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VILLAVICENCIO VS.

LUKBAN

The mayor of the City of Manila ordered the closure of prostitution houses found in his municipality and had the prostituted women
deported to Davao.

Facts:

1. Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the City of Manila, “ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been
permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.” From October 16 to 25, 1918, 170 women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. During said period, the city authorities, with some arrangements
with the Bureau of Labor, planned to send the women to Davao as laborers.
2. On the midnight of October 25, the police and Lukban went to the houses and hustled the 170 prostituted women into
patrol wagons and placed them aboard the steams Corregidor and Negros. The women were given no opportunity to
collect their belongings, and were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation and had no knowledge that they were being sent to Mindanao. Moreover, the women were not asked
whether they wanted to leave Manila and live in Davao.
3. The vessels reached Davao on October 29. The women were received by the provincial governor, Francisco Sales and
by haciendero Feliciano Yñigo.

Ruling:

1. Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of Congress. The Governor-
General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine
Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment
by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute.
2. But one can search in vain for any law, order or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the City of
Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands – and these women despite their being
in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens – to change domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary Philippine penal
law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence.
3. In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded
in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the US, who has often been said to exercise more
power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore,
has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers.

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RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

Acting through Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro directed the Manguines to
permanently settle in the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan. Rubi, one of the Manguines subject to said measure, and those living in
his Rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and were liable to be punished in accordance with
Section 2759 of Administrative Code.

Facts:

1. The provincial governor of Mindoro, Juan Morente, Jr., chose the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan as the place most
convenient for the Manguianes (Mangyanes) to live and permanently settle. It is 800 hectares of public land. The action
of the provincial governor is anchored on Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. Said provision states that
provincial governor of any province where non-Christian inhabitants may be found is authorized to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order. The site is to be selected by the provincial governor, to be approved by the provincial board and by the
Department Head.
2. The governor’s choice was approved by the provincial board on February 1, 1917, through Resolution No. 25, and
further by the Secretary of Interior 20 days later. Pursuant to this, the provincial governor issued executive order no. 2
on December 4, which directed all the Mangyans in the towns of Naujan and Pola, Mangyans east of the Baco River
including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi’s place in Calapan to permanently settle on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake not later than December 31, 1917. The executive order likewise stated that those Mangyans who refused
to comply were to be imprisoned for not more than 60 days upon conviction, in accordance with Section 2759,
Administrative Code.
3. Rubi and those living in his Rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao. They have
questioned Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917.
4. The Manguianes are very low in nature. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the
Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people and numbered approximately
15,000. They have shown no desire for community life and have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government.

Ruling:

1. Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently
with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes
the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator. Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free
to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by a lawful calling, among
others. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one’s employment, right to
labor, and the right of locomotion. In general, liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily
done by free men.
2. To hold Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 would leave people weak and defenseless. However,
considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its
rightful authority.
3. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that the due process of law has not been followed. To go back to the definition of due process of law and equal
protection of law, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods
of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
4. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does
not deny to him the equal protection of law. Said section is constitutional. Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned
or restrained of their liberty. Thus, habeas corpus cannot issue.

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LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH

Facts: Angel Lorenzo was a leper. He was confined in San Lazaro Hospital in Manila in conformity with the provisions of
Section 1058 of the Administrative Code, authorizing the segregation of lepers. Lorenzo filed petition alleging that his
confinement in said hospital was in violation of his constitutional rights.

Issue: WON he administrative code provision on confinement is violative of liberty of abode

Ruling: No. Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative body in the legitimate exercise of the police
power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It was place on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a
grave health problem. The methods provided for the control of leprosy plainly constitute due process of law.

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NISHIMURA EKIU VS. US

Facts: The petitioner arrived at the port of San Francisco on the steamship Belgic, from Yokohama, Japan, on May 7, 1891. William
H. Thornley, commissioner of immigration of the state of California, and claiming to act under instructions from and contract with
the secretary of the treasury of the United States, refused to allow her to land; and on May 13, 1891, in a 'report of alien
immigrants forbidden to land under the provisions of the act of congress approved August 3, 1882, at the port of San Francisco,
being passengers upon the steamer Belgic, Walker, master, which arrived May 7, 1891, from Yokohama,' made these statements
as to the petitioner: 'Sex, female; age, 25.' 'Passport states that she comes to San Francisco in company with her husband, which
is not a fact. She states that she has been married two years, and that her husband has been in the United States one year, but
she does not know his address. She has $22, and is to stop at some hotel until her husband calls for her.'

With this report Thornley sent a letter to the collector, stating that after a careful examination of the alien immigrants on board
the Belgic he was satisfied that the petitioner and five others were 'prohibited from landing by the existing immigration laws,' for
reasons specifically stated with regard to each; and that, pending the collector's final decision as to their right to land, he had
'placed them temporarily in the Methodist Chinese Mission, as the steamer was not a proper place to detain them, until the date
of sailing.' On the same day the collector wrote to Thornley, approving his action.

Thereafter, on the same day, this writ of habeas corpus was issued to Thornley, and he made the following return thereon: 'In
obedience to the within writ I hereby produce the body of Nishimura Ekiu, as within directed, and return that I hold her in my
custody by direction of the customs authorities of the port of San Francisco, Cal., under the provisions of the immigration act;
that, by an understanding between the United States attorney and the attorney for petitioner, said party will remain in the
custody of the Methodist Episcopal Japanese and Chiness Mission pending a final disposition of the writ.' The petitioner remained
at the mission-house until the final order of the circuit court, regarding petitioner’s right to land.

At the hearing before the commissioner of the circuit court, the petitioner offered to introduce evidence as to her right to land;
and contended that the act of 1891, if construed as vesting in the officers named therein exclusive authority to determine that
right, was in so far unconstitutional, as depriving her of her liberty without due process of law; and that by the constitution she
had a right to the writ of habeas corpus, which carried with it the right to a determination by the court as to the legality of her
detention, and therefore, necessarily, the right to inquire into the facts relating thereto.

The commissioner excluded the evidence offered as to the petitioner's right to land; and reported that the question of that right
had been tried and determined by a duly-constituted and competent tribunal having jurisdiction in the premises; that the decision
of Hatch, as inspector of immigration, was conclusive on the right of the petitioner to land, and could not be reviewed by the
court, but only by the commissioner of immigration and the secretary of the treasury; and that the petitioner was not unlawfully
restrained of her liberty.

On July 24, 1891, the circuit court confirmed its commissioner's report, and ordered 'that she be remanded by the marshal to the
custody from which she has been taken, to-wit, to the custody of J. L. Hatch, immigration inspector for the port of San Francisco,
to be dealt with as he may find that the law requires, upon either the present testimony before him, or that and such other as he
may deem proper to take.' The petitioner appealed to this court.

Issue: Whether or not Ekiu was unlawfully restrained of her liberty.

Held: No. An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an act of congress,
and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful.
And congress may, if it sees fit, as in the statutes in question in U. S. v. Jung Ah Lung, just cited, authorize the courts to investigate
and ascertain the facts on which the right to land depends. But, on the other hand, the final determination of those facts may be
in trusted by congress to executive officers; and in such a case, as in all others, in which a statute gives a discretionary power to
an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence
of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to re-examine or controvert the
sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.

It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile
or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in
opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive branches of the national government. As to
such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by congress, are due
process of law.

There could only be then unlawful restraint of liberty, when the person who ordered such restraint does not have the authority
to do so. In this case, the inspector of immigration was duly appointed and his decision against the petitioner's right to land in
the United States was within the authority conferred upon him by the act of 1981. No appeal having been taken to the
superintendent of immigration, that decision was final and conclusive; the petitioner is not unlawfully restrained of her liberty;
and the order of the circuit court is affirmed.

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ZEMEL VS. RUSK

Facts: After this country had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba and the Department of State had eliminated Cuba from the
area for which passports were not required, appellant applied to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba "to satisfy [his]
curiosity . . . and to make [him] a better informed citizen." His request was denied, and he filed suit in federal district court seeking
a judgment declaring that he was entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States to travel to Cuba and to have his
passport validated for that purpose, that the Secretary of State's travel restrictions were invalid, and that the Passport Act of
1926 and § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 were unconstitutional. In addition, he prayed that the Secretary
and the Attorney General he enjoined from interfering with such travel. A three-judge court granted the Secretary's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the action against the Attorney General.

Held:

1. Since the complaint launched a substantial constitutional attack upon two federal statutes and prayed that their operation be
enjoined, the three-judge court was properly convened. Pp. 5-7.

2. The Passport Act of 1926 grants authority to the Executive to refuse validation of passports for Cuban travel. Pp. 7-13.

(a) The consistent interpretation by the Department of State of its authority to impose area restrictions, both before and
after [p2] the 1926 enactment, must be given weight by the courts in construing the statute. Pp. 8-11.

(b) In 1952, Congress enacted legislation relating to passports, but, despite the many executive impositions of area restrictions,
it left untouched the broad rulemaking authority granted in the Passport Act of 1926. P. 12.

(c) This case, where the Secretary's refusal is based on foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens, is distinguished
from Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, where the passport denial was based on the applicant's political beliefs or associations. Pp. 12-
13.

3. The restriction on travel to Cuba does not abridge appellant's constitutional rights. Pp. 13-18.

(a) The fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be
inhibited. P. 14.

(b) The restriction here is justified by the weightiest considerations of national security. Pp. 14-15.

(c) The failure to validate appellant's passport results in an inhibition of action, and not a restriction of a First Amendment right.
The right to speak and publish does not carry with it an unrestrained right to gather information. Pp. 16-17.

(d) The Passport Act of 1926 contains sufficiently definite standards for action, especially since the area is that of foreign affairs,
where the Executive has broad authority. P. 17.

(e) The Passport Act of 1926 does not grant the Executive completely unrestricted freedom of action, as it authorizes only those
passport restrictions which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice. Pp. 17-18.

4. Adjudication of the reach and constitutionality of § 215(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as applied to travel
in violation of an area restriction must await a concrete factual situation. Pp. 18-20.

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YAP VS. CA

Facts: Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5 Million.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted
the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty
from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment
is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” He sought the
reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory
amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issue: Whether the condition imposed by the CA is violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Held: No. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section
6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above
provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which
is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer
look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform
the court in case he does so.
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MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

The Marcoses wanted to return to the Philippines three years after they had fled to Hawaii. President Corazon Aquino, however,
barred their return due to interests of safety and tranquillity and order of the State and society.

Facts:

1. The Marcoses, who fled to Hawaii in 1986, wanted to be return to the country. Thirteen days after the SC dismissed
the petition, then-President Marcos died on September 28, 1989.
2. In a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners on October 2, 1989, the petitioners contended that “to bar former
President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens
to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos
under the Constitution;” “the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country;” and “there is no basis for
barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.”

Ruling:

1. The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under
which the Court’s decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has
been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing
fears to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses.
2. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his/her oath of office, is to protect and
promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at
this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

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