Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs.

Duque

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant

Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the
DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the
questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks
to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In
1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and

Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in
the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under
Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that
such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an

international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA

Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

Cecilia Zulueta, Petitioner,vs.Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin, Respondents.

Facts
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took certain possessions
and documents belonging to Dr. Martin. It was to be used as evidence for the suit
Cecilia filed against her husband. Dr. Martin filed an action before the RTC of Manila
which rendered a decision declaring him as “the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and suppress.
”The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia
Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from “using or
submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in question. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this
petition. Petitioner contends that a previous ruling of a different nature involving the
same documents were admissible as evidence.

Issue
Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be admissible
as evidence.

Held
The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the co institutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

FACTS:

August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the
booth of the “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped
packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the
packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars,
and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain
dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the
cellophane wrappers.

The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting
in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:

Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONALE:

Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule

Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a

defective search warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in
Mercado vs People’s Court.

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government
without the latter transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted.

FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS – Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents

conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the
NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused / appellant.

CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof

BILL OF RIGHTS

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy,

protection against whom, protection against the STATE.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

G.R. No. 101083 July 30 1993

FACTS:
Forty-four children, through their parents, sought to make the DENR Secretary stop
issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking their right to a healthful environment (Secs. 16,
15 Article II, 1987 Constitution). The petitioners further asserted that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn." They further claimed that the Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements to cover more areas for
logging than what is available.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to file the case.

RULING:
Yes. the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter: “[it]
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions”. The right is linked to the
constitutional right to health, is “fundamental”, “constitutionalised”, “self-executing” and
“judicially enforceable”. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.

The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their
generation and for succeeding generations as “the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.”

Stonehill v. Diokno Digest

Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ

Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against
the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal
properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws,
Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results,
search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in
the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance
violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he
filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in the
deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects
found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and
seizure in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those
done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second
situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the
personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein.
Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of a
seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right
to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and
things seized from the offices and the premises).
Time, Inc. v. Hill
385 U.S. 347 (1967)

Facts
Plaintiff and his family were held hostage for 19 hours in their home by three escaped
convicts. The family was not harmed, but the story made front pages when the police
subsequently killed two of the convicts and captured the third. A few years later, Life
Magazine (owned by defendant Time) published an article about a new Broadway
thriller, which the article stated was based on plaintiff’s family’s experience. It painted
the family in a positive light, stating that they “rose in heroism” in a time of crisis.

Issue
Is a publication that contains false statements or representations about a private
individual entitled to constitutional protections of free speech and free press?

Holding / Rule
(Brennan) Yes. Judgment set aside and case remanded. A plaintiff cannot recover in
tort for a false report of a matter of public interest in the absence of proof that the
defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of
the truth.

Reasoning
The risk of exposure of private individuals to public view is inevitable in a society that
values freedom of speech and of press. Those freedoms are seriously threatened by a
rule that requires the press to verify to a certainty facts about a person mentioned in a
news article, especially in non-defamatory matters. Fear of large verdicts in damage
suits for innocent or merely negligent misstatements would cause publishers to be so
careful that even legitimate speech would be suppressed. Nevertheless, calculated
falsehoods are not entitled to constitutional free speech and press protections. On the
evidence here, a jury could have found either that Life’s misstatement was innocent or
merely negligent, or that it was made with reckless disregard of the truth or with actual
knowledge that it was false.

Black (joined by Douglas) concurred, reiterating his view in New York Times v.
Sullivan that the First Amendment completely barred these types of suits.
Douglas concurred, arguing that the matter was already one of public interest and so
even a fictionalized version of the event does not implicate privacy concerns.

Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, urging the adoption of a negligence
standard, in part because of the inability of plaintiff and his family to use counterspeech
to offset the errors in the Life Magazine account.

Fortas (joined by Warren and Clark) dissented, arguing that the jury instructions were
close enough to the majority’s insistence on knowing or reckless falsity.
Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board

424 U.S. 507

Facts. Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the
nine retail locations in Atlanta. One of those stores was located within the North DeKalb
Shopping Center, owned by the Petitioner, Hudgens (Petitioner). After the picketers had
been marching for about half an hour, the general manager of the shopping center
threatened to have the strikers arrested if they did not leave.

Issue. Can a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the
public?
Held:
1. Under the present state of the law, the constitutional guarantee of free
expression has no part to play in a case such as this, and the pickets here
did not have a First Amendment right to enter the shopping center for the
purpose of advertising their strike against their employer. Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551. Pp. 512-521.
2. The rights and liabilities of the parties are dependent exclusively upon the
NLRA, under which it is the NLRB's task, subject to judicial review, to resolve
conflicts between § 7 rights and private property rights and to seek
accommodation of such rights "with as little destruction of one as is
consistent with the maintenance of the other," NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112. Hence, the case is remanded so that the NLRB may
reconsider the case under the NLRA's statutory criteria alone. Pp. 521-523.