSTFNA TAULE, particularly described as a parcel of land (Lot 6,
Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the SW., along line 1-2 by Mt. State Agricultural College, T.C.T. # 7179; on the NE., along line
2-3 by Morris Leano; on the NE., along line 3-4 by Psu-1-000485; on the SE., along line 4-1 by lot 7 of the
plan,. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being S. 64 deg. 20'E. 1382.57m. from Tri. "TRINIDAD", La
Trinidad, Benguet, thence:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
N. 20 deg. 50'W., 47.27m. to point 2;
S. 45 deg. 15'E., 16.02m. to point 3;
S. 43 deg. 38'E., 24.91m. to point 4;
S. 38 deg. 20'W., 18.96m. to point of beginning.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Containing an area of THREE HUNDRED NINETY (390) SQ. METERS, more or less.

Lot 7, Psu-1-002413, in the name of LAWANA T. BATCAGAN, particularly described as a parcel of land (Lot
7, Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NW, along line 1-2 by Psu-1-000485; on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris Leano; on the
SE., along line 3-4 by an alley (2.00 m. wide); on the SW., along line 4-5 by Mt. State Agricultural College,
T.C.T. #7179; on the NW., along line 5-1 by lot 6 of the plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being
S. 65 deg. 02'E., 1385.03 m. from Tri. "TRINIDAD", La Trinidad, Benguet,
thence:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
N. 62 deg. 02'E., 3.1 lm. to point 2;
S. 47 deg. 13'E., 10.58m. to point 3;
S. 44 deg. 47'W., 26.43m. to point 4;
N. 20 deg. 50'W., 10.29m. to point 5;
N. 38 deg. 20'E., 18.96m. to point of beginning.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Containing an area of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (250) SQ. METERS, more or less.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The decree of registration shall be issued upon attainment by this judgment of its finality.

This Amended Decision supersedes the Decision earlier rendered by the court.

SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 92584. Petitioner essentially
argued that the La Trinidad RTC erred in granting respondents' application for registration since they failed
to prove that the subject property constitutes alienable and disposable land; that the annotation on the
survey plan that the subject property is alienable and disposable is not sufficient; and that respondents
failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property.

On February 23,2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the September 11, 2008 Amended
Decision of the La Trinidad RTC, pronouncing thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Appeal bears no merit.

Appellant Republic asseverates that appellees12 failed to comply with the legal requirement of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands applied for since 12 June 1945
or earlier as required under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.13cralawred
Appellant's asseveration does not hold sway.

Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"Sec. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance x x x an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since <B>June 12, 1945, or earlier</B>."
By the same token, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 14114 which took effect [in] November
1936, amended by Section 4 PD No. 1073, provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945."
The proceedings under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529), and Section 48 of the Public Land
Act (C.A. No. 141 as amended by P.D. No. 1073), are the same in that both are against the whole world,
both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and
final. Both proceedings are likewise governed by the same court procedure and law of evidence.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14
(1) - that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12,1945 or earlier.

Withal, appellees must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claim and they cannot just
offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.
Jurisprudence dictates that a person who seeks confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to a piece
of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest shoulders the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of C.A. No.
141, as amended.
Parenthetically, case law teaches us that the determination of whether claimants were in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as
required by law, is a question of fact. Here, We find no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of
the court a quo that appellees have the registrable right owing to their and their predecessor-in-interest
continuous possession of the subject parcels of land. The foundation of such conclusion is primarily
factual. Findings of fact of the trial court are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence on record.

Contrary to appellant's thesis, appellees were able to prove by convincing evidence that they and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession over the
subject properties since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Appellee Angeline had personal knowledge that her
predecessor-in-interest, Antonio, owned and possessed them from pre-war time. She and her husband
Dado, tilled and cultivated the lands in question since 19621 when it was given to them by Antonio as a
wedding gift. This was corroborated by co-appellee Lawana who was a co-employee of Antonio in 1961
at the Mountain State Agricultural College (MSAC), and witness Albert Dimas (Albert), a resident of the
adjoining lot (MSAC cottage), and witness Victor Alejandro, a neighbor of Antonio in Camp Dangwa.

In the same vein, appellees declared the subject properties for taxation purposes. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Next, appellant's postulations that the disputed lands were not yet alienable and disposable and that
appellees failed to overcome trie presumption that all lands form part of the public domain, carry no
weight.

xxxx

In the case at bench, appellees were able to discharge such bounden duty. The subject properties are no
longer part of public domain. Their private character is declared in the annotation of the survey plan
approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources through the Bureau of Lands,
Regional Office No. 1, San Fernando, La Union, viz: "The survey is inside alienable and disposable areas per
Proa No. 209, Lot-A "; xxx The land herein described is outside any military and civil reservations, xxx" The
Supervising Geodetic Engineer of the same Office likewise certified "x x x this survey is outside the
Mountain State Agricultural College and it is within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A."

We echo with approval the disquisition of the court a quo which thoroughly threshed out the issue on the
alienable and disposable character of the challenged parcels of land -
"In the case at bar, the tracing cloth (Diazo Polyester film) of the approved survey plan of the land
embracing the lots subject of the application xxx.

The Court takes judicial notice of Proclamation No. 209 issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay on
October 20, 1955. xxx
Lot A, mentioned in the aforestated certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh.
"H"), is one of the three (3) lots described in the aforecited Presidential Proclamation No. 209 opened to
"disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act."

The categorical statement of facts in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), in
conjunction with the aforecited Proclamation No. 209, support the certification that the land subject of
the survey is alienable and disposable.

The certifications therein attesting that the land, which embraced Lots 1, 6 and 7 subject of the present
application, is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College reservation, that it is within the
Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A; that the land is alienable and disposable - pursuant to the Proclamation
No. 209, Lot-A, and that it is outside any military or civil reservations. [This] statement of facts in the
certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan sufficiently contain[s] all the essential factual
and legal bases for any certification that may be issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources that the lots subject of the present application are indeed alienable and disposable. More
importantly, the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan was approved by Regional Director Sulpicio
A. Taeza "For the Director of Lands." As such, the aforecited certifications in the tracing cloth of the
approved survey plan carry not only his imprimatur but also that of the Director of Lands for whom he
was acting. Thus, the approval of the survey plan was in effect the act of the Director of Lands. Necessarily,
the certifications in the approved survey plan were [those] of the Director of Lands, not only of the
Supervising Geodetic Engineer I and Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The foregoing discourse is in congruity with the principle enunciated in Republic v. Serrano15 wherein the
Supreme Court explicitly pronounced, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and
disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso
V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submittedin evidence by Paulita, constitutes
substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as
belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18,1925.

The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It
bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to
contest respondents' applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are
inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the
Certification may be equitably extended in favor of respondents.
In precis, We discern no reversible error committed by the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Amended Decision dated 11 September 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in LRC No. 03-LRC-0024,
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.16
Hence, the present Petition

Issues
In a November 25, 2013 Resolution,17 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which contains
the following assignment of errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AS WELL AS MADE FINDINGS WHICH
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH, OR NOT SUPPORTED BY, THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. LIKEWISE, IT GRAVELY
MISAPPLIED THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE, AS FOLLOWS:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The land registration court gravely erred in granting the application for registration of the three (3)
subject lots despite respondents' utter failure to prove that the said lots are alienable and disposable, a
mere annotation on the survey plan that the said lots are alienable and disposable being insufficient to
prove alienability;

(b) Respondents' evidence is utterly insufficient to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
occupation and possession by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.18
Petitioner's Arguments

In its Petition and Reply19 seeking reversal of the assailed CA decision and the dismissal of respondents'
application for registration in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024, petitioner argues that respondents failed to
satisfy the legal requirements relative to proof of the alienability of the subject land and continuous, open,
exclusive and notorious possession thereof. Particularly, petitioner claims that it was erroneous for the
trial and appellate courts to consider as substantial compliance the certification or annotation in the
survey plan that the subject land is alienable and disposable; that respondents did not present in court
the public officials who issued the said certification/annotation in order that they may authenticate the
same; that respondents failed to establish the existence of a positive act of government declaring that the
subject land is alienable and disposable; that respondents failed to secure a government certification that
the subject land constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the trial court erred
in taking judicial notice of Proclamation 209, as the exact boundaries of the lots covered by said law, as
well as that of the subject land, are not a matter of judicial knowledge; that respondents have not shown
that their predecessors-in-interest were in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land for 30 years or since June 12, 1945 or earlier; that respondents' possession is not genuine; that the
trial court erred in relying on the testimonial evidence taken in LRC Case No. N-453 since the transcripts
of stenographic notes in said case were not submitted to the court; and that respondents' tax declarations
and receipts do not constitute proof of adverse possession or ownership of the subject land.

Respondents' Arguments

In their Comment,20 respondents contend that, as correctly found by the trial and appellate courts, the
annotations and certifications in the approved survey plan substantially comply with the legal
requirement for a certification as to the alienability of the subject land. They cite as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Third. The approved survey plan (Exh. "H") of the respondents contain certifications attesting to the fact
that the three (3) lots, among others, which are the subject of their application for title, are within the
parcel of land described as Lot A in Presidential Proclamation 209 of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
excluded from the Mountain State Agricultural College (now Benguet State University) and released for
disposition; x x x The certifications are found at the foot of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), which, for
ready reference, are here quoted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Note:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

All corners not otherwise described are P.S. cyl. Cone. Mons. 15x60 cm. This survey is for registration
purposes and should not be subject of a public land application unless declared public land by a competent
court. This survey is claimed by Irene L. Ca-aya - representing the Hrs. of M. Leano. This survey is inside
the alienable & disposable area as per Proc. No. 209, Lot A. The land herein described is outside any
military or civil registrations. Tax declaration no. 4317 of real property has been submitted as part of the
survey-returns.

- CERTIFICATION -

I hereby certify that this survey is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College and it is within the
Proclamation No. 209, Lot A.

(Signed)
GERONTMO B. FERNANDEZ
Superv. Geodetic Engineer - I
In recommending approval of the survey plan, Laurentino P. Baltazar, Regional Chief, Surveys Division, of
the Regional Lands Office No. 1, Bureau of Lands, then Department of Natural Resources (now
Department of Environment and Natural Resources), at San Fernando, La Union,
certified:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I certify that the complete survey returns of the herein described survey, which are on file in this Office,
were verified and found to conform with pertinent laws of the Philippines and with applicable regulations
of the Bureau of Lands. In view thereof, approval of the plan is hereby recommended.

(Signed)
LAURENTINO P. BALTAZAR
Regional Chief, Survey Division
Sulpicio A. Taeza, Regional Director, Regional Lands Office No. 1, Bureau of Lands, then Department of
Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources), at San Fernando, La Union,
approved the survey and plan (Exh. "H") "For the Director of Lands."

The survey plan (Exh. "H") was approved on April 10, 1976. Subsequent thereto, or on August 18, 1977,
the sketch plan of Mr. Edilberto Quiaoit (Exh. "P" and Exh. "Z" and series) was prepared. It contains this
certification of District Land Officer Amador Roxas of the Bureau of Lands at the foot thereof, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this sketch plan is true and correct as plotted from the technical descriptions of Lot
954, GSS-157, & Lots 1-7, PSU-1-002413 which are on file in this Office.

Issued upon request of Mr. Lawana Batcagan in connection with Administrative Case No. (N) Angeline
Dayaoen et al. vs. Morris Leano et al.

... Bu. Of Lands, Baguio City August 18, 1977

(Signed)
AMADOR P. ROXAS
District Land Officer21
Respondents add that, as correctly held by the trial and appellate courts, they have satisfactorily proved
their continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land; that their predecessors-
in-interest occupied the land as early as during the Japanese occupation, or clearly prior to June 12, 1945;
and that petitioner's evidence should not be believed for being biased.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.

The trial and appellate courts seriously erred in declaring that the annotation in the tracing cloth of the
approved survey plan (Exh. "H") and the certifications therein constitute substantial compliance with the
legal requirement on presentation of a certificate of land classification status or any other proof that the
subject land is alienable and disposable. We cannot subscribe to such notion.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The classification and
reclassification of such lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President may at any
time transfer these public lands from one class to another.22chanrobleslaw

While in 1955 the President - through Presidential Proclamation No. 209 declared particular lands in
Baguio City as alienable and disposable, they may have been re-classified by the President thereafter. This
is precisely the reason why an applicant for registration of title based on an executive proclamation is
required to present evidence on the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for. such as a
certificate of land classification status from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which only the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer23(CENRO) and the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer24 (PENRO) are authorized to issue under DENR
Administrative Order No. 38,25 series of 1990 (DAO 38).

In Republic v. Cortez,26 the Court made the following pronouncement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable.

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and
disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant also
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the
case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services
of the DENR,the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said
plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands
subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable. (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Republic v. Roche, the Court declared that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held thathe must present a certificate of land classification status issued by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within
the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis in the original)

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the
land which bears no information regarding the land's classification. She did not bother to establish the
status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said
that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez is not the kind of evidence required by law as
proof that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Cortez failed to present a certification from the proper government agency as to the classification
of the subject property. Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary
had indeed classified the subject property as alienable and disposable. Having failed to present any
incontrovertible evidence, Cortez' claim that the subject property forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain must fail. (Emphasis supplied)
Later, another pronouncement was made in Fortuna v. Republic,27 stating
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Section 6 of the PLA,28 the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the prerogative
of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can
classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, jurisprudence has required
that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public land grant must present
incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute.

In this case, the C A declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the notation in the
survey plan, which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August
7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title
previously issued for the subject parcel[.]" However, we find that neither of the above documents is
evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.

Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties' alienable and
disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable area per verification
through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of
the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary
or as proclaimed by the President. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, the Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey
by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the
land into alienable and disposable, as declaredJpy the D,ENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the
President.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the DENR Secretary
has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these
documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR
Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.

For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses
Fortuna's claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied. (Emphasis supplied
and/or in the original)
Yet again, in another subsequent decision of this Court in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Republic,29 it was
held that —
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of Sate ownership of the lands of the public domain
is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the properties subject of the application
are alienable and disposable. Even the notations on the survey plans submitted by the petitioner cannot
be admitted as evidence of the subject properties' alienability and disposability. Such notations do not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject properties remain
part of the inalienable public domain. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 209 may be taken, the DENR certificate of land
classification status or any other proof of the alienable and disposable character of the land may not be
dispensed with, because it provides a more recent appraisal of the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable, or that the land has not been re-classified in the meantime. The applicable law - Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 - requires that the property sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed;30 one way of establishing this
material fact is through the DENR certificate of land classification status which is presumed to be the most
recent appraisal of the status and character of the property.

The ruling in Republic v. Serrano31 cannot be controlling. Instead, We must apply the pronouncements
in Republic v. Cortez, Fortuna v. Republic, and Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Republic, as they are more
recent and in point. Besides, these cases accurately ratiocinate that such notations or certifications in
approved survey plans refer only to the technical correctness of the surveys plotted in these plans and
have nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the properties surveyed, and that they
only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable
and disposable per verification through survey by the proper government office; they do not indicate at
all that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.
On the issue of continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession, however, there appears to be no
reason to deviate from the identical findings of fact of the trial court and the CA, which are rooted in the
testimonies of the respondents and their witnesses - categorical declarations which petitioner has failed
to refute. We adopt the findings of the trial court, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It has been well established that since pre-war Antonio Pablo had been in possession and occupation of
the land (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005), which is corroborated by evidence that when the land was verbally given to
applicant Angeline Dayaoen and Dado Dayaoen as a wedding gift, the old man Antonio Pablo had already
an old hut thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, p. 14) where the spouses stayed after their marriage (TSN, Oct.
19, 2005, p. 9), and there were already on the land some fruit trees, and some other plants, consisting of
guavas and avocados already bearing fruits, which he had planted thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, pp. 12-
14). The anterior possession and occupation of Antonio Pablo of the land since pre-war should be tacked
to the possession and occupation of applicant Angeline Dayaoen, and the latter's possession and
occupation, in turn, is tacked to the present possession and occupation of her co-applicants, who acquired
titles from her.32
Thus, while respondents have complied with most of the requirements in connection with their
application for registration, they have not sufficiently shown that the property applied for is alienable and
disposable at the time their application for registration was filed. The Court is left with no alternative but
to deny their application for registration. To be sure, the nation's interests will be best served by a strict
adherence to the provisions of the land registration laws.33chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 92584 and the September 11, 2008 Amended Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 63 in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents' application
for registration in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELA V. MADAYAG, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 19,
2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004, which set aside the lower court’s order to suspend the
proceedings on respondent’s application for land registration.

On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square meters located
in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.2 Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey
Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City.

On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional Survey
Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan because the lot
encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the
new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001.3

Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. The Republic of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed
their respective oppositions.

On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought
seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in
Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land Registration Commission on
August 26, 1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands
on December 29, 1970. These parcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title, some of which
are already in the name of the petitioner while the others are still in the name of the previous owners.

On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as to the petitioner, the Republic, and
the heirs of Romulo Visperas. Thereafter, respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.

Meanwhile, acting on petitioner’s request for the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan, DENR
Assistant Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, advised the
petitioner to file a petition for cancellation in due form so that the DENR could properly act on the
same.4 Accordingly, petitioner formally filed with the DENR a petition5 for cancellation of the survey plan
sometime in March 2002, alleging the following grounds:

I.

THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT LOT IN THIS
CASE
II.

NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNER AND WHO BEARS INTEREST OVER
THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THE OWNERS OF ADJOINING LANDS.

III.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD FAITH AND/OR MALICE ATTENDED THE APPROVAL OF
(PLAN WITH PSU NO. 01-008438).6

On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings7 in the land registration case,
alleging that the court should await the DENR resolution of the petition for the cancellation of the survey
plan "as the administrative case is prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case.

On October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion, thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant motion and suspends the
proceedings herein. In the meantime, and until receipt by this Court of a copy of the resolution of the
petition for cancellation by the DENR, the instant case is hereby ARCHIVED.

SO ORDERED.8

Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in land registration proceedings,
the RTC agreed with the petitioner that the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the
petition for land registration.9

On February 13, 2003, the RTC denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration of its
order.10 Respondent thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the order suspending
the proceedings.

On March 19, 2004, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
proceedings, the CA granted the petition for certiorari, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Orders dated
October 8, 2002 and February 13, 2003 of the respondent Court are declared NULL and VOID.

The Court a quo is directed to continue the proceedings until its final determination. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.11

The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the
presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising
from an application for registration.12

On July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution13 denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was, thus, compelled to file this petition for review, ascribing the following errors to the CA:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUSPENSION OF
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE IS LEGAL AND PROPER PENDING THE
DETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-REGION 1.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE ASSAILED
ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT HAVE PROPER AND SUFFICIENT BASES IN FACT AND IN LAW.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS AND ARCHIVING THE
CASE.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE FILING OF THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IS NOT THE
ONLY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW ON THE PART OF
HEREIN RESPONDENT.14

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner contends that, since the respondent’s cause of action in the land registration case depends
heavily on the survey plan, it was only prudent for the RTC to suspend the proceedings therein pending
the resolution of the petition for cancellation of the survey plan by the DENR.15 It, therefore, insists that
recourse to a petition for certiorari was not proper considering that respondent was not arbitrarily
deprived of her right to prosecute her application for registration.16

Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent in every court to control
the disposition of the cases in its dockets, with economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and
litigants. But courts should be mindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case and,
thus, should not be too eager to suspend proceedings of the cases before them. Hence, every order
suspending proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants
and courts,17 or when the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the
questions raised in the first action are settled.18 Otherwise, the suspension will be regarded as an arbitrary
exercise of the court’s discretion and can be corrected only by a petition for certiorari.

None of the circumstances that would justify the stay of proceedings is present. In fact, to await the
resolution of the petition for cancellation would only delay the resolution of the land registration case and
undermine the purpose of land registration.

The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree No. 1529) is to finally settle
title to real property in order to preempt any question on the legality of the title – except claims that were
noted on the certificate itself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequent
thereto.1avvphi1 Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law, owners can rest secure on
their ownership and possession.19

Glaringly, the petition for cancellation raises practically the very same issues that the herein petitioner
raised in its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. Principally, it alleges that the
survey plan should be cancelled because it includes portions of the seven properties that it purchased
from several landowners, which properties are already covered by existing certificates of title.

Petitioner posits that it is the DENR that has the sole authority to decide the validity of the survey plan
that was approved by the LMS.20 It cites Section 4(15), Chapter 1, Title XIV, Administrative Code of 1987
which provides that the DENR shall

(15) Exercise (of) exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling
of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies.

However, respondent argues that the land registration court is clothed with adequate authority to resolve
the conflicting claims of the parties, and that even if the DENR cancels her survey plan, the land
registration court is not by duty bound to dismiss the application for registration based solely on the
cancellation of the survey plan.21lawphil.net

Without delving into the jurisdiction of the DENR to resolve the petition for cancellation, we hold that, as
an incident to its authority to settle all questions over the title of the subject property, the land registration
court may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property overlaps the petitioner’s
properties without necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void.

It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious
resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration
court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious
cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.22 When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. 23 It
may, therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration.

In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the
issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title.24 An application for
registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, 25 which is not
allowed by law.26 But the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the
survey plan in order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already
titled property. The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis
the certificates of title of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely
serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a
portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will
be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.27

Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its
determination of the propriety of the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:

SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. – The court may require facts to
be stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and
may require the filing of any additional papers.
The court may also directly require the DENR and the Land Registration Authority to submit a report on
whether the subject property has already been registered and covered by certificates of title, like what
the court did in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals.28 In that case, we commended such move by

the land registration court for being "in accordance with the purposes of the Land Registration Law."29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March
19, 2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan is DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in L.R.C. Case No. U-1134 and to resolve the
same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.