G.R. Nos.
86883-85 January 29, 1993 treachery, hereby sentences each of them to a penalty of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORBERTO MANERO, JR., EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO,
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO, ROGER BEDAÑO,
RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN DOE and PETER
DOE, accused.
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO and ROGER
BENDAÑO, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo P. Jorge for accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown.
A hapless foreign religious minister was riddled with bullets, his head
shattered into bits and pieces amidst the revelling of his executioners as they
danced and laughed around their quarry, chanting the tune "Mutya Ka
Baleleng", a popular regional folk song, kicking and scoffing at his prostrate,
miserable, spiritless figure that was gasping its last. Seemingly unsatiated
with the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader picked up pieces of the
splattered brain and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators.
Some accounts swear that acts of cannibalism ensued, although they were
not sufficiently demonstrated. However, for their outrageous feat, the
gangleader already earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what is
indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali1 was senselessly killed for no apparent
reason than that he was one of the Italian Catholic missionaries laboring in
heir vineyard in the hinterlands of Mindanao.2
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive
manhunt which resulted in the capture of the perpetrators except Arsenio
Villamor, Jr., and two unidentified persons who eluded arrest and still remain
at large.
Informations for Murder,3 Attempted Murder4 and Arson5 were accordingly
filed against those responsible for the frenzied orgy of violence that fateful
day of 11 April 1985. As these cases arose from the same occasion, they
were all consolidated in Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan,
Cotabato.6
After trial, the court a quo held —
WHEREFORE . . . the Court finds the accused Norberto
Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias
Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo
Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, and with
the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to pay the Pontifical
Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the
congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, a civil
indemnity of P12,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00 for each of the eight (8) accused or a total sum
of P400,000.00; court appearance fee of P10,000.00 for
every day the case was set for trial; moral damages in the
sum of P100,000.00; and to pay proportionately the costs.
Further, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr.
alias Commander Bucay GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of Arson and with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of not less than four
(4) years, nine (9) months, one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the Pontifical
Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the
congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, the sum
of P19,000.00 representing the value of the motorcycle and
to pay the costs.
Finally, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr.,
alias Commander Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio
Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia alias
Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Attempted Murder and
with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of not less than two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, and
minimum, to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay the complainant Rufino
Robles the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and
P2,000.00 as court appearance fee for every day of trial and
to pay proportionately the costs.
The foregoing penalties shall be served by the said accused
successively in the order of their respective severity in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.7
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines,
Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño appealed with respect to the cases for
Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo
Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case.
Consequently, the decision as against them already became final.
Culled from the records, the facts are: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00
o'clock in the morning, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and
Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren
Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo
Diocades at Km. 125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were
conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor
of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards. Plans to
liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed.
Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v.
NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias
Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest
suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino
Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in the
Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others
are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to
Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias,
another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.8
At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified
companions nailed a placard on a street-post beside the eatery of Deocades.
The placard bore the same inscriptions as those found on the cigarette
wrapper except for the additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo."
Some two (2) hours later, Elpidio also posted a wooden placard bearing the
same message on a street cross-sign close to the eatery.9
Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four
(4) appellants, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil",
their first intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of
Deocades' carinderia. They were met by "Bantil" who confronted them why
his name was included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the query;
instead, he asked "Bantil" if he had any qualms about it, and without any
provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of "Bantil".
"Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion
of his right ear were hit. Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil"
was extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running away, he
was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil"
however managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo
Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr., ordered his men to surround the house and not to
allow any one to get out so that "Bantil" would die of hemorrhage. Then
Edilberto went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistol-whipped him on
the face and accused him of being a communist coddler, while appellants
and their cohorts relished the unfolding drama. 11
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him
with a burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as
he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his head. This again drew
boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados.
At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle.
He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-
accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway.
Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and
burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and
rejoiced. 12
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the
latter simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this
point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you
want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me,
Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the
head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped
against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he
knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the
prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of
gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter
on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his
brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their
comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from
possible assistance. 13
In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants Severino Lines, Rudy
Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño contend that the trial court erred in
disregarding their respective defenses of alibi which, if properly appreciated,
would tend to establish that there was no prior agreement to kill; that the
intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; that there was
only one (1) gunman, Edilberto; and, that there was absolutely no showing
that appellants cooperated in the shooting of the victim despite their proximity
at the time to Edilberto.
But the evidence on record does not agree with the arguments of accused-
appellants.
On their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim
that they were harvesting palay the whole day of 11 April 1985 some one
kilometer away from the crime scene. Accused Roger Bedaño alleges that he
was on an errand for the church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato,
that morning of 11 April 1985, taking along his wife and sick child for medical
treatment and arrived in La Esperanza, Tulunan, past noontime.
Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard
gunshots that they rushed to the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay
Captain of La Esperanza, where they were joined by their fellow CHDF
members and co-accused, and that it was only then that they proceeded
together to where the crime took place at Km. 125.
It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only
be at some other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 14
Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical
impossibility of being present at the crime scene, as can be readily deduced
from the proximity between the places where accused-appellants were
allegedly situated at the time of the commission of the offenses and the locus
criminis, 15 the defense of alibi is definitely feeble. 16After all, it has been the
consistent ruling of this Court that no physical impossibility exists in instances
where it would take the accused only fifteen to twenty minutes by jeep or
tricycle, or some one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance
between the place where he allegedly was at the time of commission of the
offense and the scene of the crime. 17 Recently, we ruled that there can be
no physical impossibility even if the distance between two places is merely
two (2) hours by bus. 18 More important, it is well-settled that the defense of
alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution
witnesses. 19
In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and
Manuel Bantolo, testified that they were both inside the eatery at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 when the Manero brothers, together
with appellants, first discussed their plan to kill some communist
sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they still saw the appellants in
the company of the Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon when
Rufino Robles was shot. Further, at 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon,
appellants were very much at the scene of the crime, along with the Manero
brothers, when Fr. Favali was brutally murdered. 20 Indeed, in the face of
such positive declarations that appellants were at the locus criminis from
10:00 o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the
alibi of appellants that they were somewhere else, which is negative in
nature, cannot prevail. 21 The presence of appellants in the eatery at Km. 125
having been positively established, all doubts that they were not privy to the
plot to liquidate alleged communist sympathizers are therefore removed.
There was direct proof to link them to the conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to
commit a crime and decide to commit it. 22It is not essential that all the
accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. 23 It
is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is
singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. 24
The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a
community of design as evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused.
Thus —
The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered
firearms, were positively identified with Norberto Manero, Jr.
and Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of Reynaldo
Deocades in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00
o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 morning . . . they
were outside of the carinderia by the window near the table
where Edilberto Manero, Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor,
Elpidio Manero and unidentified members of the airborne
from Cotabato were grouped together. Later that morning,
they all went to the cockhouse nearby to finish their plan and
drink tuba. They were seen again with Edilberto Manero and
Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that
day near the house of Rufino Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto
Manero shot Robles. They surrounded the house of
Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left
when Edilberto Manero told them to leave as Robles would
die of hemorrhage. They followed Fr. Favali to Domingo
Gomez' house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the
motorcycle of Fr. Favali and later stood guard with their
firearms ready on the road when Edilberto Manero shot to
death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr.
and Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on
the death of the priest. 26
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were
not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the
savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by
the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a
fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance
to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop
Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles
may die of hemorrhage. 27Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure
success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of
the conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali
and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants
may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action
showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it
was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless,
Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian
priest. On this, the conspirators expressly agreed. As witness Manuel
Bantolo explained 28 —
Q Aside from those persons listed in that
paper to be killed, were there other persons
who were to be liquidated?
A There were some others.
Q Who were they?
A They said that if they could not kill those
persons listed in that paper then they will
(sic) kill anyone so long as he is (sic) an
Italian and if they could not kill the persons
they like to kill they will (sic) make Reynaldo
Deocades as their sample.
That appellants and their co-accused reached a common understanding to
kill another Italian priest in the event that Fr. Peter Geremias could not be
spotted was elucidated by Bantolo thus 29 —
Q Who suggested that Fr. Peter be the first
to be killed?
A All of them in the group.
Q What was the reaction of Norberto
Manero with respect to the plan to kill Fr.
Peter?
A He laughed and even said, "amo ina"
meaning "yes, we will kill him ahead."
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Severino Lines? What was
his reaction?
A He also laughed and so conformed and
agreed to it.
Q Rudy Lines.
A He also said "yes".
Q What do you mean "yes"?
A He also agreed and he was happy and
said "yes" we will kill him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Efren Pleñago?
A He also agreed and even commented
laughing "go ahead".
Q Roger Bedaño, what was his reaction to
that suggestion that should they fail to kill Fr.
Peter, they will (sic) kill anybody provided he
is an Italian and if not, they will (sic) make
Reynaldo Deocades an example?
A He also agreed laughing.
Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently
shown, the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary. 30
The award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the
congregation, the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, is
not proper. There is nothing on record which indicates that the deceased
effectively severed his civil relations with his family, or that he disinherited
any member thereof, when he joined his religious congregation. As a matter
of fact, Fr. Peter Geremias of the same congregation, who was then a parish
priest of Kidapawan, testified that "the religious family belongs to the natural
family of origin." 31 Besides, as We already held, 32 a juridical person is not
entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. It is only when a juridical
person has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation,
that moral damages may be awarded.
Neither can We award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased who may
otherwise be lawfully entitled thereto pursuant to par. (3), Art. 2206, of the
Civil Code, 33 for the reason that the heirs never presented any evidence
showing that they suffered mental anguish; much less did they take the
witness stand. It has been held 34 that moral damages and their causal
relation to the defendant's acts should be satisfactorily proved by the
claimant. It is elementary that in order that moral damages may be awarded
there must be proof of moral suffering. 35 However, considering that the
brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali was attended with abuse of superior
strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
pain and anguish of the victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse,
exemplary damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though not
proved nor expressly pleaded in the complaint, 37 and the amount of
P100,000.00 is considered reasonable.
With respect to the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio
Favali, the amount is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with existing
jurisprudence, which should be paid to the lawful heirs, not the PIME as the
trial court ruled.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the
evidence is AFFIRMED with the modification that the civil indemnity which is
increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 is awarded to the lawful heirs of
the deceased plus exemplary damages of P100,000.00; however, the award
of moral damages is deleted.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 132330. November 28, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1 JOSE
BANGCADO[1] and PO3 CESAR BANISA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SPO1 JOSE BANGCADO and PO3 CESAR BANISA appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City convicting them of two (2)
counts of murder and two (2) counts of frustrated murder, imposing upon
them the corresponding prison terms, and to pay damages plus costs.[2]
The facts: On 27 June 1993, at around 8:30 in the evening, Pacson
Cogasi, Julio Clemente, Leandro Adawan and Richard Lino were at the
Skyview Restaurant, Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, drinking and listening
to folksongs. Moments later, a group of five (5) arrived and sat one table
away from Pacson Cogasi and his friends. Among the newcomers was a thin
person wearing a blue long-sleeved jacket, later identified as SPO1 Jose
Bangcado, and a heavier one wearing a t-shirt and maong pants, later
identified as PO3 Cesar Banisa. The rest of their group were not identified.
At that time, members of the police force of Baguio City were
conducting Operation Kapkap at the Skyview Restaurant. They however
exempted the table of PO3 Cesar Banisa as they knew him to be a fellow
policeman.
At around 9:00 o'clock that evening, Cogasi and his friends left the
restaurant to go home. They were residents of La Trinidad, Benguet. As they
went behind the restaurant where their Ford Fierra was parked, they noticed
SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa following them. Cogasi and his
group recognized Bangcado and Banisa to be customers at Skyview
Restaurant. Bangcado and Banisa approached them. First, Banisa asked
Richard Lino for a light. Then Bangcado and Banisa asked the group if they
were willing to be frisked. Since the two (2) police officers were armed with
handguns and smelled of liquor, the group agreed to be frisked.As Leandro
Adawan stepped aside to urinate, Bangcado slapped him and then asked the
group where they came from. Their answer was, from Besao, Mt. Province,
except Clemente who said that he came from Balili, La Trinidad. Bangcado,
with Banisa standing guard behind him with a drawn gun, ordered Cogasi,
Clemente, Adawan and Lino to form a line against the Ford Fierra facing him
in that order. Adawan was only one meter away from Bangcado. Lino and
Cogasi were about 1-1/2 meters away, while Clemente, four (4) meters
away. Without any warning, Bangcado suddenly fired his gun in quick
succession at the four (4) persons lined up against the Ford Fierra. Cogasi
saw Adawan and Lino fall down. Cogasi then felt he was hit on the left side of
his neck and he also fell down. He managed however to crawl away and run
to the Hilltop where he was able to ask for help before falling unconscious.
Cogasi woke up to find himself confined at the Baguio General Hospital
together with Clemente. There Cogasi learned that Lino and Adawan died
from gunshot wounds in their heads. Cogasi himself suffered a gunshot
wound at the neck, at the junction of his left jaw near the ear, while Clemente
received two (2) gunshot wounds on his right shoulder with one (1) of the
bullets being lodged just below his right eye.
After their release from the hospital, Cogasi and Clemente filed a
complaint with the NBI in Baguio City. On 8 July 1993, four (4) civilian males
were presented to Cogasi for identification by the NBI, but he told them that
the suspects were not among those present. Clemente did not participate in
the identification process because of his eye injury.
In the morning of 10 July 1993 Bangcado and Banisa reported for their
regular rank inspection at the La Trinidad Police Station. The policemen were
told to remain in formation after the inspection. Cogasi went around the
formation four (4) or five (5) times before pointing to Bangcado and then to
Banisa. Clemente also went around the formation but despite going around
longer than Cogasi, Clemente was unable to identify anybody.Clemente
started to point to James Tagle but withdrew his identification of him when
some people then present laughed and shouted "Hoy!" and "Sabali!"
meaning "Wrong!" or "Different!" Accused-appellants insist that Clemente
could not have made a reliable identification of them at the NBI and La
Trinidad line ups, nor even in open court, because his eye injury blurred his
vision.
The rule is that positive identification of witnesses prevails over the
simple denial of the accused. It cannot be doubted that Clemente and Cogasi
had a good view of the faces of the accused. From the testimonies of various
witnesses, including PO3 Jimmy Baybay, one of the policemen who
conducted Operation Kapkap, the Skyview Restaurant was well-
lighted. Banisa himself testified that although the lighting may be "somewhat
dim," he could still recognize a person from a distance of four (4)
meters.[3] This is relevant considering that the two (2) groups were seated
only one (1) table apart. Thus, Cogasi and his friends were able to recognize
their assailants as the persons who came out from the Skyview Restaurant.
The crime scene was illuminated by two (2) streetlights and the lights
coming from the nearby Garden Inn and various sari-sari stores. The fact that
the policemen who responded to the report of the incident had to use a
flashlight in their investigation did not prove that the area was so dark as to
preclude the identification of the persons involved. For one thing, the
policemen had to be careful not to overlook any piece of evidence, such as a
spent bullet. For another, SPO4 Antonio Naungayan of PNP Baguio City,
who was part of the investigating team, testified on cross-examination that
even if the area was not brightly lighted, one could still recognize
people.[4] According to Clemente, he was only four (4) meters away from his
attackers when they fired upon him and his friends. Cogasi was only 1-1/2
meters away while Adawan and Lino, who died on the spot, were each only
about a meter away.
It cannot be doubted that Cogasi and Clemente had enough time to take
a good look at their assailants faces who conversed with their victims,
ordered them to fall in line, frisked them one by one, and asked them
questions before shooting them. When Bangcado and Banisa leaned over to
frisk Cogasi and his friends, their faces must have only been inches away
from their victims; and when they ordered their victims to line up against the
vehicle, they stood only a few meters away.
Although Clemente admitted to be suffering from blurred vision, Cogasis
positive identification of appellants could be sufficient to establish their
identities. Indeed, there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single
witness must be corroborated except, of course, when expressly
mandated. Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, in determining the
credibility of witnesses and the value of each piece of evidence. In fact, the
testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to
convict,[5] and must be given full faith and credence when no reason to
falsely testify is shown.[6]
Assuming arguendo that Clemente was unable to identify accused-
appellants during the line-up in La Trinidad as his right eye was still
bandaged from his injuries, he was able to make a positive identification in
open court. Neither is it material now that Clemente made some attempts to
point to policeman James Tagle for it seems clear that he withdrew his
identification. Besides, Clemente admitted candidly that he could not identify
anyone in the line-up since his right eye was still covered with a bandage and
was still suffering from blurred vision.
Further, the defense failed to shake Cogasis certainty, either when he
declared that he recognized accused-appellants as being those who were
earlier in the Skyview Restaurant, or when he pointed to them in the line-up
at La Trinidad. The fact that he took some five (5) minutes and had to go
around the line-up four (4) or five (5) times did not detract from his
credibility. Rather, it is to his credit that he took time to look closely into the
faces of more than twenty-four (24) or so similarly garbed men to make sure
that he did not make a mistake in identifying his assailants.
Neither should the defense attempt to mislead the Court by pointing out
that Cogasi was not able to identify Bangcado during the NBI line-up since it
is clear that that line-up did not include accused-appellants. Instead, it was
composed of four (4) civilians, none of whom he had ever seen before. Since
these four (4) had no connection with the crime, there was no reason for
Cogasi to implicate any of them in the murder.
The defense also points out that the policemen who
conducted Operation Kapkap indicated in their joint affidavit that they only
saw Banisa present inside the Skyview Restaurant, along with three (3)
unidentified companions. According to the defense, this only proves that
Bangcado was not there since the policemen personally knew Bangcado and
thus should have included him in their joint affidavit.
However, the theory of the trial court that the reason why they did not
see Bangcado with Banisa was because he went to the washroom or
elsewhere deserves credence. Considering that the Skyview Restaurant had
some thirty (30) to fifty (50) customers that night; that the four (4) policemen
were busy going around the tables conducting Operation KapKap; that they
did not approach the table of Banisa to frisk him and his companions
because they recognized him as a policeman, then it is evident that their
attention was elsewhere, and that they did not bother to inquire whether
Banisa had other fellow officers with him. Further, the policemen testified that
they were in the restaurant for only a few minutes.
Further, PO Delfin Balan-eg, one of the policemen who
conducted Operation Kapkap, testified that he saw Bangcado and Banisa
drinking beer inside the restaurant. The defense tried to destroy his credibility
by establishing that he and the two (2) victims as well as the two (2)
complaining witnesses were related. However, it must be stressed, that
relationship, much less bias, cannot be established by the fact that two (2)
persons live in different barangays that form part of the same town.
The defense insist that neither could Cogasis testimony be given any
weight since his testimony in open court contradicted his sworn affidavit
executed immediately after the incident before the investigating officer.While
he testified that he saw the accused emerge from the Skyview Restaurant, in
his affidavit, he swore that their attackers actually alighted from a red -
colored car. The theory of the defense is that if the gunmen alighted from a
red or maroon colored car immediately before the shooting, then they could
not have come from the Skyview Restaurant, and vice versa.
An affidavit taken ex parte is judicially considered to be almost
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and
sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which
the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary
for his accurate recollection of the incident.[7] Further, an examination of
Cogasis sworn statement shows, however, that there was actually no
contradiction. His testimony was as follows: "x x x I noticed a maroon car x x
x I noticed also two persons who were immediately following us went (sic)
near the parked maroon car and one of them opened the door at the drivers
side but immediately closed it."[8] Quite obviously, the two (2) persons who
emerged from the Skyview Restaurant intended to board the parked car but
changed their minds and, instead, followed Cogasi and his friends to the
Ford Fierra that was parked.
The accused-appellants raise the defense of alibi which is inherently
weak. To prosper, alibi must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that
the accused could not have been physically present at the crime scene at the
time of the incident.[9] The alibis of the accused clearly show upon
examination that this could not have been so.
Bangcado testified that he stayed at home because he served his tour
of duty from 12:00 midnight to 8:00 a.m. the previous day. Thus, on the day
of the incident, he was at home where he slept, read the newspapers,
watched television and played with his one-year-and-seven-month old
daughter. After dinner, he took a nap until his mother-in-law woke him up
before 11:00 p.m. so he could report to the police station before 12:00
midnight. As police officer assigned to patrol his area of responsibility, his job
was to ride in the police vehicle going around La Trinidad. [10] This was
confirmed by Bangcado's mother-in-law Angela Gondales when she testified
for the accused.
Yet, Bangcado himself told the court that Central Pico, La Trinidad,
Benguet, where his mother-in-laws house stood, was only five (5) kilometers
away from Skyview Restaurant and could be negotiated in thirty (30) minutes
using a motor vehicle.[11] The fact that La Trinidad was only thirty (30)
minutes away from Baguio City was corroborated by Banisa himself. [12] And
Bangcados house is near a national highway where jeepneys pass by on
their way to Baguio City, which means, it was not impossible for Bangcado to
have left the house earlier than 11:00 p.m. and be in Baguio City at the time
of the incident.
The defense failed to establish with credible evidence that SPO1 Jose
Bangcado was on duty from 11:00 o'clock in the evening to 8:30 the following
morning. SPO4 Lilia Pascual, Records Custodian of the PNP at La Trinidad,
Benguet, testified that there was no record of the attendance of PNP officers
from June to December 1993. SPO4 Carlos Layagan, Bangcados Patrol
Section Supervisor, testified that on that day, Bangcado was present for his
regular tour of duty from 12:00 o'clock midnight to 8:00 o'clock the following
morning and conducted routine patrol by mobile,[13] but the incident occurred
at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening according to the police who responded
when the crime was reported to them. Thus, Bangcado had plenty of time to
do what he did and still go on his tour of duty. More damaging was the
admission of Layagan in his cross-examination that before 12:00 o'clock
midnight of 27 June 1993 he was not in the company of SPO1 Jose
Bangcado.[14]
The alibi of PO3 Cesar Banisa was even more incredible. He admitted
being at the Skyview Restaurant when Cogasi and his friends were there, but
claimed that he left with his brother to eat mami and siopao at the Baguio
First Hotel, which is only about a hundred (100) to a hundred and fifty (150)
meters away from Skyview Restaurant and could be reached in five (5)
minutes of walking.[15] He explained however that "this bold admission x x x
placing him within the vicinity of the crime scene shows his clear
conscience. For, if he was involved in the crime, he would naturally put
himself in other places."[16] His testimony was corroborated by Abelardo
Lucas who testified that he, along with Arsenio Palileng and Raymund
Banisa, accused-appellants brother, was with Banisa that night.
While flight of an accused is competent evidence to establish prima
facie his guilt, there is no law or principle that non-flight per se is proof, let
alone conclusive proof, of innocence. Much like the defense of alibi, non-
flight cannot prevail against the weight of positive identification of the
accused.[17] It is more credible to believe that Banisa had no choice but to tell
the truth regarding his presence at the Skyview Restaurant because four (4)
policemen who knew him well saw him there while they were
conducting Operation Kapkap.
PO3 Banisa further claims that his group stayed at the Baguio First
Hotel Restaurant for only ten (10) minutes and then went down the road to
the jeepney station where they boarded a jeepney at 9:00 o'clock in the
evening bound for La Trinidad and got home after twenty-five (25) to thirty-
five (35) minutes. Yet he also testified that the boarding station for jeepneys
bound for La Trinidad was only across the road from Skyview Restaurant.
SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa could have accosted their
victims, gone back to Skyview Restaurant and joined their companions who
may have thought that they (Bangcado and Banisa) just went to the comfort
room or stepped out for some fresh air. Abelardo Lucas himself testified that
while they were at the Skyview Restaurant his companions would frequently
stand up and leave, purportedly to go to the restroom.
The defense bewails the fact that nothing seemed to have been done to
the deformed slug found near the body of the deceased Richard Lino, nor to
the other slug extracted from Clemente, and that no ballistics examination
was conducted to determine from what caliber they were fired and if the gun
used was the same. Investigators did not even cause the surrender of
accused-appellants firearms for examination and comparison. Neither were
accused-appellants required to undergo a paraffin test.
 Nonetheless, a ballistics examination is not indispensable, and even if
another weapon was in fact actually used in killing the victim, still the
accused cannot excape criminal liability therefor as he was already positively
identified.[18] Because credible witnesses had already demonstrated
accused-appellants' culpability, there was no need to present further
evidence linking them to the crime. There is no requirement of a certain
quantum of evidence before one may be justly convicted of an offense
except when specifically required by law. The only requisite then is that the
guilt of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt.[19]
Accused-appellants insist that they had no motive to shoot the victims
and/or the complaining witnesses. However, even the absence of a known
motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential to convict when
there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit.[20] Lack of motive does not
preclude conviction when the crime and the participation of the accused
therein are definitely shown,[21] particularly when we consider how nowadays,
it is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have killed or committed
serious offense for no reason at all.[22]
The defense also tried, but failed, to establish that Cogasi and Clemente
knew beforehand that Bangcado and Banisa were policemen as they all lived
and worked together in the same neighborhood. This allegation is not
sufficient to prove that the witnesses for the prosecution had any ill motive to
testify against accused-appellants. When there is no evidence to show any
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely
against an accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime,
the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[23]
The defense also assails the conclusion reached by the trial court that
the accused were guilty because they remained silent when they were
pinpointed by Cogasi during the police line-up. The trial court asked, "Is it not
that 'Qui tacen concentire videtur,' meaning, 'Silence means consent'?"[24]
Although the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in
the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or
says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action
or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may
be given in evidence against him,[25] courts should be cautious in interpreting
silence against the accused. Further, the facts do not support the conclusion
that the accused remained silent. Both Bangcado and Banisa gave their
individual reactions during the line-up but police discipline kept them from
breaking rank.[26] As police officers, they are bound by the strict discipline of
their profession, as well as an awareness of their rights to remain silent and
to avail of the services of counsel. These rights are not diminished by the fact
that they are policemen.
However, the trial court ruled, and correctly so, that at the time of the
police line-up, accused-appellants were not yet under the custody of the
police agencies. Their rights had not yet been restricted or curtailed. The
right to counsel attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when
the investigating officer begins to ask questions to elicit information and
confessions or admissions from the accused.
From the testimony of the victims as well as from the physical evidence,
it seems that SPO1 Bangcado was the lone gunman, while PO3 Banisa
merely stood behind him with his gun drawn. In his testimony, Cogasi
narrated how the shooting occured -
Q: You testified that the thin one who called himself Jose Bangcado
pointed a gun at Leandro Adawan, what type of gun is (sic) that x x x
x
A: It was black and short.
Q: What about the fat man at that time, was identified as Cesar Banisa,
what was he doing at that time?
A: He was also standing beside him and was holding his gun.
Q: Would you illustrate to this Court how Jose Bangcado pointed a gun at
Leandro Adawan?
A: Witness stretch[ed] both his arms and clasped his hands together with
the forefinger extended in front of him.
Q: After you saw Jose Bangcado point a gun at Leandro Adawan, what
else transpired, Mr. Witness?
A: He suddenly fired his gun.
Q: To whom Mr. Witness did he fire his gun?
A: He fired his gun to the four of us.
Q: After firing his gun what else transpired, Mr. Witness?
A: I just felt that I fell down.
Q: Why did you fall down?
A: Because I was shot.[27]
On cross-examination, Cogasi affirmed his sworn statement taken by
the investigating officer immediately after the incident wherein he referred to
only one (1) gunman who did the shooting. He further testified that he heard
four (4) successive shots when the gunman started shooting, then heard
more shots only after he had succeeded in running away.
On his part, Clemente attested in his sworn statement that "the man in
jacket then ordered us to line up. After we have formed a line, he started
shooting at us starting from the left. He shot first Leandro, then Richard and
followed by Pacson. After hearing the shots and seeing my companions fall, I
turned my back and held my nape with my two (2) hands and started to run
but I got hit and fell. I got up and tried to run but I fell down again."[28]
 On the other hand, during his direct examination Clemente testified -
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, when these two (2) persons followed you and your
companions, what did you observe from them that time?
A: They have (sic) guns, sir.
Q: What kind of guns do (sic) they have?
A: Short and black, sir.
Q: And were they holding their guns?
A: They were holding their guns, sir x x x x
Q: After you were made to fall in line, what happened next?
A: He pointed a gun, sir.
Q: Who pointed the gun to whom?
A: The thin man pointed his gun at Leandro Adawan, sir.
Q: What else transpired after that?
A: They fired their guns at us, sir.
Q: Who shot at who (sic)?
A: The two (2) of them, sir, because there were two of them.[29]
On cross examination, Clemente testified -
Q: So, you said on that date you were frisked and then later on lined-up
and when you heard successive shots, you fell down?
A: When I heard the three (3) successive shots, I saw one pointing the
gun again at me, so, I turned around and prepared to run, but I was
hit, sir. When I turned my back and started to run, I was hit, sir.
Q: So, because you turned your back, you did not really see who actually
shot you?
A: I saw the thin one point the gun at me and both were armed with guns,
sir x x x x
Q: So, you want to tell the court that it was the thin one who shot you
because he was holding the gun that way, is that correct?
A: I do not know because both of them have (sic) guns, sir. But I saw the
thin one pointing a gun at me, sir.[30]
Thus, as to the identity of the gunman, it is apparent that both witnesses
were positive only as far as Bangcado was concerned. However, it seems
that they only concluded that Banisa participated in the shooting because he
was also holding a gun. The failure of the surviving victims to assert with
confidence that Banisa also fired his gun raises reasonable doubt as to
whether he participated in the shooting.
Accused-appellants deny the existence of treachery, nighttime and
abuse of public position to aggravate the commission of the crimes. It is
settled that qualifying circumstances cannot be presumed but must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, as conclusively as the killing
itself.[31] The defense alleges that there is no evidence that accused-
appellants made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to
insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the
person attacked to defend himself. For treachery to be considered, two (2)
elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. [32] In this case,
treachery was not present. In a long line of cases, the Court held that "the
essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed
victim without the slightest provocation on his part."[33]
To ensure that he was not in any risk, accused-appellant Bangcado
frisked and searched Cogasi, Clemente, Adawan and Lino to see if they were
concealing any weapons. After making sure that the victims were unarmed,
Bangcado directed the victims to form a line against the Ford Fierra to
separate the victims from each other and so that the latter could not rush to
their friends defense. Because Bangcado and Banisa were holding
handguns, Cogasi and his friends did as they were told and were caught
unaware when they were shot. In fact, Adawan and Lino died of gunshot
wounds in the head, while Cogasi and Clemente only sustained head
wounds that did not prove fatal.
In the absence of any previous plan or agreement to commit a crime,
the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and
the same person is individual and not collective, and that each of the
participants is liable only for his own acts.[34] Consequently, Banisa must be
absolved from criminal responsibility for the assault on the victims. It is clear
that neither the victims nor Banisa could have anticipated Bangcados act of
shooting the victims since the attack was sudden and without any reason or
purpose. Thus, the criminal design of Bangcado had not yet been revealed
prior to the killings.
For public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance,
the public official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his
office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have
perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse
of public position.[35] Hence, that aggravating circumstance cannot be
appreciated here. While it may seem that accused-appellants intended to
assert their authority as policemen and encourage in the victims minds the
belief that they were part of Operation KapKap when they frisked the victims,
both Cogasi and Clemente testified that they never told the investigating
officers that their assailants might be policemen. In fact, because the
assailants were not in uniform, they believed the latter to be civilians.
The defense claims that the injuries of the surviving victims were not
serious enough to classify the attack under the frustrated stage, therefore,
they committed only attempted homicide. However, the doctors who attended
to the surviving victims testified that had they not treated Cogasi and
Clemente's injuries the latter would have suffered from infection which could
result in their death. It is clear that only timely medical attention saved both
victims from imminent death.
Accused-appellants deny that there was an offer to compromise when
their relatives visited Miguel Adawan, the 81-year old father of Leandro
Adawan. The old Adawan in tears testified that he came to know of the
accused Bangcado and Banisa through their relatives when the latter came
to his house in Besao, Mt. Province. Although the incident occurred on 27
June 1993, the first visit was sometime in April 1995 when Magdalena
Mabiasan, the mother of Jose Banisa came "for a possible settlement of the
case."[36] Again, sometime in August or September 1996, Bangcados wife
and parents, along with Banisas mother Magdalena, visited him at Pico, La
Trinidad.[37]
The defense claims that the only reason the relatives of accused-
appellant went to visit and talk to Miguel Adawan was to prevent him from
avenging his sons death on the families of accused-appellant, in keeping with
the tradition of the Igorot indigenous people. Therefore, this cannot be
interpreted as an implied admission of guilt. Moreover, Sec. 27 of Rule
130[38] contemplates an offer of compromise from the accused himself. There
is no showing that the visits were made with the knowledge or upon the
instructions of accused-appellants. Thus, even if the purpose of the visit was
to negotiate a settlement, accused-appellants had nothing to do with it, since
they were neither participants nor initiators.[39]
The trial court believed in the testimony of Adawan, compared to that of
the relatives of accused-appellants who could be biased, partial and, of
course, hoping to save the two (2) accused from the serious predicament
they were in.[40] It posited this question:
But why is it that during the first time that they approached the 77-year
old man Adawan in Besao, Mountain Province, they were already assured
that the family of the deceased Adawan would not take revenge and for the
last three years, nothing happened to the families of the accused, still they
again went to the residence of Miguel Adawan at Pico, La Trinidad,
Benguet. This would only show that they tried to amicably settle the cases,
but they were rebuffed.[41]
But an offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount
to an admission of the party himself.[42] Although the Court has held in some
cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an
implied admission of guilt,[43] we believe that the better rule is that for a
compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should
be present or at least had authorized the compromise.
In People v. Macatana[44] it was held: "No implied admission can be
drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the courts, primarily
because appellant did not take part in any of the negotiations. The efforts to
settle the case x x x in accordance with the established Muslim practices,
customs and traditions were initiated by acknowledged leaders x x x in an
effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the tribes."[45]
The general rule is that claims for actual damages should be supported
by actual receipts. However, it is undisputed that the victims are members of
the indigenous community and were buried according to their customs and
traditions. The relatives of the victims attested that they incurred expenses
for the caao, the traditional gathering of Igorots. The Court is not unaware
that the informal market system still governs the economic transactions of
indigenous communities. Thus, receipts and other documents do not play a
large role in their daily commercial transactions. In this case, wherein it is
clearly established that the claimants were indeed members of indigenous
communities, then the court should allow reasonable claims for expenses
incurred in relation to traditional burial practices.
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of
the deceased Leandro Adawan. The fact that the prosecution did not present
documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of the
damages.[46] Testimonial evidence is sufficient to establish a basis for which
the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages for the
loss of earning capacity.[47] Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of
earning capacity of a deceased victim, the Court can consider the nature of
its occupation, his educational attainment and the state of his health at the
time of his death.[48] The testimony of Adawans father sufficiently established
the basis for making such an award. It was shown that Adawan was thirty-
seven (37) years old at the time of his death in 1993 and earned P4,000.00 a
month as a mechanic.
Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality adopted by this Court in several cases,[49] the loss of his earning
capacity is to be calculated as follows:
Net Earning Capacity (x) = Life Expectancy x Gross annual income living
expenses (50% of gross annual income)
where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of deceased [37 years])
x = 2/3 x (80 - 37) x [(P4000.00 x 12) - (P4000.00 x 12)50%]
x = 2/3 x 43 x [P48,000.00 - P24,000.00]
x = [2/3 x 43] x P24,000.00
x = 28.67 x P24,000.00
x = P688,080.00
 Since Leandro Adawan was thirty-seven (37) years old at the time of his
death, his life expectancy was 28.67 years. Considering that his average
monthly income was P4,000.00, his gross annual income would
be P48,000.00. Using the above formula, the victims unearned income would
thus be P688,080.00.
On the other hand, the Court has no basis to award damages for
Richard Lino loss of earning capacity because the prosecution failed to
introduce any evidence on this matter.
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence) is automatically granted to the offended party, or his/her heirs
in case of the formers death, without need of further evidence other than the
fact of the commission of any of the aforementioned crimes (murder,
homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary damages may be
separately granted in addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded
only upon sufficient proof that the complainant is entitled thereto in
accordance with Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can
be awarded if the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the discretion of
the courts.[50]
Under present case law, the award of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. Moral damages, vis-a-
vis compensatory damages or civil indemnity, are different from each other
and should thus be awarded separately.[51] Thus, as explained in People v.
Victor,[52] the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex
delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing
judicial policy and aside from other established actual damages, is itself
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be
considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on different
jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.[53]
In People v. Victor the Court increased the civil indemnity for rape
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law,
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. The Court held that "This is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court
over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." [54] It is submitted that
the heirs of victims of murder, which is also a heinous crime, should not
receive less than what victims of rape receive as civil indemnity. If the civil
indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof
other than the fact of the commission of the offense, all the more reason
should the same minimum amount be imposed on those convicted of murder,
as more often than not the victims who are killed leave behind grieving
families who are depended upon them for support. Thus, indemnity
of P75,000.00 should therefore be reckoned for each count of murder
committed by accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado.
Since the crime was committed on 27 June 1993, the penalty for murder
prescribed by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by
RA 7659, which took effect only on 31 December 1993, should be applied in
imposing the penalty for frustrated murder, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum
to death.
The penalty for frustrated murder is one (1) degree lower than that
prescribed by the Penal Code for the consummated offense, hence, the
imposable penalty for frustrated murder should be prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present in the
commission of the offense, the penalty to be imposed for the frustrated
murder shall be taken from the range of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor medium or four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day to
ten (10) years as minimum, to the medium period of prision mayormaximum
to reclusion temporal or twelve (12) years five (5) months and eleven (11)
days to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days as
maximum. Hence, an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years two (2)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen
(14) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum may be considered reasonable for the frustrated murder under
the facts of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo in Crim. Cases Nos.
11619-R to 11622-R imposing reclusion perpetua for the two (2) counts of
murder and the indeterminate prison term of prision mayor in its medium
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period for two (2) counts of
frustrated murder on both accused-appellants SPO1 Jose Bangcado and
PO3 Cesar Banisa is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 11619-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado
is found GUILTY of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code
qualified by treachery, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of the victim Richard Lino P75,000.00 as indemnity for his
death, P59,300.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and
to pay the costs;
2. In Crim. Case No. 11620-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado
is found GUILTY of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
qualified by treachery, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of the victim Leandro Adawan P75,000.00 as indemnity for his
death, P93,100.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and
to pay the costs;
3. In Crim. Case No. 11621-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado
is found GUILTY of frustrated murder under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of
the Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
the absence of modifying circumstances, he is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years four (4) months and ten
(10) days reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, for the frustrated murder
of the victim Julio Clemente, and pay him P100,000.00 as moral damages,
and to pay the costs; and,
4. In Crim. Case No. 11622-R, accused-appellant SPO1 Jose Bangcado
is found GUILTY of frustrated murder under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of
the Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
the absence of modifying circumstances, he is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of of eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years four (4) months and ten
(10) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, for the frustrated
murder of Pacson Cogasi, and pay him P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
to pay the costs.

There being no finding of conspiracy with accused-appellant SPO1 Jose

Bangcado, PO3 Cesar Banisa is ACQUITTED of all the charges against him
and, consequently, is ordered released from custody in connection with
herein cases, unless he is held for other lawful causes.

SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. 129304. September 27, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AVA MA.
VICTORIA CARIQUEZ y CRUZ, and LEEZEL FRANCO y
SAMSON, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of 19 March 1997, of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, in Criminal Case No. 110410
convicting accused-appellants Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez y Cruz (hereafter
AVA) and Leezel Franco y Samson (hereafter LEEZEL) of the crime of
parricide and homicide, respectively.
In an Information[2] dated 30 May 1996, AVA and LEEZEL were initially
charged with serious physical injuries under Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No.
7610.[3] However, on 31 May 1996 the victim, Mariel Cariquez y Cruz
(hereafter ETHEL) died. On 30 August 1996 the information was amended to
charge AVA and LEEZEL with the crime of parricide. The Amended
Information[4] reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, accuses
AVA MA. VICTORIA CARIQUEZ Y CRUZ and LEEZEL FRANCO Y
SAMSON of the crime of Parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 5 of R.A. 7659 committed in
the manner herein narrated as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of May 1996, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
AVA MA. VICTORIA Y CARIQUEZ, being then the mother of a 2 1/2 years
old child, MARIEL CARIQUEZ Y CRUZ, conspiring and confederating
together with Leezel Franco Y Samson, and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, taking advantage of
superior strength and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, beat and maul said MARIEL CARIQUEZ Y CRUZ in the different
parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly
caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Lilia Gojul, Michelle
Torrente, Theresa Castillo, Dr. Antonio Vertido, Dr. Jose Joey Bienvenida,
SPO3 Adonis Bacarra, Dr. Arsenio Pascual, and Benilda Almario. Lilia Gojul
is AVAs sister.The relevant and material facts established by their
testimonies are faithfully summarized in the Appellees Brief, as follows:
Mariel Cariquez y Cruz, fondly called Ethel, was two and a-half years old
when she and her mother, Ava Cariquez, moved in sometime in January
1996 to No. 116 Royal Townhomes, San Rafael Mandaluyong City. Avas
sister, Lilia C. Gojul moved in with them (TSN, October 16, 1996, pp. 5-6,
32). She slept with the little girl in one of the two bedrooms on the house
(TSN, Ibid., p. 12). Ava had a housemaid named Elizabeth Patao, who also
watched over Mariel or Ethel (TSN, October 16, 1996, pp. 6,8). At the time,
Ava had a live-in partner, Leezel Franco (TSN, October 16, 1996, pp. 5-6,
49). He was not the father of Ethel, however (TSN, ibid., p. 51).
Avas household was not at all peaceful because almost everyday, Ava and
Leezel quarreled, nagbubugbugan (TSN, October 16, 1996, pp. 9, 11;
October 29, 1996, pp. 29, 40-41). Ava an Leezel were then taking or using
drugs (TSN, October 16, 1996, p. 39).
In the middle of March 1996, Lilia Gojul left Avas household and went to live
in her home at Urduja Village, Novaliches, Quezon City (TSN, October 16,
1996, p. 6).
In the meantime, the little girl caught the attention of their neighbors as she
was cute and friendly. While the neighbors became fond of Ethel, they
however found Ava and Leezel aloof snobbish (October 29, 1996, pp. 9, 30,
21).
On April 14, 1996, Lilia visited Ava and her niece at the Royal townhomes
but she was shocked to see Ethels appearance; her hair was shaven, her
face was full of contusions, her neck had faded cigarette burns while her
arms and legs had traces of pinching and maltreatment. She also had marks
of black-eye on both eyes. Lilia also noticed Ethels knees with contusions
due to prolonged kneeling. (TSN, October 16, 1996, pp. 12, 13). When Lilia
asked the little girl to identify who inflicted the injuries on her body, Ethel
tearfully pointed to Ava and Leezel (TSN, October 16, 1996, p. 14). Lilia
confronted Ava about her and Leezels treatment of Ethel (Ibid., p. 13).
Neighbors were hearing the little girl crying everyday, morning, noon,
evening, and even at 1:00 oclock or 2:00 oclock in the morning (TSN,
October 29, 1996, p. 8, 29-30). Sometime in April, Michelle Torrente, an
occupant of Unit 114, was aghast to see her shaven, with bruises all over her
body and wounds in her arms and legs (TSN, ibid., pp. 10,130. Ethel also
had cigarette burns, and when Michelle asked what happened, Ethel
replied: pinaso po ako. When Michelle further asked who burned her and
caused her bruises, Ethel said, Papa ko po, referring to Leezel Franco
(TSN, ibid., pp. 11-13).
The little girls shaven head and bruises were also noticed by Theresa Castill,
an occupant of unit 115, adjacent to Avas residence. When she asked
Ethels yaya why this was done to the little girl,
the yaya answered, parusa (TSN, October 16, 1996, p. 150).
The next time that Lilia visited Ava and her daughter was on May 12,
1996. At the time, Avas housemaid has already left the household. On that
occasion, Lilia observed that Ethel was sickly and had even more contusions
than the last time she saw her in April. Out of pity for the little girl, Lilia tried to
persuade Ava that she take custody of Ethel (TSN, October 16, 1996, p.
15). Ava agreed to her suggestion and wrote a note where she passed on to
Lilia Gojul the guardianship of Ethel Cariquez (TSN, ibid., pp. 16, 19; Exhibit
A). However, on May 14, 1996, Lilia had to leave Avas household without
bringing Ethel with her (TSN, October 16, 1996, p. 21). Ethel cried silently
when Lilia left (TSN, ibid., pp. 22, 36). Lilia heard nothing from them after
that.
On May 27, 1996, around 3:00 or 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Ethel was
brought in an ambulance from the Mandaluyong Medical Center to the
Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital at Greenhills, San Juan (TSN, November
14, 1996, pp. 8; 29).At the time, she was unconscious and was assisted by
an ambu bag, unable to breathe on her own. Her body was limp and she had
prominent bruises on the forehead and the right cheek (TSN, ibid., pp. 8, 16).
Dr. Jose Joey Bienvenida attended to her and in the course of taking her
medical history, he interviewed the mother, Ava Cariquez. Ava at first told the
doctor that it was her brother, the patients uncle, who mauled the child and
inflicted upon her serious injuries. Ava later changed her story, saying that
the little girl actually fell from the stairs (TSN, ibid., pp. 9-10, 25-27).
A CT-scan was taken of the child and the results showed a combination of
chronic and acute subdural hematoma on the left frontotemporoparietal (front
side and apex) convexity of the brain.
Massive edema and musk effect in the left cerebral hemisphere and right
fronte-parietal lobe were noted. A fracture was also noted on the left frontal
bone (TSN, ibid., p. 11). Blood clot was found in almost the entire cerebral
hemisphere. He also found soft tissue injuries, i.e., hematoma and abrasions,
in other parts of the body (TSN, ibid., p. 42). Dr. Bienvenida noted that the
injury on the head was a confluent injury, which means that it was sustained
on different dates (TSN, ibid.,p. 40); one portion of the injury was resolving
hematoma which was at least two (2) years old, while the more acute injury
was sustained within 24 hours from his examination (TSN, ibid., p. 41). Ethel
was thereafter confined at the Intensive Care Unit of the hospital, attached to
a respirator (TSN, ibid., p. 16). She was classified as a brain-dead patient
(Ibid., p. 18).
Ethels condition however grew worse and she eventually died on May 31,
1996 at about 10:20 in the morning. After her death, the life support system
was removed (TSN, ibid., p. 18; Exhibit E). The cause of death was cardio
respiratory arrest secondary to multiple organ system failure, severe massive
crania-cerebral trauma (TSN, ibid., p. 23; Exhibit C-2).
Dr. Antonio Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, conducted an autopsy on the
little girls body (TSN, November 7, 1996, p. 4). The doctor made the
following significant findings: fracture linear, right middle cranial fosse;
abrasion, right forehead; contusion, right leg; contusion-abrasion left face;
hematoma, forehead right and hematoma, scalp, right fronto-parietal (Exhibit
D). In his autopsy report, Dr. Vertido concluded that the cause of death was
Traumatic Head Injury, Severe (Exhibit D-2).[5]
AVA and LEEZEL were the witnesses presented by the defense.
According to AVA, during their breakfast at about 7:30 a.m. on 27 May
1996, she talked with LEEZEL about their up-coming concert on 1 June 1996
at Subic. Then, she went out of the house to make a telephone call. When
she left the house, her daughter ETHEL was eating while LEEZEL was
playing the guitar. When she returned she saw ETHEL playing with the
food. She told ETHEL to hurry up as she was going with her to the office, but
ETHEL stubbornly looked at her and continued to play with her food. She
again told ETHEL to hurry up and finish her food. ETHEL still said No. To her
repeated order to do so, ETHEL also repeatedly said, No. AVA then got a
plastic belt and hit ETHEL with it on the buttocks a number of times, which
made ETHEL cry. Since ETHEL continued to be hard-headed, AVA held her
on the shoulder. ETHEL struggled and slipped from AVAs hold, got out of
balance, and fell ETHEL hit the sofa and when she bounced back her head
hit the edge of the cemented stairs. AVA got shocked and noticed LEEZEL
stop playing his guitar and shout: Ava yoong anak mo. AVA then held ETHEL
and gave her mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. Seeing ETHELs serious
condition, LEEZEL suggested to AVA to bring ETHEL to the hospital, which
they did, at first to the Mandaluyong City Hospital and because the hospital
cannot provide the best medical care, to the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital, where she was brought to and confined at the hospitals Intensive
Care Unit (ICU). Early on the morning of 28 May 1996, AVA went to the
Mandaluyong Police Station to get her car and to find out the reason why her
car was impounded. She was not able to get the car. Instead, she was
detained at about 8:00 p.m. of 28 May 1996. AVA came to know that the
police found drugs in her car, for which reason she was detained. [6] Three (3)
days after her detention, Lilia Gojul, her sister, went to jail and asked her to
sign some papers and asked her permission to take off the respirator of
ETHEL in the hospital. She did not give her permission.[7]
On cross-examination, AVA declared that the cigarette burns on
ETHELs body were caused by sprinkling oil while their maid was cooking;
LEEZEL had nothing to do with any of the childs bruises or injuries; when
Lilia Gojul, her sister visited her in jail, the former told her that she should
point to LEEZEL as the one responsible for ETHELs death, otherwise, she
will do something to her; and that she has no personal relation with
LEEZEL. However, in her affidavit,[8] dated 1 June 1996, and in her reply-
affidavit,[9] AVA pointed to LEEZEL as the one responsible for ETHELs
injuries, stating that when she returned home after making a phone call from
outside the house, she found LEEZEL hit ETHEL with the buckle of a belt at
the back and front of her head. She tried to stop him but he pushed her. As
LEEZEL continued to hit ETHEL with the belt, what she did was to get the
antenna of the TV and hit LEEZEL with it at his hand causing him to release
the same. She then got hold of ETHEL but because LEEZEL pushed her she
fell to the floor with her daughter. This was repeated several times. When
she noticed ETHEL was having difficulty in breathing, she ran to the comfort
room in order to give ETHEL a shower to revive her, at the same time
applying mouth to mouth resuscitation to her. She went out of the bathroom
to bring ETHEL to the hospital.[10]
In her reply-affidavit AVA declared that when she returned home after
making a telephone call, she found LEEZEL hit ETHEL with a buckle of his
belt. That was not the first time that she saw him hit ETHEL; he used to hit
her whenever he is high on drugs and ETHEL was noisy playing. On those
occasions LEEZEL used to hit AVA and they end up fighting because AVA
always tried to protect ETHEL from harm.
AVA tried to diminish the value of these admissions in her affidavit and
reply-affidavit by testifying that she did not read them before signing and she
signed under a state of shock.[11]
LEEZEL offered two versions for his defense. In his counter-
affidavit[12] of 11 June 1996, he declared that during breakfast in the morning
of 27 May 1996, he and AVA talked about the band and their concert in
Subic. Thereafter, AVA told him that she was going to make a phone call
outside of the house. Before leaving, she ordered ETHEL to hurry up with her
food because she was to go with AVA to the latters office. However, when
AVA returned, ETHEL had not finished eating. AVA hit ETHEL very hard,
whipped her with a belt, held her by the arms and pushed her, sending
ETHEL to hit the corner of the sofa and then to bounce, causing her head to
hit the end of the cemented stairs and to fall to the floor.ETHEL was on the
verge of death. AVA was shocked. Seeing this, LEEZEL picked up ETHEL
and brought her to the comfort room where he poured water on
her. Thereafter, he and AVA brought ETHEL to the hospital.[13]
But, in his testimony in court LEEZEL declared that his statement in his
counter-affidavit that AVA pushed ETHEL, causing the latter to fall and to hit
the cemented stairs was only narrated to him by AVA and that he never
witnessed the incident.[14] He further declared that he had nothing to do with
ETHELs injuries and the testimony of Lilia Gojul is not true. Lilia had an
ulterior motive against him because on one occasion he prevented
Catherine, Lilias daughter from entering AVAs house and because of that,
Lilia, her husband and her sons Caesar and Julius kicked him and hit him
with a chair. Finally, LEEZEL claimed that he had no idea as to what
happened to ETHEL; all that he saw was the child lying on the floor, and he
then helped AVA bring the child to the hospital. In the hospital, he was asked
by the police to go with them to the Complaints and Investigation Division of
the Mandaluyong City Police, where he stayed for more than four
hours.Since the police conducted no formal investigation on him, he left for
home.[15]
In its decision[16] of 19 March 1997, the trial court found AVA and
LEEZEL guilty of parricide and homicide, respectively. It decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Ava Ma.
Victoria Cariquez y Cruz and Leezel Franco y Samson guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of Parricide and homicide
respectively and considering the mitigating circumstance that they did not
intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and there being no
aggravating circumstances on record, imposes upon-
a) Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
b) Leezel Franco the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor a minimum to fourteen (14) years
eight (8) months and one () day of reclusion temporal as
maximum;
c) To pay the costs.
Any detention service rendered by the accused should be credited in
their favor computed pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 85.
AVA and LEEZEL appealed to us from the decision.
In their Appellants Brief, AVA and LEEZEL interpose this lone
assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH
ACCUSED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR CONVICTION.
In support thereof, they argue that the prosecutions principal witness
Lilia Gojul, as well as the other witnesses never saw how ETHEL sustained
the injuries inflicted upon her; Lilia never testified that during her stay in
AVAs house the child was the object of their quarrel; the prosecutions
evidence is purely hearsay, conjectural and fails to show any conspiracy that
they maltreated and caused ETHELs death; her death was purely accidental;
only circumstantial evidence is on record against them and there was no evil
motive on their part to kill ETHEL.
They characterized the report of ETHEL to Lilia Gojul as to the formers
shaven head and injuries as hearsay and cannot be considered an exception
to the hearsay rule because it was not made on an impending death or with
the thought of an impending death and was related to Lilia many days before
the incident.
LEEZEL further asserts that only AVA was formally charged, hence,
there is no case against him.
The trial court convicted AVA and LEEZEL on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. Circumstancial evidence is sufficient to convict provided the
following requisites are present, namely: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived from are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [17] The circumstantial
evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to the guilt of the accused. [18] In the
Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General enumerates seven (7)
circumstantial evidence which the trial court took in to account and relied
upon as bases for its finding that AVA and LEEZEL, were criminally
responsible for the death of ETHEL, to wit:
1. In 14 April 1996, prosecution principal witness, Lilia Gujol, saw
Ethel shaven, with many constusions on her face, black eyes,
cigarette burns on her arms and neck, and several marks of
maltretament on her legs and both knees as well as traces of
pinching all over her body. When asked who caused her those
injuries, the 2 year old girl pointed to her own mother, Ava, and
her mothers live in partner, Leezel Franco;
2. When Lilia next saw Ethel on 12 May 1996, Ethel had even
graver injuries and was sickly. Again, Ethel pointed to
appellants Ava and Leezel as the ones who caused her the
injuries.
3. Michelle Torrente, a resident of the unit adjacent to the
townhouse unit occupied by Ava Cariquez, Leezel Franco and
Ethel Cariquez, testified that she used to hear Ethel crying
between 1:00 to 2:00 in the morning. She further testified that
one day she saw Ethel with bruises and cigarettes burns and
when asked what happened to her, Ethel replied, pinaso po
ako; Ethel pointed to her Papa Leezel as the one who did it to
her.
4. Theresa Castillo, another occupant of an adjacent unit, also
testified that she often saw Ethel bruised and crying and
sometime in April, saw her head shaven. When she asked
the yaya why Ethels hair was shaved,
the yaya answered parusa.
5. Dr. Jose Bienvenida, the doctor who attended to Ethel at the
Cardinal Santos Memoraial Hospital, opined that the injuries
found on the head of Ethel were inflicted on different dates.
6. Dr. Bienvenida further testified that in the course of taking the
medical history of the child, he interviewed the mother, Ava
Cariquez, who gave conflicting accounts as to how the child got
injuries: while the mother initially said that her daughter was
mauled by her uncle (AVAs brother), she later changed her
story by claiming that the child fell from the stairs.
7. Dr. Vertido testified that the cause of death was traumatic Head
Injury, Severe
Aside from the foregoing circumstantial evidence, the trial court also
took into account AVAs affidavit (Exhibit R), reply-affidavit (Exhibit S), and
LEEZELs counter-affidavit (Exhibit T), as well as the circumstances of the
apprehension of the two by authorities for illegal possession of shabu and
AVAs judicial admission that ETHEL slipped form her hold, fell and her head
hit the cemented floor.
We are fully convinced from the evidence on record of the culpability of
AVA and LEEZEL for ETHELs maltreatment. The testimony of Lilia Gojul,
Michelle Torrente and Theresa Castillo ineluctably show that AVA and
LEEZEL tormented ETHEL. Where ETHEL dwelt was not a home; it was not
even a house. It was hell. AVA and LEEZEL considered ETHEL not as a
child with human dignity and an object of love as children should be, but an
unwanted object against whom they could vent everything from frustrations
to anger and hate. What Lilia saw on ETHEL was truly shocking -- an
innocent child with shaven hair; with a face full of contusions; a neck with
faded cigarettes burns; arms and legs with traces of pinching and
maltreatment; black-eyed eyes; and contused knees due to prolonged
kneeling.[19] When Lilia asked the little girl to identify who inflicted the injuries
on her body, ETHEL tearfully pointed to AVA and LEEZEL.[20] Lilia confronted
AVA about her and LEEZELs maltreatment of the child.[21]
In April 1996 Michelle Torrente was aghast to see ETHELs head
shaven, with bruises all over her body and wounds in her arms and
legs,[22] as well as cigarette burns. When she asked what happened, ETHEL
replied: pinaso po ako. When she further asked her who burned her and
caused her bruises, ETHEL said, Papa ko po, referring to LEEZEL.[23]
Theresa Castillo also noticed ETHELs shaven head and body
bruises. When she asked ETHELs yaya why this was done to the child,
the yaya answered, parusa.[24]
The declarations of Lilia, Michelle and Theresa as to what they
observed on ETHEL were not hearsay. They saw her and personally noticed
the injuries and telltale marks of torture. While the answer of ETHEL as to
who inflicted the injuries may have been, indeed, hearsay because ETHEL
could not be confronted on that, yet it was part of the res gestae and,
therefore, an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Section 42 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequently thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.
There are three requisites to the admission of evidence as constituting
part of the res gestae. (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[25] In this case the
startling occurrences were the tortures inflicted on ETHEL, who when asked
who caused them spontaneously pointed to AVA and LEEZEL. That some
time may have lapsed between the infliction of the injuries and the
disclosure, it must however, be pointed out that there has been no uniformity
as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling
event from the making of the declarations. What is necessary is that the
injuries sustained by ETHEL prior to the incident on 27 May 1996 were
inflicted by AVA and LEEZEL. These acts are covered by and punished
under R.A. No. 7610, under which they were originally prosecuted. However,
the then Information was amended to charge them with parricide under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence on the prior incidents
cannot legally justify a conviction for the physical injuries inflicted before 27
May 1996.
The issue then that must be resolved is who was or were responsible for
the act on 27 May 1996, which caused or resulted in the death of
ETHEL? On this the prosecution failed to offer any direct evidence. The
circumstantial evidence the trial court appreciated related to acts or events
which happened before 27 May 1996.
Yet, these prior acts are inseparable from that which happened on 27
May 1996. The latter was the coup de grace. Fortunately, for the prosecution,
AVA offered two versions. The first was that she offered at the witness stand
in open court, i.e., ETHELs death was due to an accident. The second was
narrated in her affidavit (Exhibit R) and reply-affidavit (Exhibit S), where she
pointed to LEEZEL as the culprit. We cannot allow her to disown her affidavit
and reply-affidavit as the explanation given for that is very flimsy and
incredible, and clearly concocted to exculpate LEEZEL and at the same to
absolve herself under a claim of accident. Her affidavit and reply-affidavit
were prepared at her instance long before she took the witness stand. In a
manner of speaking they were given voluntarily and spontaneously long
before the prospect of a court trial became imminent and the dismissal of the
cases against her was her goal. That she told the truth in her affidavit and
reply-affidavit cannot escape the verdict of rational minds.
AVAs story of accident cannot, likewise, work in her favor.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code. In order that accident may exempt an accused from criminal
liability, it must be shown that the accused was performing a lawful act with
due care; the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and there must
be no fault or intent to cause the injury on the part of the accused.[26]
The defense of accident shifted to AVA the burden of the evidence and
it was incumbent upon them to prove that they were exempt from criminal
liability. It is at once evident from the story foisted to the trial court by AVA
while she was on the witness stand that the requisites of accident as an
exempting circumstance were not proven. On the contrary, the totality of her
story proved beyond reasonable doubt that ETHEL was maltreated and
pushed hard driving her head to the cemented stairs and causing the injuries
which were the proximate cause of her death.
We agree with the trial courts appreciation of conspiracy against AVA
and LEEZEL. The rule is well settled that in conspiracy the act of one is the
act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by
the other conspirators.[27] Proof of conspiracy need not be direct but may be
inferred from proof of facts and circumstances.[28] If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent were in fact connected, indicating a closeness of formal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved.[29] The
facts and circumstances proven in this case unerringly lead us to a
conclusion that AVA and LEEZEL conspired to maltreat, injure, inflict pain,
torture ETHEL and they were united in that purpose and intention. The
totality of their evil deeds demonstrated beyond doubt their resolve to pursue
with persistence their common objective, which eventually resulted in the
death of ETHEL. As amply demonstrated by the evidence, ETHELs injuries,
particularly that on the head, in addition to those on the body, were sustained
not only on the date of the fateful incident but on dates before the day of the
incident. Thus, Dr. Bienvenida testified that: he noted that the injury on the
head was a confluent injury, which means that it was sustained on different
dates;[30] one portion of the injury was resolving hematoma which was at
least two (2) days old, while the more acute injury was sustained within 24
hours from his examination.[31]Likewise, the result of the CT-Scan which was
taken on the child showed a combination of chronic and acute subdural
hematoma on the left fronto-temporoparietal (front side and apex) convexity
of the brain. Massive edema and musk effect in the left cerebral hemisphere heirs of ETHEL Cariquez, except accused-appellant Ava Cariquez, the death
and right fronto-parietal lobe were noted. A fracture was also noted on the indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
left frontal bone. Blood clot was found in almost the entire cerebral
hemisphere. Also found were soft tissue injuries, i.e., hematoma and Costs against accused-appellants.
abrasions, in other parts of the body.[32] In the autopsy conducted by Dr. SO ORDERED.
Vertido of the NBI, the doctor concluded as the cause of Ethels death:
Traumatic Head Injury.[33]

Indisputably, AVA committed the crime of parricide under Article 246 of

the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that no modifying circumstances
were proven, then pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the
lesser of the penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua, was correctly imposed by the
trial court on AVA. LEEZEL was correctly held liable for the crime of homicide
only as he was a stranger to the victim, ETHEL. Previous to its amendment
by R.A. 7610, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, was reclusion temporal. As amended by R.A. 7610, the penalty
for homicide in cases where the victim is a child below twelve (12) years of
age is reclusion perpetua. The second paragraph of Section 10 of Article VI
of R.A. 7610 provides, as follows:

For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable
under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder,
homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries,
respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon

LEEZEL. His claim that he was not charged in the amended information is
absolutely wanting in basis. He was, although for parricide, but, he could
legally be convicted of homicide, which is necessarily included in that
charged.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated 19 March 1997 of the Regional Trial

Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, in Criminal Case No. 110410 finding
accused-appellant Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez y Cruz and Leezel Franco y
Samson guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Parricide
and Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 246 and Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, respectively, and imposing, with respect to
appellant Ava Cariquez, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby
AFFIRMED, but MODIFIED as to the penalty for Leezel Franco y Samson
and as so modified, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The decision is further MODIFIED by directing accused-appellants
Ava Cariquez and Leezel Franco y Samson to pay jointly and severally the
 [G.R. No. 125539. July 27, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO
PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr. were charged
before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region
stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery. * The Amended Information
dated October 11, 1985 charged:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above
named two (2) accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with three
(3) others whose identities are still unknown and who are still at large, armed
with bladed weapons by means of force, violence and intimidation, taking
advantage of the nighttime to better realize their purpose, and in the dwelling
of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three
Hundred (P300.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victim Corazon
Aliman and the following personal property: one (1) adjustable wrench, one
(1) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of levis pants, one (1)
travelling bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10.00) pesos, with a total
value of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the
victims Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine Belesario, the over all total of cash
and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, without the consent of the above-mentioned offended
parties and to their damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount; that by
reason or on the occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2)
accused did then and there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him
and inflicting wounds which required medical attendance of more than thirty
(30) days, as well as inflict physical injuries to the other victims Corazon
Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries requiring
medical attendance for several number of days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 92-93, II Record.)
In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque,
Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court
with the crime of robbery with multiple rape, thusly:
That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-
named three (3) accused, with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable
motive, conspiring, confederating and working together with Richard Doe,
Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all armed with firearms and
other deadly weapons, thereby performing [sic] themselves into a band,
entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain
and with violence against, and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away Five Hundred
(P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, and
one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, making
a total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will
and/or consent of the owner; that on the occasion thereof, the above-named
three (3) accused, conspiring and working together with their companions
who are still at large, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Perpetua
Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar and Josephine Belesario,
against their will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 90-91, II Record.)
Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered
a plea of not guilty to both crimes charged (p. 103, II Record).
After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:
Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof
showing that the accused in these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the charges filed against them, they are hereby sentenced as
follows:
a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused
Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque are penalized to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years, and One (1) day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount
of P700.00 representing the value of her property robbed from her and also
to indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the
expenses he incurred for his medication and hospitalization due to the
wounds he suffered.
b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused
Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death
penalty and to indemnify the members of the Carcillar family the amount of
P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles taken from them.
In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 80, Rollo.)
The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the
following findings:
Criminal Case No. 18376
The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by
accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as well as by their
unidentified companions, based on the positive identification made by
complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by her son Reynaldo
and the latters half sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).
Criminal Case No. 18305
Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras,
as well as an unidentified companion, acted in concert to commit the crime of
robbery with multiple rape. They were positively identified by the following
witnesses:Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by Alex Mijaque; Josephine
Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia Carcillar who was
raped by Alex Mijaque; and Perpetua Carcillar, who was raped by Nestor
Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape her. Accused-
appellant Patalin was likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally
knew him as a former barangay-mate for along time, as well as by Corazon
Aliman, mother of Reynaldo. The identification of accused-appellants was
facilitated and aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact that they tarried
in the crime scene for a long period of time, thus allowing their victims to
imprint in their memory the countenance or visage of accused-
appellants. Said positive and clear identification by the complaining
witnesses, who were not shown to have any ill motive to falsify the truth and
to implicate accused-appellants, prevails over the latters defense of
denial. Band, nocturnity, and dwelling, were likewise appreciated against
accused-appellants (pp. 78-79, Rollo).
The errors assigned by accused-appellants in their individual briefs are
summarized as follows: (1) The trial court erred in finding that accused-
appellants are responsible for the crimes charged; (2) The trial court erred in
convicting accused-appellant Patalin notwithstanding the fact that the latter
was arrested without a warrant; (3) Assuming without conceding that
accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the crimes charged, the trial
court erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was suspended
upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).
The prosecutions version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the
testimony of prosecution witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia
Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman, Corazon Aliman, Josephine Belisario,
Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar, is summarized in
the Solicitor Generals consolidated Brief, as follows:
At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his
half sister Josephine Belisario, and their mother Corazon Aliman were having
a conversation inside their house at Barangay Lumanay, municipality of
Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., who was outside
the fenced perimeter of said house, called out Reynaldo Aliman by his
nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons with him in
(pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).
Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw
appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. with (2) other persons. Appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo Aliman to let them in (pp. 7-8,
ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin together with
his companions, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the
premises (pp. 8, 10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this
juncture, appellant Alex Mijaque hacked Reynaldo Aliman twice with a bolo
hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the chest (pp. 14-16,
ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).
Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their
house, witnessed the hacking incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6,
TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, June 30, 1988). Two of the assailants, one
of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed Corazon Aliman and Josephine
Belisario inside their house, covered their mouth and told them not to make
any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to the
house of the latters aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is beside their
house. The other man stayed put and while holding a double-bladed knife,
threatened to kill Corazon Aliman if the latter will not give him money. After
Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash, he
ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip, one (1)
screw driver, one (1) pair of Levis trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one
(1) wallet containing ten pesos (P10.00); the total value thereof is seven
hundred pesos (P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300.00)
cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged Corazon Aliman to her sisters house
(pp. 6-8, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30, 1988).
Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunts house
which is just twenty (20) meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is
appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., outside the house of her aunt. Josephine
Belisario was forced to call out her aunts name and ask that the door be
opened for her. While the door was being opened, it was kicked by one of the
six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in, boxed the aunt of
Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-
up. The other companions of appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including
appellant Alex Mijaque, who were armed with knives, a bolo, and a gun also
went in and restrained Josephine Belisarios cousins, namely Rogelia,
Juliana, Perpetua, Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed Carcillar (pp.
11-15, TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine Belisario
together with her aunt and cousins were all forced to lie face down on the
floor of the sala (p. 15, TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15,
1990). Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar (Josephine
Belisarios aunt and the mother of her cousins), kicked and boxed the latter
and exclaimed: Money, money. It is money we want. Appellant Alfonso
Patalin forced Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him money (p.
16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8, February 15, 1990). Then, appellants and
their companions seized the following personalities of the Carcillars: (1) one
Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two (2) pairs
of ladys rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of earrings,
and (4) two (2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15, 1990).
Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque
who was armed with a butchers knife and threatened to kill her if she will not
lie down. Because of fear, she did as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN,
February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly removed her underwear
and placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but appellant Alex
Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the formers neck and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant
Alex Mijaque brought her inside the house and ordered her to lie face down
on the floor again (pp. 13-14, ibid.). Then, one of the companions of
appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a gun took her outside and
brought her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. 14, ibid.). This
man, at the point of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will not obey his
orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for her life, was left with no choice but
to obey the mans orders. There, she was raped for the second time by this
gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being raped,
appellant Alfonso Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p.
18, ibid.).
Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex
Mijaque who, with his knife, tried to rape her but he initially failed because of
her resistance. This angered appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill
Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was prevailed upon not to do so by
one of his companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29, 1989).
Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana
Carcillar, turned her over to one of his companions who was in the garden
outside the house and armed with a gun. This man threatened her with the
gun and mauled her.She was overpowered and he undressed her. He
inserted his finger on her sex organ and eventually succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.). Then, this companion of
appellant Alex Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and
ordered to look for money. When she told him that they have no more
money, he kept on harming her. In the course thereof, he found and took a
Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he brought her outside
the house again where he had a brief conversation with appellants Nestor
Ras and Alfonso Patalin. She was then brought back inside the house and
ordered to lie face down on the floor again. While at this position, appellant
Alex Mijaque approached her and brought her outside the house. She
refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaques order to lie down on the ground so
he pushed her downwards. Her strength gave out and he succeeded in
raping her twice. She was then brought back inside the house (pp. 18-21,
TSN, June 29, 1989).
Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was
dragged by appellant Alex Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He threatened
her with his knife and was able to undress her. He fondled her breasts, pulled
her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her. She was then left inside the room. Two companions of appellant Alex
Mijaque came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia and Perpetua
Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another
room. The man demanded money from her but she was not able to give him
money. The man was also carrying a knife and threatened her with the
same. She resisted when he was forcing her to lie down on the bed but her
strength finally gave out. He likewise succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her. After raping her, the man took a piggy bank which was at the foot of
the bed and brought her back to the room where she was first raped. Her
aunt and cousins were also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30,
1988).
Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the
floor of the living room, she was pulled by the heir by appellant Alfonso
Patalin and ordered to stand up. When she stood up, she realized that her
sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, armed with a double-
bladed knife, brought her outside the house, ordered her to undress and lie
down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was then only thirteen (13)
years old, obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis into
her vagina but did not succeed. Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her
over to appellant Nestor Ras, a member of their group who was only about
two (2) arms length away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed with a double-bladed
knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to lie down. He
fondled her breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her. After raping her, appellant Nestor Ras brought her back inside the
house. When she was returned inside the house, the intruders were still
demanding for money from her mother and were taking turns in beating the
latter (pp. 4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990).
Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the
valuables stated earlier after threatening them not to report the matter to the
police or else they will return and kill all of them (p. 19, TSN, February 15,
1990).
Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where
he received first aid. He was then brought to West Visayas Medical Center
located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp. 18-20, TSN, December 16, 1986) and was
treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May 14, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman
sustained the following injuries: (1) hack wound, mid forearm, area ulnar side
middle third forearm, and (2) hack wound, left side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid;
Exhibit A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for almost three (3)
months and he spent more than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for
medicines, food and other expenditures (p. 19, TSN, December 16, 1986).
Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two
days after she was raped. A hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was
found on the left shoulder of Josephine Belisario which could have been
caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the ground. Josephine Belisario
vagina admits two (2) fingers. Further, hematoma was noted in the hymen at
nine oclock and three oclock positions and fresh lacerations was also noted
at nine, eleven, and three oclock positions. These are indications that a
foreign object, which could be a human penis, was inserted in the vagina and
caused the lacerations of the hymen (pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).
Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also
examined and treated by Dr. Leticia Santiago but such was conducted three
days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).
A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar
(p. 18, ibid). Her vagina admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a
lacerated wound which is one centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3,
TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations were likewise noted in her
hymen at eight, eleven and three oclock positions (p. 3, TSN, November 10,
1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a foreign object was inserted in the
vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p. 3, TSN,
November 10, 1986).
Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left
and right side of the face, upper right arm, uppermost and lower portions of
the left thigh, occipital region of the head and left side of the mouth. She also
sustained the following injuries: (1) cm. lacerated wound on the left side of
the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left shoulder, (3) 1 cm.
incised wounds on the right index finger and right thumb, (4) 4 inches incised
wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back including
the portion below the waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh
lacerations in the hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and four oclock
positions (pp. 10-15, TSN, November 10, 1986).
Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a 1 centimeter lacerated wound
on the perineum which was also swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers
snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh laceration at six oclock position and a
hematoma also at six oclock position were noted on her hymen (Exhibit C, p.
15, Record).
(pp. 300-311, Rollo.)
Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their
testimony and that of their witnesses, Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo Lebona,
Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The denials, together with other
arguments, are summarized as follows:
Alfonso Patalin
Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only
included by Jesus Larang, whom he described as the landlord of Jesusa
Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to reveal the names of the
persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily, he declared on the stand
that when the victims saw him at the police station, two of them (Josephine
Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn, August 13, 1993,
pp. 10-11, 19-20).
In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing
that when prosecution witness Josephine Belisario was asked on the stand if
she recognized the person who called [her] brother Reynaldo, said witness
responded that she did not know the person who called her brother, and that
she only recognized the callers voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-
31). Further, accused-appellant Patalin also alleges that he was arrested
without a warrant.
Alex Mijaque
Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of
Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3, II Record), there is no mention of his name nor that of
accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes
charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination in the lower court,
accused-appellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the
malefactors. He likewise points out that in the police blotter, the first report
mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown persons.No rape was
reported. In the second report, it was blottered that the alleged offenders
were four unidentified persons. Again, no rape was reported. Accused-
appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by Rogelia Carcillar
who merely narrated the robbery but did not report any rape.
 According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo,
Manduriao (also referred to in the record as Mandurriao) received a
complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen previous
to the incidents herein involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque was suspected
as the thief and was picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police Station
without any warrant of arrest and was thence detained for three days without
any complaint (p. 93, Rollo).Meanwhile, the robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo was
being flashed at all police stations in Iloilo. The arresting officers of the
Manduriao Police Station, so accused-appellant Mijaque contends, in order
to save themselves from charges of arbitrary detention, immediately referred
him for custodial investigation in regard to the Lambunao
robbery. Consequently, three days after his confinement, a criminal
complaint for robbery with physical injuries and another for robbery with rape
was filed against him by the Chief of Police of Lambunao, Iloilo.
Nestor Ras
The third accused-appellant, Nestor Ras, argues that his name was
never mentioned by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, and that Josephine Belisario was
merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his name. He also states
that the witnesses declarations as regards his identification are confusing
and inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo).
Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by
the public prosecutor about what happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar,
testified that Nothing happened to them (p. 210, id). And when Perpetua
Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses reported the alleged
incident to the police authorities, they never mentioned that they were raped.
As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the
charges, also presented their respective alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin
testified that he was at home with his parents, wife, and children, at Pandan,
Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 16-17) at the time of the incident. As
corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the person in charge
of the plantation where he was working, who testified that accused-appellant
Patalin did not leave the plantation house from August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn,
October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).
For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no
opportunity to get out of the farm where he was working which was located in
Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In July, 1985, he was arrested for
theft of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail for
investigation. Although three of the herein complainants were brought in front
of his detention cell, he was not identified. Instead, the policemen pointed to
him and said, That is Alex Mijaque who raped you. If you will not include him,
he will file a case against you. Moreover, he testified that he was mauled in
jail (tsn, July 29, 1993, pp. 10-13). Defense witness, Alejandro Tabucan,
neighbor of accused-appellant Mijaque, corroborated the latters alibi that on
August 11, 1984, they had a drinking spree from 6 oclock in the evening to
12 oclock midnight, and accused-appellant Mijaque was not able to leave the
premises in Manduriao. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep
the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10).
Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the
province of Antique (particularly, in Igbangkal, Dao) on August 11, 1984 (tsn,
December 17, 1993, p. 4). As corroborative witness, he presented Cristina
Gumban, a vendor who testified that on August 11, 1984, she bought
cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal, Dao,
Antique from 3 oclock to 5 oclock in the afternoon, and that he saw Ras put
the purchased items in a sack (tsn, March 4, 1994, p. 4).
We are not persuaded by the above posturings and are compelled to
affirm.
Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that
the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93
[1997]). We generally uphold and respect this appraisal since, as an
appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold
pages of a written record (People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]).
A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution
witnesses credibility, particularly the ravished victims, who, for approximately
two agonizing hours, were subjected to a hellish nightmare occurring in the
very privacy of their own homes.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated
brief, the defense was not able to prove any motive on the part of the private
complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and raped by accused-
appellants. In fact, two of the rape victims, Josephine Belisario and Rogelia
Carcillar, were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant Patalin (pp.
327-328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily turn against a relative although this
be by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate they narrated.
Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the
complaining witnesses. As discussed above in their individual defenses, they
emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of the
perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on August 11, 1984, Reynaldo
instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to report the hacking and robbery
incidents at the Lambunao Police Department, as well as the robbery
committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter stated that
the alleged offenders were unknown persons but contained no report of any
rape; and that Rogelia Carcillars report did not mention that she was raped.
Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal
accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is
satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An
examination of Reynaldo Alimans sworn statement (p. 3, I Record) shows
that he clearly identified one of the callers as accused-appellant Alfonso
Patalin. Anent his failure to mention accused-appellant Mijaques name, he
explained on cross-examination that he did not know yet the name of the
person who attacked him with the bolo at the time he executed his sworn
statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It was only later that he found
out that the name of his assailant was Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus
Larang, the fact that he mentioned unknown persons in his report does not
affect Reynaldos categorical and positive identification of accused-appellants
Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the hacking and robbery incidents
at his home.
Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told
them not to report the matter to the police, otherwise, the assailants will
return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims were overcome
by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in reporting the multiple
rapes was not procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date of the
incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far shorter period than those
mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that
a delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6 months, by a victim of rape in reporting
the attack on her honor, does not detract from the veracity of her charge.
The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the
complaining witnesses, as follows: (1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier that
the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on a small
table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked down, thus
placing the house in darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua Carcillar,
earlier said that although there was no more light in the house coming from
the lamp, yet she could still see because the light of the moon still illuminated
their house, allegedly through the plastic roofing; and (2) the prosecution
witnesses could not agree concerning the date they went to San Dionisio,
Iloilo to identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as well as the date when Ras
was arrested.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to
minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony, and do not impair
the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant
(Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In fact, honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than
destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is
shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses (People vs. Agunias,
279 SCRA 52 [1997]).
With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these
defenses, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative
and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary
value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Positive identification,
where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]). Verily, even if the defense
of denial is supported by the testimony of friends of the accused, it deserves
the barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). It will
be given weight only if it would preclude any doubt that the accused could
not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the
time of commission (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs.
De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709
[1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241
SCRA 718 [1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs.
Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243 SCRA 7
[1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244
SCRA 87 [1995]).
Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in
Manduriao, Iloilo. The overland travel time from the town of Manduriao to
Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes. Accused-appellant
Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan, which is merely adjacent to
Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in
Antique, a province neighboring Iloilo, which is approximately two hours
away therefrom viaoverland transportation. The defense tried to corroborate
these alibis by presenting witnesses who testified on details which happened
ten years prior to the date their testimony was given, and hence of naturally
doubtful credibility.
Mutatis Mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering
that the places where accused-appellants alleged they were at could be
traversed by motorized vehicles, it was not impossible that accused-
appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7 oclock or 7:30
o'clock in the evening on August 11, 1984. More importantly and damming
yet is the positive identification of their presence thereat by the victims.
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and dwelling in Criminal Case No. 18376 considering that nighttime
facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence shows that
accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to successfully
consummate their plans (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798
[1968]). Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which the victims
reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as the violation
of the sanctity of privacy in the victims homes. He who goes to anothers
house to slander him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law, Vol.
I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs.
Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and Viada, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We
further affirm the trial courts finding on the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of band considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that
accused-appellants Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was
later identified as accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7,
Dec. 16, 1986). This was corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw
four (4) persons enter their gate, one of whom was accused-appellant Patalin
(tsn, p. 10, June 30, 1988). These same aggravating circumstances likewise
attended the commission of the crime of robbery with multiple rape in
Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the victims
thereof who stated that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin,
armed with a bolo, a knife, and a long gun, entered their dwelling that
unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10; February 15, 1990, p. 5).
With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaques defense that
they were arrested without warrants, suffice it to say that any objection,
defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As correctly pointed
out in the Peoples consolidated brief, the record shows no objection was
ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial (p. 324, Rollo).
It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the
crimes in both Criminal Cases No. 18376 and 18305. In the first criminal
case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin and
Mijaque, together with unidentified companions, committed the crime
charged. Said culprits shared the common criminal objective of robbing the
victims and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the occasion of the
robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants (together with
unidentified companions), who were positively identified by the victims
themselves, undoubtedly had the common criminal design of robbing the
household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple rape on the
occasion of the robbery. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine
Belisario to her aunts house and the other culprits followed suit. Accused-
appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced that they were
staging a hold-up.After robbing the household, they proceeded in ravishing
the four young female victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua,
one after the other, thus truly exhibiting their concerted acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs.
Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It cannot be merely presumed. Similar to the
physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual
agreement among accused-appellants adduced at the trial
...direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that
the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into
and pursue a common design. The existence of the assent of minds which is
involved in a conspiracy maybe, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually
must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which,
taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved (People vs.
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146; People
vs. Balignasay, G.R. No. 76743, May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA
486)...
(People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).
Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited
by the straightforward testimony of the victims themselves.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the
death penalty. At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984,
robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal
Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty
was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed upon
accused-appellants. Said provision reads as follows:
Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it.Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect
upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. However, said provision left the
matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Simply stated, it did not
prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508).
Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act
No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.
Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitutions
abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to the
accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on January 1,
1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision
was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty
Law had already taken effect.
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. At
the time of the commission of the crime in 1984, as held by the trial court,
robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (Article 294[2],
Revised Penal Code [as amended by Presidential Decree No. 767]).
True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to
Congress future restoration thereof for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still at its trial
stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed. Considering that the
provision provides that [a]ny death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, it is clear that the framers intended said provision to
have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death
having been imposed yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987
Constitution, any death penalty already imposed is automatically without
need for any executive action commuted (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).
The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was
abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused-
appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act
restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An affirmative
answer would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the death
penalty.
Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an
individual may be compelled to hold his life (or lose it), or the means of living,
at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any country where freedom
prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 [1919]). Before us is a heinous
crime indeed where People were harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused in
the defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but human nature to feel some
measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the offenders considering the
inhuman aspect of the crime committed. However, the ascendancy of the law
is axiomatic in our type of government. Every official act must be based on
and must conform to the authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must
be rejected (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our
intention is insufficient.
There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987
retroactively affected and benefited accused-appellants. Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that [p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed
against the state (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p.
5). The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character since it
deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This penal provision
may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal
prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution
began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun;
and (c) when the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of
Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil
483 [1932]).
In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the
abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused-appellants. Perforce,
the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The
framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by
Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have
prospective application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p.
748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227,
citing I Record, p. 747-748).
There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law
which entitles him to insists that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor
has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which precludes
its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular
matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as
to impair a right that accrued under the old law (Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
Pineda, 98 Phil 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil 372 [1946]). Courts have
thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their retroactive operation in
order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing
rights. Clearly, accused-appellants right to be benefited by the abolition of the
death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them.
Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested (Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515
[1992]), the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used (Balatbat vs. Court
of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).
By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits
accruing to workmen under the old law cannot be taken away from them by a
succeeding law. In the case at bar, there is greater reason to apply this
principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at issue.
As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal
Case No. 18376, correctly awarded P700.00 to Corazon Aliman representing
the total value of the cash and personal property forcibly taken, and
P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses incurred for
medication and hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the
trial court failed to order indemnification for the multiple rapes. Thus, in line
with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor(G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998)
wherein we said:
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape
continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of
higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the
jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same
direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity
for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than
P75,000.00. this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression
of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity. Accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as
indemnification for five counts of rape (considering that Juliana Carcillar was
twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum of
P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and articles that were taken
from the victims. In line with the recent ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R. No.
127569, July 30, 1998), moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for
each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded. Lastly, so
that the instant case may serve as an object lesson to the public, exemplary
damages in the amount of P10,000 per count of rape is further awarded
(People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]).
Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and
Mijaque are jointly and severally liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal
Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-appellants are solidarily liable
for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by
the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with the
following modifications:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, considering that the aggravating circumstances of band,
nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime, accused-
appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum;
(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally
held liable for the amounts awarded by the trial court in said criminal case,
particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the total value of the cash
and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00 representing the
expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication and hospitalization;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua; and
(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial
court to the Carcillar family representing the value of the cash and articles
taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are hereby awarded an
additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape, P50,000.00 for each
count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as
exemplary damages, for which amounts all three accused-appellants are
jointly and severally liable.
SO ORDERED.