Page 1 of 20
Rule 116 – ARRAIGNMENT/PLEA 1996 Order. According to respondent judge, the following transpired in his sala on 3
1. Gamas v. Judge Oco, March 17, 2004
FACTS:
- This is a complaint for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law filed by
complainants Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrio (complainants) against Judge
Orlando A. Oco(respondent judge), former[1] Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato (MTC Polomolok) and SPO4
Willie Adulacion (respondent Adulacion), a police prosecutor in the MTC Polomolok.
- In their Complaint (Complaint) and supporting affidavits, complainants allege that
they are the accused in a case for theft[2] which, at the time material to this case,
was pending in the sala of respondent judge. As respondent judge had issued
warrants for their arrest, complainants on 3 October 1996 went to the
MTC Polomolok to post bail. Complainants allege that
respondent Adulacion enticed them to plead guilty to the charge, apply for
probation, and thus avoid imprisonment.
- Respondent Adulacion, who had allegedly prepared a draft decision embodying
his suggestion, conferred with respondent judge, and handed the draft decision
to respondent judge. After reading the document, respondent judge signed it, told
complainants O, plead guilty man kamo (O, youre pleading guilty), and handed
the document to a clerk. Respondent judge told the clerk to read the contents of the
decision to complainants and to instruct them on what to do. The clerk read the
contents of the document to complainants and asked them to sign it.
Complainants signed the document upon respondent Adulacions assurance
that once the police apprehend the rest of the accused,[3] the police will revive
the case and respondent Adulacion will present complainants as star witnesses.
Complainants later found out that what they signed was an Order[4] (3 October
1996 Order) finding them guilty of theft and sentencing them each to
imprisonment for six (6) months and one (1) day.
- Finding the proceedings highly irregular, complainants sought the assistance of
a lawyer. Upon motion of complainants counsel, respondent judge vacated the 3
October 1996 Order, ostensibly on the ground that complainants had entered
improvident guilty pleas. Respondent judge scheduled complainants re-
arraignment on 2 February 1997.
- In the present complaint, complainants contend that respondent judge is
administratively liable for rendering judgment against them without the benefit
of an arraignment and in violation of their right to be represented by counsel.[5]
- In his Answer (Answer), respondent judge denied complainants allegations regarding
the alleged procedural irregularities in the issuance of the 3 October
October 1996:
XXX 2. On [the] session day [of October 3, 1996,] prosecutor
Willie Adulacion with two men who turned out to be complainants,
Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrioapproached me. It was Adulacion who
talked. He stated that these two have long pending warrants of arrest and
they cannot afford to file P10,000.00 bail. They were charged of theft of corn
worth P4,500.00. x x x They were caught with two others who are their
relatives hauling 3 or 4 tricycle loads of corn cabs [sic].Adulacion said
that Gamas and Sobrio asked him to propose to the judge
that Sobrio and Gamas would plead guilty, but be meted the most minimum
penalty, allowed probation and after which they be released [on] their own
recognizance because they cannot file their bailbonds.
XXX 11. [Thus], there was arraignment and that their plea of guilt was
voluntary.
XXX 14. So it is clear that before deciding I
arraigned Gamas and Sobrio upon their demand for instant solution to their
predicament. Before arraignment I counseled them of their rights and I even
warned them the exact penalty I will give them. There was no lawyer in
attendance but the lawyer was their problem. I heard them saying that since
they were caught carrying the corn, a lawyer would not have much use,
moreover they expressed they have no money to pay for a lawyer.I argued
that I can give them a PAO lawyer but they insisted they plead guilty so that
all will get done without jailing them that instant.[6]
- We referred this matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Polomolok, South Cotabato (RTC Polomolok) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
- On 7 December 2000, Executive Judge Eddie Roxas (Executive Judge Roxas) of
RTC Polomolok submitted his Report (Report), finding respondent judge liable
for simple neglect of duty and recommending the imposition of P10,000 fine on the
latter.
- On 31 January 2001, we referred the Report to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
- In its Memorandum dated 11 May 2001, the OCA, while agreeing with the findings
of Executive Judge Roxas, finds respondent judge liable not for mere simple
neglect of duty but for gross ignorance of the law. Accordingly, the OCA
recommends that respondent judge be fined P20,000.
Page 1 of 20

ISSUE/S:
-
RULING:
- The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA well-taken.
- Respondent Judge Failed to Properly Apprise Complainants of their Right to
Counsel
 The Constitution mandates that [I]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall x x x enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel.[10] Indeed, the accused has a right to representation by
counsel from the custodial investigation all the way up to the
appellate proceedings.[11] At the arraignment stage, Section 6 of
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
 SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel.
Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right
to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the
accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed
counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to
defend him. (Emphasis supplied)
 Section 6 of Rule 116 means that:
[W]hen a defendant appears [at the arraignment] without [an]
attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 It
must inform the defendant that it is his right to have [an] attorney
before being arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the
court must ask him if he desires the aid of attorney; 3 If he desires
and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign [an]
attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to
procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefor.[12]
 Compliance with these four duties is mandatory.[13] The only
instance when the court can arraign an accused without the
benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right and the
court, finding the accused capable, allows him to represent
himself in person. However, to be a valid waiver, the accused
must make the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.[14]In
determining whether the accused can make a valid waiver, the
court must take into account all the relevant circumstances,
including the educational attainment of the accused. In the
present case, however, respondent judge contends that
Page 2 of 20
complainants waived their right to counsel and insisted on their
immediate arraignment.
 After reviewing the records and taking into account the
circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that respondent
judge did not properly apprise complainants of their right to
counsel prior to their arraignment. Consequently, there was no
basis for complainants alleged waiver of such right.
- Respondent Judges Arraignment of Complainants Highly Irregular
 Section 1(a), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states:
Arraignment and plea; how made. The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was
filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open
court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy
of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language
or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty
or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other
than those named in the complaint or information.
 We have explained the rationale, requirements, and compliance
of this rule in this manner:
[S]ection 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be
made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court
[1] furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information
with the list of witnesses stated therein, then [2] reading the same
in the language or dialect that is known to him, and [3] asking him
what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading
be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands
and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said
Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law
affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him
and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the
necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of
the due process clause under the Constitution.[20]
 We subscribe to Executive Judge Roxas finding that respondent
judge similarly failed to comply with the requirements of Section
1(a) of Rule 116. Complainants deny respondent judges claim
that he arraigned complainants by read[ing] to them [the
information] in the dialect they understand and inform[ing] them
Page 2 of 20

[of] the nature of the evidence arrayed [against
them].[21] However, there is no disputing that respondent judge
failed to furnish complainants a copy of the information with the
list of the witnesses.
 The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are
not empty rituals that a judge can take lightly. Each step
constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal
litigation where the issues are joined x x x and without which the
proceedings cannot advance further.[22] Respondent judge may
have genuinely desired to spare complainants the travails of
being detained in jail, thus the rush in arraigning them, accepting
their guilty pleas, imposing a light sentence, and granting them
probation. While well-intentioned, such conduct unjustifiably short-
circuited the mandatory arraignment procedure in Section 1(a) of
Rule 116.
- WHEREFORE, we find respondent Orlando A. Oco, former Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law.Accordingly, we FINE respondent Orlando A. Oco P20,000, to be taken from his
withheld retirement benefits. The complaint against respondent Willie Adulacion is
DISMISSED
2. Hao v. People of the Philippines, 735 SCRA 312, 2014
FACTS:
- Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, filed by Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of
the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision2 dated February 28, 2006 and resolution3 dated
June 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289. These CA rulings affirmed the February 26,
20044 and July 26, 20045 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
which respectively denied the petitioners' motion to defer arraignment and
motion to lift warrant of arrest.6
- On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa
- Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where
Ngo was the manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s
advice to deposit his money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of
return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan
Hao, who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an
incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the
recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return. 8
Page 3 of 20
- Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). This initial investment
earned the promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, toincrease his
investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his
investments through several checks he issued in the name of State Resources. 9 In
return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for his
investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen
Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos
(₱114,286,086.14). All these checks10 were subsequently dishonored when Dy
deposited them.
- Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored
checks. Ngo promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo
already resigned from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he
confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia
invested his money in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s husband,
Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dy’s
money.
- On the basis of Dy’s complaint12 and supplemental affidavit,13 the public prosecutor
filed an information14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-
accused. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to
respondent RTC of Manila, Branch 40.
- Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other
accused. Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment
and motion to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of
probable cause against them and the pendency of their petition for review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ).15
- In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners’ twin
motions.16 The petitioners moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this
in its July 26, 2004 order. Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for
certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
- The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and motion
to lift warrant of arrest.
- Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still
probable cause to believe that the petitioners committed the crime of simple estafa. 21
The Petition
- XXX Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were
null and void.
ISSUE/S:
Page 3 of 20

- that this case may properly proceed to trial, where the merits of both the parties'
RULING:
The Court’s Ruling
- We resolve to DENY the petition.
- We note that the present petition questions the CA’s decision and resolution on the
petition for certiorari the petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners
imputed grave abuse of discretion against the trial court for the denial of their twin
motions to defer arraignment and to lift warrant of arrest.
- This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya
v. Transmed Manila Corporation25 where we faced the question of how to review a
Rule 45 petition before us, a CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this
cited case the kind of review that this Court should undertake given the distinctions
between the two remedies. In Rule 45, we consider the correctness of the decision
made by an inferior court. In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on jurisdictional
errors.
Suspension of Arraignment
- Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be
suspended if there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending
at either the DOJ, or the Office of the President. However, such period of suspension
should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office.
- As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November
21, 2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their
arraignment should be suspended indefinitely.
- We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not
an unqualified right.1âwphi1 In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang,47 we explained that while the
pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to
deny the motion to defer arraignment.48
- As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the
petitioners' petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of
the petitioners' arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the
petitioners' motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.
- As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed
because of the petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their
erroneous invocation of the Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the
petitioners' commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now ensue so
Page 4 of 20
evidence and allegations may be weighed.
- WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM
WITH MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners
Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge. The
warrants of arrest issued stand.
3. Bandoy v. Judge Jacinto Jr., November 19, 2014
FACTS:
- For review before the Court is this administrative case against respondent
Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. (Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branches 451 and 46,2 San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy
(Bandoy) for Grave Abuse of Authority in relation to Criminal Case No. 2-
1928,3 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Caspar Bandoy, Peter Alfaro and
Randolph Ignacio" and Criminal Case No. Z-1910, entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Romulo De Jesus, Jr."
- Complainant Bandoy alleged, in his verified complaint,4 that he was one of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 2-1928, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by
Romulo De Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus, Jr.),which was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC,
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge Jacinto, Jr. as the
Assisting Presiding Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De Jesus,
Jr.
- Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel
Panaligan during the 2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their
municipality’s public elementary school, was one of the chairpersons of the
Board of Election Inspectors; that they were both assigned in Precinct 3-A of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to be closely
associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire),
son of House representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa)and Mayor Jose
Tapales Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in the said
local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of ballot switching, which was
captured on video by a member of the media, a certain Randy Bool; that by virtue of
a search warrant from the Commission of Elections (COMELEC), De Jesus, Jr.
was caught in possession of some ballots inside his backpack; and that as a
result of this incident, De Jesus, Jr. was criminally charged with the offense of
ballot switching. Accordingly, on August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest was issued
against De Jesus, Jr.5
- According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr. personally appeared
before Provincial Prosecutor Levitico Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious
Page 4 of 20

Illegal Detention against him, Peter Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election
Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty. Lorenzo). Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did
this while there was a standing warrant of arrest against him. Worse, De Jesus,
Jr. remained at-large until he was able to post bail on March 7, 2008 before then
Las Pinas RTC Judge Raul B. Villanueva.6 Because complainant Bandoy was
charged with Serious Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended "no
bail" leaving them incarcerated for more than two years.7
- Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his
authority by displaying manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr.
when he granted several postponements of De Jesus, Jr.’s arraignment,
originally scheduled on April 23, 2008,8 but was reset for seven times until De Jesus,
Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s chambers on
July 6, 2011.9
- Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were mostly due to De
Jesus, Jr.’s non-appearance for failure to locate him at his given address.
Despite these supposed obvious court defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient
and seemingly tolerated his continuous non-appearance in the court’s subsequent
scheduled hearings.
- Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration and filed a
petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ)to have the serious
illegal detention case against them dismissed. Meanwhile, co-accused Atty.
Lorenzo filed a separate petition with the Court of Appeals (CA)and won the
case. The Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against her. At first, the
DOJ denied their petition. Upon reconsideration, however, the DOJ, under the helm of
Justice Secretary Leila De Lima, directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Occidental Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal of the case against Bandoy and his
co-accused.10 Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed its Motion to
Withdraw Information.
- Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order,11 dated July 5, 2011, denied the motion to
withdraw information. In the end, Bandoy was only able to regain temporary
freedom when Judge Jacinto, Jr. finally resolved12 to allow him to post a bail
bond
- Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge
Wilfredo De Joya Mayor (Judge Mayor) became the assisting presiding judge of
Branch 44. It was during this time that the case for serious illegal detention was
temporarily dismissed, but upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to
reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case of ballot
switching against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on October 25, 2012, 14while their bail
for the serious illegal detention case was cancelled. 15
- In its Report,32 dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
did not give credence to Bandoy’s allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an
order for his arrest without a warrant and to the insinuation that the Court’s audit
team was conveniently housed in Aroma Family Hotel of the Villarosas for failure to
present proof.33The OCA observed, however, that Judge Jacinto, Jr. never
refuted the allegations of leniency over the several resettings of the arraignment
of De Jesus, Jr. and that the arraignment was held in his chambers.
Page 5 of 20
- Thus, the OCA recommended that:
1. The administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Jose S.
Jacinto, Jr., Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, be RE-DOCKETED as regular administrative
matter; and
2. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found GUILTY of Bias
and Partiality and Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure
and, accordingly, be FINEDin the amount of Forty Thousand
Pesos (₱40,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.35
ISSUE/S:
-
RULING:
The Court's Ruling
- The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.
- Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and
procedure, the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross
ignorance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a)
thereof requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in open court, to wit:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. – (a) The
accused must be arraigned before the court where the
complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The
arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk
by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known
to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other then those
named in the complaint or information.
- Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was
postponed from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action coming from the court.
Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed of known legal remedies to compel De
Jesus, Jr. to personally appear for his arraignment, but he did not. The
appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an
impression of bias and partiality that should be addressed and corrected.
Page 5 of 20

- WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality.
Accordingly, he is FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand (₱40,000.00) Pesos
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
4. Daan v. Sandiganbayan, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
- Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
24167-24170, 24195-24196,[1] questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his
plea bargaining proposal.
- Said accused,[2] together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged
before this Court for three counts of malversation of public funds. xxx Thus,
in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted
before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a
public officer or employee.
- In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not
guilty and substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not
guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in
the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not
guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of
an accountable officer to render accounts.
- Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable
the proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public
document by a private individual.
- The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,[4] dated March 25, 2004,
denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation
by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to
justify its approval.[5]
- The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution dated May 31, 2004.
- Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his plea bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an
accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on
a routinary basis, negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is
only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.[6]
Page 6 of 20
ISSUE/S:
-
RULING:
- The petition is meritorious.
- Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge.[7]
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused,
with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed
by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the
proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining
to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,[8] viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars
of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of
evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to
admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of
trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
Page 6 of 20

(f) such matters as will promote
a fair and expeditious trial of
the criminal and civil aspects
of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions
made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced
in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they
cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering
the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved
by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
- But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has
finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is
immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it
was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.[9]
- Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon
which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor,[10]and that the plea of guilt should be to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules
however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make
such plea.[11] Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter
offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. [12]
- In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,[13] the Court ruled that the acceptance of
an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as
a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court,[14]
- In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground
that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would
redound to the benefit of the public.
- Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's
plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play
dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted.
- In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,[20] the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution
dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the
prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie Atong Ang. The agreement provided that
the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and promises to return
the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement,
the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and
whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his
earlier plea of not guilty; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a
Page 7 of 20
lesser offense; and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation
to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is Plunder.[21]
- The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by
the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the present case.
- In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to
hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of
Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by
Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of
his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of
the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.
- Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this
case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such
lesser offenses.
- WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25,
2004 and May 31, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to
grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to
the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
5. Lumanlaw v. Peralta, February 13, 2006
FACTS:
- Vexatious, oppressive, unjustified and capricious delays in the arraignment violates
the constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy case disposition, particularly when
the accused is detained. Under the circumstances of the present case, mandamus is a
proper remedy for relief from prolonged detention.
- Before us is a Petition for Mandamus[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
(1) the dismissal of the Information filed against Petitioner John Joseph
Lumanlaw y Bulinao; and (2) his release from the Manila City Jail.
- Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District near San
Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, on the evening of November 26, 2002, for illegal
possession of a dangerous drug.
- A Commitment Order[4] was consequently issued by Presiding Judge Luis
J. Arranz directing the detention of petitioner in the Manila City Jail and setting
the latters arraignment on January 8, 2003. On even date, petitioners counsel
manifested[5] his intention to file a motion for preliminary investigation. Because
of the Manifestation, the arraignment was deferred to February 21, 2003. The
aforesaid Motion[6] was filed together with a Petition to Reduce Bail[7] on January 17,
2003.
- The resolution of these matters was overtaken by Judge Arranzs retirement
from public service. Thus, the arraignment scheduled for February 21, 2003, had
to be postponed. This Court designated herein respondent, Judge Eduardo B.
Peralta, Jr., as acting presiding judge.
Page 7 of 20

- On March 26, 2003, the newly designated acting presiding judge issued an
Order[9] setting the arraignment of petitioner on April 23, 2003. On the latter date, the
arraignment was reset to June 25, 2003, due to the public prosecutors absence.[10]
- On June 25, 2003, petitioners counsel received the lower courts Order
granting Lumanlaws Petition to Reduce Bail and denying his Motion for Preliminary
Investigation for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. [11] In the same
Order, the trial court set petitioners arraignment on August 6, 2003.
- The arraignment was postponed again, this time due to the absence of
petitioners counsel. According to him, he requested the court to proceed with the
arraignment, with the public defender assisting the accused, but that respondent judge
denied the request on the ground that petitioner was already represented by a
counsel de parte.[12] The trial court then re-scheduled the arraignment
on September 24, 2003.[13]
- In what was beginning to be a pattern of laxity, the September 24 arraignment was
likewise postponed in view of the scheduled meeting of presiding judges with
accredited newspaper publishers and was thus reset to October 1, 2003.[14]
- Again, the arraignment did not occur on December 10, 2003, because petitioner
had not been brought to the court by the wardens of the Manila City Jail.
According to the trial courts Order,[16] there was no proof of service on the Manila City
Jail. The arraignment was thus reset to March 1, 2004.
- Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw
remained uninformed of the charges against him, while continuing to be in
detention and despair all throughout that period of limbo. Owing to this
insufferable state of affairs, petitioners counsel manifested his intention to file a motion
to dismiss on account of the violation of his clients right to a speedy
trial.[17] Accordingly, an Urgent Motion to Dismiss[18] was filed on December 19,
2003. The Motion was heard on February 20, 2004, but was promptly denied by
the trial court. The arraignment was reset yet again to March 17, 2004.[19]
- The arraignment did not take place, however, because the accused was not produced
in court by the jail wardens concerned. It turned out that the trial court had not issued
a produce order to the Manila City Jail. Another resetting was ordered for April 16,
2004.[20]
- Now frustrated with the repeated postponements, petitioner filed a Second Urgent
Motion to Dismiss[21] on March 22, 2004. Relying on the provisions of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandating that arraignment should be
held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the
accused, petitioner argued that the protracted delay of his arraignment violated his
constitutional right to speedy trial.[22]
- On April 16, 2004, the RTC could not proceed with the arraignment.
- On May 26, 2004, the arraignment could not be conducted, again because of the
Manila City Jails failure to bring petitioner to the court despite notice.[24] On the same
day, his counsel received[25] the trial courts Order[26] dated May 3, 2004, denying his
Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss. The arraignment was reset to June 16, 2004.[27]
- On this date, it was respondent judges absence that caused the postponement
of the arraignment, which was reset to July 21, 2004.[28] But on that date, no
Page 8 of 20
hearing was conducted in Branch 13 because of the ongoing semestral inventory of
cases in respondent judges regular sala, Branch 17.[29]
- Hence, the present Petition.[30]
ISSUE/S:
- Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether or not the failure of public respondent to
conduct the arraignment of the petitioner despite the
delay of one (1) year, nine (9) months and four (4)
days constitute undue and unjustifiable delay in
violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.
2. Whether or not such undue and unjustifiable delay
would warrant the dismissal of the Information filed
against the petitioner.
- On the whole, the issues may be reduced to the following:
1) whether there was a violation of the right to speedy trial,
warranting a quashal of the information against petitioner; and
2) whether mandamus is the proper remedy.
RULING:
- The Petition is meritorious.
- Main Issue: Right to Speedy Trial
Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused
are formally informed of the charges against them. [33] The proper conduct of
the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere
formality, but an integral part of due process.[34] Particularly, it implements
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial.
On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondents failure to act
expeditiously on his arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He
points out the fourteen postponements that resulted in his intolerable
detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of Supreme
Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as The Speedy Trial Act of 1998), which provides that arraignment
shall be held within thirty days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction
over the accused.
- Speedy Trial Construed
The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[36] It was held in that case that the period was
Page 8 of 20

not absolute. Certain delays were allowed by law and excluded from the
computation of the time within which trial must commence. The Court ruled
that those exclusions should reflect the fundamentally recognized principle
that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.[37]It held further that courts must strive to maintain a
delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of
speedy trial, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right of the State to
prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals.
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They must contend
with the realities of everyday life. Thus, a sensible assessment of their
conduct must consider several factors, rather than a mere mathematical
calculation of periods that have elapsed between stages. Jurisprudence has
set forth the following guidelines:
x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
- Reasonable Postponements
It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the seemingly
endless postponements of the arraignment. He asserted his right to speedy
trial twice, but was denied by respondent in both instances. Considering that
petitioner has been under detention since December 2002, we need not
belabor the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a result of the
delayed arraignment.
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound,
such as the retirement of Judge Arranz[39] and the manifestation of petitioner
that the latter would be filing a Motion for Preliminary Investigation.[40] Those
matters were manifestly not intended to delay the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 02-208426.
- Unjustified Delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case,
but finds them far from being reasonable. There were fourteen
postponements in all. Going over the causes for the delays, we see the lack
of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as
soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could
have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and
upholding petitioners constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy
disposition.
Page 9 of 20
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a
violation of the right of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost
two years[44] elapsed from the filing of the Information against him until the
filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An arraignment
takes, at most, ten minutes of the courts business and does not normally
entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused the
charges leveled against them, ensuring their understanding of those
charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute
judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are presented
before the court.
In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information
to the conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental
right should and can be done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we
are astonished that the court a quo could not complete such a simple but
fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay became all the
more oppressive and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the
liberty of the accused was being curtailed for the entire duration.
- WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 02-208425-26 pending
before Branch 13 of the Manila Regional Trial Court is DISMISSED. Petitioner is
hereby ordered RELEASED from the Manila City Jail, where he is currently detained,
unless he is being held for any other lawful cause.
6. People v. Janjalani, January 10, 2011
FACTS:
- Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30
June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in
Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision
convicted the three accused-appellants xxx of the complex crime of multiple murder
and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua xxx
- On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its
Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move
out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men
running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged
and let them in.
- As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA,
the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver
initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited
unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave
in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and
Page 9 of 20

ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw
fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After
a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either
lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a
statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
- The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu
Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced over radio station DZBB that the group
had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
- As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an
exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in
the Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the
network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he
had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus
conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they
were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14
February.
- Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused
remain at-large.
- On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476),
Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon
arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477),
accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat
pled not guilty to both charges.
- In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan
and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge
of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge
of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense
counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the
consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and
manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them,
Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.[2]
- After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under
training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two
other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were
told that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that their
first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other
parts of Metro Manila.
ISSUE/S:
- Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
Page 10 of 20
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea
of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-
appellants for the crimes charged had been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.[4]
RULING:
First Assignment of Error
- Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a
searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty. The
transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the
Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below: XXX
- As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial judges
must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice
demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of
his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.[6] Thus, trial court judges are
required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
- The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's
original plea was not guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.[7] According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially
in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in
order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might
have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the
plea.[8]
- Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v.
Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the
Page 10 of 20
 Page 11 of 20

accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the (exclusive television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; indeed the perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing.[15] Accordingly, the Court
that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.[9] Appeals.
- We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry - WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty
plea.[10] This requirement is stringent and mandatory.[11] 7. Enrile v. People of the Philippines, August 11, 2015
- Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was
conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused.
The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to FACTS:
another charge multiple murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple
frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to - see separate pdf file
one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one
through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by ISSUE/S:
both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation).
Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the -
sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-
arraignment is not warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of RULING:
the condemnatory judgment under consideration.[12]
Second Assignment of Error -
- In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a
searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is
made loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on 8. People v. Pastor, March 12, 2002
independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense
charged.[13] Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
FACTS:
- Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea
is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and
- For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of
credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained,
Tagbilaran, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 10283, dated August 30, 1999, finding
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on
accused-appellant Elpidio Pastor guilty of incestuous rape xxx
evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.[14](Emphasis supplied.)
- In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not
- On April 8, 1999, accused-appellant was arraigned and, with the assistance of PAO
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor
lawyer Atty. Perpetuo Magallano, entered a plea of not guilty.
was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.
- During the hearing on June 23, 1999, Atty. Adriano Damalerio of PAO manifested that
- Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for
after a conference with accused-appellant, the latter had decided to change his plea
the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts,
from Not Guilty to Guilty. The trial court ordered that the previous plea of not guilty be
primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the
set aside and that accused-appellant be arraigned anew. Upon re-arraignment,
accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified accused Baharan
accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty to the Information which was read and
and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who
translated to him in the Visayan dialect. Thereafter, the trial court propounded
had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had
clarificatory questions to accused-appellant to ascertain whether he understood the
scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the other
consequences of his plea.
hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in
- Accused-appellant then testified on the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty,
the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad
voluntary surrender and drunkenness which is not habitual. The prosecution admitted
was sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their
the plea of guilty and voluntary surrender. Accused-appellant offered evidence to
respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions
Page 11 of 20

prove drunkenness. He testified that on May 7, 1998, he drank tuba and in his
drunkenness, he was led to think bad about his daughter, herein complainant,
because his wife left him. He claims that it was never his intention to rape his
daughter.3
- On August 30, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of incestuous rape. It nevertheless
recommended the commutation of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua by
reason of the remorseful attitude exhibited by accused-appellant.
- In his appellant's brief, accused-appellant avers that the trial court gravely erred in not
applying the guidelines for a plea of guilty to a capital offense provided in Section 3,
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, it is contended that
the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the accused-appellant's plea, pursuant to the
ruling laid down in the cases of People vs. Bello8 and People vs. Dayot.9 Allegedly,
the questions propounded to the accused-appellant were limited to his family
background and personal circumstances. Accused-appellant thus prays that the case
be remanded to the court a quo for a full-blown trial.
- Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, viz:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of his culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf."
- When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, the trial court is duty bound
to: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's
full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (3) inquire from the accused if he desires to present evidence on his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. 10 The rationale behind the rule is that the
courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is
irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded
guilty.11 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on
appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.12
I.
Anent the first requirement, the searching inquiry must determine whether the plea of guilt was
based on a free and informed judgment. Hence, it must focus on (1) the voluntariness of the
plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. 13 Although there is no
definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have
held that the following guidelines should be observed:
Page 12 of 20
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the
law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that
the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not
only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.14
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court
to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the
precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. 15
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood
by the latter.16
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or
furnish its missing details.17
- In the case at bar, the records will show that the trial court miserably failed to
discharge its duty to conduct a "searching inquiry," xxx
- The questions propounded by the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of
the plea of guilt of accused-appellant nor did the questions demonstrate that he
fully understood the consequences of his plea.
ISSUE/S:
-
RULING:
Page 12 of 20

- IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment appealed from is SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings in accord with the guidelines
set forth in this Decision.
9. People v. Lunia, April 23, 2002
FACTS:
- the case because Circular No. 11-99, which authorizes the transfer of
ISSUE/S:
- level courts after the effectivity of the said Circular can no longer be
RULING:
- instead of ordering its transfer to the RTC.
10. Taglay v. Judge Daray, August 22, 2012
FACTS:
- Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Digos City, Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, in Criminal Case No.
FC-71-02. The March 9, 2004 Order denied herein petitioner's Motion to Dismiss,
while the June 7, 2004 Order denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
- The instant petition arose from a Criminal Complaint[2] for Qualified Trespass to
Dwelling filed by private respondent against herein petitioner xxx
- Finding probable cause to indict petitioner, the Public Prosecutor assigned to handle
the case filed an Information[3] against her on November 19, 2001.
- Subsequently, the case was transferred to the RTC of Digos City where petitioner was
brought to trial.
- Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the presentation of the
final witness for the prosecution, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contended that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case, because the MCTC erroneously transferred the case
to the RTC instead of dismissing it. Petitioner also argued that the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction was further aggravated when she was not arraigned before the RTC.
- On March 9, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order[7] ruling that it acquired
jurisdiction over the case when it received the records of the case as a consequence
of the transfer effected by the MCTC;
Page 13 of 20
- Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
RTC via its Order[8] dated June 7, 2004.
- Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
- Petitioner raises two main grounds.
First, petitioner contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
Family Courts cases filed with first-level courts to the RTCs, is applicable
only to cases which were filed prior to the effectivity of the said Circular on
March 1, 1999. Petitioner argues that all Family Courts cases filed with first-
transferred to the RTC; instead they should be dismissed. Considering that
the Information in the instant case was filed with the MCTC on November
19, 2001, petitioner avers that the MCTC should have dismissed the case
Second, petitioner insists that she should have been arraigned anew
before the RTC and that her arraignment before the MCTC does not
count because the proceedings conducted therein were void.
RULING:
- The petition is meritorious.
- The Court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the second issue raised that
she should have been arraigned by the RTC.
- It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the
proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are
null and void.[24] Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings
conducted therein, including petitioner's arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the
need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the RTC.
- It is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held before the
RTC without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong
for the RTC to rely on the case of People v. Cabale,[25] because the accused therein
was in fact arraigned, although the same was made only after the case was submitted
for decision. In the similar cases of People v. Atienza and Closa[26] and People v.
Pangilinan,[27] the accused in the said cases were also belatedly arraigned. The Court,
in these three cases, held that the active participation of the counsels of the accused,
as well as their opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses during trial
without objecting on the ground that their clients had not yet been arraigned, had the
effect of curing the defect in the belated arraignment. Moreover, the accused in these
Page 13 of 20

cases did not object when they were belatedly arraigned. The same, however, cannot
be said in the instant case. There is no arraignment at all before the RTC. On the
other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and void. Thus, there is
nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the RTC the fact
that her client, herein petitioner, was not arraigned.
- WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Digos City, Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered dismissing the Information
in Criminal Case No. FC-71-02, without prejudice to refiling the same in the proper
court.
11. People of the Philippines v. Halil Gambao y Esmail et. al, October 1, 2013
FACTS:
- 1
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision dated 28 June 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
109 dated 16 October 1998, finding accused-appellants xxx guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of kidnapping for ransom xxx.
- During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim
manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding
judge then explained the consequences of a change of plea,
- On hearing this clarification, the other appellants likewise manifested, through their
counsel who had earlier conferred with them and explained to each of them the
consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas they entered. The
trial court separately asked each of the appellants
- Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to change his plea and assured the trial
court that he understood the consequences of such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the
trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28 the trial court
directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
- On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim,
Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian
of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
- In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications
the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: xxx
- It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years
old at the time of the commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.29
- Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses
is primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and
conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding
unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact
Page 14 of 20
or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. 31 In People v.
Tañedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial
court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great respect since it had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court. 33
Improvident Plea
- As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,
the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the records 36 shows that on
7 October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and were
re-arraigned. They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping
for ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of
the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court
is mandated:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid
improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved
since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and
liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of
his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court
on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.40
- Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was
based on a free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness
of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court
finds no cogent reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by
jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the same:
- Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a
"searching inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:
- Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations; and
Page 14 of 20

(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judge’s intimidating robes.
- Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.
- Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy
index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
- Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not
only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
- Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court
to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the
precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
- All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by
the latter.
- The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty.
The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.
- It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have NOT been fully
complied with. The questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure
that accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is
readily apparent from the records43 that Karim had the mistaken assumption that his
plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the judge and his
counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty
pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by the trial
court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the
penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
- As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and
the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of
judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because
then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the
commission of the offense charged.
Page 15 of 20
ISSUE/S:
-
RULING:
- WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR–H.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN
y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y
NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and
NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals
in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN
PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in
the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner:
the principals to the crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total
amount of ₱288,000.00 while the accomplice shall pay the victim ₱12,000.00,
subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on several and subsidiary
liability.
- The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release
THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served
the penalty imposed on her, unless her further detention is warranted for any
other lawful causes.
-
12. People of the Philippines v. Gumimba, February 27, 2007
FACTS:
- For review before the Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26
April 2006, affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Ozamiz City, Branch 15,3 dated 10 March 1999, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
- In an Information4 dated 17 April 1997, appellant Rogelio Gumimba y Morandante
alias Rowing and co-accused Ronie Abapo (Abapo) were charged before the
RTC, with the crime of rape with homicide of an eight (8)-year old child,
Page 15 of 20

- On 16 May 1997, appellant and Abapo both entered a plea of not guilty on
arraignment.6 Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial with the prosecution first
presenting two witnesses:
- However, appellant manifested though counsel (before the court) at the
following hearing on 22 May 1997 that he would like to change his earlier plea of
not guilty to a plea of guilty.8 The RTC ordered appellant's re-arraignment and the
latter accordingly entered a plea of guilty.9 The court conducted an inquiry to ascertain
the voluntariness of appellant's plea and his full comprehension of the consequences
thereof. Prosecution was likewise charged to establish the guilt and degree of
culpability of appellant.10
- Before resting its case, the prosecution presented appellant as witness against
his co-accused Abapo. Appellant testified that he and Abapo raped and killed
the victim. He likewise explained that he had previously confessed to Magallano,
Arañas and Acapulco that he alone committed the crime in the hope that the parents
of the victim, who were relatives of his, might take pity on him. 12
- In his defense, Abapo testified that at the time the crime was allegedly
committed, he was with his mother and three (3) siblings at the Labo River,
about two (2) kilometers away from Barangay Pantaon, washing their
clothes.13 In support thereof, Abapo presented his mother Virgencita Abapo,
Elisa Carreon and Raymundo Orot, all of whom corroborated his alibi. 14 The
defense also presented witness Arañas who reiterated his earlier testimony that
appellant confessed to him that he alone was responsible for the raping and killing of
the victim.15 Finally, Eugenio Bucog, a teacher at Capucao Elementary School, was
presented to demonstrate Abapo's good character when he was his student. 16
- On 10 March 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision. On the basis of appellant's
plea of guilty, the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
as charged.
- On the other hand, the trial court acquitted Abapo on the ground that his guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.
- With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review. Pursuant to this Court's decision in People v. Mateo,19 the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals.
- On 26 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision20 affirming the appellant's
conviction, but with modification as to damages awarded to the heirs of the victim.
ISSUE/S:
- Thus, appellant raises the following errors in this petition for review:
- The ultimate issue is whether appellant's guilt was established by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Page 16 of 20
- It must be conceded at the outset that the trial court failed in its duty to conduct
the prescribed "searching inquiry" into the voluntariness of appellant's plea of
guilty and full comprehension thereof. Consequently, appellant's plea of guilty was
made improvidently and it is rendered inefficacious.25 Nevertheless, the Court must
rule against appellant as the evidence on record is ample to sustain the judgment of
conviction independent from his plea of guilty.
- The Information, to which appellant pleaded guilty, alleged that homicide was
committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape of AAA. This, if proven, would
warrant the penalty of death at that time.26 Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such
charges calls into play the provisions of Section 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus -
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in
his behalf.
- Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there are three
(3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty
by the accused: (1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea; (2) it must require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to
present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. 27
- There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," or
as to the number and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the
earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured
according to its individual merit.28 However, the logic behind the rule is that courts
must proceed with caution where the imposable penalty is death for the reason that
the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.29 An improvident plea of guilty on the
part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should be avoided since he
might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without
having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his
plea.30 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on
appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.31
- In the instant case, when the accused entered a plea of guilty at his re-arraignment, it
is evident that the RTC did not strictly observe the requirements under Section 3, Rule
116 above. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is
insufficient.32 Such procedure falls short of the exacting guidelines in the conduct of a
"searching inquiry," as follows:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself
Page 16 of 20

(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel
during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed
under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical
harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of
the judge's intimidating robes.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as
his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which
may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the
penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of
a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of
guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime
proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to
fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of
his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and
understood by the latter.
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty,
is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or
reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.33
- An examination of the records of the proceedings will illustrate the court's treatment of
appellant's change of plea, viz:
Q When you were arraigned, you pleaded guilty, do you understand
the consequence of your pleading guilty?
Page 17 of 20
A I do not know Your Honor [,] the consequence.
Q You pleaded guilty to the offense of rape with homicide, did you
understand?
A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
Q That by your pleading guilty to the offense you will be sentenced to
die?
A Yes, I am aware.
Q Your act of pleading guilty to the offense charged is your voluntary
will?
A Yes, I admitted that crime, but we were two.
- Atty. Cagaanan:
Q When you pleaded guilty [,] was it in your own free will?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you not forced or coerced by anybody with this crime?
A No, sir.34
- The inefficacious plea of guilty notwithstanding, the totality of the evidence for
the prosecution undeniably establishes appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. Apart from his testimony upon
changing his plea to a plea of guilty, appellant gave a subsequent testimony
when he was presented by the prosecution as a witness against his co-accused.
This second testimony which constitutes another judicial confession, replete
with details and made consciously as it was, cured the deficiencies which made his
earlier plea of guilty improvident. The latter testimony left no room for doubt as to the
voluntariness and comprehension on appellant's part of his change of plea, as well as
completed his narration of how he raped and killed the victim.
- Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the
sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated
not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission
of the offense charged.36 Thus, as we have ruled in People v. Derilo:37
While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty
when re-arraigned, we find no need, however, to remand the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence. As a rule, this Court has set
aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of
improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court receives evidence
to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting his
guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not)
loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based
on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged.
- Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still be convicted
if there is adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction.
Page 17 of 20

- WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 00193
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the heirs of the
victim, AAA, in the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus costs.
13. People v. Aguilar, March 14, 2008
FACTS:
- On petition for review is the Court of Appeals' decision[1] of August 31, 2005 which
affirmed with modification that of Branch 69 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
convicting appellant, Roberto Aguilar, of Qualified Rape.[2]
- On his scheduled date of arraignment on June 23, 2003, appellant's counsel de
oficio informed the trial court that appellant intended to plead guilty to the charge. To
afford appellant time to reflect on his intended plan and its consequences, however,
the trial court postponed the arraignment to July 6, 2003, and later to July 21, 2003.
- On arraignment on July 21, 2003, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial
court thereupon conducted a searching inquiry to determine the voluntariness of
appellant's plea and his full comprehension of the consequences thereof. On being
convinced that appellant indeed voluntarily admitted his guilt and fully understood its
consequences, the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence "to prove
the guilt of [appellant] and [the] exact degree of culpability."
- By decision of October 10, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant and imposed
the death penalty on him,
- The case was thereupon elevated for automatic review to this Court, appellant faulting
the trial court on the sole ground that in convicting him, it failed to comply with Section
3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in
his behalf.
- Following People v. Mateo,[9] the Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate review.
- By Decision of August 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals, finding the evidence for the
prosecution to have proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
appellant, affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification by increasing
the award of civil indemnity,
- The case is back before this Court.
Page 18 of 20
- The above-quoted provision of Sec. 3 of Rule 116 provides the procedure to be
observed when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense in order to safeguard his
rights.
- The Court has in several cases prescribed the following guidelines on the manner in
which a searching inquiry should proceed:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel
during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed
under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical
harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of
the judge's intimidating robes.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as
his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which
may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the
penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of
a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of
guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime
proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to
fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of
his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter.
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty,
is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or
reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.[13]
- The trial court attempted to observe these guidelines as reflected in the
following excerpt of the proceedings taken on July 21, 2003:
- It bears reiterating at this juncture that in the earlier-quoted transcript of his testimony
during the searching inquiry conducted by the trial court after he pleaded guilty to the
Page 18 of 20

charge, appellant, when asked why he made such plea, answered, "Dahil ginawa ko
po kase talaga," and that after the prosecution rested its case, appellant opted not to
present evidence in his defense.
ISSUE/S:
- -
RULING:
- WHEREFORE, the challenged August 31. 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals
is MODIFIED in that appellant, Roberto Aguilar, is sentenced to suffer, reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole. In all other respects, the appellate court's
decision is AFFIRMED.
14. People v. Mamarion, October 1, 2003
FACTS:
- This is an automatic review of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City (Branch 50) in Criminal Case No. 96-17590 finding appellants John Mamarion y
Hisugan, Charlito Domingo y Gorospe, Rolando Maclang y Ventura and Juliet Harisco
y Carrera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM,
- Only accused Gale and appellants Mamarion and Domingo were arraigned on
January 27, 1997. The other accused remained at-large. Gale and appellant
Domingo pleaded "not guilty" while a plea of "not guilty" was entered by the
trial court for appellant Mamarion as he refused to enter any plea. 7 Trial
proceeded only with respect to Gale, appellants Mamarion and Domingo.
- On March 23, 1997, accused Leysa was arrested in Tondo, Manila. Upon his
arraignment on April 30, 1997, he pleaded "not guilty." 8 Trial then ensued with
respect to him.
- Meanwhile, accused Gale filed a motion, with the approval of the public
prosecutor, seeking that he be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense, i.e.,
from Kidnapping for Ransom to Slight Illegal Detention. 9 Acting on said motion,
the trial court conferred with the victim's sister, Teresita Cokin, and the latter agreed.
10 There being no evidence presented as yet against Gale 11 and on the
condition that he will testify for the prosecution, the trial court found no
impediment to grant the motion. Gale was re-arraigned and entered a plea of
guilty to Slight Illegal Detention. Accordingly, the trial court rendered a Decision
dated May 13, 1997, sentencing Amado Gale
- On July 7, 1997, accused Villarosa was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty," 13
and trial proceeded with regard to him.
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- Teresita had in mind to follow Obing's instruction and keep the police out of the
incident but without her knowledge, her nephew, Andres Sumpay, with the help of a
family friend a retired policeman Graciano Reyes, reported the kidnapping to the NBI.
Teresita was at first furious when the NBI started to investigate but as she could do
nothing more, she accepted and welcomed the NBI's intervention.
- The remains of Obing Cokin was discovered in a shallow grave in a secluded area of
a sugarcane plantation in the town of Anilao, Iloilo on August 7, 1995. . . .
Roberta died of "Traumatic shock, secondary to multiple physical injuries". The
autopsy was conducted on August 8, 1995. Dr. Jaboneta opines that Roberta died not
earlier than August 1, 1995 and not later then August 5, 1995. 19
- The trial court relied principally on the testimony of Gale together with the
corroborating testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, namely: Andres
Sumpay, Teresita Cokin and Mario Mahusay as to appellant Mamarion, establishing
the participation of appellants in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping with
Ransom,
ISSUE/S:
-
RULING:
- The Court will first determine whether or not the trial court erred in allowing Gale to
plead to a lesser offense in consideration of testifying as a prosecution witness.
- Appellants assail Gale's plea to a lesser offense arguing that it should have been
made during the plea bargaining stage of the trial and that it should not be subject to
the condition that he will testify against appellants. In the Brief for the State, the OSG
maintains that Gale was validly discharged as a state witness. Under the
circumstances, it is not correct to state that Gale was discharged as a state witness
under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Gale was allowed to change his plea
pursuant to the then prevailing Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, 45 which
provided:
- Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime
charges, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
- A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged
for purposes of double jeopardy.
- Records show that during the May 13, 1997 hearing, the Chief State Prosecutor
manifested that he has approved Gale's motion to be allowed to plead to a lesser
offense, i.e. Slight Illegal Detention. 46 Private complainant Teresita Cokin, upon
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query of the trial court, consented to Gale's offer of plea to a lesser offense Slight
Illegal Detention. 47
- It is immaterial that said plea was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses. In People vs.
Villarama, Jr., 48 a 1992 case, the trial court allowed the accused therein to change
his plea even after the prosecution had rested its case, applying the herein above-
quoted Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Court elucidated, thus:
- Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during
the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the
accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:
- xxx xxx xxx
- However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the
aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.
- In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser
offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation,
jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a
yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People vs.
Kayanan, we held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. 49 (Emphasis
supplied)
- Gale's testimony was crucial to the prosecution as there was no other direct evidence
linking appellants to the commission of the crime. Hence, the trial court did not err in
allowing Gale to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
- The Court will now determine: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in giving full faith
and credit to the testimony of Gale; and (2) whether or not the participation and
conspiracy of the four appellants in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
- WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City (Branch 50) in Criminal Case No. 96-17590, convicting appellants John
Mamarion y Hisugan, Charlito Domingo y Gorospe, Rolando Maclang y Ventura and
Juliet Harisco y Carrera of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of DEATH and ordering them to pay jointly and severally, to the
heirs of Roberta Cokin the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity with MODIFICATION that they are further ordered to pay an additional
amounts of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages and
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages.

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