18-09-24 Qualcomm Opposition To FTC Motion 4 Partial Summary Judgment

Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 870 Filed 09/24/18 Page 1 of 31
1 KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
Robert A. Van Nest (SBN 84065) Richard S. Taffet (pro hac vice)
2 rvannest@keker.com richard.taffet@morganlewis.com
Eugene M. Paige (SBN 202849) 101 Park Avenue
3 epaige@keker.com New York, NY 10178-0060
Justina Sessions (SBN 270914) Telephone: (212) 309-6000
4 jsessions@keker.com Facsimile: (212) 309-6001
633 Battery Street
5 San Francisco, CA 94111-1809 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
Telephone: (415) 391-5400 Willard K. Tom (pro hac vice)
6 Facsimile: (415) 397-7188 willard.tom@morganlewis.com
1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
7 CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP Washington, DC 20004-2541
Gary A. Bornstein (pro hac vice) Telephone: (202) 739-3000
8 gbornstein@cravath.com Facsimile: (202) 739-3001
Yonatan Even (pro hac vice)
9 yeven@cravath.com MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
825 Eighth Avenue Geoffrey T. Holtz (SBN 191370)
10 New York, New York 10019-7475 gholtz@morganlewis.com
Telephone: (212) 474-1000 One Market, Spear Street Tower
11 Facsimile: (212) 474-3700 San Francisco, CA 94105-1596
Telephone: (415) 442-1000
12 Attorneys for Defendant Facsimile: (415) 442-1001
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED
13
14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
15 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
16 SAN JOSE DIVISION
17 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Case No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC

18 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT QUALCOMM
INCORPORATED’S OPPOSITION TO
19 vs. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON QUALCOMM’S
20 QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a Delaware STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT
corporation, LICENSING COMMITMENTS
21
Defendant.
22 Date: October 18, 2018
Time: 1:30 p.m.
23 Dept.: Courtroom 8, 4th Floor
Judge: Hon. Lucy H. Koh
24
Trial Date: January 4, 2019
25
REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED
26
27
28
Defendant Qualcomm Incorporated’s Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Qualcomm’s
Standard Essential Patent Licensing Commitments
Case No. 17-cv-220-LHK-NMC
C:\redactions.D
[[NYLIT:2773918v4:9/24/2018 4:08:01 AM
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii

I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................1
4
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................3
5
A. The Relevant Commitments to ATIS and TIA ........................................................4
6
B. The Content of the ATIS and TIA Standards ..........................................................5
7
C. The ANSI Essential Requirements and Patent Policy .............................................7
8
D. Industry Practice of Licensing Complete End-User Equipment, Not
9 Components Such As Modem Chips .......................................................................8
10
E. The Need for Compatibility Among IPR Policies of Cellular SDOs. ...................10
11
III. LEGAL STANDARD........................................................................................................12
12
A. Summary Judgment Must Be Denied When the Plain Language
13 Interpretation or a Contractual Ambiguity May Be Resolved in the Non-
Movant’s Favor. .....................................................................................................12
14
B. Under California Law, the Entire Contract and All Other Evidence Must
15 Be Considered To Determine if a Contract Is Reasonably Susceptible to a
Party’s Proposed Interpretation..............................................................................12
16
IV. ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................13
17
A. The FTC’s “Plain Language” Interpretations of the ATIS and TIA IPR
18 Policies Do Not Take Account of the Complete Contractual Provisions at
Issue. ......................................................................................................................14
19
1. The FTC Fundamentally Misreads the ATIS and TIA Policies
Because Modem Chips Do Not Practice or Implement the Standard. .......14
20
2. The Non-Discrimination Commitments Do Not Compel
21 Component-Level Licensing. .....................................................................18
3. TIA’s Licensing Guidelines Are Not Part of the TIA Contract and,
22 in Any Event, Do Not Support the FTC’s Reading of the TIA IPR
Policy. ........................................................................................................19
23
B. The Overwhelming Evidence Establishes, at the Very Least, a Genuine
24 Factual Dispute Concerning the Appropriate Interpretation of the ATIS and
TIA IPR Policies. ...................................................................................................19
25
1. Long-Standing Industry Practice Confirms That the ATIS and TIA
26 Policies Do Not Require Licensing the Manufacture and Sale of
Modem Chips. ............................................................................................20
27 2. ANSI Has Confirmed That Licensing at the Component Level Is
Not Required. .............................................................................................22
28
i
C:\Users\mp018711\Desktop\Qualcomm\MSJ Opp 9.24
FINAL (1052PTPM) - CW final check with highlighted
1 3. The FTC Concedes the Need for Evidence Interpreting the ETSI
IPR Policy, Which Must Be Consistent with the ATIS and TIA
2 Policies. ......................................................................................................22
C. Amici Misconstrue FRAND Caselaw, Which Does Not Establish That
3 Licensing the Manufacture and Sale of Components Is Required by the
TIA or ATIS IPR Policies. .....................................................................................24
4
V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................25
5
10
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ii
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
Cases
3
4 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 12
5
Apple v. Qualcomm,
6 LEXIS 145835 (S.D. Cal Sept. 7, 2017). .................................................................................. 25
7 Bank of the West v. Superior Court,
2 Cal. 4th 1254 (Cal. 1992) ....................................................................................................... 12
8
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
9
477 U.S. 317 (1986) ............................................................................................................ 12, 18
10
In the Matter of Certain Wireless Communications Equipment,
11 2007 WL 1221125, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-577 (Feb. 22, 2007) .......................................... 19
12 City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,

68 Cal. App. 4th 445 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ............................................................................... 13
13
Copart, Inc. v. Sparta Consulting, Inc.,
14
277 F. Supp. 3d 1127 (E.D. Cal. 2017)..................................................................................... 12
15
Crestview Cemetery Ass’n v. Dieden,
16 54 Cal. 2d 744 (1960) ......................................................................................................... 13, 21
17 Ericsson v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,

773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................... 24, 25
18
Kennecott v. Union Oil,
19 196 Cal. App. 3d 1179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ...................................................................... 13, 21
20
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,
21 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................... 24
22 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,

795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 24
23
Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc.,
24 454 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................... 12
25 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
26 69 Cal. 2d 33 (Cal. 1968) .......................................................................................................... 13
27 Phoenix Tech. Ltd. v. VMware, Inc.,

No. 15-cv-1414-HSG, 2017 WL 1289863 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) .................................passim
28
iii
1 Powerine Oil Co. v. Superior Court,

37 Cal. 4th 377 (Cal. 2005) ....................................................................................................... 12
2
Public Storage v. Spring Corporation,
3
No. CV 14-2594, 2015 WL 1057923 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015) ............................................... 20
4
Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indem. Co.,
5 14 Cal. App. 5th 1086, 1128 (Cal. 2017) .................................................................................. 12
6 Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.,

509 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................... 12
7
TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,
8 No. SACV 14-341, 2017 WL 6611635 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) .......................................... 19
9
Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.,
10 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................................... 13
11 Turner v. Met. Life Ins. Co.,

56 Cal. App. 2d 862 (1943) ...................................................................................................... 18
12
Statutes & Rules
13
Cal. Civ. Code § 1641 ......................................................................................................... 12, 14, 18
14
15 Cal. Civ. Code § 1644 ............................................................................................................... 13, 17
16 Cal. Civ. Code § 1649 ..................................................................................................................... 21
17 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1861 ........................................................................................................... 13
18 Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56......................................................................................................................... 18
19 REFERENCES
20 All references to “Ex. __” are to the exhibits attached to the accompanying Request for Judicial
Notice (Exs. 1-20) or to the accompanying Declaration of Geoffrey Holtz (Exs. 21-36).
21
All References to “___ Decl.” are to an accompanying Declaration.
22
All references to “FTC Ex. __” are to the exhibits attached to the Aug. 30, 2018 Declaration of
23 Jennifer Milici in Support of the FTC’s Motion. (ECF No. 792-1.)
24
25
26
27
28
iv
1 I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
2 Under the guise of seeking merely to “streamline the trial” (Mot. at 3), the FTC’s Motion
3 for Partial Summary Judgment requests a ruling that would radically reshape licensing in the
4 cellular industry, not just for Qualcomm but for all cellular SEP holders that made FRAND
5 commitments to ATIS or TIA. The FTC contends that those SEP holders have a clear and
6 unambiguous contractual obligation to grant licenses to manufacture and sell modem chips. The
7 FTC’s position distorts the language of the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies, and it is starkly at odds
8 with real-world practices. If the FTC were correct that modem chip license agreements are
9 required by commitments to ATIS and TIA, then such agreements should be commonplace, found
10 throughout the industry. But they are not. In fact, they are anything but. There is not a single
11 major holder of cellular SEPs that includes modem chip licenses in its licensing program. That is
12 because what the FTC casts as a plain reading of the IPR Policies—which it asks the Court to
13 adopt as a matter of law, without hearing any evidence at all—is in fact a complete reimagining
14 of the industry, neither required by the applicable language nor supported by the overwhelming
15 extrinsic evidence of the IPR Policies’ meaning. Rather than rebut this evidence—much of which
16 is undisputed—the FTC asks the Court to ignore it, in conflict with basic canons of California
17 contract law.
18 The FTC’s Motion fails at the most basic level: it has not shown that the text of the ATIS
19 or TIA IPR Policy clearly and unambiguously requires SEP holders to license the manufacture
20 and sale of modem chips. First, the FTC repeatedly focuses on the portion of the IPR Policies
21 that requires licenses to be made available to “applicants” or to “all applicants”, and it
22 simplistically argues that modem chip suppliers can be “applicants” entitled to a license. This
23 argument ignores key limiting language in the IPR Policies making it clear that SEP holders are
24 not required to make licenses available to all applicants for all purposes. As the FTC itself notes,
25 the ATIS licensing commitment requires that licenses be made available only to those applicants
26 “desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of implementing the [relevant ATIS] standard”, and
27 the TIA licensing commitment requires that licenses be made available to applicants only “to the
28 extent necessary for the practice of [the relevant TIA standard]”. (Mot. at 2 (alterations in
1
1 original).) Thus, to give effect to this limiting language, the relevant question is whether the
2 purposes specified in the IPR Policies include manufacturing and/or selling modem chips. The
3 word “applicants” does not answer that question, and therefore does not compel the reading
4 advanced by the FTC.
5 Second, the manufacture and sale of modem chips are not among the purposes for which
6 the IPR Policies require licenses to be made available; at the very least, the Policies are
7 ambiguous, creating an issue of fact on that point that precludes summary judgment. Licenses
8 must be made available to “implement” (ATIS) or “practice” (TIA) the relevant standards. As
9 shown by the detailed evidence Qualcomm submits together with this Opposition, both the ATIS
10 and TIA standards describe the operation of a complete mobile device (e.g., a cellular phone) and
11 the cellular network itself (e.g., the base stations and other infrastructure). The standards do not
12 describe the operation of modem chips or other components of a complete device. Thus, whereas
13 complete devices may “implement” or “practice” the ATIS or TIA standards, modem chips
14 cannot. The FTC’s Motion provides no technical support for its assertion that modem chips
15 implement or practice those standards. It relies instead on statements that modem chips may
16 practice one or more claims of Qualcomm’s standard-essential patents. But standards are
17 comprised of thousands of individual technologies, including many that are claimed by an SEP;
18 the fact that a modem chip (with its attendant software) practices one or more of those patented
19 technologies does not mean that the chip itself performs all the functions required to practice or
20 implement “the standard”, as the FTC erroneously assumes.
21 Third, the non-discrimination obligations in the IPR Policies do not support a reading that
22 requires making licenses available for the manufacture and sale of modem chips. On their face,
23 the non-discrimination obligations mean only that if a license must be made available, such
24 license must be on non-discriminatory “terms and conditions” (i.e., that similar terms and
25 conditions be offered to similarly situated licensees). The non-discrimination obligations do not
26 address the antecedent question of whether a license must be made available for any specific
27 purpose or field of use. The FTC’s accusation that, by not licensing modem chip suppliers,
28 Qualcomm discriminates against its competitors is baseless: Qualcomm makes licenses available
2
1 to all applicants for the purposes specified in the IPR Policies, whether or not the applicant also
2 competes with Qualcomm in the modem chip business.
3 Fourth, and perhaps most fundamentally, under California law, which the FTC states
4 should govern the resolution of the FTC’s Motion, all credible evidence should be considered to
5 determine whether the IPR Policies are reasonably susceptible to Qualcomm’s interpretation.
6 Here, the evidence powerfully demonstrates that the FTC’s interpretation of the IPR Policies
7 cannot be accepted, or at minimum demonstrates a genuine issue of disputed fact that precludes
8 summary judgment. The FTC’s interpretation is contrary to the indisputable industry practice of
9 licensing SEPs only at the device level; indeed, the FTC’s own licensing expert acknowledged
10 this practice, and the FTC does not identify any cellular SEP holder that grants the modem chip
11 licenses that the FTC says the IPR Policies so clearly require. The FTC’s interpretation is also
12 contrary to a decision of the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”)—an organization
13 that accredits American standards development organizations (“SDOs”), including ATIS and
14 TIA. ANSI decided that its own patent policy, on which the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies are
15 based, does not require the licensing of components such as modem chips. And the FTC’s
16 interpretation would introduce disparities between the American SDOs and the cellular SDOs in
17 the rest of the world, even though the SDOs themselves have entered into partnerships that
18 require their policies to be consistent with one another. Critically, the FTC’s Motion concedes a
19 “need for evidence regarding the meaning of Qualcomm’s commitments” to ETSI (Mot. at 3); as
20 a result, it cannot be the case that the TIA and ATIS IPR Policies, which must be consistent with
21 ETSI’s policy, can be interpreted differently and without regard to evidence, as a matter of law.
22 The FTC’s effort to short-circuit the trial and foist its made-for-litigation reading of the
23 ATIS and TIA IPR Policies on the entire cellular industry ignores key language in the IPR
24 Policies, ignores the technical characteristics of the standards and products at issue and runs
25 directly counter to extensive and compelling evidence demonstrating, at minimum, numerous
26 issues of disputed fact. Partial summary judgment should be denied.
27 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
28 The FTC’s Complaint alleges that the IPR Policies of the European Telecommunications
3
1 Standards Institute (“ETSI”), which is the leading cellular SDO (Lupin Decl. ¶ 8), as well as of
2 two United States SDOs, ATIS and TIA, require Qualcomm to provide licenses for the
3 manufacture and sale of modem chips. (Complaint for Equitable Relief (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 57-59.)
4 The FTC’s Motion asks this Court to find as a matter of law that “Qualcomm’s voluntary
5 FRAND licensing commitments to [ATIS and TIA], under the plain meaning of these SDOs’
6 intellectual property rights (‘IPR’) policies, require Qualcomm to make licenses available to
7 competing modem-chip sellers.” (Mot. at 1.) The FTC’s Motion does not seek a similar
8 judgment concerning the ETSI IPR Policy, but rather concedes at least a “need for evidence
9 regarding the meaning of Qualcomm’s commitments” to ETSI. (Mot. at 3.)
10 A. The Relevant Commitments to ATIS and TIA

11 The Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (“ATIS”) is the U.S.
12 Organizational Partner of 3GPP, a global collaborative partnership of SDOs and other industry
13 participants that develops cellular standards. (Lupin Decl. ¶ 15.) The Telecommunications
14 Industry Association (“TIA”) is the U.S. Organizational Partner of 3GPP2, another global
15 collaborative partnership that has developed cellular standards. (Mot. at 10.)1 3GPP and 3GPP2
16 develop technical specifications, which are then “transposed” (i.e., republished and adopted) by
17 their Organizational Partners (such as ATIS, TIA or ETSI) into cellular standards for the regions
18 governed by the Organization Partner (such as North America for ATIS and TIA). (Mot. at 7,
19 10.) Each of the 3GPP and 3GPP2 IPR policies requires that each contributor of technology
20 comply with the relevant IPR policy of the Organizational Partner of which it is a member.
21 (Ex. 7 at Art. 55 (3GPP Working Procedure); Ex. 8 at Art. 55 (3GPP2 Working Procedure).)
22 ATIS’s IPR Policy states that a holder of essential patent claims may give “assurance that
23 a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available to applicants desiring to utilize
24 the license for the purpose of implementing the standard . . . under reasonable terms and
25 conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.” (FTC Ex. 2 at 10 (ATIS
26 Operating Procedures) (emphasis added).) Pursuant to that policy, Qualcomm has made
27 1
The other 3GPP Organizational Partners are ETSI (Europe), ARIB and TTC (both of Japan),
CCSA (China), TSDSI (India), and TTA (Korea). (Casaccia Decl. ¶ 7.) The other Organizational
28 Partners of 3GPP2 are ARIB, TTC, CCSA and TTA. (Tiedemann Decl. ¶ 10.)
4
1 FRAND commitments to ATIS assuring that it would make licenses available to applicants “for
2 the purpose of implementing the standard.” (Id. at 8-10.)
3 Until 2005, the TIA IPR policy provided that SEPs “will be made available under
4 reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination to
5 applicants only and to the extent necessary for the practice of the TIA Publication.” (FTC
6 Ex. 39 at 87 (TIA Eng’g Manual, 2002) (emphasis added).) A “TIA Publication” contains a
7 standard adopted by TIA.2 (FTC Ex. 3 at 3 (Guidelines to the TIA IPR Policy, 2014).) In 2005,
8 the TIA IPR Policy was modestly amended, but not in any respect relevant here. (Lupin Decl.
9 ¶ 16; see also Ex. 15 (Koninklijke Philips NV v. Asustek Computer Inc., [2016] EWHC 2220 (Pat)
10 (UK High Court of Justice) (change served “to make it explicit that a patent that was necessarily
11 infringed by the practice of an ‘optional’ element of a standard was nonetheless still an ‘essential’
12 patent.”)). Qualcomm has provided TIA with commitments to make licenses available to
13 applicants “only and to the extent necessary for the practice of the” TIA standards. (Mot. at 12-
14 14.)
15 B. The Content of the ATIS and TIA Standards

16 The 3GPP (ATIS) and 3GPP2 (TIA) technical specifications that have been adopted by
17 ATIS and TIA specify with great precision the performance, interoperability and communication
18 protocols between two broad “domains” of a cellular system: (1) Infrastructure, which comprises
19 fixed equipment such as base stations that send and receive wireless signals and relay those
20 signals over wired connections, and (2) User Equipment, an operational device such as a
21 smartphone (“UE”, also referred to as the “Mobile Station” in 3GPP2). (Casaccia Decl. ¶ 13;
22 Tiedemann Decl. ¶ 16.) The basic domain split between the “User Equipment Domain” and the
23 “Infrastructure Domain”, is shown in the figure below drawn from an ATIS standard. (Casaccia
24 Decl. ¶¶ 12, 13.)
25
26
2
27 A “Standard” is any TIA publication that establishes “engineering and technical requirements
for processes, procedures, practices and methods that have been adopted by consensus”. (FTC
28 Ex. 1 at 8 (TIA IPR Policy).)
5
10
11
12
13 As the figure demonstrates, cellular standards generally treat the internal workings of each
14 domain as a “black box”. The standards specify the actions a complete device must take (such as
15 which signals it must transmit) to operate on a cellular network. Conversely, the standards say
16 nothing at all about the design of modem chips, antennae, power-control chips or the many other
17 components that make up a cellular device. (Casaccia Decl. ¶ 19; Tiedemann Decl. ¶¶ 16-17, 27-
18 28, 37-46.) They also do not define how a smartphone or Mobile Station should be constructed
19 or what components each must contain. As such, these standards provide device manufacturers
20 (and infrastructure manufacturers) broad discretion regarding how to construct a user device or
21 infrastructure. (Casaccia Decl. ¶ 9; Tiedemann Decl. ¶ 15.) Indeed, the standards do not even
22 specify whether any required functions must be implemented in hardware or software.
23 (Tiedemann Decl. ¶ 18.)
24 As a representative example, the ATIS 3GPP TS 36.331 standard published by ATIS
25 defines the LTE Radio Resource Control (“RRC”) protocol and relevant behaviors for
26 communication between an LTE-compatible mobile device and the base station. (Casaccia Decl.
27 ¶ 23.) This specification expressly provides over 350 requirements concerning an LTE-
28 compatible User Equipment (i.e., “the UE shall . . .”), but does not provide any requirement as to
6
1 the internal components of the UE, including the modem chip or multiple other components that
2 typically play a role in communications between a UE and Infrastructure (e.g., an RF transmitter
3 and receiver or an antenna). (Casaccia Decl. ¶ 23.)
4 Because the ATIS and TIA standards define the functionality of the UE and its
5 interconnectivity with the cellular network, conformance with the standards is tested and
6 determined by analyzing the functioning of a complete operational device, not the behavior or
7 design of any component of the UE such as modem chips. (Casaccia Decl. ¶¶ 29-34; Tiedemann
8 Decl. ¶¶ 35-44.) Modem chips do not and cannot operate on a cellular network on their own,
9 outside of a UE that has all of the hardware and software components needed to implement the
10 standards-specified functionality. (Tiedemann Decl. ¶¶ 19-34.) Thus, whereas a UE either
11 complies or does not comply with (and therefore implements/practices) a standard, the very same
12 modem chip can be placed in a UE that complies and in a UE that does not comply with the
13 standard.
14 C. The ANSI Essential Requirements and Patent Policy

15 In addition to being Organizational Partners of 3GPP and 3GPP2, respectively, ATIS and
16 TIA are accredited by ANSI, a non-profit organization that oversees the development of standards
17 in the United States. (Mot. at 7, 10.) To maintain ANSI accreditation, ATIS and TIA must meet
18 certain “Essential Requirements” defined by ANSI, including maintaining IPR Policies that are
19 consistent with ANSI’s own Patent Policy. (Ex. 2 § 4.1.1, § 4.2.1.1 (ANSI Essential
20 Requirements).) That ANSI Patent Policy provides that patent holders provide assurance that a
21 license “will be made available to applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of
22 implementing the standard . . . under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free
23 of any unfair discrimination”. (Id. at 11 § 3.1.1.) ATIS has explicitly adopted the ANSI Patent
24 Policy verbatim as its own (Mot. at 8), while TIA adopted the closely similar language discussed
25 above.
26 Importantly, ANSI’s Executive Standards Council (“ExSC”) has expressly determined
27 that its own Patent Policy does not require that accredited SDOs mandate component-level
28 licensing:
7
1 We . . . take this opportunity to emphasize that [a prior ExSC decision] was not
intended to create a “default” interpretation of the ANSI Patent Policy requiring
2 licensing at the component level. While the ExSC determined in the IEEE case
that such a requirement was not inconsistent with the ANSI Patent Policy, that
3 does not mean that ANSI’s Patent Policy requires licensing at the component
level. We do not wish to express or imply any such “default” interpretation and we
4 leave it to negotiations between patent holders and implementers to decide what
licensing terms are appropriate in particular standards, subject to the terms of an
5 [SDO’s] patent policy.
6 (Ex. 1 at 14 (February 23, 2018 Decision of the ANSI Executive Standards Council Appeals
7 Panel at 14) (emphasis added).) The ExSC further clarified that a commitment to license “to the
8 extent necessary to practice wholly compliant implementations”, rather than mere components, is
9 equivalent to the ANSI Patent Policy’s requirement that a license be for “the purpose of
10 implementing the standard”. (Id. at 2.)
11 D. Industry Practice of Licensing Complete End-User Equipment, Not

Components Such As Modem Chips
12
13 It is cellular industry practice for SEP owners to make licenses available for the
14 manufacture and sale of end-user devices, but not for the manufacture and sale of components
15 such as modem chips. The FTC’s expert, Richard Donaldson, acknowledged this. (Ex. 21 at
16 283:9-24 (Donaldson Dep.) (testifying that “the practice to date is—has been people take licenses
17 at the device level. That’s the way it kind of grew up . . . .”).) The record shows this practice to
18 be industry-wide and long-standing. For example,
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 Nokia is a member of both ATIS and TIA and has given

27 assurances to both. (Ex. 9 at 4 (ATIS Membership Listing); Ex. 10 at 4 (TIA Members List); Ex.
28 12 (Nokia Letters of Assurance).)
8
1 Ericsson has explained that it has a similar practice and understanding of industry norms
2 through Christina Petersson, Vice President of IPR and Legal Affairs. Ms. Petersson testified that
3 when Ericsson licenses its cellular SEP portfolio, it “would be licensing the company putting its
4 name on the fully compliant equipment and selling that on the market”. (Ex. 23 at 25:5-11
5 (Petersson Dep.).) Device-level licensing had been Ericsson’s practice since it became involved
6 in cellular SEP licensing. (Id. at 25:15-17.)
10
11 Ericsson, too, is a member of both ATIS and TIA and has given assurances to
12 both. (Ex. 9 at 3 (ATIS Membership Listing); Ex. 10 at 2 (TIA Members List); Ex. 13 (Ericsson
13 Letters of Assurance).)
14 InterDigital, another ATIS and TIA member that provided license assurances (Ex. 9 at 3
15 (ATIS Membership Listing); Ex. 10 at 3 (TIA Member List); Ex. 14 (InterDigital Letters of
16 Assurance)),
17 InterDigital’s Ranae McElvaine testified regarding the company’s licensing policy:
18
19
20
21
22
23
24 The record indicates that modem chip suppliers, too, were well aware it was industry
25 practice to license SEPs at the device level, and not at the component or modem level.
26
27
28
9
10 The record amply demonstrates that licensing the manufacture and sale of end-user
11 devices, rather than modem chips, is ubiquitous industry practice.
12 E. The Need for Compatibility Among IPR Policies of Cellular SDOs.

13 The technical work of promulgating technical specifications occurs at 3GPP (and, in the
14 past, occurred also at 3GPP2); ATIS and TIA then “transpose” the technical specifications of
15 3GPP and 3GPP2 and adopt them as North American standards. (FTC Ex. 21 (3GPP Partners);
16 FTC Ex. 31 at 6 (3GPP2 Partnership Project Description, 2002).) To ensure that 3GPP and
17 3GPP2 specifications are subject to the same licensing requirements worldwide, the operating
18 rules and procedures of both 3GPP and 3GPP2 mandate, as a condition of being an organizational
19 partner of each SDO, that the IPR policies of each of their Organizational Partners must be
20 compatible with one another:
21 “Organizational Partnership is open to any Standards Organization . . . which

has . . . an Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy which is compatible with
22 those of the Organizational Partners.”4
23
3
24 Although Qualcomm has obtained inbound cross-licenses to the cellular SEPs of its licensees,
those were to ensure that its licensees cannot sign a license for rights under Qualcomm’s patents
25 and then opportunistically assert their own patents against Qualcomm. (Ex. 29 at 209:10-210:1
(Hartogs Dep.).) As the FTC acknowledges, as a SEP holder, Qualcomm has not sought to
26 license its cellular SEPs for the manufacture and sale of modem chips. (Mot. at 6.) Nor does
Qualcomm assert its cellular SEPs against modem chip manufacturers. (Ex. 32 at 163:4-164:5
27 (Mar. 5, 2018 Gonell Dep.).)
4
See FTC Ex. 5 at Art. 6 (3GPP Working Procedures) (emphasis added); Ex. 8 at Art. 6 (3GPP2
28 Working Procedures) (emphasis added).
10
1 In addition, each of ETSI, TIA and ATIS is an organizational partner of oneM2M, a more
2 recently formed global standards initiative for Machine to Machine Communications and the
3 Internet of Things. (Ex. 3 (oneM2M - Partners).) Like 3GPP and 3GPP2, oneM2M requires that
4 the IPR Policy of each Organizational Partner be compatible with those of the other
5 Organizational Partners. (Ex. 6 § 3.1 (oneM2M Partnership Agreement).) Consequently, the IPR
6 Policies of ATIS and TIA are required to be compatible with those of ETSI and the other
7 Organizational Partners. The FTC’s expert, Michael Lasinski, agrees, for example, that the ATIS
8 IPR Policy is “fundamentally similar” to ETSI’s. (Ex. 33 ¶ 52 (Lasinski Report).)
9 Representatives of ETSI have recognized that its IPR Policy does not require licensing the
10 manufacture and sale of components like modem chips. When one SDO, the Institute of
11 Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”), revised its policy in February 2015 to require
12 licensing for the manufacture of components, the ETSI Secretariat confirmed that the ETSI Policy
13 had no such requirement. (Ex. 27 at 93:4-94:11; 103:16-105:18 (Weiler Dep.).) The language of
14 the ETSI IPR Policy on its face also makes clear that it does not require component-level
15 licensing.5 Clause 6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy, which specifies the scope of the ETSI licensing
16 commitment, clarifies that a patent holder’s obligation to make licenses available is limited to
17 rights for the production, sale, lease, disposition of, repair, use or operation of “any system, or
18 device fully conforming to a STANDARD” or to “use METHODS”. (Ex. 11 Clause 15-8, 15-4
19 (ETSI IPR Policy).) The terms “system”, “device” and “fully conforming” indicate that the ETSI
20 licensing commitment extends to end-user devices, but not to components.6 Indeed, industry
21 practice at the time of the adoption of the ETSI IPR Policy in November 1994 was to license only
22 fully compliant end-user devices, and not components; and the drafters of the ETSI IPR Policy
23 did not intend to change normal industry practice. (Ex. 34 at 40 (Huber Report); Ex. 28 at
24 187:25-190:14 (Huber Dep.).)
25
26
5
27 (Ex. 35 at 10-11 (Fauvarque-Cosson Report); Ex. 30 at 114:8-115:2 (Fauvarque-Cosson Dep.))
6
(Ex. 34 at 35-36 (Huber Report); Ex. 28 at 146:9-17 (Huber Dep.); Ex. 35 at 11 (Fauvarque-
28 Cosson Report); Ex. 30 at 86:6-24 (Fauvarque-Cosson Dep.).)
11
1 III. LEGAL STANDARD
2 A. Summary Judgment Must Be Denied When the Plain Language

Interpretation or a Contractual Ambiguity May Be Resolved in the Non-
3 Movant’s Favor.
4 As the moving party, the FTC has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
5 issue of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The FTC’s
6 burden extends to demonstrating the absence of a fact dispute on each element of its claim,
7 including the interpretation of the contract. Id. at 322-23; Copart, Inc. v. Sparta Consulting, Inc.,
8 277 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1144 (E.D. Cal. 2017). To meet its burden, the FTC “must affirmatively
9 demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for [it]”. Soremekun v. Thrifty
10 Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he
11 evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its]
12 favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). “[I]f the interpretation [of a
13 contract] turns upon the credibility of conflicting extrinsic evidence, or if ‘construing the
14 evidence in the nonmovant’s favor, the ambiguity can be resolved consistent with the
15 nonmovant’s position,’ summary judgment is inappropriate.” Phoenix Tech. Ltd. v. VMware,
16 Inc., 2017 WL 1289863, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (quoting Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods.,
17 Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2006)). The FTC has not met this burden.
18 B. Under California Law, the Entire Contract and All Other Evidence Must Be
Considered To Determine if a Contract Is Reasonably Susceptible to a Party’s
19 Proposed Interpretation.
20 The FTC’s Motion asserts that the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies should be governed by the
21 contract law of California (Mot. at 15 n.49), which for purposes of this Motion Qualcomm does
22 not dispute. Under California law, “[t]he fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give
23 effect to the mutual intention of the parties.” Powerine Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th
24 377, 390 (Cal. 2005) (citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1264 (Cal.
25 1992)). “The court will not impose its own interpretation at variance with the parties’ intention.”
26 Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indem. Co., 14 Cal. App. 5th 1086, 1128 (Cal. 2017). In
27 interpreting contractual language, “[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give
28 effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.” Cal.
12
1 Civ. Code § 1641; City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 68 Cal.
2 App. 4th 445, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
3 Under California law, when terms are “used by the parties in a technical sense” or when
4 “a special meaning is given to them by usage”, courts should follow the meaning the parties have
5 given them. Cal. Civ. Code § 1644. In addition, California law mandates that if there is a dispute
6 as to the meaning of an agreement, “the court must consider extrinsic evidence of possible
7 ambiguity.” Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir.
8 1988) (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33
9 (Cal. 1968)). Such evidence includes “the object, nature and subject matter of the writing” and
10 the parties’ post-contractual conduct. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 69 Cal.2d 33 at 40; see also
11 Phoenix Tech. Ltd., 2017 WL 1289863 at *3 (courts must consider extrinsic evidence to
12 determine if the language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation urged by either party).
13 Indeed, “[t]he conduct of the parties after execution of the contract and before any controversy
14 has arisen as to its effect affords the most reliable evidence of the parties’ intentions.” Phoenix
15 Tech., 2017 WL 1289863, at *3 (citing Kennecott v. Union Oil, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1179, 1189-90
16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)); see also Crestview Cemetery Ass’n v. Dieden, 54 Cal. 2d 744, 754 (1960).
17 And the court should consider evidence that terms “have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar
18 signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance, in which case the
19 agreement must be construed accordingly.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1861.
20 IV. ARGUMENT
21 After providing nine pages of “Background Facts” and purportedly “Undisputed Material
22 Facts” (Mot. at 3-14), and citing 50 exhibits, the FTC’s Motion asserts that the “plain language”
23 of the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies unambiguously “requires Qualcomm to make licenses
24 available to competing sellers of modem chips”. (Mot. at 18, 20.) Accordingly, it asserts, the
25 Court should not consider “extrinsic evidence” that contradicts the FTC’s proposed contractual
26 interpretation. (Mot. at 16.) In Part IV.A below (as well as in Part II above), Qualcomm
27 demonstrates why the FTC cannot establish that the contractual language “clear[ly]” and
28 “explicit[ly]” compels its interpretation as a matter of law (Mot. at 16); to the contrary, the plain
13
1 language supports—or at a minimum is susceptible to—the interpretation proposed by Qualcomm
2 and accepted by the entire industry for decades. In Part IV.B, Qualcomm describes the extensive
3 extrinsic evidence that, under California law, should inform the Court’s assessment of the range
4 of possible interpretations. This evidence includes a longstanding and uniform industry practice;
5 the ANSI acceptance of the IPR Policies of ATIS and TIA as consistent with its own; and the
6 FTC’s concession that there is a “need for evidence regarding the meaning of” the IPR Policy of
7 ETSI, an SDO whose IPR Policy must be interpreted consistently with those of ATIS and TIA to
8 enable their continued participation in the 3GPP, 3GPP2 and oneM2M partnerships. This
9 evidence overwhelmingly contradicts the FTC’s proposed interpretation and, at a minimum,
10 creates a genuine dispute of fact that precludes summary judgment. Finally, in Part IV.C,
11 Qualcomm demonstrates that FRAND caselaw, including that cited by amici, does not address the
12 proper interpretation of the ATIS or TIA IPR Policies.
13 A. The FTC’s “Plain Language” Interpretations of the ATIS and TIA IPR
Policies Do Not Take Account of the Complete Contractual Provisions at
14 Issue.
1. The FTC Fundamentally Misreads the ATIS and TIA Policies Because
15 Modem Chips Do Not Practice or Implement the Standard.
16 The FTC argues that Qualcomm must make licenses available to modem chip suppliers
17 based on what the FTC contends is the clear and unambiguous language of the ATIS and TIA IPR
18 policies and Qualcomm’s accompanying licensing commitments. (Mot. at 20.) But the specific
19 contractual language, read in its entirety, does not support—let alone compel—the FTC’s
20 interpretation, precluding summary judgment in its favor. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1641.
21 With respect to ATIS, the FTC acknowledges that the ATIS IPR Policy calls for licenses
22 to be made available “to ‘applicants’ whose products ‘implement the standard.’” (Id. at 20)
23 (emphasis added.) The FTC further recognizes that the language of Qualcomm’s license
24 assurances to ATIS limit its commitment to only those products that implement the particular
25 standard in connection with which the specific assurance was given. (Id. at 9-10.) Similarly, the
26 FTC acknowledges that Qualcomm’s commitment to TIA was to make licenses available to
27 applicants “that wish to ‘practice’ TIA standards”. (Id. at 18.)
28 The FTC’s argument focuses on the IPR Policies’ instruction to make licenses available to
14
1 “applicants”, but stops there and ignores limiting language in both policies that expressly defines
2 the purpose for which a license must be made available under each Policy. (FTC Ex. 2 at 10
3 (ATIS Operating Procedures) (licenses must be granted “for the purpose of implementing the
4 standard”); FTC Ex. 1 § 3.1.1 (TIA IPR Policy) (licenses must be granted “only to the extent
5 necessary for the practice of any or all of the Normative portions” of the standard).) The FTC’s
6 assertion that the ATIS and TIA licensing obligation is not “limited to applicants selling a
7 particular type of product” (Mot. at 18) is thus incorrect. Under both the ATIS and TIA IPR
8 Policies, the licensing commitment extends only to the manufacture and sale of products that
9 practice or implement the relevant standard—namely User Equipment and Infrastructure, the only
10 products defined by the standard. (Above Part II.B.)
11 In other words, when a SEP holder makes a licensing commitment to ATIS and TIA, it
12 commits to make licenses available to all applicants, but it does not commit to license those
13 applicants to practice its patents for any and all purposes. For example, if a company makes both
14 handsets and modem chips (such as Samsung or Huawei), Qualcomm agrees that its licensing
15 commitments to ATIS and TIA (and to other SDOs) oblige it to license that company (even
16 though it is a competitor), but only for its manufacture and sale of handsets. Likewise, if a
17 modem chip supplier like MediaTek wanted to expand its business into the manufacture and sale
18 of handsets, the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies would require Qualcomm to grant MediaTek a
19 license for those purposes. But there is no requirement in the licensing commitments under either
20 IPR Policy that a SEP holder make a license available to any applicant for its manufacture and
21 sale of separate components—including not just modem chips, but RF chips, antennae, power
22 management chips or software—just because those components may be put into User Equipment
23 that implements relevant standards. (Lupin Decl. ¶ 4.)
24 The FTC’s contrary arguments fail to address the fact that modem chips do not themselves
25 “implement” or “practice” an ATIS or TIA “standard”. As the Declarations of Lorenzo Casaccia
26 and Edward Tiedemann demonstrate, the 3GPP and 3GPP2 standards define the interconnectivity
27 and interoperability of User Equipment (ATIS)/Mobile Stations (TIA) and infrastructure
28 equipment. (Above Part II.B.) The ATIS and TIA standards do not define the design of modem
15
1 chips (or the other components mentioned above), and modem chips cannot by themselves
2 communicate with cellular networks. (Casaccia Decl. ¶¶ 5, 10; Tiedemann Decl. ¶¶ 8, 19-34.)
3 Indeed, device manufacturers are generally free to attain the functionality specified in the
4 standard using any component or aggregation of components they deem fit. (Casaccia Decl. ¶ 9.)
5 In that sense, standards generally treat the end-user device as a “black box”; they do not specify
6 how it is to be constructed, only how it must perform with respect to certain functions. For
7 example, only the operation and capabilities of a complete end-user device can be tested to
8 determine if it implements a standard, and there are no such tests for components of an end-user
9 device, such as modem chips. (Casaccia Decl. ¶¶ 29-34; Tiedemann Decl. ¶¶ 35-44.) While a
10 modem chip may facilitate compliance with a standard, it cannot achieve such compliance;
11 implementation of the standard depends on the design of the complete end-user device. (Casaccia
12 Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8, 10; Tiedemann Decl. ¶¶ 16, 19-34.) Thus, commitments to ATIS and TIA do not
13 require licenses to be made available for modem chips because modem chips do not implement or
14 practice cellular standards; only complete end-user devices (and infrastructure) can do that.
15 The FTC offers no proof to the contrary, only its own assertion and inapposite evidence.
16 For example, the FTC points to deposition testimony of Keith Kressin, Qualcomm’s Senior Vice
17 President of Product Management, for the proposition that “[m]odem chips . . . are cellular
18 handset components that implement cellular standards and allow handsets to communicate with a
19 cellular network.” (Mot. at 5 n. 12.) Even setting aside the fact that Mr. Kressin is not involved
20 in standard development or licensing, Mr. Kressin did not say what the FTC attributes to him; all
21 he did was explain the functions that a baseband processor, together with other related
22 components, typically perform.7
23 The FTC’s reliance on the testimony of a single individual who is not involved in
24 7
In the cited testimony, Mr. Kressin was asked, “[W]hat functionality does the baseband
processor or modem provide?” He responded:
25
What functionality does the modem provide? The modem provides ability to
26 utilize cellular communications, right? The modem in combination with the AP in
combination with the RF chip provide, you know -- and the power management
27 kind of provide the core chipset, if you will. And so modem functionality or
baseband functionality is appeared to, you know, graphics and central processing
28 and other functions. (FTC Ex. 7 at 11:17–12:4 (Kressin Dep.).)
16
1 standards development or licensing speaks volumes. In light of the body of evidence refuting the
2 FTC’s theory, including the testimony of multiple witnesses at multiple companies who are
3 deeply involved in standards development and cellular SDOs, even if Mr. Kressin had said
4 exactly what the FTC contends (which he did not), such shorthand, colloquial use outside of the
5 context of cellular SEP licensing could hardly trump the language appearing in the standards
6 themselves, see Cal. Civil Code § 1644, or negate the extensive evidence demonstrating a
7 contrary understanding of the relevant IPR Policies by major industry participants, see Phoenix
8 Tech., 2017 WL 1289863, at *3. At minimum, an issue of fact exists, which precludes summary
9 judgment.
10 The FTC also relies on various statements regarding whether Qualcomm owns any SEPs
11 that contain claims that are infringed by an unspecified modem chip. (Mot. at 19, 20.) That
12 question is irrelevant. Whether certain claims of Qualcomm’s patents read on a typical modem
13 chip (as some do) has no bearing on whether a modem chip “implements” or “practices” an ATIS
14 or TIA standard. These are two distinct and unrelated inquiries. The IPR Policies specifically do
15 not require SEP holders to license applicants for the purpose of practicing or implementing any
16 claim of any standard-essential patent; rather, they require SEP holders to license applicants for
17 the purpose of practicing or implementing the standards as a whole. The distinction is critical. A
18 claim in a patent can (and often does) specify a narrow function that could be infringed by a
19 single component such as a modem and its attendant software, a filter, an RF chip or an antenna.
20 Each of these components may support the implementation of a standard by a complete handset,
21 when combined and configured with other components. But a standard, unlike a patent claim,
22 specifies hundreds, if not thousands, of functions required to be carried out by complete UEs
23 (handsets) and infrastructure equipment, each of which comprises hundreds of components.
24 (Casaccia Decl. ¶ 23.) The fact that a modem chip may contain one of the individual
25 technologies that a complete UE comprised of hundreds of components working together must
26 use does not mean that the modem chip, by itself, practices (or implements) all of the
27 functionality required to comply with the standard.
28 The FTC has the burden to establish with admissible evidence that there is no dispute of
17
1 fact as to every element of its legal claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Because the FTC has
2 failed to prove that a modem chip “implements” or “practices” an ATIS or TIA “standard”, it
3 necessarily fails to satisfy its burden. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
4 Qualcomm, as the Court must under Rule 56, there is at least a genuine factual dispute on this
5 issue that precludes summary judgment.
6
2. The Non-Discrimination Commitments Do Not Compel Component-
7 Level Licensing.
8 The FTC as well as amici ACT | the App Association (“ACT”) and the Computer &
9 Communications Industry Association (“CCIA”) argue that the “non-discriminatory” language in
10 the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies requires that licenses be made available to “competitors”. (Mot.
11 at 19, 20; Br. of Amici Curiae, ECF No. 864 (“Amici Br”) at 5.) As noted above (Part IV.A.3),
12 Qualcomm has never disputed that licenses must be granted to any applicant including
13 competitors—but only for the specified scope and purpose. Like the FTC, amici attempt to read
14 out of the Policies the critical language limiting that scope: only for the manufacture or sale of
15 products that “implement” or “practice” “the standard”—which modem chips do not do. As
16 stated in the case that amici rely on, these are “words of limitation or restriction”, and they must
17 be given effect. Turner v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 862, 869 (1943); see also Cal. Civ.
18 Code § 1641. The FTC and amici effectively ask the Court to rewrite the language of the Policies
19 to remove this critical limitation in the licensing commitment, which it may not do.
20 What the non-discrimination obligation in the Policies actually does is govern the “terms
21 and conditions” of the licenses that SEP holders commit to grant. (FTC Ex. 2 at 10 (ATIS
22 Operating Procedures) (“reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair
23 discrimination”); FTC Ex. 1 § 3.1.1 (TIA IPR Policy) (“terms and conditions that are reasonable
24 and non-discriminatory”).) For example, it would prohibit an SEP holder from charging one
25 licensee a 1% royalty while (all other terms being equal) charging a similarly situated licensee a
26 5% royalty. The non-discrimination obligation does not expand the purposes for which licenses
27 must be made available to sweep in purposes other than implementing or practicing the standard.
28
18
1 3. TIA’s Licensing Guidelines Are Not Part of the TIA Contract and, in
Any Event, Do Not Support the FTC’s Reading of the TIA IPR Policy.
2
To support its interpretation, the FTC also turns to TIA’s IPR Guidelines. (Mot. at 18-
3
19.) As a threshold matter, the Guidelines are not part of the TIA IPR Policy. Indeed, the TIA
4
Guidelines expressly state: “These guidelines serve as a companion document and are not
5
intended to substitute for the Policy . . .” (FTC Ex. 3 at 1 (Guidelines to the TIA IPR Policy.) On
6
their face, therefore, they are not part of the contract, and the FTC’s reliance on them undermines
7
the FTC’s claim that the Court should ignore all extrinsic evidence and look only at the plain
8
language of the IPR Policies. The decision in TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v.
9
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341, 2017 WL 6611635 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21,
10
2017), cited by the FTC, is not to the contrary. There, the court expressly stated it would consider
11
numerous pieces of evidence to interpret the ETSI IPR Policy, including the ETSI guidelines and
12
fact and expert declarations. Id. at *5-6. Nowhere did the court hold that any guidelines were
13
part of the contract itself or imposed contractual obligations. By contrast, In the Matter of
14
Certain Wireless Communications Equipment, 2007 WL 1221125, at *7 USITC Inv. No. 337-
15
TA-577 (Feb. 22, 2007) expressly addressed the status of SDO IPR guidelines and held that “the
16
[ETSI guidelines were] not intended to be part of a binding contract to which members agreed”.
17
In any event, the FTC’s reliance on the guidelines is misplaced. To reach the conclusion
18
that “modem chips are clearly a product contemplated by the standards at issue here, as they are
19
necessary to implement the standards”, the FTC points to language in the TIA Guidelines that
20
refers to “products contemplated by the standard in question”. (Mot. at 19.) As explained in
21
detail above, the standards do not define the operation of modem chips, and ATIS and TIA
22
licensing commitments therefore do not require that a mere component supporting a complete
23
device’s implementation of a standard must also be separately licensed.
24
B. The Overwhelming Evidence Establishes, at the Very Least, a Genuine
25 Factual Dispute Concerning the Appropriate Interpretation of the ATIS and
TIA IPR Policies.
26
Under California law, courts should consider all credible evidence concerning the
27
contracting parties’ intent when determining whether the contractual language is ambiguous, i.e.,
28
19
1 reasonably susceptible to a party’s interpretation, including evidence that is extrinsic to the
2 language of the contract. Phoenix Tech., 2017 WL 1289863, at *3; Public Storage v. Spring
3 Corporation, No. CV 14-2594, 2015 WL 1057923, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015). But the FTC
4 ignores extensive evidence refuting its position, including (1) consistent, decades-long industry
5 practice of exhaustively licensing SEPs only for the manufacture and sale of complete devices
6 (and infrastructure), and not components such as modem chips; (2) a recent interpretation by
7 ANSI, the organization that accredits both ATIS and TIA, of its own IPR Policy, which is
8 identical to ATIS’s and consistent with TIA’s; and (3) the obligation of both ATIS and TIA to
9 maintain IPR policies that are consistent with those of the other Organizational Partners of 3GPP
10 and 3GPP2, and the evidence that ETSI—the leading SDO at 3GPP—considered a policy
11 requiring component-level licensing not to meet this consistency requirement. This evidence
12 establishes, at the very least, a genuine issue of factual dispute concerning whether Qualcomm’s
13 commitments under the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies require licensing the manufacture and sale of
14 components, including modem chips.
15 1. Long-Standing Industry Practice Confirms That the ATIS and TIA

Policies Do Not Require Licensing the Manufacture and Sale of
16 Modem Chips.
17 Long-standing industry practice demonstrates the error in the FTC’s proffered
18 interpretation. This evidence takes two forms—the custom and practice of licensors, and the lack
19 of licenses taken by companies selling modem chips. The indisputable evidence shows that all
20 major cellular licensors, including those who at some point were also suppliers of UEs,
21 infrastructure and components, license only end-user devices, not modem chips. (Above Part
22 II.D.) Richard Donaldson, the FTC’s licensing expert, confirmed this is the long-standing
23 practice of the cellular industry. (Ex. 21 at 283:9-24 (Donaldson Dep.).) The FTC asks the court
24 to upend this ubiquitous industry practice, disrupting decades of cellular patent licensing—and
25 asks that it do so as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment, without even considering
26 evidence outside the purportedly “plain language”. However, California law requires that the
27 Court consider this evidence, and the overwhelming evidence of a uniform industry practice
28 weighs heavily against the FTC’s proposed interpretation of the ATIS and TIA Policies,
20
1 precluding summary judgment. See Crestview Cemetery Ass’n, 54 Cal. 2d at 754 (“[E]ven if it be
2 assumed that the words standing alone might mean one thing to the members of this court, where
3 the parties have demonstrated by their actions and performance that to them the contract meant
4 something quite different, the meaning and intent of the parties should be enforced.”); Phoenix
5 Tech., 2017 WL 1289863, at *3 (“The conduct of the parties after execution of the contract and
6 before any controversy has arisen as to its effect affords the most reliable evidence of the parties’
7 intentions.”) (citing Kennecott, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1189-90).
8 Equally compelling is the evidence showing that major suppliers of modem chips do not
9 have a practice of entering into licenses for cellular SEPs covering the manufacture or sale of
10 modem chips. (Above Part II.D.) The evidence shows that multiple current and former suppliers
11 of modem chips do not have a single license for cellular SEPs. The FTC points to not a single
12 instance of a chip seller seeking to legally enforce its purported contractual right to obtain a SEP
13 license covering the manufacture and sale of modem chips from cellular SEP holders who made
14 licensing commitments to either ATIS or TIA (or at all). This telling absence leads to but one
15 conclusion: the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies do not mandate the grant of a license for the
16 manufacture or sale of components. Indeed, this point is further amplified by
17
18
19
20 These practices and Qualcomm’s interactions with participants in the cellular industry
21 described in the Declaration of Louis Lupin (¶¶ 4, 5) confirm the existence of an issue of fact
22 concerning the interpretation of Qualcomm’s licensing commitments. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1649
23 (“If the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the
24 sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee understood it”).
25 This irrefutable evidence of the custom and practice in the industry demonstrates the
26 unreasonableness of the FTC’s interpretation—and explains its attempt to foreclose the Court
27 from considering this evidence. This evidence reflects the uniform industry-wide practice and
28 intent, at ATIS, TIA and beyond, that cellular SEPs licensing commitments cover only the
21
1 manufacture and sale of end-user devices and network equipment, and not for the manufacture
2 and sale of modem chips. This evidence establishes overwhelmingly the intent and meaning of
3 the terms “for the purpose of implementing the standard” and “to the extent necessary for the
4 practice of the TIA publication.” Under California law, this evidence compels the conclusion that
5 the relevant Policies do not require licensing for the manufacture and sale of modem chips—or, at
6 the very least, that a disputed issue of fact exists as to the existence of such an obligation.
7 2. ANSI Has Confirmed That Licensing at the Component Level Is Not

Required.
8
ATIS and TIA are both accredited as SDOs by ANSI. (Mot. at 7, 10.) Accordingly, both
9
ATIS and TIA are obligated to follow ANSI’s Essential Requirements, which includes the ANSI
10
Patent Policy. (Mot. at 7-10.) As the FTC acknowledges, ATIS has done so by adopting ANSI’s
11
Patent Policy verbatim as its own. (Mot. at 7-8.) TIA’s policy, while slightly differently
12
articulated, is substantively indistinguishable from the ANSI policy. (Mot. at 10-11.)
13
As described above (Part C) within the last year the ANSI Executive Standards Council
14
Appeals Panel issued a formal decision emphasizing that the requirement to license applicants
15
“for the purpose of implementing the standard” “does not mean that ANSI’s Patent Policy
16
requires licensing at the component level.” (Ex. 1 at 14 (Feb. 23, 2018 Decision of the ANSI
17
Executive Standards Council Appeals Panel).) It could not be correct to conclude as a matter of
18
law that two member IPR Policies—one of which is verbally identical, the other closely similar,
19
and both required to be consistent with ANSI’s policy—do impose that very requirement.
20
Nothing in the FTC’s Motion, or in the record, even suggests that either ATIS or TIA
21
have adopted policies at odds with ANSI’s interpretation of its own policy, or that SEP owners
22
giving license assurances to ATIS and TIA have operated with an understanding that any such
23
distinctions exist. Based on this evidence, the only reasonable interpretation of the ATIS and TIA
24
policies is that they do not require licensing for the manufacture and sale of modem chips.
25
3. The FTC Concedes the Need for Evidence Interpreting the ETSI IPR
26 Policy, Which Must Be Consistent with the ATIS and TIA Policies.
27 ETSI, ATIS and TIA are Organizational Partners in global collaborative standards
28 partnerships—3GPP (ATIS and ETSI), 3GPP2 (TIA and ETSI) and oneM2M (all three). (Ex. 3
22
1 (oneM2M - Partners); Casaccia Decl. ¶ 9; Tiedemann Decl. ¶ 10.) To ensure that cellular
2 specifications are subject to the same licensing requirements worldwide, the operating rules and
3 procedures of each standards partnership require, as a condition of membership in each
4 partnership, that the IPR policies of each of their Organizational Partners be compatible with that
5 of the others. (Lupin Decl. ¶ 10.) This is to ensure the success of the global standards effort that
6 is the mission of each of the collaborative organizations. (FTC Ex. 5 at Art. 2 (3GPP Working
7 Procedures); Ex. 8 at Art. 2 (3GPP2 Working Procedures); Ex. 6 at 1 (oneM2M Partnership
8 Agreement); Lupin Decl. ¶¶ 9-10) Accordingly, the meaning of the ETSI IPR Policy with regard
9 to licensing components, including modem chips, is directly relevant to the interpretation of the
10 ATIS and TIA Policies.
11 The FTC, however, concedes a “need for evidence regarding the meaning” of the ETSI
12 IPR Policy (Mot. at 3), which itself precludes its request for partial summary judgment. If
13 determining the meaning of the ETSI IPR Policy requires evidence, and that meaning must be
14 consistent with the meaning of the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies, then it cannot be the case that
15 those latter Policies are susceptible to interpretation as a matter of law.
16 Further, Qualcomm, in support of this Opposition, submits uncontroverted evidence that
17 commitments under the ETSI IPR policy does not require that licenses be made available for the
18 manufacture and sale of modem chips. Put differently, as evidence in the record shows, ETSI’s
19 IPR policy does not require holders of essential IPRs to license their IPRs at the component level.
20 (Above Part II.E.) This is confirmed by the long-term chair of ETSI’s IPR Special Committee,
21 Dirk Weiler. As Mr. Weiler testified, the ETSI licensing commitment does not include an
22 obligation to license components of cellular devices. (Ex. 27 at 43:3-45:1 (Weiler Dep.); see also
23 Ex. 23 at 21:20-25:23 (Petersson Dep.).) It is further supported by the fact that ETSI
24 representatives have stated that its IPR Policy is not consistent with the IPR Policy of IEEE, on
25 the ground that recent amendments to the IEEE policy do require component-level licensing.
26 (Ex. 27 at 87:1-88:14 (Weiler Dep.); QX2786 at 10-11 (Draft Minutes from the ETSI General
27 Assembly, Mar. 17-18, 2015).)
28 In the face of this strong evidence that the ATIS and TIA policies are and were carefully
23
1 intended to be consistent with the ETSI policy that does not require licensing of components, the
2 FTC asks this Court to declare as a matter of law that they are instead inconsistent, and in an
3 aspect that the FTC obviously must concede is very important. Such a result would balkanize
4 global standards development collaborations and defeat the central goals of these global
5 organizations to support global technical specifications and broad access to that technology by
6 promoting consistent global licensing requirements. (Lupin Decl. ¶¶ 8-14.) Because the ATIS
7 and TIA policies must be harmonized with the ETSI IPR policy, and the FTC concedes a need for
8 evidence concerning the ETSI IPR Policy (Mot. at 3), summary judgment is precluded.
9 C. Amici Misconstrue FRAND Caselaw, Which Does Not Establish That

Licensing the Manufacture and Sale of Components Is Required by the TIA
10 or ATIS IPR Policies.
11 Amici cite precedent that they contend establishes that “[t]he TIA and ATIS policies, on
12 their faces, simply do not permit an interpretation limiting the beneficiaries of the licensing
13 promise to ‘some’ applicants”. (Amici Br. at 6-7.) But amici do not address the IPR Policies’
14 language limiting the licensing obligation to specific purposes (i.e., to implement or to practice a
15 standard) and therefore miss the point. Qualcomm’s interpretation, which is consistent with
16 universal cellular industry licensing practice, does not impose “hidden, unstated restrictions”, as
17 amici suggest (id. at 7), but instead gives effect to express limitations in the IPR Policies that
18 amici’s interpretation completely ignores.
19 None of the cases relied on by amici establishes that ATIS or TIA licensing commitments
20 include the manufacture or sale of components, rather than only complete User Equipment or
21 Infrastructure. In both Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012), and
22 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit
23 addressed the IPR Policy (“Common Patent Policy”) of another SDO, known as ITU. In neither
24 case did the Court have cause to consider whether any language in that Policy limited the scope of
25 the obligation to license products that actually practiced the relevant standard. Nor could it, as
26 the ITU’s Common Patent Policy does not contain any language like the language in the ATIS
27 and TIA IPR Policies, which limits the licensing requirement to products that implement or
28 practice a standard. In Ericsson v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the
24
1 Federal Circuit made the unremarkable observation that a firm that had committed to license its
2 patents on reasonable and non-discriminatory (“RAND”) terms could not completely refuse to
3 license its patents to all others or only on conditions intended to preserve a monopoly.
4 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred by instructing the jury on
5 the Georgia-Pacific factor that considers whether the IP holder has sought to maintain its patent
6 monopoly rather than licensing its patents. Id. at 1235. But the Court did not interpret the terms
7 of any particular RAND (or FRAND) obligation, much less address whether commitments to
8 ATIS or TIA require the granting of licenses to manufacture or sell components that do not by
9 themselves practice the relevant standard.
10 Finally, amici rely on an Order issued in Apple v. Qualcomm, which is, of course, a
11 dispute between Qualcomm and a manufacturer of handsets (i.e., User Equipment), not a
12 manufacturer of modem chips. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835 (S.D. Cal Sept. 7, 2017). In
13 denying Qualcomm’s motion for an anti-suit injunction, Judge Curiel merely observed that the
14 dispute between Apple and Qualcomm was more than a “paradigmatic private contractual
15 dispute” among private parties, but rather potentially implicated the interests of “any number of
16 corporations in China, Japan, the U.K. and Taiwan that are similarly-situated to Apple”, i.e., that
17 manufacture handsets, and “that are similarly entitled to benefit from Qualcomm’s FRAND
18 promise to ETSI”. Id. at *31-32. The Court did not determine that modem chip suppliers fell
19 within the class of firms that were beneficiaries of Qualcomm’s FRAND commitment under the
20 terms of the ETSI Policy it referred to, let alone under the ATIS and TIA IPR Policies at issue in
21 this Motion, which it never mentioned.
22 V. CONCLUSION
23 For all of the foregoing reasons, the FTC has failed to meet its burden of establishing its
24 interpretation of the ATIS and TIA IPR policies as a matter of law. At minimum, genuine issues
25 of material fact exist, and the FTC’s motion should be denied.
26
27
28
25
1 September 24, 2018
3 By:
4 Robert A. Van Nest (SBN 84065)

Eugene M. Paige (SBN 202849)
5 Justina Sessions (SBN 270914)
KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS
6 LLPKEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP
633 Battery Street
7 San Francisco, CA 94111-1809
Telephone: (415) 391-5400
8 Facsimile: (415) 397-7188
9
Gary A. Bornstein (pro hac vice)
10 Yonatan Even (pro hac vice)
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
11 Worldwide Plaza
825 Eighth Avenue
12 New York, NY 10019-7475
Tel.: (212) 474-1000
13 Fax: (212) 474-3700
gbornstein@cravath.com
14 yeven@cravath.com
15 Richard S. Taffet (pro hac vice)
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
16 101 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10178-0060
17 Tel.: (212) 309-6000
Fax: (212) 309-6001
18 richard.taffet@morganlewis.com
19 Willard K. Tom (pro hac vice)
20 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004-2541
21 Tel.: (202) 739-3000
Fax: (202) 739 3001
22 willard.tom@morganlewis.com
23 Geoffrey T. Holtz (SBN 191370)
24 One Market, Spear Street Tower
San Francisco, CA 94105-1596
25 Tel.: (415) 442-1000
Fax: (415) 442-1001
26 gholtz@morganlewis.com
27 Attorneys for Defendant
28
26
Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 870-1 Filed 09/24/18 Page 1 of 3
KEKER, VAN NEST & PETERS LLP MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
1 Robert A. Van Nest (SBN 84065) Richard S. Taffet (pro hac vice)
rvannest@keker.com richard.taffet@morganlewis.com
2 Eugene M. Paige (SBN 202849) 101 Park Avenue
epaige@keker.com New York, NY 10178-0060
3 Justina Sessions (SBN 270914) Telephone: (212) 309-6000
jsessions@keker.com Facsimile: (212) 309-6001
4 633 Battery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111-1809 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
5 Telephone: (415) 391-5400 Willard K. Tom (pro hac vice)
Facsimile: (415) 397-7188 willard.tom@morganlewis.com
6 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP Washington, DC 20004-2541
7 Gary A. Bornstein (pro hac vice) Telephone: (202) 739-3000
gbornstein@cravath.com Facsimile: (202) 739-3001
8 Yonatan Even (pro hac vice)
yeven@cravath.com MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
9 825 Eighth Avenue Geoffrey T. Holtz (SBN 191370)
New York, New York 10019-7475 gholtz@morganlewis.com
10 Telephone: (212) 474-1000 One Market, Spear Street Tower
Facsimile: (212) 474-3700 San Francisco, CA 94105-1596
11 Telephone: (415) 442-1000
Attorneys for Defendant Facsimile: (415) 442-1001
12 QUALCOMM INCORPORATED
13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
14
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
15
SAN JOSE DIVISION
16
17
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC
18
Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF GEOFFREY T.
19 HOLTZ IN SUPPORT OF
vs. DEFENDANT QUALCOMM’S
20
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
21 a Delaware corporation, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON QUALCOMM’S STANDARD
22 Defendant. ESSENTIAL PATENT LICENSING
COMMITMENTS
23
Date: October 18, 2018
24 Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept.: Courtroom 8, 4th Floor
25 Judge: Hon. Lucy H. Koh
26
27 Trial Date: January 4, 2019

28
MORGAN, LEWIS & Holtz Declaration in Support of Opposition to
BOCKIUS LLP 1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SAN FRANCISCO
Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC
1 DECLARATION OF GEOFFREY T. HOLTZ
2 I, Geoffrey T. Holtz, declare and state that:
3 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of California, a partner of
4 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, and counsel of record for Defendant Qualcomm (“Qualcomm”)
5 Incorporated. I submit this declaration in support of Qualcomm’s Opposition To Motion For
6 Partial Summary Judgment On Qualcomm’s Standard Essential Patent Licensing Commitments.
7 I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, or my knowledge is based upon my
8 review of records of this case. If called upon as a witness in this action, I could and would testify
9 competently thereto.
10 2. Attached to the accompanying Request for Judicial Notice, as Exhibits 1-15, are
11 true and correct copies of documents that are publicly available as described in the Request for
12 Judicial Notice.
13 3. Attached to the accompanying Request for Judicial Notice, as Exhibits 16-20, are
14 true and correct copies of responses to “Questionnaire for chipset manufacturers” submitted to the
15 Korean Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”), and produced to Qualcomm by the FTC in this action
16 or produced to Qualcomm in the KFTC proceeding.
17 4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 21 is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the
18 deposition transcript of Richard L. Donaldson, dated August 15, 2018.
20 deposition exhibits and transcript of Susanna Martikainen, dated April 17, 2018.
22 deposition exhibits and transcript of Christina Petersson, dated April 20, 2018.
24 deposition exhibits and transcript of Ranae McElvaine, dated April 3, 2018.
26 deposition transcript of John Finbarr Moynihan, dated March 12, 2018.
28 deposition transcript of Yooseok Kim, dated March 21, 2018.

MORGAN, LEWIS &
BOCKIUS LLP 2 Holtz Declaration
ATTORNEYS AT LAW Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC
SAN FRANCISCO
2 deposition transcript of Dirk Weiler, dated March 27, 2018, including exhibit QX2786, “Draft
3 Meeting Minutes from the ETSI General Assembly, March 17-18, 2015.”
5 deposition transcript of Bertram Huber, dated August 8, 2018.
7 deposition transcript of Michael Hartogs, dated February 28, 2018.
9 deposition transcript of Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, dated August 16, 2018.
11 30(b)(6) deposition exhibits and transcript of Taraneh Maghame, dated March 14, 2018.
13 deposition transcript of Fabian Gonell, dated March 5, 2018.
15 expert report of Michael Lasinski, dated May 24, 2018.
17 expert report of Bertram Huber, dated June 28, 2018.
19 expert report of Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, dated June 28, 2018.
21 deposition transcript of Xuxin Cheng, dated March 27, 2018, including relevant excerpts from
22 exhibit QX2418.
23 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
24 Executed on this 24th day of September, 2018 in San Francisco, California.
25
26
Geoffrey T. Holtz
27
28
MORGAN, LEWIS &
BOCKIUS LLP 3 Holtz Declaration
ATTORNEYS AT LAW Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC
SAN FRANCISCO
Exhibit 21
RICHARD L. DONALDSON, ESQ. - 08/15/2018 ·
·1· · · · · · · RICHARD L. DONALDSON, ESQUIRE
·2· · · · · · · UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
·3· · · · · · ·NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
·4· · · · · · · · · · SAN JOSE DIVISION
·5
· · ________________________________
·6
· · FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
·7
· · · · · · · · · Plaintiff,
·8· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·Case No.
· · · · · V.· · · · · · · · · · · · ·5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC
·9
· · QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a
10· Delaware corporation,
11· · · · · · · · Defendant.
12· ________________________________
13
14· · · · · · · · VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF
15· · · · · · ·RICHARD L. DONALDSON, ESQUIRE
16· · · · · · · · · · WASHINGTON, D.C.
17· · · · · · · ·WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 2018
18· · · · · · · · · · · · 9:00 A.M.
19
20· · · ·VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF RICHARD L. DONALDSON,
21· ESQUIRE, a witness herein, taken on behalf of the
22· Defendant, at the Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of
23· Competition, 400 7th Street, Southwest, Washington,
24· D.C.
25· REPORTED BY:· MICHELE E. EDDY, RPR, CRR, CRI
Epiq Court Reporting Solutions - New York

1-800-325-3376 www.deposition.com
RICHARD L. DONALDSON, ESQ. - 08/15/2018 Page 283

·2· makers?· Are you aware of any evidence indicating 17:27:54
·3· that that has ever happened in the cellular 17:27:57
·4· wireless space? 17:28:01
·5· · · · · · MS. GILLEN:· Object to the form. 17:28:02
·6· · · ·A· · Nothing comes to mind right now. I 17:28:03
·7· can't say one way or the other for sure.· I just 17:28:05
·8· don't recall anything. 17:28:08
·9· · · ·Q· · So let's -- let's turn to the next part 17:28:09
10· of your opinion, which was expressed in paragraph 17:28:11
11· 20.· This regards Qualcomm's position that 17:28:22
12· chip-level licensing would be contrary to industry 17:28:32
13· practice.· So what is your opinion in this case 17:28:35
14· regarding Qualcomm's position on chip-level 17:28:41
15· licensing and industry practice?· Let me ask that 17:28:49
16· a different way. 17:28:56
17· · · · · · What is your opinion, sir, regarding the 17:28:57
18· industry practice of chip-level licensing versus 17:29:00
19· device-level licensing? 17:29:04
20· · · ·A· · I think the practice to date is -- has 17:29:07
21· been people take licenses at the device level. 17:29:10
22· That's the way it kind of grew up when you started 17:29:16
23· off with the early phones that were just cell 17:29:19
24· phones. 17:29:21
25· · · ·Q· · So you don't disagree with Qualcomm's 17:29:24

1-800-325-3376 www.deposition.com YVer1f
RICHARD L. DONALDSON, ESQ. - 08/15/2018 Page 299
·2· · · · · · CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER
·3
·4· · · · · · I, Michele E. Eddy, Registered Professional
·5· Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter, the court
·6· reporter before whom the foregoing deposition was
·7· taken, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript
·8· is a true and correct record of the testimony given;
·9· that said testimony was taken by me stenographically
10· and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my
11· supervision; and that I am neither counsel for,
12· related to, nor employed by any of the parties to this
13· case and have no interest, financial or otherwise, in
14· its outcome.
15
16· · · · · · IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
17· hand and affixed my notarial seal this 16th day of
18· August, 2018.
19· My commission expires July 14, 2022
20
21
22· _____________________________
23· MICHELE E. EDDY

· · NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR
24· THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
25

1-800-325-3376 www.deposition.com
Exhibit 22
Document Sought to Be Sealed
Exhibit 23
Exhibit 24
Exhibit 25
Exhibit 26
Exhibit 27
Exhibit 28
1 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

2
3
4 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, )
5 Plaintiff, )
6 vs. ) Case No.
7 QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a ) 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC
8 Delaware corporation, )
9 Defendant. )
10
11
12
13 The videotaped deposition of DR. BERTRAM
14 HUBER, called by the Federal Trade Commission, for
15 examination, taken before Stephanie A. Battaglia, CSR
16 and Notary Public in and for the County of DuPage and
17 State of Illinois, at 191 North Wacker Drive, Suite
18 2700, Chicago, Illinois, on August 8, 2018, 9:16 a.m.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
146
Huber
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc. 8/8/2018
1 meaning of the respective words and terms used in that

2 clause you come to the conclusion that it makes a
3 difference at which level you license.
4 Therefore, to give you a direct answer to
5 my question of whether I believe this FRAND commitment
6 would require to grant a license to anybody, my clear
7 answer is, no, it does not, and it does not
8 deliberately.
9 Q. I understand that -- again, I am
10 paraphrasing, but I understand that your opinion as
11 set forth in your report is that you said it depends
12 at the level at which you are licensing, and my
13 understanding of your opinion is that the FRAND
14 commitment does not require IPR holders to license at
15 the component level, is that accurate?
16 A. This is accurate, yes. It does not
17 require to grant a license at the component level.
18 Q. And under your reading of the ETSI IPR
19 Policy would the policy permit an IPR -- an IPR holder
20 to assert its patents against a component maker, to
21 exclude that component maker?
22 A. That is probably too general a question
23 would be necessary to have the specific circumstances,
24 but basically the fact that the ETSI IPR Policy
25 especially in its Clause 6.1 states as a requirement
For The Record, Inc.

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
187
Huber
1 higher royalties?
2 A. No, it would not, because it would allow
3 the patentholder to obtain an appropriate royalty, a
4 fair and reasonable royalty, because the royalty is
5 being calculated at the level of the relevant device
6 where all the positive effects being contributed by
7 especially network connectivity, universal network
8 connectivity, comes to life, and that is where it --
9 why it makes most sense.
10 In addition, and I think I have
11 elaborated on this on various instances, it has been
12 industry practice all the time, it makes most sense,
13 it is most practical, and any deviation therefrom is
14 not impractical but it is really hard to practice at
15 all because a different regime of licensing at various
16 levels at mixing various levels of licensing would end
17 up in a total mess because you cannot all only look at
18 one single licensor, you have to look at all of them,
19 and you end up in a nightmare of checking and double
20 checking what can be licensed, what has been licensed
21 already, and that is simply why industry has chosen
22 and stick to that until today that the base for
23 licensing is the end-user device, and that makes
24 perfect sense.
25 Q. So in the same paragraph you refer to

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
188
Huber
1 submissions of ETSI members with proposals relating to

2 a small and salable practicing unit?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. I know we talked about this earlier. Are
5 you familiar with any of the cases from U.S. courts
6 containing guidance on the small and salable patent
7 practicing unit?
8 A. All I know is that there are I think very
9 rare cases which deal with that, but I am not familiar
10 with any of these in detail. As I said, I am not an
11 expert in U.S. law.
12 Q. Would you agree though that a
13 patentholder seeking damages in a U.S. court would be
14 bound by the U.S. patent laws and guidance from the
15 U.S. federal courts?
16 A. If you go to court probably the court
17 will apply the laws of the jurisdiction it is placed
18 in that for sure. But here we are talking about FRAND
19 licensing, we are not talking about patent damages
20 law, so that is basically two different aspects.
21 Patent license, negotiated and concluded patent
22 license is not necessarily guided only by the patent
23 damages law of this country. Typically licenses are
24 portfolio licenses for the whole world so why should
25 they be guided alone by the court's practices in one

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
189
Huber
1 particular country and be it a very important country.

2 Q. Turn to Page 32, the second to last
3 paragraph, it begins with "The fact that the ETSI IPR
4 Policy does not prescribe specific rules."
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. The end of that sentence you say, "the
7 FRAND commitment should be viewed as consistent with
8 common industry licensing practices."
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Is there any basis in the text of the IPR
11 -- ETSI IPR Policy for the idea that the commitment
12 should be viewed as consistent with common industry
13 licensing practices?
14 A. Well, coming from the other ends you can
15 certainly state that would ETSI have been concerned to
16 change industry practice it would have had to
17 positively state so.
18 ETSI decided not to do so, to the
19 contrary, to leave the definition of the specific
20 terms and conditions to be made basis of the license
21 agreement to the parties and the parties bilateral
22 negotiation. And at the same time general industry
23 practice was there, was existing, and it was generally
24 known and there was no point where I could recall that
25 ever anybody advocated for changing existing industry

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
190
Huber
1 practice.
2 That is why I think it is fair to say
3 that the fact that there is no specific rules to
4 deviating from or only rules generally how licensing
5 complying with FRAND should be done is indicative in
6 any case that the industry practices as they were
7 present and they have remained present until the
8 present day would be understood as being in line with
9 the ETSI FRAND requirements.
10 Q. And the reference to the common industry
11 licensing practices there, you are referring to the
12 industry practices when the ETSI IPR Policy was
13 adopted in 1994, correct?
14 A. At that time, yes.
15 Q. And do you have an understanding as to
16 whether -- let me rephrase that.
17 Would you agree that in 1994 when the
18 policy was adopted most handset makers were vertically
19 integrated?
20 A. I am not sure I can answer this. I would
21 have to look into this in more detail. I probably
22 sitting here today I think I would require some time
23 to look deeper into this. I am not sure I can confirm
24 this.
25 Q. If it were the case that most handset

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
229
Huber
1 STATE OF ILLINOIS)
2 ) SS.
3 COUNTY OF DUPAGE )
4 I, STEPHANIE A. BATTAGLIA, CSR and Notary
5 Public in and for the County of DuPage and State of
6 Illinois, do hereby certify that on August 8, 2018, at
7 9:16 a.m., at 191 North Wacker Drive, Suite 2700,
8 Chicago, Illinois, the deponent DR. BERTRAM HUBER
9 personally appeared before me.
10 I further certify that the said DR. BERTRAM
11 HUBER was by me first duly sworn to testify and that
12 the foregoing is a true record of the testimony given
13 by the witness.
14 I further certify that the deposition was
15 terminated at 5:45 p.m.
16 I further certify that I am not counsel for
17 nor related to any of the parties herein, nor am I
18 interested in the outcome hereof.
19 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
20 hand and seal of office this 9th of August, 2018.
21 s/Stephanie A. Battaglia
22 Notary Public
23 CSR No. 084-003337 - Expiration Date: May 31, 2019.
24
25

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
Exhibit 29
Michael Hartogs Volume IDocument
Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Highly 870-10
Confidential - Attorneys'
Filed 09/24/18 Page 2 of 5Eyes Only
February 28, 2018
· · · · · · · · · UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
· · · · · · · · ·NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
· · · · · · · · · · · · SAN JOSE DIVISION
· · ·FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
· · · · · · · · Plaintiff,· · Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · CASE No. 5:17-md-02773-LHK
· · · · · · · · v.
· · ·QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a
· · ·Delaware corporation,
·
· · · · · · · · Defendant.
· · ·_______________________________________________________
· · ·IN RE: QUALCOMM ANTITRUST

· · ·LITIGATION
· · ·_______________________________________________________
· · · ·*** HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY ***
· · · ·VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL HARTOGS, VOLUME I
· · · · · · · · · · · SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
· · · · · · · · · · · · FEBRUARY 28, 2018
· · ·Reported By:
· · ·PATRICIA Y. SCHULER
· · ·CSR No. 11949
· · ·Job No. 655307
U.S. Legal Support | www.uslegalsupport.com ·

·1· ·
·2· ·
·3· · · ·
·4·
·5· ·
·6·
·7·
·8·
·9·
10· · · · Q.· ·But Qualcomm requests that all licensees
11· ·cross license at least some patents back to Qualcomm;
12· ·is that right?
13· · · · A.· ·Yes.
14· · · · Q.· ·And why is that?
15· · · · A.· ·Qualcomm has a product business, and in
16· ·granting a license under -- our outbound licenses are
17· ·typically all of our patents.· If we grant someone a
18· ·license under all of your patents and then that company
19· ·turns around and sues you for patent infringement the
20· ·next day, you are in a position to defend yourself.
21· · · · · · ·So if a license results in us granting a
22· ·license under all of our patents, then we take the
23· ·license back to usually all of the patents of the
24· ·licensee for Qualcomm's products to assure that the QCT
25· ·business is free to operate without fear of

·1· ·infringement claims by a licensee.
·2· · · ·
·3·
·4· ·
·5· · · ·
·6· · · ·
·7· ·
·8· · · ·
·9· ·
10·
11·
12· · · ·
13· ·
14· ·
15· · · ·
16·
17· ·
18· ·
19· ·
20· ·
21· ·
22· ·
23· · · ·
24· ·
25· · · ·
Michael Hartogs Volume IDocument
February 28, 2018
·1· · · · · · ·I, the undersigned, a Certified Shorthand
·2· ·Reporter of the State of California, do hereby certify:
·3· · · · · · ·That the foregoing proceedings were taken
·4· ·before me at the time and place herein set forth; that
·5· ·any witnesses in the foregoing proceedings, prior to
·6· ·testifying, were duly sworn; that a verbatim record of
·7· ·the proceedings was made by me using machine shorthand
·8· ·which was thereafter transcribed under my direction;
·9· ·that the foregoing transcript is a true record of the
10· ·testimony given.
11· · · · · · ·Further, that if the foregoing pertains to
12· ·the original transcript of a deposition in a Federal
13· ·Case, before completion of the proceedings, review of
14· ·the transcript [X] was [ ] was not requested.
15· · · · · · ·I further certify I am neither financially
16· ·interested in the action nor a relative or employee of
17· ·any attorney of party to this action.
18· · · · · · ·IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have this date
19· ·subscribed my name.
20· ·Dated:· March 1, 2018
21
22· · · · · · · · · · · · · _________________________
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · PATRICIA Y. SCHULER
23· · · · · · · · · · · · · CSR NO. 11949
24
25
U.S. Legal Support | www.uslegalsupport.com 230

Exhibit 30
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3
4 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, )
5 Plaintiff, )
6 vs. ) Case No.
7 QUALCOMM, INCORPORATED, ) 5:17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC
8 Defendant. )
9 --------------------------)
10
11 Thursday, August 16, 2018
12
13 825 Eighth Avenue
14 New York, New York
15
16 The above-entitled matter came on for the deposition of
17 BENEDICTE FAUVARQUE-COSSON, pursuant to notice, at 9:03
18 a.m.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
86
Fauvarque-Cosson
1 just the definition because the definitions are not in

2 paragraph 6, it's in paragraph 15, so I reached the
3 conclusion that it's clear and not ambiguous as
4 regarding not only the definitions but also what is
5 said in paragraph 6.1 regarding the extent.
6 Q. So just so we're clear you have reached the
7 opinion that paragraph 6.1 is clear and unambiguous
8 that holders of essential IPRs shall grant licenses at
9 least to the extent that licensees can, quote,
10 manufacture, including the right to make or have made
11 customized components and subsystems for the
12 licensees's own design for use in manufacture. I'm
13 going to end there.
14 So that is -- it's clear that the ETSI IPR
15 policy imposes at least that obligation; is that right?
16 A. Yes. I think I can say that is right, yeah.
17 Q. And the definition of manufacture is clear and
18 manufacture means, quote, manufacture shall mean
19 production of equipment. Right?
20 A. That is right.
21 Q. The definition of equipment is unambiguous and
22 equipment means, quote, equipment shall mean any system
23 or device fully conforming to the standard. Right?
24 A. Yes. Right.
25 Q. Nowhere in the text of the ETSI IPR policy do

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
114
Fauvarque-Cosson
1 by lawyers or by an expert.
2 Q. A French court could consider contrary
3 evidence, if such evidence existed, that contributed
4 what Dr. Bertram Huber said was the intention of the
5 ETSI IPR policy drafters, right?
6 A. Yes. A French court could consider contrary
7 evidence if it was brought by the other party.
8 Q. And in the ordinary case, if there was
9 conflicting evidence regarding the intention of the
10 ETSI IPR policy drafters, the French court would
11 consider all the evidence, right?
12 A. It will have to take everything into account,
13 yes, and make its own mind up.
14 Q. So in order to interpret what you refer to as
15 the clear and unambiguous language of the ETSI policy,
16 you need to know what, quote, system or device fully
17 conforming to the standard means, right?
18 MR. EARNHARDT: Object to the form.
19 A. I'm -- I'm not so sure that it's necessary to
20 know in detail what fully conforming to a standard
21 means in order to interpret the policy. What is clear
22 for me, when I read the policy and when I read the
23 definition, is that the word component is not there and
24 it's not in the definition of equipment, and that's the
25 important point because, as I've said before, a judge

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
115
Fauvarque-Cosson
1 could not add a word in the contract if it was not

2 there.
3 Q. When you say it's not there, you mean the word
4 component does not appear in the definition of
5 equipment, right?
6 A. That is what I mean, indeed.
7 Q. Now, can we take a look at CX7552-003. This is
8 the ETSI policy we were discussing.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. The intellectual rights policy.
11 So 6 point -- Clause 6.1 has four bullets,
12 right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. The first bullet, it's fair to say that this
15 bullet states that holders of essential IPR shall grant
16 at least the right to manufacture, including the right
17 to make or have made customized components and
18 subsystems to the licensees's own design for use in
19 manufacture, right?
20 A. This is the first bullet, yes.
21 Q. And that bullet doesn't have the word equipment
22 in it, does it?
23 A. That bullet has the word component in it.
24 Q. My question is: Does that bullet contain the
25 word equipment?

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
162
Fauvarque-Cosson
1 C E R T I F I C A T I O N O F R E P O R T E R
2 DOCKET/FILE NUMBER: 5:17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC
3 CASE TITLE: FTC vs. QUALCOMM, INCORPORATED
4 DEPOSITION DATE: August 16, 2018
5
6 I HEREBY CERTIFY that the transcript contained
7 herein is a full and accurate transcript of the notes
8 taken by me at the hearing on the above cause before
9 the FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION to the best of my
10 knowledge and belief.
11
12 DATED: 8/17/18
13
14
15 s/Stefanie Krut
16 STEFANIE KRUT
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555
Exhibit 31
Exhibit 32
Fabian Gonell Volume IDocument
March 05, 2018
· · · · · · · · · UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
· · · · · · · · ·NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
· · · · · · · · · · · · SAN JOSE DIVISION
· · ·FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
· · · · · · · · Plaintiff,· · Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · CASE No. 5:17-md-02773-LHK
· · · · · · · · v.
· · ·QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a
· · ·Delaware corporation,
·
· · · · · · · · Defendant.
· · ·_______________________________________________________
· · ·IN RE: QUALCOMM ANTITRUST

· · ·LITIGATION
· · ·_______________________________________________________
· · · ·*** HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY ***
· · · · VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF FABIAN GONELL, VOLUME I
· · · · · · · · · · · SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
· · · · · · · · · · · · · MARCH 5, 2018
· · ·Reported By:
· · ·PATRICIA Y. SCHULER
· · ·CSR No. 11949
· · ·Job No. 665271
U.S. Legal Support | www.uslegalsupport.com ·

YVer1f
Page 162 Page 164

·1· ·earlier, it settled in 1999.· And litigation,
·2· ·obviously, took place before then.· I don't know if
·3· ·Ericsson was in the component business at that time,
·4· ·but that is possible that they were.· That is what I
·5· ·can think of.
·4· · · · Q.· ·When you wrote "Qualcomm does not interfere

·5· ·with its competitors' efforts to cell components," what
·6· ·do you mean by "interfere"?
·7· · · · A.· ·I meant by asserting patents against the
·8· ·component makers, in some way that would block those
·9· ·sales.
10· · · · Q.· ·Has Qualcomm ever asserted its patents
11· ·against another component maker?
12· · · · A.· ·Cellular baseband components or any
13· ·components?
14· · · · Q.· ·Cellular baseband components to start.
15· · · · A.· ·I am sorry, my question for clarification was
16· ·unclear.· Against -- asserted patents against cellular
17· ·baseband components, or against a company that makes
18· ·cellular baseband components?
19· · · · Q.· ·A company that makes cellular baseband
20· ·components.
21· · · · A.· ·So at a time where Broadcom was or had
22· ·entered the business of baseband components, there was
23· ·patent litigation between Qualcomm and Broadcom that
24· ·had been initiated by Broadcom.· And there was patent
25· ·litigation between Qualcomm and Ericsson in 1999 or
Fabian Gonell Volume IDocument
March 05, 2018
Page 326 Page 328
·1 ·1· · · · · · · · · ·DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET
·2 ·2· ·CASE NAME:· FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. QUALCOMM
·3 · · ·DEPOSITION DATE:· MARCH 5, 2018
·4 ·3· ·WITNESS NAME:· FABIAN GONELL
·5 ·4· ·Reason Codes:· 1. To clarify the record.
·6 ·5· · · · · · · · · 2. To conform to the facts.
·6· · · · · · · · · 3. To correct transcription errors.

·7
·7· ·Page _____ Line ______ Reason Code ______
·8
·9· ·I, FABIAN GONELL, do hereby declare under the penalty
·9· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
10· ·of perjury that I have read the foregoing transcript;
10· ·Page _____ Line ______ Reason Code ______
11· ·that I have made any corrections as appear noted, in
11· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
12· ·ink, initialed by me, or attached hereto; that my
13· ·testimony as contained herein, as corrected, is true
13· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
14· ·and correct.
15· · · · EXECUTED this _____ day of _________________,
15· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
16· ·20____, at ________________________, ________________.
17· · · · · · · · · · · (City)· · · · · · · · (State)
17· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
18
19· · · · · · · · · · · · ____________________________
19· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
20· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · FABIAN GONELL
21 21· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
22 22· ·Page _____ Line ______ Reason Code ______
23 23· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
24 24· ·Page _____ Line ______ Reason Code ______
25 25· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
Page 327 Page 329

·1· · · · · · ·I, the undersigned, a Certified Shorthand ·1· ·Page _____ Line ______ Reason Code ______
·2· ·Reporter of the State of California, do hereby certify: ·2· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
·3· · · · · · ·That the foregoing proceedings were taken ·3· ·Page _____ Line ______ Reason Code ______
·4· ·before me at the time and place herein set forth; that ·4· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
·5· ·any witnesses in the foregoing proceedings, prior to ·5· ·Page _____ Line ______ Reason Code ______
·6· ·testifying, were duly sworn; that a verbatim record of ·6· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
·7· ·the proceedings was made by me using machine shorthand ·7· ·Page _____ Line ______ Reason Code ______
·8· ·From _______________________ to ____________________

·8· ·which was thereafter transcribed under my direction;
·9· ·that the foregoing transcript is a true record of the
10· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
10· ·testimony given.
11· · · · · · ·Further, that if the foregoing pertains to
12· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
12· ·the original transcript of a deposition in a Federal
13· ·Case, before completion of the proceedings, review of
14· ·From _______________________ to _____________________
14· ·the transcript [X] was [ ] was not requested.
15· · · · · · ·I further certify I am neither financially
16· ·From _______________________ to ____________________
16· ·interested in the action nor a relative or employee of
17
17· ·any attorney of party to this action.
· · ·______Subject to the above changes, I certify that the
18· · · · · · ·IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have this date
18· ·transcript is true and correct.
19· ·subscribed my name.
19· ·______No changes have been made. I certify that the
20· ·Dated:· March 6, 2018
· · ·transcript is true and correct.
21 20
22 21
23· · · · · · · · · · · · · _________________________ 22· · · · · · · · · · · ·_____________________________
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · PATRICIA Y. SCHULER 23· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·FABIAN GONELL
24· · · · · · · · · · · · · CSR NO. 11949 24
25 25
U.S. Legal Support | www.uslegalsupport.com 326 to 329

Exhibit 33
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN JOSE DIVISION
CASE NO. 5:17-cv-00220
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
v.
EXPERT REPORT OF MICHAEL J. LASINSKI
May 24, 2018
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY

 use METHODS.
The above undertaking may be subject to the condition that those who seek licenses
agree to reciprocate. 83
51. However, ETSI does not provide specific guidance on what is meant by FRAND.
5.4.2. ATIS IPR Policy
52. ATIS – another member of 3GPP – also has an IPR policy which is fundamentally similar to the ETSI
policy. The ATIS IPR policy encourages the disclosure of SEPs:
In connection with the development of American National Standards, or other

deliverables that require use of patented inventions, the use of patented inventions
shall be governed by the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) Patent
Policy as adopted by ATIS and as set forth below. In addition, disclosure of
relevant patented inventions at the earliest possible time in the development
process should be encouraged. 84
53. Furthermore, ATIS requires that the owners of SEPs commit to license them on a royalty-free or
reasonable and non-discriminatory basis:
Prior to approval of such a proposed ANS, ATIS shall receive from the identified
party or a party authorized to make assurances on its behalf, in written or
electronic form, either:
(a) assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does
not hold and does not currently intend holding any essential patent claim(s); or
(b) assurance that a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available
to applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of implementing the
standard either:
83
ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, November 18, 2015, § 6.1.
84
“Operating Procedures for ATIS Forums and Committees,” version 5.4, March 1, 2015, pp. 9-10.
30
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Case No. 17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC

Plaintiff,
vs.
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
Expert Report of Dr. Bertram Huber
June 28, 2018
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY

1. The ETSI IPR Policy speaks in terms of “EQUIPMENT,” indicating that

the IPR Policy contemplates device-level licensing.
In 1994, when the current ETSI IPR Policy was adopted, it was general industry practice in the
telecommunications industry that manufacturers of electronic components typically would not
take licenses but would rather sell their products, namely electronic components, without any
warranty for the freedom from infringement of third party patents. Thus, patents covering the
functions realized in the electronic component would not be licensed by component
manufacturers, as this was left to the manufacturers of the complete end-user devices, e.g. mobile
phones, etc. The prevailing industry practice in 1994 (which remains still in place today) is
reflected in the language of the ETSI IPR Policy, and the ETSI IPR Policy was understood not to
upset that practice.
Most basically, the text of the ETSI IPR Policy on its face does not expressly require that a
licensor make available licenses of essential IPRs to component manufacturers. I also do not
know of any ETSI document that ever suggested that the ETSI IPR Policy would encompass
such requirement.
The drafters of the ETSI IPR Policy used language reflecting the prevailing industry practice, i.e.
language focused on the manufacture of equipment rather than components. To this end, Clause
6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy states that the scope of the license that the IPR owner should be
prepared to grant on FRAND terms and conditions includes the rights to:
 MANUFACTURE, including the right to make or have made customized components

and sub-systems to the licensee’s own design for use in MANUFACTURE;
 sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of EQUIPMENT so MANUFACTURED;
 repair, use, or operate EQUIPMENT; and
 use METHODS.
The ETSI IPR Policy further defines MANUFACTURE as the “production of EQUIPMENT”,78
and EQUIPMENT as “any system, or device fully conforming to a STANDARD”.79
At the time the ETSI IPR Policy was developed, debated, drafted, and adopted, the drafters were
well-aware of the difference between end-user devices that fully comply with a standard and
components of those end-user devices, and this makes the language that was selected for use in
the Policy particularly revealing. By using the terms “system,” “device,” and “fully
conforming”—words that connote finished products rather than individual components—in the
78
ETSI IPR Policy, Clause 15-8.
79
ETSI IPR Policy, Clause 15-4.
35

definition of EQUIPMENT, and defining MANUFACTURE as the production of such

EQUIPMENT, the drafters stated that the FRAND undertaking extends to end-user devices, but
not components of those end-user devices, consistent with the prevailing industry practice at the
time.
This intent is further reflected by the fact that, while the ETSI IPR Policy addresses the “right to
make or have made customized components . . . for use in MANUFACTURE”, it omits any
discussion of components from “sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of EQUIPMENT so
MANUFACTURED” or “repair, use, or operate EQUIPMENT”. “Customized components” are
parts which are made by a third party (a subsupplier) for the manufacturer/licensee in accordance
with the technical design of the manufacturer. The third party involved by the manufacturer acts
as an extended workbench of the manufacturer. The underlying concept of this clause was to
reduce the scope of the manufacturing license to the complete product (the end-user device) and
(only) such parts and components comprised in such end-user device actually designed by the
manufacturer. So, the ETSI IPR Policy deals only with components which are part of the
complete products (the end-user device). It does not include a requirement that holders of
standard essential IPRs must be prepared to grant a license for other components, such as
bought-out/sourced-in standard components, sourced from third parties, which are not made by
the manufacturer itself directly or by companies operating as extended workbench for the
manufacturer. This is the scope of the manufacturing license as defined by Clause 6.1 of the
ETSI IPR Policy.
Stepping back, it is important to recognize that Clause 6.1 defines a minimum scope of the
license that an essential IPR holder is prepared to grant (“to at least the following extent”). What
does this mean? It means that while the holder of standard essential patents may grant licenses
with a scope wider than the defined minimum scope, it is not required or obligated to do so.
Thus the text of Clause 6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy limits the obligation to grant licenses. The
omission of “components” (other than “customized components”) from the scope of the
minimum licensing requirement in Clause 6.1 is consistent with the prevailing industry practice
in 1994 and still today, where licenses are almost always negotiated and executed between
essential patent holders and end-user device manufacturers. This is further evidence that licenses
to companies that merely intend to supply modem chips are not required by the ETSI IPR Policy.
All of the aforesaid is strongly supported by the history that ultimately led to the ETSI IPR
Policy of 1994, which (as mentioned above) I was personally involved with. In a draft version of
the 1993 ETSI IPR Policy and Undertaking,80 in Annex 1, Definitions, further to defining the
terms “EQUIPMENT” and “MANUFACTURE,” ETSI defined “GOODS” as “EQUIPMENT,
80
The 1993 ETSI IPR Policy and Undertaking is described in greater detail in section V.B. See also section
IV.B.
36

the ETSI standards would be inevitable. ETSI was concerned, therefore, that the presence of
IPRs could impede the standards development process, and later, the successful implementation
of the ETSI standards.
Ultimately, when ETSI enacted its current ETSI IPR Policy in November 1994 (the endpoint of a
more than 5-year process of discussions, debates and consensus-building), the consensus among
ETSI members was that the FRAND undertaking would sufficiently safeguard its objective of
ensuring the successful implementation of the standards that would result from ETSI’s standards
development activities. Importantly, at that time, the drafters of the Policy did not intend for the
FRAND undertaking to eliminate or fundamentally change normal industry practice. Rather, the
drafters’ expectation was that the already prevailing industry practice would continue under the
ETSI IPR Policy. That practice was that IPR holders generally licensed manufacturers of fully
compliant end-user devices such as handsets and not component manufacturers. In my own
experience of many years of handling licensing transactions in the telecommunications industry,
I have seen that licenses of IPRs related to ETSI standards are practically always with handset
manufacturers (using end-user devices as the royalty base) instead of with component
manufacturers.
40


Exhibit 35

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Case No. 17-cv-0220

Plaintiff, HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL -
v. ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
Expert Report of Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson

Table of Contents
1. Qualifications .......................................................................................................... 1

2. Introduction and Assignment .................................................................................. 1
3. Summary of Conclusions ........................................................................................ 2
4. French Contract Law: General Principles .............................................................. 3
5. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims ................................................................................. 9
A. Question I. DOES AN ETSI FRAND COMMITMENT IMPOSE AN
OBLIGATION TO LICENSE AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL? .......... 10
B. Question II. CAN A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY INVOKE THE
FRAND COMMITMENT TO CHALLENGE A LICENSE AFTER
AGREEING TO IT?.................................................................................. 13
i
1. Qualifications
I have been a professor of private law since 1995, first at the Université de Rouen (1995–
1998), later at the Université René Descartes (Paris V) (1999–2002), and since 2002 at the
Université Panthéon–Assas (Paris II). I received a Ph.D in law in 1994 from the Université
Panthéon–Assas (Paris II) and a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) from King’s College London. I
regularly give advice and expert opinions on French law. My background, training, and
experience are detailed in my curriculum vitae, which is attached as Exhibit 1.
I have been compensated at my usual hourly rate of $750 for my time working on this matter.
My compensation does not depend on the conclusions of this report or the outcome of this
case. The opinions set forth herein are my own, and I am independent from the parties to this
proceeding and their counsel.
Within the past four years, I have testified by deposition or at trial as an expert witness in the
following cases:
 Ericsson v. Samsung - Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication

Devices, Tablet Computers, Media Players, and Televisions, and Components
Thereof; Inv. No. 337-TA-862; United States International Trade Commission
 Samsung v. Ericsson - Certain Wireless Communication Equipment and Articles

Therein; Inv. No. 337-TA-866; United States International Trade Commission
2. Introduction and Assignment
I have been retained by Qualcomm Incorporated (“Qualcomm”) to provide an opinion in

connection with an action against Qualcomm currently pending in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California: Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm
Incorporated, Case No. 17-cv-0220 (“N.D. Cal. Action”).
I understand that Qualcomm is the holder of many patents for which it has made written
commitments, under the Intellectual Property Rights Policy (“IPR Policy”) of the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”), to license on “fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory” (“FRAND”) terms, in accordance with that IPR Policy. Licenses related to
these patents form the basis for the dispute at issue in the N.D. Cal. Action.1
The commitment to be prepared to license on FRAND terms is a contractual obligation from a

patent holder (in this case, Qualcomm) to ETSI. Qualified potential licensees are third-party
1
I do not take a position on whether Qualcomm’s licenses that include both standard
essential patents (“SEPs”) and non-standard essential patents (“NEPs”) are subject to
Qualcomm’s FRAND commitment at all. In this report, for purposes of argument, I have
been instructed to assume that Qualcomm’s FRAND commitment applies to the SEPs in such
licenses.
1
beneficiaries of this obligation. By its terms, ETSI’s IPR Policy is governed by the laws of
France, which thus govern Qualcomm’s ETSI FRAND commitments.2
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) alleges that Qualcomm has violated its FRAND
commitments by refusing to license its standard essential patents (“SEPs”) at the component
level.3 Similarly, Carl Shapiro, an expert retained by the FTC, offers the opinion that
Qualcomm has refused to offer licenses to its SEPs to other chip suppliers “notwithstanding
Qualcomm’s commitment to license its cellular SEPs on FRAND terms.”4
As a potential remedy, the FTC seeks an order requiring Qualcomm to give current licensees
the option to renegotiate their licenses.5
Qualcomm has asked me, as an expert in French contract law, to explain and comment on
(i) Qualcomm’s obligations resulting from its FRAND commitments; and (ii) whether certain
licensing practices are consistent with these contractual obligations, as interpreted under
French law.
Attached as Exhibit 2 is a list of materials I have relied upon in forming the opinions
expressed in this report.
3. Summary of Conclusions
In this Report, I primarily address the above allegations made by the FTC in the N.D. Cal.
Action. My opinions are limited to the nature of the obligations created when a patent holder
makes a FRAND commitment to ETSI and under the ETSI IPR Policy, which is governed by
French law. Under French law, contracts are interpreted on the basis of the parties’ intent,
which can be ascertained from express contractual language, the parties’ negotiation history,
and industry practice.
(1) The FTC takes the position that ETSI FRAND commitments create an
obligation to grant licenses to the manufacturers of baseband processors (i.e., to grant licenses
at the component level).6 For reasons that I explain in this report, that is incorrect. Applying
principles of French contract law to the terms of the ETSI IPR Policy leads me to conclude
that a FRAND commitment does not impose an obligation on SEP holders to offer FRAND
licenses at the component level. (See my response to question I.)
2
§ 12, ETSI Intellectual Rights Policy, ETSI Rules of Procedure, Annex 6, clause 12.
(“The POLICY shall be governed by the laws of France.”).
3
Complaint for Equitable Relief, Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated,
Case No. 17-0220, Jan. 12, 2017 (“FTC Complaint”), para. 3(c).
4
Shapiro Rep. para. 9.
5
FTC Second Amended Resp. To Qualcomm’s First Set of Interrogatories, at 6.
6
FTC Complaint para. 3(c).
2
(2) As a potential remedy, the FTC seeks an order requiring Qualcomm to give
current licensees the option to renegotiate their licenses.7 However, under French law, the
licensees themselves could not invalidate a duly executed license agreement with Qualcomm
on the basis that the terms of the license agreement are inconsistent with Qualcomm’s
FRAND commitment. Under French law, a potential licensee is merely a third-party
beneficiary of the FRAND commitment; after the licensee enters into a license contract, the
licensee cannot challenge it as non-FRAND because, under French law, the license is a
separate and independent contract that has been freely negotiated. (See my response to
question II.)
I have reached the above conclusions by applying principles of French law to the ETSI IPR
Policy. These include analyses of the text of ETSI’s IPR Policy, general practices in the
cellular communications industry, and the negotiation history of the ETSI IPR Policy.
4. French Contract Law: General Principles
As mentioned above, Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments are governed by the ETSI IPR
Policy, which includes a choice of law provision stating that it “shall be governed by the laws
of France.”8 As such, Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments, and any claims arising out of an
alleged breach of those commitments, are governed by French law.
Under French law, parties are free to negotiate the terms of a contract and, under the principle
of the “binding force of the contract,” are bound by the agreed-upon terms. When the terms
of the contract are clear and unambiguous, they are generally not subject to further
interpretation with external sources so as to avoid distorting the terms of the contract and the
intent of the parties. But if the contract language by itself does not unambiguously resolve a
particular question, the use of external sources to interpret a contract may be appropriate. “To
interpret is to determine the meaning and the scope of the contracted obligations.”9
A reform of French contract law was adopted by way of Ordonnance on 10 February 2016.10
This reform is applicable, with transitional measures, as of 1 October 2016.11 The
7
8
§ 12, ETSI IPR Policy, op. cit.
9
F. Terré, P. Simler, Y. Lequette, Les obligations, Précis Dalloz, 11th ed., 2013,
para. 444.
10
For matters of clarity, it should be noted that the official translations of the French
codes (where they exist) are normally accessible on the official website named legifrance. The
legifrance website has a full translation of the Civil Code, up to date as of July 1, 2013. The
official translation of the 2016 reform is to be found on the ministry’s website
(http://www.justice.gouv.fr/): http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/THE-LAW-OF-
CONTRACT-2-5-16.pdf. Together with two colleagues from Oxford University, I have
coauthored this translation, which was commissioned by the Direction des affaires civiles et
du sceau, Ministère de la Justice. We have recently sent an updated translation with the 2018
modifications. It has not been published on the website yet.
3
Ordonnance is not applicable to contracts that have been entered into before 1 October 2016,
nor to actions in court introduced before 1 October 2016. Even if not binding on FRAND
commitments made prior to 1 October 2016, it is however relevant to my analysis insofar as it
confirms and clarifies the law. On many points this Ordonnance recodifies the established
law in France; notably, it partially modifies the articles on interpretation referred to below but
confirms the major principles.
The French Civil Code contained rules of contractual interpretation (articles 1156 to 1164)
which dated back to 1804 (hereafter “Old Article” or “Old Code”).12 The reform has
modified some of them, but the basic principles have been kept and are now to be found in
new articles 1188-1192 of the new Civil Code (hereafter “New Article” or “New Code”).13
Article 1156 of the Old Code introduces the essential rule: “One must in agreements seek the
common intention of the contracting parties, rather than stop at the literal meaning of the
words.”
Parties’ intent must define the contents of a contract (the so-called subjective method of art.
1156). But their intent cannot always be discerned by the terms of the contract because the
parties cannot stipulate to all eventualities. Therefore, to determine the parties’ intent where
the language is ambiguous, a court may rely on “all elements external to the contract itself,
such as the content of negotiations or publicity documents, the material situation at the time of
the contract, or even acts foreign to the parties so as to determine the intention of the parties,
and all the more so other contracts forming part of the same group (art. 1189 para. 2). Of
Anglo-Saxon inspiration, the contractor’s ‘legitimate expectations’ may also be taken into
account.”14
Of the elements external to the contract that may be relevant to determining the parties’ intent,
I will discuss the history of the parties’ negotiations, prior contractual practices and industry
practice.
11
In 2018, the Ratification Act amended some twenty provisions from the 2016
Ordonnance (Loi n° 2018-287 du 20 avril 2018 ratifiant l'ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10
février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des
obligations). Some of these amendments simply remove some “typos” from the Ordonnance.
Others clarify the meaning of some of the Ordonnance’s provisions (they are designed to
become one with the Ordonnance’s provisions which they clarify, and thus apply
retroactively to all contracts concluded as of 1st October 2016). Finally, several provisions
that make substantive modifications are not applicable in this litigation.
12
Old Code, arts. 1156-1164 (Fr.) (both the original French text and English translation
provided).
13
New Code, arts. 1188-1192 (Fr.) (both the original French text and English translation
provided).
14
A. Bénabent, Les obligations, 16th ed., LGDJ, lextenso éditions, 2017, para. 287;
F. Terré, P. Simler, Y. Lequette, Les obligations, op. cit., para. 450.
4
i. The Role of Parties’ Practices and Negotiations
Under French law, contractual interpretation is done “in concreto, that is to say, through the
search for the intent that the parties themselves may have had, and not in abstracto by that
wished for by any other ‘reasonable’ person in the same situation.”15
The parties’ negotiation history is therefore an important element that helps determine the
parties’ intent.
In an ordinary contractual setting, a French court will examine the pre-contractual documents,
the content of the pre-contractual negotiations, publicity documents, etc., to determine
whether they can clarify the parties’ intent.16
A FRAND commitment, however, is somewhat different. In the FRAND context, a device

manufacturer claiming rights under a FRAND commitment had no role in defining that
FRAND commitment;17 the device manufacturer is only a third-party beneficiary of a
commitment made by an SEP holder under the terms of the ETSI IPR Policy.
The patent holder is not permitted to negotiate a “custom” FRAND commitment with ETSI; if
it chooses to declare its patents as potentially essential, it must make the commitment called
for by the ETSI IPR Policy.
Thus, it is the “intent” behind the ETSI IPR Policy that is relevant to interpreting the meaning
of a FRAND commitment made under that Policy. As a result, when interpreting the meaning
of a FRAND commitment made to ETSI, a French court would examine evidence of the ETSI
members’ “intent” when adopting the ETSI IPR Policy, just as it would, in the classic
contractual setting, examine the parties’ negotiation history, or even as it would examine the
legislative history of a statute to determine lawmakers’ intent. Such evidence of the ETSI
members’ intent may include the text of the ETSI IPR Policy itself; the text of the patent
holder’s FRAND declaration; evidence concerning the deliberations by ETSI’s members at
the time ETSI adopted its IPR Policy; subsequent actions by ETSI relating to its IPR Policy
and the meaning of FRAND, including decisions by ETSI to incorporate SEP holders’
technology into standards when aware of their licensing practices; and evidence of the
industry’s understanding of the meaning of a FRAND commitment at the time ETSI adopted
its IPR Policy.
15
A. Bénabent, Les obligations, op. cit., para. 287; F. Terré, P. Simler, Y. Lequette, Les
obligations, op. cit., para. 448.
16
A. Bénabent, Les obligations op. cit.; F. Terré, P. Simler, Y. Lequette, Les obligations,
op. cit., para. 450.
17
June 27, 2018 discussion with Bertram Huber.
5
ii. The Role of Industry Practice
Industry practice and usage play an important role in the interpretation of the contract, as
shown in the following three Civil Code articles:18
Old Art. 1159: “What is ambiguous shall be interpreted according to what is

the usage in the region where the contract was made.”
Old Art. 1160: “Clauses which are commonly used in a contract shall be filled
in, even though they have not been inserted.”
New Art. 1188: “A contract is to be interpreted according to the common

intention of the parties rather than stopping at the literal meaning of its terms.
Where this intention cannot be discerned, a contract is to be interpreted in the
sense which a reasonable person placed in the same situation would give to it.”
In order to interpret the contract “in the sense which a reasonable person placed in the same
situation would give to it,” usages are important.19 A French judge would, in such
circumstances, use industry practice to determine the contents of contractual obligations.
Furthermore, when an issue cannot be resolved by relying only on the parties’ intent, the Civil
Code allows the interpreter to fill gaps in the contract by relying on external elements to
impose additional contractual terms.
Article 1135 of the Old Code—which appears in the section regarding the effects of
obligations and is binding on courts—explicitly recognizes that courts may rely on usage not
only to interpret contracts, but also to impose additional contractual obligations.
Old Art. 1135: “Agreements bind not only as to what is therein expressed, but
also as to all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose upon the
obligation according to its nature.”20
The rule is now in New Article 1194:
18
Old Code, arts. 1159, 1160 (Fr.) (both the original French text and English translation
provided).
19
F. Chénédé, Le nouveau droit des obligations et des contrats, Précis Dalloz, 2017, para.
24.33: “the French legislator has not felt the need to specify the indications of that
“reasonable” interpretation: circumstances of the conclusion [of the contract], nature of the
agreement or even usage. One can nevertheless imagine that these different elements will
serve as a guide for judges (…).”
20
Old Code, art. 1135 (Fr.) (both the original French text and English translation
provided).
6
New Art. 1194: “Contracts create obligations not merely in relation to what
they expressly provide, but also to all the consequences which are given to
them by equity, usage or legislation.”
French courts regularly refer to industry norms and to established practice. As explained by
Pascale Deumier:21
No. 428. Practice and the will

“The qualification of simple practice or usage will have an effect, and only one,
which is essential: it will determine the relationship between the will and the
application of the practice. More precisely, it will dictate whether, in the silence
of the parties, the practice will apply. Either it is a matter of contractual
innovation, of a practiced clause, among others, of a simple practice in
development, already somewhat constant but not yet very constant: in this case,
these practices cannot be applied except upon the basis of their acceptance. The
solution is valid for the application of the general conditions of the parties or
general conditions developed by the professional organization. Or it is a matter
of the consecration of usage anchored in the sector and generally followed: in
this case, they would be applicable on this sole basis and, among professionals
of the sector, in the silence of the parties. It is thus the derogation from the
practice that must be accepted, the act of stipulating a mode different from the
usage is sufficient to manifest the will to discount it . . . .”22
No. 429 Practice and the judge

“In the case of practice raised before the judge, it has already been seen that the
judge can establish the existence of a practice and qualify it as usage, as
applicable. Trial judges are sovereign in this appreciation of this existence. Once
the practice is established, the judge will sanction it taking into account these
conditions of application: absence of contrary will in the contract, absence of
contrary mandatory statutory provisions. The Court of Cassation (i.e., the
French court of last resort in civil and criminal matters) ensures that usages
observed by the trial judges have been applied.”23
As explained by Alain Bénabent:
“Usage is a precious element, but delicate to handle: precious because it allows

what the parties could consider as evident to be introduced into the contract
without it having to be specified; delicate because the knowledge of and proof
of a usage, its range, its intensity, its scope of application, are often subject to
21
P. Deumier, Introduction générale au droit, 4th ed. LGDJ-Lextenso, 2017, paras. 428,
429.
22
Ibid. para. 428.
23
Ibid. para. 429.
7
discussion. In fact, all kinds of usages exist: commercial, rural, professional,

ethical, local, business. (...). They are not included in the contract unless they
are known to both parties and the latter are free to remove them. Questionably,
certain decisions emanating from the commercial chamber have even stated in
the past that they would apply only ‘if the parties expressly intended to adopt
them’, a formula that really limits Article 1135 and erases Article 1160, which is
not followed by the first civil chamber and which seems to be called into
question today.”24
Established practice can even justify departures from ordinary rules of contract law.
For example, French contract law includes the principle that silence in response to an offer
generally is not an acceptance. But French courts have created an exception to this principle:
“silence can be taken to mean acceptance when circumstances allow it to be given such a
meaning.”25 Another example is the general usage that silence upon receipt of a confirmation
letter in which the offering party reiterates the terms the parties agreed upon during
negotiations constitutes acceptance of the reiterated terms.26
French law uses industry practice to determine the contents of contractual obligations in a
large number of cases and in extremely varied areas of the law (e.g., intellectual property,
commercial contracts, commercial leases, rural leases). To interpret a contract, a court may
refer to prior industry practice, just as it may refer to the prior contractual practices of the
parties themselves, for example, to agreements previously made.27
Below, I cite a number of examples of statutory provisions that expressly refer to industry
practices, thus demonstrating their importance in French law:
Commercial Code
Article L442–6, I: “Engages the responsibility of its author and obliges him to
remedy the loss caused [by] the act, by any producer, trader, industrial or
person registered in the trades register: …
5° The abrupt, even partial, breaking off of an established commercial

relationship, without prior written notice taking into account the duration of the
commercial relationship and observing the specified minimum advance notice
24
A. Bénabent, Les obligations, op. cit., para. 293.
25
F. Terré, P. Simler, Y. Lequette, Les obligations, op. cit., para. 124.
26
Com. Jan. 9, 1956, Bull. Civ. III, n° 17.
27
Cass. Soc., Nov. 5, 1987, N° 84-45881.
8
period, in reference to commercial usage, by inter-professional agreements.

…”.28
Article L145–14: “The lessor may refuse the renewal of the lease. However,
except in cases of the exceptions provided in articles L145-17ff., the lessor
must pay the evicted tenant compensation for the eviction equal to the loss
caused by the absence of renewal.
This compensation includes, in particular, the market value of the business,

determined according to the usages of the profession, possibly supplemented
by the normal costs of moving out and relocation, as well as costs and transfer
fees to be paid by a business of the same value, except when the owner
establishes that the injury is less.”29
Article L145–36, para. 2: “The price of the lease of premises built or

converted for use as a cinema theater as defined in article L212-2 of the
Cinema and Moving Image Code is, contrary to articles L145-33ff. of this
code, determined solely according to the usages observed in the sector of
activity in question.”30
Article L145–47: “The tenant may add related or complementary activities to

the activity specified in the lease.
To that end, he must notify the owner of his intention by extra-judicial means
or by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt requested, indicating the
activities intended to be undertaken. This formality shall be deemed equivalent
to formal notice to the owner to give notice, within a period of two months, on
pain of forfeiture, if he challenges the related or complementary nature of these
activities. In the event of a challenge, the Tribunal de Grande Instance to which
the matter is referred by the party first to act, shall rule in accordance in
particular with the evolution of commercial practice . . . .”31
5. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims
Having reviewed general principles of French contract law, I now turn to the FTC’s claims
arising out of Qualcomm’s FRAND commitment, which are governed by French law, and
assess these claims under French law.
28
Code de Commerce [C. Com.] [Commercial Code], art. L442-6, I (Fr.).
29
Ibid., art. L145–14.
30
31
9
A. Question I. DOES AN ETSI FRAND COMMITMENT IMPOSE AN

OBLIGATION TO LICENSE AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL?
The FTC takes the position that Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments create an obligation to
grant licenses to the manufacturers of baseband processors (i.e., to grant licenses at the
component level).32 This is incorrect, based on my analysis of the ETSI IPR Policy according
to French law.
i. Express Language
The clear and unambiguous language of the ETSI IPR Policy requires an SEP holder making
a FRAND commitment to be prepared to license at the device level; it does not require
licensing at the component level. When making a FRAND commitment under clause 6.1 of
the ETSI IPR Policy, a patent holder commits that it “is prepared to grant irrevocable licenses
on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions under such IPR to at least the
following extent:
 MANUFACTURE, including the right to make or have made customized components

and sub-systems to the licensee’s own design for use in MANUFACTURE;
 sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of EQUIPMENT so MANUFACTURED;
 repair, use, or operate EQUIPMENT; and
 use METHODS.. . . .”33
The definitions of “MANUFACTURE” and “EQUIPMENT” in the ETSI IPR Policy

demonstrate a clear, unambiguous intent to impose an obligation on SEP holders to be
prepared to grant licenses at the device level.
(1) Definition of MANUFACTURE:
(a) “‘MANUFACTURE’ shall mean production of

EQUIPMENT.”34
(2) Definition of EQUIPMENT:
(a) “‘EQUIPMENT’ shall mean any system or device fully

conforming to the standard.”35
32
E.g., FTC Complaint para. 3(c).
33
§ 6.1, ETSI IPR Policy, op. cit.
34
Ibid., § 15.8.
35
Ibid., § 15.4.
10
Under the terms of the IPR Policy, an SEP holder need only commit to licensing the
production of “EQUIPMENT” (i.e., “MANUFACTURE”) and sale, lease etc. of
“EQUIPMENT,” where EQUIPMENT is defined as a “system or device fully conforming to
the standard.” Therefore, the key to understanding what SEP holders must license is the
meaning of a “system or device fully conforming to the standard” (i.e., “EQUIPMENT”).
“System or device fully conforming to the standard”: I have been informed that the drafters of
the ETSI IPR Policy also understood that only complete devices satisfied the criterion of
“system or device fully conforming to the standard”.36 Dr. Bertram Huber explained to me
that it was the intention of the ETSI IPR Policy drafters that “system or device fully
conforming to the standard” referred only to complete systems or devices, such as cellular
handsets or infrastructure.37 He further explained that “system or device fully conforming to
the standard” as used in the ETSI IPR Policy was not intended to cover an isolated component
such as a cellular chipset or thin modem.38 Moreover, I have been advised that many aspects
of a cellular standard describe how a “conforming” device must respond to and interact with a
cellular network, and that such standards can only be “fully conformed to” by a complete,
operational device, not by separate components.39 Based on this information, as a matter of
French law, a French court would likely conclude that the ETSI IPR Policy’s use of
“EQUIPMENT” would limit the FRAND obligation to requiring that SEP holders be prepared
to grant licenses to makers of complete “systems or devices,” such as cellular handsets or
tablets, not to makers of individual components.
Moreover, the ETSI IPR Policy itself draws a distinction between “components” and
“EQUIPMENT”, reinforcing this point. The Policy refers to “components” separately from
“EQUIPMENT”. Section 6.1 of the IPR Policy entails only the right to “make or have made”
components “for use in MANUFACTURE”, i.e., the production of complete devices; it does
not entail the right to a FRAND license to “sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of” components
on their own. In contrast, a license regarding “EQUIPMENT” (i.e., a complete device) entails
the right to “sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of” it. Thus, the ETSI IPR Policy does not
require an SEP holder to offer a license to a seller of components.
ii. Negotiation History
For the reasons noted above, I believe that a French court would find that the clear and
unambiguous terms of the ETSI IPR Policy require a conclusion that a FRAND licensing
obligation under the ETSI IPR Policy is limited to an obligation to be prepared to grant SEP
licenses to makers of complete, operational devices, such as cellular handsets or tablets.
36
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
11
But if the language of the ETSI IPR Policy were nevertheless found to be ambiguous, then a
French court would consider ETSI’s IPR Committee’s negotiation history and considerations
at the adoption of the IPR Policy and at subsequent points as providing evidence of the
intention behind the ETSI IPR Policy and of the understanding of that Policy by industry
participants, including the companies that make FRAND commitments. A French court
would consider the history of the debate among the members of ETSI that led to the adoption
of the ETSI IPR Policy, the history of the debate among the members of ETSI concerning
subsequent proposed changes to the Policy, as well as decisions by ETSI following the
adoption of the IPR Policy to incorporate SEP holders’ technology into standards when aware
of their licensing practices.
A French court would also give significant weight to Dr. Huber’s testimony that he and other
drafters of the ETSI IPR Policy never considered or intended that a FRAND commitment
would require licensing of component makers.40
A French court would likely find that ETSI’s practice of continuing over several decades to
incorporate into its standards the technology of SEP holders who had consistently only
licensed at the device level demonstrates a clear intention on the part of ETSI that its IPR
Policy does not require licensing only at the component level.41
Moreover, ETSI’s General Assembly has repeatedly rejected proposals to impose prohibitions
on particular practices.42
iii. Industry Practice
If a court were to find some ambiguity in the terms of the ETSI IPR Policy, then the court
would also give significant weight to the established practice in the relevant industry
(“industry licensing practice”) both (i) prior to and at the time of the drafting of the IPR
Policy because that would provide insight into the meaning of the IPR Policy as drafted and
(ii) over the years as the Policy has been applied because the fact that the IPR Policy has not
been rewritten is an implicit endorsement of the industry practice.
I understand from my discussion with Bertram Huber that there is an established practice of
negotiating SEP licenses for complete cellular devices.43 A French judge would consider this
practice to constitute usages or practices that provide insight into the FRAND commitment.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
For example, in 2003, ETSI rejected proposals that would have imposed prohibitions
on royalty-free cross-licenses, requiring ‘grantback’ of rights to improvements, and licensing
certain regions of the globe at different rates from those charged for other regions.
ETSI/GA42(03)20 at p.8; ETSI/GA42(03)20 Rev.1; ETSI/GA42(03)34 at pp.4-5. See also
ETSI GA/IPRR06(06)24 Rev.1 at p.14.
43
12
The fact that the longstanding practice of licensing only at the device level has been used
since the mobile communications industry started is strong evidence of the intention on the
part of the ETSI IPR Committee at the time of the Policy’s drafting to impose the ETSI
FRAND commitment only at the device, rather than at the component, level.44 Moreover, the
evidence that royalty-bearing licenses to large patent portfolios in the cellular industry have
continued, most commonly, to be granted only to makers of complete devices (not to makers
of separate components) would be considered by the French courts to be strong evidence that
the practice of licensing exclusively to device makers for complete devices is FRAND within
the meaning of the ETSI policy, since it is based upon the commercial practices and the
usages in the industry and the IPR Committee has not redrafted the Policy to require any other
level of FRAND licensing.
B. Question II. CAN A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY INVOKE THE

FRAND COMMITMENT TO CHALLENGE A LICENSE AFTER
AGREEING TO IT?
The FTC claims that many OEMs believe that Qualcomm’s royalties are non-FRAND.45 The
FTC has stated that it may seek an order requiring Qualcomm to give current licensees the
option to renegotiate their licenses.46 However, the licensees themselves could not invalidate a
duly executed license agreement with Qualcomm on the basis that the terms of the license
agreement are inconsistent with Qualcomm’s FRAND commitment. Under French law, a
current license cannot be invalidated on the basis that its terms do not comply with FRAND.
Qualcomm’s commitment to ETSI was to be “prepared to grant irrevocable licenses on fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions” with qualified potential licensees as
third party beneficiaries of that commitment.47 Qualcomm’s licensees lost their status as third
party beneficiaries of Qualcomm’s FRAND commitment with respect to the SEPs licensed
when they entered into their license agreements with Qualcomm. Under French law, as
licensees, they can no longer invoke Qualcomm’s FRAND commitment.
French law recognizes that contracts may contain clauses in favor of third party beneficiaries:
New Art. 1205: A person may make a stipulation for another person.
“One of the parties to a contract (the ‘stipulator’) may require a promise from
the other party (the ‘promisor’) to accomplish an act of performance for the
benefit of a third party (the ‘beneficiary’). The third party may be a future
44
Ibid.
45
FTC Complaint para. 76.
46
47
13
person but must be exactly identified or must be able to be determined at the

time of the performance of the promise.”48
Under French law, the third party beneficiary of a contract may sue the promisor if the
promisor fails to perform under the third party beneficiary contract.
Here, the stipulator, ETSI, entered into a contract with Qualcomm, the promisor, to bestow a
benefit on a particular group of third parties: potential licensees. The benefit was that
Qualcomm was “prepared to grant irrevocable licenses on fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory terms and conditions” to its SEPs to potential licensees.49 A prospective
licensee’s remedy under French law when an SEP holder refuses to offer an SEP license on
FRAND terms is to sue as a third party beneficiary for breach of this FRAND commitment.50
However, once a license contract has been entered, the licensee has given up its status as a
third party beneficiary because it is no longer a potential licensee with respect to the licensed
SEPs. The licensee therefore cannot rely upon a licensor’s FRAND commitment to argue that
the terms of an executed license breach the licensor’s FRAND commitment or that the
executed license should be invalidated.
Once the parties agree on the terms and conditions, their agreement forms the basis of the
license contract. This contract has its own binding force and is governed by the law that has
been chosen by the parties. French law on third party beneficiaries, as provided for by the
ETSI IPR Policy and thus the FRAND commitment, no longer applies.
CONCLUSION
In French law, contracts are interpreted on the basis of the parties’ intent. In the case of a
FRAND commitment undertaken pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, the relevant intent is that
of the ETSI members who crafted the policy. According to French law, that intent would be
discerned from, among other things, the express language of the policy, the negotiation
history surrounding the adoption and implementation of the policy, and practice in the
relevant industry.
According to the express terms of the ETSI IPR Policy and other French law tools of
contractual interpretation, an SEP holder who makes a FRAND commitment undertakes an
obligation to be prepared to grant licenses to its SEPs for the manufacture and sale of devices
fully conforming to a standard. That is, the FRAND commitment entails an obligation to
license SEPs only at the device level. It does not require licensing at the component level.
48
Here, the translators (as explained by them in a footnote) “have followed closely the
language in the French, which itself evokes its own Romanist background. In English
discussions, the ‘stipulator’ would often be termed the ‘promisee’.”.
49
50
New Code Art. 1206.
14
Furthermore, under French law, a duly executed license cannot be invalidated by a FRAND
commitment.
Dated: June 28, 2018
_____________________________________
Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson
15

([KLELW

1
Bénédicte FAUVARQUE‐COSSON
Professor of Law, University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II)
benedicte.fauvarque-cosson@u-paris2.fr
+ 33 (0) 6 03 40 49 62
EDUCATION
Professorship in Private Law and Criminal Science (Agrégation de droit privé et de

sciences criminelles) (1995)
PhD, University Panthéon-Assas, Paris II: Thesis on Conflict of Laws (Libre disponibilité
des droits et conflits de lois) (1994)
Post-graduate Degree (LLM) in Private International Law and International Trade Law
(Diplôme d’études approfondies (DEA) de droit international privé et de droit du
commerce international), University Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris I, (1990)
Post-graduate Degree (LLM) in Private Law (Diplôme d’études approfondies (DEA) de
droit privé), University Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris I, (1989)
Law Degrees in French and English Law (1984-1988), “double maîtrise”
LLB, King’s College, London,
(JD) (Maîtrise) of French Private Law, University Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris I
Member of the Institut Universitaire de France (2009-2014)
TEACHING POSITIONS AND UNIVERSITY APPOINTMENTS
At the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), since September 2002:

Professor: Comparative Law, Contract Law, Maritime law, Litigation, Conflict of
Laws, International Environmental Law, Digital law and data protection.
Co-founder and codirector of the degree Data Protection Officer (2017),
Digital Law and technologies (2018) ; co-director of the Master degree on
Environmental Law (2006-2017)
Director of the Collège de droit, International branch (1st and 2nd year), since 2009
2
LLM International Business Law, Sorbonne-Assas International Law School,

Environnemental law classes (Paris, Singapour, Maurice)
Director of the European Exchange Program of the University Panthéon-
Assas, Paris II with the Universities of Oxford, UCL, Queen Mary, Trinity
College and University College of Dublin (2003-2007)
Director of the Joint Law Degree (double maîtrise) organized by the University
Panthéon-Assas, Paris II and Cambridge University (2003-2007)
At the University René Descartes, Paris V, (1998-2002):
Professor: Conflict of Laws, Arbitration, Comparative Law, International Contracts
Director and founder of the Common Law syllabus
At the University of Rouen (1995-1998): Comparative Law, International Contracts,
Conflict of Laws and Intellectual Property
OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Chair of the Board of Expertise France (ad interim, July 2017- March 2018)
President of Trans Europe Experts (since 2009), an association of European legal
experts, founded in September 2009
Expert at the Ministère de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche,
coorganisor of the « Etats généraux de la recherche (janvier 2017)
Appointed by the French Ministry of Justice (with Professors John Cartwright and Simon
Whittaker, Oxford) to translate into English the new provisions of the Code civil
(Ordonnance n° 2016-131 of 10 February 2016) for the law of contract, the general
regime of obligations and proof of obligations ; publication on the Ministry’s website.
Elected Visiting Research Fellow of the Institute of European and Comparative
Law, Oxford University (2016-2018)
Special Counselor for Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissaire
(DG Justice), Viviane Reding, for contract law (2011-2014)
President of the Société de Législation Comparée (2012-2015) and General Secretary
from 2006 to 2011; organisor of many international conferences ; coorganisor of the
Mardis de Beauvais, Paris (chair of the sessions with Justice Breyer, Vassilios Skouris,
Anne-Marie Leroy) ; chair of the contract law group (since 2016)
Cofounder of the European Law Institute and Vice President (2011-2013) ; in charge of
the International committee (2011-2014)
Vice President of the International Academy of Comparative Law, since 2006
(Associate member and national reporter for the 1998 and 2002 congresses; General
reporter for the 2006 congress)
Corresponding member of Unidroit (since 2013)
3
Part time mission of expertise at the French Ministry of Justice on the reform of contracts
(European and international perspective), 2007-2008
ACTIVE MEMBERSHIPS
Member of the Unidroit Group drafting the Unidroit Principles on International

Commercial Contracts (2005-2010) and French corresponding member of Unidroit
(since 2013). Member of the drafting group developing, in collaboration with FAO and
IFAD, an instrument on agricultural land investment contracts (since 2016)
Member of the Hague Conference working group in charge of establishing Principles on
Choice of Law in International Contracts (2009-2014)
Foreign corresponding member, Austrian Academy of sciences, OAW (since 2014)
Member of the Board of Justice Coopération internationale (2012-2015)
Member of the Board of Expertise France (since 2015)
Member of the Scientific board of the Fondation pour le droit continental,
professor at its Summer school (international contracts), chair of its working group
on the Unidroit/FAOIFAD Legal Guide on Contract Farming (2014-2015)
Member of the Groupe de travail sur les contrats internationaux, dir. Prof. F. de
Ly, since 2005
Member of the Study Group on a European Civil Code, European group of academics
elaborating Common Principles for Contract Law, Tort and Property Law, directed by
Professor C. von Bar, Germany (2001-2009)
Cofounder and codirector of a joint group (Association Henri Capitant/Société de
Législation Comparée) working on the Common Frame of Reference for European
Contract Law (2006-2009)
Director of Studies, International Association of Legal Science, IALS, (Unesco,
2005-2008)
European project “Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the EU” (2002-2006)
Member of a Joint Seminar between Professors of Paris II/ Oxford on French and
English Contract Law (2003-2007)
Member of the French Committee of Private International Law (Comité français de
droit international privé)
EDITORIAL ACTIVITIES
Scientific Director of the Recueil Dalloz, a leading weekly Law Review (since 2006)
Director of the Revue internationale de droit comparé since 2016, Member of the
comité de rédaction, Revue internationale de droit comparé
4
Member of the Consulting Board, European Review of Contract Law

Member of the comité éditorial, European Review of Private Law (2003 à 2007)
Member of the comité de lecture, Grief, Revue sur les mondes du droit, Dalloz, ed.
EHESS
Director of the collection Droit privé comparé et européen, éd. SLC
Member of the « Comparative Law Review », Revue de droit comparé, Nicolaus
Copernicus University, Pologne.
Editorial Board Member, Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law
Springer
Member of the Advisory Board, ELTE Law Journal, Hongrie and of other law reviews
abroad
REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS
Droit comparé des contrats, Revue des contrats (since 2006)

Panorama, Droit des contrats (yearly contribution 2005-2011), Recueil Dalloz
Chronique Droit des contrats et de la responsabilité, Revue Constitutions
(trimestrielle, 2009-2014), Dalloz.
PUBLICATIONS
List of books (including books codirected or coauthored)
List of books in English
Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract law, Ius Commune Casebooks on the Common
Law of Europe, avec H. Beale, J. Rutgers, D. Tallon, S. Vogenauer, 3rd edition
forthcoming, 2nd edition, 2010, Hart Publishers.
Full Edition, Draft Common Frame of Reference, éd. Sellier, 2009, 6 volumes (coauthor
of notes and comments on French law)
European Contract Law: Materials for a CFR, Terminology, Guiding principles, Model
Rules, éd. Sellier, 2008 (codir. D. Mazeaud)
The Rise of Comparative Law: A Challenge for legal Education in Europe, The Seventh
van Gerven Lecture, Europa Publishing, 2007
List of books in French

Etats généraux de la recherche sur le droit et la justice, actes du colloque, codir. T.
Clay, F. Renucci, S Zientara-Logeay, LexisNexis, 2018
La réécriture du code civil. Le droit français des contrats après la réforme de 2016,
with S. Whittaker et J. Cartwright co-ed, May 2018, Société de législation comparée.
5
Aux sources de la réforme du droit des contrats, coll. Essai, Dalloz 2017, coréd. F.
Ancel and J. Gest (prize of Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 2017 for the
best European private law book).
La sphère privée, IXe journées juridiques franco-japonaises, Volume 14, coll. Droits
étrangers, éd. SLC 2016 (editor)
L’accès au juge de cassation, codir. G. Drago et M. Goré, coll. Colloques, éd. SLC
2015.
Le droit comparé au XXIè siècle. Enjeux et Défis. Journées internationales de la
Société de législation comparée (8-9 avril 2015), éd. SLC 2015 (editor).
La sécurité juridique et l’entreprise, coll. Colloques, éd. SLC 2015 (codir. J.-L.
Dewost).
L’informatique en nuage/ Cloud computing, vol. 14 coll. Droit comparé et européen,
SLC 2014 (editor).
Codification du droit privé et évolution du droit de l’arbitrage, journées franco-
sudaméricaines de droit comparé, ed. with D. P. Fernando Arroyo, J. Monéger, coll.
Colloques, éd. SLC 2014.
La confiance, 11èmes journées bilatérales franco-allemandes, ed. with P. Jung, vol. 12
coll. Droit comparé et européen, éd. SLC 2013.
Mise en oeuvre des instruments optionnels européens en droit privé, coll. « Trans Europe
Experts », vol. 5, Société de législation comparée, 2012, ed. with M. Béhar-Touchais
Droit et grands enjeux du monde contemporain, Chapitre 1 La loi, Chapitre 3 Le contrat,
Chapitre 4 La responsabilité, La documentation Française, 2012
L’information, VIIIèmes journées franco-japonaises, ed. with Y. Ito, Société de législation
comparée 2011
La citoyenneté européenne, ed. with E. Pataut et J. Rochfeld, coll. TEE, éd. SLC, 2011
L’Arbitrage en France et en Amérique latine à l’aube du XXIème siècle, ed. with A. Wald,
éd. SLC, 2008
Projet de Cadre commun de référence : Terminologie contractuelle commune et Principes
contractuels communs, 2 volumes, ed. with D. Mazeaud, SLC, 2008
La confiance légitime et l’estoppel, rapporteur général and editor, SLC 2007
Pensée juridique française et harmonisation européenne du droit, textes rassemblés in
volume 1 de la collection « Droit privé comparé et européen », SLC, 2003
Libre disponibilité des droits et conflits de lois, LGDJ, bibl. de droit privé, t. 272, 1996,
préface Y. Lequette
Le Code civil face à son destin, Documentation française, 2006, ed. with. S. Godechot-
Patris
Selection of articles in French

Protection des données personnelles, Recueil Dalloz 2018, 1033 (with W. Maxwell)
La diffusion de la jurisprudence en Europe : jusqu’où anonymiser les décisions de
justice ? JCP 2017, special issue, suppl to n° 9, p. 58
6
Du Correspondant informatique et libertés (CIL) au Délégué à la protection des

données (DPD) : entre continuité et changements (coréd. E. Jouffin), Revue Banque et
Droit, série 2017, p.4
Vers un droit civil plus attractif et plus sûr ? Regards sur les réformes du droit des
obligations et de la prescription, Mélanges J.-L. Vallens, à paraître
Les nouvelles règles du Code civil relatives à l’interprétation des contrats : perspective
comparatiste et internationale, RDC 2017, à paraître
Les interactions entre les systèmes juridiques. Réflexions sur le rôle du droit européen
dans la réforme française des contrats, Mélanges A. Kettani, à paraître
justice ? , in la jurisprudence dans le mouvement de l’open data, JCP, suppl. au n° 9,
27 février 2017, p. 56.
Première influence de la réforme du droit des contrats : à propos de la nullité, relative
ou absolue, du mandat de l’agent immobilier, note sous Ch. Mixte Cour de cassation,
Recueil Dalloz 2017, 793.
Le droit des Etats dans un univers transnational : quelle territorialité ? in La France
dans la transformation numérique, quelle protection des droits fondamentaux, La
documentation Française, 2016.109.
L’entreprise, le droit des contrats et la lutte contre le changement climatique, Recueil
Dalloz 2016.324
La Magna Carta, source d’un héritage constitutionnel commun, éd. SLC 2016, 29.
Concevoir la sphère privée, ouverture des IXe journées juridiques franco-japonaises,
in La sphère privée, SLC, 2016, 21
Règles impératives et instruments de droit souple : quelle articulation ? Réflexions à
partir des Principes d’UNIDROIT relatifs aux contrats du commerce international,
Mélanges P. Mayer, LGDJ lextenso éd., 2015, 195
La Société de législation comparée dans le XXIè siècle, in Le droit comparé au XXIè
siècle. Enjeux et Défis. Journées internationales de la Société de législation
comparée (8-9 avril 2015), éd. SLC 2015
Roland Drago et le droit comparé, RIDC 2015,341
L’accès au juge de cassation : perspective comparatiste (with T. Paris), in L’accès au
juge de cassation, codir. G. Drago et M. Goré, coll. Colloques, SLC 2015.
Livres propos sur la sécurité juridique et l’entreprise, in La sécurité juridique et
l’entreprise, codir. J.-L. Dewost, SLC 2015
Le Guide juridique UNIDROIT/FAO sur l’agriculture contractuelle, Semaine
juridique, éd. Générale, février 2015
Lorsque le changement s’imposera, Revue de droit d’Assas sur le changement en droit,
n° 10, février 2015, 188
Le Dahir marocain du droit des obligations et la formation d’un droit transnational des
contrats, in Le centenaire du Dahir formant code des obligations et contrats,
Fondation A. Kettani ed., 2015,79.
7
Argument de droit comparé et sociologie juridique, in L’argument sociologique en

droit. Pluriel et singularité, dir. D. Fenouillet, Dalloz, Thèmes et commentaires, 2015,
69.
L’interdépendance contractuelle dans une opération incluant une location financière. A
propos de deux arrêts de chambre mixte de la Cour de cassation, European Review of
Private Law, 2014, p. 253-260.
Cloud computing, protection des données et nouvelles pratiques contractuelles, Petites
Affiches, 14-18 aout 2014, Petites affiches, n°s 162-164, p. 41-45.
Le droit international privé des contrats en marche vers l’universalité ?, Mélanges en
l’honneur du Professeur Bernard Audit, LGDJ Lextenso ed., 2014, p.269-284.
Codifier le droit des contrats au XXIme siècle : perspective française, européenne,
internationale, in Codification du droit privé et évolution du droit de l’arbitrage, codir,
D. P. Fernando Arroyo, J. Monéger, coll. Colloques, éd. SLC 2014, p. 15-40 .
Gaz de schiste : quelles vérités ? (coréd. F. Renard), in La vérité, coll. Les colloques
de l’Institut universitaire de France, di. O. Guerrier, Publication de l’Université de
Saint-Etienne, 2014, p. 156-169.
Pour penser autrement ce qui est : l’importance des notions dans l’œuvre de Georges
Rouhette, Hommage à Georges Rouhette, sous l’égide de l’Association H. Capitant,
Dalloz 2013.
Entre droit souple et droit dur : les « Principes » en droit des contrats internationaux,
in Le droit souple, Rapport annuel du Conseil d’Etat, 2013, La documentation
française, p. 256-271.
Un nouvel instrument du droit souple international. Le projet de Principes de La Haye sur

le choix de la loi applicable en matière de contrats internationaux, coréd. P. Deumier,
Dalloz 2013, n° 34
Les clauses-types sur l'utilisation des Principes d'UNIDROIT relatifs aux contrats du
commerce international ? Dalloz 2013, n° 30
Le droit des contrats au cœur de l’innovation juridique, Liber amicorum Camille Jauffret-
Spinosi, Dalloz 2013, p.323-338.
L’interdépendance contractuelle en droit comparé, Revue des contrats 2013, 1079.

Vers une consécration de la notion de contrat « lié » ou « accessoire » en droit
européen, RDC 2013, 1116.
Le traitement juridique des contrats liés en droit néerlandais, coréd. C. Mak,
RDC 2013, 1104.
Les ensembles contractuels à la lumière de la théorie de la « cause concrète »
(« causa in concreto ») en droit italien, RDC 2013,1096.
L’appréhension par le droit belge des ensembles contractuels indissociables,
RDC 2013, 1093.
Le droit québécois et le phénomène des contrats interdépendants, RDC
2013,1108.
L’intégration de la dimension européenne, in La confiance, 11èmes journées bilatérales
franco-allemandes, codir. P. Jung, vol. 12 coll. Droit comparé et européen, éd. SLC
2013, p. 193.
8
Clauses limitatives de réparation entre professionnels : étude de droit comparé, RDC

2013, p. 671-701.
Unidroit, la CNUDCI et le droit international des contrats, RDC 2012, p. 1355-1383
L’Europe, laboratoire de la démocratie participative et de l’innovation juridique, in Revue
Chantiers politiques, n° 10, Le nouveau contrat européen, 2012, p. 22
Le droit commun européen de la vente et la technique des instruments optionnels, volume
6 de la collection Trans Europe Experts, SLC, sous la dir. d’O. Deshayes
Les enjeux juridiques européens ; nouvelles gouvernances et nouvelle régulations en
Europe, Introduction des Actes du Forum de Trans Europe Experts, Petites Affiches, 2012,
n°130 with J. Rochfeld
L’actualité de la citoyenneté européenne, La citoyenneté européenne, dir. B. Fauvarque-
Cosson, E. Pataut et J. Rochfeld, collection TEE, SLC 2011, p. VII, with J. Rochfeld
« Droit commun européen de la vente : l’unité sans l’uniformisation», Revue des contrats
Revue des Contrats, 2012, p. 191, coréd. M. Béhar-Touchais et Z. Jacquemin
« Vers un droit commun européen de la vente », Recueil Dalloz, 2012.34
Réflexions sur la protection de la personne au sein d’une société de l’information ultra-
perméable, in L’information, VIIIèmes journées franco-japonaises, codir. Y. Ito, Société
de législation comparée 2011
« Deux siècles d’évolution des méthodes de droit comparé », Revue Internationale de
Droit Comparé, 2011.527
« Précisions sur le projet de droit européen des contrats », Revue des Contrats, 2010.1045
« Le renouvellement des sources du droit en droit des contrats : le rôle des acteurs
privés », Les mutations de la norme, dir. N. Martial-Braz, J.-F. Riffard, M. Béhar-
Touchais, éd. Economica 2011.261
« Vers un instrument optionnel en droit européen des contrats », Revue Constitutions
2010, n° 4, p. 564
« Le choix d’un instrument optionnel en droit des contrats : aspects de droit international
privé », Le règlement communautaire Rome I et le choix de loi dans les contrats
internationaux, dir. S. Corneloup et N. Joubert, LexisNexis Litec, 2011
« Renégociation et révision judiciaire du contrat en cas de changement de circonstances :
l’interprétation audacieuse de la CVIM par la Cour de cassation belge », RDC, 2010.1405
« Réflexions sur le principe de subsidiarité en droit communautaire des contrats », Revue
Constitutions, 2010, N° 1 (coréd. J. Gest)
« Un nouvel élan pour le Cadre commun de référence en droit des contrats », Recueil
Dalloz, 1362
« Codification et droit privé européen », Mélanges B. Oppetit, LexisNexis Litec, 2010.179
« Projet de cadre commun de référence : la Chambre des Lords ne cache pas son manque
d’enthousiasme », RDC, 2010.731
« Droit européen des contrats : bilan et perspectives pour la prochaine décennie », RDC
2010.316
9
« L’influence des droits nationaux sur le droit communautaire en droit des obligations,
Justice et cassation, revue annuelle des avocats au Conseil d’Etat et à la Cour de
cassation », éd. Dalloz 2009, p. 280
« Le Code civil brésilien, avant-propos », édition éd. bilingue SLC, 2009
« L’influence des droits nationaux sur le droit communautaire en droit des obligations,
Justice et cassation, Colloque du 7 novembre 2008, Paris, Dalloz, 2009.280
« Terminologie, principes, élaboration des règles modèles : les trois volets du cadre
commun de référence », Rev. trim. dr. eur. 2008.695
« Regards sur la force obligatoire du contrat », in Un nouveau regard sur le droit chinois,
éd. SLC, 2008, p. 31
« La contribution des universitaires, notamment français, au projet de cadre commun de
référence. Le droit des contrats, perspectives européennes et réformes internes », Dr. et
patrimoine, n° 174, 4 juin 200
« Pour un cadre commun de référence limité aux contrats », RDC, 2008.918
« Les travaux du groupe Association H. Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique
Française/Société de législation comparée : terminologie, principes directeurs et révision
des Principes du droit européen du contrat », Era Forum Special Issue, 2008, vol. 9, p. 51
« Commentaire de la loi du 17 juin 2008 portant réforme de la prescription en matière
civile », Recueil Dalloz 2008.2511, (coréd. avec J. François)
« Les codifications doctrinales, nouvelles sources du droit de l’arbitrage ? », in
L’Arbitrage en France et en Amérique latine à l’aube du XXIème siècle, 2008, p. 27
« L’opportunité économique d’une harmonisation du droit des contrats en Europe », in
Droit et économie des contrats, LGDJ, 2008, p. 257
« Heurs et malheurs de l’unification du droit des contrats en Europe », Mélanges P.
Tercier, Schulthess, 2008, p. 245
« Vers un universalisme renouvelé : quelles en sont les manifestations en droit ? »,
Diogène, N° 219, juill.-sept. 2007
« Droit international privé et droit comparé : brève histoire d’un couple à l’heure de
l’Europe », Mélanges H. Gaudemet-Tallon, éd. Dalloz, 2008, p.43
« Le rôle de la doctrine en droit privé européen », Mélanges G. Viney, LGDJ, 2008, p. 417
« L’élaboration du cadre commun de référence : regards comparatifs sur les travaux
académiques », RDC, 2008.527
« Droit européen des contrats », dossier spécial corédigé, Droit et patrimoine, déc. 2007,
p. 40
« La convergence des droits en Europe », Petites Affiches, 2007, N° 79, p. 63, (coréd. W.
van Gerven)
« Droit européen et international des contrats : l’apport des codifications doctrinales »,
Recueil Dalloz 2007.96
« Les Principes Unidroit relatifs aux contrats du commerce international : nouvelles
perspectives, nouveaux enjeux », in Le code de commerce 1807-2007, éd. Dalloz, 2007, p.
737
« Le droit brésilien, cet “inconnu” qui ne l’est plus », Mélanges A. Wald, 2007, p. 33
10
« L’incidence des codifications doctrinales sur les sources du droit des contrats », in Les
sources du droit. Aspects contemporains, SLC, 2007.125
« L’avant-projet français de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la
prescription », Revue de droit uniforme/ Uniform Law Review, 2006-1, p. 103. (corédigé
avec D. Mazeaud)
« La concurrence des systèmes juridiques : conclusions d’une privatiste », in La
concurrence des systèmes juridiques, Presses universitaires d’Aix Marseille, 2006
« L’avant-projet français de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription
et les principes du droit européen du contrat : variations sur les champs magnétiques dans
l’univers contractuel », Petites Affiches, 2006, n° 146, p. 12 (corédigé avec D. Mazeaud)
« La promotion de notre système juridique s’organise : la constitution d’une Fondation
pour le droit continental », Recueil Dalloz 2006.996., (corédigé avec M. Grimaldi)
« Regards comparatistes sur l’exécution forcée en nature », RDC, 2006-2, 529-542
« La réforme du droit français des contrats : perspective comparative », RDC 2006-1, 147-
166
« Quel système de droit dans un environnement de plus en plus concurrentiel ?
observations » in La convergence du droit, 4ème conférence internationale du droit et de
l’économie, Paris place du droit, conférence du Barreau de Paris, éd. Lamy, 2006
« Le régime du risque transfrontière de la responsabilité environnementale : en marche
vers un droit spécial des conflits de loi ? » Rapport franco-belge corédigé avec M. Fallon
et S. Francq, Les responsabilités environnementales dans l’espace européen, Point de vue
franco-belge, dir. G. Viney et B. Dubuisson, Schulthess, éd. Bruylant, LGDJ, 2006, 547-
652
« Vers une réforme du droit anglais des clauses abusives ? Le rapport “Unfair Terms in
Contracts” des Law Commissions anglaise et écossaise », RDC, 2005-3, 891-900
« L’arbitre et le droit européen des contrats », Revue des affaires européennes, Law and
European Affairs, 2005/2, p. 271
« Comment appréhender la diversité en droit ? », in Le devenir du droit comparé en
France, dir. J. du Bois de Gaudusson, éd. PUAM 2005, p. 185
« Le droit comparé, art d’agrément ou entreprise stratégique », in Mélanges X. Blanc-
Jouvan, SLC, 2005, p. 69
« La prescription en droit international privé », in Travaux du comité français de droit
international privé, éd. Pedone, 2004, p. 235
« L’obligation de restituer les profits tirés de la violation du contrat », Revue des contrats,
2005, N° 2, p. 479
« L’ordre public », in 1804-2004, Le Code civil, Un passé, un présent, un avenir, éd.
Dalloz 2004, p. 473
« L’accord procédural à l’épreuve du temps », in Mélanges P. Lagarde, éd. Dalloz
2004.263
« L’accès libre au droit grâce à Internet : une nouvelle garantie de démocratie dans un
nouvel espace de luttes d’influences », nov. 2004, http://www.frlii.org/spip.php?article98
11
« L’enjeu de la distinction entre le contrat void et voidable pour le tiers acquéreur de

bonne foi », RDC, 2004, n° 3, p.1096.
« Variations sur le processus d’harmonisation du droit à travers l’exemple du droit de la
prescription extinctive », RDC, 2004, N° 3, p. 793
« Les techniques anglaises d’interprétation des contrats et le contrôle de l’exercice des
pouvoirs contractuels », RDC, 2004, N° 2, p. 483
« Le changement de circonstances », RDC, 2004-1, p. 67
« Le droit comparé et le droit international : alliés ou ennemis ? La réponse », Rev. int. dr.
comp. 2003.530
« Droit européen des contrats : première réaction au plan d’action de la Commission »,
Recueil Dalloz 2003.1171
« Faut-il un code civil européen ? » Rev. trim. dr. civ. 2002.463
« L’enseignement du droit comparé », Revue internationale de droit comparé 2002.293
« Le droit international privé classique à l’épreuve des réseaux », in Le droit international
de l’Internet, éd. Bruylant, 2002, p. 55
« L'estoppel du droit anglais », in L’interdiction de se contredire au détriment d’autrui,
éd. Economica, 2001, coll. Etudes juridiques, p. 3
« Droit comparé et droit international privé : la confrontation de deux logiques à travers
l’exemple des droits fondamentaux », Revue internationale de droit comparé, 2000.797
« Le juge français et le droit étranger », Recueil Dalloz 2000.25
« Aspects de droit comparé de la prescription » in Les désordres de la prescription, PUF,
Rouen 2000, p. 45
V° « Nullités », Encyclopédie Dalloz, International, 2000
« Les contrats du commerce international, une approche nouvelle : les Principes d'Unidroit
relatifs aux contrats du commerce international », Revue internationale de droit comparé,
1998.462
Selection of articles in English and Spanish

« Comparative Law in France », Oxford Handbook on Comparative Law, 3rd ed. Oxford
University Press, dir. M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, forthcoming
Corporate Social responsability in contracts, coréd. A.G. Castermans, in CSR for
Young Lawyers, eleven international publishing, 2017, 109-136
The Process of Elaboration of the Reform of the Law of Contract’ in Cartwright, J

and Whittaker, S (eds), The Code Napoléon Rewritten: French Contract Law after the
2016 Reforms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) 17, cored. Gest, J and Ancel, F
‘Does Review on the Ground of Imprévision Breach the Principle of the Binding
Force of Contracts?’ in Cartwright, J and Whittaker, S (eds), The Code Napoléon
Rewritten: French Contract Law after the 2016 Reforms (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2017) 187
12
The New French Contract Law in the International Sphere’ Montesquieu Law Review
(2017), 6
‘The French Contract Law Reform and the Political Process’ (2017) 13 European
Review of Contract Law 337
The French Contract Law Reform, Zeitschrift für Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht,

2017/3, 124
V° Estoppel, European Encyclopedia of Private International Law, Jürgen Basedow,

Franco Ferrari, Pedro de Miguel Asensio & Giesela Rühl (eds.), 2017.
The new proposal for harmonised rules for certain aspects concerning contracts for the
supply of digital content (Termination, modification of the digital content and right to
terminate long term contracts), Briefing paper presented at the European Parliament
(Legal Affairs Committee), Febr. 17, 2016
The UNIDROIT Principles, the World and the French reform of contract law, Liber
amicorum M. Bonell, Unidroit, 2016
Towards an important reform of the French Civil Code, Montesquieu Law Review,
Issue n° 3, 2015
Foreign Law before the French Courts : a unique procedural treatment, in Courts and
Comparative Law, M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve eds, OUP 2015.
Restructuring Legal Education in Europe: The Necessity of Comparative and European
Law”, Ars Aequi november 2014, 867
The French Contract Law Reform in a European context, ELTE Law Review, 2014, vol. 1,
59
The Europeanisation of private law: problems and perspectives, The Making of European
Private Law: Why, How, What, Who?, Luigi Moccia ed, Sellier 2013
Two Centuries of Comparative Law Evolution, in French Legal Doctrine

Jurisprudence. 2013, No. 1-2 p. 320
European Contract Law. Through and Beyond Pluralism: the Case of an Optional
Instrument, in Pluralism and European Private law, N. Leone ed, OUP 2012, p. 95
Contribution on French Law, Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 2012, ed. J. Smits
« The new section on conditions in the third edition of the Unidroit Principles », Uniform
Law Review, 2012.537
Hacia un Derecho comun europeo de la compraventa, in La Revision de las normas
eurpeas u nacionales de proteccion de los consumidores, S. Camara y E. Arroyo
Amayuelas eds, Thomson Reuters, 2012, p. 41
The relationship between the Political frame of reference (PFR) and the consumer
acquis, in A Common Frame of Reference for European Contract Law, J. Kleineman
ed., Stockholm Center for Commercial Law (SCCL), 2011, p. 55-72.
13
« A Step Further in a Long and Incremental process: the Feasability Study of the Expert
Group on European Contract Law », in Towards a European Contract law, éd. Sellier,
2011.173
« The Need for codified Guiding Principles and Model Rules in European Contract Law »
in The Foundation of European Private Law, R. Brownsword, H. Micklitz, L. Niglia, S.
Weatherill, Hart Publishing, 2011
«European Contract Law: Towards an Optional instrument?» in Multijuralism,
Manifestations, causes and consequences, A. Breton, A. des Ormeaux, K. Postor, P.
Salmon, Ashgate, 2009, p. 121
Book review of Unifying and Harmonizing Substantive Law and the Role of Conflict of
Laws, K. Boele-Woelki, American Journal of Comparative Law, 2011.592
« A Way Forward for the Common Frame of Reference: Views from France », Zeitschrift
für Europaïsches Privatrecht, ZEUP 4/2009, p. 675, coréd D. Mazeaud
« Is Law an Economic Contest? French reactions to the Doing Business World Bank
reports and economic analysis of the law », Am. J. of Comp. Law, 2009.811, coréd. A-J.
Kerhuel.
« Negotiation and renegotiation: A French perspective » in Reforming the French Law of
Obligations, Comparative Reflections on the Avant-projet de réforme du droit des
obligations et de la prescription », J. Cartwright, S. Vogenauer, S. Whittaker, éd. Studies
of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative law, Hart Publishing 2009, p. 33
European Contract Law: Materials for the CFR, éd. Sellier, 2008 (ouvrage codirigé)
« The Contribution of European Jurists in the Field of Contract law », Liber Amicorum G.
Alpa, BIICL 2007, p. 363
« Towards a new French Law of Obligations and Prescription? », Zeitschrift für
Europaïsches Privatrecht, 2007, vol. 2, p. 428
« Comparative Law in France », Oxford Handbook on Comparative Law, éd. Oxford
University Press, dir. M. Reimann et R. Zimmermann, 2006, p. 35
« Towards a European Civil Code », book review in European Review of Contract Law,
N° 1
« Foreign Law before the French Courts: the Conflicts of Law Perspective » in
Comparative Law Before The Courts, dir. G. Canivet, M. Andenas, D. Fairgrieve, BIICL
2004, p. 3
« Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws: Allies or Enemies? New Perspectives on an
Old Couple », American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 49, 2001.407
« Modern Developments in French Codification », Edinburgh Law Review, 2000, vol. 4,
p. 350
Other publications
Notes in Revue critique de droit international privé, Journal du droit international,
Recueil Dalloz, Revue européenne de droit privé (European Review of Contract Law)
Book reviews in Revue internationale de droit comparé, Revue de l'arbitrage, Revue
trimestrielle de droit civil, Revue de droit privé européen (European Review of Private
Law)
14
Contribution to Les droits de tradition civiliste en question : à propos des rapports

Doing Business de la banque Mondiale, vol. 1, Ass. H. Capitant, éd. SLC, 2006
Dictionnaire juridique Harrap’s-Dalloz, 2004, Consultant
SELECTION OF CONFERENCES
Contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services, ERA, Brussels nov.
2017
Hearings (2016-2017) :European Parliament , Contracts for the supply of digital

content and digital services ; Assemblée nationale, with Trans Europe Experts : les
conventions citoyennes sur l’avenir de l’Union européenne et le harcèlement de rue.

justice ?, Cour de cassation, octobre 2016
L’admission de la révision pour imprévision, une atteinte au principe de la force

obligatoire et Le processus d'élaboration de la réforme du droit des contrats :
Oxford, septembre 2016.
The new proposal for harmonised rules for certain aspects concerning contracts for the
supply of digital content (Termination, modification of the digital content and right to
terminate long term contracts), Briefing paper presented at the European Parliament
(Legal Affairs Committee), Febr. 17, 2016
La réforme du droit français des contrats dans le contexte européen - enjeux et
perspectives, European Court of Justice, Grande Salle d’Audience, Luxembourg,
March 17, 2016, followed by a workshop « Atelier terminologique », ECJ, Direction
générale de la traduction
Les figures de la mobilité : le statut de la personne, entre territorialité et

extraterritorialité, Conseil d’Etat, Jan. 27, 2016
La Magna Carta, source d’un héritage constitutionnel commun, in honor of Roger

Errera, Conseil d’Etat, Paris, Nov. 30 2015
Le droit des contrats et la lutte contre le changement climatique, Réglementations

climatiques et opportunités économiques, coorg. Société de législation comparée,
Ambassade de France à Berlin, Berlin, Nov. 19, 2015
Private Law Reforms in a global context, keynote speech at the opening ceremony of
the academic year for your LLB in Global Law at Tilburg Law School, Netherlands,
21 September 2015
Legal Education in Europe: The Necessity of Comparative and European Law (XXIII Bi-
Annual Colloquium of the Italian Association of Comparative Law, Palerme, June 2015
15
Future development of the principle of party autonomy and international practices in

the international commercial arbitration, Chinese delegation at the SLC, Paris, May
2015
Journées internationales de la Société de législation comparée, Cour de cassation
Grand chambre, Avril 2015
The French Contract Law Reform in an International Environment, Max Planck Institute,
Hambourg, mars 2015
La compétitivité des systèmes juridiques et le phénomène de forum shopping, Association
de l'Institut de Droit des Affaires, Paris, Place internationale de l'arbitrage, mars 2015
Combating climate change through contractual clauses, Max Planck Institute, Hambourg,
mars 2015 (with Prof. A.G. Castermans, Leiden)
Le droit des Etats dans un univers transnational : quelle territorialité ? (présidence de
séance, Conseil d’Etat, La France dans la transformation numérique, 6 février 2015).
The French contract law reform in a European and International environment, Max Planck
Institute for foreign law and comparative law, March 9, 2015.
Interactions between legal systems, keynote speaker, Leiden University, January 2015.
New developments in international commercial contracts, Leiden, October 2014
Impact of EU law on the contract law reform in France, Etvos Lorand University,
Budapest, April 2014
The Significance of Comparative law for Europe, Johns Hopkins University, Paris,
April 2014
La réforme du droit français des contrats dans le contexte européen - enjeux et
perspectives, Ferrare, avril 2014
Hommage à Roland Drago, Conseil d’Etat, février 2014
Argument comparatiste et argument sociologique , janvier 2014, Paris, La Sorbonne
L’avenir du droit européen des contrats en Europe, Université de Montréal, octobre
2013
Cloud computing and contracts, World Social Science Forum Scientific, Montréal,
octobre 2013
Mise en œuvre des instruments optionnels dans le domaine du droit civil en Europe, Étude
présentée au Parlement européen, commission JURI, avec M. Béhar-Touchais, mars 2012
The Europeanization of Private Law, problems and perspectives, Rome, May 2012
La citoyenneté de l’Union, un nouveau moteur pour la politique judiciaire ?, Europäische
Notarentage / 24th Conference of European Civil-Law Notaries, Salzburg, 13 April 2012
The Optional Instrument on a Common European Sales law (CESL), La Rioja, Espagne,
mars 2012
Les Principes d’Unidroit et la convergence des droits, Cour de cassation (Paris), mars
2012
Les nouveaux textes sur la condition dans les Principes d’Unidroit, (Genève), février 2012
L’information (droit civil), journées juridiques franco-japonaises de la SLC (Tokyo), 2011
16
Les métamorphoses du droit comparé, Faculté internationale de droit comparé

(Strasbourg), conférence d’ouverture, 2011
Deux siècles d’évolutions des méthodes en droit comparé, Collège de France (Paris), 2011
Le CCR : un outil optionnel pour les contractants, (Bruxelles), 2010
Private Law Theory - A Workshop, Washington, XVIIIth International Congress of
Comparative Law, 2010
Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in French courts, European Circuit of the Bar Annual
Conference (Paris), 2010.
Les mutations de la norme en droit des contrats, Université René Descartes (Paris), 2010
Le choix d’un instrument optionnel en droit des contrats : aspects de droit international
privé (Dijon), 2010
The optional instrument in European contract law: scope and legal nature (Katowice),
2010
A practical case (Draft Common Frame of Reference and Italian law compared), Bocconi
University (Milan), 2010
A propos de la création d’un European Law Institute, Institut universitaire de Florence
(Florence et Vienne), 2009 et 2010
Chair of the session on cost and fee allocation rules, International Academy of
Comparative Law (Washington), 2010
Le réseau Trans Europe Experts, Chambre de Commerce (Paris), 2010
DCFR et droit de la consommation (Stockholm), octobre 2009
European Private Law, Université PUC, (Rio de Janeiro) 2009
La protection de l’environnement, le rôle de l’Union européenne, participation au Réseau
ID organisé avec le collège de France, (Sao Paulo), 2009
Les travaux français en vue de l’élaboration du cadre commun de référence (Rome), 2008
Negotiation and Renegotiation: a French Perspective (Oxford), 2008.
Le cadre commun de référence, Kopaonik, 2007.
New Challenges in European Legal Education, The Common Core of European Private
Law Turin, 2007
The « Avant-projet français de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la
prescription », Max Planck Institut, Hambourg, 2006
La contribution des universitaires dans le domaine du droit des contrats, European jurists
Vienne, 2007
French law on Changes of Circumstances: an Oddity?, Institute of European and
Comparative Law (Oxford), 2003
La période précontractuelle, Association H. Capitant (Padoue), 2003
Internationalisation and Harmonisation. The Conflict of Laws Perspective, Institut
Universitaire Européen de Florence, 2003
Foreign Law before the French Courts, British Institute of International and Comparative
Law (Londres), 2003
17
Codifying European contract law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law,
(Londres) 2003
Promesses de vente et pactes de préférence : atteintes au principe de la force obligatoire
des contrats ?, Institut de droit comparé et Association H. Capitant, Lausanne, 2002
Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws: Allies or Enemies?, Association of American
Law Schools (AALS), San Francisco 2001
Modern Developments in French Codification, AJFB (Edimbourg), 2000
Article 4 of the EC Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
TMC Asser Institut (La Haye), 2000
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Consulting services, including expertise on French law, in Contract Law, Comparative Law,
Private international Law, Intellectual property Law.
DISTINCTIONS
- Prix Descartes-Huygens, Prix international de l'Académie des sciences 2013 ; followed by

the constitution of the franco-néerlandais Grotius-Pothier and organisation of regular
meetings between Dutch and French PhD students.
- Chevalier dans l’Ordre des Palmes académiques

- Chevalier de la Légion d’honneur, promotion du 1er janvier 2012
([KLELW
Materials Relied Upon – Expert Report of Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson

Books
 Alain Bénabent, Droit Des Obligations (16th ed. 2017).
 François Chénédé, Le Nouveau Droit Des Obligations Et Des Contrats (2017).
 François Terré, Philippe Simler, & Yves Lequette, Droit Civil Les Obligations (11th ed. 2013).
 Pascale Deumier, Introduction Générale Au Droit (4th ed. 2017)
Expert Reports
 Expert Report of Carl Shapiro, Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm, May 24, 2018
Legislation
 Code de Commerce [C. Com.] [Commercial Code]
 Code civil [C. civ.] [Civil Code] (New Code)
 Code civil [C. civ.] [Civil Code] (Old Code)
Cases
 Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for civil and criminal matters] soc., 1987, N° 84-
45881
 Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for civil and criminal matters] com., 1956, Bull. Civ.
III, n° 17
Court Filings
 Complaint for Equitable Relief, Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated,

February 7, 2018.
 Federal Trade Commission’s Second Amended Response To Qualcomm’s First Set of
Interrogatories, Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated, February 7, 2018.
Other
 European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ESTI/GA42(03)20
 European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ESTI/GA42(03)20 rev.1
 European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ESTI/GA42(03)34
 European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI GA/IPRR06(06)24 rev.1
 European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy

Exhibit 36
633 Battery Street
Telephone: (415) 442-1000
13

SAN JOSE DIVISION
16
17 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC
18 Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF LORENZO
CASACCIA IN SUPPORT OF
19 vs. DEFENDANT QUALCOMM
20 QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a Delaware INCORPORATED’S OPPOSITION TO
corporation, MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
21 JUDGMENT ON QUALCOMM’S
Defendant. STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT
22 LICENSING COMMITMENTS
Time: 1:30 p.m.
25
26
27
28
MORGAN, LEWIS & Tiedemann Declaration ISO Opposition to
BOCKIUS LLP Motion for Summary Judgment
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SAN FRANCISCO
1 DECLARATION OF LORENZO CASACCIA

2 I, Lorenzo Casaccia, hereby declare as follows:
3 1. I am currently a Vice President of Engineering of Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. I
4 have been employed by Qualcomm since the year 2000. In 2000, I obtained a laurea degree in
5 electrical engineering from the Polytechnic University of Turin, and a telecommunications degree
6 from the Eurecom Institute of Sophia Antipolis. I also hold a laurea degree in philosophy and a
7 master’s degree in the philosophy of knowledge from the Sapienza University of Rome.
8 2. I submit this declaration in support of Qualcomm’s Opposition to Motion for Partial
9 Summary Judgment on Qualcomm’s Standard Essential Patent Licensing Commitments.
10 3. I have been a part of Qualcomm’s Standardization and Industry Organization
11 (“QSIO”) activities related to 3rd Generation Partnership Project (“3GPP”) cellular standards
12 development since 2001. I have led the QSIO team in 3GPP since approximately 2008-2009. In
13 these roles, I have been involved in the development of Third Generation (3G), Fourth Generation
14 (4G), and Fifth Generation (5G) cellular standards, including, for example:
15 • 3G UMTS standards for WCDMA and High Speed Packet Access (HSPA)
16 (including High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA), High Speed Uplink
17 Packet Access (HSUPA), and Evolved High Speed Packet Access (HSPA+)),
18 • 4G standards for Long-Term Evolution (LTE) and LTE-Advanced (LTE-A); and
19 • 5G New Radio (5G-NR).
20 4. I currently oversee over 80 engineers responsible for day-to-day standards
21 development and participation within 3GPP in 16 different 3GPP Working Groups. I have
22 personally attended over one hundred 3GPP meetings, including 35 Radio Access Network
23 (“RAN”) Plenary meetings and over 50 Working Group meetings.
24 I. Summary
25 5. I understand that the FTC argues that modem chips implement the Alliance for
26 Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) standards for the 3G UMTS, 4G LTE, and 5G
27 wireless standards. As a technical matter, this is incorrect because the ATIS standards have no
28 notion or definitional unit that corresponds to a cellular modem chip. Rather, the communications
MORGAN, LEWIS & Casaccia Declaration ISO Opposition to Motion
BOCKIUS LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 1 for Summary Judgment
SAN FRANCISCO Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC
1 protocols defined by the ATIS standards concern complete end-user devices (referred to as “User
2 Equipment” or “UE”) and their interactions with the cellular network and other complete end-user
3 devices. A modem chip standing alone cannot implement the UE-level requirements defined in the
4 ATIS Cellular Standards.
5 6. 3GPP was initially formed in December 1998 when the European
6 Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) partnered with other standard development
7 organizations (SDOs) from around the world to develop new technologies (or more specifically,
8 technology specifications) for the third generation (3G) of cellular networks. ATIS is the North
9 American Organizational Partner of 3GPP.
10 7. ATIS does not independently develop 3G, 4G, or 5G standards (collectively, “3GPP
11 Cellular Standards”). Instead, 3GPP develops technical specifications, which 3GPP’s
12 Organizational Partners may then transpose and publish as their own standard. In addition to ATIS,
13 the 3GPP Organizational Partners are: ETSI – the European Telecommunications Standards
14 Institute (Europe); ARIB – Association of Radio Industries and Businesses (Japan); CCSA – China
15 Communications Standards Association (China); TSDSI – Telecommunications Standards
16 Development Society, India (India); TTA – Telecommunications Technology Association (Korea);
17 and TTC – Telecommunications Technology Committee (Japan). When adopting, or transposing,
18 3GPP specifications within their regions, the Organizational Partner SDOs do not change any of
19 the substantive text of the 3GPP specification. Any modifications are made only to conform to
20 specific local requirements. For this reason, I refer to the 3GPP Cellular Standards and documents
21 in this declaration as they were also adopted by ATIS.
22 8. 3GPP Cellular Standards have no notion of modem chips, and the 3GPP Cellular
23 Standards do not define a modem chip or how a modem chip should be implemented. In my years
24 of participation in 3GPP activities and supervising others participating in 3GPP, I am not aware of
25 any 3GPP project proposals, 3GPP study items, 3GPP Technical Reports, or 3GPP technical
26 specifications for cellular modem chips. Instead, the 3GPP Cellular Standards and the development
27 efforts underlying these standards address performance, interoperability, and communication
28 protocols between the entities that make-up cellular systems, namely, the Core Network, the Access
BOCKIUS LLP
1 Network, and the User Equipment (“UE”), which is the device operated by end-users.
2 9. 3GPP Cellular Standards do not define how a UE is constructed, whether particular
3 functions are implemented in hardware or software, or even the components of a UE. Instead, these
4 standards provide UE manufacturers broad discretion regarding how to construct a UE.
5 10. More specifically, Cellular Standards do not define a modem chip, and a modem
6 chip standing alone cannot implement the Cellular Standards requirements that are defined at the
7 UE-level for at least the following reasons, each explained in further detail below, with reference
8 to 3GPP Cellular Standards:
9 a. First, 3GPP Cellular Standards define interfaces among, and the operation
10 of, domains in the cellular system/network. For example, 3GPP TS 23.101
11 defines 3G UMTS systems in terms of domains, which are the major
12 subsystems of the cellular system/network. The basic domain split between
13 the “User Equipment Domain” and the “Infrastructure Domain” is shown in
14 Figure 1, below. “User Equipment” refers to complete devices such as
15 cellular handsets, smartphones, tablets, or other end-user devices.
16 “Infrastructure” refers to the network (similar domain splits focused on user
17 equipment are discussed in greater detail below for 4G and 5G).
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
BOCKIUS LLP
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
ATIS, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group
17
Services and System Aspects; General Universal Mobile
18
19 Telecommunications System (UMTS) architecture (Release 14)",
20 ATIS.3GPP.23.101V1400 (March 2017) (Exhibit 1) at 6 ; see also 3GPP,
21 “General Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)

22 architecture,” TS 23.101 v14.0.0, available at
23
http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/23-series.htm (last accessed September
24
11, 2018).
25
26 b. Second, beyond defining the UE as including a SIM card, the UE domain is
27 not further partitioned, and the UE is the functional element used in 3GPP
28 standards descriptions. That is, if the 3GPP Cellular Standards intended to
BOCKIUS LLP
1 further parse the UE and specify the inclusion or operation of a particular

2 component like a modem chip, it knew how to but did not do so.
3 c. Third, 3GPP Cellular Standards are voluminous. In the parlance of 3GPP
4 Cellular Standards, a technical description in a specification is mandatory if
5 it uses the word “shall.” The 3GPP Cellular Standards include thousands of
6 instances stating that the “UE shall” meet some particular performance or
7 communication requirement. These same standards do not, however,
8 discuss—let alone provide—that a “modem chip” (or some equivalent term)
9 meet any particular performance or communication requirement. This is
10 consistent with the fact that the 3GPP Cellular Standards define the
11 requirements of a fully-network operational device like a UE instead of its
12 components.
13 d. Fourth, 3GPP Cellular Standards define and provide for testing to determine
14 conformance of devices with the standards’ requirements. These testing
15 specifications are at the device level (i.e., the entire UE), defining how an
16 individual UE must communicate with and operate in the network. These
17 testing specifications do not call for—let alone provide for—any testing of
18 modem chips.
19 II. 3GPP Architectural Domains
20 11. 3GPP defines an architecture that provides a common framework for the
21 development of 3GPP Cellular Standards.
22 12. Figure 1 of the “General Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)
23 architecture,” Exhibit 1 to this declaration, illustrates the architectural framework and identifies the
24 relationships between functional elements for 3G UMTS systems. Id.
25
26
27
28
BOCKIUS LLP
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 13. The figure above illustrates the “User Equipment Domain” and the “Infrastructure
19 Domain” as the two primary domains, where the Infrastructure Domain is further broken down into
20 the Access Network Domain and the Core Network Domain. 3GPP Cellular Standards define how
21 equipment operated by end-users in the User Equipment Domain interacts with supporting
22 infrastructure in the Infrastructure Domain. Generally, “User Equipment” or “UE” refers to devices
23 such as cellular handsets, smartphones, tablets, or other end-user devices. “Infrastructure” refers
24 to the network. The Access Network Domain refers to base stations and other equipment that
25 receive wireless signals from User Equipment, while the Core Network Domain refers to the
26 network that transports voice and data, generally over wired connections. Within the User
27 Equipment Domain, 3GPP standards occasionally describe the “USIM Domain” and the “Mobile
28 Equipment Domain” as sub-elements. USIM is an acronym for Universal Subscriber Identity

BOCKIUS LLP
1 Module, also commonly known as a SIM card, while Mobile Equipment refers to everything with
2 the UE besides the USIM.
3 14. 3GPP Cellular Standards do not dictate the implementation of these individual
4 functional elements, but are instead focused on the protocols for communications across the
5 “reference points” between the functional elements.
6 15. Akin to the description of 3G UMTS provided above, the functions of the whole
7 LTE system are based on the elements shown in Figure 4.2.1-1 of TS 23.401, “3rd Generation
8 Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; General Packet
9 Radio Service (GPRS) Enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
10 (E-UTRAN) Access,” provided below. ATIS, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
11 Specification Group Services and System Aspects; General Packet Radio Service (GPRS)
12 enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access
13 (Release 14)," ATIS.3GPP.23.401V1460 (December 2017) (Exhibit 2); see also 3GPP, “3rd
14 Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects;
15 General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio
16 Access Network (E-UTRAN) access (Release 14),” TS 23.401 v14.6.0, at 19 (December 2017),
17 available at http://www.3gpp.org/dynareport/TSG-WG--S2.htm?Itemid=445 (last accessed
18 September 13, 2018). Figure 4.2.1-1 is the non-roaming LTE architecture and illustrates the
19 framework and relationships between functional elements for 4G LTE systems.
20
21 Id. The 4G LTE standards specifications define the interfaces between pairs of these elements,
22 e.g., the relationship and protocols for communications between the UE and E-UTRAN, defined
23 by the LTE-Uu reference point.
24 16. While the LTE architecture shows more sub-divisions within the Access Network
25 (“E-UTRAN”) and Core Network than were shown above for 3G UMTS, the functional element
26 defined for end-user devices is still the UE.
27 17. Reliance on the UE as the primary functional element for end-user device
28 functionality and standards definitions remains true for 5G New Radio (5G-NR) as well, as shown
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1 below, where the UE remains the primary architectural element for the end-user.
2
18. This figure above is from “3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
3
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage
4
2 (Release 15),” attached as Exhibit 3. ATIS, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
5
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage
6
2 (Release 15)," ATIS.3GPP.23.501V1520 (June 2018) (Exhibit 3); see also 3GPP, “3rd
7
Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects;
8
System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage 2 (Release 15),” TS 23.501 v15.2.0, at 20 (June
9
2018), available at http://www.3gpp.org/dynareport/TSG-WG--S2.htm?Itemid=445 (last accessed
10
September 13, 2018).
11
19. As is shown by each of the figures above for 3G, 4G LTE, and 5G-NR, 3GPP
12
Cellular Standards subdivide system elements when required to define standardized functionality.
13
Nowhere, however, is a modem chip defined as a functional sub-element of the UE in 3GPP
14
Cellular Standards.
15
20. Another example of the 3GPP Cellular Standards’ system architecture defining the
16
UE as the primary functional element for end-users is in 3GPP’s System Architecture Working
17
Group’s (“SA2”) specifications regarding back-up telephone support when LTE services are not
18
available. Here, 2G, 3G, and 4G systems are shown where a UE may “fall-back” on legacy
19
networks when LTE connectivity is not available.
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28 ATIS, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System
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1 Aspects; Circuit Switched (CS) fallback in Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 2 (Release 14),"
2 ATIS.3GPP.23.272V1420 (December 2017) (Exhibit 4); see also 3GPP, “3rd Generation
3 Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Circuit Switched
4 (CS) fallback in Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 2 (Release 14),” TS 23.272, v14.2.0, at 11
5 (December 2017), available at http://www.3gpp.org/dynareport/TSG-WG--S2.htm?Itemid=445
6 (last accessed September 13, 2018). This illustrates that the UE has been the universal functional
7 element for cellular system design across multiple generations of cellular standards. Again, nothing
8 in this architecture mentions the modem chip.
9 III. 3GPP Cellular Standard Requirements Specify that the “UE Shall”
10 21. Consistent with SA2’s architectural definition, 3GPP working groups that develop
11 technical specifications set forth functional and performance requirements for these same
12 functional domains, including thousands of “UE shall” requirements instead of the “modem chip
13 shall” or the like.
14 22. For example, TS 25.331 defines the WCDMA Radio Resource Control (RRC)
15 protocol and relevant behaviors for communication between the mobile device (UE) and the UMTS
16 base stations (Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network) (NodeB). ATIS, "3rd Generation
17 Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; Radio Resource
18 Control (RRC); Protocol specification (Release 14)," ATIS.3GPP.25.331V1450 (December 2017)
19 (Exhibit 5); see also 3GPP, “3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group
20 Radio Access Network; Radio Resource Control (RRC); Protocol specification (Release 14),”
21 TS 25.331 v14.5.0, at 146 (December 2017), available at http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/25-
22 series.htm. The RRC provides various functions for establishing and maintaining connections
23 between the UE and the NodeB/UTRAN. In this 3GPP specification, the specification states over
24 1,500 times the “UE shall” meet some particular requirement. See id. Noticeably, it never once
25 states that the “modem chip shall” meet any particular requirement. See id. This is because these
26 specifications are intended to define—and are necessarily written from—the perspective of a
27 complete end-user device. See id.
28 23. TS 36.331 defines the LTE Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol and relevant
BOCKIUS LLP
1 behaviors for communication between the mobile device (UE) and the LTE base station (Evolved
2 Radio Access Network) (eNodeB). ATIS, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
3 Specification Group Radio Access Network; Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access
4 (E-UTRA); Radio Resource Control (RRC); Protocol specification (Release 14),"
5 ATIS.3GPP.36.331V1451 (January 2018) (Exhibit 6); see also 3GPP, “3rd Generation Partnership
6 Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; Evolved Universal Terrestrial
7 Radio Access (E-UTRA); Radio Resource Control (RRC); Protocol specification (Release 14),”
8 TS 36.331 v14.5.1, at 62-63 (January 2018), available at http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/36-
9 series.htm. The RRC provides various functions for establishing and maintaining connections
10 between the UE and the eNodeB. See id. Over 350 times, this specification expressly sets forth
11 “UE shall” requirements, while not including any “modem chip shall” requirements. See id. This
12 is because the requirements of these specifications are intended to define—and are necessarily
13 written from the perspective of—a complete end user device. See id.
14 24. TS 24.301 defines the LTE non-access stratum (NAS) functional layer, which is
15 used to manage the establishment of communication sessions and for maintaining continuous
16 communications with mobile user equipment. ATIS, "3rd Generation Partnership Project;
17 Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Non-Access Stratum (NAS) protocol
18 for Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 3 (Release 14)," ATIS.3GPP.24.301V1460 (December
19 2017) (Exhibit 7); see also 3GPP, “3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification
20 Group Core Network and Terminals; Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for Evolved Packet
21 System (EPS); Stage 3 (Release 9),” TS 24.301 v14.6.0 (December 2017), available at
22 http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/24-series.htm. Over 1,250 times, this specification expressly
23 sets forth “UE shall” requirements, while not including any “modem chip shall” requirements. See
24 id. Again, a modem chip by itself could not meet the requirements of these specifications directed
25 towards UE behavior. See id.
26 25. The following excerpts show a few examples of how the 3GPP standards
27 specifications actually define the UE behavior, as opposed to cellular chip behavior.
28
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1 26. For example, TS 25.331 (Exhibit 5) defines initial connection setup with a network.
2 The excerpt below shows transfer procedures defined in relation to the UE, not a modem chip.
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22 Id. at 146. As illustrated and defined, the required communications are between the UE and
23 network, and not to any components within the UE.
24 27. TS 24.301 (Exhibit 7) defines UE behavior during security procedures to
25 authenticate a UE. Notably, this document concerns the USIM functional element mentioned
26 previously, but makes no mention of a modem chip or other components within the UE. As shown
27 in the excerpt below, all functionality is defined in relation to the UE and USIM functional
28 elements.
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21 ATIS.3GPP.24.301V1460 (Exhibit 7) at 87-88; see also 3GPP TS 24.301 at 57-58.
22 28. TS 36.331 (Exhibit 6) defines UE behavior during paging procedures to establish or
23 maintain a communication link between a UE and a base station. As shown again in the excerpt
24 below, all functionality is defined in relation to the UE, not a modem chip.
25
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23 Id. at 62-63. As illustrated and defined, the required communications are between the UE and the
24 network, and not to any components within the UE.
25 IV. 3GPP UE Performance and Conformance Testing
26 29. 3GPP Cellular Standards specify performance and conformance testing of UEs to
27 certify that UEs comply with the standards in order to facilitate smooth interoperation in cellular
28 systems. This includes interoperation with infrastructure equipment and operation in a manner that
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1 does not materially impact the operation and performance of other UEs. These testing
2 specifications are at the device level (i.e., the entire handset), spelling out the way that an individual
3 UE communicates with the network. Such standards-based procedures never deal with modem
4 chips, and there are no 3GPP standards for performance or conformance testing requirements of
5 modem chips.
6 30. After performance and functional objectives are set, substantial systems engineering
7 efforts are required to develop standardized technical specifications meeting objectives that define
8 the entire system. The technical specifications define the interfaces among the entities in the system
9 (e.g., the air interface between the base station and UE), and specify how each UE must operate
10 within the system to enable the system as a whole to meet these objectives that allow many users
11 to simultaneously enjoy the benefits of the wireless technology.
12 31. The goal of conformance testing is to ensure a minimum level of system
13 performance, and this is specified in terms of UE performance as a whole as opposed to the
14 performance of its components. For the UE, conformance testing is categorized into three distinct
15 areas: (1) Radio Frequency, (2) Radio Resource Management, and (3) Signaling each of which is
16 testing performed on a device level rather than a component (e.g., modem chip) level.
17 32. More specifically, 3GPP’s Radio Access Network Working Group 5 (“RAN 5”) has
18 developed the following detailed conformance tests.1 None of these conformance tests are specific
19 to a modem chip but instead focus on complete UEs. Indeed, a modem chip could not, by itself,
20 meet any of these conformance tests.
21
22
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25
26
27 1
This table is excerpted from 3GPP, “3GPP Specifications for group: R5 (showing rapporteur),”
available at http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/TSG-WG--R5.htm?Itemid=425 (last accessed
28
September 13, 2018).
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1 TS 11.10 Mobile Station Conformity Specification

TS 11.10-1 Mobile station (MS) conformance specification; Part 1: Conformance specification
2
TS 11.10-2 Mobile station (MS) conformance specification; Part 2: Protocol Implementation
3
Conformance Statement (PICS) proforma specification
4
TS 11.10-3 Mobile Station (MS) conformance specification; Part 3: Layer3 (L3) Abstract Test
5
Suite (ATS)
6
TS 11.10dcs Mobile Station Conformity Specification (DCS 1800)
7 TS 11.40 GSM System Simulator specification
8 TS 11.40dcs DCS 1800 System Simulator conformity specification
9 TS 34.108 Common test environments for User Equipment (UE); Conformance testing
10 TS 34.114 User Equipment (UE) / Mobile Station (MS) Over The Air (OTA) antenna
11 performance; Conformance testing
12 TS 34.121 Terminal conformance specification, Radio transmission and reception (FDD)
13 TS 34.121-1 User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Radio transmission and

reception (FDD); Part 1: Conformance specification
14
TS 34.121-2 User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Radio transmission and
15
reception (FDD); Part 2: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS)
16
TS 34.122 Terminal conformance specification; Radio transmission and reception (TDD)
17
TS 34.123-1 User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 1: Protocol conformance
18 specification
19 TS 34.123-2 User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation
20 conformance statement (ICS) proforma specification
21 TS 34.123-3 User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 3: Abstract test suite (ATS)
22 TS 34.171 Terminal conformance specification; Assisted Global Positioning System (A-
23 GPS); Frequency Division Duplex (FDD)

TS 34.172 Terminal conformance specification; Assisted Global Navigation Satellite Systems
24
(A-GNSS); Frequency Division Duplex (FDD)
25
TS 34.229-1 Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation
26
Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE)
27 conformance specification; Part 1: Protocol conformance specification
28
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1 TS 34.229-2 Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE)
2
conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS)
3
specification
4
TS 34.229-3 Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation
5 Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE)
6 conformance specification; Part 3: Abstract test suite (ATS)
7 TS 34.229-4 Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation
8 Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE)
conformance specification; Part 4: Enabler for IP multimedia applications testing
9
TR 34.901 Test Time Optimisation based on statistical approaches; Statistical theory applied
10
and evaluation of statistical significance
11
TR 34.902 Derivation of test tolerances for multi-cell Radio Resource Management (RRM)
12
conformance tests
13
TR 34.943 Analysis of difference between FDD and 1.28 Mcps TDD and corresponding effect
14 on terminal conformance test in radio access stratum protocol aspects
15 TS 36.508 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core
16 (EPC); Common test environments for User Equipment (UE) conformance testing
17 TS 36.509 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core
(EPC); Special conformance testing functions for User Equipment (UE)
18
TS 36.521-1 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE)
19
conformance specification; Radio transmission and reception; Part 1: Conformance
20
testing
21
TS 36.521-2 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE)
22 conformance specification; Radio transmission and reception; Part 2:
23 Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS)
24 TS 36.521-3 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE)
25 conformance specification; Radio transmission and reception; Part 3: Radio
Resource Management (RRM) conformance testing
26
27
28
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1 TS 36.523-1 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core
(EPC); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 1: Protocol
2
conformance specification
3
TS 36.523-2 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core
4
(EPC); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation
5 Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma specification
6 TS 36.523-3 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core
7 (EPC); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 3: Test suites
8 TS 36.579-1 Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 1: Common test environment
9 TS 36.579-2 Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 2: Mission Critical Push To Talk
(MCPTT) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification
10
TS 36.579-3 Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 3: Mission Critical Push To Talk
11
(MCPTT) Server Application conformance specification
12
TS 36.579-4 Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 4: Test Applicability and
13
Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma specification
14
TS 36.579-5 Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 5: Abstract test suite (ATS)
15 TS 36.579-6 Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 6: Mission Critical Video
16 (MCVideo) User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification
17 TS 36.579-7 Mission Critical (MC) services over LTE; Part 7: Mission Critical Data (MCData)
18 User Equipment (UE) Protocol conformance specification
19 TR 36.903 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Universal
Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN); Derivation of test tolerances for
20
Radio Resource Management (RRM) conformance tests
21
TR 36.904 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Universal
22
Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN); Derivation of test tolerances for
23 User Equipment (UE) radio reception conformance tests
24 TR 36.905 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Universal
25 Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN); Derivation of test points for radio
26 transmission and reception conformance test cases
27
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1 TR 36.978 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) User Equipment (UE)
antenna test function definition for two-stage Multiple Input Multiple Output
2
(MIMO) Over The Air (OTA) test method
3
TS 37.544 Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA) and Evolved UTRA (E-UTRA); User
4
Equipment (UE) Over The Air (OTA) performance; Conformance testing
5
TS 37.571-1 Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA) and Evolved UTRA (E-UTRA) and
6 Evolved Packet Core (EPC); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification for
7 UE positioning; Part 1: Conformance test specification
8 TS 37.571-2 Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA) and Evolved UTRA (E-UTRA) and
UE positioning; Part 2: Protocol conformance
10
11
Evolved Packet Core (EPC); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification for
12
UE positioning; Part 3: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS)
13
15 UE positioning; Part 4: Test suites
16 TS 37.571-5 Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA) and Evolved UTRA (E-UTRA) and
UE positioning; Part 5: Test scenarios and assistance data
18
TR 37.901 User Equipment (UE) application layer data throughput performance
19
TS 38.508-1 5GS; User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 1: Common test
20
environment
21
TS 38.508-2 5GS; User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Common
22 Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma
23 TS 38.509 5GS; Special conformance testing functions for User Equipment (UE)
24 TS 38.521-1 NR; User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Radio transmission and
25 reception; Part 1: Range 1 Standalone
27 reception; Part 2: Range 2 Standalone
28
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reception; Part 3: Range 1 and Range 2 Interworking operation with other radios
2
TS 38.521-4 NR; User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Radio transmission and
3
reception; Part 4: Performance
4
TS 38.522 NR; User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Applicability of radio
5
transmission, radio reception and radio resource management test cases
6 TS 38.523-1 5GS; UE conformance specification; Part 1: Protocol
7 TS 38.523-2 5GS; UE conformance specification; Part 2: Applicability of protocol test cases
8 TS 38.523-3 5GS; User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 3: Protocol Test Suites
9 TS 38.533 NR; User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Radio Resource
10 Management (RRM)
11 TR 38.903 NR; Derivation of test tolerances and measurement uncertainty for User Equipment
(UE) conformance test cases
12
TR 38.905 NR; Derivation of test points for radio transmission and reception User Equipment
13
(UE) conformance test cases
14
TS 51.010-1 Mobile Station (MS) conformance specification; Part 1: Conformance specification
15
TS 51.010-2 Mobile Station (MS) conformance specification; Part 2: Protocol Implementation
16 Conformance Statement (PICS) proforma specification
17 TS 51.010-3 Mobile Station (MS) conformance specification; Part 3: Layer3 (L3) Abstract Test
18 Suite (ATS)
19 TS 51.010-5 Mobile Station (MS) conformance specification; Part 5: Inter-Radio-Access-
20 Technology (RAT) (GERAN / UTRAN) interaction Abstract Test Suite (ATS)
21 TS 51.010-7 Mobile Station (MS) conformance specification; Part 7: Location Services (LCS)
test scenarios and assistance data
22
23
33. These testing requirements are directed to the operation of complete UEs within a
24
complete cellular system.
25
34. For example, TS 36.508 defines “Common test environments for User Equipment
26
(UE) conformance testing,” which, as illustrated below, specifies the testing of a UE. ATIS, "3rd
27
Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; Evolved
28
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1 Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core (EPC); Common test
2 environments for User Equipment (UE) conformance testing (Release 14),"
3 ATIS.3GPP.36.508V1440 (December 2017) (Exhibit 8); see also 3GPP, “3rd Generation
4 Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; Evolved Universal
5 Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core (EPC); Common test environments
6 for User Equipment (UE) conformance testing (Release 14),” TS 36.508 v14.4.0, Annex
7 (informative): Connection Diagrams (December 2017), available at
8 http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/36-series.htm. There is no specification for testing a modem
9 chip component.
10
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18 Id.
19 35. For at least these reasons, it is incorrect to state that the 3GPP or ATIS cellular
20 communication standards are implemented by a modem chip. The 3GPP and ATIS standards, and
21 their features, define the UE and its interconnectivity with the cellular network, not further
22 subdivisions of the UE such as specific components like modem chips.
23 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
24 foregoing is true and correct.
25
26 Executed on this 24th day of September, 2018 in Barcelona, Spain.
27
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1 Lorenzo Casaccia
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Exhibit 1 - 8
Documents Sought to Be Sealed
633 Battery Street
Yonatan Even (pro hac vice) yeven@cravath.com
9 825 Eighth Avenue MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
New York, New York 10019-7475 Geoffrey T. Holtz (SBN 191370)
10 Telephone: (212) 474-1000 gholtz@morganlewis.com
Facsimile: (212) 474-3700 One Market, Spear Street Tower
11 San Francisco, CA 94105-1596
Attorneys for Defendant Telephone: (415) 442-1000
12 QUALCOMM INCORPORATED Facsimile: (415) 442-1001
13
14
16
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC
17
Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF DR. EDWARD G.
18 TIEDEMANN, JR. IN SUPPORT OF
vs. DEFENDANT QUALCOMM
19
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a Delaware INCORPORATED’S OPPOSITION TO
20 corporation, MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON QUALCOMM’S
21 Defendant. STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT
LICENSING COMMITMENTS
22
Date: October 18, 2018
23 Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept.: Courtroom 8, 4th Floor
24 Judge: Hon. Lucy H. Koh
25
26 Trial Date: January 4, 2019

27
28
BOCKIUS LLP Motion for Summary Judgment
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SAN FRANCISCO
1 DECLARATION OF DR. EDWARD G. TIEDEMANN, JR.

2 I, Dr. Edward G. Tiedemann, Jr., hereby declare as follows:
3 1. I am currently a Senior Vice President of Engineering of Qualcomm Technologies,
4 Inc. I have been employed by Qualcomm since 1988.
5 2. I submit this declaration in support of Qualcomm’s Opposition to Motion for Partial
6 Summary Judgment on Qualcomm’s Standard Essential Patent Licensing Commitments.
7 3. I received a Doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Electrical
8 Engineering and Computer Science in 1986, a Master’s degree from Purdue University in Electrical
9 Engineering in 1977, and a Bachelor of Science degree from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
10 State University (“Virginia Tech”) in Electrical Engineering in 1975.
11 4. I have led Qualcomm’s worldwide standardization and industry organization
12 activities since approximately 1991.
13 5. I have been involved with the Telecommunications Industry Association (“TIA”)
14 since early 1992. I was heavily involved in the design, development, and standardization of the
15 TIA/EIA/IS-95 CDMA system, also called cdmaOne. I also led Qualcomm’s, and much of the
16 industry’s, efforts in the design and development of the third-generation cdma2000 standards 1x,
17 published by TIA as TIA/EIA/IS-2000. I was also involved in 1xEV-DO, published by TIA as
18 TIA/EIA/IS-856, through my roles in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (“3GPP”).
19 Additionally, I led the offline industry group on Machine to Machine (“M2M”) convergence, which
20 resulted in oneM2M, the global standards initiative for Machine to Machine Communications and
21 the Internet of Things. I serve on the Board of Directors of the Open Mobile Alliance and the Open
22 Connectivity Foundation.
23 6. Over the years, I have chaired multiple groups involved in the standardization of
24 CDMA. Beginning in 1992, I chaired TR45.5.3.1, which was responsible for the physical layer of
25 CDMA. TR45.5.3.1 developed the physical layer for the TIA/EIA/IS-95, TIA/EIA/IS-95-A, and
26 TIA/EIA-95-B, and TIA/EIA/IS-2000 standards. When the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2
27 (“3GPP2”) was founded in 1999, I began chairing Working Group 3 of the Technical Specification
28 Group for the air interface, TSG-C, which had responsibility for the physical layer covering both
BOCKIUS LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 1 Motion for Summary Judgment
1 TIA/EIA/IS-2000 and TIA/EIA/IS-856. In December 2009, I began chairing 3GPP2 TSG-C, which
2 had responsibility for all aspects of the CDMA air interface. When TSG-A and TSG-C merged at
3 the beginning of 2013, I began chairing 3GPP2 TSG-AC: Access Network & Air Interfaces.
4 7. In 2008, I received the 3G-CDMA Industry Achievement Award for Industry
5 Leadership from the CDMA Development Group (CDG) for my “long-running contribution to
6 CDMA development and standardization.” See CDG Press Releases, “2008 3G CDMA Industry
7 Achievement Awards Presented by the CDG in San Diego,” CDMA Development Group (Nov. 20,
8 2008), available at http://www.cdg.org/news/press/2008/Nov20_08.asp (last accessed September
9 17, 2018). In 2009, I received the Global IT Innovator and Leadership Award from Yonsei
10 University in Korea. In addition, I have received the 2010 Virginia Tech College of Engineering
11 Distinguished Alumni Service Award, and in 2014 became a member of the Virginia Tech
12 Academy of Engineering Excellence. I have received both the Purdue University College of
13 Engineering Distinguished Engineering Alumnus and the Purdue University Outstanding Electrical
14 and Computer Engineer Awards. I served as general chair of the IEEE Globecom 2015 Conference,
15 one of the IEEE Communications Society’s two flagship conferences.
16 I. Summary
17 8. I understand that the FTC argues that modem chips practice the
18 Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) standards for the CDMA family of wireless
19 standards, including cdmaOne, cdma2000 1x, and 1xEV-DO. As a technical matter, this is
20 incorrect because a modem chip cannot practice these standards.
21 9. The TIA published the original cdmaOne standard as IS-95, and additional versions
22 as IS-95-A and IS-95-B. The first version of the cdma2000 standard was published in August 1999
23 by the TIA in the United States in six parts under the titles TIA/EIA/IS-2000.1 through TIA/EIA/IS-
24 2000.6. 3GPP2 then took over the further development and maintenance of the CDMA family of
25 standards, so that all documents were first developed as 3GPP2 specifications and then published
26 as standards. For example, the “A” version, TIA/EIA/IS-2000-A, was first published by 3GPP2
27 and then transposed into a TIA standard in 2000. 3GPP2 also developed 1x- EV-DO, which was
28 published by TIA as the TIA/EIA/IS-856 standard. With a few minor exceptions, all specifications
BOCKIUS LLP
1 developed by 3GPP2 have been published by TIA as standards. I collectively refer to the
2 documents produced by TIA and 3GPP2 as the CDMA Cellular Standards.
3 10. 3GPP2 is a collaboration of Standard Development Organizations (“SDOs”), called
4 Organizational Partners, to bring high-quality mobile telecommunications to a worldwide mass
5 market by achieving the goals of increasing the speed and ease of wireless communications. Five
6 SDOs comprise the Organizational Partners of 3GPP2: ARIB – Association of Radio Industries
7 and Businesses (Japan), CCSA – China Communications Standards Association (China), TIA –
8 Telecommunications Industry Association (North America), TTA – Telecommunications
9 Technology Association (Korea), and TTC – Telecommunications Technology Committee
10 (Japan).
11 11. During most of the 2000s, 3GPP2 had four Technical Specification Groups
12 (“TSGs”) comprised of representatives from 3GPP2’s individual member companies: TSG-A
13 (Access Network), TSG-C (Air Interfaces), TSG-S (Systems Aspects), and TSG-X (Core
14 Network). At the beginning of 2013, these four TSGs merged to form two TSGs: TSG-AC (Access
15 Network & Air Interfaces) and TSG-SX (System Aspects & Core Network). Through the work of
16 the TSGs, 3GPP2 produces technical specifications. Each of the Organizational Partners then
17 transpose the 3GPP2 technical specifications into “standards.”
18 12. When adopting or transposing 3GPP2 specifications within their regions, the
19 Organizational Partner SDOs do not change any of the substantive text of the 3GPP2 specification.
20 Any modifications are made only to conform to specific local requirements. For this reason, I refer
21 to the CDMA Cellular Standards and documents in this declaration as adopted by TIA.
22 13. CDMA Cellular Standards have no notion of modem chips, and a modem chip does
23 not practice a CDMA Cellular Standard. In my years of participation in 3GPP2 and TIA activities
24 and supervising others participating in those activities, I have not been aware of any 3GPP2 project
25 proposals, Work Items, Technical Reports, or Technical Specifications for modem chips.
26 14. Instead, the CDMA Cellular Standards and the development efforts underlying these
27 standards address performance, interoperability, and communication protocols between the entities
28 that make-up the cellular system: an end-user device (called a “mobile station”); an access network
BOCKIUS LLP
1 consisting of a base station and several other elements that facilitate communications with the
2 mobile station; and a core network that maintains subscription information and manages
3 authorization and authentication of the mobile station, and transfers information sent/received by
4 the base station to a wired network, or—for communications to another mobile station—to the
5 access network servicing that mobile station.
6 15. CDMA Cellular Standards do not define how a mobile station is constructed, nor do
7 they even define the components of a mobile station. Instead, these standards provide mobile
8 station manufacturers broad discretion regarding how to construct a mobile station. For example,
9 TIA/EIA/IS-2000—the cdma2000 cellular communication standard for 3G that was produced in
10 3GPP2 and published as a standard by TIA in August 1999—defines and provides solutions to
11 technical problems at the level of the mobile station and base station.
12 16. More specifically, a modem chip does not practice CDMA Cellular Standards for at
13 least the following reasons, each explained in further detail below, with reference to CDMA
14 Cellular Standards:
15 a. First, the express purpose of the CDMA Cellular Standards is to define the
16 technical requirements for mobile stations. For example,
17 Telecommunications Industry Association, “Introduction to cdma2000
18 Spread Spectrum Systems” TIA/EIA/IS-2000.1-C, at 1-1 (May 2002)
19 (Exhibit 1) provides:
20
21
22
23
24
See also Telecommunications Industry Association, “Mobile Station-Base
25
Station Compatibility Standard for Dual-Mode Wideband Spread Spectrum
26
Cellular System,” TIA/EIA/IS-95-A, Preface, at i (May 1995) (Exhibit 2)
27
(“These technical requirements form a compatibility standard for cellular
28
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1 mobile telecommunications systems. They ensure that a mobile station can

2 obtain service in any cellular system manufactured according to this
3 standard. These requirements do not address the quality or reliability of that
4 service, nor do they cover equipment performance or measurement
5 procedures.”).
6 b. Second, CDMA Cellular Standards define interfaces among, and the
7 operation of, the major subsystems of the cellular system/network. The basic
8 subdivision is between mobile stations (also called “Access Terminals,” or
9 “ATs”) and infrastructure equipment, as exemplified in Figure 1.3-1 (below)
10 of Telecommunications Industry Association, “cdma2000 High Rate Packet
11 Data Air Interface Specification,” TIA-856-B-2[E], at 1-2 (July 2012)
12 (Exhibit 3) (also known as “cdma2000 1xEV-DO Revision B”). “Mobile
13 station” refers to a complete device such as a cellular handset, smartphone,
14 tablet, or other end-user device. I use the term “Infrastructure Equipment”
15 to refer to the network equipment such as base stations and the mobile
16 switching centers (similar splits between functional elements in a cellular
17 system showing a focus on mobile stations are discussed in greater detail
18 below for other CDMA Cellular Standards, including TIA/EIA/IS-95-A and
19 TIA/EIA/IS-2000).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 c. Third, the mobile station is the functional element used in CDMA standards
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1 descriptions. Beyond defining the mobile station as including a SIM card or

2 Terminal Equipment, the mobile station is not further partitioned. That is, if
3 the CDMA Cellular Standards intended to further parse the mobile station
4 and specify the inclusion or operation of a particular component like a
5 modem chip, they knew how to but did not do so.
6 d. Fourth, CDMA Cellular Standards are voluminous. In the parlance of
7 CDMA Cellular Standards, a technical description in a specification is
8 mandatory if it uses the word “shall.” The CDMA Cellular Standards
9 include thousands of instances stating that the “mobile station shall” meet
10 some particular performance or communication requirement. These same
11 standards do not, however, discuss—let alone provide—that a “modem
12 chip” (or some equivalent term) meet any particular performance or
13 communication requirement. This is consistent with the fact that the CDMA
14 Cellular Standards define the requirements of a fully network operational
15 device like a mobile station instead of its components.
16 e. Fifth, CDMA Cellular Standards define and provide for testing to determine
17 conformance of devices with the standards’ requirements. These testing
18 specifications are at the mobile station level, defining how an entire, discrete
19 mobile station must communicate with and operate in the network. The
20 testing specifications are about conformance and performance testing of the
21 mobile station. They do not call for—let alone provide descriptive
22 procedures for—testing of modem chips.
23 II. 3GPP2 Structural Elements and Requirements
24 17. The CDMA Cellular Standards cannot be practiced by a modem chip by itself. The
25 CDMA Cellular Standards do not specify the design or implementation of
26 components in modem chips. In fact, the standards do not address modem chips at
27 all. The CDMA Cellular Standards neither use the terms “chipset,” “baseband
28 processor,” or “modem chip,” nor do they define any such terms. Rather, the CDMA
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1 Cellular Standards refer to a “mobile station,” defined as “a station that

2 communicates with the base station.” See, e.g., Telecommunications Industry
3 Association, “Physical Layer Standard for cdma2000 Spread Spectrum Systems,”
4 TIA-2000.2-F-1[E], at 1-9 (July 2014) (Exhibit 4).
5 18. The CDMA Cellular Standards do not describe how a compliant mobile station is to
6 be constructed. Any design of the physical hardware of the mobile station is acceptable, provided
7 that the end product adheres to the communications protocols and constraints of the standards. This
8 is set forth in the stated purpose of the CDMA Cellular Standards:
9 The technical requirements contained in cdma2000 form a
10 compatibility standard for CDMA systems. They ensure that a
11 mobile station can obtain service in a system manufactured in
12 accordance with the cdma2000 standards. The requirements do not
13 address the quality or reliability of that service, nor do they cover
14 equipment performance or measurement procedures.
15 Compatibility, as used in connection with cdma2000, is understood
16 to mean: any cdma2000 mobile station is able to place and receive
17 calls in cdma2000 or IS-95 systems.
18 TIA/EIA/IS-2000.1-C (Exhibit 1) at 1-1; see also TIA/EIA/IS-95-A (Exhibit 2), Preface, at i; and
19 TIA-856-B-2[E] (Exhibit 3) at 1-2. Mobile station manufacturers specifically did not want to
20 discuss any partitioning of the mobile station during standards meetings as they did not want the
21 CDMA Cellular Standards to put any constraints on their implementations. Thus, the standards are
22 what are required for interoperability between the entire mobile station and the base station, and to
23 have acceptable performance of the entire mobile station.
24 19. That a mobile station would require more than a bare modem chip to practice the
25 CDMA Cellular Standards is illustrated by the following excerpts from the standards.
26 20. TIA/EIA/IS-95-A (Exhibit 2), titled “Mobile Station-Base Station Compatibility
27 Standard for Dual-Mode Wideband Spread Spectrum Cellular System,” defines cellular
28 connectivity between mobile stations and base stations. By its express terms, the standard defines
BOCKIUS LLP
1 mobile station requirements. For example, IS-95-A, Section 6 defines the “Requirements for
2 Mobile Station CDMA Operation,” and “describes the requirements for CDMA-analog dual-mode
3 mobile stations operating in the CDMA mode. A mobile station complying with these requirements
4 will be able to operate with CDMA base stations complying with this document.” Id. at ii.
5 21. TIA/EIA/IS-2000-F (Exhibit 4), titled “Physical Layer Standard for cdma2000
6 Spread Spectrum Systems,” defines cellular connectivity between mobile stations and base stations.
7 See TIA-2000.2-F-1[E] (Exhibit 4). For example, IS-2000.2-F-1[E] contains two primary sections:
8 (a) “Requirements for Mobile Station CDMA Operation,” and (b) “Requirements for Base Station
9 CDMA Operation.” The standard refers to the mobile station in the first section as follows: “This
10 section describes the physical layer requirements for mobile stations operating in the CDMA
11 mode.” See id. at xliii. This specification defines how a complete, discrete end-user device
12 communicates with a base station. For example, IS-2000.2-F-1[E] contains 344 “mobile station
13 shall” requirements, and never mentions a modem chip or otherwise defines the architecture or
14 subcomponents of a mobile station.
15 22. TIA-856 (Exhibit 3), titled “cdma2000 High Rate Packet Data Air Interface
16 Specification,” is part of the EV-DO family of cdma2000 standards, and explains in the introduction
17 that the EV-DO standards define protocols for access to the network, rather than defining the
18 implementation of mobile stations or sub-components, such as modem chips. In this section, the
19 mobile stations are referred to as “Access Terminals:”
20 These requirements ensure that a compliant access terminal can
21 obtain service through any access network conforming to this
22 standard. These requirements do not address the quality or
23 reliability of that service, nor do they cover equipment performance
24 or measurement procedures. . . . Compatibility, as used in
25 connection with this standard, is understood to mean: Any access
26 terminal can obtain service through any access network conforming
27 to this standard. Conversely, all access networks conforming to this
28 standard can service access terminals.
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1
TIA-856-B-2[E] (Exhibit 3) at 1-1.
2
23. This specification goes on to illustrate the “Architecture Reference Model” that
3
defines the system layout, where the Access Terminal is the basic building block for defining
4
functionality in the EV-DO family of standards:
5
10
11
12
13
14
15
Id. at 1-2.
16 24. TIA-856 (Exhibit 3) defines the “Access Terminal (AT)” as:
17 A device providing data connectivity to a user. An access terminal
18 may be connected to a computing device such as a laptop personal
19 computer or it may be a self-contained data device such as a personal
20 digital assistant. An access terminal is equivalent to a mobile station
21 in [TIA/EIA/IS-2000-2-A, Physical Layer Standard for cdma2000
22 Spread Spectrum Systems].
23 Id. at 1-12. There is no further partition of the Access Terminal into components such as a modem
24 chip.
25 25. TIA/EIA-637-B (Exhibit 5), titled “Short Message Services for Wideband Spread
26 Spectrum Systems,” defines cellular protocols for transmitting and receiving SMS messages (i.e.,
27 what are known colloquially as text messages). See Telecommunications Industry Association,
28
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1 “Short Message Services for Wideband Spread Spectrum Systems,” TIA/EIA-637-B (January
2 2002) (Exhibit 5). The standard begins:
3 Id. at 1-1.
4 26. At the original writing of this text, in the early 1990s, it was envisioned that the
5
10
11
12 communication was between the mobile station and some user device in the network for entering
13 and receiving text messages. Today, most of us think of text messages as going between mobile
14 stations, though they go through the SMS message center (MC) to reach the receiving mobile
15 station.
16 27. As with the other standards in the CDMA Cellular Standards family, the
17 TIA/EIA-637-B definitions are centered on the mobile station, with references to the UIM (i.e., the
18 SIM card). The standard makes no reference to any other sub-part of the mobile station, such as a
19 modem chip. By contrast, the specification recites that the “mobile station shall…” perform various
20 functions 31 times.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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10
11
12
Id. at 1-7.
13
28. TIA-683-E (Exhibit 6), titled “Over-the-Air Service Provisioning of Mobile Stations
14
in Spread Spectrum Systems,” enables remotely updating mobile station software or settings. See
15
Telecommunications Industry Association, “Over-the-Air Service Provisioning of Mobile Stations
16
in Spread Spectrum Systems,” TIA-683-E-1[E] (May 2012) (Exhibit 6). The standard makes no
17
reference to any other sub-part of the mobile station, such as a modem chip. By contrast, the
18
specification recites that the “mobile station shall…” perform various functions 1,162 times. For
19
example, Section 2.2.3, titled “Mobile Station Procedures,” defines messaging requirements in
20
terms of the mobile station, as shown below:
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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10
11
12
13
14 Id. at 2-18.
15 29. TIA/EIA/IS-707-A (Exhibit 7), titled “Data Service Options for Wideband Spread
16 Spectrum Systems,” introduces the network model in TIA/EIA/IS-707-A.1 that defines the primary
17 components of the CDMA system described in the IS-707 standards:
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Telecommunications Industry Association, “Data Service Options for Wideband Spread
19
Spectrum Systems,” TIA/EIA/IS-707-A.1 at 2-1 (April 1999) (Exhibit 7). The standard also
20
states that:
21
22
23
24
25
26
Id. at 1-3.
27
28 30. Although the mobile station (“MS”) is illustrated as containing MT0 and MT2, this
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1 is not intended to convey that the mobile station comprises two separate devices. Rather, a MT0 is
2 a device such as a handset which has a keyboard and display. In the parlance of the standard, a
3 MT2 is a mobile communications device which has an interface (Rm) to an external keyboard and
4 display. The Rm interface is described in TIA/EIA/IS-707-A.3 as EIA/TIA-232-E, perhaps better
5 known as RS-232, and using the standard AT command set.
6 31. TIA/EIA/IS-707-A.1 (Exhibit 7) also provides a written description of each network
7 element:
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23 Id. at 2-1 and 2-2.

24 32. Notably, the standard provides that the “only network entity that is by definition a
25 physical device is the MS. Each of the others may be a physical device, it may form part of a
26 physical device, or it may be distributed over a number of physical devices.” Id. at 2-1. That is,
27 the standard points to a mobile station as the physical device in the network, showing how CDMA
28
BOCKIUS LLP
1 Cellular Standards are built around end-users’ physical mobile stations. Nowhere in
2 TIA/EIA/IS 707 does the standard mention a chip. During standards development, there was no
3 effort to further partition the end-user’s mobile station. Indeed, equipment manufacturers were
4 resistant to further partitioning, as they wanted to maintain their own design flexibility.
5 33. TIA/EIA-41-D (Exhibit 8), titled “Cellular Radiotelecommunications Intersystem
6 Operations,” also consistently defines the mobile station as the fundamental network element for
7 defining standardized functionality for the end-user. See Telecommunications Industry
8 Association, “Cellular Radiotelecommunications Intersystem Operations,” TIA/EIA-41-D
9 (December 1997) (Exhibit 8). For example, Chapter 5 defines the Network Reference Model, tying
10 all system network nodes to the mobile station being serviced:
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 Id. at 1-24.
22 34. Accordingly, the call flow diagrams of TIA/EIA-41-D (Exhibit 8) define
23 information flows in relation to the mobile station being serviced by these various network nodes,
24 as shown below in Figure 7. The standard contains no concept of communications to any
25 subcomponent within the mobile station, but rather designs communications to and from the mobile
26 station.
27
28
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10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17 Id. at 3-17.
18 III. 3GPP2 Mobile Station Performance and Conformance Testing
19 35. CDMA Cellular Standards include performance and conformance testing standards
20 for mobile stations which are used to verify that mobile stations comply with the standard and
21 perform adequately for smooth interoperation in cellular systems. This is testing interoperation
22 with base stations and operating in a manner that does not materially impact the operation and
23 performance of the network. The performance testing standards are at the device level (e.g., the
24 entire handset), and specify a minimum level of performance, and provide test configurations and
25 procedures to verify the performance. TIA-98-H-1[E] (Exhibit 9), titled “Recommended Minimum
26 Performance Standards for cdma2000 Spread Spectrum Mobile Stations” is the latest version of the
27 mobile station performance standards for IS-95 and cdma2000 1x. See Telecommunications
28
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1 Industry Association, “Recommended Minimum Performance Standards for cdma2000 Spread

2 Spectrum Mobile Stations,” TIA-98-H-1[E] (April 2014) (Exhibit 9). TIA-866-D-1[E] (Exhibit
3 10) is the latest version of the access terminal performance standard corresponding to TIA-856.
4 See Telecommunications Industry Association, “Recommended Minimum Performance Standards
5 for cdma2000 High Rate Packet Data Access Terminal,” TIA-866-D-1[E] (April 2014) (Exhibit
6 10). Similarly, the conformance testing standards are also at a device level and verify that an
7 individual mobile station properly implements the various protocols for communication with a base
8 station. Id. TIA-1035-B (Exhibit 11), titled “Signaling Conformance Test Specification for
9 cdma2000 Spread Spectrum Systems” is the latest version of the mobile station conformance
10 standards for IS-95 and cdma2000 1x. See Telecommunications Industry Association, “Signaling
11 Conformance Test Specification for cdma2000 Spread Spectrum Systems,” TIA-1035-B
12 (August 2014) (Exhibit 11). TIA-919-B (Exhibit 12), titled “Signaling Conformance Specification
13 for High Rate Packet Data Air Interface” is the latest version of the access terminal conformance
14 standard corresponding to TIA-856. See Telecommunications Industry Association, “Signaling
15 Conformance Specification for High Rate Packet Data Air Interface,” TIA/EIA-919-B (September
16 2011) (Exhibit 12). There are additional standards which test other aspects of the CDMA Cellular
17 Standards such as SMS, position location, and data services.
18 36. The performance and conformance testing specifications form the basis for the
19 formal CCF (CDMA Certification Forum) certification program, now part of the GCF (Global
20 Certification Forum).
21 37. None of the performance and conformance standards-based procedures deal with
22 modem chips, and there are no 3GPP2 specifications for conformance testing requirements of
23 modem chips. During the development of the CDMA standards, mobile station vendors were very
24 opposed to having any special interfaces in the mobile station for testing. As a result, no interfaces
25 beyond that to a UIM and to a TE, which were previously mentioned, were ever defined. A standard
26 for loopback, TIA-126-E (Exhibit 13), titled “Loopback Service Options (LSO) for cdma2000
27 Spread Spectrum Systems” was developed to facilitate such testing. See Telecommunications
28 Industry Association, “Loopback Service Options (LSO) for cdma2000 Spread Spectrum
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1 Systems,” TIA-126-E (December 2011) (Exhibit 13).

2 38. For completeness, I note that the CDMA Cellular Standards do recognize that the
3 antenna may be a separable element of the mobile station. Nevertheless, the performance
4 requirements include the antenna, such as parameters from transmit power given in terms of ERP
5 (Effective Radiated Power) or EIRP (Effective Isotropic Radiated Power)—which is as if the
6 antenna is present. The “separable antenna” allows direct input of RF signals into the mobile station
7 (MS) and measurement of the transmitter using a test base station—rather than having to do the
8 testing in an anechoic chamber or in the field.
9 39. The goal of performance testing is to ensure a minimum level of system
10 performance. Performance testing is specified in terms of mobile station performance as a whole,
11 as opposed to the performance of its components.
12 40. Most of 3GPP2’s detailed performance and conformance testing specifications were
13 developed by Working Group 4 of TSG-C. None of these conformance tests are specific to a
14 modem chip; instead, the tests focus on complete mobile stations or for the case of a specialized
15 aspect such as position location, the specific mobile station functionality related to position
16 location. Figure 6.12.1-1 illustrates the testing setup for GPS-based position location testing from
17 TIA-916-A, titled “Recommended Minimum Performance Standard for Mobile Stations with
18 Position Service,” where a GPS simulator has been added to send GPS satellite navigation signals
19 as well as the infrastructure PDE (Postion Determining Element) simulator, which calculate the
20 mobile station location. See Telecommunications Industry Association, “Recommended Minimum
21 Performance Standard for Mobile Stations with Position Service,” TIA-916-A (February 2012)
22 (Exhibit 14). Again, all testing is relative to the mobile station.
23
24
25
26
27
28
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10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Id. at 6-21.
18
41. The Test Specification for cdma2000, TIA-1035-B (Exhibit 11), titled “3GPP2
19
Signaling Conformance Test Specification for cdma2000 Spread Spectrum Systems,” makes no
20
reference to a modem chip. TIA-1035-B (Exhibit 11). Instead, it refers to a complete cellular
21
handset: “‘mobile station’ refers to a subscriber terminal, handset, PDA, wireless local loop unit,
22
or any other CDMA subscriber terminal that communicates with the base station at the air
23
interface.” TIA-1035-B at xv. The Test Specification for cdma2000 describes the testing objective
24
as follows: “The objective of these tests is to demonstrate mobile station or base station compliance
25
to over-the-air messaging and protocol requirements in the cdma2000 family of standards indicated
26
in the Traceability sections of each test case.” Id. Examples of compliance tests that a modem
27
chip, by itself, could not practice include the following:
28
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1 a. “Power on the mobile station” and “Verify that the mobile station does not
2 indicate CDMA service is available.” Id. ¶ 1.2.1.4.
3 b. “Make a mobile station-originated Call, and verify that the mobile station
4 uses the access parameters specified in Table 1.3.1.2.4-2.” Id. ¶ 1.3.1.2.4.
5 c. “Verify that the mobile station indicates called party busy, e.g. the mobile
6 station plays the busy tone in the earpiece.” Id. ¶ 2.3.1.4.
7 42. Annex A of TIA-1035-B (Exhibit 11) shows test configurations for the mobile
8 station, all of which show a complete mobile station, without any splitting of the mobile station
9 into components.
10 43. TIA-98-H-1[E] (Exhibit 9), titled “Recommended Minimum Performance
11 Standards for cdma2000 Spread Spectrum Mobile Stations” also illustrates that TIA-standards
12 compliance is determined in relation to the complete device. For example, the functional block
13 diagrams for test set-up are configured to simulate and measure compliance between a base station
14 and a “Mobile Station Under Test,” as shown below in Figure 6.5.1-1.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Id. at 6-19.
28
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1 44. TIA-820-D-2[E] (Exhibit 15), titled “Removable User Identity Module for Spread
2 Spectrum Systems,” defines functionality for the SIM card within a mobile station. See
3 Telecommunications Industry Association, “Removable User Identity Module for Spread Spectrum
4 Systems,” TIA-820-D-2[E] (January 2014) (Exhibit 15). This specification illustrates that the TIA
5 standards are capable of partitioning a mobile station when desired; however, the complete mobile
6 station remains the primary functional end-user element defined by the TIA cellular standards.
7 While this figure differentiates the UIM from the Mobile Equipment (“ME”) within the MS, the
8 nomenclature merely differentiates the UIM from everything else in the MS (collectively referred
9 to as the ME). There is no such partitioning for modem chips within mobile stations.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Id. at 4-4.
20
45. The exhibits I have cited and enclosed with this declaration are true and correct
21
copies of the TIA standards discussed herein. The 3GPP2 versions of these documents are also
22
available for download from the respective 3GPP2 webpages.
23
46. Thus, for at least the reasons identified in Paragraph 16 above and as detailed in the
24
examples from the CDMA Cellular Standards in subsequent paragraphs, it is incorrect to state that
25
the 3GPP2 or TIA cellular communication standards are practiced by a modem chip. The 3GPP2
26
and TIA standards define the mobile station and its interconnectivity with the cellular network, and
27
do not define features or functionalities on further subdivisions of the mobile station, such as
28
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Exhibits 1 - 15
Documents Sought to Be Sealed
Robert A. Van Nest - # 84065 Richard S. Taffet (pro hac vice)
Eugene M. Paige - # 202849 101 Park Avenue
Justina Sessions - # 270914 Telephone: (212) 309-6000
633 Battery Street
Telephone: 415 391 5400 Willard K. Tom (pro hac vice)
6 Facsimile: 415 397 7188 willard.tom@morganlewis.com
Telephone: (415) 442-1000
13
17 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Case No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC

18 Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF LOUIS M. LUPIN IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT
19 vs. QUALCOMM INC.’S OPPOSITION TO
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S
20 QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a Delaware MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
corporation, JUDGMENT
21
Defendant.
Time: 1:30 p.m.
24
25
26
27
28
1
1 I, Louis M. Lupin, do hereby declare and state as follows.
2 1. I respectfully submit this declaration in support of Qualcomm Incorporated’s
3 (“Qualcomm”) Opposition to the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Motion for Partial
4 Summary Judgment. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this declaration, and if
5 called upon as a witness I could and would testify competently.
6 2. I was employed by Qualcomm from 1995 until 2014. I joined Qualcomm’s Legal
7 Department as Senior Legal Counsel in February 1995. I was promoted to Vice President,
8 Proprietary Rights Counsel in 1996, and to Senior Vice President, Proprietary Rights Counsel in
9 1998. In September 2000, I became Senior Vice President, General Counsel of Qualcomm, and
10 was promoted to Executive Vice President, General Counsel in 2006. In August 2007, I stepped
11 down as General Counsel, but I continued as a Legal Consultant to Qualcomm until August 2014.
12 Prior to being employed by Qualcomm, I was a partner at Cooley, Godward, Castro, Huddleson
13 & Tatum (now Cooley LLP), practicing patent litigation. I was a member of the California Bar
14 from 1985 until I retired and voluntarily resigned on August 31, 2018.
15 3. From 1995 through 2007, I was either involved in or was the ultimate decision-
16 maker overseeing Qualcomm’s obligations under the policies of standards development
17 organizations (“SDOs”), including in connection with assurances and commitments made by
18 Qualcomm to SDOs to make licenses available for Qualcomm’s standard essential patents
19 (“SEPs”) pursuant to the terms of the SDO policies. The SDOs included the European
20 Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”), the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry
21 Solutions (“ATIS”), and the Telecommunications Industry Association (“TIA”). During my
22 employment by Qualcomm and still today, I was and continue to be familiar with both the terms
23 of the intellectual property rights (“IPR”) or patent policies of each of these SDOs, and
24 Qualcomm’s license assurances and commitments made under these IPR policies.
25 4. During my nearly 20 years at Qualcomm, it was always Qualcomm’s practice,
26 under the cellular SDO IPR or patent policies, and specifically the policies of ATIS, TIA, and
27 ETSI, to make licenses available to makers and sellers of end user equipment (e.g., handsets) or
28 infrastructure equipment (e.g., base stations). Qualcomm made it known to potential licensees,
1
DECLARATION OF LOUIS M. LUPIN
1292815.01
1 SDO participants, and others that this practice was consistent with Qualcomm’s understanding of
2 its obligations under the relevant SDO policies; that is, while nothing prevented a SEP holder to
3 license to whomever it wished, by making a license commitment to SDOs such as ETSI, ATIS
4 and TIA, the SEP holder was only committing to make licenses available at the end-user device
5 or infrastructure level.
6 5. I personally expressed Qualcomm’s understanding of the SDO IPR policies and of
7 our intent in making the corresponding licensing commitments to numerous licensees, potential
8 licensees, SDO members, and other companies who had made commitments to license in
9 accordance with the policies. I explained Qualcomm’s understanding that under cellular SDO
10 IPR or patent policies, and specifically the policies of ATIS, TIA, and ETSI, Qualcomm was
11 obligated to make licenses available only for the manufacture of, sale of, and other rights relating
12 to, end-user equipment (e.g., handsets) or infrastructure equipment (e.g., base stations)—and that
13 the IPR policies and licensing commitments did not obligate Qualcomm to grant such licenses for
14 components such as modem chips, transceiver chips, filters and antennae. Many of those
15 individuals expressed agreement with Qualcomm’s understanding. I do not recall a single
16 instance in which anyone with whom I discussed such matters stated that he or she believed that
17 an SDO IPR policy required an SEP holder to license anything other than rights relating to the
18 end-user and infrastructure equipment, which are the products defined by the cellular standards.
19 6. I have reviewed the FTC’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, including the
20 FTC’s position that the ATIS and TIA IPR policies require Qualcomm to offer licenses to its
21 cellular SEPs for the manufacture and sale of modem chips. The FTC’s interpretation is contrary
22 to the custom and practice in the cellular industry, including Qualcomm’s practice – both now
23 and during the entire time period in which I was employed by and consulting for Qualcomm –
24 which has been and continues to be to make licenses available for the manufacture and sale of
25 end-user and infrastructure equipment, and not components such as modem chips.
26 7. This industry custom and practice was well-established at the time Qualcomm the
27 submitted licensing assurances identified by the FTC in its moving memorandum and was an
28 important consideration in Qualcomm’s decisions to make such assurances. With respect
2
1292815.01
1 specifically to the letters of assurance I personally signed this was the case. These letters of
2 assurance are the correspondence with ATIS, which is Exhibit 24 to the FTC memorandum, and
3 the correspondence with TIA, which are Exhibits 37 and 38.
4 8. The same is true for commitments that Qualcomm made to ETSI under the ETSI
5 IPR policy. To appreciate the significance of this point, it is important to understand the global
6 stature of the ETSI policy. Based in part on the very large number of countries and regions that
7 have adopted standards developed by ETSI, including the early development and widespread
8 adoption of the 2G cellular standard known as “Global System for Mobile” or “GSM,” ETSI has
9 long been considered as having the leading IPR policy in the cellular industry. The GSM cellular
10 standard had a far wider reach than the 2G CDMA standard.
11 9. When work began on 3G standards, the industry recognized the need for global
12 consistency. As a result, it sought to utilize global partnerships to develop the technical standards
13 so that the standards would have global reach. Thus, 3GPP was created as a partnership of
14 several regional technical standards bodies who were denominated Organizational Partners,
15 which currently include ETSI (Europe), ARIB (Japan), CCSA (China), ATIS (USA), TTA
16 (Korea), TTC (Japan), and TSDSI (India). 3GPP focused its standardization efforts on WCDMA,
17 and more recently on the development of the LTE standard. 3GPP2 adopted a similar partnership
18 structure, and included ARIB, CCSA, TTA, TTC, and TIA as its Organizational Partners. 3GPP2
19 focused its standardization efforts on CDMA2000.
20 10. The goal of standards development through partnerships such as 3GPP and 3GPP2
21 was, and to my understanding continues to be, to allow for the implementation of common
22 cellular standards globally, which would support the availability and interoperability of
23 standardized products regardless of geographic boundary. These features would make possible
24 cellular interconnectivity and communications in every region of the world, thus enabling global
25 roaming by cellular subscribers and helping equipment manufacturers achieve greater economies
26 of scale and reduced costs to consumers. Critical to achieve these goals was not only technical
27 consistency between and among standards adopted by individual Organizational Partners, but also
28 a common understanding and implementation of IPR policies relating to licensing obligations.
3
1292815.01
1 Otherwise, the ability to enter into coherent worldwide licenses would be undermined because a
2 licensor such as Qualcomm would have no certainty that its identical licensing commitments
3 would not be subjected to conflicting interpretations in different jurisdictions under inconsistent
4 interpretations of regional SDOs’ IPR policies. This is why Qualcomm always understood and
5 interpreted the content of the licensing commitments it made to ETSI to be applicable in all other
6 regions where a 3GPP Organizational Partner transposed a 3GPP standard. This uniform and
7 global applicability was essential to the 3GPP and 3GPP2 standards, which were intended to have
8 a global reach, applying to the distribution and sale of products capable of working anywhere in
9 the world, and which might be made anywhere under the license granted by a SEP holder. My
10 colleagues and I were aware that the governance documents for 3GPP and 3GPP2 expressly
11 provided for a compatible, harmonized worldwide IPR regime as a necessary element for the
12 success of both 3GPP and 3GPP2.
13 11. In practice, once 3GPP or 3GPP2 developed a standard, the regional
14 Organizational Partners transposed the standard for their specific region. Thus, for example,
15 ATIS transposed 3GPP standards for the United States region, and ETSI transposed the same
16 3GPP standard for the European region. In transposing 3GPP or 3GPP2 standards, however, the
17 regional Organizational Partners did not make substantive changes to the specifications, so as to
18 preserve the global consistency of the standard and the ability of firms to implement worldwide
19 licensing and product development programs and strategies.
20 12. At the time 3GPP and 3GPP2 were formed, Qualcomm was very concerned about the
21 nature and scope of the IPR policies that would apply to the standards developed by those
22 organizations. Neither 3GPP nor 3GPP2 has its own IPR policy. Rather, they provide that the
23 IPR policies of the Organizational Partners will apply to the standards transposed by each
24 Organizational Partner in its specific region. Given that, Qualcomm wanted to ensure that the
25 IPR policies of the various Organizational Partners were consistent and would not have an effect
26 on Qualcomm’s established and future licensing programs.
27 13. In addition, Qualcomm sought to ensure that the policies would be balanced and
28 fair, such that the global expansion of cellular communications would not be impeded by
4
1292815.01
1 conflicting IPR policies. Accordingly, at the time 3GPP and 3GPP2 were formed, I spoke with
2 representatives of certain of the Organizational Partners and participants in those standards bodies
3 to discuss the need for consistent, compatible, balanced and fair IPR policies across all
4 Organizational Partners, so that Qualcomm’s licensing commitments would not operate
5 differently in different parts of the world.
6 14. Confirming this consistency was important to Qualcomm because when 3GPP2
7 was formed, Qualcomm had been broadly licensing its patents that were essential to TIA’s 2G
8 IS-95 standard and had begun licensing its patents that were essential to 3G standards.
9 Qualcomm wanted to make sure there would be no disruption of its existing licensing program.
10 3GPP2, once formed, began work on what, from a technical perspective, was the evolution of the
11 2G IS-95 standard to a next generation or 3G CDMA standard. It included new technologies to
12 improve, extend, and create new functionalities of the CDMA technologies underlying the IS-95
13 standard. Qualcomm’s licensing commitments to TIA for the 3GPP2 standard were made in the
14 context of its already established and well-known licensing program. If the TIA policy required
15 Qualcomm to make available licenses to manufacture and sell modem chips, which would differ
16 from the ETSI IPR policy, Qualcomm would never have made the licensing commitments it did
17 to TIA because it would have undermined Qualcomm’s ability to maintain a single, worldwide
18 licensing program. It was within my responsibilities to determine whether to make any such
19 license commitments.
20 15. Based in part on its understanding that the IPR policies of the 3GPP and 3GPP2
21 Organizational Partners were consistent, Qualcomm also made licensing commitments to the
22 3GPP Organizational Partners such as ETSI and ATIS for the 3GPP WCDMA standards. If the
23 ATIS policy required Qualcomm to make available licenses to manufacture and sell modem
24 chips, which would differ from the ETSI IPR policy, Qualcomm would never have made the
25 licensing commitments it did to ATIS because it would have undermined Qualcomm’s ability to
26 maintain a single, worldwide licensing program. It was within my responsibilities to determine
27 whether to make any such license commitments.
28 16. I am aware that TIA amended its IPR policy in 2005 to include language providing
5
1292815.01

18-09-24 Qualcomm Opposition To FTC Motion 4 Partial Summary Judgment

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18-09-24 Qualcomm Opposition To FTC Motion 4 Partial Summary Judgment

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Case 5:17-cv-00220-LHK Document 870 Filed 09/24/18 Page 1 of 31

14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

15 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

16 SAN JOSE DIVISION

17 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Case No. 17-cv-0220-LHK-NMC

3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii

4 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

12 City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,

17 Ericsson v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,

22 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,

27 Phoenix Tech. Ltd. v. VMware, Inc.,

1 Powerine Oil Co. v. Superior Court,

6 Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.,

11 Turner v. Met. Life Ins. Co.,

15 Cal. Civ. Code § 1644 ............................................................................................................... 13, 17

16 Cal. Civ. Code § 1649 ..................................................................................................................... 21

17 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1861 ........................................................................................................... 13

18 Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56......................................................................................................................... 18

21 that requires licenses to be made available to “applicants” or to “all applicants”, and it

4 advanced by the FTC.

20 implement “the standard”, as the FTC erroneously assumes.

25 conditions be offered to similarly situated licensees). The non-discrimination obligations do not

2 competes with Qualcomm in the modem chip business.

12 contrary to a decision of the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”)—an organization

25 directly counter to extensive and compelling evidence demonstrating, at minimum, numerous

26 issues of disputed fact. Partial summary judgment should be denied.

27 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

9 regarding the meaning of Qualcomm’s commitments” to ETSI. (Mot. at 3.)

10 A. The Relevant Commitments to ATIS and TIA

2 the purpose of implementing the standard.” (Id. at 8-10.)

15 B. The Content of the ATIS and TIA Standards

24 Decl. ¶¶ 12, 13.)

22 specify whether any required functions must be implemented in hardware or software.

23 (Tiedemann Decl. ¶ 18.)

24 As a representative example, the ATIS 3GPP TS 36.331 standard published by ATIS

2 typically play a role in communications between a UE and Infrastructure (e.g., an RF transmitter

3 and receiver or an antenna). (Casaccia Decl. ¶ 23.)

10 standards-specified functionality. (Tiedemann Decl. ¶¶ 19-34.) Thus, whereas a UE either

14 C. The ANSI Essential Requirements and Patent Policy

26 Importantly, ANSI’s Executive Standards Council (“ExSC”) has expressly determined

10 implementing the standard”. (Id. at 2.)

11 D. Industry Practice of Licensing Complete End-User Equipment, Not

26 Nokia is a member of both ATIS and TIA and has given

6 in cellular SEP licensing. (Id. at 25:15-17.)

17 InterDigital’s Ranae McElvaine testified regarding the company’s licensing policy:

11 devices, rather than modem chips, is ubiquitous industry practice.

12 E. The Need for Compatibility Among IPR Policies of Cellular SDOs.

20 compatible with one another:

21 “Organizational Partnership is open to any Standards Organization . . . which

8 IPR Policy is “fundamentally similar” to ETSI’s. (Ex. 33 ¶ 52 (Lasinski Report).)

24 187:25-190:14 (Huber Dep.).)

1 III. LEGAL STANDARD

2 A. Summary Judgment Must Be Denied When the Plain Language

15 nonmovant’s position,’ summary judgment is inappropriate.” Phoenix Tech. Ltd. v. VMware,

27 interpreting contractual language, “[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give

2 App. 4th 445, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).

19 agreement must be construed accordingly.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1861.

1 language supports—or at a minimum is susceptible to—the interpretation proposed by Qualcomm

9 evidence overwhelmingly contradicts the FTC’s proposed interpretation and, at a minimum,

12 proper interpretation of the ATIS or TIA IPR Policies.

27 applicants “that wish to ‘practice’ TIA standards”. (Id. at 18.)

10 products defined by the standard. (Above Part II.B.)

23 that implements relevant standards. (Lupin Decl. ¶ 4.)