SECTION 2

MONCADO VS. PEOPLE

Facts: Petitioner stands accused of treason before the people’s Court, the information against him having been filed
by Prosecutor Ladaw on February 28, 1946. Almost a year before, on April 4, 1945, at about 6:00 p.m., petitioner
was arrested by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army at his residence at 199-A San
Rafael St., Manila, without any warrant of arrest, and taken to the Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa, where he was
detained.

On April 11, 1945, petitioner's wife, who transferred to their house at 3 Rosario Drive, Quezon City, was approached
by several CIC officers, headed by Lt. Olves, and ordered to accompany them to the house at San Rafael to witness
the taking of documents and things belonging to petitioner. Upon hearing from the officers that they did not have
any search warrant for the purpose, she refused to go with them, but after the officers told her that with or without
her presence they would search the house at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado decide to accompany them. Upon arrival at
the house, Mrs. Moncado noticed that their belongings had been ransacked by American officers and that the trunks
which she had kept in the attic and in the garage when she left the house, had been ripped open and their contents
scattered on the floor. Lt. Olves informed Mrs. Moncado that they were going to take a bundle of documents and
things, which were separated from the rest of the scattered things, because they proved the guilt of her husband.
Mrs. Moncado protested in vain. No receipt was issued to her. Subsequently, after making an inventory of their
belongings at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado found the important documents and correspondence missing.

Issue: Whether or not illegally seized evidence is admissible in court.

Held: The Supreme Court, following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that evidence illegally obtained is not
necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence in such case, the evidence admitted,
without prejudice to any criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it. In other words,
the admissibility of the evidence is not effected by the illegality of the means by which it was acquired.

The evidence illegally seized is still admissible as long as it is not excluded by the rules of court, on the theory that
the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely because “the constable has been blundered”.
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SECTION 2
STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO

Facts: Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations
of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to
above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and
the Rules of Court for being general warrants. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority
of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices
of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.
Held: No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted
to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations,
to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them
in their individual capacity.
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SECTION 4
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS. COMELEC

Facts: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH
Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject
of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted
for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against
it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped
in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression.

Held: Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return
for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech. Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

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SECTION 22
NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Nuñez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused
before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuñez that PD1486, as
amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims
that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuñez’s right to equal protection, because – appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of
law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari
to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter
of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.

Issue: Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process, equal protection and ex post facto clauses of the
Constituiton, thus decraling it unconstitutional.

Held: No, The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be adjudged. Those
adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the
spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If
law be looked upon in term of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (5) deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the
claim of petitioner.

This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal
procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of
a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.” This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make
a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1606. Petition dismissed. No costs.
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SECTION 22
PEOPLE VS. FERRER

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of
1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for
being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt
and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5
others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine
Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of
opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the
guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt
by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political
party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of
the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing
of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2
witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of
membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its
valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issue: Whether or not the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti-Subversion Law is a bill of attainder.

Held: No. Article 3 Section 22 of the Constitution provides:

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

A Bill of Attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bill of attainders serves to implement
the principle of separation of powers by confining the legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative
usurpation of the judicial function.

The singling our of a definite class, the imposition of burden on it, and a legislative intent to stigmatise statute as a
bill of attainder.

1. The Supreme Court held that when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
the Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simple
to declare the party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the
prohibition.

The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional purposes. In fact the act applies not only
to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any organisation having the same purpose and their
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.