WARRANTLESS ARREST and INQUEST

An arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission off an offense; a person is arrested for a specific purpose – to make him answer for
the commission of an offense. (see pages 226-227, Riano Book)

General rule: No peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyone
without a warrant of arrest, except those cases expressly authorized by law.

Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 (1991)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions,
seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the
decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in
the several petitions. Among these laws are the outlawing the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with
shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or
sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the
Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly
Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their
possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial
admissions;

4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3
The
writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into
the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9
July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were
made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.

There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo
without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6
The law expressly allowing
arrests without warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the
grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural)
was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for
subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8a continuing offense,
thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy
of nationwide magnitude. . . .

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day
before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part
of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of
the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers
of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil
case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person
to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or
private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the
one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without
warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private
person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of

the person to A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable

be arrested. 10

cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a
confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom
mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that
based on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot
4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot
wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to
engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third —
as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was
in reality Rolando Dural.

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their

believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect
motion for reconsideration, 13

that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending
doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore,
came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are
deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed
to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not
appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without
warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant,
an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was
filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He
was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting
officers). On 31 August 1988, he was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No.
84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo

Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition
in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in
court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of
the authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA
about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house
occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St.,
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in
view of this information, the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12
August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house
was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not
produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other
communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the
CPP. 16

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988,
and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the
rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of
Roque;17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents
belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato
Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but
failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was
believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the
agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make
the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the
other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato
Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple),
which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of
the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the
safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests,
they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by
the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly
performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo,
Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That
would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom
devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21
An
arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without
warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence
of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without
warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof,

But if they do not strictly comply

even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24

with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary
detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative
sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis
of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November
1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu
spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a

Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for

nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28

subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the
perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to
insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free
speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the
peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest(not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail
for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace
officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the
resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-
68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28
December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the
police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be
made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible
flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts
and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil
Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order
dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by
the same trial court.
 On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13
January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of
the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which
liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably
because of the strength of the evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed
in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They
complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-
G.R. No. still undocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.

that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the

In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30

case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive
documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by
the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not
to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless
arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on
the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln
the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged
perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest
without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will
promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality
of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court,
as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered
released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted,
with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.
The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not
on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records
show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are
DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Warrantless Arrest, Sec. 5, Rule 113 (In flagrante delicto)

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)

Compliance with these conditions: (a) probable cause; and (b) good faith of
arresting officers (Umil v. Ramos)

Warrantless arrest also valid in certain cases

People v. Aminnudin,163 SCRA 402 (J. Cruz)

CRUZ, J.:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally
transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a
fine of P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took
him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening
2

and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against
3 4

Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and
5

trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a
vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was Identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of
7 8

June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and
9

inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
examiner, who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
10

corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and
two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search
11

warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what
12

marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. He also argued that the marijuana he was
13

alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches
but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other
expenses. Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when
15

he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. He also said he sold one of the
16

watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, to a friend whose full name he
17

said did not even know. The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the
18

injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of
the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation,
flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge
sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he
did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had
that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in
1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched without
warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision
did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin
was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as
incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested
Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular
informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they
received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, another two weeks and a third "weeks before June 25." On this matter, we
20 21 22

may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have
already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities
of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you many days before you received the
intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling
and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin
was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary.

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court cannot
countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of
probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to
be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. Here it was held that
24

vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown
that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was
25

clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do
so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a
judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be
picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is
allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not
justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak
as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be
admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit
of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search
was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement
officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the
realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high
a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557

FELICIANO, J.:

Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended (known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), in an
information which read as follows:

That on or about September 6, 1987, from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to Nacagang, Sabangan,
Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while being a
passenger in a Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ 242, destined for Baguio City, without lawful authority did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry with him as part of his baggage and transport about four (4) kilos of dried
marijuana which the accused intended for distribution and sale at Baguio City, knowing fully well that said marijuana is
a prohibited drug or [a] source of [a] prohibited drug.

Contrary to law. 1

After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
2

Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and essentially asks this Court to determine —

Whether the [trial] court deprived [the] accused of his right to due process by:
 (1) ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search of the accused;

(2) admitting confessions extracted from the accused after two hours of interrogation conducted by four (4) soldiers one
after the other under intimidating circumstances; and

(3) misappreciation of facts. 3

The relevant facts as found by the trial court and as set forth in the court's decision are as follows:

That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain
Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate No. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon
reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who
were seated at the back, saw accused carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat No. 18 after putting
the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan
before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat No. 18.
After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers [who]
the owner of the carton [was] but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan
and C2C Bongyao invited the herein accused to the detachment for questioning as accused was the suspected owner
of the carton containing marijuana. As both P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan saw accused, Bonifacio Barros carrying that
same carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan. That upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in
the presence of accused and accused Bonifacio Barros was asked if he owned the carton of marijuana and accused
denied [this]. That when accused denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus
conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. That during the oral
investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership of the carton (Exhibit "B") containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped
packages of dried marijuana. (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4").

. . . [A]fter he was orally investigated, [the accused] was brought to the Abatan General Hospital, Bauko, Mountain
Province, for physical examination and a Medico Legal Certificate was issued (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"), indicating that
accused suffered no physical injuries and that accused was probably under the influence of marijuana. That Dra.
Danna Aleta inquired from accused Bonifacio Barros if he smoked marijuana and accused admitted having smoked
marijuana. That after accused was medically examined, he was escorted by three members of the P.C. to the P.C.
detachment at Tadian, Mountain Province, where the carton of marijuana (Exhibit "B") was also brought. That at
Tadian, a seizure receipt was made together with a certification (Exhibit "C") pointing out to the fact that approximately
4 kilos of dried marijuana leaves were from accused Bonifacio Barros and which certification was signed by the
accused (Exhibit "C-1") and subscribed before Judge Romualdo P. Awisan (Exhibit "C-2"). That in connection with the
confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and the apprehension of accused Bonifacio Barros, the P.C.
officers who figured in this case namely M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao have correspondingly
executed their sworn statements (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2", "D", "D-1", "D-2").

. . . [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four packages marked Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", and "B-
4" and placed in four separate envelopes, following an order of the court to that effect and were hand-carried by Police
Officer Jack Masilian to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for laboratory test. That Capt. Carlos Figueroa, the
Forensic Expert conducted two kinds of test on the four samples sent by the court and found them to be positive of
marijuana as per his report No. D-011-88. (Exhibits "I" and "I-1"). 4

The defense of the accused on the facts consisted of a simple denial of the ownership or possession of the carton box containing the four (4)
kilos of marijuana. The trial court summarized the story of the accused in the following manner:

That accused Bonifacio Barros since 1984 was employed at the Honeymoon Disco Pad, Baguio City. That on
September 5, 1987, accused was sent by his Manager, Engineer Arsenio Cuanguey to Bontoc, Mountain Province, to
get their records from one Billy Cuanguey at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That upon arriving at
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, accused looked for the residence of Billy Cuanguey and he was pointed to a
house where someone was tending a store. That accused asked the man if Billy Cuanguey was there and the man
answered that he did not know where Billy went. So accused asked the man if Billy left [in] his room the tapes and
records and the man said he did not know. Thereafter, accused asked the man to stay over night in that house where
Billy was staying as it was the instruction of his manager. That the following day, September 6, 1987, after taking
breakfast, accused, was going back to Baguio. On that morning of September 6, 1987, accused Bonifacio Barros
boarded the Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province bound for Baguio City. That when the Dangwa
Bus reached the P.C. Checkpoint, soldiers went inside the bus and checked the baggages. That a soldier fished out a
carton under the seat of [the] accused and shouted who owns the carton but nobody answered. Thereafter, the soldier
went down with the carton and moments later returned to the bus and called accused Bonifacio Barros to alight from
the bus. That Mr. Barros was surprised why he was ordered to alight and accused took his baggage which consisted of
apasiking and went down the bus. That accused was led by the soldiers to a house where his pasikingwas taken and
his clothes removed and his wallet taken. Accused was made to accept ownership of the carton of marijuana but he
refused.

. . . [A]t 11:00 o'clock that same day, September 6, 1987, three soldiers escorted accused to the hospital and from the
hospital, they proceeded to the Municipality of Tadian, Mountain Province. That upon reaching Tadian, accused was
brought to the P.C. Camp and there he saw someone typing. Later, the soldiers allegedly presented to accused some
papers which he was asked to sign but accused refused. That accused was threatened and if he refused to sign the
papers that something will happen to him. That moments later, accused was threatened [by] a soldier [who] pointed a
gun to him and told him to sign the paper and because of fear, he had to sign the document marked Exhibit "C."
Thereafter, the soldiers allegedly threatened again accused and asked him to sign his name on the inside part of the
cover of the carton of marijuana. Exhibit "X" for the court and Exhibit "B-5" for the prosecution. That after staying at
Tadian for one night, accused was brought back to Sabangan and later transferred to the Bontoc Provincial Jail. 5

Turning to the legal defenses of the accused, we consider first his allegation that the police authorities had impermissibly extracted
confessions from him after two (2) hours of interrogation, "under intimidating circumstances," by four (4) soldiers one after the other. The
accused complains that he was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, that he had not waived his rights as an accused
person, and that he had signed a confession involuntarily and without the assistance of counsel. He essentially contends that the confession
is inadmissible as evidence against him.

We find, however, that it is not necessary to pass upon the above contention of appellant Barros. For the trial court in reaching its judgment
of conviction had not taken into consideration the statements which had been obtained from the appellant during the interrogation conducted
by the police officers. The trial court, so far as can be determined from its decision, totally disregarded Exhibits "C", "E" and "B-5," the alleged
uncounselled confessions. The trial court made very clear the bases of its conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged; those bases did not include the alleged confessions:

First — M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan testified that they saw the accused carrying the carton (Exhibit
"B") when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That the bus conductor pointed to accused
at the checkpoint of Sabangan, Mountain Province. That accused is the owner of the carton (Exhibit "B"). That the
carton (Exhibit "B") which contained four packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4")
was fished out from under the seat of the accused which fact was admitted by the accused himself.

Second — That per testimony of Dra. Danna Aleta, she examined accused Bonifacio Barros and that he suffered no
physical injuries that would show that the accused was in anyway maltreated by the police authorities, and this fact was
also admitted by accused to the effect that he was never harmed by the police nor the soldiers. Dra. Aleta also found
that the accused was under the influence of drug[s] and that the accused admitted [to] her that he, accused, smoked
marijuana. This is clear evidence that accused is not only a pusher of marijuana but also a user of said prohibited
drugs. (See Exhibits "F" and "F-1" and TSN — Page 24 — Orpecio).

Third — The samples taken from Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" sent by the court for laboratory test at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet were all positive of marijuana per Report No. D-011-88 (Exhibits "I" and "I-1") of Captain
Carlos Figueroa, forensical expert.

Lastly, accused's testimony in his own behalf does not impress the court at it lacks the ring of truth. Besides, it is devoid
of any corroboration. Our Supreme Court in this respect said:

The weak and uncorroborated denial of the accused cannot prevail over the clear, positive and straightforward
testimony of prosecution witnesses [sic]." (People vs. Acelajao, 148 SCRA 142)." 6

We turn, therefore, to the second legal defense asserted by appellant Barros — i.e., that his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures had been violated by the police authorities. The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2],
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witness as he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. . . .

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above quoted constitutional
provision. The evidence secured thereby — i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure — will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in
7

any
proceeding. 8

The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There
are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct
9

searches of moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant
before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. In 10

carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither
really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection.
In Valmonte vs. De Villa, the Court stated:
11

[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is
not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
(Citations omitted)

When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible
only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal
offense. 12

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations
where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
13

Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep
14

penetration" agent that prohibited drugs be brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had
15

received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and
other identification papers when requested to do
so; and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the
16

accused would be transporting marijuana. 17

In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the record of this case any circumstance which constituted or could have
reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying of
such a box by appellant onto a passenger bus could not, by itself, have convinced M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan either that
the appellant was a law violator or the contents of the box were instruments or the subject matter or proceeds of some criminal offense. The
carrying of carton boxes is a common practice among our people, especially those coming from the rural areas since such boxes constitute
the most economical kind of luggage possible. The peace officers here involved had not received any information or "tip-off" from an
informer; no such a "tip-off" was alleged by the police officers before or during the trial. The police officers also did not contend that they had
detected the odor of dried marijuana, or appellant Barros had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and taking a seat during
the trip to Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned the carton box later ascertained to contain four (4) kilos of
marijuana. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James
Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any
such probable cause.

M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as testified as follows:

Direct Examination by Fiscal Moises Ayochok:

Q: On September 6, 1987, do you recall if you reported for duty?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And where did you go on the morning of September 6, 1987?
A: I went to Sabangan, sir.
Q: What transportation did you use?
A: Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ-242.
Q: Where did you board the Dangwa Bus?
A: At the Dangwa Terminal at Bontoc.
Q: When you said you boarded the bus with Plate No. ABZ-242 which started for Baguio City from Bontoc, Mountain Province, and while it
stopped at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, was there anything that happened?
xxx xxx xxx
A: When the bus stopped at Sitio Chackchakan, we saw a person carrying a baggage or carton and boarded the bus then took his seat, seat No.
18.
Q: What was he carrying that time Mr. witness?
A: A carton.
Q: And where did he place that carton which he was carrying?
A: In front of seat No. 18 where he sat.
Q: You mean inside the bus?
A: Yes.
Q: And after this person boarded the bus at sitio Chackchakan and holding a carton and placed it in front of seat No. 18, what happened to the
bus afterwards?
A: It proceeded to Sabangan.
Q: And at Sabangan, Mountain Province, what happened, if any?
A: The bus stopped for the routinary checkpoint and inspection.
Q: When they [were at] the routinary checkpoint, what happened?
Atty. Sokoken:
He did not say routinary checkpoint. He said routinary inspection.
Fiscal Ayochok:
We substitute the words inspection with checkpoint to satisfy the objection of counsel.
Q: What happened when you stopped for the routinary inspection?
A: We called C2C Bongyao a member of the detachment to inspect the baggage of the suspect and when C2C .
Atty. Sokoken:
We request that [the] witness answers the question that he testifies [to] not in the narrative way.
Fiscal Ayochok:
He is answering the question.
Court:
Let the witness finish.
A: When Bongyao inspected the baggage of the suspect and he found out that it contained MJ.
Q: What do you mean MJ?
A: Marijuana.
xxx xxx xxx18

For his part, S/Sgt. James Ayan testified as follows:

Direct Examination:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And in the morning of September 6, 1987, do you recall where you were particularly in the afternoon?
A: In the morning of September 6, 1987, we rode on a Dangwa bus [with Plate] No. ABZ-242 going to Sabangan.
Q: You said we. Who was your companion that time?
A: Master Sgt. Yag-as, sir.
Q: And when this bus reached Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, what did you see?
A: We saw a civilian board the bus we were riding carrying a carton.
Q: And where did this civilian who boarded the bus which you were riding on place that carton?
A: He placed the carton under the seat of No. 18.
Q: Inside the bus, Mr. witness?
A: Inside the bus, sir.
Q: And what about the passenger who boarded the bus carrying the carton baggage, where did he go?
A: He sat facing the seat No. 18.
Q: Between seat No. 18 and the seat seated by the civilian who brought the carton, where was the carton exactly located?
A: As far as I know, sir, it was located just beneath seat No. 18.
Q: When this bus which you rode on which the passenger carrying the carton luggage you saw reached Sabangan what happened there?
A: When the bus reached Sabangan that we were riding, it was stopped for routinary inspection.
Q: What happened next?
A: We called C2C Bongyao to inspect the baggage that we have just seen at Chackchakan.
Q: Did he inspect the baggage?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was the contents of that baggage if there was any?
A: It turned out that the contents of the baggage was MJ sir.
Q: You mean marijuana?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Cross Examination:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You stated that on September 6, 1987, a Dangwa bus stopped at Sabangan, Mt. Province for purposes of military check-up, is that correct?
A: Routinary inspection, sir.
Q: But it was not you who entered the Dangwa bus for routinary check-up?
A: We were there riding in the bus, sir, and we called C2C Bongyao to come.
Q: So your purpose in riding inside the Dangwa bus was actually to see that person carrying this carton which is marked Exhibit "B"?
A: No, sir, because I am a detachment commander at Sabangan and that is why I called one of my men, sir.
Q: So that you have full knowledge that from Chackchakan, Bontoc, going to Sabangan, there is already marijuana being carried inside that bus?
A: That is only our suspect [should be suspicion], sir.
Q: Would you please tell this Honorable Court why you have not inspected it when you arrived at Alab? Why have you waited to reach
Sabangan to inspect it?
A: Because it is the checkpoint, sir, at Nacagang, Sabangan.
Q: Are you now admitting that you do not have authority to inspect the baggage here in Bontoc?
A: We just wanted it checked in Sabangan, sir.
Q: Could you give us a very special reason why you have to wait in Sabangan?
A: Because we are stationed in Sabangan and that is the checkpoint.
Fiscal Ayochok:
Why argue with the witness? It is up for them to check it at the proper checkpoint.
Court:
Sustained.
xxx xxx xxx 19

The testimony of C2C Fernando Bongyao is much briefer, but equally uninformative:
Direct Examination:
Q: On September 6, 1987, at around 9:30 a.m., do you recall having reported for duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And while you were on duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, was there anything unusual that happened that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that Mr. witness?
A: When we were on the checkpoint, the bus stopped bearing Plate No. ABZ-242.
Q: When the bus stopped, what did you do?
A: While on my way to check the bus, Master Sergeant Yag-as and Ayan called for me, sir, and they told me that a carton was placed under seat
No. 18, sir.
Q: And when you were told to inspect that carton under seat No. 18, did you inspect that carton?
A: I inspected it, sir.
Q: You said you inspected that carton, what did you do in inspecting that carton?
A: I inserted my hand inside and when I removed my hand, it was a stuff of marijuana, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 20

So far as the record itself is concerned, therefore, it would appear that there existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited
the suspicion of the two (2) police officers riding in the same bus as appellant Barros. They asked the police officers at the checkpoint at
Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried by appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess that appellant Barros might be carrying
something in the nature of contraband goods. There was, in other words, nothing to show that appellant Barros was then in the process of
"actually committing" or "attempting to commit" a crime. There was, moreover, nothing on the record that could have reasonably led the two
21

(2) police officers to believe that "an offense [had] in fact just been committed" when appellant Barros boarded the bus at Chackchakan or
when he was asked whether he owned the box here involved at the checkpoint in Sabangan. The two (2) police officers, according to the
record, had no "personable knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it." There was, in
brief, no basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally non-permissible and
invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the four (4) kilos of marijuana — should therefore not have been admitted in
22

evidence against appellant Barros.

The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant Barros had waived any irregularities which may have attended his arrest.
Presumably, the Solicitor General also argues that appellant Barros has waived the non-admissibility of the carton (Exhibit "B") which
contained four (4) packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"). The Solicitor General said:

. . . [E]ven assuming in gratia argumenti that irregularities attended the arrest of appellant, still the same cannot be
questioned at this late stage. Well-settled is the doctrine laid down in the case of Callanta vs. Villanueva (77 SCRA
377), and later reiterated in the more recent case of Bagcal vs. Villaraza (120 SCRA 525), that "posting of [a] bail bond
constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person and estops him from questioning its validity." Here,
appellant had in fact posted the required bail to obtain his provisional liberty, albeit his application was subsequently
denied (see TSN, Feb. 10, 1988, p. 65). Consistent with jurisprudence, therefore, he should be deemed to have waived
any irregularity attending his arrest, if any there be, and cannot now be heard to assail the same. 23

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure
may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected
with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop as accused from
questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe,
however, that waiver of the latter (by, e.g., applying for and posting of bail) necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former —
an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless
arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and
seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional
grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution. We consider that appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under
24

the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during during the
trial.

In the dissenting opinion, my learned brother Melo, J. takes the view that appellant Barros had waived his rights by his "stoic deportment"
consisting of failure to object to the search by the police authorities immediately after the opening of the carton box:
 . . . In point of fact, when the police authorities inspected the carton of marijuana and asked accused-appellant who
owned the box, accused-appellant denied ownership of the box or carton and failed to even mutter the least bit of
protest (p. 3, Decision). His demeanor should therefore be construed as implicit acquiescence to the search inasmuch
as the objection thereto is vulnerable to express or implied waiver (People vs. Kagui Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]);
1 Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, First ed., 1987, p. 108). . . . .
25

It is submitted, with respect, that Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the case at bar; rather it is People vs. Burgos, promulgated fifty (50)
26

years after Kaqui Malasuqui, that is applicable. In Burgos, this Court ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the
unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object" —

. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out
by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson vs. Zerbts, 304 U.S.
458). (Emphasis supplied) .
27

Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case, because there the Court explicitly found that there was probable cause for the
warrantless arrest of the accused and therefore, the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter was equally lawful. In Kagui
Malasugui, a Chinese merchant was found lying on the ground with several nasty wounds in the head; one resulted in skull fracture and
proved fatal. He died in the hospital to which he had been immediately brought by a policeman. Mr. Malasuqui became a suspect because
when the victim was found, still alive, and upon being asked who had attacked him, laconically answered, "Kagui." On the same day, the
accused Kagui Malasugui was arrested and a search of his person was conducted without objection from the accused. Before the body
search of the accused was carried out, the accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities a couple of bracelets belonging to the
deceased victim and when asked if he had anything else to surrender, he, in a trembling voice, answered in the negative. The police
thereupon conducted a body search of the accused, without any objection from him; the search resulted in the production of additional
personal effects belonging to the deceased victim. Under these circumstances, the Court ruled that:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from
complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

A propos my distinguished brother Melo, J.'s suggestion that the right against an unlawful warrantless search or arrest is personal and may
not be invoked by the accused's counsel during trial, it is relevant to note that the law (the Rules of Court) specifies the proper time when
objections to admission of evidence must be raised and that in the case at bar, a timely objection was made by appellant Barros. Finally, the
accused's silence during the warrantless search should not be lightly taken as consent to that search, but rather construed as explained by
the Court in Burgos, and as pointed out by Mr. Justice Laurel, a "demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."
28

It is, of course, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been guilty of transporting the four (4) kilos of marijuana. His guilt must,
however, be established by constitutional means. The non-admissibility of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right of
the accused against unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by the Constitution for disregard of such right; the sanction
is a powerful one, for it renders inutile the work done by the police officers, by the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is a sanction which this
Court has no choice but to apply in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain Province, in Criminal Case No.
687 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence lawfully before the trial
court not being sufficient to establish his guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.

Method of arrest by officer without warrant, Sec. 8, Rule 113

Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. — When making an arrest without
a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause
of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is
pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before
the officer has opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest. (8a)

Method of arrest by private person, Sec. 9, Rule 113 (Citizen’sarrest)

Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. — When making an arrest, a private

person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of
the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued
immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the
person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest. (9a)

Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, Sec. 26, Rule 114

Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. — An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall
resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the
case. (n)

Overturns Rolito Go v. CA (That once the accused has posted bail, he waived his
right to question any defect in the issuance of the warrant of arrest)

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig,
M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along
1

Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started
travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped
each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A
security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene
of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land
Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they were informed that
petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used
by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively
identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police
launched a manhunt for petitioner.

On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the
police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police
station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio
2

("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that
he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.

On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan,
died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder before
3

the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and
proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
4

conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being
granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.

On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail
5

recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond posted by 6

petitioner and ordered his release. Petitioner was in fact released that same day.
7

On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation and prayed that in
8

the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of
petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.

Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set
9

for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which
10

granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which
granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.

On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991
Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of
his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his
petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.

On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.

By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991.

On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.

On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his
custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court
entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3,
11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11

On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view of public respondent's
failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he
was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.

On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the
13

one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that
that motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness.

On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
14

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had been
"freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police
station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one
witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.

b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to
preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had the
inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial
judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial
Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.

On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of
Appearance" with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
15

On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing
respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court.

In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected
by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.

In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant.
Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work,
petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station
Commander, etc., et al., one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc.,
16

v. Ramos, et al. where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in
17

connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the
Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after
the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was
arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none
had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.

The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil
v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days
after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were
subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner
was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one
had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."

Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the
meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting
be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover,
none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too
that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:

Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting office or person

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation
by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a
responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding
rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with
the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)

is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2)
lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the
police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation
to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for
petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the
preliminary investigation.

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from the
very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for
murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor,
and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of
petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be
conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information
for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the
time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, this Court held:
19

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn,
 as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should
the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action.While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal
may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the
People to due process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
[such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court
he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. . . . (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
20

Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo
v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the
information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's
omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was
that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary
investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary
investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus,
even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was
applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with.

We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is statutory rather than
constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The
21

right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably
exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any
one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him
the full measure of his right to due process.

The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was
already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke
it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary
22

investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari,
prohibition and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.

Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation.
In People v. Selfaison, we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their
23

arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." In 24

the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had
thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his
release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when
the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's
claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of
the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect
the jurisdiction of the trial court.
25

It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an
acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the
17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been
submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.

The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the merits has already commenced,
the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly,
petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the
charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail?

Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial
on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
accorded to petitioner. It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that
26

probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not
warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way
of procedural due process. Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with
27

extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so
"kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for
arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment
precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and
28

objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio.
During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial
without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection." Petitioner had promptly gone to the
29

appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness
of his detention. If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely
30

loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use
what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may
move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the
evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively
obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the
Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the
vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this
point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not
be idleceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation
and determination to respect those rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby
SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against
petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the
merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Almonte v. Judge Bien, 461 SCRA 218

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

In a verified, sworn administrative complaint[1] directly filed with this Court, herein complainant, Thelma Almonte, charges
herein respondent, Judge Fred A. Bien,incumbent Acting Presiding Judge of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San
Jacinto-Monreal, 5th Judicial Region, San Jacinto, Masbate with gross ignorance of the law in connection with respondents
preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 4598, a prosecution for robbery filed with respondents court at the instance of Isauro
Lique against the complainant and her husband, Jaime Almonte.

Complainant alleges that after conducting a semblance of a preliminary investigation by an ex-parte inquiry on Isauro Lique,
the respondent judge, in his order of April 24, 2002, [2] directed the arrest of complainant and her husband and fixed their bail for
provisional liberty at P40,000 each.

Complainant avers that respondent judge disregarded the procedure for preliminary investigation, as provided under Section
3(b) and (c), Rule 112, of the Revised Rules of Court. She claims that she and her husband were deprived of their right to due
process because they were not given copies of the complaint for robbery, nor were they summoned by the respondent judge to
appear before him and present their counter-affidavits and other supporting documents.

On May 20, 2002, complainant, through counsel, filed in Criminal Case No. 4598 a Motion To Quash Or Cancel The Order
Dated April 24, 2004 Directing The Issuance Of The Warrant Of Arrest Of Accused Herein And Fixing The Bail Bond For Their
Provisional Liberty And The Warrant Of Arrest Itself.[3] However, in his order of June 25, 2002,[4] the respondent judge denied the
motion, relying on the ruling of this Court in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals[5] that once an accused posted his bail bond, he thereby
waived his right to question any defect in the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

Complainant asserts that the respondents denial of their aforementioned motion is another manifestation of the latters
ignorance of the rules of procedure, arguing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that admission to bail shall not
bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, provided that he raised them
before entering his plea. Not having been arraigned yet, complainant argues that she has all the right to question the validity of the
warrants of arrest issued against her and her husband.

In the same administrative complaint, complainant further avers that prior to the filing of the robbery case against her and her
husband by Isauro Lique, they had caused the filing against Lique of a criminal case for acts of lasciviousness for molesting their 9-
year old daughter, Brenda Almonte, which case is still pending with the Regional Trial Court at Masbate, Branch 48 (Family Court).
Complainant asserts that Lique maliciously filed the complaint for robbery in order to compel her and her husband to drop the earlier
criminal case for act of lasciviousness they filed against him.

In his COMMENT[6] dated March 10, 2003, respondent judge wants it placed on record that he is: (1) the Acting Presiding
Judge of the MCTC of both San Jacinto and San Fernando, Masbate; (2) the Judge-Designate of some of inhibited cases in the
MTCC, Masbate and MCTC of Aroroy, Masbate; and (3) the Presiding Judge of the MCTC of Dimasalang, Masbate, his permanent
station.

In the same COMMENT, respondent admits having conducted on April 24, 2002 the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case
No. 4598; that after finding the existence of a probable cause, he issued the warrant of arrest against complainant and her husband
and fixed a bail bond of P40,000 each for their provisional liberty, as required under the first stage of preliminary investigation; that
although no subpoenas were issued to the accused, such an omission was an honest mistake on his part in the performance of his
duties, and not due to his ignorance of the law or procedure, adding that he had been extra-careful and diligent in the discharge of
his duties, dispensing justice without delay, fear or favor; that in fact, his April 24, 2002 order was even affirmed by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Masbate City which eventually filed an information for Robbery against complainant and her husband before
the Regional Trial Court at San Jacinto, Masbate.

As regards his denial of the Motion To Quash Or Cancel The Order dated April 24, 2002, etc., (supra) filed by complainant
and her husband, thru counsel, in Criminal Case No. 4598, respondent, by way of explanation, reproduced in his COMMENT the full
text of his denial Order of June 25, 2002,[7] to wit:
This is a Motion to Quash or Cancel the Order dated April 24, 2004 Directing the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest Herein and Fixing the Bail
Bond for their Provisional Liberty and the Warrant of Arrest Itself, filed by accused thru counsel Atty. Ruben Joel A. Puertollano in the above-
entitled case.

Accused alleged that this Court did not observe the provisions of Sections 3, 5 and 6 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended relative to the conduct of the preliminary investigation and before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

Records of the case would readily show that when this instant motion was filed on May 20, 2002, the Court also received an Order of Release
issued by the Hon. Cristobal M. Bailon of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, San Jacinto, Masbate commanding the Jailer of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, San Jacinto, Masbate to release from custody accused Thelma Almonte for having posted the required bail bond.

In the case of People vs. Rolito Go, the Supreme Court held that once an accused has posted his bail bond, he waives his right to question any
defect in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. For this reason, the instant Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest issued by this Court has now
become moot and academic.

As to the allegation that the Court did not observe the provisions in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of warrant of
arrest, it is worth recalling that basically the preliminary examination has two phrases or stages. The first is the preliminary examination. It is here
where the Court conducts an ex parte inquiry on the prosecution witnesses based on their sworn statements in the form of searching questions and
answers. After this, if the Court believes that there is a probable cause that the crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, then the Court will issue a warrant of arrest in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

When the accused has already been arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court, and has been committed for detention, the
Court immediately issues a subpoena to the accused requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence for the
evaluation of the Court. This is the second stage of the preliminary investigation.

It is submitted that the Court has correctly applied the rules on the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, and it finds no justifiable reason to quash or cancel the order dated April 24, 2002 and the warrant of arrest itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to DENY the instant Motion to Quash or Cancel the Order dated April 24, 2002
and the Warrant of Arrest.

SO ORDERED. (Underscoring by respondent himself).

Respondent judge submits that the aforequoted Order is in accordance with law and with what he honestly believed as correct
and proper, and not on his alleged ignorance of the law and procedure, as charged by complainant.

In her Reply to Comment,[8] complainant expresses the belief that respondent judge issued the warrants of arrest in Criminal
Case No. 4598 without giving her and her husband notice and chance to file their counter-affidavits to favor Isauro Lique.
Elaborating thereon, complainant asserts that if respondent judge is truly not ignorant of the law, as he claims, then it could well be
that his intention in forthwith issuing the warrants is for her and her husband to be immediately arrested and detained, such that if
they could not post bail, Lique would have a bargaining leverage for the dropping of the case for acts of lasciviousness then pending
against him. Complainant also points out that Liques complaint for robbery was directly filed by the latter with the Municipal Trial
Court of San Jacinto, Masbate without reporting the alleged robbery incident with the local barangay authorities or with the
Philippine National Police of San Jacinto, Masbate.

Complainant also contends that respondent judges argument to the effect that a preliminary investigation has two stages or
phases is misplaced. She asserts that respondent judge obviously applied Section 6, Rule 112 of the old Rules on Criminal
Procedure which has been already amended by the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000.
She posits that under the new rules, respondent judge cannot take cognizance of the crime of robbery since it is not within the
jurisdiction of the MTC or the MCTC, hence improper for him to issue a warrant of arrest without waiting for the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation, explaining that only when the offense charged is within the original jurisdiction of the MTC or MCTC that a
judge thereof may issue warrant of arrest without waiting for the termination of the preliminary investigation if he finds after
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a
probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice.

On the basis of its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) which initially acted on the subject administrative
complaint recommended that: (1) the same be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; (2) respondent judge be fined in the
amount of P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law; (3) he be reprimanded in his capacity as a member of the Philippine Bar for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and this be reflected in his record at the Office of the Bar Confidant; and (4)
respondent judge be sternly warned that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

In separate resolutions both dated February 23, 2004,[9] we redocketed the present case as a regular administrative matter
and required both parties to manifest whether they are amenable to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. In
their respective manifestations, complainant and respondent judge expressed their willingness to submit the case based on the
pleadings filed, which manifestations were noted by us in our Resolution of July 19, 2004. [10]

After a thorough examination of the OCAs evaluation report and the records on hand, the Court finds merit in the
recommendation of the Court Administrator.

Doubtless, the root of the controversy is respondent judges unfamiliarity with the rules applicable in cases requiring
preliminary investigation.

It is the stance of respondent that there are two stages or phases of preliminary investigation; that he was only in the first or
the preliminary examination stage when he issued the warrants of arrest against the Almonte spouses after examining the
complaining witness Isauro Lique and after finding the existence of probable cause that a crime had been committed; and that the
issuance of subpoenas to the accused requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and other evidence would only be after they
shall have been arrested (the second stage or the preliminary investigation proper).

Obviously, the respondent judge failed to keep track with the developments in law and jurisprudence.

In Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Judge Efren Albano[11] and reiterated in Bagunas vs. Fabillar,[12] this Court
ruled that under the new rules of procedure, preliminary investigation has only one stage, viz:
[U]nder the old rules, the preliminary investigation conducted by a municipal judge had two stages: (1) the preliminary examination stage during
which the investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where
the complaint or information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced against him, after
which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911, upon which the present rule is based, removed
the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now, the proceedings consist only of one
stage.

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure for conducting a preliminary investigation:

Section 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as
well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2)
copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer
oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he
is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the
investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy
them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the
respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the
requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit
his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The
respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating
officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at
the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be
asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period
for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the
respondent for trial.

Here, respondent judge disregarded the procedure for preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 4598. As it were, he
merely took the statement[13] of therein complainant Isauro Lique, and, on that very same day, terminated his investigation and
issued warrants of arrest[14] against the couple. The spouses Almonte were not furnished with the copies of the complaint for
robbery, thereby denying them the chance to examine the same and the evidence submitted by Lique. Nor were they given the
opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and supporting documents. If anything else, the respondent judges actuations in the
premises only betray his ignorance of procedural rules and reckless disregard of the accuseds basic right to due process.

Further demonstrating respondents deliberate disregard of the law, if not his gross ignorance of the same, is his misplaced
reliance in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals. According to respondent judge, he denied the Almontes motion to quash the warrant of
arrest because of this Courts ruling in Rolito Go that once an accused has posted bail, he waived his right to question any defect in
the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the New Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, application for bail or the admission to bail is
no longer considered as a waiver of the accuseds right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest as regards its attendant illegalities
or irregularities. The provision reads:

Sec. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack or irregular preliminary investigation. - An application for or admission to bail shall
not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court
shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

We are not unmindful of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment which judges may commit. In the same breath, however,
judges are expected to show more than a mere cursory acquaintance with elementary rules of procedure as well as settled
authoritative doctrines.

For sure, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. [15] As
advocates of justice and visible representation of the law, they are expected to keep abreast with the developments in law and
jurisprudence, and to be proficient in their application and interpretation thereof. When a law or a rule is basic, a judge owes it to his
office to simply apply it; anything less than that is gross ignorance of the law. [16]

The OCA recommends that we impose a fine of P10,000 upon the respondent judge. Given respondents proven gross
violation of the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct, we are in full agreement with the recommended penalty.
 WHEREFORE, herein respondent Judge Fred A. Bien, incumbent Acting Presiding Judge, MCTC, San Jacinto, Masbate is
hereby declared GUILTY of gross violation of Section 3, Rule 112, Section 26, Rule 114, of the Revised Rules of Court, and Rule
3.01, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and, as recommended, is hereby meted the penalty of fine of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000), with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Search incident to lawful arrest, Sec. 13, Rule 126

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)

- Scope of search should be limited to the area within which the arrestee can reach
for a weapon or for evidence in order to destroy it

(Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752)

FACTS: Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary.
Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's
residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts
upheld the conviction.

ISSUE: Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth
Amendment as "incident to that arrest?"

RULING: In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are
limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search
and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from rummaging through
the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and
probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse.

People v. Mortos, G.R. No. 103632, Sep. 1, 1993: Buy-bust operation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROGELIO MORTOS y TOLENTINO, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1of the Regional Trial Court convicting accused-appellant Rogelio Mortos of
violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act which provides:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of
the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. (As amended by PD No.
1675, February 17, 1980)

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the afternoon of January 5, 1990, an informant reported to the Criminal Investigation Service in Cainta, Rizal a
certain person who was selling marijuana in Sitio Ruhat, Mambugan, Antipolo, Rizal. Accordingly, a buy-bust team
composed of C1C Rogelio Dado, Sgt. Romeo Savillo, C1C Manuel Mercader, and C2C Ronald Villacruzes was
organized. Thereafter, the team accompanied by the informant proceeded to the aforementioned place where
informant identified the person who was sought to be arrested. Afterwards, the group carried out the plan for the
arrest of the suspected pusher.
C1C Manuel Mercader alighted from the vehicle, walked towards Rogelio Mortos who was then in a sari-sari store
where several people were present, and acting as the poseur-buyer, inquired from the latter if he was selling
marijuana. When Rogelio Mortos answered in the affirmative, Mercader handed him five (5) marked twenty (20)
peso bills. He was then asked to wait while Rogelio Mortos got the marijuana from the sari-sari store. Upon his
return, Rogelio Mortos handed to Manuel Mercader a plastic bag containing 50 grams of marijuana. Upon receipt
thereof, he scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to the rest of his team who thereupon approached the two
and arrested Rogelio Mortos. They confiscated from him the marked money and tea bags of marijuana. These were
later presented as evidence against accused-appellant.

Rogelio Mortos, however, denied selling marijuana. He claimed that he was buying cigarettes from the sari-sari
store when he was arrested and brought to the police station where he was allegedly forced to sign a document
and five (5) twenty peso bills. 2He also averred that no marijuana or marked bills were ever seized from him.

After trial, the lower court pronounced the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the
appealed decision reads as follows:

ALINSUNOD SA MGA NASABI, dahilan sa napatunayan ng taga-usig nang walang bahid alinlangan na si Rogelio
Mortos y Tolentino, ang nasasakdal ay nagkasala ng krimeng Paglabag sa Pangkat 4 ng Artikulo II ng Batas
Republika 6425 (na sinusugan noong 1972, 1980, at 1982), siya ay pinapatawan ng Hukuman, sang-ayon sa
nasabing batas ng parusang habang buhay na pagkabilanggo; at magbayad ng multang DALAWAMPUNG LIBONG
PISO (P20,000.00).

Dahil sa siya ay isang bilanggo, ang panahong inilagi ni Rogelio Mortos y Tolentino sa piitan ay ibabawas sa
nasabing parusa kung siya ay sasang-ayon sa mga disciplinary rules na inilalapat sa mga bilanggo alinsunod sa
Artikulo 29 ng Bagong Kodigo Penal na sinusugan Batas Republika 6127 at Batas Pambansa Blg. 85.

WALANG KOSTAS.

ITO ANG IPINAG-UUTOS.

As basis for the judgment of conviction, the trial court relied upon the testimony of the apprehending officers,
namely Manuel Mercader, Domingo Dado, and Romeo Savillo, all of whom identified Rogelio Mortos as the drug-
pushing suspect who was apprehended during the buy-bust operation and testified that Rogelio Mortos was caught
in the act of selling marijuana to Rogelio Mercader. It held that the testimonies of the above-mentioned officers
sufficiently established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding his denials in his
testimonies. According to the trial court, the accused did not succeed in imputing malice on the part of the
arresting officers for arresting and testifying against him.

Accordingly, the trial court applied the rule that public officers are presumed to have performed their duties in
accordance with the law. Furthermore, the trial court held that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the officers
were minor and instead of destroying the credibility of their testimonies, buttressed the same.

Rogelio Mortos now appeals his conviction with this sole assignment of error, to wit:

The Court a quo committed a reversible error in admitting the tea bags of marijuana and the twenty peso bills
adduced in evidence by the prosecution.

The assignment of error goes beyond the issue regarding the admissibility as evidence of the marked money and
marijuana. In effect, it questions the manner by which accused-appellant has been arrested and brought to trial.

In the Appellant's Brief, Rogelio Mortos argued that the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Courts 5regarding warrantless arrests are not applicable because he has not committed, nor was he committing,
nor was he about to commit a crime when he was arrested. For his arrest and for the search to be valid, therefore,
a warrant of arrest and a search warrant were necessary.

We find no reason to reverse the trial court's judgment.

After a careful review of the records, we are convinced that the prosecution successfully overcame the initial
presumption of innocence enjoyed by the accused and proved the latter's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To recall,
the arresting officers, including the officer who acted as the poseur-buyer, positively testified that Rogelio Mortos
was caught selling marijuana.

To rebut the testimony of the prosecution, the defense presented Rogelio Mortos to testify that he had been
coerced into signing a document and five (5) twenty peso bills. Apart from this testimony, however, no other
evidence was presented to support his denial. Neither the document nor the bills which were alluded to in Rogelio
Mortos' testimony were presented as exhibits for the defense. If there were any bills on record, they were the ones
which were offered as evidence by the prosecution. Furthermore, accused did not even reveal to the Court the
contents of the alleged document. We find that Rogelio Mortos' denials did not successfully cast doubt on the
veracity of the testimony of prosecution's witnesses. "[T]he absence of evidence as to improper motive actuating
the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive
existed, and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit." 6Paraphrasing this Court's pronouncement
in People v. Arceo, 7we hold that appellant's denial of guilt, uncorroborated by any reliable evidence, cannot
possibly overthrow the clear and convincing testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses as to his culpability.
In People v. Cruz, 8we also said: "We sustain the rule that police officers in buy-bust operations are entitled to the
presumption of having acted pursuant to official duty. Their testimony is entitled to great respect."

The fact that accused-appellant was arrested during a buy-bust

operation - ". . . a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto 9- has been established. Since accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, the arresting officers were
not only authorized, but were under obligation to apprehend him even without a warrant of arrest. 10Thus, the
arrest of accused-appellant falls within paragraph (a) of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court. 11

[S]ince appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was also valid. 12
This
is in accordance with Sec. 12, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court which provides inter alia:

Sec 12. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof for the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

From the foregoing, it necessarily follows that because the marijuana and the marked money were taken from the
accused during a valid arrest following entrapment, they can be legally admitted as evidence against herein
accused-appellant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401

PADILLA, J.:

In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is
as follows:

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the
country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to
Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.

At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to
Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of
the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902. 1

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional
Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay,
Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the
said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had in his possession prohibited drugs. 2

The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area
at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their
inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer
asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it
was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered,
the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped
objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2)
travelling bags from the luggage carrier.

Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the
officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags
that accused finally presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the
investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken
from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus,
an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects.
He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned
by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple
intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and
asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other Identification papers, he handed to one of
the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers.
The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused
that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The
trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.

The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise such defense at the
earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the
hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about
said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.

In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
3

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him
GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.

Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad
Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.

SO ORDERED. 4

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal
effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the
illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest
5

without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 6

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and
he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
7

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of
accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was
then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The 8

required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to
the facts of each case.
9

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause,
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
10 11

attempted to flee.
12

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had
prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that
accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada
to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police
13

authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons
engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-
the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the
passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused,
during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification
papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to
do so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious
failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused
was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless
search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to
open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as
the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide
his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even
without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment
of society.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
accused-appellant.

Inquest, Sec.6, Rule 112, When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.
Section 6. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense
which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace office directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party
or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he
must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding
the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time
he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule. (7a;
sec. 2, R.A. No. 7438)

Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation, R.A. No.

7438 (April 27, 1992)
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS
THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF

xxxxxx

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.–

(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.

(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person
for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer. lawphi 1Ÿ

(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is
signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately
explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known
to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and
signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of
the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest
or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding.

(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and
void and of no effect.

(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of
his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family
or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by
 any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family"
shall include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt,
nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting
preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.

Bail during P.I., Sec. 17(c), Rule 114

Sec. 17 (c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held.

Motion for Reinvestigation or Motion for P.I., Sec. 6, Par. 3,Rule 112

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary

investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing,
ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense
as provided in this Rule.

RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1987 Constitution: Sec. 2, Art. III: Right against unreasonable search and seizure shall
be inviolable

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Purpose: to protect the privacy and sanctity of the person and of his house and other
possessions against arbitrary intrusions by State Officers.

When unreasonable: without the issuance of a valid warrant from the authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrant of arrest.

Requisites of a valid Warrant:

- must have probable cause (pc)
- PC must be determined personally by a judge
- such judge must examine under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce
- the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized

Probable Cause
- it means such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that are
in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them
Probable Cause for the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
- it means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested

Probable Cause for the issuance of a Search Warrant

- it means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and the object sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched

Allowable Warrantless Searches

1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 16)
a) the item to be searched was within the arrestee’s custody or area of
immediate control;
b) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest

2) Seizure of evidence in plain view

a) a prior valid intrusion into a place;
b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are;
c) the illegality of the evidence must be immediately apparent;
d) and is noticed without further search

3) Search of a moving vehicle – there must be a highly reasonable suspicion

Amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.

4) Consented warrantless search

a) such right must exists;
b) that the person involved had knowledge of the existence of such
right either actual or constructive;
c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

5) Customs search or seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties;

6) Stop and Frisk
7) Exigent and Emergence Circumstances

Sec. 3(2), Art. III: Exclusionary Rule, “inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding”

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

General rule: Search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant
Reasonable warrantless searches and seizures, per jurisprudence:
1. Search incident to lawful arrest, Sec. 13
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view”

Padilla v. CA, G.R. No. 121917, Mar. 12, 1997

ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents. (summarized)

FRANCISCO, J.:

On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of
petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla
 Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 [2] thru the following
Information:[3]
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite
rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357
caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro
Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and
permit to carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW."[4]
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,[5] but granted his application for bail.[6] During the
arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, [7] upon
advice of counsel,[8] to make any plea.[9] Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in any and all
stages of the case.[10]
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting
petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum".[11] Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. [12] Pending the appeal in the
respondent Court of Appeals,[13] the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows strong
evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of
this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's
conviction,[14] the dispositive portion of which reads:
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given credence
by respondent court, is as follows:[26]
"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny
Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took
shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on
motorcycles (pp. 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang
noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the
vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular,
he said thus: 'Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7, ibid). True enough,
immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a
sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had
happened, remarked 'oy ta na' signifying that Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or
shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid).Manarang, being a member of
both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the
incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and called
the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time
Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general
direction to the north (p. 11, ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody (p.
11, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and
chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle
as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1993). He called the Viper through the radio once again (p.
34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run
accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the
second radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the
vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its Patrol
Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan
C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and
positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way going
to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office
and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2 Buan was Mobile
No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp.
8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p.
8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to
intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and run incident,
even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the
Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15,
1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan bridge
because he knew Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge,
he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p.
10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and informed them that there was a hit and run
incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon learning that the two police officers already knew about the incident,
Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang was in front of Tina's
Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner
adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in
front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the
Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN,
February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from their position, the two
police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light and
drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p.
11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2
Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p.
12, ibid). The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They
recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with
him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his
motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which
appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that
when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked on the left side of his waist was
revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid).SPO2 Borja made the move to
confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers
(p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal papers, it would
have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit
and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at
the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p.
20, ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and
SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police officer in the
group, SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit
and run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was
dangling and the railing and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his
misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3
Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-15, ibid).Because appellant's jacket
was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right
pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking and
proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting
that appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado
prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-
17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It
had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked
appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were at his home (pp.
26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession
of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-
32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with
a single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live
bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and
one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated by the
Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street
beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene
Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant admitted possession of
the firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to produce any permit to
carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain, Senior Inspector Mario
Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4,
1993). The Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite
rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-
A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated
 December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the
name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that
he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the
subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel
punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no
warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the
Abacan bridge illegal.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person.[29] Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle
figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then
sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the
arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND
proceeds at once to the scene."[30] As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed
by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter
gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having
sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found
responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected
the actual arrest of petitioner.[31]
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who
actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. [32] We beg to disagree
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest
which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an
urgent need to render aid or take action.[33] The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit,[34] a fleeing
suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which
speed is essential and delay improvident.[35] The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible
stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the
vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.[36] Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. [37]
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending
an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. [41]Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside
from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence,
placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.[42] Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner
patently waived such irregularities and defects.[43]
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, [44] are
as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court[45] and by prevailing jurisprudence[46],
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47]
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[48]
3. search of a moving vehicle.[49] Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes
a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity.[50]

4. consented warrantless search, and

 5. customs search.

In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled
upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. [51] The seizure of the
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back
pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification
applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as
they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. [52] Thus
it has been held that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers
should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of
the corpus delicti."[53]
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure
even without a warrant."[54]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's
conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is
AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED

Elements of Plain View Doctrine

(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle (also, vessels and aircrafts);

Reason Qualification for motor vehicles

People v. Bagista, G.R. No. 86218,Sep. 18, 1992

Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the decision dated September 26, 1988 of the Regional
Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs.

The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City,
received information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with
naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2" or 5’3", would be transporting marijuana from up north. 1
Acting upon this piece of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a
civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Upon arriving at said location at
around 11:00 o’clock that same morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles,
both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana
leaves on board. 2

After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and
body number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and
thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they
were going to search their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the rear of the bus while Sgt. Fider
began inspecting the bags in the front. 3

While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as one is facing
the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap.
Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted
clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later
brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and investigated. The woman was
then identified as Accused-Appellant. 5 The confiscated bundles were subjected to laboratory
examination, and found positive for marijuana. 6

Accused-appellant’s defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was engaged in the buying and
selling of vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus
at Abatan, Benguet, bringing with her ten (10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain
Maria Opino in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she approached the conductor for her ticket to cover
the fare for her sacks of cabbages, but was told by the latter that he would attend to her later.

When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the NARCOM agents who boarded the same
and began inspecting the baggages of the passengers. Accused-appellant claimed that the bag
containing the marijuana was taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats. When nobody
admitted owning the bag, the NARCOM agent approached her, took the shoulder bag on her lap, and
asked her to come with them for investigation as she fits the description of the would-be transporter of
the marijuana given by the NARCOM informer. She denied having anything to do with the marijuana
found on the bus.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

To corroborate her story, Accused-appellant presented the conductor of the Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor
Yangkin. He testified that when the NARCOM agents boarded the bus at Tublay, Benguet, one of them
got a bag from the luggage carrier, opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked the
passengers who among them owned the bag; when nobody answered, he walked to the back of the bus,
all the time looking at the faces of the passengers. When the agent approached accused-appellant, who
was seated at the rear of the bus, the former talked to her, then escorted her out of the bus. 7

During Yangkin’s cross-examination, it came out that the 10 sacks of vegetables that were loaded at
Abatan were brought by a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival at the
Dangwa Station in Baguio City but that the owner of the sacks would be riding in the bus. And yet,
Yangkin did not seek out the alleged owner of the sacks. The witness also testified that none of the
passengers approached him and offered to pay for the fare of the sacks, 8 contrary to accused-
appellant’s testimony.

In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the testimony of Sgt. Parajas credible. Said the
court a quo:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

". . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and straightforward as he gave all the requisite
details of the entrapment operation they conducted based on an information provided by a
coordinating individual. His testimony reveals that the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found
on the lap of the accused. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt. Parajas was moved by any
motive than simply the carrying out of his official mission or duty. Where there is no evidence and
nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People
v. Francia, L-69253, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 495)." 9

The trial court brushed aside the defense’s observation that there were discrepancies between the
testimony of Sgt. Parajas and the evidence presented, such as the color of the bag allegedly taken from
accused-appellant and the kind of marijuana taken from the bag, as immaterial. Similarly brushed aside
was the defense’s contention that the evidence against accused-appellant, such as the Receipt of
Property Seized 10 and her signature thereon, 11 and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 12 and her
signature thereon, 13 were inadmissible due to the absence of counsel, since these were not
confessions or extra-judicial statements.

Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the testimonies of accused-appellant and her witness
Nestor Yangkin, in view of the testimony of Sgt. Parajas that he took the bag containing the marijuana
from accused-appellant’s lap. Moreover, the court a quo observed that there was a discrepancy
between the testimonies of accused-appellant and Yangkin on the matter of the 10 sacks of cabbage,
which led the court to conclude that the former was in the act of transporting marijuana at the time of
her arrest.

Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the marijuana leaves found in the bag
taken from her was inadmissible in evidence as it was the product of a warrantless search, which motion
was denied by the trial court for lack of merit on November 22, 1988.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Aggrieved, Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, alleging that the court a quo erred (1) in not
finding the warrantless search conducted by the NARCOM agents as illegal and unconstitutional, and (2)
in admitting the illegally obtained evidences and convicting her on the basis of said evidences.

Accused-appellant is in error.

The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be
subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a
search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 14 The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned
right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a
moving vehicle, 15 and the seizure of evidence in plain view. 16

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought. 17

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches
of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. 18

The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from
the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their
regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellant’s
belongings since she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant.

Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the
course of said search is admissible against Accused-Appellant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in the court below on the inadmissibility
of the evidence against her on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. This
amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence
obtained therefrom. 19 Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to admit the evidence. 20

Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove accused-appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag
containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellant’s possession.

She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the luggage carrier
above the passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what
actually happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-
appellant’s apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this, the
matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because,
unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and
attitude of the witnesses at the trial. 21 The exception is when the trial court has overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result, 22 which We do not find in the
instant case.

Moreover, Accused-appellant’s defense was weakened by the fact that her witness Nestor Yangkin
contradicted her on the matter of the 10 sacks of vegetables appellant claims to have brought with her
at the time of her arrest. Appellant claims she loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay
for its fare, but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims otherwise: the sacks of vegetables
were loaded by a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City,
and that no one on the bus offered to pay for the same.cralawnad

In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater weight must generally be given to the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than the denials of the Accused-Appellant. 23

Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly disregarded the corroborative testimony of
Nestor Yangkin. The matter of the ownership of the 10 sacks of vegetables is material since appellant’s
reason for being on the bus was to deliver these sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not
hers, then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way to Baguio City to sell the
marijuana found in her possession.

As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution’s case, such as the color of the stripes of the bag
which contained the marijuana and whether the items seized from accused-appellant were marijuana
leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the prosecution’s
case since it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, 24 which was signed by accused-appellant,
that these were the very items taken from her at the time of her arrest.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against Accused-Appellant.

4. Consented warrantless search

People v. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221 (1936)
DIAZ, J.:

At about 5:30 o'clock in the morning of March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, was found lying on the ground,
with several wounds in the head, on a path leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato, and situated within the property of another Chinese
named Yu Enching Sero. Tan Why received a wound on the upper part of his forehead, which necessarily proved fatal because it fractured
his skull. He died as a result of this wound shortly afterward in the Cotabato Hospital where he had been brought by an agent of authority
with the aid of some laborers who had gone to the scene of the crime.

The death of Tan Why was imputed to the herein accused who was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. He was convicted of
said crime and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to return the sum of P150 to the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Tan Why in the sum of P1,000, with costs. The accused appealed therefrom and assigns five errors as committed by
the lower court, which may be briefly summarized as follows:
 (1) In not having granted him a period of twenty-four hours to prepare his defense;

(2) In having denied his petition for the return of the articles taken from him during the search of his person, without the
corresponding judicial warrant;

(3) In having admitted Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, L and L-1, as evidence in the case;

(4) In having denied his petition to dismiss for lack evidence, filed immediately after the fiscal had finished presenting his
evidence; and

(5) In having found him guilty of robbery with homicide, instead of acquitting him.

When Tan Why was found on the morning in question, he was still alive and able to answer laconically "Kagui", when Moro Alamada, was
among the first to approach him, asked who had attacked him. The appellant was known by this name in Cotabato, whereupon Lieutenant A.
Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered his immediate arrest. The accused was arrested shortly after eight o'clock in the morning of the same
day, and after he had been brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, who had already been informed, that he had just redeemed two pairs of bracelets
from some pawnshops of Cotabato and that he carried money, said lieutenant asked him for the bracelets and he then voluntarily and
without protest produced what now appear in the record as Exhibit A. He was later searched, without opposition or protest on his part, and it
was discovered that he also had the pocketbook (Exhibit B), containing P92 in bills (Exhibit C), Tan Why's identification card and a
memorandum of amounts with some Chinese characters (Exhibit D). In one of the pockets of his pants was found some change, making the
total amount of money found in his possession P92.68.

Tan Why, the deceased, carried the pocketbook, Exhibit B, as he did on former occasions, a few hours before his body was found in the
condition and under the circumstances above stated. Before he left his home between 4.30 and 5 o'clock that morning, he had it full of bills
because he was, as usual, on his way to purchase palay in Carcar as part of his work. The memorandum of amounts, Exhibit D, found in the
pocketbook, Exhibit B, is in Tan Why's handwriting; and in the afternoon before his death he was given by Kaw Tin of the Mindanao Rice
Industrial Company the sum of P150 to be invested in the purchase of palay, in addition to the P80 that remained of the amount previously
delivered to him.

The appellant had to be searched after he had voluntarily produced the bracelets Exhibit A and placed them on Lieutenant Jacaria's table,
because, upon being asked if he had any thing, he tremblingly answered in the negative.

The foregoing facts are inferred from the testimony of the government witnesses Alamada, Chua Sian, Kaw Tin, Yap Sea, Lieutenant
Jacaria, and Police Sergeant Urangut.

Alamada testified that the deceased, shortly before he died, Kagui as his aggressor, and the appellant was known by this name in Cotabato.
He also testified that on the morning in question, he saw the appellant, with a club in his hand, pass by the house where he and the
deceased lived. The club, Exhibit M, then with bloodstains, was found near the place where Tan Why was wounded.

Chua Sian, an employee of the deceased, identified the pocketbook Exhibit B saying that it was the same that the deceased used to carry
whenever he went to make purchases; that it was usually kept in a box at Tan Why's store; that the deceased in truth carried it when he left
his store on the morning of March 5, 1935, to purchase palay, and that it was then full of bills.

Kaw Tin, cashier of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, in turn, testified that on the night before the crime, he gave the deceased, at the
latter's request the sum of P150 to purchase palay, inasmuch as he was a buyer of said commodity for the company in Cotabato.

About four meters from the place where Tan Why's body was found, there was a coconut tree with two dangling leaves, as if they were so
arranged intentionally to hide anybody who might post himself near the trunk. At the very place where the tips of the leaves touched the
ground, there were footprints presumably of somebody who had posted who had posted himself there in ambush, without being seen: the
fresh footprints exactly the same size as the appellant's foot; and the said bloodstained club was found very near the place. Such was the
testimony of Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Eusebio de los Santos who inspected the scene of the crime, particularly the latter who did so
early in the morning and took said measurements with the aid of Exhibit E which is a part of a reed-grass leaf.

The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and through intimidation taken from him the
bracelets (Exhibit A), the pocketbook (Exhibit B) and all the money which he carried (Exhibit C); and that, but for the printing thereon, the
identification card found in the pocketbook then was blank and there was no memorandum of the kind of Exhibit D, in Tan Why's handwriting,
inside the pocketbook, thereby, insinuating that it was Lieutenant Jacaria who typed or caused to be typewritten on the card Tan Why's name
and personal data and who placed Exhibit D in the pocketbook. There is nothing of record to corroborate the appellant's imputation to said
two officers; and it is unbelievable that they so acted because they were induced by no other motive than to comply with their duties as
agents of authority. The appellant permitted them to search his person and to take from him the articles in question to be used as evidence
against him in due time; at least, he neither made any objection nor even muttered a bit of protest. Consequently, his contention that he was
subjected to the rigor of an unreasonable search to dispossess him of his effects without judicial warrant, and that the court should have
ordered their return to him when he so formally requested before the trial, is unfounded. When one voluntarily submits to a search or
consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th
ed., vol. I page 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly. On the other hand, the appellant was then charged with the crime, imputed to him by Tan Why before the latter's
death, of having assaulted the "deceased; that he was then also known to be carrying much money; and that a few moments before he was
brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, and shortly after the assault on Tan Why, he was able to redeem two pairs of bracelets from two persons to
whom he had pledge them several months before. These are circumstances which undoubtedly warranted his arrest without a previous
judicial warrant, only upon a verbal order from said officer to Sergeant Urangut, or of the latter's own will, inasmuch as he had direct
knowledge of the aggression committed on the person of Tan Why, his violent death, the revelation made by Tan Why before his death
naming the appellant as the author of the of the aggression, and the other circumstances already stated. This is so because under the law,
members of Insular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the municipal police and of chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and even
of townships (secs. 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and 2383 of the Revised Administrative Code) may make arrests without judicial warrant, not only
when a crime is committed or about to be committed in their presence but also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect
that one has been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by them. (U. S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472; U.
S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U. S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853.) An arrest made under said circumstances is
not unlawful but perfectly justified; and the agent of authority who makes the arrest does not violate the provisions of article 269 of the
Revised Penal Code which defines and punishes unlawful arrest, nor infringe the constitutional precept relative to the inviolability of one's
right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures; as either provision of law permits, like
the above cited sections of the Revised Administrative Code, the making of arrests without judicial warrant, when there exist reasonable
motives therefor so that the person arrested may be brought to the corresponding authority. In fact such was the appellant's state and
circumstances when he was searched and his alleged effects (Exhibits A, B, C and D with Tan Why's identification card) were taken from him
and, such being the case, it was proper, perfectly lawful, prudent and even necessary, in order to avoid any possible "surprise or aggression
from the appellant, in the search to be made and the effects in question seized by the persons concerned, to be presented, as they were in
truth presented to the competent authority. Section 105 of General Orders, No. 58 reads:

A person charged with a crime may be marched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the crime.

Article III, section 1, paragraph (3), of our Constitution is identical in all respects to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States; and said constitutional precept has been interpreted as not prohibiting arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but
only those that are unreasonable.

In United States vs. Snyder (278 Fed., 650), it was said:

The Fourth Amendment, providing that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized," contains no prohibition
of arrest, search, or seizure without a warrant, but only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures.

When the search of the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the effects found in his possession are incidental to an arrest made in
conformity with the law, they cannot be considered unreasonable, much less unlawful.(Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 652, citing
favorably 1 Bishop, Crim. Proc., sec. 211; Wharton, Crim. Pl. & Pr., 8th ed., sec. 60; Dillon vs. O'Brien, 16 Cox, C. C., 245, Ir. L. R. 20 C. L.,
300; Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439; United States vs. Welsh, 247 Fed., 239; United States vs. Kraus, 270 Fed., 578, 582, par. 7;
Garske vs. United States, 1 Fed. [2d], 620; King vs. United States, 1 Fed. [2d], 931.) In this last case it was said:

In these circumstances of search and seizure of defendant engaged in the commission of a felony, and of which the officers had
reliable information and cause to believe, there is nothing unreasonable within the import of that term in the Fourth Amendment.
After the amendment, as before it, the law necessarily sanctions arrest, search, and seizure of persons engaged in commission of
a crime, or reasonably believed to have committed a felony, without any paper warrant. This case is so plain that it suffices to say
so.

Anent an identical question, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in United States vs. Snyder, supra, said:

To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant,
would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances.

The appellant contends that the lower court did not grant him even twenty-four hours to prepare his defense, thereby denying him the right
afforded to every accused by section 30 of General Orders, No. 58. We have carefully examined the record and found nothing to convince us
that said court had in truth refused to grant him time for said purpose. To be entitled to said time as a matter of right, the interested party
must expressly ask for it, inasmuch as the law so prescribes. The truth, however, is that the appellant not only did not ask for it but, after his
petition for the return of his effects to him had been denied, he forthwith asked, through his counsel, to be arraigned and to proceed with the
trial.

The appellant likewise contends that there was error in the admission of the evidence Exhibits A, B, C, and D, alleging that they had been
taken from him through force and intimidation. The record shows that before proceeding with the trial in the lower court, the appellant asked
for the return of said effects (Exhibits A, B, C, and D) to him on the ground that they were unlawfully taken away from him. Leaving aside the
foregoing considerations, his testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient to counteract that of the government witnesses, Lieutenant
Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who testified that when Lieutenant Jacaria asked him what other things he carried, after having voluntarily
placed the two pairs of bracelets, Exhibit A, on the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt his body, he did not show the least opposition. It follows,
therefore, that the lower court committed no error in accepting as evidence Exhibits A, B, C and D, not only because the appellant did not
object to the taking thereof from him when searched, but also because the effects found in his possession of a person detained or arrested
are perfectly admissible as evidence against him, if they constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto. (Adams vs. New
York, 192 U.S., 585; 24 Sup. Ct., 372; 48 Law. ed., 575; Weeks vs. United States, supra; People vs. Mayen, 205 Pac., 435.) It is certainly
repugnant to maintain the opposite view because it would amount to authorizing the return to the accused of the means of conviction seized
from him, notwithstanding their being eloquent proofs of crime, for him to conceal, destroy or otherwise dispose of, in order to assure his
impunity.

The appellant attempted to prove that the money found in his possession had been given to him, on different occasions, by the witnesses
who testified in his favor, as Kagui Guialal, Kagui Patak, Kakim, Akun or Amay Indo. Kagui Guialal, in truth, testified that he had given the
accused P90, two days before the latter's arrest; Kagui Patak, P45, on two occasions, one month, and two weeks, respectively, also prior to
his arrest; and Kakim and Akun or Amay Indo, P22.50 and P20, seven and five days, respectively, before the day of the crime. These four
witnesses are all relatives of the appellant; and if it were true that the latter had enough money several days prior to the aggression and
death of Tan Why, the natural thing to assume is that he would have not redeemed the two bracelets Exhibit A, precisely on the very morning
in question. Furthermore, their testimony did not destroy the unexplained finding in the appellant's possession, of the deceased Tan Why's
pocketbook, containing much money, and the latter's personal papers. In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the
possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the
aggression and death of said person and of the robbery committed on him (U.S. vs. Merin, 2 Phil., 88; U.S. vs.Divino, 18 Phil., 425).

The facts which we consider as having been fully established in view of the foregoing considerations, constitute the crime of robbery with
homicide defined and punished with reclusion perpetua to death in article 249, subsection 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Inasmuch as no
aggravating circumstance had been proven and the penalty imposed by the lower court is in accordance with law, taking into consideration
the rules prescribed in article 63 of said Code, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, except that part thereof containing a
pronouncement in favor of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, a strange party to the case, which should be entirely eliminated; and it is
ordered that Exhibits B (pocketbook), C (money), D (memorandum of amounts) and Tan Why's identification card be delivered to the latter's
heirs, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

5. Customs search (Tariff and Customs Code)

Exception: search of a dwelling house
 6. Stop and frisk (Terry searches, from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, Sep. 29, 1989 (En Banc)
PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the
respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.

Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its
capacity as an association whose members are all members of the IBP.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive
to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
1

installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their
safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars
and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant
and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the
Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off
inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints
where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been
2

harassed.

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to
declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks,
the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.

In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National
Police, it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as
3

real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been
infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a
4

judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military
manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against
unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against
unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
7

looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
8 9

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected
in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and
the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.

Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in
the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the
Metropolitan Police Director. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances

Definition of “probable cause” for warrantless searches

People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 (1998)

ROMERO, J.:

With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers tend
at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched
constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the
clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos.[1]
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the court a
quo found the following:

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain Aling Rosa would be
arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.
Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and
Sgt. Efren Quirubin.

While thus positioned, in a Victory Liner Bus two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out
to the team Aling Rosa who was then carrying a travelling bag.

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.

Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked Cash Katutak. The team
confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated
marijuana leaves.

Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted accused-
appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City
in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[2]
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger
who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched must be
specifically designated and described.

2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM agents, still no court
would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.

3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the latters
constitutional rights.

These submissions are impressed with merit.

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.[12]
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies
on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is
required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown
by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,
and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. [13]
 In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent
any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person
arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a
reexamination of the facts. The following have been established:(1) In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law
enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving
for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large
volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory
Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3)The law
enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello
about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried
marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the arrival of
Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle
was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the police could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a
warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was
held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the
warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under
Section 5 of Rule 113
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had
she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a
crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of
accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the second
exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still
had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a search of a moving
vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended several
minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not while
inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by government
agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the
NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely
crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to
flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the
paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency
circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building
was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of
armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated
requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed
and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being
committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be
said in the instant case.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[36]
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil
that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.[37]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she
is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
 Cases where police officers, using their senses, observed facts that led to the suspicion:
Manalili v. CA, 345 Phil. 632 (1997)

The above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited
drug and knowing the same to be such

Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that
they were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, dated July 5, 1994, which
was adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves
was waived because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their
admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search
was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the
landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,[18] a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):

x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may
properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken. [19]

In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime
prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and
manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable
cause to make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden
discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have
hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone;
paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It would
have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years experience to have failed to investigate this
behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that
what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge.[20] Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a
fruit of the poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule:

SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
 This right, however, is not absolute.[21] The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search incidental to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver
by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. [22] In People vs.
Encinada,[23] the Court further explained that [i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made only
with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable
cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction
by law is in the place to be searched.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search
without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals ,[24] the Court held that there are many instances
where a search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of
which is stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped
petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioners bag one
.38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear
gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to
search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much
too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quowhile obtaining
more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that
appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member
of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug
addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if
he was actually high on drugs.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor Generals contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto
during the trial.

People v. Solayao, 330 Phil. 811 (1996)

ROMERO, J.:

Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, with
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Nio, narrated that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 9, 1992,
with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, he went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran,
Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify reports on
the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. [2]
From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Nio proceeded to Barangay Onion where they met the
group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they observed that the
latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.Accused-
appellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled. [3]
Police Officer Nio told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized
the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm
locally known as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm or
whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission
to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the
policeman of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm. [4]
Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was only
given to him by one of his companions.
On August 25, 1994, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearm. It found that
accused-appellant did not contest the fact that SPO3 Nino confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no permit
or license to possess the same.
Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following errors:
In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in
evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that the search made on his person
violated his constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant but it did not fall under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides, inter alia:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."

Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence for
being "the fruit of the poisonous tree."[11] As such, the prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the accused-
appellant acquitted.
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et al.[12] where this Court
declared: " emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in
order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on
evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law."
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments are hardly tenable. He
and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Nio's group, as well as the fact that he
himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit[13] and that upon espying the peace officers, his
companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports
that armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. [14].
In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified himself as a
government agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense
of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming around in the
barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their
suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was
carrying hid a firearm.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor
was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.
As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second element, that is, the absence
of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General which
pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant lacked the necessary permit or license to
possess the subject firearm.
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution. The
absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of
firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.[18]
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and ordered immediately released unless there are
other legal grounds for his continued detention, with costs de oficio.

Search warrant defined, Sec. 1

Requisites for issuing search warrant, Sec. 4
Examination of Complainant, Sec. 5
Issuance and form of search warrant, Sec. 6
Personal property to be seized, Sec. 3; The enumeration is exclusive.

Court where application for search warrant shall be filed, Sec. 2

Malaloan v. CA, 232 SCRA 249

Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file, Sec. 14

Where to file motion:

The Exclusionary Rule (Sec. 3(2), Art. III, 1987 Constitution) or Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree Doctrine
Stonehill v. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738 (1967, per C.J.Concepcion, En Banc)
People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, Jul. 30, 2014
People v. Marti, 193SCRA 57 (1991)
Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, Feb. 29, 2012

Right to break door or window to effect search, Sec. 7

Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of twowitnesses, Sec. 8
(mandatory)
 People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743
Time of making search, Sec. 9
Validity of search warrant, Sec. 10
Receipt for the property seized, Sec. 11 (mandatory)
Cf. Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 (Inventory of confiscated/seized drugs)
Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return andproceedings thereon,
Sec. 12; Violation or non-compliance constitutes contempt of court