"

From: "The Structuralist-Mar;idst and Parsonsian 17

'I'heo r Le s of the State" by Erik O'l í.n Wright 18
and Luca'Perrone (unpublished manuscript) 1973
:J • .TIi2..§'??l1GTURALIST-MARXISl' AP:!'RO:\CH

deficiencias and recoupir,g the ~peciricity a~d scicntiric a1equa~/

In thí s 'P'J.rt of i:}:e rapar ve rlll e:"..t ensl'le1y dea1 'td.th the
oí an integral marxi~t theory oí society.
s~ru~tu~list-~arxist approach.

First (3.1.), we will present a critica1 exposition of the basic

th~oretlcal preuis~s oí the st~ucturalist-marxist school: i.e. thei=

critl.que of the h"geUan roots in J'larr.ist the0rJ, their conception 01'

3.1.1 Harxiet Comolex Totality ve. H,:gelian Simp12 '.!'otali.tz
totality a,¿ contradlctlon, Dnd th~ir ~eformulaticn of the infr~-

st ruct, ure-superst ruct.ure relationship. Pe rtí.cu Lar' consaderatí.on nil1

Tho íamous argument of the simple "inversion" oí t110 hcgel:l.a.-:. pri..-:.cip'iell
be giver, t.o the th,,(¡~:etical status of their idea of causalit:r, and
as the origi!l of marxist phil050Phy can be quicldy cte.ted:
some in].ti~l crlt:"cal reaarks wiIl be advanced ,
The whole hcgelian conception Ls regul.aí.ed hy thed:l.aleetic oí the
l'h",n (}.2.), He Hi11 consider the case of political po"er and
internal pri!·1.ciples oí each society, thati$, :l.;. Hegel's syst(!!f'. tolla
th& Capitalist Stat.e as a particular (Uregional fl ) application of tha
dialectic oí tha moment8 of the Idea.
gi:nsL"::.l theoretlcal mode.l,
explains material lire and concrete histOIY by a di~lactic of ccr--
ecácusneas (the peop.Le t s conscácusneae oí :ttfjelf¡ it.s ide~lf)u izl

Ml!.rx's termsj. 1'0:::' Harxj on the other hand , th!: t.,ateriú.l liro 01' n.en
'I'he theoretlc:al tl~!Ja~~ure oí' th6 s-:ruc'turalist-marxist ~chat)l is-
exp'l.aáns their hietory. 'l'heir conscáousness , theil.' ideology i are th€,¡;
the c~ssrtion of the radical oifferencc and incom~atibility betNeen
me:::'ely tila phenorcena (in the philosophical sense oí appearance I opposed
the hegoLí.an and the ne.rxí.an c ouc epte of t~ta.litJ and cont.radí.c tdon
to the real essence) of their material lire. tlhilo for Hegel tlle
(what in Leas philosophical and more sociological t.erms p.e rrsJ.ght call
politico-i.deologicd wal! the easence oí bhe economí,c (see tila Hegel:Lm
social sys t em , and conflict and changa).
p:dmacy oí the Spiritual-Political Society - the State and everyth::r¡¡;;
The reason tnr this a.:lt..t-hegelia'1. depart.ure, (a. ccnst.ezrt prel:!,m-
embodaed 1:1 i t -- en the Civil Society, or seciety oí needs}, ¡t':',
inary sta.tem~nt in every majar lolork of th& ~c.hool) 1s te be f'ound in
~ar'Á the econono,c ls the essence of the politico-ideolcgical; t\1e
tha widespread conception of ~arxist dia1actic as resulting írem a
politicel ar~ the ideological (the 51~erstructure5) hiJl therefo?c
simple "í.nve raí.on" of the hege Lí an system; in the theoretica.:~ defi-
be merely pure phenomena Di: the economí.c (the infra-struct1.lre) t;mch
ciencias broutiht in ma:::xism by such ar. hegeJ.1a.n root (historicism,
will be t-heir "truth".
sccnomism); ::.t.nd eventvally i.n t.he 'necE:ssi.ty for challenging these
f'IJT Hegel '13 "p=e principIe of consciousness, for the s:l.n!ple

internal pr:lncip].e !ihich he conccfved as tho principle of inte.llegibilit"

 19
20

In the ma.r;<ist case, it is no longer a question of del.'1ving tl1e

successlve momenta froc the Idea but from the Economy. The diale<:tlc
oí all the determjnationo oí a histocical people, !;e have
of hlstozy ls reduced to the dialectic generating the suecessive m~les
SUDStituted anotae]" "sinrl!~ciple, it5 opposite: Haterial
of produetion, that is, in the last analysis, the different prcductlo~
llfe, the eeonomy - a simple principle \1hieh in turn beeomea the aole prin-
techniques (the reonomist-mechanistic line of the Und Internatione1e
cipIe oí u.~i,er5aJ. inte11igibility oí all historical determination.
man:isl!l). More sophisticated man:ist authors, reacting against this
While the position oí the terms has changed (Hegel~5 phenomena are
positivistie lnterpretation of marY~st dialcetic ~~d its dcter.nínist1c
MérX'S easenee and ;ice versa), ths two coneeptiona Ghar~ nonetheless
consequences, shifLed the emphasis to a more subjeetive priLciple of
the same idea oí en orgnnic totality eon8isting oí a unique interna:
historical variatlonl class conscicusness. This "as eonceiv~d oU; i;he
pri:Jcipls and ita extenlalizations, in en ess~nee-phenomenon relation-
more or less adequate sYr.'lbolization oí the "human essenco" as "mbodied
ohip. All the phenomena of any ene epoque or Bociety are merely the
in the self-representation of a cIass , The unlty of a social fOrnll1.-
externalizations ("alienations") oí ene moment, oí the deval.opmenb oí the
tion and its institutions, then, resides in the nweltru1scha~.gn oí the
internal prineiple (Idea, or the Eeono~J) whieh is the eesenee ol
ideologically ruling cLaas , Likcldse, the decline and disorganiza.Uoll
t.hos e phenomena, manifesting itself in each and all oí them, and expr-essed
of a' social formation lffi.S understood in terms oí' the deeay 01' tbis
Qy €laeh and a11 oí them,
weltanschaung. (This tradition constitutes the historicist-humanist
The atrueturalist-marxists eall such a totality en "expressive" t~rpe
kind of marxism born in the '20s with the early writings oí Lukacs,
oí totality, aiming by thi3 deaágnatdon to underseore the íollowing:
Korsch, Gramsoi, and then continued in different ways by authors nuch
its apparent eomplexity eone€lala an essential simplieity, in the senoe t~~t
as Sartre, Garaudy, Hareuse and so fox;th.)l
the complex oí diverse phenomena (appearanee5) i5 reducible to a
In either case, tne conception of the social uhole has one simple
s~e and aimple easence , Thus, in Hegel'a analysea, íor instanee, the
principIe of unity and organization, to Hhich all historics.1 var'cl:'.tion
essenee oí'RoIte, pervading its whole histor'J and its manifold in:"ti-

tutions, ie the prineiple oí the nAbatraet Legal Peraonality¡" the

----.··-··ll
¡ :

l. Perhaps the most renowned. example of the anplicatlon of this

~:rspect;ve to politieal analysis i5 ¡'!areuse. since 1935 Hal:ouse lJ' '""' .,
eaaenee oí the modern world j cquálly pervaaíve , is "Subje ctivity"
~xplie;t~y admittea that the unity oí a social formation is the I<orld
concep"ion of the class whieh is ideologieally rulir~ in that for-
'""' J .
(Hegel, 1967). mation ~see Cult.ure and SodctI). Likewise, in Cne Dimensiona.l Nan,
the bes_c cha~ter of tcday's s~iety 1s explained by the absen~e ~f
l\:~ia:;'~~~~Oo1';fiJ~H,I~"Wo~~~~glf:r~. ~'\J'~- a prolet!U1.an class conw=r-e.. ,?~,..¡
Ase oU~ness -- e'~n ~n ~neÁ~ absence -- which define the crucial
chai:-acterlstics of a s oc í.a.l, systcu,
 21 22

can be reduceli. lfuether in the economí,e development or in the ideo- long ago given up "ita" po11ticaJ. revolutlon in exchange fer BiSlllatit's

logioal hegemony, it Ls always the ~ oontradiction betReen CapitaJ. Dúlltary- and bureaucratic protection and the superprofits of ·capltalist

and Labor that governs history. and eolonialist exploitation; in a Germany endowed, too, with a cnau-

~!a.rv--ism, accozdáng to the structuralist-ma..-rxist authors, breake vinist and renc+'ionary petty bourgecí.aí,e, Going back to our theorP.tical

once ~~d for alI wlth the·reductionism of this historicist or econo~ist

issuesl They forgot that, in fact, the economic quintessence of con-

tradiction 'fIas quite s1mpl: abstracto The real contradiction wa.s b~

problematic and ldth its ccncepi:.ion of the "simple unity" of an "originaJ.

essenes," and established complexity as 1ts prinoiple. "lo'here reality tween the economic suust.mctarre and its "cd.rcunsbances" ("phenomena").

is concemed," Louis Althusser clairns, "ve are never deallng with the Such a contradlctíon was only discernible, ident1fia.ble and manipula.ble

through and in those cí.rounstances,

pure existence of simplicity, bc it assenoe or categorf, but ldth the
In eonclusicn, states Althusser, the Capital-T~bor contradictlon
~(istence of 'concretes,' oi oomplex and structured beings and pro-

cesses" (19691197). He fu-~her on specifies that the circumstanccs ls never simple, but always detennined by the f'crms and c1l."e1lll1stll.1lces

and pheriomena in terms of ,r.1i.ch the supposedly pure essence develops in lIhich it is exercised. It is specified by the forms oí the super-

are as i~~port.a.l·lt as t.heir essence, Lnstiead cf a 6.C1:.ive-simple-essence/ strueture ldth their specí.t'Lc impa.ct (State, dominant iueology, rellgion,

passive-multiple-phenomena schema, rnar;<1sm establishes the recognition po11tioal erganizations, etc.), by the internal and external historieaJ.

oí the "gí.venneas" of the conp'Lex et.ruct.irre of t>:ny concrete ob ject , In situation (national past , international competition, etc.) and so fcr'dl,

particular, the superstructures OIe ~ot the mere phenomena oí the This is .nat the structuralist-n:arxists mean .nen they state that the

"cssent.í.a'L" economic structure, t.'1ey are its condition of exí.stence, appa.rently simple contradicticn ls alHays oyerdetermlned (sUrdetermln~e)1

Nissing this point means conde"mL~g m~Áism to theoretice1 inadequacy, It results from the uneven eombination of different faetors ("lnst.'1!\ces"),

For example, the German Socialdemocrats at the end of the 19th each one ll'ith its osn relative aut.onomy and effectivity, instead of

Century imagined that they c cuId shortly be promoted te socialist tri- one "essential" instance (economy) and its tacit identity Hith the other

Q~ph by virtue of belenging to the mcst powe~~l capitalist State,then instunces (í.e. the ecollomy as tohe "cssenee" or the "t:roth of" the

undergoing rapid ecenemie growth, just as they 'fIere experiencing rapid political, the ídeological, etc.).

electoral gro\fth. They obviously saw hlstery p:::ogressing ;dth the It viII sti11 be possibIe to observe, in sueh complex contradietion,

greatest economic development, Rith Hs contradietion zeduced to the the "dourí.nance" of one aapect, over the othera (i.e. the dominant ~le of

purest fonn - the contradleticn bet.veen Capital and Labor.. So i:hey one instance ovar the others), but this instance ldll not be necea-

fo:..;;ot that all this >las taklng place L~ a. Germany armed lIith a powe:r- sarlly the econcmy, or any other fixed principIe. Thus, Mane hi'1Jself'

ful State machine, in a Gennany endowed .'ith a boure;eoisie 'fIhich had in his analysis on the pre-capitaJ.ist formations points out that, in

the feudal mode of' production, it is the ideologr - in its religious
fonn - that holds a "dosrínant," functlon; like¡dse the asian ncde of
product on exhibits the dcamant functien of the pol1tical instance
í
(i.e. the political membership of the individual in the community and
its heritago rights over tho land are the precondition for any economic
actlvity). An analogous domí.nance of the political over the economic
could easl1y be demonstrated in more recent formatlons, such.!l.S mono-
polistic state capitalism or othor interventionist forms of the capi-
talist state.
jihat tho structural1st-mar.--ists seem to advance is t.hus o. multi-
faceted conception of historical causatí.on instead of the monistic con-
cepti on that sine e Plakhan ov has often been aasccí.at.ed with ma....-xist
theory of society.
3.1.2. The Dom1nant Role and the Detemina."lt in the tast Instance
The thecretical problem that the st:::uctura1ist-m~ist.authorshave
·to solva at this point is ho" te reconcile their more reallstic fermula-
tion of a plu:ral1ty of instances as constituting the social "hole and
detormining social changa, with ~he theoretic31 dete~nacy previded q¡
the mandan claim of the. economy as the deter.ninant prineiple. Is the
autonomy a."ld spccific effectivity of the non-economie, sllperstructural
instances going to replace hlstodeal materiallsm by a sort of nethcdo-
logical pluralism?
UO fo The autonc!!lj" Qf' the superstr..lctures -- the structuralist-
1l>arxists argue -- is not absolute, and thelr specifie impact daes not
eliltinate the primacy of tlle econcmy ;¡hich, following Engel 's famous
letter to Bloch, is still determinant "in tho ll'.st instance. p2 To
dispel the apparerrt paradox oí an econoey \olhich ls determinant in the
last instance, but not necessarlly alliaYs "domnant," deterd.l'.atlon il'l
the last instance 15 defined as folloliSl The economy determines for
the non-economc elemerrts their respective degrees of autonomyfdepen-
dence in relation to itself and to one another, and thus theirdifl'e:t'-
elltial degrees of specific impact. Economy can detenaíne itself as
dominant or non-dominant at any particular time, and in the lattor case
it determines llhich of the other eleroents ls to be dominante Althllsser
(1969) expresses this detormination as follows I
It is economism (meehanism) and not the true
Marxist tradition that sets up the hicrarchy of
instances once and for all, assigns each its
essence and role and defines tlle universal mean-
ing of their relations; it is economism that
identifies roles a."ld actore eternally, not rP-a-
lizing tha.t the nccessit.y of' the process lies
in an exchange of roles 'aocordin" t.o cí.rcua-
stances.' It is ec~nomism that identifies
etemally Íi1 advance the determinant-contra-
di~tion-in-the-last-instance;ó.th tho rolo of
the dominant eontradiction, which fcr evér as-
similates such and such an 'aspect' (forees of
production, economy, practice) to the principal
role, and such ando such anotner 'aspect It (:re-
lat.ions of production, politics, ideology,
theor,¡) to the sec ondary ~ -- whereas in
2. This lattor is reprinted in Marx end Engles l Selected liorks,
v ; Ir, pp.!H38-490 (Nosco", Foreign Languages Publishing House,1962).
The relevant pasaage readsl "Aceording to the material1st concetrcñ.on
of histor,¡, the ultimatelv dete:rmin1ng elementin histor! 1s the- pro-
duetion and reproduction of real Lí.f'e , More than this neither!'.a.r..{
no I have ever usserted. Honce if somebody twists ,this into sdying
that theeconomic element is the only determining one, he transfonns
that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phr-áSe. The
economie situation is the basis, but the various elements of thc
structure ... also exereise their influence unon the couree of the his-
torieal struggles and in many cases prepond~rate in determining their
forro, ti .
 25 26

essence or hege'Iáan principle (i.e. superstructures are not passive

real historJ d<;!termination in the last instance
by the econoay is exe:::cised pracisely 111 the "phenomena" oí the same "essence" -- economy).
permutations of the principal =ole between the
econo~y, politics, theorJ, etc. (p.213) It is difficult to find in the struoturalist-ma:ccist literature

a fomal definition of the positive concept of "structural causality"

beyond this double negation, and He .~ll return on the ambi~~ous status

!loll we knov hOR t!lis determination in the last Lnatance by the of the "sbrucbura'L causality" later in the papez-, From the woñcing

economy has to be understood, but we still need more specificatiorí as definitions and analytical use that they make of structural causation,

to the type of causality that Lí.nks the economic hase "determlnant in it seens legitimate to unde'rst.and it as a type of functi'lnal causation,:3

the last Inst.ance" t.o the ncn-econcní.c instances and their donünan t or where the general structure of the forees and relations of production

non-dcninant role. Consistently with their rejection of hegelianism and sets limits of functional compatibility and variation on the other in-

ec onorrí.sn, the structuralist-marxists claim a "nev" concept of US t l:UC- stancee, These instances in turn develop differentially according to

tUTal ca.u~alityU distinct both f'rom the ntra.'1s1ti~·e-linearu and "ex- the type and degree of "functional support" that a) 15 required by the

pressive" causal imageries tY""i'ical of pre-mazxí.st, phí.Losophy, The economic activity (in particular, in the capitalist for.;¡ation, the ex-

lineE.:!.' or t rans í.t.Lve type oí ca.usality, vhí.cn is found in many positi- traction of surplus value); and, b) they are able to provide.

vistic derivatives oí marxism, is ahLe to accourrt for the effect of Due to the theoretical importan'le of this point, let us consliler

one element on anothea., but not of the 1<hole en its part,a, On the one of the fev. places ¡;here a. structuralist-marxist a.uthor, ~l. Godelier

other hand the hegelian "expresaí.ve" causality, which accounts for the (1970, 1972), explicitely deals with the problem of the "causality" cf

determinatlon of its purts by the llhole, does that only by reducing ii; economy end the consequent infrastructure-superstructure relationship,

to a'l eesence of which they would be the phenomena, i.e. by simplifylng In the productd on prooess of the capitalist fonndion, Go..i.elier contenda,

the .hole. the relations of ~roduction between capitalist and worker, and the lat-

The concept oí structural causeJ.ity is intended to be distinct' tsr's necessHy to WOrK fo::: the first, seem largely independent oí

from bcth , From the first, because the structure is a cause present er , religious, familiar and even political tieso Every social structure

it'~~ent in its elements/effects, rather than exterior to them (i.e. (HO might say functional area) seens largely aubonomousj the econcmist

superstructures are not generated by a'l sJCcernal structure). From the can treat non-economic variables as exogenous variables, and look for

second, because aJ.though the struct.m.""e exif'.ts only in the totality of

these elements/effects aud thei~ relations, these elements are func- 3. Follm:ing Stinchcombe (1968: 80), by functional explanation Hell'.ean
one in which the conseouences of sorne behavio::: or social structures are
tionally different and 'lannot be reduced to a. ccmmon 1eibnitzian internal essential elcments of the causes oí that beha'lior or structure.

'i
 27
28

an "econoní.e ration:!.lity" in itse1:f. The co.rzespondence between In tM.s abstract example, the econom;Y"-Idnshil' correspondence appeaza

st ruct.urea seens nostly an "ext.ezna'l," one , no longer as an external relationship but, as an internal coexí.st.ence, and

But in an archaic society, 'o;e have a different situation. 'I'h':l yet .':l.thout confuslng the economíc relations anong kí.ns with thair reli-

aazxlst economist can easily distinguish, sayo tha productiva forees gí.eus, or sexual relations (i.o. "thare Ls a unity of f\mctions 1dW_n

(hunting, fishing, a..griculture and so 0:1) out cannot distinguish .~ the kinship relations Hhich do es not imply either their ic!e.'1tit:1' or tbeir
"I~olo."'''· rel,,~. ,,;:. p"",cluct'Oh. O.... "d le<t\".+, ho will d\"..H~utsh.¡,'l'\e'"
,,1.'1 the f'unc t Lorri.ng itself of the kínship relations. It 1s kinship ::0- conruaí.on, The anti-hegelian irrerlucibility of functions to one c=.. on

lations th30t detemine one's rights to Land and products, one's obllga- principIe excludes their identity but not their urü.ty"}, 1'0 the ext errt

tio.'1 to ¡;0~1t for others , to glve, to receí ve. Likell1se, they determine that in such socí.ety kinship fun-::tions as real relations of product cn, í

one t s aut-hority on tile others in political, religlous matters. In such ihe determ1nant r')l", of economy rather than contradicting the dominant

society, the kinship relations "dominateU the social life. role of klnship, 15 expressed therein.

HOH can kinship's dominant role and economy's determination 1.'1 th~ LikeHise, we can suppose that the-development of new conditicns of

1ast instance be unds.rst.ood in a mar.dst perspective? Such understanding production in arehaic societies medifies demography, requires new forms

~s 1opossl01e, urites Godelier, as long as econorny and kinship are con- of l!.uthority, engenders new re1ations of production. Ne can also suppose

sidered as infrastructure and superstructure. In an archaic society, that, beyond a certain limit (coinciding Hith what >le might call the

the kinship relations function ao relations of production as Hell as "neolit1c revolution" of the productive forees), the old kinship rela-

politica! re1aticns. There[0re, in Marx's te~s, kinship relations ar9 tions 11111 not be able to nanage these new f'unct.Lons , The kinsh1p rela~

here al: tne samo -time infrastructure and superstructure; and one can sus- tions from forms for tha deve10pment of the productive forees turn into

pect that the complexity of the kinship :rolations Hithin archaic socé.e- hí.ndrancea, The kinship relations Hill thus shift to a different, secon-

ties is related 1.0 the multiple fun~tiúns 1.0 be met in such type of da:ry role, xhereas nesr political and religious relations bearing nev

society. Also, one can suspect that the doml.'1ant role and the cC'mplex
faction of economic needs rests entirely 0.'1 conjuga! society and the
structure of the kinship relations in archaic societies is related,to the s~xual divis~on of labor Not 0.'111' are man and Homan differently sps-
c~alj.zed tecnnically, a."d hererore depend 0.'1 one another for the con-
general structure of the productive fo~es, i.e. 1.0 their 10H degree of :::truction of the things necessa:ry for daily tasks, but the:\, devote them-
selves to the production of different kinds oí food. A comnlete, ~~d
develo~~ent Hhich imposes group living ~~d cooperation amoáng individuals above all a regular diet thus depends 0.'1 that veritable 'pr;duction co-
operative,' tha household ...Particularly in primitive societies, "here
111. oroer 1.0 subsist and reproduce, group living and cooparation for ,¡¡úch
the harshness of thc geo~~hical environment and the rudimentary state
4 of technique m~~e hunting and gardening, collecting and gathering equally
the kinship ties are the major guarantee. hazardous, existence is almost imr;.oGsible for nn individual left to liL'll-
self."

4. en this, see Claude Levi-Strauss (quoted in Codeller, 19721 365-

366)1 'The situation is quite dtffere.'1t in groups for which the satis-

1,11"""
I 0\
\VI
7
/
 29
functions llill take over the dominant role (e.g. primitive fonns oí
S'"a'te, nel/ religions). Concludes Godelierl
Thc functions, form, and ir.l.porln..'1ce oí" every
st ruct.irre heve changed and this ·~er'.! relation
betwaen ons ntructure ann all the others con-
stitutes the general structure itself of a
given social fo:rmation. The function'illy do-
te~ined relation and import~'ce of e~e~J struc-
ture determi~es the spccific causality of evexy
st.rcct.ure and the linits of their reciprocal
correspondcnce. Gonstructblg a theory of the
differerr';;iated deve.Lotraen t of society means at
the saIJe time const.ruéting a scientific theory
oí kinship, oí the political, of the ideolo-
gical. It means t.ú be ab l,e t o rcccgrü ze that
in given historien1 conditicns kinship 15 eco-
noray cr that religio!l, as it 15 the case in
Tibot or witb ane í.errc Lricas , ,~a.n directly runc-
tion as relations of prcduction. This, dogma-
tic ma'rxi.sm cannoc unde rar.and because it Ls
ur.able to simply think of it. (19701109)
We night L~state toe causal 5cheme ~~p1icit in ·the quotation as
follOllSI
l. A co!!stant ("invarlant") source of variation in the assUlaption
of tohe continuous devaLopaerrt oí the produo cí.ve :roreen;
2. the creation by sllch develop!!lent of r:el/ functional exigencies
(e.g. fonns of c.uthority, cooperation, and other relations of production)
on t he usupe:rstructures; n
3. such fu.'lctlonal exigencies 1;"0:rk as a) limits on the inte:::nal
development of the "superstructures" (e'5' it is i:npossible for the ju..."'i-
dical superstructure to develop the principIe oi abstract legal perscn-
ality in a feudal mode of production; or, as .i1ax Weber shcwed. it 15
impossible for bureaucracy to develop as long as the office is considered
a private economic resaurce and a praebendal. non-monetary econo~y per-
sists), b) as selective criteria far the rotation of the "dominant role"
among 'the"::~~uperstructures," according to the different de¡,;ree of corres-
JO
pondence to the above exigencies (i.e. ~..h ich oí the "superetr.lctures"
better maintains and reproduces l/hat ve might 100seIy caD. -Che ecenoaí,c
activity).
In such a scheme, the distinctive feature of the structuralist-
narxí.st appzoach is point 3. It is neither the idea of the deveLopaent
of tho productive fo:r-::es :1.Cr that of the functienal adaptll.tion by
"superstructures" that establishes the novelty. Rather it is the fact
that such f'unctd.ona'l, adapt.at.í on modifies the trMitional use of the Cls-
tinction between infrastructure and superstructu...~. It does this t.o
ways: First, the tr-aditional notion of one structure uniquelr. cister-
mining (or causing) another Gt~'1lcture is replaced by the con~e:¡¡t oi
~. Poulantzas puts i t this l/aYI
In ter::ns of the relationship¡; of structural instances,
their ao-ca.Ll.ed 'inte=tion,' whioh is, i:1 effeet,
the mode of intervention of one st.ructural level en
another, consists of tbe limits within which one
level can modiry anothar-, 'I'hese limits are "Che ef-
fect at toe same time of toe concrete matrix of a
social fo:mation and_ of the s"Oecific struct.ures of
each level, Hhich are 'Chemsel;:'es detennined 1T.f their
placo ~'1d thair function in this matrix. In this sensa,
the deteL~ination of one strJcture by another in tho
relationshiu between st~~ctures, indicates-the limits
of var:iatioñ of ene regional st ruct.ure -- let'ssay-
the St.ate -- in relationship to another -- let's say
the economic -- limits l/bich are themselves the ei-
fects of the matrix ••• (v.l. p.96)5
5. Poul.ant.zaa further developes the concept of l/hat he calls "liJ:Ú.ts
of the second degree." These are limits on class practice imposeC. by
various aSj1ects of class struggle within the limits im"Oosed bv the Struc-
tu!.'es of a femnation. PouJ.antzas wr:i.tesl -.
Political practice •••is itself inscribed :dthin limits which
are the effeots of tbe global sphere of class strugglo and
of the diverse levels of this struggle on political prac-
tice. These limits are, however, the limits of the second ¡-&
deGres, to the extent that the domaine of nractices is it- 0'\
self cireumscr:i bed by the effects of str'.lct.ures as limits. 0'\
(v.i, p.97)
 31 32

Secondly, instead of the old image oí infrastructure/superstructure

im:!?lying over-assigned roles of domination and dependence; and fued
"natural properties" among a .given set of in"tances (economy/polltical,
ideologic?..l), 'Re find a set of instances aaong which the dominant r"le
shifts as "functional property. ,,6 The ;reight of every instance is rela-
tive to the ensemble (i.e. the specific combination of instances) in
;¡hich it uorks , Such combination (i.e. the heirarchical system of
instances) is in tunl relative to the functional exigencies of econonic
activit;r and to the necessity to mediate them into socially viable and
stable relationships. This conceptá on of econorrí,c detennination as
riedá.at ed by other non-eccncmí,c instances (betterl by the .mole system
of instances, one of "hich has the dominant role) provides a tool foY'
assessing historical varlation and causation fax more sophistlcated than
the "vulgar" conception of' a directo irnmediate detenn1nation by ec onoay
on the social system. So much for economic detennination and the infra-
structUL~/superstructureproblcm.
'1'0 anticipate some of the critical remaJ:ks in the final par'" oí the
paper, ;re ;rant te underscore the follo>ring. cursory POintSI
l. The overtly functionallst flavor of the structurallst-ma..'"X:ist
statements. in particular the refonnulation oi the infrastructu:re/super-
structure relationship (functionalism vs. detenninism).
2. T'ne asymmetrical che.racter of the resulting functional systom,
in a double senser a) the functionality of the structures is function-
ality to the ec onomy, The functional exigencies of the economic activity

at a given time are the invariant point of reference for the role of the
Godelier (1972) expliciUy connects this nation of limit to the Mandan
prohLen of contradiction and to cybernet Lcs s other structures. In this sense theI"e are no real functional exí gencf es
The e.ppearance of a cont.zadf.ct.Lon Ls , in fact, ·the
specifical1y generated by, say, religious, ideological, political re-
appea~~ce oí a l~mit to the co~ditions of invariance
of a s'truct.ur-e , Beyond this limit a change in the
lations, etc. but only by the economy; b) such functionality to the ~o­
structure is necessarJo In this perspe~tive, the no-
ticn of contradiction I aa putting fonra.....a >tould pcr-
nomy is usually not equally distributed among the instances out "concen-
haps be of interest to cybernetics. This science
exPloriJs the 1imit possibilities and internal regula-
trated" on one of them. the dominant (i.e. the most crucial to the
tion that allow ~~y syste~f physiological, economic,
or hnatev~rJ tú maintain itself in spite of a deter-
economic activity in a given mode of production). (asymmetrical vs. sym-
;;dned zange of varí.atd on 01" Hz internal and external
condition~ of functiolling. (362) metrical functionalism)7
Tt is interesting to not.e that st~ucturalist-ma.rxistssee this link oí
their líon: to cybeznet.ác theory. As;rc will see later on in this papero 3. The invariant primacy (in the last instance) of the eccncay be-
it is also a partial convergence vlth ?arsonsian functionalism.
hind the "variant" dominant instances is assumed rather than theoreticILlly
6. Thus ?oulantzas (19631 ,.l,p.ll), referring to the case of the poli-
tical insta.nce, statss that flits status as an object of science; ioe, elaborated. In a passage conceznáng this problem, Balibar simp1y quot.es
the construction of its concept, do~s nút depend on its natura, but on
its position a..'1d function in the pa:-ticclar combi.'1ation that cha.racter- a text by ~Iarx on the feudal reglme that develops the foUo..-:ing sy1l0v.sml
izes a given ¡.cde of production ••• ln paxticular, it is the articulation
of the instances characteriE:i:.ic of this·mode of 1':-Od11ction .mich de-
fines ~he seoue and limit~ oí the spe~ific instance, giving the cor-
7. On Marxism as an "asy¡nmetrical" form of functionalism, see
responding the0ry Hz field." (:see also v.i, ¡¡.l50)
Stinchcombe (19681 93ff).
 33

~ if economic activity is to be carried out, 'extra-economic'

reasons must intervene necesaary fox a comparatlve use of the theo:ry, because Hh11e ln the capi-

1>- but th15 economic acth-:l.ty must be cazrí.ed out ta11st fonnatlons the economic function can ea.slly be ls01ated from the

~ hence the reason behind tho ext~-economic reason ls economic others, in no pre-capital1st soclety can such a determinant instance be

As sorne criti.cs have already'observed (e.g. Glocksmann 1972), there are ls01atoo on the basis of mere intuition, as Godelier's state:nents on the

soae p!:"Oblems of logic and coapazat í. ve naturo in such aasumpt.Lons , First, multifunctionality of kinship ln avehaic societies implic1tly indicate.

if tho "nust" in the minor preJllise is to lead to the concluslon, another

3.1.4. Tl(o Conseguencesl Theoretical Anti-Historic1 sm a'1d 1,nti-~I\l¡¡¡anism
pos tuLat.e must be Lrrt rcduceds 111at all reasons, conscious ox not, that
To the extent that the social .mole is t.o be regardod as an "arttcu-
a society presents for living and dying count for nothing before the fect
Labed combination" (Hanc's "Gliederung to ) of structures, the al.~ents of
that in crder to preserrt rt-:!i?.Sons a1~ alJ., Hhatever they are, it. must,
this ensemble eoexist in a mut.uaL definition, such that the l/hole cannct
":fl.rst" live 1n tho purely econcmj,c senso of the ¡(oDio 110reover, a :'!e-
be :reconstituted by a temporal composition that introduces these e'l.enent s
cona postulate is necessary to estab11sh the firstl The llOrdS "11ve in
ln succession. Hence the rejection of a genetic, diacronic explanation
the purely econoní.c sense" must nave a meaní.ng in a11 societies; and such
of the structures, and the pri.rnacy of the syncronic ana'lysf,s ,
meaning !!l:lst be distinct from that impliea by other functions ("super.-
The st.udy of the genesis oí' a strueture can only be done 1f "governed"
structur:3:s"), or else instead of the detennlnal'lt in the last instance-
by the preví.ous theoretical knoaLedge of such sh"Ucture and the logical
doamant instance sequence there Ls pure ci.rcularlty (i.e. ihe idea that
combination of i~s elements. So, history can only refer to the genealogy
the "superatruc-tures" filust correspond to the economía base lo¡ould ccnceaf,
of the elements oí' the st rucbure , but, 1..'1 no >lay to the genení.s of the
iha fact that., in doi..'1g this, the "superat ruct.ures" correspond oo1y tG
str..tcture, .mere hlsto:ry -- fonIlally s!",..aking - does not exist ("thec-
themselves)! Balibar; and ·the oth~r structuralist-marxists, does not
retieal objects have no histo:ry," classical philosophy stated in a similar
explicitely formulate these two posbul.at.es , even if he does imply them
vein). á
Wien he uses a phzase of pIa.n: as justifica:tior..: r-trhis nuch , however,' i5

elear, that the Middle Ages coula not 11ve on Catholicism nor the aneient
8. See, for instance Foulantzas (19681 v.l, 1,,131)1 " [There isl no
l<orld 011 politics. en the eontl-ary. It ls tt,e mode in whieh toey gained. history of the genesis of a mode of praduction, but just a geneology of
some of its elements, It is neeessary to discriminate oetween the Pre-
a livelihood that eX]Jlains .'by the ¿omi~lt role ~as represented theTe by hi 0torx and the struct~ of a lno~e of production; because, while t~-e
C".,":I:",\\.J exists a variety of effecti\"e processes which can generate these Oletilents~
polities, here by Catholecism" ~ri671 v.i.,p.82,fn.2), once thesc elemf'nts are ;:>1'es6I1t, their combination generates the s2l:le
stIUcbre, " Similarly, Godelier (1972: 345)1 "Thus, to analyse the his-
Yet these p05tuJ.ates ¡¡hicr. i!;r)v.~rn the universa11zation of the eco:1olllic toriCill gent-.:sis (tf a strttctu::"C: is to analyse the conditions oí ernergenctl:
of it¡, lnter.lal "lefilCnts ar.d tbe way they come into relation with one
determination are not theoretically e:cplicitated. Sueh explicitation i5 a~other. In its constitution, economic history presupposes that
elements and this relatiolls are al1'eady identified, so it presupposes
economic theory."

I~·
 35
The structu:::alist-marxists find the first most authoritative con-
firmation of such position in the non-historiographic but rather theo-
retical-abstract order of Marx's ~. "here the capitalist mode of
production is studied not so much as the historical genesis of the capí.-
talist relations, but as an "already-given" logical structure of general
elements. It 1s only after the theoretical understanding of these ele-
mente (commodity, exchange value, money, circulatiun and eventually
capital) is established that. the genes í.s of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction can be approached in the f~~cus cap.XY~V (Primitive Accumulacion).9
The logic oí the combination ?_~d the inte~al functioning of the given
complex structure (syncrcn1c an~1ysis) has theorccical priority over
the history oí ite elemel\~s (diacronic ana.Iys í.s }, In other "ords, The
"meanlng of hí.st ory" does nof underlie the meaning cf the structurell
On trie ccntrazy, it i10 the structurea that a11o" us to assign significa-
lO
tions to historJ.
9. On Mar::'s exnlicit subor'dánatí.on of the rliachronic to the syn-
crrrorü.c , see the I~;-t~r('dur:tion ~o t~w Critiaue of Po:!.itical Econ~1 "It
would be ÑTonb'and ~nappropriate to ,resent Bco~omic categories in the
same order that they Cec!!.rr:e historically efi'"ective forces,. Their logi-
cal success i on, Lnsr ead, 1s determinad by their inter-re1at10nships in
modern bourgeois society, and this o~er ls the exact reverse of what
seems to be their natural orde~ or of m1at corresponds to their succes-
sion in historical deveLopmen t , u
10. The structuralist-marxist 'lUthors refer hez-e to "hat historians
such as 1. Febvre, Labrousse, Broudql, etc., observed as the presence
of different leve1s of history, and th~ different temporalities or
rhyth~l'\s of devaLopmerrí; of these hí.st.czí.es , Narxist theory, argues
AlthusGer (19"701 9ó), nust, "T'31ate these varieties as so many varaa-
ticns io the structur~ oí the .hole, a1though the latter directly go-
veJ.11S the production of the -.;aneties ••• [Thtts] t.here 15 no histor'.f in
f':eneral but only specific st.ruct.ures of histori.c1ty, based in the 1a5t
resr.::-t on the specific st.ruccures oí t.he ,U:fere:\c modes of production,
snecific struct.ures of historiclty ;;hici> since the:! are merely the
e~istence af determinate social :'0rmations (austng fro:n specific modes
of production), areicu1ated as social ~~holes, have no meaning except as
The influence of, Claude Levi-St:rauss f analysis oí kinship st:ruc-
tures is very apparent in such a radical position. The st:ructuralist
anthropologists deduced real &~d possible kinships frem ~~ atpmporal
typology of exchange systems (restricted or generalized). In a similar
;;ay. structuralist-marxists try to define the basic structures of any
mode of production on tite basis of a small number of elements and
typical relations between them (i.e. in tarros of a universal and ~~is-
torical set of combinations of these elements). Referting to Balijar's
major attempt to use such derivations, Althusser (1970) stresses.
It is clear that the theoreticál nature of this
concept of 'combination' may provide a founda-
tion for the thesis I have already suggested in
a critical form, the t.hes l.s that Harxism i3 :Jot
a his-coricism, since the Marxist concept of his-
tory depends 01'1 the principIe of variation of
the forms of this 'combination.' (177)
According to this radical1y rel~tional-syncronic approach, as
structures cannot be thcught as hlstory, 50 they cannct either be thought
as "subject.a;" The theoretical anti-historicisill ls explicitely esca-
lated to a thecretical anti-humanisrn. Althusser (19701 180. Also 139-40,
The stk~cture of the relations of production de-
termines the nlaces and functions ~ccupied and
. adopted by the agente of production, who are
never anythingmore than the occupants of ihese
~laces, insofar as they are th~ 'supports'
tTrager) of these functicns. The true 'subjects'
in the sense of costitutive subjects of the pro-
cess are therefore not these occunants or func-
ticnaires, are not, despite al1 appearances of
'obviousness' of the 'given' of naive anthropo-
logy. 'concrete individuals,' 'real men;' .but
a f ll!1ction of the essence of these totalities, 1.e. of the essence oí
their peculiar complexity. (108-109)
 3.2 Political Power and the Capitalist State
the definition ana distrib~tion oí these nlaces
and lunctions. The tzue fsubjects~ are these We will now turn to a particular application of the structur~
definers and distributorsf the relations of
roduction (and political ~~d ideological social alist marxist general approach: Poulantzas' theory of the State ana
relations. But since these are 'relations,'
they cannot be thol16ht ;:itl·,in the categc.I'Y political power. Jl.fter a short characterization of the po l í.t.Lce L
subiect.
instance as determined by the various modes of production and sccial
Balic.e.r (1970: 251-3) has expressod t.he aame idea by saying tha;; "indi-
forl'1ations, sae "'ill present Poulantzas' particular theory of th0 State
Viduals are merely the effects of different structures and tha.t eaeh
i:1 a capí.t.eLd s t; formation, its "functions" with regdrd both to the
~;lativelj autonomous structure ••• engende~ foma of historical indi-
subordinated and the ruling classes, and a brief assassment of thc
ví.dual.Lt.y >lhlch are peculiar to ;\."',," Thlls, c cnt.rary to the young Man's
specificity, uses and limits of his work as compared to the traditional
thesis that lt 15 men that maY.e hlstorj, here the theoretical relevance
marxist political theory. A broader critical comparison with non-
of the htman subject 15 deflnltlvely abolished.
marxist functionalist polítical theory ",i11 f o Lkow in the .f i.na l, d:ar-
The task of the structuralist-marxlst ~~alysis 15 then te explain
ter of the papero
by the play of the structures, their cúniliinatlons and functional rela-

tionships, lolhat in the past, has been expl.aí.ned b)· the two concepts
3.2.1 Modes of Production, Social Formation and the Economic Deter-
~ital in classical ma~<i&~ -- of history a~d consciousness. mination ofthe Polítical.

According to the theoretical principles "'e have already elabor-

ated, the understanding of the political, as ",ell as any other, Lns t ance
docs not depend on its supposedly fixed "nature" but on the function
it plays in the particular combination of instances that character-
izes a given mode of production. l l It is he re that the economy's
uetermination in the last instance on the political is visible.
Let us consider Poulantzas I interpretation of the play o f t:·,€
economic and political instances l Z in the two major combinations

c:~text consider~'~i
e
-\. ::::et::: Poulantzas explicitly limits his
ation:the political and the economic instances, "leaving aside for
now the ideologica~' (1968:v.l, p. 24) Actually, as we shall s~e,
there is no real functional distinction between the political and
the ideological instances in the structuralist-marxist literature.
They essentially share the same basic function of the reproduction
of the social conditions of production (i.e., the integrat~on or--
a social formation). See on this, section 5.2.Z·.
 39
(modes of production) analyzed by Marx: the pre-capitalist and th~
capitalist. 1 3 The basic distinctive feature that Poulantzas finds
in the capitalist mode of production is the (relative)autonomy be-
tween economic and political instances, whereas the precapitalist
modes of production (asian, ancient, germanic, feudal).share a "mixe4"
"crganic," "natural" and--as Harx sometimes says--"simultaneolls" r8-
lationship between the two. The reason for such difference in the
autonomy and specifici-i::y of t.he instances líes in the different struc-
tu re of the modes of production, what the marxist-structuralists
try to formalize as different combinations:of ·three ultimate and
invariant economic elements: the wozke.r , the means of production, and
th", non-';,'orker appropriating surplus labor. The three component ele-
men t s are ana Ly t ca.Ll.y a Lways the same (though their concrete con-
í oÍ the worker and the means of production) and the relations of pro-
tents are different). The structural difference ís to be found at the
zeve L of che relations be twe en t.hem , 'l'he produc t í.on process in the
[,"udal regime unites the labor force and the means of labor (t.ne
wozke r is not separate from his means of production). In the capital-
Ls t, regirae, on t.ne contrary, the worke r is "free" and the labor force
i~ separated fraro the means or yrouuction (mechanization, heavy i~-
dustryl. Hence different resuirements and possibilities for the
relations of property and exploitation emerge.
In reudalisrn, because of the structural unity between t.he ;.¡or-
~er e.nd means of production, an ilrtiEicialdistinction must be made
b",t\,ee!l che "necessary" labor process (dcvot.ed to the reproduction
of the labor force) and the process of surplus labor (producing sur-
plus labor for the ncn-worker ) , Cons e querrt Ly , a powez which is not;
13 Th e cwo majar wo rk s by He.rx on wh í.ch Poulantzas bas-as this
di.sc us s í.on are Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (ed , B.J. Hobsbawm,
Lendon, 1964) and Ca?~tal, v:-Llr, Ch. XXXVI
directly economic--a political power--is required to impose this sep-
aration on the producers: "Thus surplus labor for the nominal.o\~ner
of the land can only be extorted from them by other than economíc
1<1
pressure whatever the form assurned may be." . In other wozd s , the
reliltions of property (not in the legalistic sense of course, Dut in
the mandan meaning of extraction of surplus labor-surplus va1ue)
have to separa te something that is "naturally" non-separated and
need therefore the clirect support of an "external" (i.e., non-economic)
polítical coercion. This aocounts for the non-autonomy between the
economic and the political instances.
It is thus a particular relationship between ~omic elements--
Le. the re1ationship betl'leen forces of production (the non-separati.on
duction (the separation of the worker and the product or his work)--
that determines in the feudal mode of production:
a) the intimate, non-autonomous relationship between political ana
e conomí.c instance, as t.he latter cannot go on "by i tself," I'lithin
the purely economic region, but needs "external" intervention by
the political, an intervention which is essential for the extrac-
tion of surplus value;
b) the clominant role of the political over the economic installce,
since, for these economic relations to exist, they have to be re-
produced as relations of personal subjugation by political means.
In the capitalist mode of production, on the other hand, the
worker is separated froro the means of production; there is na term
by term coincidence of the labor process and the proce~s of prOdUCing.'.I~!
i'l~¡
! !
14 pr om Pre,-Capitalist Economic Forruations, cited in Althusser' '
(1970:221)
value" and surplus value "goes by its~!lf to the governing classes
without it being necessary to resort to the direct intervention of
extra-economic pressure;,,15 The transformation of the free worker
into an elc~ant of the economic capital, of labor into a
fro:u the very bcginning, with no lleed for coercion but through the
purely economic mechanisms of the labor market and wage, gives the
economic instance an autonomous, self-sufficient functioníng.
Again, it is a relationship bebleen economí c e Lemen t s , Le.,
the relationship between production process (separation) and the
property or exp Loí.t.at.í.on process (separation), that determines:
a) the specific autonomy of tile political instance from the economic;
b) the dominant role, besides the determination in the le.st instance,
of the economic instance that is able to carry out and reproduce
the productinn of surplus value by itself.
Of course, the mcde of
o: instances according to the
prcp,=,rty rc Lat í.onsh íp , j.s ? "f ortna l-abstract" ob j ect; ,
on1y tile social formation exists concretely, consisting of a peculiar,
empírical and asy~~etrical combination of several modes of production
fe.g. in Bismar];:' s Germany I th8 specific combinaticn of patriarchal,
I
f.~udal and capitalist modes of production). The forms of articulation
and dominance in the social f orrna t Lon , el7en though complicated, \.¡ill
basically be those of the domin~lt mode of production (e.g. usually
ti,a economic is t.he dominant Lns t.ence in a social f orrnatí.on wheze
t.he capitalist mode of production is tOhe dominant modei .16
l6There is a certain circularity in Poulantzas' reasoning llere
whí.cn s t.e.us f z'ora the lack of specification of independent criteria
for determining what mode of production is in °fact dominant in a social
(cont)
3.2.2 General Function and Specific Modalities of the State in a
Capitalist Social Formation.
In this perspective, the role of the political structure--the
con~odity, State--in a capitalist formation will not be the extortion of surplus
value, but the integration of t-hose conflictual features that such
extortion brings about, both in the capitalist mode of production it-
self (class polarization and struggle) and ín the capitalist social
formation (contradictions which result from the overlapping of dif-
ferent modes of productíon).17 The Capitdlist State is then definea
as "the fact.or of unity of a social f'orma t Lon ;" providing unity a.id
integration in an unstable equilibrium situation is the gene~'al poli-
tical function of the Capitalist State, a function that the economy
calls for but cannot provide by itself.
This general political function of the Capitalist State, ccn-
tiúues Poulantzas, has i~s own specifíc modalities~-techno-economic,
id.eological and political in the strict sense--according to the in-
stances where such general function of political integration is re-
In reality, quired (e.g. education is an ideological nodality; examples of tec~~o-
economic modality are public works, increasing productivity and tlle
juridical systenl regulating exchange processes, etc.). Poulantzas i
makes an interesting attempt to systematically link the dominance 'o,'[o ''
, 1\);
(16 conc , ) fcrmeotíon. He postulates that the forms of articulation
of the instances of a so:ial formation will ~end.to be ~~ose of th,:-:--
dominant mode of prcducc í.on , but t.he only crJ.ter~a he qa.ve s fer WhJ.CH
mode is dominant are the forms of articulation oi instances in t~e
social formation. This kind of circularity--which occurs in sever~l
cther contexts in Pou Larrt z as I analvsis--is one of the Lmpor t.arvc '·.'ea}~.-
nesses in his exposition. -
17 I n more recent wr í.c í.nqs , Poulantzas and .~lthusser havo no
longer restricted the concept of "state" to the political instance, but
have reconceptualized it as a compLex sys t em that is composed oi: bo t n
repressive (i.e., political) and ideological apparatuses. The m2aning
of this reconceptualization will be made clear in section 5.2 below.
 43

generatedby the politico-ideological· "superstructures," several

or non-dominance of the political instance at the societal level
formal consequences
with the dominance of.one or another of the modalities (or "sub-
instances") at the State level. The dominant role of the economic a)
modality ~ithin the general political function of the State would in-
dicate that, in the general articulation of instances in the social
formation, the political instance has the dominant role: Le., it is
necessary that the State interver..e into the economic activity (e.g.,
asia~ mode of production, cr modes of production superceding liberal
capi.talism, such as State monopoly capital). \'ihere on t.he contrary
the political modality prevails, the economy can go on by itself
without State intervention, etc., end this in turn shows that the eco-
b)
acmic instance is likely to have the dominant role (besides of ccurse
tho determination in the last instance, e.g., in liberal capitalism).
Against the social-democratic theories distinguishing in the
¡-¡clfare State a class-biased "political" function from a "good" or at
lcast neutral "social" function, Poulantzas insists that all these
modalities are aspects of the sam~ general political function of r.he c)
Capitalist State, insofar as they are in tended to previde unity and
integration to the capitalist formation.
3.2.3 Structural Traits of the Capitalist State
deri~e in the structure of the State:
The popular-classless leqitimacy of the State. "~ile pre-capital-
ist states publicly instituticnalized class subordination in a
system of caste and statuses,19 the cñpitalist State has no ex-
plicit presence of class domination in its institutions. Instead,
its very foundati6n is the "general will" ofa people of formally
free and egual citizens-inGividuals, ~hose political partiGipation
manifests itself in the universal vote. The State is the embodi-
ment of such general will and universal intCllSt.
The universalistic-normative character of the juridical svstem.
While the feudal rule was grounded on a variety of particularisiic
privileges, modern law consists of abstract~formal norms grounded
on ~he universal principIes of freedom ana eguality. No con-
cession is formally made to the particularistic interests of
any given group.
Relative autonomy and specific unity of th~ State. The above traits
lead to a certain emancipation of the State apparatus from direct
and immediate control and pressure by social classes--against
the vulgar-marxist conceRtíon or the State as the mere instrument
of the ruling class; and to an institutional unity that pr.-8vents

After showing ~ general function and specific modalities public institutions from being fractioned and divided among

have to be performed by the Sta te, Poulantza~ tries to explain ~

social classes or interest groups as a plurality of economico-

the specific structure of the mocern Stata carries out such iuncticns. political power centers (as was the case in feudal pre-capitalist

~he fundamental and distinctive trait of the Capitalist State is seen

States where the economy and the political weze not autonomous ) , ----¡
i.n tha fact t.hat .i t s subjects are not dafined as agents of production
19 s e e,'for instance, G. Balandier, Political Anthropology
{Vintage:197DJ, ch. 6
IJ.·
,
t:; /
Col.) I
distributed in social classes, but as "citizen5," "abstract individuals," / ~'!
{l8 cont.)of the structures on the sphere of social relations." T):e',,:---_
"political persons.- 18 From this basic distortion of class relations central point whá ch he stresses Ls that classes should not be de f í.ried
merely as the effects of t he economic instance alone, but the d í.s t nc- í

18Poulantzas defines social classes as ." the global effect tive cowbination of instances that constitute a mode of production and
(cont) a social formation.
 1.5
3.2.4 l:'unetional Consecruences on the Subordinate Classes: The
Isolation Effect-
The transformation by i::he politico-ideological "superstruc-
tures" of agents of prcductiol1 (social classes) into juridico-political
subjects has the major effect of concealing to the agents of procuc-
tion their class relations and their possible political organization,
and makes them li.e in fragmented and atomistic relations. This i5
what the classies of marxism mean when they contrast the economíc
struggle ("individual," "local," "partial," "isolated," e t.c , ) ~,/ith
the political struggle characterized by class unity.
Sueh "isolation" and "privati2iation" of the agents of produc-
tion by non~economic instances (ideolegico-political superstructures)
is the specifie way of counteracting the socialization and class unity
increasingly induced by the economic ins·tance {mechanization, heavy
industry, etc.),.by creating instead private economic competition on
one hand, and formal-abstract unity and political representation on
the other. Thus the Capitalist State becomes the "unity" (the rep-
resentative of the "general interest") of those isolated, privately
competing, and abstract individual s that the State itself (or, in
20
seneral, the politico-ideologieal superstructure) has generated.
"l'he State," Poulantzas writes (v l , p. 140), "represents t he unity
i that structurally (Le., at the very level of the combination of the
oE an isolation that is mostly the effect of the State itself."
20Poulantzas shows at length, here, that in the classicaJ.
theory of political dernoc racy , f r om :·lontesquieu through recent authcrs
such as Burdeau, Leibolz a~d Biseman~, it is the classless concept
of "the people," together with that of scvereignty originated by·
the ~~solut~st State, which legitimates the centralized organization
of the Capitalist State and the correspo~ding decline of local powers.
The prevention of the political organization of subordina·te
classes is the specific function of the capitalist State, the f~nc-
tion that largely accounts for its specific structure and f ozrns
of legitirnacy. This political disorganization is accomplished by:
a) isolating the agents of production from the class to which thc",
belong;
b) formally representing the isolated individuals in the abstract
body of the "nation" and '1::.he people."
Pre-capitalist States limited the political organization of the
subordinate classes by the institutional establishment of the class
of slaves, serfs, etc., in a public statute, i.e., by overtly in-
scitutionalizing the class domination. The Capitalist State excrcises
this function by a more sophisticated rnechanism involving ideolog:
and political representation, ie., by the mystification of social
differences instead of their justification by "religion," "nature,"etc. 21
3.2.5 Functional Consequences on the Dominant Classes: Power
Coalition and Hegemony
As we have seen, che gE::neral political function of the State Ls
to rnaintain the unity of the capitalist social forrnation, a formation
econemic elements) implies a separation between worker ane non-worker
and the domination of the latter over the former. We have also seen
the ~~iversalistic structure and legitimacy that the State has to
2lRather than the non-ideological character of pre-capitalist
States, what is here implied is the difference in the type of ideology
involved: moral-philosophical in the slave society, religious in feudal
society, and juridico-political in bourgeois society (what Weber as-
sociated with the rise of a cast of speeialized jurists). The specific
character of bourgeois ideology is that it aims at a) elicitinq acti~~
consensus by the ruled classes and b) presenting itself as a scientific
teehnique as opposed te utopias, participation in the sacred, etc. By
Lhus CODcealing ~ts ideo~ogie~l character, it may be defined as f.second
degree Ldeo l.oqy , (On t.h í,s po í.nt; see Habermas, Strhktun:andel de r
Offentlichkeit,p. 100)
 .':'::;.
47
aSSlli~e in order to ~ragment and neutralize the disruptive tension
inbuilt in the system (Le., the political organization of the workers).
Such universalistic structure and legitimacy of the State implies
that the poli~ domination of the economically dominant class has
ca shape itself in the forro of universalistic, general interests. The
interests ofthe ruling c Las s have to appcaz as the general interests
of the people and the nation, the only source of legitimacy for the
mudern political i~stance.
The ability of a class to operate such universalization oÍ
~ts own interests marks its passage from economic to political dom-
ination. This political ability of the bourgeoisie, that historicist
marxism (especially Lukacs aud Gramsci) associated with the economic-
ally ascending parabola of the bourgeois class and with the eventual
fixation by this class of a set of instrum0ntal political institu-
t í.cn s (Parliament, Btate apparatus, etc.), is questioned by Poulantza.s.
By a thorough analysis of ~arx's political writings and a com-
parative examí.nat.Lon of fuebourgeois revolutions in Western Europe,
?oulantzas argues that the bourgeois class has never exhibited any
~nified, naturally hegemonic political consciousness. Quite the COn-
trary, the bourgeoisie is a structurally fractioned class, a class
whose internal divisions (cornmercial, industrial and finance fraction,
let alD~e
landed property) are rooted in the very constitution of
22
capital and the extended reproduction process. This internal frac-
tloning of the bourgeoisie is intensified by the greedy pursuit of
individual, private interests even within a given class fraction. In
addition, the presence of other classes (generated by other modes oi
p"oduction coexisting in the same social formation, e.g. , landed
aristocracy and petty producers) which have been drawn onto the
22 s e e especially Capital, Vol. III, parts IV and V.
¡~'institutions by the non-dominant c l as se s ,
48
the political scene by the universal franchise, and, of course, tilo
ascent and political struggle of the working class, have made it even
more difficult for the bourgeoisie to rule through its own poli.tical
parties. It is the relative autonomy of the State, Poulantzas argues,
that has replaced direct rule by the dominant class, and which has
made the political domination of the bourgeoisie possible in spite
of its pervasive incapacity to rule directly.
Because of the heterogeneity of the bourgeois claas, and the
existence of other "dominant" classes during periods.:of transition,
Poulantzas rejects the old dichotomous vulgar-marxist imagery of ~
simple ruling c Las s , Instead we have a po\"er coalition (le bloc au
pouvoir) consisting of several class fractions or classes. COllsistent
with the structuralist-marxist paradigm, the pONer coalition also con-
tains one class. with a "dominant role" (hegemony) over the oche is ,
Rather than explain this dominance simply as a conformity to the
totality-with-dominance scllama, Poulantzas tries to give a more co~-
plex explanation in terms of the structural unity of the State. Be
argues that the particular unity of the institutionaliaed powe r oE
t.h·", capitalist state makes it impossible for state po·..:er to be divided
among a plurality of classes or fractions, each controlling a "part"
of the state. 23 There must always be, therofore, one heqemonic
23According to Poulantzas, the separation oi powers (leGis- i : VI
:1 t-'
.' .....
lative, executive, judicial) does not contradict the unitv of the
power of the State, because, again, there is always one dominant powe
(at the present time the exccutive) in \cllich the real legitlmacy and l
basis of the hegemonic class are grounded. Tho dominance of one of the--
"powers" over the others reflects, according to Poulantzas, different
forros of legitimacy(more or leas restricted to parliamentary publicity,
political parties, information, etc.; more or less basad on charisma
and personalization of power, etc.). All of theso varied forms 61
legi~imacy occur within the same basic type of Ci'.¡)italist Statc. In
partlcular, the present dominance of the executive correspondes tothe
difficulty that the monopolistic fraction (hegemonic) has- in orcanizina
consensus in the legislature and to the general decline in il1:Do';:'tance -
of bourgeois political parties. This decline in bourgeois representa-
tiv~,instituti?n~ (legislatures, partie~) is the result of an internal
proo...em of legltlmacy ratner than any rlsk of the take-over of these
 49 50

class orclass fraction that ultimately holds the State power in its the other classes of the coalition to hold Hhatever power they have

unity. The interests of the other classes of the coalition are in the other 1evels; their interests are thus "crystalized" by the

represented in the State insofar.as they are "crystalized" by the interest of the hegemonic class. 25

hegemonic class. 24
The crystalization by one class or class fraction of the inter- 3.2.6 The Hegemonic Operation via the State

ests of the whole po~er coalition is not due to any "more advanced" ,. rt is important to stress the structural, non-subjective ·qual-

class consciousness, "totalizing" power and the like, such as the ity of the factors for hegemony. They are:

historicist ana1yses implied. According to the specificity.and asym- a) the speeific, hierarchical combinatión of instances in a given

metry of instances in a given social formation, power can be "decen- formation (functionally dependent on the combination of the eco-
trated" a~ong various classes. So one class may be eco~omically dom- nomic elements--\-lorker, means and non-worker). This híerarchical

inant without necessarily being politically dominant (e.g., bour- combination produces the "dcminant" instance that in turn is the
geoisie in pre-1688 England, when aristocracy he Ld its political power criterion for the "dominant power ,," i.e., the hegeI:lony of onc

in spite of the 1640 revolutionl, or ideologically dominant without class or fraction over the others.

being economical1y or politically domina,t, etc. One class may !lave b) the institutional unity and autonomy oí the state which means that

the power to realize its economic interests (e.g., tradeunionism) the State will represent the one class or class fraction--the one

\·:ithout t11,,, powe r to realize its political interests; or it may nave polítical standpoint--that best represents the unity ef the capi-

po Lí,tical powe r w thont "correspoading" Lde o Loq í.c a L power (e.9.

í t the talist formation the State has to maintain. 8uch a ~tandpoint i5

e f f ec t.Lve functioaing of "ille<Jitimate" politicaJ. structures) and SO· ob'lious1y that of the class which is dominant in the dominant

forth. instance.

The c1ot'.inant class is tllU5 the class which is dominant at that These structural reasons fer the hegernony, tegether with

Lev e L or Lns t ance that is dom.í nant; in a gi\'en social f orrna t Lon , This "objective" meaning of the woz'd "interest,,,26 are intended to rev.:3rse

class' poHer in the "dominant" instance is functionally necessary for

.... us t~ r at;e t'ne h e qemona' c ro 1 e
25'To 1."1 Lt.h an
W~ í t'ne powe'r coa l '~tj.cnr
,
24 Poulantzas uses the histo~ical example of the role of the financial
The concept.s "hQgcntonylr and "powe r coaLí.t.Lon" both Lack any bourgeoizie in the Freneh pO\-ler coalition--finance, industrial canitel
real concreteness in ?oulantzas! analvsis. He never provides any sub- and landlords--since Lonis Philippe. This role in the English andGer-
stantive cr t.e r a for know í.nq wh í.ch ciélsses or class fractions be long
í í man case \-las held by co~~ercial and industrial capital respectively
to t.ae coa1ition and wh í.ch are he qemon i.c w ch í,n Lt , 'l'hey b ecome ab-
í in the 19th century. A current case of hegemonic fraction is tlv, mon-
stract categcries merely identifying the class interests served by opolistic fraction in which industrial and finance caoital--at least
the State, rather than concrete cetegories identifying social force s according to ce~tain authors--are virtually indistinct. (See, fer in-
which imping·;,; 011 the State. If the concepts of hegenony or the power sta~ce, Paul Sweezy, "Monopoly Capital and Corporations," ;.!c.nt!lJ.·..-
coali t on are ae tua Ll.y to exp Laí.n any t.h í.nq ,there have to be sorne
í
~, Nov. 1971) ------J_

t hco r e c i ceL c r í, t.ez í.a fer them wni ch are inc1ependent of what; they are 26
trying to ex~lain (i.e .., tll~ class interests sezved by t~e state). , Po~lantzas of course dz aws a sharp d s t í.nc t í.on beh:een ob j ec t.i.ve
í

'rhe ab se ace of such c:riteria leads to the J:ind of circularity men t í.oned and sub]ectlve interests. The objective class interests are defined
in footnote 16 above. as "the scope of possible action" of a class, which is determined by:
(cont)
 52
51

push and pull of the various 'classes and their relativo consciousness
the traditional explanation of the historicist marxism, whereby it
ap.d economic interests, is the precondition for the hegemonic oper-
was an aIready politically unified ~~d conscious class which shaped
ation: i.e., economic concessions to certain subordinate classes, in
the State apparatus and used it as a passive instrumento Here the
possible opposition with the short terro economic interests of the rul-
order is reversed. It is the State, as system-maintenance function,
ing classes, but in full compatibility with the latter's political
that takes over the political interests of the bourgeois class or
fractions which, left to themselves, ~ould pursue their merely economic domination.
This hegemonic o!=,eration, invo1ving the possibility of real
interests and raise internal and external conflicto "To a certain ex-
economic concessions to subordinate classes in order to polit.i.calJ.~;
tent, the Capitalist State takes over the political interest of t~e.
disorganize them and reta in politic al domination, was not possible in
bourgeoisie and pursues by itself the political function of hegemony
social formations where an economíc grievance (e.g., abrogation of
that fue wurgeoisie cannot fulfill." (Vol. II, 112) ~nd again:
a status,of a privilege) was at the same time a political grievance,
The State ••• is the factor oÍ political unification of
tl1e power ccal~tion under the aegis of the hegemonic one that questioned the systern of "public powers. h But the hegemonic
class or f r ac t i.on , In other wo rds , it is the factor of
hegemonic organization of this class or fraction so that operation is clearly possible in the capitalist formation·character-
i ts specific interests can crystallize t.hosn of the other
~~a~ses or fracticns of the coalition ••• Strictly speaking,
ized by the autonorny of the political frorn the economic il1stance and
~'- ~s not a function of t!le State in front of classes al-
ready.organized ~olitically, ~narbitration among already by a structure--the State--that embodies such autonomy.
con s t.Lt u t.ed pa r t í.as , Everytlung happen s as if the state
permanently holds the role oÍ political organizer of the It is possible, in this way, to think of economic concessions
pov...e r coa.lition. In fact, t!1t2 State takes ove r such func-
t on to t!le ex t en t; that the poli tical oarties of the bour-
í

or other social "sacrifices" impesed by the State on the dominant

geois class and fractions cañ fulfi11 ño autonomous o~gan-
·.izationa 1• function comparable to that of the wozk nc class í

class, in order to save the latter's long run political interests

?arties." (Vol. II, 129)
(Le., maintain the sy s t em) , '¡'his is the case of many "social policies"
The hegemony of a c1ass is thus made possible by the State ar.d
of the modern State. They are implicitly present in Marx's Capital,
is exercised through the State, notl-!itbstanding this class' poli tica1
especially the pages of the first volume on factory legislation¡27
consciousness. This critical distance of the State from the empirical

(26 cont.) of these ideologically reoresented interests--~~lile they

(26 ccnt.)a) the structural position of the class, and b) the power actually do not have power--relative to the objective intere?ts and
It is somchow close t.O l·¡!lat ,'Ieber and laterO Luka~s
of other c Las se s , possibilities of their structural positicn in the economy, etc.--and
called the "possible consciousness" of a class (zugerechnetes:- BeS'ICus- are thereby "rnystified."
stsein) ar.c. what more recently D. Wrong conGeptualized as potential
,:,S
opp(;,sed to actual powe r S"Some Prob1ems in Defining Soci.al Power," 27 In this particular case, howave.r , it was a "false" sacrifice
~P. Dre~tzel, ed. Recent Soc~oloqv, 1969). Poulantzas stresses that which in fact corresponded to the limited interest of capital. (See
these objective class ~nterests do not necessarily coincide wí.t h their P. Sweezey, The Theory oi Capitalist Development, 1962, part II.)
ideological representation by the class-subject. or other c l ae se s , The basic po~nt that Poulantzas stresses ~s tnat it is possible to
Powe r , s,?ys Poulantzas, is the c ep ac.i t y o f rcalizing the ob j e c t í.ve , make real concessions te the subordinate classes which do not have
not the Lde oLoq.í.ca.Ll.y represented Lnt e re s t s of a c l.as s , In the case immed~ate economic returns to the ruling class.
of the working class, for instance, the subjcctively represented in-
tere~ts mal' be much narrower than the objectively feasible interests,
to tne extent that \<Iorking class organizations are content with trade-
~nioni~tic. self-defense wheri more advan ccd strategies (e.g., self-
~~te~m~na;~on) are possib1e. In this caso, working cIass lead~rs will
acIuue th_mselves that: they have power--relative to the accomplishment
(cont )
i
L,
 53

they are more explicitly mentioned in Class Struggle in France when rather than on those repressive features that the traditional m.J.rxi¡;t

Marx refers to the February Republic as one that had to present it- approach emphasized (e.g., Lenin's The State and Revolution). The
self as "a republic surrounded by social institutions,' and in the emphasis on the repressive role of the Stat~ had its own historical
18th Brumaire·on the "social cesarism" of Louis Bonaparte. The5e merits,28 but is theoretically inadequate to account for tho internal
social p01icies can be seen, more recently, in ma~y functions of the solidification of the capitalist world that followed: trusts eco~omy,

¡'¡elfare State. Even though these social functions have evo1ved into monopolisti.c development, integration of the bulk of the working

a policy of public investments functional to the absorption of the class in hrge reformistic parties, etc.
surplus of monopolistic production, and therefore functional to thc mmt was needed was a t:1eoretical elaboration of the noti:ons
economic in.te:t6ts of the monopolistic fraction, they t<lere historicalJ.y of integration, political representation, manipulated consensus bo-
imposed on the ~uling classes by the State, under thc p~essure of sides repressed dissent, etc. Poulantzas' theory represents a11 impor-
the subordin2.te classes, ancl their initial implementation often tant attempt to elaborate this underdeveloped aspect ot marxi.st t;leory,
:caised hostility be tween St.a t.e and ruling c Las se s , In the long rlm, in a significant convergence with those attempts in non-mazxí s t polit-·
noweve r , s uch social compromisos and sacr r í.ces by this or >:hat frac-
í ical theory to complement the ¡"eberian definition of Statc as "monop-
tion of the domí.narrc classes are necessary to realize their political oly of legitimate force" i.,ith system-maintenance functions. 29
interests anu to drain off the disruptive features implicit in the
pursuit of merely eco~omic interests: i~e.~ te maintain the eYisting 2. CI2.ss-Society State vs. Class State. The base for the inb;srative
social formation or mode of production. features of the Stlate is derived from;the functional needs of a gh'en
Concluded Poulantzas: "'rhe particular relationship bet!.¡een combination of instances (i.e., neutralizing the two disruptive by~
State and hegemonic class or fractioll does not derive from a direct products of the economic p~ocess: concentration and political 0rq~1-

dependence of t~e State apparatus on this or that class or fraction; ization of the workers, internal fractioning of the bourgcoisie)
on the contrary, it is grounded on the first's autonomy from the latter rather than philosophically deducted from the 'Weltanschaung" of one
and from the whoLe power coalition." (Vol. II, 127)
28The merits of Lenin's analysis have been largely int~r~rcted
in terros of an anti-bureaucratic pol~mic a9'ainst social-democratic
parliamentary opportunism, at a time when the perspective of a total
:3.2.7 Poulantzas' Tlleory of the State and Tradi tional ¡·lar:dsül European Revolution s eerned very reasonable and the Pu s s Lan over t hxow
was considered t.he firs c , and to some extent unforescen, episocle of a
long series. See R. l-l.i.Lí.barid , ,urhe State and Revolution,n i~onthly
A few remarks are due on the originality of Poul~1tzas' ~~~lysis ~ ' April 1970.
29
with respect to the traditional marxist ~heory oi the State. See, for instance, Apter, nA Ccm?arative Hethod for the Stuuy
of Politics," in Eulau, ed , , Political Behavior, p. 87ff; Al.mond and
l. Integration vs. Repression. The focus cf Poul2.ntzas' analysis Colema<1, The Politics of Developlng Arcas, 1%0, p. 12ff; and che
cybernetic models of D. Easton, p.. Framework for Poli tical i'.llalysi~
is on the integrative, system-maintenance feal.ures of the State, and K. Deutsch, The Herves oi Government.
 55

overall dominant class. role of dominance is assigned by functional criteria. The State is
This latter approach, in terros of true/false, anticipated/ the instance that maintains tl1e cohesion, and reproduces th.~ non···
delayed class consci6usness (Lukacs, Gramsci) is of course more sophis- economic conditions of production, of a given combination (social
ticated than the leninist approach, in that it accounts for the ínte- forw~tion), by maintaining in the long run (i.e., the concept of
grative features of the State, but Sill is theoretícally inadequate political vs. economic interests) those forms of domination on which
for several reasons: the combination is built. ~'he result, as Poulantzas epítomizes, "is
not the State of one class, but the State of a society divided into
a) it retains the vulgar-marxist nation of the State as a passive
social c l.as s es ;" (Vol. II, 10) This conception oE the State as t.he
instrumeút of the will of one class, thus offering little e}~lQn-
factor of a "moving stable equilibrium model" dces not dismiss the
ation for internal conflicts often observad between State and
basic rnarxian achievement, i.e., the power of a c Las s derived from
ruling classes ..
its ?osition in a given mode of production; but gives it articulations
b) in the notion of the absolute cumu Lat í.on of power in the hands
and analytical possibilities that most traditional marxist formula-
of one ruling class, it assumes a collinear variation of the
tions did not explicate (e.g., distinction between economic, ideolog-
variou~ dimel1sions of power (political, economic, ideological)
ieal, political power; conflict between State and dominant c1asses
that in fact hava a relativa autonomy. This in turn creatas a
or fractions;economic los ses that can be political gains, etc.).
misrepresentation of the "net" position of a class along these
It seems·..to us that both the theoretical insistence on integra-
different instances-dirncnsionsi for instance, the cowmon prgsump-
tion and the systemic frame oE refcrence in which it is developed,
ticn of abso1utepower and integration, or absolute decline and
í.e., the innovative features of this analysis, are the result cf
disintegration, so frequent in unsophisticated marxist analyses
the stkongly functionalist inclination oÍ Poulantzas' marxismo
on the ruling class.
c) when such collinearity of different instances-dimensions is not
hela, class consciousness is used as a residual variable without
systemütic relation with OtI19X" II c c r e " variables: í.e., it accounts

for tne residual variation 1eft unexplained1::y the "core" economic

variables so sacrificing their theoretical power and making the
theory non-falsifiable. 30
Poulantzas' meritO is the attempt to resolve historical variation
in the combination of a f ew equally "ob j e ct.Lve " variables, where the
l~
30Por this remark on the marxist use of consciousness as <"
residual category, see N.J·. Smelser, Sociological Theory: A Contem-
'~orar,/ V.í.ew, 1971, p. 69
 57 57a

2. Mode of Prc-cluction and Class Strug&!=e

APPENDIX TO sscrrcx 3:
SYHBOLIC REPRE5ENTATION OF POULAllTZAS' THEORY OF THE STATE
+
CAPITALIST IDDE
OF Pf,oDUCTION
(~
~.
CLASS
STRUGGLE

It is possible, using the causal diagra'lls presented by Stinchcombe (196(\) to

construct a general symbolic representation of the averall ::ltructure of

+
FIGURE 3.
Poul.antaaa I theory. This ,,-lll be usef'ul, for our later comparison ¡.;ith too explanation: Classes are defined as the effeet of the strueture5 of a social farma-
tion on the social relations oft-he formation. Class strllgglé naturalJ.y
comparable part.s of Parsons' theor-,f oí politics. He will first present separ-- intensifies along a variety or dlmensions (economic, political,ideol-
ogácal.¡ dominant vs , suhjugated classes; íractions vs •. fractionsj etc)
ately each oí th~ cornponent.a of the total diagram, indicating the Ileetions¡in in the cour-se of the deve.Lcnmerrt of capit.?~ism, and this stru;iSl~ in
turn becomes a causal force for ehan~ing thc structures of tbe mode of
the pape!' which dáscuss tae ccmponent , and then present the entire map of production, eventually in a revolutionary way. (Class str'lggle i~ not,
however, the only "dynamic" element in the sY8tem -- to prcs1Z1e the:'
Poulantzzs' model. it is is part oí the historicist deformation oí marxis@ accordir~ to
the ¡;tructuralist mar:rists). This "explosive loop" constitutes one
aspect oí the central contradiction of thc capitalist aystp~.

J. Compenentll of the recdel

3. The General Function of the State

1. Econo:nic Determination in the la:;t instance.

AUTONOlolY OF THE STATE:

ECONO~.!1C INSTANCE: THE r'ACTOR OF COHESlON
~ + IN A SOCIAL FORHATION

r1-
eombination oí the. CA..PIT¡lLIST M:lDE
three invariant ~ ~
elements Oi?PRODUCTION

FIGURE 2.
+ ¡
---~i'
M:lDE'~ ~
discusaed ~, section: 3.1.2j 3.2.1
CAPITALIST CLAS5 STRUGGLE
expl.anat.Lont The particular combination of the three invariant e'Lement.a in the OF PRODUCTION ~'"
economic instance - worker, means 01' production, and nouworker -
detcrrrine the ove!'all a.-ticulation oí structural instances in the -{-
mode of product.áon, This combination eets the lir.lits of variation
that are possible f'or- thc structural instances in order for that
combination to be maintained. [r'lote: there is a certain latent tel- FIGURE 4.
eology in this formulation which P~i1antzas never effectively Jisousse<ll1'l sed¡",,: 3.~.t ",,013.2.3
elimi."lates] • explanation: The most general function oi: the state i5 to act as the "fact.c·r oí
unity oí 13. social formaticn." It Ls thus a nezat.ive force eount.eracting cLass
struggle and as a result p¡;evcnting (if the State is effecCive) ot-
dampening bhe explosive qu.ali':.y of the internal contradictious c·f
the capitalist mode of production.
 57b 57e

and atomiza the workers, thus at least partia1ly eou:\teracting the

"tension" from their politieal organization; To theCl<.-tel"lt that this
effort at isolation does not neutralize political stru,ggle, the the
world.!lg class makee "dema'lds" on the state, which increase. tila produc-
4. CIass StruggIe: political effec-ts tion of isolating factors.

6. The Autonomous Steto end the Dominant Classes: HegernOIV

FRACTIWALIZATlON OF POLITICAL ORG.f¡!UZMION

~-p
TllE BOUP-GEOISIE: AND TJNITY OF TllE
incapacity to rule ¡'¡ORKIlIG CT....ASS BOURGEOIS HEGENOUY
RELATlVE AUTONONY
AND THE "i:'~;r.
y""
OF THE STATE

,~
POHm COALITION r.'{'~
\ IO~--/erm po\lc:.le.~
.~/
CLASS FRACTIONAL1ZATlO::\
STRUGGLE THE BOURGE01SlE:
incapacity to rule
FIGURE 5
FIGURE 7
di~cussed L'l seotio05 3.2.2; 3.2.5 discussed in sectdons 3.2.5; 3.2.6
cxplanation: Class struggle has two central political effects: 1) !t leads to the ezp'Lanatdone The relative autonomous state produces long-terro policies which serve
political or-ganázaírí.on and solidarit:r of the working cIass. Although the "objective interes'cs" oí the dominant, classes and thus counteract
Poul.anbaas st.ronglJ' rejeots the historicist restriction or "trus" class the "tension" caused by their esscntial incapacity te rule. As this
struggle to the political level, he does regard the political forl1l5 of L'1ability to rule increases, the donrinarrt classes - presurnably
cl.as s unity and class struggle as crucial. 2) 1t leads to tlle incapacity through t:1eir organization as a . power coalition under tha hese¡¡lQnic
of the bourgeoisie to rule directlJ' on its own behalf be cause oí: directiún oí one clas5 or íraction - inerease the selcctive press¡¡re
fractionalization, competition, etc. on the State to rule autonornous1y on their behalí. [note: the~e i5
practicallJ' no specification oí this particular process of selection
in Poul.antaae r ¡'Titing].

II. THE CONPLEl'E ~lOD~:

t=HK D¡:Ml'\~tls ".JO

1::1..=,::"11.. S<.API'CR:l'
""'"
RELATIVE AUTONONY AI.'Ú:..--------........@ ISOLATION OF THE .
or THE STA'rE <, ..Ji. iI03.KEP..3: ATOHIZAT10N
~~ OF S'rnUGGLE

l'<O}.>OI1IC,~cessl]'
ISOLP.110}..l
o,..
WORI'SJi:S
P,l->~
l..eE.IT1HJ'\T\0IY ....,.

;,~;. .

POLITlCAL ORGANlZATlOn OF
ilORKING CLASS

FIGUHE 6
discU5sed :'l1 section 3.2.4
e:.;:planatiOIl: The relatively autonomous state produces economic concessdcas and ap
ideolog¡.- oí "neutrality," "c1asslessness," eto.which serve to isolat.e
FIEtURE8
 Hegel, G.F
1967 Phenomenolosr oí Hind, Harper &; R01f

Kidron,M.
1968 Western C~nitalism Since the War,Pe1ikan

Lockwood ,D.
1959 "Sorne Reraarks on 'The Social System'" in British Jotunal
of Sociolo~y,JtL~e

Nage'l., E.
1969 For Marx,Penguin 1961 Tae Structure of Science,Harcourt Brace
19'10 ~eadinG Canit~1rNew Left Book$
1971 I.enin and Philosophy,i.10nthly Review Par-s on s , T.
1951a. The Social System.Free Press
Balibar, E. 1951b. Toward a General Theory oí Action,Harper and Row
1970 1960 Structure and Pr-o c es s in Modero Socj etl,]'ree Pr'es s
i ssi Theories of S0ciety,Frea Free9
Blackburn, R. 1966 Soeieties,Prentiee Hall
1972 IQeolo.~ in the Social Sciences,Fontana 1967 Sociolo:fical Theory and rúodern Soe i ety,Free J'ress
1969 Politica ~nd Sociol Structllre,Free Press
1971 'fhe Syst cm of Mc!181"n Sec:!.ety ,Prentice Hall
1972 ..Al thusser' s r.Iarxisrn : An Account and Assessment" in
~1el'{ T. eft ::1. evi ew n , 71, J anua ry Parsons,T. and Smelser N.J.
1956 Economy and Society,Free press
Glucksme.!1.."1" A.
1972 "The Altnusserian Theatre" in He\\' 1eft Revie71 n.72,1IIarch Pouf.ant z aej N,
1968 Fouvoir Poli tique et C1asses Sociales de J.! Etat Ce.EitcJ.i2te,
Gorlelier,1é. Maspero,Faris
197:) ReJoinder to L.Seve,in marxismo e Strutturalis:no,Eil13,udi J.972 "Sorne Remarks an the Capitalist State" in B1aekburn(ed.)cit.
1972 "S:;stem, Structure and Gontrariiction in Marx' s Capital" in
BlackbuEl(ed.i,cit. Séve,1.
1970 "Structural ¡,fethod and Dia1ectical Iúethod" in I:!!L~~
Goulcner,A.IV. Strutturalismo,cit.
1971 The Coming Crisís oí Western Socio10gy,Equinox
Smelser,N.J.
Hempel, C.G~ 1959 Social C~nge in the Industrial Revolution.Univ.of C~~ozgo
Pl'ess
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