Emergency

24 Planning

Contents

24.1 Introduction 24/3

24.2 On-site Emergency Planning 24/3
24.3 Resources and Capabilities 24/5
24.4 Developing an Emergency Plan 24/8
24.5 Training 24/9
24.6 Essential Functions and Nominated
Personnel 24/9
24.7 Declaration and Communication of the
Emergency 24/10
24.8 Cooperation and Drills 24/11
24.9 Public Relations 24/11
24.10 Off.;ite Emergency Planning 24/11
24.11 Transport Emergency Planning 24/12
24.12 Spectators 24/13
24.13 Emergency Incidents 24/13
24.14 Recovery 24/14
24.15 Regulations and Standards 24/15
24.16 Literature 24/15
Appendix A: NFPA Publications 24/15
There is a considerable body of work on disasters of various
kinds, both natural and man-made, and, whilst much of
this may be only marginally relevant to process plant
emergencies, it is helpful to have some awareness of this
background (Table 24.1).
Table 24.1 Selected references on emergency planning
Disaster planning
BSC (n.d./2); Prentiss (1951);Featherstone (1962); Ministry
of Health (1962); Grosset et al. (1964); H.B.Williams (1964);
Inbbar (1965); Healy (1969); Chatham-Savannah Defense
Council (1971);Home Office (1972); Office of Emergency
Preparedness (1972); Puget Sound Council of Governments
(1975);J.W.Richardson (1975);W.H.Gibson (1976);J. Howard
(1976); League of Red Cross Societies (1976); Manning
(1976); Abe (1978); Quarantelli (1978); de Boer and Baillie
(1980a,b); H.D. Foster (1980); Frey and Safar (1980);
Smulders (1980);Whittow (1980); Geipel (1982,1991);
R. Jackson (1986); May and Williams (1986); Society of
Industrial Emergency Services Officers (1986);Theodore,
Reynolds and Taylor (1989); Dupont,Theodore and
Reynolds (1991); M.A. Hughes (1991);D.J. Parker and
Handmer (1992)
Works emergency planning
MCA (SG-4); NRC (Appendix 28 Emergency Response,
Emergency Planning); Anon. (1961b); Labine (1961);
Tenneco Oil Co. (1964b); Kling (1965); D.T. Smith (1967);
Fowler and Spiegelman (1968); Gilmore (1968); Bennett
(1972); van Cleve (1973); Hunter (1973);Hydrocarbon
Processing Editors (1973); IRI (1973/9); PITB (1973/4);
K.Wright (1973); Associated Octel (1974Bklt 20/74);
Brannon (1974,1976); Bruce and Diggle (1974);Duff and
Husband (1974);Maas (1974); CIA (1976 RC20,1991 RC31,
RC47); CISHC (1976/6); Diggle (1976); Underwood,
Sourwine and Johnson (1976); Chlorine Institute (1977
FIRE, 1982 Pmphlt 64,1985 OPFLOW); H.R. Hill, Bruce
and Diggle (1977); Searson (1977);Webb (1977); API (1978
Publ. 2025); Harvey (1979b); Blanchard (1980); Melancon
(1980);Willems (1980); Davenport (1981a); DnV (1981 RP
C106); Isman (1981); Lihou (1981LPB 42); E.Wilson (1981);
Ranby and Hewitt (1982); G. Martin (1984); Burgoyne
(1985c); HSE (1985 HS(G) 25); Husbands (1985); Lynskey
(1985,1985 LPB 61);Vervalin(1985a); IBC (1986/67,1989/76);
Marlier and Roure (1986);Walford (1986);Wfflcock (1986);
CONCAWE (198711/87,1988 6/88,1989 2/89); Kalinins
(1987); Mullins (1987 LPB 87); O'Reilly (1987); AIHA
(1988-/13); Cassidy and Pantony (1988); ILO (1989);
Kharbanda and Stallworthy (1989); Lakey (1998); ACGIH
(1989/35); Marlier (1989);Tavel, Maraven and Taylor (1989);
Phong (1990); AGA (1991/74,75); Essery (1991);Ham and
Gansevoort (1992); Keyworth, Smith and Archer (1992);
Marsden, Ferrario and Green (1992);J.N. Scott (1992); Zika
and Matyas (1992);Schulein, Kloet and Stolk (1993)
Off-site aspects: Quarantelli et al. (1979); Gabor and
Griffiths (1980);J. Gray (1981);J. Gray and Quarantelli
(1981);Tierney (1981,1982); CIA (1984 RC20a); Quantarelli
(1984); HSE (1986b); Bellamy and Harrison (1988); Cassidy
and Pantony (1988); de Larderei (1988); NSW Government
(1988); Pietersen (1988b, 1993); Egol (1989a); ILO (1989);
Belanger (1990);J. Singh and McBride (1990); C.R.Young
(1990); Essery (1991); Rogers and Sorenson (1991);
Ruggiero, Macchi and Morici (1992); S.Wilson (1992,1993);
Callen, Dipema and Miller (1993);Thwaites (1993); Stephan
(1994)
Evacuation: Hans and Sell (1974); Ikeda (1982) Lynskey
(1985); Purdy and Davies (1985,1985 LPB 65); Fitzgerald
(1991 LPB 97); Essery (1993)
Gas dispersion hazards: Ryckman and Peters (1982);
M.E. Smith et al. (1983); Purdy and Davies (1985,1985 LPB
62, 63); McNaughton,Worley and Bodner (1987);
Chikhliwader and Gelinas (1988); Ginnity (1988); Bais,
Zerefos and Ziomas (1989); Rusch (1993);J.R. Taylor (1993)
Police
Drabek (1969); B.E. Fisher (1978a,b, 1980b); C.S. Lees
(1985)
Fire services (see alsoTable 16.2)
Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council (1978); Gebhardt
(1984); Beech (1985); Stephan (1994)
Medical services
Savage (1971,1977,1979);J.W.Richardson (1975);
W.H. Rutherford (1975); Fozard (1976); Baskett and Zorab
(1977); Easton (1977a,b); Lea (1977); Plewes and Kindle
(1977); Snook (1977); Blanshan (1978); DJ.Williams (1979);
de Boer and Baillie (1980a,b); Smulders (1980); Lessenger
(1985);Thornley (1985)
Computer aids (seeTable 29.1)
Transport emergencies
MCA (CC-1-CC-87);M.M. Anderson (1971); M.T. Miller
(1971); Scannell (1971);Boardman (1972); Franklin (1972);
Hess (1972); Benner (1975b); Cumberland and Hebden
(1975); Ashton and Butcher (1976); McNeil (1976); Mesler
(1976); BCGA (1977GN1);Camm (1977);W.E.Clayton (1977);
Mansfield (1977); Zajic and Himmelman (1978); Nimptsch
(1979); Bosnian (1980); Hart (1980); Somerville (1981);
ASTM (1983 STP 825,1990/1); Anon. (1984); Cooney (1985,
1991); Mascone (1986); O'Reilly (1987); Cashman (1988);
CONCAWE (1988 5/88,1989 7/89); Lakey (1988);
Saccomanno and Allen (1988); Lycett et al. (1989); Rogers
and Sorensen (1989); Quarantelli (1991); Sorensen, Carnes
and Rogers (1992); Browne (1993); Stephan (1994)
Hazard information systems
Anon. (1986p); Cahffl (1989 LPB 85)
Data sheets, Chem Cards: MCA (CC and CIC series);
Bigelow (1970,1971)
HAZCHEM: Home Office (n.d./6); London Fire Brigade
(1973);Walmsley(1973);CIA (1975);FPA (1989CFSDFS 6041)
TREMCARDS: CIA (n.d./2); Walmsley (1973,1974)
National Chemical Emergency Centre: Cumberland (1978);
Goodwin (1984);W.C.J.White (1985)
Emergency response
Road: IP (1989/1); API (1992 RP 1112)
Rail: Barren (1971);Cato and Dobbs (1971); O'Driscoll
(1975a); A.D.Williams and Catalan (1976)
Pipeline: API (1991 RP 1122)
Sea: Sohnke (1971);Balemans (1975); H.D.Williams (1975);
Preston (1983)
Fire services: Hayes (1971);E Taylor (1975)
Emergency, mutual aid schemes
Gabor (1991)
HI scheme: Bigelow (1970,1971);Sylvia (1972a, 1974);Anon.
(1973a)

G Centres: ICI (n.d.a); Walmsley (1973)
CHEMSAFE: CIA (1973/6.1991 RC32); Moddrel (1977)
CHEMTREC: Bigelow (1970,1971); Rosenhah and Cole
(1973); Zercher (1975,1976); Anon. (1994e); Resen (1986);
E. Meyer (1989); Donahue (1994)
CHRIS: G.H. Brown (1976)
Chioraid: CIA (1983,1992 RC48); Carr (1986)
CAER: Vervalin (1985b); Mascone (1986)
Particular chemicals
Ammonia: Cato and Dobbs (1971); Luddeke (1975); Greiner
(1984); Lessenger (1985)
Chlorine: R.L. Mitchell (1971); Carr (1986); CIA (1992 RC48)
Missisauga incident: Whitaker (1980);Wignal and Leek
(1980); Fordham (1982 LPB 44)
Hydrogen cyanide: Gemmill (1961b)
LPG: Anon. (1984v).
Vinyl chloride: Dowell (1971)
Glendora incident: Dowell (1971); Kogler (1971)
Radioactive materials: Lindell and Perry (1980)
Spectators
Hymes (1985 LPB 65)
Public relations, community impact,
community response
Essex County Council (n.d.); MCA (SG-12); Segaloff (1961);
D.T. Smith (1967); Koran (1970); Nesmith (1970);Vervalin
(1970); CISHC (1976/6); Attwood (1977);Windscale Local
Liaison Committee (1979); CIA (1980); J. Gray (1981);J. Gray
and Quarantelli (1981); Preece (1982); Walker (1982);
J. Harris (1985)
Aftermath
Geipel (1982,1991)
Stress, including post-traumatic stress disorder: Weisaeth
(1988,1992); Gill and Picou (1991)
Land reclamation: SCI (1980); Pratt (1993)
Accounts of this work include Emergency and Disaster
Planning (Healy, 1969), Disaster Preparedness (Office of
Emergency Preparedness, 1972), Disaster Technology
(Manning, 1976), Disaster Planning (H.D. Foster, 1980),
Types and Events of Disasters Organization in Various Dis-
aster Situations (Frey and Safar, 1980), Disasters (Whittow,
1980), Disaster Policy Implementation (May and Williams,
1986), Accident and Emergency Management (Theodore,
Reynolds and Taylor, 1989) and Hazard Management and
Emergency Planning Perspectives in Britain (D.J. Parker and
Handmer, 1992).
In the United Kingdom, the Disaster Prevention and
Limitation Unit (DPLU) at the University of Bradford is a
specialist resource on disasters. Another is the Disaster
Research Center, Ohio State University, and latterly the
University of Delaware in the United States.
For the process industries specifically, relevant materials
are Highly Hazardous Spills and Emergency Planning (Zadic
and Himmelman, 1978), Guide to Emergency Planning
(Society of Industrial Emergency Services Officers, 1986)
and Emergency Response to Chemical Accidents (O'Reilly,
1987).
24.1 Introduction
Process safety of a chemical plant encompasses several
layers of protection. Control measures, shut-down systems,
EMERGENCY PLANNING 24/3
I 1
Preparedness
Response
[ Recovery
Figure 24.1 Componentsof emergency planning
release absorption, accumulation of releases by dikes, and
protection by barriers. These layers of protection are
intended to prevent an event from propagating into severe
consequences because of deviations from normal operation
conditions. Emergency response is the last layer of protec-
tion that is intended to control an event if possible, or to
reduce consequences in cases of loss of control. However, a
reliable response to an emergency event requires planning.
The three components of emergency planning are pre-
sented in Figure 24.1.
Much of the material in the preceding chapters has been
concerned with reducing the scale and frequency of
hazards. Nevertheless, there remains for any hazard a finite
possibility that it will be realized. It is necessary, therefore,
to plan for such emergencies. Emergency planning is an
integral and essential part of the safety and loss prevention
strategy. Its objective is to mitigate the consequences of any
incident that may occur.
The probability of the realization of a hazard is evaluated
by a relatively sophisticated procedure, as already described.
It is not then logical to assume that if this occurs, the worst
consequences will necessarily follow. It is more appropriate
to take a probabilistic approach to the evaluation of the
consequences also.
There are two main types of emergencies with which
the chemical industry is concerned. These are the works
emergency and the transport emergency. They are some-
what different and require separate treatment. Whatever
the type of emergency plan, the overall message is that it
should be kept simple and flexible, but capable of being
scaled up or down as circumstances demand.
24.2 On-site Emergency Planning
24.2.1 An overview
Unanticipated circumstances may yield emergency
events. Emergency planning adds an additional layer of
protection to circumstances where all of the other layers of
protection failed to prevent the incident. Figure 24.1
demonstrates the three major components of emergency
planning
Emergency preparedness process begins with iden-
tification of credible scenarios for which appropriate
response strategies are developed. The analysis of resour-
ces and capabilities of facilities to respond to the emer-
gency scenarios is part of the preparedness stage. This
analysis examines the resources and the capabilities at
24/4 EMERGENCY PLANNING

the facilities, at neighbour sites, and the resources that
are available at the local community. The development
of resources is conducted according to the resources
assessment and the potential of cooperation among site
emergency responders, neighbouring facilities, and
neighbouring communities.
As mentioned above, at least three separate parties are
involved in emergency situations, in addition to the net-
work within the facility. Therefore, communication sys-
tems are crucial to successful execution of emergency plans
in real-time situations as well as in drills.
The complex nature of emergency events requires a very
clear hierarchy of command, and a procedure without any
ambiguities. It is extremely important that every position
in the hierarchy is assigned to personnel with the appro-
priate skills and personality. Training and assessment of
the potential collaboration among these three groups is
also extremely important. It is not uncommon for pre-
paredness programmes to be revised based on assessments
of drill results.
The development of physical facilities infrastructure
consists of the following:
(1) Development of shelters and safe havens.
(2) Establishment emergency operations centre (EOC).
(3) Development of emergency communication cap-
abilities.
(4) Development of appropriate medical support infra-
structure.
24.2.2 Identification of credible scenarios
The problem
A process hazard evaluation yields a large list of potential
incidents. This list should be assessed to determine like-
lihood and consequences of each of the events, and then
prioritized according to the risk associated with these
events.
Preparedness for emergencies involving worst case sce-
narios requires enormous resources and may overwelm the
business operability of the facility. Therefore, the outcome
for each scenario should be evaluated based on the con-
sequences and probabilities of the scenario. It is important
to consider management controls in these evaluations.
Incidents such as instantaneous loss of conainment are a
major concern in the process inductries. However, mea-
sures, such as control systems, overpressure reliefs,
alarms, mechanical as well as non-destructive tests reduce
the likelihood of development of such as scenario. Emer-
gency planning may be effected by local regulations. The
law may dictate the type of scenarios that emergency
planning should be address.
The large number of chemicals along with the large
number of equipment and the variety of potential incidents
that can occur from the combinations of chemicals equip-
ment lead to an enormous number of possible scenarios. As
mentioned earlier, it is impractical to plan for all emergen-
cies, and therefore it is neccesary to analyse and prioritize
the scenarios. The process of scenario selection and prior-
itization is shown graphically in Figure 24.3.

As shown in Figure 24.2, emergency systems are Identification of process areas with high hazards
developed in parallel with the development of physical A large number of techniques are available for the identifi-
facilities. The list below consists of typical items in emer- cation of areas of major hazards. Dow Fire and Explosion
gency systems; however, it can vary according to special Index (F&EI), and Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) are
circumstances: examples of techniques that can be used to identify and
evaluate hazards according to the nature of the substances,
(1) Emergency power supply and other process physical conditions. The US National Fire
(2) Emergency water supply Protection Agency (NFPA) Fire Hazard Indices is a classi-
(3) Communication systems fication methodology that classifies materials according to
(4) Emergency management computer support system the reactivity, flammability and their possession of health
(5) Site and community alert systems hazards. The results of examination of the plant with these
(6) Adequate incident command transportaion techniques will lead to a list of ranked areas that should
(7) Appropriate control room protection measures. then be analysed to identify credible scenarios.

f -',
.... ~ Preparedness I
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I I
I Development of I
I
physical facilities I
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scenarios capabilities Establishment of
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Figure 24.2 Emergencypreparedness flow chart

 EMERGENCY PLANNING 24/5

~ dentificationofprocessareaswiths e v e r e ~
hazards

............... 1 ..................
Identification of credible scenarios
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ,

.~ ...... i....~,
..... ~,,, ,,,~'"

f
Scenario prioritization for
consequence analysis

Scenarioselectionfor /
emergencyplanning
, , ,

Figure 24.3 Process of scenario selection for emergency planning

Credible scenarios 24.3 Resources and Capabilities

A variety of techniques are available for identification of 24.3.1 General
credible scenarios. The depth of analysis can vary from an The development of strategy for emergency response
informal review to a full Process Hazard Analysis session. requires consequence assessments of a list of credible inci-
The level of investigation is mainly dependent on the experi- dents and data on resources and capabilities. Data should
ence of the reviewers. Highly experienced reviewers are able be gathered on the following:
to identify credible scenarios by an informal review only.

Consequence assessments (1) Emergency response equipment on-site.

A preliminary screening of incidents is a helpful phase in (2) Emergency response equipment in neighbouring
reducing the number of consequence assessments, and in facilities.
categorization of the incidents prior to the assessment (3) Emergency management service in local communities.
stage. The following criteria could be helpful for the (4) On-site medical capabilities and medical facilities in
screening purpose: local communities.

(1) Incidents with only minor effects and low probability

for escalation into a serious incident should be elimi- Appropriate resources and adequate capabilities are major
nated. factors in determining the severity of consequences of an
(2) Incidents with high similarity of discharge rates, incident. The following is a common list of physical facil-
locations, inventories and emergency response ities, equipment and systems that are useful in preparing
operations should be grouped. for emergencies:
(3) Two representative incidents should be grouped from
each of the groups: (1) incident with high probability of (1) shelters;
occurrence, which may result in severe illness/injury (2) safe havens;
or major property damage and (2) a credible worst-case (3) emergency power supply;
scenario with critical/catastrophic consequences. (4) adequate and alternate water supply;
(5) EOC;
The screening procedure described above will establish a (6) command post vehicle (CPV);
list of incidents for consequence assessment. (7) emergency management computer system;
The common forms of incidents are fires, explosions and (8) media information centre;
release of toxic material to the environment. Consequence (9) medical facilities;
assessment tools help in the estimation of the impact of these (lO) large-scale decontamination equipment;
incidents on the employees, local communities, property (11) emergency evacuation transportation;
and the environment. Source term modelling is used to esti- (12) communication centre;
mate the release rate and quantity released. Explosion (13) on-site and off-site alerting system;
modelling, fire and thermal modelling, and dispersion (14) weather station.
modelling are applied for the assessment of the impact of
the incidents. These are discussed in detail in previous
chapters. The results of the consequence assessments lead The paragraphs below present the major components of
to determination of areas that will be affected and the level the equipment and systems above that are relevant to
of toxicity/thermal load/overpressure in these areas. emergency preparedness.
24/6 EMERGENCY PLANNING
24.3.2 Facilities and equipment in emergency planning
On-site shelters and safe havens
Shelters and safe havens provide protection from toxic
substances release incidents when an evacuation is not
viable.While shelters provide passive protection by closing
all air passages and shutting ventilation systems, safe
havens consist of independent source of breathing air, such
as compressed air bottles, or a specially designed active
carbon filtration system. Because of the need to safely shut
off (or control) critical systems, it is common to design
control rooms as shelters, and sometimes as safe havens.
The process of emergency planning for shelters and
safe havens should consider variables such as concentration
of employees, distance from incident location, typical wea-
ther conditions, and alternate evacuation routes. Admin-
istration buildings are commonly used as shelters. When
a building is selected as a shelter, the planner should
verify that the spaces that are designated as shelter areas
do not have holes and cracks, that doors and windows
seal properly when closed, and that a ventilation system
control (at least a shut-off control) is available.
Both shelters and safe havens should consist of support
systems that are proportional to the estimated occupancy.
Emergency power supply
Emergency power supply is a critical system. Planners
should verify that vital systems and locations have a power
supply for all situations. Generators that are attached to
internal combustion engines are most common as emer-
gency supply systems. However, stored electrical energy as
battery racks are used as well. NFPA 110 - Emergency and
Standby Power Systems, and NFPA 111 - Stored Electrical
Energy Emergency and Standby Power Systems, provide
guidelines and codes for these systems.
Adequate and alternate water supply
Adequate water supply is extremely important for proper
emergency response. Type of chemicals used in the plant,
thermal load, demand of sprinkler systems, foam systems
and hose streams are factors that should be considered in
calculation of water reserves.
Alternate water supply is necessary to assure water
delivery in an emergency. Ponds, lakes, reservoirs, and
on-site tanks can be used as an alternate water source.
However, for an adequate preventive maintenance pro-
gramme, it is crucial to have the source as well as the
equipment available. Moreover, heavy equipment is often
required to access the alternate source of water, which will
require hard surface pavement for the anticipated load. In
case of extreme cold weather, measures should be taken to
avoid freezing.
Emergency operations centre
It is not uncommon to designate a special room as an EOC.
Location of the EOC should be carefully selected to mini-
mize risk. The distance of EOC from processing areas and
storage is an important variable in its functionality. The
distance of the EOC from the normal residency of the
management should be considered as well. The planner
should designate an alternated EOC, which will be located
opposite to the EOC in reference to the processing area.
This will allow access to the alternate EOC in situations
where access to the main EOC is not possible. An optimal
EOC is one designed as a safe haven. NFPA 101 - Life safety
code, consists of specifications for designing an EOC. An
EOC should contain plans which facilitate the control of
the emergency. Table 24.2 provides an example of a list of
plans that should be available in the EOC. Documentation,
material and equipment that may be necessary to monitor,
administer and control the emergency should be provided.
This includes the Emergency Plan and the list of personnel
with their department, assembly point, home address,
nearest relative, and telephone number, if applicable.
Information from PHA studies scenarios should be avail-
able in an appropriate format so that the EOC personnel can
carry out continuous speculative reviews of the possible
development of the emergency. The EOC should be pro-
vided, as appropriate, with any equipment needed for
dealing with the emergency, such as breathing apparatus,
rescue gear, etc.
The EOC should be manned in an emergency by the
senior emergency coordinator, nominated senior works
personnel, senior officers of the outside services and any
nominated assistants such as messengers. Other personnel
should not be in the centre. If the hazard justifies it, the
EOC may be manned continuously.
Command post vehicle
CPV allows the Incident Commander (IC) to control the
efforts and activities in emergencies and be located at
vantage points. The IC should be able to communicate with
the management in the EOC, have access to essential
documents, be able to document the scenario, and be able to
monitor the environment. Therefore, the CPV should be
selected to allow installation of all the equipment necessary
and installation of power source that will be able to supply
the consumption that this equipment demands.
Emergency management computation system
Emergency management computation systems (EMCS) are
used for organization of information, estimation of severity
of the incident by using source and dispersion models, data
collection from the field if a network is installed, receiving
monitoring data, etc. This information is essential to
determine the magnitude of the event, and to make deci-
sions as to announce an escalation and to determine the
need of evacuation both on- and off-site. Modern wireless
networks, computation capabilities, and mobilization of
computation systems make these systems extremely use-
ful. Advanced process safety management packages with
well-developed emergency management, can be connected
Table 24.2 Some plans required in the Emergency
Control Centre
Fire water system and alternative water supply
Other fire fighting equipment
Safety equipment
Works entrances and road system
Assembly points
Shelters and safe haven locations
Relation of works to immediate surroundings and plans
which can be used as an emergency develops to show:
(1) areas affected by hazard;
(2) areas evacuated;
(3) deployment of emergency teams and equipment.
(4) inventories of hazardous materials

to weather station, alarm systems, local, state and federal
authorities.
Media information centre
A significant incident may have an impact on the organi-
zation's reputation. Sharing information and collaborating
with the media could reduce the snowball effect that an
emergency event may have. Moreover, media can assist by
announcing the emergency, and increase the awareness of
the general public in areas that might be affected.
A large room such as a conference room can be desig-
nated a media information centre (MIC). The MIC should be
located at a distance that will assure the safety of the
reporters and should be designed as a shelter or safe haven.
Medical facilities
On-site medical facility can have the capability of a first-aid
room or a medical department. In general, the adequate
capability is a function of parameters such as number of
employees in the plant, capabilities of the local community
medical centres, distance to these centres, and the antici-
pated consequences in an emergency. Coordination between
emergency team, on-site medical facility, and local commu-
nity medical centres may have major impact on the severity
of consequences in cases of multiple casualty events, espe-
cially if decontamination is required. Local emergency cen-
tres should be made aware of the chemicals in the plant, and
the estimated number of injuries that are expected in emer-
gency. A procedure that enables evacuation of injuries by
airlift is very common and can help in cases where the medi-
cal centre is too far, or in cases where the situation requires
specialties that are not available in the local medical centre.
Communication system
The design of communication system should address the
following:
(1) Maintain on-site communication.
(2) Establish communication with off-site agencies and
neighbouring facilities.
(3) Allow communication among management, emer-
gency team and responders.
Communication equipment includes announcement system,
alert system, phones, secure phone system, cellular phones,
radio system, wireless computing systems and cableTV.
Alerting and announcement systems serve both on- and
off-site. Use of alerting system requires coordination
between the plant and the local agencies. An audio alerting
system requires that a code be well communicated with the
general public. In general, alerting systems are used to
alert on weather hazards such as a tornado. Since man-
made hazards are rare, emergency plan should verify pub-
lic knowledge with regard to audio alerting systems. Cable
TV is a very effective tool to notify the general public in
local community with regard to hazards, and to deliver
behav-ioural guidelines and directions. It is recommended
that the planner not leave the notification of the general
public to the local agencies. A computer dial-up system can
be used as a tool to contact the general public in emergency.
On-site response equipment and supplies consist of a
variety of items. An inadequate equipment and supply can
worsen the consequences of an event. Therefore, the plan-
ner must verify that equipment and supplies will meet the
needs in an emergency.
EMERGENCY PLANNING 24/7
Response equipmentand supplies
The success of the response team in mitigating an incident
is dependent on the availability of adequate equipment, and
implementation of an adequate procedure of inspection,
maintenance and replenishment of this equipment.
Response equipment and supplies can be divided to three
main categories:
(1) personal protection,
(2) fire fighting, and
(3) decontamination.
Personal protection equipment allows the response team to
function in the affected zone in order to continue with the
efforts to control the incident and minimize the con-
sequence. Personal protection equipment consists of two
major types:
(1) respiratory protection and
(2) thermal and chemical protection.
The circumstance determines the level of respiration pro-
tection that is needed. In many cases, a mask equipped with
a canned active carbon filter may answer the needs. In
other cases, a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) is
required. This apparatus usually consists of a full face
protection mask and a regulator connected to a compressed
air cylinder that is carried by the responder. NFPA stand-
ard 1981 Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
determines the requirement of SCBA.
A supplied air respirator (SAR) is a system that supplies
air from a source that is located in a distance from the
affected area. This system is known as an airline respira-
tion system as well. The air is supplied through an air-line
hose to the responder. The major advantages of this system
are that it allows the responder to stay longer in the affected
area, and that the responders are not required to carry
heavy systems as with SCBA. The major disadvantages are
that the responder is not as mobile as with SCBA, and that
the air-line hoses are vulnerable to mechanical, thermal
and chemical damage and therefore this arrangement is not
approved for Immediate Danger to Life and Health envir-
onment, unless an emergency escape SCBA is carried by
the responder as well.
As for fire fighting gear, these systems supply reason-
able thermal protection for most fires. In incidents in which
excessive thermal load is expected, the responder should
wear adequate clothing. An ice vest is used when high
ambient temperature is imposed on the responders. The
vest consists of pockets in which ice can be installed. The
ice absorbs the thermal load, and enables the responder to
stay longer in high-temperature environment, or to get
closer to the source of the heat.
NFPA 1991 - Standard on Vapor-Protective Ensembles for
Hazardous Materials Emergencies, and NFPA - 1992 Stand-
ard on Liquid SplashPr~ Ensembles and Clothing for
Hazardous Materials Emergencie's assist in determining
the proper clothes according to the characteristics of the
hazards.
Fire fighting and decontamination equipment consist of
(but not limited to) the items in Table 24.3:
A planner should determine the necessity of integrating
heavy equipment as dump trucks, earth movers, and
cranes, and integrating these in the planning.
24/8 EMERGENCY PLANNING

Table 24.3 Major fire fighting and decontamination Table 24.4 Organizations that may be involved in
equipment local community emergency planning

Fire extinguishers Local community emergency preparedness organization

Sprinkler system Emergency management services
Water and foam engines Fire department
Hydrant system Police department
Portable pumps Traffic control agencies
Fire fighting truck Hospitals
Inhibitors Red cross
Neutralizers Salvation army
Sorbents Department of Health
Hazardous material vehicle EPA and OSHA (US)/HSE (UK)
Coast guard
Media
24.4 Developing an Emergency Plan Mayor
24.4.1 Overview
Regulatory agencies require preparation for emergencies
and documentation of emergency plans. The emergency When establishing a mutual framework for efforts in
team will respond to incidents according to this plan and emergency, the planner should identify each one of the
therefore the importance of the accuracy and comprehen- personnel that the plant should interact with, and establish
siveness of the written plan. Emergency plan consists of a dialogue that will create mutual trust and commitment.
the following major components:
24.4.3 Development of response tactic
Initial assessments and criteria for decision on escalation
(1) Establishment of a set of credible scenarios. of emergency are major issues in responding to an emer-
(2) Study emergency plans of neighbouring facilities gency. The planner should establish procedures for assess-
and local community. ment of severity of the incidents, and a set of criteria that
(3) Study availability of resources and capabilities, and will help in the decision to declare on escalation of the
determining needs. situation. The emergency team management must under-
(4) Study emergency-related regulations and emer- stand that the safety of the employees and responders is
gency authorities' requirement and responsibilities. their first priority. Next is preventing the incident from
(5) Development of tactics to respond to fires and escalating. Environmental concerns are next and finally
explosions, release of hazardous materials, natural the prevention of property damage is the last priority
hazards, terrorist threats, rescue, evacuation, and among these. The actions to be taken should be developed
plan for medical response and emergency mitigation. according to these priorities for both: fires and explosions,
(6) Development of procedures to assess level of and release of hazardous material. In both cases, the initial
emergency. efforts should determine work zones, in which the respond-
(7) Training of emergency teams, other employees and ers will be able to respond from.
contractors. Following the initial assessment, the IC should deter-
(8) Development and execution of drills (include neigh- mine what the objectives of the response are, for example,
bouring facilities and local communities). should the responders try to extinguish the fire (aggressive
(9) Development of drill-based improvement procedure. response), prevent it form spreading or, respond just to
(10) Communication of the emergency plan on- and off-site. allow safe evacuation of employees (defensive)? This deci-
sion should be made based on the risk associated with level
Component (1), (2) and (3) in the list above were discussed in of intervention.
detail earlier in this chapter. Next, location for mitigation efforts to take place should
be determined as well as entrance and exit routes, the time
24.4.2 Emergency organizations and regulations frame for the variety of actions, and who will carry out the
Emergency-related regulations, requirements and respon- variety of responsibilities.
sibilities are different in different countries. The planner The planner should develop procedures for the following
should study the requirements and regulations and develop indirect response components:
the plan to meet these requirements. An active Local
Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) in the United (1) Warning and alerting
States can assist a great deal in coordinating between the (2) Communication
plant and the local community authorities and responding (3) Distribution of managerial responsibilities
agencies. A central entity such as the LEPC in the United (4) Emergency shut-down
States may have in hand emergency plans from other sites (5) Identification of missing employees
and the emergency plan of the local community. Moreover, a (6) Mutual assistance with the variety of external
mutual agreement that establishes a net of emergency entities
equipment and supplies may be available and thus reduce (7) Reporting
the costs involved in preparing the plant for emergencies. (8) Declaration of escalation
Local community planning should include diverse gov- (9) Security
ernment, volunteer and private organizations. Table 24.4 (10) Dealing with the media and
consists of examples of such organizations. (11) Special notification.
Procedures for direct response efforts should include the
following:
Evacuation
Medical mitigation
Rescue
Fires and explosions
Release of hazardous materials
Terrorism threats
High winds
Flood
Freeze.
Procedures for training, drills, effectiveness measure-
ments and post-drill change management should be con-
sidered part of the response stage as well as part of the
preparedness.
24.5 Training
24.5.1 Background
Training is the foundation of the success of emergency plan-
ning. The training verifies that all employees are familiar
with the alerting and warning codes, and the location of
shelters and safe havens. Members of the response team are
introduced to their responsibilities and its role in the 'big
picture'. The frame for training for emergencies was man-
dated by the government in the United States. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Transpor-
tation require training for emergencies. Other organizations
established standards and good practices that are very use-
ful. OSHA requires that an employer will train his employees
at least once in three years.
24.5.2 Fundamental training
The most fundamental emergency training is the use of fire
extinguishing systems and equipment. It is common for all
employees to be trained to use these systems. Additional
training that all employees should receive is familiarity
with alert codes, evacuation routes, and the locations of
shelters and safe havens. These training include identifi-
cation of hazards, the type of response that is appropriate,
and to whom these hazards should be reported, and which
communication system is to be used.
24.5.3 Operators training
Operations personnel are required to be familiar with the
site emergency plan, and to be familiar in details with the
relevant part of the plan that is related to their processes.
This part requires knowledge of safe work practices and
emergency shut-down procedures. The operators should be
trained on the procedure, and to the criteria for proper shut-
down. This type of training is extremely important, and
more important is exercising it, in order to increase the
correct decision-making, and to prevent wrong decision-
making as was made in the Piper Alpha incident in the
North Sea.
24.5.4 Response teams
Response teams are required to have high level of familiarity
with the emergency plan. They have to understand the
inherent hazards that are characterizing the plant, and the
list of credible incident that the emergency plan was
developed for, hierarchy of command, reporting system,
responsibilities, communication systems and all other rel-
evant information and procedures that the emergency plan
consists of. The response teams are required to have knowl-
edge and skills in several types of response categories:
(1) Fire fighting
(2) Release of hazardous material (in all phases: leak of
liquids, rain of vapour and drops, gas)
(3) Terrorism threats
(4) Rescue (natural hazards, man-made hazards, con-
fined places)
(5) Medical and
(6) Evacuation.
In most cases the teams are designated to one or more of
the categories; however, they are expected to be able to
perform in other teams as well.
Several of the emergency response personnel should be
trained to deal with the media and public relations.This is a
very sensitive duty because of the impact that the incident
and the media covering the events may have on the image of
the organization.
24.6 Essential Functions and Nominated Personnel
24.6.1 Incident Commander
It is the IC responsibility to proceed to the scene of the
incident and to coordinate the efforts. The following list
describes the IC's major responsibilities:
(1) As soon as the IC becomes aware of an incident, he
should assess its scale against predetermined cri-
teria or emergency reference levels, and decide whe-
ther a major emergency exists or is likely. If so he
should immediately activate the on-site plan and if
necessary the off-site emergency plan.
(2) Ensure that emergency services have been called.
(3) Direct the shutting down and evacuation of the other
plant areas, etc., likely to be affected.
(4) Ensure that key personnel have been notified.
(5) Direct all operation at the scene.
(6) Control the rescue and fire fighting operations
activities until the arrival of the fire brigade, when he
should hand over control to a senior fire officer.
(7) Search for casualties.
(8) Evacuate non-essential workers to assembly areas.
(9) Set up a communications point with radio, telephone
or messenger contact with the EOC.
(10) Give advice and information as requested to the
emergency services.
(11) Brief the site emergency management and keep them
informed of developments.
Where a fire is involved, the IC will direct fire fighting
until the outside Fire Brigade officer or the Fire Services
arrives, he will then hand over control of this aspect to the
senior officer of the fire brigade. The IC should be thor-
oughly familiar with the works situation; a suitable person
is the shift section manager. It is important that the IC be
readily recognizable when he is at the scene of the incident.
This is facilitated if he wears a distinctive garment such
as a brightly coloured or luminous jacket or helmet. This
garment should be known to all concerned and should be
24/10 EMERGENCY PLANNING
distinct from any which might be worn by others at the
scene, including the outside services.
24.6.2 Emergency Operation Manager
The function of the Emergency Operation Manager (EOM)
is to take overall control of the emergency operation activ-
ities from the EOC. The EOM controls the 'big picture' from
the EOC, and takes an overall control of the scene. Among
his responsibilities are the following:
(1) If he decides that a major scale emergency exists or is
likely to be developed, then he should ensure that the
emergency services have been called and the off-site
plan activated.
(2) Ensure that key personnel are called in.
(3) Exercise direct operational control of those parts of
the works outside the affected area.
(4) Continually review and assess possible develop-
ments to determine the most probable course of
events.
(5) Direct the shutting down of plants and their evacua-
tion in consultation with the IC and key personnel.
(6) Ensure that casualties are receiving adequate atten-
tion. Arrange for additional help if required. Ensure
that relatives are informed.
(7) In case of emergencies that involve risk to outside
areas from wind blown materials, contact the local
meteorological office to receive early notification of
impending changes in weather conditions.
(8) Liaise with chief officers of the fire and police serv-
ices and provide advice on possible effects on areas
outside the works, and ensure that personnel are
accounted for.
(9) Control traffic movement within the works.
(lO) Arrange for a log of the emergency to be maintained.
(11) Where the emergency is prolonged, arrange for the
relief of site personnel and the provision of catering
facilities.
(12) Issue authorized statements to the news media.
(13) Ensure that proper consideration is given to the pre-
servation of evidence.
(14) Control rehabilitation of affected areas after the
emergency.
The EOC should be familiar with the activities and
should have the authority needed to take any necessary
major decisions affecting these activities, the activities in
the neighbouring facilities and the outside services.
A suitable person is the shift manager. For both managers
deputies should be appointed who can take over their
duties if they are unavailable for any reason.
24.6.3 Other functions and personnel
There are numerous other functions that may have to be
carried out in an emergency. Some of these functions are
normal, though they can easily become overtaxed in an
emergency, but most are specific to the emergency situation.
Similar to the list of responsibilities of the IC and EOM, each
of the key personnel should be familiar with all his respon-
sibilities, all the relevant procedures, to whom he reports
and who are those under his responsibilities, and to whom he
reports if the primary person is not in duty for any reason.
24.7 Declaration and Communication of
the Emergency
24.7.1 Raising the alarm
When a serious incident occurs, it is very desirable for the
alarm to be raised as quickly as possible. Prompt action
will in many cases forestall the development of a full
emergency. Crucial aspects of raising the alarm are the
authority to raise the alarm, the training of personnel and
the alarm system. An efficient and widely practiced policy
is to allow any employee to raise the alarm. Such a policy is
more effective if personnel have been specifically trained
in this aspect.
24.7.2 Declaration of the emergency
When the alarm has been raised, the emergency procedure
is activated. The first stage is the decision as to whether the
incident constitutes, or could develop into, an emergency.
The IC should visit the scene of the incident. He then makes
the decision whether to declare an emergency. The author-
ity to declare an emergency need not be restricted to the IC;
however, it is undesirable to allow the authority to be too
widespread, but too close a restriction may introduce an
undesirable delay into the declaration. Other competent
personnel may therefore be vested with this authority.
24.7.3 Communication of the emergency
Once an emergency has been declared, it must be commu-
nicated to the following entities:
(1) EOM
(2) Personnel working within the areas affected
(3) Personnel that are needed to be called in from outside
(4) Off-site emergency services
(5) Key personnel on call-in
(6) Personnel in other threatened areas and facilities
(7) Police
(8) Medical services
(9) Media, and
(10) Headquarters.
As far as possible, the IC should be relieved of the task of
communicating the emergency so that he can devote his
efforts to dealing with it on site. However, the duties include
communication of the emergency to interested parties
until the EOM arrives. It may be appropriate to consider
arrangements that assist the IC in this task.
It is desirable to work out in advance fairly formal pro-
cedures for the notification of an emergency. The order in
which the different parties are to be notified is one obvious
aspect. It is also necessary to avoid entering into lengthy
explanations to personnel on call-in and, in such instances,
use may be made of short pre-arranged messages. Person-
nel liable to call-in should be issued with identification
which will allow them to pass through police barriers
erected to control traffic and sightseers.
It is essential that the existence of an emergency be
notified without delay to affected plants within the works,
the emergency teams and the off-site services.
The emergency should be notified to any neighbouring
firm that might be affected by it. This may be necessary if
there is a threat to the firm's plant or personnel, if the firm's
activities could compound the emergency, for example,
create a traffic jam at a shift change, or if there are mutual
assistance arrangements.
 EMERGENCY PLANNING 24/11

24.8 Cooperation and Drills unwise to expect sympathetic reporting unless over the long
24.8.1 Planning cooperation with off-site services term it has built up with the press, as far as it is able, a rela-
The planning of cooperation and the development of under- tionship of trust based on openness about the hazards pre-
standing with the off-site services is vital to the success of sent and the preventive and protective measures adopted.
response to emergency. The first step is obviously estab- It will normally be appropriate that the long-term handling
lishment of agreements to cooperate in emergencies. These of major hazard policies be done by the company's head
agreements are established mainly by the senior managers office with reference to national policies and standards.
of the organizations involved. But this needs to be followed The following is a list of common questions that a media
up by active planning and drills by plant personnel. would query about:
The activities should be seen not as two disjoint activ-
ities, but as a single operation in which a growing weight of (1) What happened and where?
resources is brought to bear on the incident. The planning (2) How it occurred?
should aim to clarify not only what is to be done but also (3) Was a hazardous material released and how much?
who is to do it. (4) What is the extent of the emergency?
Cooperation benefits greatly if there is a full-time liaison (5) How long will the event last?
officer, and this can be justified in an area where there is (6) Is the incident under control?
large potential for emergencies.What is known in advance is (7) What are the measures that are being taken to pro-
the general location and nature of possible emergencies. tect the public?
Other factors will not be so well defined: time, weather, and (8) Are there injuries and fatalities, and how many?
number of people. Excessive detail in the planning should be (9) On-going update on the emergency activities.
avoided. The aim should be to plan broad areas of responsi- (lO) Information on the criteria of declaring on escalation.
bility, chains of command and systems of communication.
Off-site services will require their own communications. A periodic training of a spokesman can significantly
On-site, the practice has been for the police, fire and medi- improve the credibility and reliability of the firm's public
cal services to be linked by radio to their own communica- relations.
tions systems. The EOC should be available to them.
Alternatively, they may wish to set up their own mobile 24.10 Off-site Emergency Planning
control centres.
Off-site emergency planning are developed within a juris-
The off-site services will also normally need to tap into
diction, or a city, county or a region. An off-site emergency
the on-site emergency internal communication. This
plan consists of procedures that address the following dis-
should be allowed through the EOC. An alternative is to
ciplines:
provide for their use portable radios as used by the emer-
gency teams.
Each service should have its own emergency plans. The
(1) Warning
police have a Major Incident Plan that covers road, rail,
(2) Communication
aircraft and airports as well as industrial situations. The (3) Shelters and mass care
fire service probably has a number of emergency plans.
(4) Evacuation
(5) Fire fighting
(6) Spills of hazardous materials and petroleum pro-
24.8.2 Emergency drills ducts
Emergency drills are effective in familiarizing personnel (7) Law enforcement
with their functions.While drills with on-site personnel can (8) Health and medical services
be dictated by a routine, real-time simulation that involves (9) Hazard mitigation
all forces, on- and off-site are much more complicated to (10) Public works
perform. However, the effectiveness of the plan, as well as (11) Utilities
the performance of each of the entities in the response stage (12) Human services
can be assessed only in full-scale drills. It is common that (13) Search and rescue
full-scale emergency drill resulted in major changes in the (14) Transportation
plan, and sometimes it required conducting process hazard (15) Donation management
analysis in order to better understand the hazards, and the (16) Terrorism threads.
risks associated. In any case, the emergency plan should
consist of a procedure for implementation of change The purpose of an off-site emergency plan is to outline stra-
management. tegic framework to respond to natural and man-made dis-
asters. Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
in New York on 11 September 2001, there is a significant
24.9 Public Relations
emphasis on mutually supporting terrorism preparedness
If a major incident occurs, it is important to provide the programmes, with the goal to enhance the capabilities by
media with accurate information. To give no report in the establishing a comprehensive programme for the full spec-
press is not an option. All personnel should direct turns from trum of terrorist threat and any other kinds of disasters.
the media to the spokesman. A good emergency plan will The off-site emergency plan is similar in structure to the
consist of a procedure that provides guidelines to answering on-site emergency plan. However, coordination of off-site
questions. Several questions might be anticipated. The emergency plan requires much more energy and effort.
choice is between an attitude to the press that may foster While for on-site plans, the EOM has an authority to direct
informed and sympathetic reporting and one that almost all the activities and disciplines in the plant, for off-site
guarantees ignorant and hostile comment. A company is plans, the EOM may have partial authority only.
24/12 EMERGENCY PLANNING
Warning procedures should use common channels of
communication to advise the public on an emergency.
However, some people who are directly threatened by the
hazard may not hear and not understand the warning. It is
necessary to address special needs groups such as sight
and hearing impaired, and nursing home.
Communication system planning should assume that the
hazards may neutralize the designated communication
systems, and that additional communication equipment
may be required.
Provision of shelters and mass care is a major responsi-
bility, and a large number of parameters are involved in the
process of designation of shelters. The efforts in the United
States should be coordinated with the American Red Cross,
which has been chartered under federal law to provide
mass care in cases of natural disaster.
The characteristics of hazards, magnitude, intensity and
anticipated duration are major factors in evacuation plan-
ning. Small- and large-scale evacuation should be addressed
by the planner. The criteria for the decision of evacuation
should be clear, and the planner should remove ambiguities
from this procedure. A common assumption is that about
80% of the population at risk will respond to the first
recommendation of evacuation. However, as the hazard
becomes more obvious, more will respond. Some of the peo-
ple will refuse to be evacuated under any circumstance.
Some of them will demand that their pets be cared for too.
All of these factors should be addressed, as well as the
response rate at different parts of the day.
Large number of procedures, modular plans and tem-
plates are available for the disciplines listed above on the
US Federal Emergency Management Agency and on states'
Division of Emergency Management websites.
24.11 Transport Emergency Planning
24.11.1 Background
As described in Chapter 23, it is essential for hazardous
chemicals to be transported in tanks and containers
designed and maintained to high standards, for transport
personnel to have any necessary training, for comparative
studies of the different means of transport to be done and
routes carefully selected, and for hazard studies to be
carried out. Even so, it is still necessary to plan for possible
transport emergencies.
As with safety in the transport of hazardous chemicals
in general, so with transport emergency planning, the
chemical industry has always tended to take the view that
although strictly the responsibility lies with the shipper, it
is very much in the interests and responsibility of the
industry also to take measures to deal with transport
emergencies. This attitude finds practical expression in
companies' willingness to send emergency teams to situa-
tions in which their own products are not involved.
Transport emergency planning has something in com-
mon with works emergency planning, but there are some
important differences. The main one is that even with
careful routing, there is a vast range of locations at which
the emergency can occur.
Transportation emergency planning includes the fol-
lowing elements:
(1) chemical data;
(2) information and labelling;
(3) incident control network;
(4) emergency procedures;
(5) emergency teams;
(6) outside services, and
(7) public relations.
The following paragraph discusses these elements.
Chemical data
Although the properties of chemicals that are shipped are
usually understood well enough for most purposes, it is
necessary that particular attention be paid to any property
that is specially important in a transport emergency. In the
Glendora incident described below, 30,000 people were
evacuated because it was feared that lethal quantities of
phosgene might be generated by burning vinyl chloride
monomer (VCM). Although the manufacturer's expert on
the spot discounted this hazard, the authorities proceeded
with the evacuation. The incident led the industry to carry
out research to determine more exactly the extent of the
hazard from this source, which turned out to be small.
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) should be part of the
delivery, to simplify the search for data.
Information and labelling
People involved in transportation incident need information
about the chemical, but their needs differ. The amount of
information required is different for the public, the person-
nel involved in the first few minutes and for those involved
in longer term incident control and clearing up operations.
There are also different sources of information. The most
accessible is the labelling of the container. Then there is
usually more detailed information carried somewhere on
the vehicle, if an MSDS is not reachable. The shipper and
outside services, such as police and fire services, should
have manuals that contain similar data. Finally, there is the
manufacturer who may be contacted through the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, EPA, and others. The UN
classification code is commonly being used for labelling in
transportation of hazardous materials.
Emergency procedures
There are certain priority actions that should be taken by
the person at the scene of the incident. The priorities are as
follows:
(1) keep people away;
(2) inform incident control;
(3) contain the chemical;
(4) avoid igniting the chemical, and
(5) obtain chemical data.
The communication with the EOC is important. The centre
should be informed as follows:
(1) place and time of the incident;
(2) chemical involved;
(3) container condition;
(4) injuries or/and fatalities;
(5) the surrounding area (urban, rural);
(6) weather conditions;
(7) the assistance available (police, fire services), and
(8) the means of maintaining contact.
It is particularly important for the man on the spot to
ensure that the control centre can keep in contact with him,

by using a cellular phone or any other communication
measure. If possible, the chemical should not be allowed to
get into sewers. A pool of liquid may often be rendered safer
by covering it with a blanket of suitable foam.
Ignition of the material should be avoided if at all possi-
ble. Sources of ignition should be kept well away.
Some chemicals that are transported have properties
that may increase the hazard of the incident. These include
low boiling points, capacity for spontaneous ignition, and
reaction with water.
Emergency teams
The manufacturer of a hazardous chemical normally
arranges for an emergency team to be available to be sent to
the scene as soon as a transport emergency is notified. In
some cases this involves mutual assistance schemes.
The personnel comprising the emergency team are
usually thoroughly familiar with the chemical and are
trained in handling incidents. In addition to the general
incident control measures already described, the emer-
gency team usually has expertise in dealing with leaks and
fires and in emptying damaged containers and clearing up.
A leak or spillage should not be ignited. If a leak has
ignited, however, it may be the best policy to let it continue
burning. The danger of putting out a fire without eliminat-
ing the leak is that the amount of flammables may build up
and, if re-ignited, cause a more serious fire or explosion.
If other containers are present, as it typically the case in
rail incidents, it may be necessary to cool these with water
to prevent their overheating.
The emergency team is sent as soon as possible on
receipt of notification, but several hours are likely to elapse
before it reaches the scene of the incident.
24.11.3 External services
The general role of the external services such as the police
and fire services has already been described. Some addi-
tional points relevant to transport emergencies may be
mentioned briefly.
A transport emergency differs from emergency activ-
ities on-site. There is therefore much less scope for advance
cooperation between a manufacturer and the services in
his local authority area. The variety of hazardous chemi-
cals that the services may have to handle is much greater.
Another feature of a transport emergency is that it may
well occur in an urban area. This means that measures
to keep people away from the scene, to divert traffic, to
maintain access for emergency vehicles and possibly to
evacuate the population assume particular importance.
Decisions on the advice to be given to the public, whether
this be to take shelter or to evacuate, are particularly diffi-
cult. In some situations where it is not strictly necessary to
involve large numbers of people, the authorities may
nevertheless have little choice but to order action, unless
precise information is available to them on the hazards of
the chemical, particularly the toxic hazards. Likewise,
information on fighting fires of the chemical is important
for the fire services. In particular, the latter need to know
whether the chemical reacts violently with water.
24.11.4 Rail transport
The foregoing account has been concerned primarily with
road transport, but most of it is applicable to rail road
transportation as well. In this case, the railway authority
establishes its own procedures and trains its own
EMERGENCY PLANNING 24/13
personnel. Again the prime requirement from the manu-
facturer is full information about the chemicals.
Emergencies involving hazardous chemicals on railways
tend to have some special features. One is the problem of
access, particularly for fire engines. The track is often
blocked by derailed rail vehicles. Another aspect is that
there are usually a number of tank cars involved, with the
danger of a spread of the fire/explosion. Frequently there is
a hazard to other transport, such as to trains on other
tracks, or to nearby roads.
24.12 Spectators
An incident that lasts for any appreciable length of time is
liable to attract spectators. This is true not only of transport
incidents occurring outside the site, but also of incidents
on-site that are visible outside.
The effect of spectators is two-fold. The number of peo-
ple at risk may be considerably increased, and the passages
for the emergency services can become congested, with
consequent delays.
The problem of spectators has been investigated by
Hymes (1985 LPB 65), who describes quite a large number
of incidents in which spectators suffered injury. Some of
the cases cited involve people who became exposed to the
threat and stood watching it develop instead of making
their escape, whilst in others they were attracted to the
incident as sightseers. Some of the incidents that he
describes are summarized in Section 24.13.
The control of spectators is therefore an essential part of
an off-site emergency plan and of a transport emergency
plan. The responsibility for such control rests with the
police.
24.13 Emergency Incidents
24.13.1 Historical data
Some information on emergencies in the process industries
has been obtained in the course of a study on human factors
as a cause of pipe work failures by Bellamy, Geyer and
Astley (1989).
For failures of mitigation, the number of incidents due
to each cause were as follows: delay, 23 (45%); design defi-
ciency, 14 (27.5 %) and lack of resources, 14 (27.5 %). Exam-
ples in the first category were lack of procedures for
handling the incident and defective fire fighting equip-
ment; in the second category, examples were a layout
leaving insufficient space for fire water jets to be directed at
the source of the fire and the inaccessibility of shut-down
equipment due to the leak itself and in the third category,
examples were lack of manpower and lack of equipment.
The information on the implementation of emergency
plans and on evacuation in this study is ambiguous. On
the one hand, there were 42 cases recorded in which an
emergency plan was put into effect. In 27 of these cases, the
plan implemented was the on-site plan and in 11 it was the
off-site plan; in the 4 remaining cases, the plan was not
specified. On the other hand, there were 30 cases in which
there was evacuation, either on-site or off-site or both, with
13 on-site and 24 off-site evacuations.
24.13.2 Incidents involving evacuation and/or shelter
There have been a number of instructive incidents involv-
ing evacuation and/or shelter. They include those at
24/14 EMERGENCY PLANNING
La Barre in 1961, Glendora in 1969, Potchefstroom in 1973,
Houston in 1976, and Mississauga in 1979.
In 1961, a rail crash occurred at La Barre, Louisiana,
involving a chlorine rail tank car, only 50 yd from a house.
A father was looking after a baby in the house, the infant
began to choke and gasp, and the frantic father carried it
outside, where the gas concentration was higher still. The
child died in hospital.
In 1969, a group of eight rail tank cars containingVCM were
involved in a crash at Glendora, Mississippi, and one started
to leak. That evening one of the tank cars ruptured, with
subsequent ignition of the leak. A heavy fog was observed
over the area and it was considered that it might beVCM. The
responders stated that in a VCM fire, phosgene could be
formed. Further advice was sought from the manufacturer's
representative, who stated that the principal problem was
likely to be HC1 and smoke, and university chemists, who
stated that burning VCM could create phosgene that was
potentially dangerous up to a radius of 35 miles. An evacua-
tion was initiated involving some 30,000 people.
In 1973, a sudden failure occurred in an anhydrous
ammonia storage tank at Potchefstroom in South Africa.
Workers in a building 80 m from the release survived, but
people who left their houses 180-200 m from it died.
In 1976 at Houston,Texas, a tank truck carrying 19 tons of
anhydrous ammonia ruptured at a highway intersection.
The resultant gas cloud enveloped the Houston Post build-
ing but the workers inside were not affected. Outside,
94 people caught in the cloud were injured, of whom 5 died.
24.13.3 Mississauga
Avery large evacuation occurred on Saturday, 10 November
1979 at Mississauga, near Toronto. At 23.52 p.m., a train
crashed and several propane rail tank cars exploded. The
train manifest was found, but it was in code. A strong smell
of chlorine was detected. At 01.30 the next morning, a
readable version of the manifest was obtained. A rail tank
car containing some 90 te of chlorine was identified as
being in the train and it was concluded that this car was
amongst the burning wreckage. At 03.00, the decision was
taken to evacuate the surrounding population. An evacua-
tion was begun which involved a total of about 215,000
people. The chlorine tank car was identified by helicopter
and found to have a visible hole in it. At 09.00 on Tuesday
morning, an initial attempt was made to plug the hole, but
this failed; a second attempt later was successful. The tank
was subsequently emptied. During Tuesday afternoon
143,000 evacuees were allowed to return to their homes in
the areas more distant from the crash. The rest returned
only after a total absence of 6 days.
24.13.4 Incidents involving spectators
The following incidents have been described in the study of
spectators. At Deer Lake, Pennsylvania, in 1959, a road
tanker carrying LPG was struck by a following truck in a
wet street. LPG was released and ignited, engulfing the
rear of the tanker. Fire services arrived, but expended
water on a nearby building, and in due course the tanker
suffered a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
(BLEVE). Fragments, which included most of the tank,
killed 11 spectators and injured 10 more. Emergency ser-
vices were hampered both before the rupture and after it.
At Meldrin, Georgia, in 1959, a rail tank car suffered a
partial rupture near a picnic site. A large gas cloud spread
and for some time did not ignite.When it did ignite, a flash
fire occurred. There were 23 dead, many of whom were found
in their cars. Emergency services were greatly hampered
because the site was remote and served only by a dirt road
congested by spectators and relatives of the casualties.
At Kingman, Arizona, in 1973, a rail tank car carrying
propane developed a leak that ignited. Despite police dis-
couragement, a large crowd of spectators jostled to get a
view. In due course the tank car underwent a BLEVE and a
huge fireball erupted. Some 90 spectators 300 m away suf-
fered injury.
At San Carlos de la Rapita, Spain, in 1978, a road tanker
carrying propylene past the Los Alfaques campsite rup-
tured with a small explosion. A flammable gas cloud began
to spread through the site. Campers who did not appreciate
that the full hazard from the burning tanker had yet to
develop stood around bemused whilst escape was still
possible. Many wore bathing suits or light beachwear.
There followed a major explosion and flash fire. The even-
tual death toll was about 210, a large proportion from
severe burns.
Other incidents in which many of the deaths occurred
among spectators are those at Texas City in 1947, and
Caracas,Venezuela, in 1982. In theTexas City disaster, a fire
developed aboard a ship in the harbour. The ship was car-
rying ammonium nitrate. In due course the ship disin-
tegrated in an enormous explosion, killing all those in the
dock, including firemen and spectators. This explosion and
a further one in another ammonium nitrate carrier killed
552 people and injured another 3000.
The Caracas disaster involved a fire in an oil tank sited
on a hill. A boilover occurred and the burning oil flowed
down the hill. Forty firefighters were killed, together with
many civil defence workers and spectators, giving a fatal-
ity toll of 153 with 7 missing.
24.14 Recovery
A recovery from a major emergency event is a process that
requires major efforts and takes a significant period of
time. The extant of the efforts is a function of parameters
such as the resources that are required to rebuild and
renovate, requirements of the enforcing agencies, person-
nel commitment, length of process purchasing and deliv-
ery, and more. The most important factor in the recovery
process is leadership, and therefore the recovery manage-
ment should be selected carefully. Recovery process
consists of a very large number of details. The recovery
manager needs to establish a recovery team that will
represents all the disciplines in the plant. The team should
include representatives from engineering, maintenance,
production, purchasing, ES&H, legal department and
other, as the circumstances require.
Following the emergency phase, the site should be
secured and preservation of evidence and data collection
need to take place. Parallel to these activities, human
resources should provide assistance to employees and vic-
tim families. Incident that resulted in fatalities will require
professional psychological support as well. Portion of the
efforts of assessment of the damage to the environment and
property and incident investigation could be integrated to
avoid repetition of some of the phases. Clean up activities
should be coordinated extremely carefully to avoid removal
of evidence. It is recommended to consider involvement of
the media in the process in order to improve public relation,
and recovery of the damaged image.
 EMERGENCY PLANNING 24/15

24.15 Regulations and Standards 24.16 Literature

24.15.1 Regulations
In the United States, the OSHA established the Process
Safety Management (PSM) requirements, following the
issuance of the Clean Air Act section 112(0. The US EPA
followed by issuance of the Risk Management Program
(RMP), for Chemical Accidents Release Prevention.
The Health and Safety Executive in United Kingdom
established guidance for writing on- and off-site emer-
gency plans 'HS (G) 191 Emergency planning for major
accidents: Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)
regulations 1999'. OSHA PSM standard consists of 12 ele-
ments. CFR 1910.38 in the standard states the requirements
for emergency planning. However, other OSHA require-
ments such as CFR 1910.156 that establish requirements for
training Fire Brigades, and CFR 1910.146 that states the
requirement for training emergencies in confined spaces
are related as well.
EPA RMP rule is based on industrial codes and stand-
ards, and it requires companies to develop an RMP if
they handle hazardous substances that exceed a certain
threshold. The programme is required to include the
following sections:
The references in the list below were considered during
the review of this chapter:
1. DENNISON,M.S., (1994) OSHA and EPA Process Safety
Management Requirements: A Practical Guide for
Compliance, pp. 174-184 (NewYork:VNR Pub.).
2. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS, (1995)
Guidelinesfor Technical Planning for On-Site Emergen-
cies, pp. 1-294 (NewYork).
3. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS, (1995)
Guidelines for Process Safety Fundamentals in General
Plant Operations, pp. 285-303 (NewYork).
4. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS, (1992)
Guidelinesfor Investigating Chemical Process Incidents
(NewYork).
5. AMERICANSOCIETYOFSAFETY ENGINEERS, (2001)'Criteria
for Accepted Practices in Safety, Health, and Envi-
ronmental Training', (Des Plaines, IL: ANSI Z490.1).
6. RE VELLE, J.S. and STEPHENSON,J. (1995) Safety Training
Methods: PracticalSolutionsfor the Next Millennium, 2nd
ed., pp. 236-268 (NewYork:JohnWiley & Sons, Inc.).

(1) Hazard assessment based on the potential effects, an

accident history of the last 5 years, and an evaluation Appendix A: NFPA Publications
of worst-case and alternative accidental releases. NFPA 1 Uniform Fire Code
(2) Prevention programme. NFPA 10 Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers
(3) Emergency response programme. NFPA11 Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-
Expansion Foam Systems
On the other hand, EPA requires that the communities NFPA 11A Standard for Medium- and High-Expansion
will put the efforts from their side. The EPA Emergency Foam Systems
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) NFPA 12 Standard on Carbon dioxide Extinguishing
establishes requirements for the industry, Federal, State Systems
and local governments, on reporting on hazardous and NFPA 12A Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing
toxic chemicals. Systems
EPCRA consists of four parts: NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler
Systems
(1) Emergency planning (Section 301-303), NFPA 13D Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler
(2) Emergency release notification (Section 304), Systems in One- and Two-Family Dwellings
(3) Hazardous chemical storage reporting requirements and Manufactured Homes
(Sections 311-312) and NFPA 13E Recommended Practice for Fire Department
(4) Toxicchemical release inventory (Section 313). Operations in Properties Protected by
Sprinkler and Standpipe Systems
NFPA 13R Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler
The purpose of the EPCRA is to help increasing aware- Systems in Residential Occupancies up to
ness in the public on chemicals at individual facilities, their and Including Four Stories in Height
uses and releases into the environment. The act states that NFPA 14 Standard for the Installation of Standpipe,
every community in the United States must be part of a Private Hydrants, and Hose Systems
comprehensive emergency plan. NFPA 15 Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for
Both, the Department of Transportation and the Fire Protection
Department of Energy, address emergency planning. NFPA 16 Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water
Information is available on their websites. Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems
NFPA 17 Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing
24.15.2 Standards Systems
A large number of standards that addresses process safety NFPA 17A Standard for Wet Chemical Extinguishing
and are relevant to process safety are available. However, Systems
the NFPA published a variety of standards that are useful NFPA 18 Standard on Wetting Agents
in emergency planning and training for emergencies. List NFPA 20 Standard for the Installation of Stationary
of NFPA publications is given in Appendix A. Similarly, Pumps for Fire Protection
the National institute of Safety and Health and the NFPA 22 Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) provide Protection
guidelines and standards that can be helpful in planning NFPA 24 Standard for the Installation of Private Fire
for emergencies. Service Mains and Their Appurtenances
24/16 EMERGENCY PLANNING

NFPA 25 Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and NFPA 70B Recommended Practice for Electrical
Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Equipment Maintenance
Systems NFPA 70E Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code for Employee Workplaces
NFPA 30A Code for Motor Fuel Dispensing Facilities NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm Cod~
and Repair Garages NFPA 73 Electrical Inspection Code for Existing
NFPA 30B Code for the Manufacture and Storage of Dwellings
Aerosol Products NFPA 75 Standard for the Protection of Information
NFPA 31 Standard for the Installation of Oil-Burning Technology Equipment
Equipment NFPA 76 Recommended Practice for the Fire Protec-
NFPA 32 Standard for Drycleaning Plants tion of Telecommunications Facilities
NFPA 33 Standard for Spray Application Using Flam- NFPA 77 Recommended Practice on Static Electricity
mable or Combustible Materials NFPA 79 Electrical Standard for Industrial Machinery
NFPA 34 Standard for Dipping and Coating Processes NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Fire Windows
Using Flammable or Combustible Liquids NFPA 80A Recommended Practice for Protection of
NFPA 35 Standard for the Manufacture of Organic Buildings from Exterior Fire Exposures
Coatings NFPA 82 Standard on Incinerators and Waste and
NFPA 36 Standard for Solvent Extraction Plants Linen Handling Systems and Equipment
NFPA 37 Standard for the Installation and Use of Sta- NFPA 85 Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code
tionary Combustion Engines and Gas Tur- NFPA 86 Standard for Ovens and Furnaces
bines NFPA 88A Standard for Parking Structures
NFPA 40 Standard for the Storage and Handling of NFPA 90A Standard for the Installation of Air-
Cellulose Nitrate Film Conditioning and Ventilating Systems
NFPA 42 Code for the Storage of Pyroxylin Plastic NFPA 90B Standard for the Installation of Warm Air
NFPA 45 Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Heating and Air-Conditioning Systems
Using Chemicals NFPA 91 Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air
NFPA 50 Standard for Bulk Oxygen Systems at Con- Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and
sumer Sites Noncombustible Particulate Solids
NFPA 50A Standard for Gaseous Hydrogen Systems at NFPA 92A Recommended Practice for Smoke-Control
Consumer Sites Systems
NFPA 50B Standard for Liquefied Hydrogen Systems at NFPA 92B Guide for Smoke Management Systems in
Consumer Sites Malls, Atria, and Large Areas
NFPA 51 Standard for the Design and Installation of NFPA 96 Standard for Ventilation Control and Fire
Oxygen-Fuel Gas Systems for Welding, Cut- Protection of Commercial Cooking Opera-
ting, and Allied Processes tions
NFPA 51A Standard for Acetylene Cylinder Charging NFPA 97 Standard Glossary of Terms Relating to
Plants Chimneys, Vents, and Heat-Producing Appli-
NFPA51B Standard for Fire Prevention During Weld- ances
ing, Cutting, and Other Hot Work NFPA 99 Standard for Health Care Facilities
NFPA 52 Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) Vehicular NFPA 99B Standard for Hypobaric Facilities
Fuel Systems Code NFPA 99C Standard on Gas and Vacuum Systems
NFPA 53 Recommended Practice on Materials, NFPA 101 Life Safety Cod~
Equipment and Systems Used in Oxygen- NFPA 101A Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life
Enriched Atmospheres Safety
NFPA 54 National Fuel Gas Code NFPA 101B Code for Means of Egress for Buildings and
NFPA 55 Standard for the Storage, Use, and Handling Structures
of Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids NFPA 102 Standard for Grandstands, Folding and
in Portable and Stationary Containers, Telescopic Seating, Tents, and Membrane
Cylinders, and Tanks Structures
NFPA 57 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Vehicular Fuel NFPA 105 Standard for the Installation of Smoke Door
Systems Code Assemblies
NFPA 58 Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code NFPA 110 Standard for Emergency and Standby Power
NFPA 59 Utility LP-Gas Plant Code Systems
NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and NFPA 111 Standard on Stored Electrical Energy Emer-
Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) gency and Standby Power Systems
NFPA 61 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and NFPA 115 Standard on Laser Fire Protection
Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food NFPA 120 Standard for Coal Preparation Plants
Processing Facilities NFPA 121 Standard on Fire Protection for Self-
NFPA 68 Guide for Venting of Deflagrations Propelled and Mobile Surface Mining
NFPA 69 Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems Equipment
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code| National Elec- NFPA 122 Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in
trical Cod~ Underground Metal and Nonmetal Mines
NFPA 70A Electrical Code for One- and Two-Family NFPA 123 Standard for Fire Prevention and Control in
Dwellings and Mobile Homes Underground Bituminous Coal Mines

NFPA 130 Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and
Passenger Rail Systems
NFPA 140 Standard on Motion Picture and Television
Production Studio Soundstages and Approved
Production Facilities
NFPA 150 Standard on Fire Safety in Racetrack Stables
NFPA 160 Standard for Flame Effects Beforean Audience
NFPA 170 Standard for Fire Safety Symbols
NFPA 203 Guide on Roof Coverings and Roof Deck
Constructions
NFPA 204 Standard for Smoke and Heat Venting
NFPA 211 Standard for Chimneys, Fireplaces, Vents,
and Solid Fuel-Burning Appliances
NFPA 214 Standard on Water-CoolingTowers
NFPA 220 Standard on Types of Building Construction
NFPA 221 Standard for Fire Walls and Fire Barrier
Walls
NFPA 225 Model Manufactured Home Installation
Standard
NFPA 230 Standard for the Fire Protection of Storage
NFPA 232 Standard for the Protection of Records
NFPA 241 Standard for Safeguarding Construction,
Alteration, and Demolition Operations
NFPA 251 Standard Methods of Tests of Fire Endurance
of Building Construction and Materials
NFPA 252 Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Door
Assemblies
NFPA 253 Standard Method of Test for Critical Radiant
Flux of Floor Covering Systems Using a
Radiant Heat Energy Source
NFPA255 Standard Method of Test of Surface Burning
Characteristics of Building Materials
NFPA256 Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Roof Cov-
erings
NFPA 257 Standard on Fire Test for Window and Glass
Block Assemblies
NFPA 258 Recommended Practice for Determining
Smoke Generation of Solid Materials
NFPA 259 Standard Test Method for Potential Heat of
Building Materials
NFPA 260 Standard Methods of Tests and Classifica-
tion System for Cigarette Ignition Resistance
of Components of Upholstered Furniture
NFPA 261 Standard Method of Test for Determining
Resistance of Mock-Up Upholstered Furni-
ture Material Assemblies to Ignition by
Smoldering Cigarettes
NFPA 262 Standard Method of Test for FlameTravel and
Smoke of Wires and Cables for Use in Air-
Handling Spaces
NFPA 265 Standard Methods of FireTests for Evaluating
Room Fire Growth Contribution of Textile
Coverings on Full Height Panels and Walls
NFPA 268 Standard Test Method for Determining
Ignitibility of Exterior Wall Assemblies
Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source
NFPA 269 Standard Test Method for Developing
Toxic Potency Data for Use in Fire Hazard
Modeling
NFPA 270 Standard Test Method for Measurement of
Smoke Obscuration Using a Conical Radiant
Source in a Single Closed Chamber
NFPA 271 Standard Method of Test for Heat and Visible
Smoke Release Rates for Materials and
EMERGENCY PLANNING 24/17
Products Using an Oxygen Consumption
Calorimeter
NFPA 272 Standard Method of Test for Heat and Visible
Smoke Release Rates for Upholstered Furni-
ture Components or Composites and Mat-
tresses Using an Oxygen Consumption
Calorimeter
NFPA 273 Standard Method of Test for Determining
the Degrees of Combustibility of Building
Materials
NFPA 274 Standard Test Method to Evaluate Fire Per-
formance Characteristics of Pipe Insulation
NFPA 284 Standard Test Method for Mattresses for
Correctional Occupancies
NFPA 285 Standard Method of Test for the Evaluation of
Flammability Characteristics of Exterior Non-
Load-Bearing Wall Assemblies Containing
Combustible Components Using the
Intermediate-Scale, MultistoryTest Apparatus
NFPA 286 Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Evaluat-
ing Contribution of Wall and Ceiling Interior
Finish to Room Fire Growth
NFPA 287 Standard Test Methods for Measurement
of Flammability of Materials in Cleanrooms
Using a Fire Propagation Apparatus (FPA)
NFPA 288 Standard Method of Fire Tests of Floor
Fire Door Assemblies Installed Horizontally
in Fire Resistance Rated Floor Systems
NFPA 289 Standard Method of Fire Test for Room Fire
Growth Contribution of Individual Fuel
Packages
NFPA 290 Standard for Fire Testing of Passive Protec-
tion Materials for Use on LP-Gas Containers
NFPA 291 Recommended Practice for Fire Flow Testing
and Marking of Hydrants
NFPA 301 Code for Safety to Life from Fire on Merchant
Vessels
NFPA 302 Fire Protection Standard for Pleasure and
Commercial Motor Craft
NFPA 303 Fire Protection Standard for Marinas and
Boatyards
NFPA 306 Standard for the Control of Gas Hazards on
Vessels
NFPA 307 Standard for the Construction and Fire
Protection of Marine Terminals, Piers, and
Wharves
NFPA 312 Standard for Fire Protection of Vessels
During Construction, Repair, and Lay-Up
NFPA 318 Standard for the Protection of Semiconductor
Fabrication Facilities
NFPA 326 Standard for the Safeguarding of Tanks and
Containers for Entry, Cleaning, or Repair
NFPA 329 Recommended Practice for Handling Relea-
ses of Flammable and Combustible Liquids
and Gases
NFPA 385 Standard for Tank Vehicles for Flammable
and Combustible Liquids
NFPA 402 Guide for Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting
Operations
NFPA 403 Standard for Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fight-
ing Services at Airports
NFPA 405 Recommended Practice for the Recurring
Proficiency Training of Aircraft Rescue and
Fire-Fighting Services
24/18 EMERGENCY PLANNING

NFPA 407 Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing NFPA 555 Guide on Methods for Evaluating Potential
NFPA 408 Standard for Aircraft Hand Portable Fire for Room Flashover
Extinguishers NFPA 556 Guide on Methods for Evaluating Fire
NFPA 409 Standard on Aircraft Hangars Hazard and Fire Risk of Vehicular Furnishing
NFPA 410 Standard on Aircraft Maintenance NFPA 560 Standard for the Storage, Handling, and Use
NFPA 412 Standard for Evaluating Aircraft Rescue and of Ethylene Oxide for Sterilization and
Fire Fighting Foam Equipment Fumigation
NFPA 414 Standard for Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fight- NFPA 600 Standard on Industrial Fire Brigades
ingVehicles NFPA 601 Standard for Security Services in Fire Loss
NFPA 415 Standard on Airport Terminal Buildings, Prevention
Fueling Ramp Drainage, and Loading NFPA 610 Guide for Emergency and Safety Operations
Walkways at Motorsports Venues
NFPA 418 Standard for Heliports NFPA 654 Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust
NFPA 422 Guide for Aircraft Accident Response Explosions from the Manufacturing, Proces-
NFPA 423 Standard for Construction and Protection of sing, and Handling of Combustible Particu-
Aircraft Engine Test Facilities late Solids
NFPA 424 Guide for Airport/Community Emergency NFPA 655 Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires and
Planning Explosions
NFPA 430 Code for the Storage of Liquid and Solid NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and
Oxidizers Explosions in Wood Processing and Wood-
NFPA 432 Code for the Storage of Organic Peroxide working Facilities
Formulations NFPA 701 Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame
NFPA 434 Code for the Storage of Pesticides Propagation of Textiles and Films
NFPA 450 Guide for Emergency Medical Services and NFPA 703 Standard for Fire Retardant Impregnated
Systems Wood and Fire Retardant Coatings for
NFPA 471 Recommended Practice for Responding to Building Materials
Hazardous Materials Incidents NFPA 704 Standard System for the Identification of
NFPA 472 Standard for Professional Competence of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency
Responders to Hazardous Materials Inci- Response
dents NFPA 705 Recommended Practice for a Field FlameTest
NFPA 473 Standard for Competencies for EMS Person- for Textiles and Films
nel Responding to Hazardous Materials NFPA 720 Recommended Practice for the Installation of
Incidents Household Carbon Monoxide (CO) Warning
NFPA 484 Standard for Combustible Metals, Metal Equipment
Powders, and Metal Dusts NFPA 730 Guide for Electronic Premises Security
NFPA 490 Code for the Storage of Ammonium Nitrate NFPA 731 Standard for the Installation of Electronic
NFPA 495 Explosive Materials Code Premises Security Systems
NFPA 496 Standard for Purged and Pressurized Enclo- NFPA 750 Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection
sures for Electrical Equipment Systems
NFPA 497 Recommended Practice for the Classifica- NFPA 780 Standard for the Installation of Lightning
tion of Flammable Liquids, Gases, or Vapors Protection Systems
and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for NFPA 801 Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities
Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Handling Radioactive Materials
Areas NFPA 804 Standard for Fire Protection for Advanced
NFPA 498 Standard for Safe Havens and Interchange Light Water Reactor Electric Generating
Lots for VehiclesTransporting Explosives Plants
NFPA 499 Recommended Practice for the Classification NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Pro-
of Combustible Dusts and of Hazardous tection for Light Water Reactor Electric
(Classified) Locations for Electrical Instal- Generating Plants
lations in Chemical Process Areas NFPA 820 Standard for Fire Protection in Wastewater
NFPA 501 Standard on Manufactured Housing Treatment and Collection Facilities
NFPA 501A Standard for Fire Safety Criteria for Manu- NFPA 850 Recommended Practice for Fire Protection
factured Home Installations, Sites, and for Electric Generating Plants and High Vol-
Communities tage Direct Current Converter Stations
NFPA 502 Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and NFPA 851 Recommended Practice for Fire Protection
Other Limited Access Highways for Hydroelectric Generating Plants
NFPA 505 Fire Safety Standard for Powered Industrial NFPA 853 Standard for the Installation of Stationary
Trucks Including Type Designations, Areas Fuel Cell Power Plants
of Use, Conversions, Maintenance, and NFPA 900 Building Energy Code
Operation NFPA 901 Standard Classifications for Incident
NFPA 520 Standard on Subterranean Spaces Reporting and Fire Protection Data
NFPA 550 Guide to the Fire Safety Concepts Tree NFPA 906 Guide for Fire Incident Field Notes
NFPA 551 Guide for the Evaluation of Fire Risk NFPA 909 Code for the Protection of Cultural Resources
Assessments NFPA 914 Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures
 EMERGENCY PLANNING 24/19

NFPA 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations NFPA 1402 Guide to Building Fire Service Training
NFPA 1000 Standard for Fire Service Professional Quali- Centers
fications Accreditation and Certification NFPA 1403 Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions
Systems NFPA 1404 Standard for Fire Service Respiratory Pro-
NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Quali- tectionTraining
fications NFPA 1405 Guide for Land-Based Fire Fighters Who
NFPA 1002 Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Respond to Marine Vessel Fires
Professional Qualifications NFPA 1410 Standard on Training for Initial Emergency
NFPA 1003 Standard for Airport Fire Fighter Profes- Scene Operations
sional Qualifications NFPA 1451 Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle Opera-
NFPA 1006 Standard for Rescue Technician Professional tions Training Program
Qualifications NFPA 1452 Guide for Training Fire Service Personnel to
NFPA 1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional Quali- Conduct Dwelling Fire Safety Surveys
fications NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational
NFPA1031 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Safety and Health Program
Fire Inspector and Plan Examiner NFPA 1521 Standard for Fire Department Safety
NFPA1033 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Officer
Fire Investigator NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident
NFPA 1035 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Management System
Public Fire and Life Safety Educator NFPA 1581 Standard on Fire Department Infection
NFPA 1041 Standard for Fire Service Instructor Profes- Control Program
sional Qualifications NFPA 1582 Standard on Comprehensive Occupational
NFPA1051 Standard for Wildland Fire Fighter Profes- Medical Program for Fire Departments
sional Qualifications NFPA 1583 Standard on Health Related Fitness Pro-
NFPA 1061 Standard for Professional Qualifications for grams for Fire Fighters
Public SafetyTelecommunicator NFPA 1584 Recommended Practice on the Rehabilitation
NFPA 1071 Standard for Emergency Vehicle Technician for Members Operating at Incident Scene
Professional Qualifications Operations and Training Exercises
NFPA 1081 Standard for Industrial Fire Brigade Member NFPA 1600 Standard for Disaster/Emergency Manage-
Professional Qualifications ment and Business Continuity Programs
NFPA 1122 Code for Model Rocketry NFPA 1620 Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident
NFPA 1123 Code for Fireworks Display Planning
NFPA 1124 Code for the Manufacture, Transportation, NFPA 1670 Standard on Operations and Training for
Storage and Retail Sales of Fireworks and Technical Rescue Incidents
Pyrotechnic Articles NFPA 1710 Standard for the Organization and Deploy-
NFPA 1125 Code for the Manufacture of Model Rocket ment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emer-
and High Power Rocket Motors gency Medical Operations, and Special
NFPA 1126 Standard for the Use of Pyrotechnics before a Operations to the Public by Career Fire
Proximate Audience Departments
NFPA 1127 Code for High Power Rocketry NFPA 1720 Standard for the Organization and Deployment
NFPA 1141 Standard for Fire Protection in Planned of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency
Building Groups Medical Operations and Special Operations
NFPA 1142 Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban to the Public byVolunteerFire Departments
and Rural Fire Fighting NFPA 1851 Standard on Selection, Care, and Main-
NFPA 1143 Standard for Wildland Fire Management tenance of Structural Fire Fighting Protec-
NFPA 1144 Standard for Protection of Life and Property tive Ensembles
fromWildfire NFPA 1852 Standard on Selection, Care, and Main-
NFPA 1145 Guide for the Use of Class A Foams in Man- tenance of Open-Circuit SCBA
ual Structural Fire Fighting NFPA 1901 Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus
NFPA 1150 Standard on Fire-Fighting Foam Chemicals NFPA 1906 Standard for Wildland Fire Apparatus
for Class A Fuels in Rural, Suburban, and NFPA 1911 Standard for Service Tests of Fire Pump
Vegetated Areas Systems on Fire Apparatus
NFPA 1192 Standard on Recreational Vehicles NFPA 1912 Standard for Fire Apparatus Refurbishing
NFPA 1194 Standard for Recreational Vehicle Parks and NFPA 1914 Standard for Testing Fire Department Aerial
Campgrounds Devices
NFPA 1201 Standard for Developing Fire Protection NFPA 1915 Standard for Fire Apparatus Preventative
Services for the Public Maintenance Program
NFPA 1221 Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, NFPA 1925 Standard on Marine Fire Fighting Vessels
and Use of Emergency Services Commu- NFPA 1931 Standard on Design of and Design Verifi-
nications Systems cation Tests for Fire Department Ground
NFPA1250 Recommended Practice in Emergency Ladders
Service Organization Risk Management NFPA 1932 Standard on Use, Maintenance and Service
NFPA 1401 Recommended Practice for Fire Service Testing of Fire Department Ground Ladders
Training Reports and Records NFPA 1936 Standard on Powered Rescue Tool Systems
24/20 EMERGENCY PLANNING

NFPA1951 Standard on Protective Ensemble for USAR NFPA 1989 Standard on Breathing Air Quality for
Operations Fire and Emergency Services Respiratory
NFPA 1961 Standard for Fire Hose Protection
NFPA 1962 Standard for the Inspection, Care and Use of NFPA 1991 Standard on Vapor-Protective Ensembles for
Fire Hose, Couplings and Nozzles; and the Hazardous Materials Emergencies
Service Testing of Fire Hose NFPA 1992 Standard on Liquid Splash-Protective
NFPA 1963 Standard for Fire Hose Connections Ensembles and Clothing for Hazardous
NFPA 1964 Standard for Spray Nozzles Materials Emergencies
NFPA 1965 Standard for Fire Hose Appliances NFPA 1994 Standard on Protective Ensembles for
NFPA 1971 Standard on Protective Ensemble for Struc- Chemical / Biological Terrorism Incidents
tural Fire Fighting NFPA 1999 Standard on Protective Clothing for Emer-
NFPA 1975 Standard on Station/Work Uniforms for Fire gency Medical Operations
and Emergency Services NFPA 2001 Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing
NFPA 1976 Standard on Protective Ensemble for Proxim- Systems
ity Fire Fighting NFPA 2010 Standard on Aerosol Fire Extinguishing
NFPA 1977 Standard on Protective Clothing and Equip- Systems
ment for Wildland Fire Fighting NFPA 2112 Standard on Flame-Resistant Garments for
NFPA 1981 Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained Protection of Industrial Personnel Against
Breathing Apparatus for Fire and Emergency Flash Fire
Services NFPA 2113 Standard on Selection, Care, Use, and Main-
NFPA 1982 Standard on Personal Alert Safety Systems tenance of Flame-Resistant Garments for
(PASS) Protection of Industrial Personnel Against
NFPA 1983 Standard on Fire Service Life Safety Rope Flash Fire
and System Components NFPA 5000 NFPA Building Construction and Safety Code