8 (batch 3)

Valmonte VS CA
G.R. No 108538 January 22, 1996
Topic: Summons
Facts:

 Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident.

 Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are husband and wife. They
are both residents of USA, Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the
Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the Philippines
 Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals against
petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte before the RTC. The subject of
the action is a three-door apartment located in Paco, Manila
 The foregoing averments were made on the basis of a letter previously sent by petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte to private respondent's counsel in which, in regard to the partition
of the property in question, she referred private respondent's counsel to her husband as
the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent
 Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who at the
time, was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted the summons,
insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife, Lourdes
A. Valmonte, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her
behalf.
 Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
 Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private
respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a
special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent's motion
 The trial court, denied private respondent's motion to declare petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default.
 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition and declaring Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default.
Issue:

 W/N in light of the facts set forth above, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly
served with summons?
Ruling: No, there was no valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte

 it will be helpful to determine first the nature of the action filed against petitioners
Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte by private respondent, whether it is an
action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. This is because the rules on service of
summons embodied in Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or the other
of these actions.
 If the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not
essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons
may be served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, §17, which provides:

 §17. Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or
the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court,
be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a
reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which
the defendant must answer..

 Service of summons in the manner provided in §17 is not for the purpose of vesting it
with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so
that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that
property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect
his interest if he is so minded.
 Private respondent's action, which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the
nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of
affecting the defendant's interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment
against him
 As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines,
service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to
be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient
 Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte
was not done by means of any of the first two modes, which must be made outside the
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the
defendant resides.8 Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons on
Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, §17 and
certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider
the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in
default for her failure to file an answer
 Service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial
court as required also in Rule 14, §17. As provided in §19, such leave must be applied
 for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his
behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application
 Alwo there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not
given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than
sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action
against a resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a
nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is
fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days
from notice
 Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her attorney-in-fact.
Although she wrote private res- pondent's attorney that "all communications" intended
for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the latter's
address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred
therefrom.
15 (batch 3)
Sansio Philippines Vs. Mogol
GR.No. 177007 July 14, 2009

Topic: Summons

Facts:
 Petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation that is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling appliances and other related products
 Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages5 against respondent
spouses Mogol before the MeTC of Manila.
 Respondent spouses Mogol purchased from petitioner air-conditioning units and fans.
Respondent spouses Mogol made partial payments, but eventually defaulted despite
several demands made
 Petitioner prayed that respondent spouses Mogol be ordered to pay the former, jointly
and severally
 The process server of the MeTC of Manila served the summons6 and the copy of the
complaint on respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila.
Respondent spouses were in the said premises, as they were waiting for the scheduled
hearing of the criminal cases filed by petitioner against respondent Alicia Mogol for
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
 Upon being so informed of the summons and the complaint, respondent spouses Mogol
referred the same to their counsel, who was also present in the courtroom. The counsel
of respondent spouses Mogol took hold of the summons and the copy of the complaint
and read the same and pointed out to the process server that the summons and the
copy of the complaint should be served only at the address that was stated in both
documents. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol apparently gave back the
summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server and advised his clients
not to obtain a copy and sign for the same
 The process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on Service of Summons,
reflecting a reason that respondent refused to accept the summon.
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default. Petitioner averred that the
summons and the copy of the complaint were already validly served upon the
respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC, which they refused to accept
for no valid reason at all
 The MeTC declared the respondent in default, Respondent raised a petition for certiorari
with the RTC
 RTC concurred with the decision of the MeTC
 CA reverse the decision of the RTC
 On the complaint for the sum of Money, petitioner presented its evidence ex parte,
judgment is rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent spouses
Mogol, ordering the latter to pay the former jointly and severally by the MeTC, which was
confirmed to by the RTC
Issue:

 Whether or not the service of summons in the courtroom, before the hearing, [was] a
valid service of summons?
Ruling: Yes

 The Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of
respondent spouses Mogol, the process server presented the summons and the copy of
the complaint to respondent spouses at the courtroom of the MeTC, At the express
direction of his clients, the counsel took the summons and the copy of the complaint,
read the same, and thereby informed himself of the contents of the said documents.
Ineluctably, at that point, the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of
receiving the summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the
part of his clients, for the same was done with the latter’s behest and consent. Already
accomplished was the operative act of "handing" a copy of the summons to respondent
spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol
was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25. That being said, the
subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the
copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material
 Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require that the service of summons
on the defendant in person must be effected only at the latter’s residence as stated in
the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear that, whenever practicable,
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required
 As correctly held by the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, the service of the copy of the
summons and the complaint inside the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24 was
the most practicable act under the circumstances, and the process server need not wait
for respondent spouses Mogol to reach their given address
 Jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was validly acquired by
the MeTC, Branch 25 in this case. For their failure to file any responsive pleading to the
Complaint filed against them, in violation of the order of the said court as stated in the
summons, respondent spouses Mogol were correctly declared in default.
1 (batch 4)
Amigo Vs CA
GR No. 102833 February 9, 1996
Topic: Dismissal of an Action: Lack of jurisdiction over person
Facts:

 Petitioners Lolita Amigo and Estelita vda. de Salinas leased in 1961 from Mercedes
Inigo, a parcel of land, Petitioners constructed their houses on the lot. Mercedes Inigo
later sold and transferred her ownership of the land to Juan Bosquit and herein private
respondent Jesus Wee Eng
 Bosquit and Wee entered into a dee4 of exchange with the City Government of Davao,
The transaction was authorized and approved by the City Council of Davao, Bosquit and
Wee caused the preparation of plan by subdividing the property into 2 lots from which
two TCT was issued.
 Bosquit and Wee instituted an action for unlawful detainer against petitioners. After
almost seven years, the city court finally dismissed the action on the technicality that the
plaintiffs did not observe the required 15-day period from the sending of the letter of
demand before filing the action, the letter having been sent only twelve days before the
filing of the action.
 Bosquit sold his rights and interests over the two Lots to Wee, and the TCT was solely
issued to Wee.
 Private respondent, filed a complaint against petitioners in the CFI for recovery of the
real property in question, from which an answer was filed by the respondent.
 The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the respondent.
 CA dismissed the appeal for the failure of petitioners to file an appeal brief.
 private respondent moved for execution of the judgment, the lower court granted the
motion and ordered the issuance of the corresponding writ, from which the respondent
moved for a special order of demolition which the court granted
 Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action or the annulment of the trial court’s
decision as well as all orders and proceedings subsequent thereto, including the various
writs of execution and demolition. Petitioners contended that the judgment rendered by
the lower court was void for want of jurisdiction
 the Court of Appeals granted petitioners’ prayer for a temporary restraining order but ws
eventually was dismissed by the same court
Issue:

 Whether or not the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and their
person in the case at bench?
Ruling: Yes

 Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil action is acquired either by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons
 In this case, by their filing of an answer and later an amended answer, petitioners must
be deemed to have formally and effectively appeared before the lower court.
 A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in
whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While
the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to
deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person
who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or
plea or answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary.
 Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be invoked at any
stage of the proceedings (even on appeal), the issue of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, however, as has been so held lately in La Naval Drug Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, must be seasonably raised, and it can well be pleaded in a motion to
dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer
 Petitioners have allowed the issue of jurisdiction to pass unquestioned until the rendition
of the judgment. It is now too late in the day for petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the
lower court over their person.
8 (batch 4)
YAP V. CHUA
672 SCRA 411 (2012)

Topic: Dismissal of an action| Grounds | pendentia litis

Petitioner Jesse Yap filed a complaint against respondents Eliza Chua and Evelyn before RTC
Makati for the cancellation of several checks he drew against his BPI account
1. Yap alleged that he purchase several real properties through Te (real estate broker)
and as payment, delivered to her a number of checks. He stopped payment on the
checks and closed his account when Te failed to deliver the titles on the properties
2. Chua, on the other hand, averred that she released P9.14 million to Yap in exchange
for 2 postdated checks payable to her for P5 million each. Despite demands, Yap
failed to make good the checks he issued to Chua.
3. As such Chua filed with RTC General Santos a complaint for sum of money against
Yap. RTC General Santos held in favor of Chua
4. Chua filed a Motion to Dismiss before RTC Makati due to litis pendentia and forum
shopping on the reason that Yap failed to inform RTC Makati of the civil case filed in
General Santos and the pendency of his appeal in said case
5. RTC Makati denied the MTD on the ground that the relief prayed for in the two cases
are different from each other since the collection case in RTC General Santos is
different from the case before RTC Makati which seeks for the annulment of the
issued checks

ISSUE: WON there is litis pendentia in this case

Ruling: Yes. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying
principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than
once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is
founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of
controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be
avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons.

The requisites of litis pendentia are:

(a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions;
(b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

CAB: The first requisite of litis pendentia is present as there is identity of parties. The second
and third requisites are likewise present. Apart from the fact that the same factual
antecedents prompted the filing of the two cases, that Yap's defense in RTC General Santos
case constitutes his cause of action civil case filed before RTC Makati, necessarily implies
reliance on the same evidence for the resolution of both cases.

The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the
same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential
to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the
two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the
subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a
different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and
the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their
privies.

DOCTRINE: Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The requisites of
litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and the relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other
15 (batch 4)
INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY V. COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION
356 SCRA 367

Topic: Order denying motion to dismiss is interlucatory, hence proper remedy is to

appeal after a decision has been rendered.

FACTS:
CHED enjoined the petitioner Indiana Aerospace University (IAU) from using the word
"university" in its corporate name and ordering it to revert to its authorized name,
1. IUA then filed a complaint for damages against the CHED, alleging that the public's
confidence in it as an educational institution was undermined because of newspaper
publications by the CHED stating that petitioner had misrepresented itself as a
university.
2. RTC denied respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and declared CHED in default for its
failure to file an answer.
3. On certiorari, the CA granted CHED's Motion to Dismiss the complaint, grounded on
failure to state a cause of action.
4. IAU claimed that certiorari cannot prosper because respondent did not first file a
motion for reconsideration of the lower court's order; and that CHED should also have
filed a motion to set aside the default order

ISSUE: WON a certiorari is the proper remedy when a MTD is denied

HELD: No. An order denying a Motion to Dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy
in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not
intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a
grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to
relieve persons from arbitrary acts — acts which courts or judges have no power or authority
in law to perform It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by
the Court.

CAB: There was no grave abuse of discretion in the RTCs denial of the Motion to Dismiss. The
trial court stated in its Decision that petitioner was an educational institution, originally
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as the "Indiana School of
Aeronautics, Inc." That name was subsequently changed to "Indiana Aerospace University"
after the Department of Education, Culture and Sports had interposed no objection to such
change. CHED issued a formal Cease and Desist Order directing IAU to stop using the word
"university" in its corporate name. CHED also published an announcement in a local
newspaper in Cebu City, that there was no institution of learning by that name. Such acts,
according to the RTC undermined the public's confidence in petitioner as an educational
institution. This was a clear statement of a sufficient cause of action.

When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling
thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must pass
upon this issue based solely on such allegations, assuming them to be true. For it to do
otherwise would be a procedural error and a denial of plaintiff's right to due process.

DOCTRINE: An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in
such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended
to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse
of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
22 (batch 4)
DAEL V. SPOUSES BELTRAN
G.R. NO 156470 (2008)

Topic: Dismissal of an Action

FACTS:
Petitioner Frederick Dael filed an action for breach of contract and damages against Spouses
Beltran. He alleged that a purchased a parcel of land from Beltran. Spouses Beltran failed to
disclose that said property was previously mortgaged and subsequently foreclosed. He
argued that Beltran’s non-disclosure of the foreclosure constituted a breach of implied
warranties in a sale under Art 1547 NCC
1. Spouses Beltran filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner Dael had no
cause of action since the contract to sell stated that the vendee was Frederick
George Ghent Dael, not petitioner
2. As such, RTC ordered petitioner to clarify whether he and Frederick George Ghent
Dael were one and the same person. Instead, petitioner filed a Notice of Dismissal
3. RTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice

HELD: Yes. As to the propriety of dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, Sec 1, Rule 17
ROC provides:

Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary
judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the
dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except
that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim.

Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial court issue an order confirming such
dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and
could be accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through
motion subject to approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without
prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice. The trial court has no choice but to consider
the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of
right, regardless of the ground.

Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal
filed by petitioner and hence, the trial court correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on
the motion.
This argument is erroneous. Sec 1, Rule 17 does not encompass a Motion to Dismiss. The
provision specifically provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal before service of
the answer or a motion for summary judgment. Thus, upon the filing of the Notice of
Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents became moot and
academic and the trial court should have dismissed the case without prejudice based on the
Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would erroneously result in res
judicata 18 and imply that petitioner can no longer file a case against respondents without
giving him a chance to present evidence to prove otherwise.

DOCTRINE: When a Notice of Dismissal, following Rule 17 Sec 1 ROC, is filed by the plaintiff,
it is mandatory that the trial court issue an order confirming such dismissal and, unless
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished
by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval
by the court.