1.
Jaime Adriano and Legaspi Towers 300 Inc vs Alberto and (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
Lourdes Lasala
G.R. No. 197842 October 9, 2013
by Red
Facts:
Petitioner entered into a security service contract with respondents
for one year.
Subsequently, respondents received a letter signed by petitioner
Jaime Adriano, the building administrator, reminding them of their
non-compliance with the security services agreement, which
includes the failure to assign security guards with the required
height and educational attainment, and the failure to provide the
agreed service vehicle. The respondents, in their compliance,
replaced the unqualified personnel with Adriano’s recommendees
and produced a car which was parked in a nearby area because of
lack of space in the building.
Still, respondents received another letter reiterating the same
instances of non-compliance. Adriano mentioned that the
differences could only be settled by requesting from petitioner
various payments.
A series of correspondence between the parties took place
thereafter, with the petitioners constantly reiterating respondents’
alleged violations of the service contract. They also added another
grievance – nonpayment of the minimum wage. Respondents came
before the LT300 Board but the latter, terminated the contract
without giving respondents opportunity to explain.
Respondents filed a complaint for damages alleging that LT300 and
Adriano illegally terminated their services.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. It held that the agreement
could only be terminated for a valid cause; that respondents neither
committed any violation nor failed to give security services to LT300;
that respondents were not given their right to be heard under the
fundamental principle of due process of law; and that respondents
were entitled to all the benefits and considerations due them. The
CA affirmed the decision hence, this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court could warrant the factual re-
evaluation of this case
2. Whether the CA erred in holding the petitioners liable for illegal
pre-termination of contract.
Held:
1. No. The determination of the existence of a breach of contract is a
factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule
45. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the
exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are binding on the Court:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
However, the petitioners failed to cite in their petition the presence
of any of the above circumstances to warrant the factual re-
evaluation of this case. The SC will not review, much less reverse,
the factual findings of the CA especially where such findings coincide
with those of the RTC.
2. No. Respondents cannot be faulted for the absorption of
personnel who failed to meet the minimum qualifications since the
petitioners were active participants in the selection and hiring
process. Respondents readily hired Adriano’s recommendees even if
they lacked the qualifications stated in the agreement. Also, no
proofs were filed by the affected employees showing
noncompliance of minimum wage and there is no evidence that the
non-parking of the vehicle within the LT300 premises hampered the
effective delivery of security services. The petitioners were the ones
who committed the breach by their abrupt and groundless
termination of the agreement.
2. Vitaliano N. Aguirre II and Fidel N. Aguirre II and Fidel N. Aguirre
Vs. FQB+, Inc., Nathaniel D. Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo and Antonio
De Villa.
GR. No. 170770 January 9, 2013
By JC
Facts:
A complaint was filed by Vitaliano Aguirre against respondents for
intra-corporate dispute, inspection of corporate book and records
and damages. Vitaliano filed the case in Branch 24 of RTC Manila,
which was a designated special commercial court. It was docketed
SEC Case No. 04-111077
FQB+ was established in 1985 with the following directors and
subscribers:
Directors
1. Francisco Q. Bocobo
2. Fidel N. Aguirre
3. Alfredo Torres
4. Victoriano Santos
5. Victorino Santos
Subscribers
1. Francisco Q. Bocobo
2. Fidel N. Aguirre
3. Alfredo Torres
4. Victoriano Santos
5. Victorino Santos
6. Vitaliano N. Aguirre II
7. Alberto Galang
8. Rolando B. Bechayda
Sometime in 2004, Vitaliano discovered a changed in the names of
the directors and subscribers. According to the petitioner, he was
not aware of any changes except for the death of Francisco Bocobo
and Alfredo Torres.
The General Information Sheets (GIS) stated:
Directors & Subscribers
1. Nathaniel D. Bocobo
2. Priscila D. Bocobo
3. Fidel N. Aguirre
4. Victoriano Santos
5. Victorino Santos
6. Consolacion Santos
Nathaniel and Priscila Bocobo, heirs of Francisco, were designated as
president and secretary/treasure, respectively. The GIS was filed in
the SEC by said heirs.
Vitaliano questioned the truthfulness of the GIS to the "real" Board
of Directors, as stated originally in the Articles of Incorporation, but
was ignored.
On September 27, 2004, Nathaniel appointed Antonio De Villa as the
corporation's attorney-in-fact to administer the corporation's farm
in the province. Antonio was stopped by Fidel and his men.
Vitaliano asserted that the respondents usurped the management
powers and prerogatives of the "real" Board of Directors.
A hearing was for the application of Vitaliano's application for
preliminary injunction, but despite notice the respondents did not
appear. On October 15, the RTC granted the application based on
Vitaliano's testimonial and documentary evidence, and on October
27, 2004, the RTC issued the writ after he filed an injunction bond.
The respondents filed a motion for an extension of 10 days to file
the “pleadings warranted in response to the complaint,” which they
received on October 6, 2004. The trial court denied this motion for
being a prohibited pleading under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim
Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-corporate Controversies under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799.
The respondents then filed a petition for Certiorari and Petition with
the Court of Appeals. The certiorari petition sought for annulment of
the RTC trial on the ground that the subject-matter is an agrarian
dispute and the RTC had no jurisdiction, rather with the Department
of Agrarian Reform.
The respondents also assailed there was forum shopping since a
case was pending with the DAR and improper venue because the
real corporate address was different from the Articles of
Incorporation.
CA Ruling
The CA ruled that the issuance of the preliminary injunction was a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The CA
held that the Vitaliano only proved a future right if he wins and an
injunction is not the proper remedy to protect future, contingent or
abstract rights. The CA also opined that GIS filed with the SEC is
documented facts on record of the corporate officers and directors
that should outweigh Vitaliano's assertions and the RTC should have
removed the respondents from their positions.
The CA then also ruled that the RTC did not have jurisdiction of the
case since the corporation at the time was dissolved and has lost its
juridical personality. The CA also ruled that the complaint was meant
to continue the business of the dissolved corporation.
CA denied motion for reconsideration
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in annulling the October 15, 2004
Order based on interchanged pages.
2. Whether the Complaint seeks to continue the dissolved
corporation’s business.
3. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute
involving a dissolved corporation.
Ruling of SC
1. Ruling of CA affirmed.
The CA correctly ascertained that Vitaliano was only able to prove a
future right against the present rights of the respondents and the
RTC should have not disturbed the status of the GIS filed with the
SEC.
2. Ruling of the CA reversed
The prayer of the petitioner showed that he wishes only to vindicate
his right as a stockholder. Dissolution of a corporation does not
moot the issues presented by the petitioner since Section 122 of the
Corporation Code requires to conduct liquidation within three years
from dissolution. The issue was then to determine the rightful board
of the dissolved corporation.
3. Ruling of the CA reversed.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and RA 8799 gives such jurisdiction
to the RTC, designated by the Supreme Court, to settle intra-
corporate disputes.
To determine what is a intra-corporate dispute two concurring
elements must be present:
1. The dispute must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations;
2. The nature of the question subject of the controversy must be
such that it is intrinsically connected with the regulation of the
corporation or the enforcement of the parties' rights and obligation
under the Corporation Code and the internal regulatory rules of the
corporation.
Dissolution of a corporation merely prohibits the continuation of
business by the corporation, not the relationship of the parties
involved.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed June 29, 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87293, as well as
its December 16, 2005 Resolution, are ANNULLED with respect to
their dismissal of SEC Case No. 04- 111077 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The said case is ordered REINSTATED before Branch 24
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The rest of the assailed
issuances are AFFIRMED.
3. Sally Yoshizaki vs Joy Training Center of Aurora, Inc.
GR No. 174978 July 31, 2013
By Roman
Facts:
Spouses Sally and Yoshio Yoshizaki bought a parcel of land and a
building thereon covered by a TCT registered and owned under the
name of Joy Training Center of Aurora, Inc. It was sold to them by
Spouses Johnson, who represented themselves as having authority
to sell, evidenced by a board resolution and certification issued by a
corporate secretary. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and a
new TCT was issued in their name.
Upon knowledge of the sale, the chairperson of Joy Training filed an
action for the cancellation of Sales and Damages with prayer for
issuance of TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against both
spouses. It also impleaded Cecilia Abordo, the OIC of the Registered
of Deeds in its amended complaint as additional defendant.
In its complaint, it alleged that the company did not authorize the
Johnsons to sell its real property. It also argued that the certification
is void for it lacks material particulars and the resolution also for
being void for failure to comply with the voting requirement of
majority under the Corporation Code.
Celia and the Spouses Johnson were in default for failure to file an
Answer within the reglementary period. However, the spouses
Yoshizaki filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims. They
maintained that Spouses Johnson had authority to sell; that the
certification and resolution were valid; that they were buyers in
good faith; that there was a contract of agency between Joy Training
and the Johnsons, hence, a valid contract of sale; and lastly, they
questioned the jurisdiction of RTC over the case. They posited that
the case is an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
RTC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of the spouses
Yoshizaki.
Aggrieved, Joy Training appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The CA upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over the case but reversed its
ruling with respect to the sale. It gave no probative value to the
certification and rendered the resolution as void for it was not
approved by a majority of the board of trustees, in violation of
section 25 of Corporation Code.
Issue:
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction. The Supreme court held that,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
before a court belong. It is conferred by law. The allegations in the
complaint and the status or relationship of the parties determine
which court has jurisdiction over the nature of an action. The same
test applies in ascertaining whether a case involves an intra-
corporate controversy.
In this case, Joy Training seeks to nullify the sale of real properties
on the ground that there was no contract of agency between Joy
Training and Spouses Johnson. The determination of the existence of
a contract of agency and the validity of a contract of sale requires
the application of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code. It is a
well settled rule that disputes concerning the application of the Civil
Code are properly cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction. No
special skill requiring the SEC's technical expertise is necessary for
the disposition of this case.
As to other issues, the SC ruled that there was no contract of agency,
the absence of which renders the contract of sale unenforceable.
4. Opinaldo vs. Ravina
GR No. 196573 16 October 2013
By RV
Facts:
Victorino Opinaldo was a security guard who raised a labor
complaint against former employer, Narcisa Ravina. He accused
Ravina of illegal dismissal and prayed for the payment of separation
pay with the NLRC. After trial and hearing, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
rendered a decision in favor of Opinaldo. Ravina Appealed to the
NLRC, but this was dismissed for lack of merit while the LA’s decision
was affirmed. Ravina then elevated the case to the CA on a Petition
for Certiorari. The CA reversed NLRC’s decision and set it aside.
Opinaldo opined that that Ravina’s appeal to the NLRC should have
been dismissed outright since it was beyond the reglementary
period, but the CA did not agree. It ruled that the issue of timeliness
was rendered moot and academic when the NLRC decided to try the
case on its merits rather than on a technicality. Opinaldo moved for
reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE AND ANSWER:
Petition was granted.
WHETHER OR NOT NLRC ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF
LIBERALITY IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS JURISDICTION.
NLRC did not err. General Rule: The perfection of an appeal within
the statutory or reglementary period and in the manner prescribed
by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to do so renders the
questioned decision final and executory and deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to
entertain the appeal.
The NLRC, however, is not bound by the technical rules of procedure
and is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in deciding
labor cases. While these rules may not be relaxed when it would
render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is
adopted, the present circumstances warrant the NLRC’s exercise of
liberality.
Liberality in labor cases stems from the mandate that the
workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. In the present case, despite the fact that it was
Opinaldo that questioned the NLRC’s discretion concerning
timeliness, it was in fact Opinaldo which the NLRC favored with the
exercise of its jurisdiction. Opinaldo attacked that which protected
him. To allow him victory would be against the welfare of labor. To
charge the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion would be
counterintuitive to the fact that it ruled in favor of its own LA. To
render a full resolution of the case on the merits is the more
palpable explanation for the liberal application of its rules.
5. Crisanta Guido-Enriquez vs Alicia Victorino
G.R. No. 180427 September 30, 2013
By John Dee
Facts:
In February 1980, Antonia Vda. De Victorino filed with the CFI of
Rizal an application for the registration of the title over the
10,603sqm lot situated in Binangonan, Rizal. The latter alleged that
she is the owner in fee simple which she and her late husband,
Felixberto, acquired thru purchase. Additionally, they “have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, adverse possession and
occupation” of the said land. She also presented a Tax Declaration
under the name of her late husband.
The Republic opposed said application alleging that the subject lot
belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.
Reports shows that the subject lot is a portion of a large parcel of
land covered by TCT No. M-2102, registered under the name of
Antonia Guido, et. Al., overlapped with another lot which was also a
subject of an application for registration. On second report by the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(Administration) alleging that a case is still pending after the
Republic of the Philippines appealed praying that the application for
registration shall “be held in abeyance until after TCT No.
23377(mother title of TCT No. M-2109) and all derivative title have
been cancelled by the Court…”
In June 1988, the Lands Management Sector informed the
Administration that the Regional Director confirmed that the subject
lot does not overlap any other parcel of land.
The RTC-Pasig issued a decision on August 15, 1988 with finality and
issued an Order for the Issuance of the Decree on November 3, 1988
directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission to
implement its decision granting Antonia Victorino’s application for
the land registration.
Meanwhile, on Nov. 21, 1991, the SC affirmed the CA in the 1988
Guido Case rendering a decision in favor of Antonio Guido, et al.,
with a judicial notice that prior to the reconstitution of the mother
title of subject lot in favor of the Guido, certain portions of the area
were in the possession of occupants who obtained certificates of
title over the area possessed and others who didn’t obtained the
titles but through possession length of time amounts to ownership.
Private respondent Alicia Victorino alleged that before Antonia
Victorino died, the latter sold the subject lot in favor of the former,
and as a consequence she filed a Manifestation and Motion for an
Alias Order for Issuance of a Decree in the Name of the New Owner
(respondent).
On Nov. 19, 2002, the RTC-Pasig rendered a decision in favour of
Alicia Victorino and directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to
issue a decree in accordance with the adjudication of the RTC
decision dated Aug. 15, 1988.
On Dec. 4, 2002, Petitioner Cristina Guido-Enriquez filed a motion
for CLARIFICATION whether the Aug. 15, 1988 decision ordered the
segregation of the subject lot and whether the LRA has the authority
to move for said segregation.
A couple of motion for reconsideration were filed by the petitioner
with the RTC but the same were denied.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with
the CA but on Sept. 6, 2007 it was also denied.
Issue:
WON
1. The CA committed serious and reversible error when it dismissed
the petition for certiorari and prohibition in CA (special civil action)
and at the same time affirming the November 19, 2002 order issued
by the Hon. Presiding Judge of branch 156 of RTC of Pasig City that
directed Register of Deeds for Rizal, Morong Branch, to annotate on
TCT No. M-2102 of the Registry of Deeds for Rizal, Morong branch, a
memorandum which, in effect, deprives of law, of 10,603 sqm of
their Lands.
2. The Honorable CA committed serious and reversible error that
deprived the petitioner of due process when it allowed the presiding
Judge who rendered the August 15, 1988 decision in in Land
registration Case No. N-10371 and LRC case No. N-55139 to
participate in the decision-making process that resulted in a decision
that held that the proceeding in the RTC as the appropriate
proceeding envisioned in the November 21, 1991 decision of the
Honorable Court in Gr No. 84966 entitle Republic of the Philippines
vs CA.
Held:
1. NO. In her first assigned error, petitioner reiterates her argument
raised before the CA that the August 15, 1988 Decision of the RTC in
LRC Case No. 10371 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction as well as
for denial of petitioner's right to due process.
The doctrine of immutability of judgment applies. The CA had
correctly ruled, the assailed August 15, 1988 decision of the RTC had
already become final and executory. A decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by
the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any
act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
While there are recognized exceptions to this doctrine, petitioner
failed to prove that the instant case is among them.
Moreover, as the CA had observed, petitioner did not raise any issue
regarding the supposed nullity of the subject Decision of the RTC in
her Motion for Clarification10 filed on December 4, 2002. It was only
in her petition for certiorari filed with the CA that petitioner posited
the argument that the said Decision is void.
2. NO. The SC does not agree that petitioner was deprived of due
process when then CA Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., who
is now a member of SC, was allowed to participate and vote as a
member of the CA Division which rendered the presently assailed
Decision, considering that he rendered the August 15, 1988 Decision
of the RTC which granted Antonia Victorino's application for
registration. This Court quotes, with approval, the disquisition of the
CA in its October 25, 2007 Resolution, to wit:
Petitioner asked if the Hon. Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Chairman
of this Division, was the presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 156, who rendered the August 15, 1988 Decision.
Petitioner, thus, alleged that "there is something seriously amiss"
which affects this Court's Decision, dated September 6, 2007.
True, Justice Villarama, Jr. was the ponente of the August 15, 1988
decision of the RTC. Indeed, They indicated the same in the SCs
decision. It is likewise true that Justices under Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court, are prohibited from sitting "in any case … in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review."
However, a careful review of the records of this case will show that
although Justice Villarama, Jr. penned the August 15, 1988 RTC
Decision, said Decision had already attained finality on or before
November 3, 1988 and was not the subject of review in this Petition.
Said August 15, 1988 decision, which is a final judgment, was merely
incidental or part of the "history" of the case. Attention is invited to
the fact that the issues raised by Petitioner in this case revolved only
on the alleged invalidity of said Alias Decree and the annotation. It is
the issuance of the Decree in the name of the Private Respondent
and the annotation thereof to Petitioner's title which initiated this
Petition for Certiorari, or the Orders dated November 19, 2002,
dated March 6, 2003 and dated September 2, 2003. Said orders,
however, were no longer penned by then Judge Villarama, Jr. but by
respondent Judge Alex L. Quiroz, Justice Villarama, Jr.'s successor.
Clearly, the August 15, 1988 Decision penned by then Judge
Villarama, Jr. was not in issue or under review in this Petition for
which a judicial officer is prohibited from participating.
The fact alone that the issuances under review in this Petition, in
effect, affirms the final and executory RTC decision, dated August
15,1988, does not mean that this Court acted with partiality and
without the necessary prudence in rendering Our Decision, dated
September 6, 2007. The court’s decision was rendered after
judicious review of the law, the records and the jurisprudence.
Noting that Justice Villarama no longer took part in the above
quoted Resolution of the CA, this Court finds nothing erroneous or
irregular in the above ruling of the appellate court.
6. Royal Savings Bank vs. Fernando Asia et. Al
G.R. No. 183658 April 10, 2013
By Jet
Facts:
Pacencia Salita and her nephew Franco Valenderia borrowed the
amount of 25,000.00 from Royal Savings Bank. The latter loaned to
them an additional 20,000.00. Salita executed a real estate
mortgage over her property to secure payment of the amounts
loaned from bank. Unfortunately, neither Salita or Valenderia were
able to pay their debts. The petitioner bank instituted an extra-
judicial foreclosure proceeding against the real estate mortgage.
Pursuant to Act No. 3135, the mortgaged property was sold to a
public auction at which the petitioner bank was the highest bidder.
Both Salita and Valenderia failed to redeem the property within the
time period prescribed thus a new title covering the same property
issued to the petitioner-bank. Salita filed with the RTC a case for
Recoveyance, annulment of title and damages against the
petitioner.
The trial court granted Salita’s prayer for nullification of foreclosure
proceedings and the reconveyance of the property under the
petioner-bank’s name. The petitioner bank appealed to the CA,
which reversed the decision of the trial court. Salita did not appeal
the ruling of the CA which reversed the decision of the trial court.
Salita did not appeal the ruling of the CA making it final and
executory. Pursuant to Sec. 7 of Act 3135, the petitioner bank filed
with the RTC an Ex-Parte Petition for the issuance of a writ of
Possession. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner bank and
issued the writ of possession in its favor.
The respondents Asia et. al claimed to have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of
owners of the land in question for 40 years. The respondents were
given three days to voluntary vacate the property. To prevent the
execution of the notice, the former filed an urgent motion to quash
the writ of possession and writ of execution. The trial court granted
the motion to quash. The petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration and the respondents filed an opposition to this.
Claiming that it raises no factual issues, the petitioner came straight
to the SC through a petition for Review under Rule 45 of Rules on
Civil Procedure.
Issues:
1. W/N the Regional Trial Court erred in issuing the herein assailed
orders on the basis of its initial finding that respondents are third
parties who are actually holding the property adversely vis-a-vis the
judgment debtor.
2. W/N the pairing judge violated the hierarchy of courts when she
quashed the writ of possession validly issued by the then presiding
Judge of the RTC Quezon City, a co-equal body.
Held:
On the first issue:
In the eyes of this Court, the RTC did not err in issuing the herein
assailed Orders on the basis of its initial finding that respondents are
third parties who are actually holding the property adversely vis-à-
vis the judgment debtor. The RTC did not err in applying the doctrine
laid down in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court,in which we
ruled that the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to
be ministerial, once it appears that there is a third party who is in
possession of the property and is claiming a right adverse to that of
the debtor/mortgagor.
Explained in Philippine National Bank v. Austria that the foregoing
doctrinal pronouncements are not without support in substantive
law. Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a
property, to wit: Art. 433.Actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property. We find that it was only proper for the RTC to quash the
Writ of Possession until a determination is made as to who, between
petitioner and respondents, has the better right to possess the
property.
On the second issue:
No court has the power to interfere by injunction in the issuance or
enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another court of
concurrent jurisdiction having the power to issue that writ.
However, as correctly pointed out by respondents in their Comment,
it was the same trial court and "not another court or co-equal court
body that quashed the subject writ of possession. The pairing judge,
who issued the Order quashing the Writ of Possession, issued it in
her capacity as the judge of Branch 222 of Quezon City-the same
branch, albeit then under a different judge, that issued the Writ of
Possession.
7. Mark Anthony Esteban (in substitution of the deceased Gabriel
O. Esteban), Petitioner -versus- Spouses Rodrigo C. Marcelo and
Carmen T. Marcelo, Respondents
G.R. No. 197725 July 31, 2013
By Grace
Facts:
The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, petitioner Mark
Anthony Esteban, had been in possession of a piece of land located
at 702 Tiaga St., Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong City, since the 1950s.
In the 1960s, the late Esteban’s sister constructed a foundry shop at
the property. In the 1970s, after the foundry shop operations had
proven unproductive, the respondents-spouses Rodrigo and Carmen
Marcelo were allowed to reside therein, for a monthly rental fee of
P50.00. Since March 2001, the respondents-spouses have stopped
paying the rental fee (which by that time amounted to P160.00).
On October 31, 2005, the late Esteban, through a lawyer, sent the
respondents-spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their
arrears and to vacate within five (5) days from receipt thereof. For
failure to comply with the demand to pay and to vacate, the late
Esteban instituted an unlawful detainer case against the
respondents-spouses on December 6, 2005.
In April 23, 2009, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled that
there was a valid ground for ejectment; with the jurisdictional
demand to vacate complied with, the respondents-spouses must
vacate the property, pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 1673 of
the New Civil Code, on the grounds of expiration of the lease and
non-payment of monthly rentals. The MeTC likewise ordered the
respondents-spouses to pay back rentals and rentals, plus legal
interest until they shall have vacated the property, attorney’s fees
and cost of the suit.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) fully affirmed the MeTC
ruling.
The respondents-spouses appealed the RTC’s ruling to the CA. In
January 17, 2011, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The CA
ruled that from the year of dispossession in 2001 when the
respondents-spouses stopped paying rent, until the filing of the
complaint for ejectment in 2005, more than a year had passed;
hence, the case no longer involved an accion interdictal cognizable
by the MeTC, but an accion publiciana that should have been filed
before the RTC. Therefore, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the
case so that its decision was a nullity.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not MeTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
Held:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
It is not the tenant’s mere failure to pay rents that makes the
tenant's possession of the premises unlawful but the owner's
demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the latter has
failed to pay the rents on time and the refusal or failure to vacate
makes the withholding of possession unlawful. Such refusal violates
the owner’s right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful
detainer.
Furthermore, in cases where there were more than one demand to
pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for filing the
unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may choose
to waive his cause of action and let the defaulting lessee remain in
the premises.
The case has been properly filed as an accion interdictal cognizable
by the MeTC, or within the one-year prescriptive period counted
from the date of the last demand on October 31, 2005, hence, the
MeTC had proper jurisdiction over the case.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the court grants the petition for
review on certiorari. The decision of the CA was reversed and set
aside and the decision of the RTC was reinstated. Cost against the
respondents spouses Marcelo.
8. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ROBERT P.
NARCEDA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182760 April 10, 2013
By Sonny
Facts:
Robert P. Narceda (respondent) married Marina on 22 July 1987. At
the time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and 4 months
old. According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore in 1994 and
never returned. There was never any communication between
them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her. Years had
passed since Marina left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union
came home from Singapore and told him that Marina was already
living with a Singaporean husband.
Consequently, respondent Narceda filed with the RTC on 16 May
2002 a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death
and/or absence of Marina. On 5 May 2005 the RTC granted
respondent’s Petition. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders
judgment declaring the PRESUMPTIVE DEATH of MARINA B.
NARCEDA for all legal intents and purposes of law as provided for in
Rule 131, Sec. 3(w-4), Rules of Court, without prejudice to the effect
of re-appearance of the absent spouse.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the RTC’s Decision to the CA. According to petitioner,
respondent Narceda failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a "well-
founded" belief that she was dead.
The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding
under the Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI. Article 247 of
the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in
summary court proceedings shall be immediately final and
executory.
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the
CA. Thus, this petition.
Issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
2. WHETHER OR NOT Respondent Narceda has failed to establish a
well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead.
Held:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 14 November 2007
Decision of the Court Appeals and its subsequent 29 April 2008
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 85704, dismissing the appeal of the
Republic of the Philippines are AFFIRMED.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union in
Special Proceeding No. 622 dated 5 May 2005 declaring the
presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda is hereby declared FINAL
and EXECUTORY. This is because the petitioner, thru the Office of
the Solicitor General, availed of the wrong remedy when it filed its
notice of appeal under Rule 42. As a result, the running of the period
for filing a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not
tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no
longer be questioned. As a result, petitioner’s contention that
respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his
absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this court.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. Nevertheless, an aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure,
even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases,
such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper
subject of an appeal.
9. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
represented by JENNIFER R. MARQUEZ vs. SPOUSES CARLOS AND
ELIZABETH ABACAN
G.R. No. 183858 April 17, 2013
By Joe Ann
Facts:
Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC) acquired a
parcel of land located in Sumapang, Malolos City from its registered
owner. Petitioner later found that the subject lot was already
occupied by some individuals, including respondent-spouses Carlos
and Elizabeth Abacan.
HTRDC then filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent-
spouses and the other occupants. The case was later on withdrawn
because there is a need to verify the exact location of the property,
which the occupants claimed was covered by emancipation patents
issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
HTRDC commenced a complaint with the DARAB which culminated
with the cancellation of emancipation patents of the occupants of
the land.
On 4 November 2003, HTRDC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
and damages with the MTCC of Malolos against the occupants of the
subject land, again including respondent spouses. The MTCC ruled in
favor of petitioner, ordering occupants to vacate the premises and
to pay reasonable rent, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
Respondents moved to reconsider the decision, but their motion for
reconsideration was denied for being a prohibited pleading. The
MTCC then ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondents
appealed on 15 August 2005, but their appeal was denied due
course for being filed out of time, as the period to appeal had not
been stayed by the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Thus,
the Decision dated 25 May 2002 became final and executory.
In order to prevent the enforcement of the writ of execution and
demolition, respondents filed several actions in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for annulment of judgment; Special Civil Action for
certiorari; and Civil Case for quieting of title. These cases, however,
were dismissed by the RTC on the grounds of forum shopping and
immutability of final judgment for the first two cases while Civil Case
finality of judgment for the third case.
The MTCC issued an Alias Writ of Execution and an Alias Special
Order of Demolition on 25 October 2006, and 28 October 2006,
respectively. Respondents moved to quash both writs on the
ground that they had now acquired ownership over the subject
property before the writs were issued, as evidenced by
Emancipation Patent issued in their favor during the pendency of
the case. The MTCC denied their motion on the ground that
respondents’ acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event
that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer
case.
Aggrieved by the MTCC’s denial of their motion to quash,
respondents filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari directly with
the CA with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
The appellate court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
ultimately granted the petition for certiorari. The CA likewise held
that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.
Hence this instant petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not MTCC had jurisdiction over unlawful detainer
case; and
2. Whether or not respondents erred in filing special civil action
directly to the CA, instead of RTC.
Held:
The court ruled in affirmative in both issues.
The CA committed reversible error in ruling that the MTCC had no
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The petition was
directed to the MTCC’s denial of respondents’ motion to quash, and
not to he MTCC’s Consolidated Decision of 25 May 2005, nor could it
be, because respondents failed to make timely appeal the said
decision, as prescribed under Rule 65 on petition for certiorari.
The sole issue in the present case is de facto possession of the
subject property. Such issue was already passed upon the MTCC
during the trial. This was conclusively settled by the MTCC in
HTRDC's favor in its final and executory Decision dated 25 May 2005.
Did the MTCC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
respondents’ motion to quash? We rule in the negative.
As to procedural issue, respondents erred in filing the special civil
action for certiorari directly with the CA instead of the RTC. In doing
so, they violated the time-honored principle of respect for the
hierarchy of courts. While the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTC
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari¸ the parties
to a suit are not given unbridled freedom to choose between court
forums. Judicial hierarchy indicates that "petitions for the issuance
of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA."
Therefore, respondents’ petition for certiorari was dismissible
outright on procedural grounds.
10. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 163037 February 6, 2013
By Krissey
Facts:
On February 9, 1990, Judge Zeus Abrogar of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, approved the Compromise Agreement dated
February 7, 1990 submitted by PLDT and respondent Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI).
Thereafter, ETPI filed, respectively, a Motion for
Enforcement/Execution and an Urgent Motion, alleging, among
others, that PLDT violated the terms of the above Compromise
Agreement. PLDT filed its Opposition with Compulsory Counter-
Motion asserting that it was ETPI that breached their Compromise
Agreement.
Both parties jointly moved for a suspension of the proceedings in
order for them to amicably settle the case. Thereafter, the parties
arrived in a letter-agreement. In a series of letters, ETPI advised
PLDT that the former agreed to the proposals of REACH Hong Kong
to have the Total Accounting Rate (TAR) for telephone service
between the Philippines and Hong Kong reduced. A letter was also
sent by PLDT to ETPI stating its objection to the reduction of
accounting rates and that it was not consulted thereon.
PLDT advised ETPI that it would be implementing a complete
blocking of telephone service traffic from REACH Hong Kong carried
on the ETPI-REACH circuits if the settlement rate arrangement for
the telephone service between Hong Kong and the Philippines were
not resolved. Despite the negotiations to amicably resolve their
issues, PLDT threatened to block all calls to and from the REACH ETPI
circuits unless the latter grants their demands. Thus, the latter
prayed for the trial court to direct PLDT to comply with the
Compromise Agreement. PLDT stated in its Opposition that the
matter sought to be enjoined by ETPI was beyond the jurisdiction of
RTC. Further contending that the Compromise Agreement was
novated by their letter agreement. RTC ruled against PLDT and
declared that it had jurisdiction on the matter sought to be enjoined
by ETPI. The trial court further ordered PLDT to comply with to
Compromise Agreement, specifically Sections 3 and 11 of the same
agreement which served as basis for the judgment. Not discouraged
by the unfavorable rulings of the trial court, PLDT filed with the
court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under rule 65 seeking to
declare null and void the trial court’s orders which were allegedly
issued without jurisdiction and with clear, grave abuse of discretion.
The petition was granted declaring the orders null and void. ETPI
duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration also with the CA and was
able to overturn the decision. PLDT moved for the reconsideration of
the amended decision but it was also denied. Hence, the party filed
an instant petition, setting forth the following issues:
Issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC-MAKATI CEASED TO HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CIVIL CASE NO. 17694
IN VIEW OF THE NOVATION OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BY
THE LETTER-AGREEMENT, WHICH PROVIDED FOR ARBITRATION AS
THE MEANS FOR SETTLING DISPUTES BETWEEN PLDT AND ETPI THAT
COULD NOT BE SETTLED AMICABLY;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS NOVATION OF THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT BY THE LETTER-AGREEMENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT BY VIRTUE OF R.A. NO. 7925 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, IT IS THE NTC WHICH
HAS PRIMARY AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER SETTLEMENT OF
ACCESS CHARGES AND REVENUE SHARING AFFECTING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES;
4. AGREEMENT CAN STILL BE ENFORCED BY MERE MOTION AFTER
THE LAPSE OF FIVE (5) YEARS FROM THE TIME IT BECAME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY;
5. WHETHER OR NOT ETPI WAS ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE RTC-MAKATI;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC-MAKATI CEASED TO HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CIVIL CASE NO. 17694
BECAUSE BY ITS OWN TERMS THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
EXPIRED ON 28 NOVEMBER 2003;
7. WHETHER OR NOT PLDT’S PETITION IS MOOT;
Held:
After a thorough review of the facts and issues of the instant
petition, the Court finds that, indeed, PLDT’S claim is already moot.
The Compromise Agreement, by its own terms, was effective only
until 28 November 2003.The conditions for the termination of the
Compromise Agreement were complied with. As a result of the
expiration of the Compromise Agreement, there is nothing for the
RTC-Makati to enforce and/or act upon. The court citing the case of
Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Court
emphatically stated that:
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline
jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot
and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is
no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Applying the pronouncement, there was no justiciable controversy
anymore in the instant petition in view of the expiration of the
Compromise Agreement sought to be enforced. Clearly, any decision
of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or
a reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, would
be equivalent in effect to an affirmance or an invalidation of the
challenged Orders of the RTC. There is nothing more for the RTC to
enforce and/or act upon. As such, any discussion on the matter
would be a mere surplusage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for
being moot and academic
11. LORNA CASTIGADOR VS. DANILO M. NICOLAS
G.R. No. 184023 March 4, 2013
By Edgar
Facts:
Petitioner was the previous registered owner of a 522-square meter
property in Tagaytay. In 2004, the City Treasurer of Tagaytay sold
the property at public auction for non-payment of real estate taxes.
According to petitioner, she did not receive any notice of
assessment, notice of delinquency, warrant of levy and notice of
public auction. Respondent Danilo M. Nicolas was thereafter
declared the highest bidder. The certificate of sale issued to
respondent was then annotated at the back of petitioner’s title.
Petitioner further alleged that she was not given a notice of the
auction sale or registration of the certificate of sale.
In 2006, respondent sought the issuance of a new title due to
petitioner’s failure to redeem the property. Petitioner, again, alleged
that she did not receive a copy of the petition or any subsequent
notices as her address indicated therein was wrong. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City rendered on May 31, 2006 its
decision granting respondent’s petition6 and ordering the issuance
of TCT in respondents name.
Petitioner filed the petition for annulment of judgment with the CA
on July 17, 2007. On July 31, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed
Resolution dismissing the petition on the grounds that: (1) the
petition is defective for failure to comply with Rule 7, Section 4 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; and (2) there is no
allegation in the petition that it is based on extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction, in violation of Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The CA simply stated that “the arguments posed by the petitioner in
support of the grounds citedfor the allowance of the petition are
bereft of merit, as they do not constituteextrinsic fraud to annul the
questioned decision.”
Issue:
WON the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition.
Held;
Under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it is incumbent that
when a court finds no substantial merit in a petition for annulment
of judgment, it may dismiss the petition outright but the “specific
reasons for such dismissal” shall be clearly set out.
On the assumption that the CA’s dismissal was based on a
procedural defect, the Court finds a reversible error committed by
the CA on this score.
The petition filed with the CA contained the following allegations,
among others: (1) “the auction sale of the land is null and void for
lack of actual and personal notice to herein petitioner”; (2) the RTC
did not comply with the procedure prescribed in Section 71,
Presidential Decree No. 1529 and (3) petitioner was not afforded
due process when she was not notified of the proceedings instituted
by respondent for the cancellation of her title. The petition need not
categorically state the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the
allegations in the petition should be so crafted to easily point out
the ground on which it was based. The allegations in the petition
filed with the CA sufficiently identify the ground upon which the
petition was based – extrinsic fraud. Fraud is extrinsic where it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not
to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The
overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court.
On the assumption, on the other hand, that the CA’s disposition of
the petition was based on its substantial merits, the Court still finds
a reversible error committed by the CA.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioner in support of its prayer for
the annulment of judgment is lack of notice, from the assessment of
the property for real estate tax purposes up to the time the title
over the property passed on to respondent. These are serious
charges and could very well affect the validity of the issuance of the
new title to respondent.
The Court is not in the proper position to determine the veracity and
validity of petitioner's allegations as these entail a factual
assessment of the records. Moreover, records show that the
proceedings before the CA did not even reach the comment stage as
the petition was summarily dismissed.
12. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON S.
CAGUIOA, Presiding Judge, Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Third
Judicial Region, Olongapo City, META TRANS TRADING
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, and HUNDRED YOUNG SUBIC
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 174385 February 20, 2013
By Pure
Facts:
In March 2005, fourteen lower court petitioners (LCPs), importers
and traders operating in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport
Zone (SSEFZ), filed before respondent Judge Caguioa a petition for
declaratory relief with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and preliminary mandatory injunction seeking to stop the
implementation of Sec 6 of RA 9334. Said law amended Sec 131 of
the National Internal Revenue Code which now provides that
imported tobacco and alchohol products shall be subject to
applicable taxes even if they are destined for tax and duty-free
shops.
In 1992, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) granted tax
exemptions to said LCPs as they engaged in the import and export of
general merchandise including alcohol and tobacco products. When
RA 9334 was passed, SBMA issued a memorandum requiring said
importers and traders to pay duties and taxes on their importations
of tobacco and alcohol products before they can be cleared and
released in the Freeport. Because of this, the LCPs filed a petition for
declaratory relief with a prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or a TRO to stop petititioner Republic of the
Philippies (acting through SBMA) from enforcing said memorandum.
On May 4, 2005, and May 11, 2005, respectively, respondent judge
granted the LCPs application and issued the preliminary injunction
despite the Republic’s opposition.
The Republic filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as GR. No. 168584, to annul the respondent
judge’s order and writ issued pursuant to this order. The Republic
also filed a motion in the RTC asking Judge Caguioa to suspend the
proceedings pending the resolution of GR No. 168584.
Subsequently, private respondents Meta Trans Trading and Hundred
Young Subic International, filed before the respondent judge
motions for leave to intervene and to admit complaints-in-
intervention and to extend to them the benefits of the May 4, 2005
order as well as the writ of preliminary injunction issued on May 11,
2005. The respondent judge, whilst not acting on the Republic’s
motion to suspend the procedings, granted their motions as he
found them similarly situated with the LCPs. Republic filed for a
motion for reconsideration (MR) but Judge Caguioa denied both MR
and petition to suspend proceedings. Hence this petitions.
According to petitioner, the respondent judge acted in partiality and
with grave abuse of discretion and that it was denied its right to due
process when the motions and complaints-in-intervention were
granted ex parte without giving prior notice of hearing nor any copy
of the said motions.
The respondents pointed out the procedural defects in the
Republic’s petition 1) it was filed out of time, saying that the 60-day
period within which to file is counted from the notice of denial, 2)
the petition did not comply with the rules on filing and service, 4)
the Republic failed to serve their counsel a copy of the petition, and
4) it did not observe the hierarchy of courts in filing the instant
petition.
Issues:
I. Are there procedural defects in the Republic’s Petition?
II. Did Respondent Judge act with grave abuse of discretion?
Held:
The Court found that petition was filed within the reglementary
period. According to Section 4, Rule 65 the 60- day period within
which to file the petition for certiorari is counted from the Republic’s
receipt of the order denying the latter’s motion for reconsideration.
The present petition complied with the rules on proof of filing and
service of the petition. Attached to the petition – in compliance with
Sections 12 and 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court – are the registry
receipts and the affidavit of the person who filed and served the
petition by registered mail.
Secondly, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed
require that recourses should be made to the lower courts before
they are made to the higher courts this principle is not an absolute
rule and admits of exceptions under well-defined circumstances.
Such as 1) when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy; 2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or 4) when
analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and
justified our immediate and direct handling of the case.
The court also found that the respondent judge violated and
continues to violate its right to due process by allowing the private
respondents and several others to intervene in the case sans notice
to the Republic; by extending to them the benefit of the original
injunction; and by continuing to suspend the Republic’s right to
collect excise taxes from the private respondents and from the
lower court petitioners, thus adversely affecting the government’s
revenues. Such a situation constitute special and compelling
circumstances calling for our direct and immediate attention.
Lastly, under our rules of procedure,19 service of the petition on a
party, when that party is represented by a counsel of record, is a
patent nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully served.
This rule, however, is a procedural standard that may admit of
exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of substantive
justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances
of the case. Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations
through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.
The respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
warranting the issuance of the corrective writ ofcertiorari. Grave
abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the
Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence.
The term refers to such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, as when the act amounts
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. The
respondent judge so acted so that the orders he issued should be
declared void and of no effect.
13. Editha Padlan vs Elenita Dinglasan and Felicimo Dinglasan
GR No. 180321 March 20 2013
By Ace
Facts:
Elenita Dinglasan is the registered owner of a lot. While riding the
jeepney with her mother Lilia, the latter had a conversation with one
Maura Passion and believed her to be a real estate agent. Lilia then
borrowed the owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to
Maura. After that, Maura was able to subdivide the lots and through
falsified deeds of sale with forged signatures of Elenita and her
husband was able to sell the lots to one Lorna Ong. Lorna eventually
sold the lot to herein petitioner Editha Padlan for P4000. Upon
discovery, the spouses Dinglasan demanded that Editha surrender
possession of said lot but she refused. As a consequence, they filed
a case for Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC
of Balanga, Bataan.
Editha filed a motion to dismiss the case arguing that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over her person because the summons was
not validly served upon her but only by means of substituted service
through her mother. The RTC declared her in default upon motion of
the respondents, thus trial ensued.
RTC RULING:
The RTC found Editha to be a buyer in good faith and the case was
dismissed.
CA RULING:
CA reversed and set aside RTC’s findings. The court found that
Editha was a purchaser in bad faith; the fact that the subject lot was
sold to her for only P4000 should have put her on guard. Thus, the
title issued to her was fraudulent and therefore null and void.
Petitioner then filed for a motion for reconsideration arguing that
the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
as well as her person. This was denied.
Hence, the petition.
Petition:
1. Petitioner posits that the court (RTC) lacks jurisdiction of
the subject matter, considering that from the complaint, it can be
inferred that the value of the property was only P4,000.00, which
was the amount alleged by respondents that the property was sold
to petitioner by Lorna.
Issue:
W/N the Honorable Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case
Held:
NO.
The SC cited Sec. 33(3) of BP 129, as amended by RA 7691 which
provides for the Jurisdiction of the first level courts:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. x x x
and Sec. 19(2), which provides for the jurisdiction of the RTC:
xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
The SC ruled that from the Complaint by the Respondents, the
action was that which involves title to real property, thus falling
within the coverage of the above-mentioned provision.
Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs (herein respondents) is
to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court
having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject
thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents
for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action. Therefore all proceedings therefrom are
null and void.
14. Darma Maslag vs Elizabeth Monzon, William Geston, and
Registry of Deeds of Benguet
GR. No. 174908 June 17, 2013
By Nica
Facts:
In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real
property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title
against respondents. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal
Trial Court.
After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in
obtaining an OCT over petitioner’s property.
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring
the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioner’s cause of action. The
presiding judge declared that it will take cognizance of the case
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides
for appeal from orders dismissing the case without trial; lack of
jurisdiction.
RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the
petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the
respondents’ contention that the proper remedy is a Petition for
Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
W/N petitioner’s ordinary appeal is the proper remedy
Held:
No. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal
should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real
property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the
RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject
property.
Since the assessed value of the disputed property is only P12,400,
MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case.
In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the
proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued
by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred only by law and it is “not within the courts, let
alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set
aside.” Neither would the active participation of the parties nor
estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where
the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.
The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually
exercised by the RTC, and not into what type of jurisdiction the RTC
should have exercised.
Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the
case is a question that already involves the merits of the appeal, but
the court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal
was improper to begin with.
Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court
affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

15. Optima Realty Corporation vs Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars Inc
G. R. No. 183035 January 9,2013
By Joe
Facts:
Optima Corporation,a company engaged in leasing commercial
spaces and buildings to its tenants, entered into a Contract of Lease
with Hertz Phil Exclusive Cars Inc. over an office unit and a parking
slot in the Optima Building fortwo years and five months,
startingfrom October 1, 2003 up to February 28, 2006.
During the lease period, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50%
drop in monthly sales and a significant decrease in its personnel’s
productivity due to the renovations made in the building. It then
requested a 50% discount on its rent for four months in
2005.Optima granted the request;however, respondent still failed to
pay.
Petitioner then wrote another letter to Hertzon December 8, 2005,
reminding the latter that the contract could be renewed subject to a
new negotiation and upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor
at least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease period.
Since noletter was received from Hertz within the 90-day period,
Optima informed it that the lease would expire on February 282006
and would not be renewed.
In its answer, Hertz wrote a letter on December 21, 2005 advising
Optima of the former’s desire to negotiate and extend the lease.
However,petitioner no longer entertained the notice.
Optima therebyordered Hertz to surrender and vacate the leased
premises.Respondent, however, refused to vacate the leased
premises which resulted to Optima filing a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in the MeTC against Hertz.
The MeTC rendered a decisionin favor of Optima. The RTC affirmed
its decision. CA reversed RTC’s decision because of the MeTC’s
failure to acquire jurisdictiondue to improper service of summons,
hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. WON the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent Hertz;
2. WON the unlawful detainer case is barred by litis pendentia;
3. WON the ejectment of Hertz and the award of
damages,attorney’s fees and costs were proper.
Held:
Petition is granted and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
appellate court were reversed.
1. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
Hertz.
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
acquired either by serviceofsummons or by the defendant’s
voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.
In the case, jurisdiction over the person of Hertz was acquired by
reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance in court.
As a rule, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The filing of motions to
admit answer is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction.
It was stated that “in spite of the defective serviceof Summons, the
defendant opted to file the Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of
Court”. From this statement,it can be concluded that respondent
had a voluntary appearance in court.
Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz did
notraise the defense of improper service of summons.
2. The instant ejectment case is not barred by litis pendentia.
Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements:
a. Identity of parties
b. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for
c. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases
In the case,rights asserted and the relief prayed for are different.
Hence, pendency of Complaint for Specific Performance is not a bar
to the institution of the present case for ejectment.
3. The eviction of respondent and award of damages, attorney’s fees
and costs were proper. Respondent failed to pay rental arrearages
and utility bills to Optima and the Contract of Lease expired without
any request from Hertz for a renegotiation thereof at least 90 days
prior to its expiration.
16. Planters Development Bank of the Philippines v. Lopez Spouses
G.R NO.186332. October 13,2013
By PJ
Facts:
Planters Development Bank filed a petition for review to challenge
the July 30,2007 amended decision and the February 5,2009
resolution of the Court of Appeals. The said judgment ordered the
respondent Lopez spouses to pay the “loan interest at 12 % per
annum computed from the finality of this decision until full payment
of the amount of 3.5 million pesos, minus the proceeds of the
auction sale of the foreclosed mortgage property. The respondents
as a defense, reiterate the Court of Appeals’ arguments. They also
assert that the amended decision has already become final and
executory due to Planters Bank filing of a motion for reconsideration
on August 22,2007.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals’ amended decision is final and
executory.
Held:
The Court of Appeals’ amended decision is not yet final and
executory. Section 13 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by an
affidavit of the person mailing the facts showing compliance with
Section 7 ,Rule 13 of the rules of court. However, the presentation
of an affidavit and a registry receipt is not indispensable in proving
service by registered mail. Other competent evidence, such as the
certifications from the Philippine Post Office may establish the fact
and date of actual service. Such certifications are direct and primary
pieces of evidence of completion of service.
Planters Bank’s motion for reconsideration dated August 22,2007
was filed on time. The Manila Central Post Office’s certification
states that the amended decision was only dispatched from Manila
Central Post Office to the Makati Central Post Office on August
2,2007. On the other hand, the Makati Central Post Office’s
certification provides that Planters bank actual receipt of the
decision was on August 7,2007 and not on August 2,2007.
17. Metropolitan bank and trust company as successor in interest
of asian bank corporation Vs Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval,Hon
Francisco H. Villaruz Jr. and Hon. Rodolfo A. Ponferada
G.R. No. 169677 Ferb.18,2013
By Irish
Facts:
Two parcels of commercial land was among the subject property in
an action brought by the Republic in a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, accounting and damages against Andres v.
Genito,jr.,Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda r. Marcos and other defendant.
To recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
nominees dummies and agents the said complaint was filled in the
Sandiganbayan. The subject properties, the two parcels of
commercial land, was under possession of the Asian Bank who also
claimed ownership through registration and writ of possession.
Hence, the Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in
order to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant, and when
they where about to terminate the presentation of evidence against
the original defendants, it moved to hold a separate trial against
Asian Bank. Asian bank sought the deferment of any action on the
motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the
testimonial and documentary evidence the republic had already
presented against the original defendants ,and contended that it
would be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be
held against it without having been sufficiently approved about the
evidence Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an
additional defendant.
The Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was
proper because its cause of action against it was entirely distinct and
independent form its cause of action against the original defendant,
and that the issue raised was whether the Bank had actual
constructive knowledge at the time of the issuance of the TCTs for
the properties In its name that such were the subject of the
complaint in civil case, and so it would justify forfeiture of the said
properties if judgment would be in favor of the Republic. The Asian
Bank replied that the issue concerning its actual or constructive
knowledge was intimately related to the issue dealing on the
character of the properties as the ill-gotten wealth of the original
defendant, thus it had a right to confront the evidence presented by
the republic as to the character of the properties; and that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction, being a special court and it could
only determine the issue whether or not the properties were
illegally acquired by the original defendants.
The Sandiganbayan grant the motion for separate trial reasoning
that the bank was merely seeking the opportunity to confront the
witnesses and whatever documentary exhibits presented by the
plaintiff and that the claim is distinct and separate, also added that
the action made against Asian bank is anchored on the claim that its
acquisition of the subject properties was tainted with bad faith
because of its actual or constructive knowledge. And that
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the claim of bad faith even if it
is merely incidental to the main action and that the court can grant
separate trial.
Asian Bank moved a motion for the reconsideration of the
resolution, but denied. Hence, Metrobank being the successor in
interest of Asian Bank commenced their special civil action for
certiorari.
Issue:
W/N
1.the Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank.
2.the only issue as regards asian bank was whether there was
evidence that the asian bank acquired the properties in bad faith.
3.The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the issue of asian bank’s
alleged bad faith in acquiring the properties.
Held:
1&2. The petition for certiorari is partly meritorious. The
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the motion
for separate trial, but was correct in upholding its jurisdiction over
republics claim against Asian Bank.
The rule on separate trial in civil action is found in sec.2 rule 31 of
the rules of court.the trial court has discretion to determine if a
separate trial if any claim,cross claim,counterclaim,or third party
complaints or of any separate issues should be held,provided that
the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice to any party
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
separate trial against Asian Bank on the ground that the issue was
distinct and separate, it veered away from the general rule of having
all the issues in every case tried at one time, forgot the dictum “that
a single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and
inconvenience to the parties and the court”. Exceptions to the
general rule are permitted only when there extraordinary grounds
for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same
case, or when separate trials of the issue will further convenience, or
when separate trials of the issue will give a fair trial to all parties.
The disadvantages that a separate trial would cause to Metrobank
would far outweigh any good or benefit that the republic would
seemingly stand to gain from the separate trials.
3. Republic’s allegation in its amended complaint in civil case that
Asian Bank acted in bad faith for ignoring the sequestration of the
properties as ill-gotten wealth has made the cause of action against
Asian Bank incidental or necessarily connected to the cause of the
action against the original defendant. Consequently, Sandiganbayan
has original exclusive jurisdiction over the claim against Asian Bank.
The court rule in presidential commission on good government vs.
Sandiganbayan, that “the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction
and exclusive not only over principal causes of action involving
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to such cases, subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by the Supreme court.
Wherefore, the court partially grants the petition for certiorari. The
Court declares that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
jurisdiction over the amended complaint against Asian Bank
corporation/Metrobank and trust company.
18. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v.
TOMAS CUENCA, MARCELINA CUENCA, MILAGROS CUENCA,
BRAMIE T. TAYACTAC, and MANUEL D. MARANON, JR.,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 173297 March 6, 2013
By Coy
Facts:
When Civil Case No. 98-023 for collection of sum of money and
damages was filed by Manuel Maranon against respondents Tomas
Cuenca and Bramie Tayactac, a writ of preliminary attachment was
ordered by the RTC against respondents.
As required, Maranon posted a SICI Bond No. 68427 JCL (4) No.
02370 for P 1 million.
Enforcing the writ of preliminary attachment, the Sheriff levied upon
equipment, supplies, materials and other personal properties
belonging to Arc. Cuisine, Inc. found in the leased corporate office-
cum-commissary or kitchen of the corporation. Upon, the court’s
approval, the properties were deposited for safekeeping at the
warehouse of Maranon.
Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the writ of Attachment were filed
by Cuenca and Tayactac, on the ground that RTC lacked jurisdiction.
As an intra-corporate matter, it is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the SEC. RTC denied both motions, as well as the
motion for reconsideration later filed by the respondents asserting
that a case for collection of sum of money is within its jurisdiction.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it dismissed
the Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 98-023, for lack of
jurisdiction.
The CA also remanded the matter to the RTC for hearing and
resolution of claims for damages resulting from the enforcement of
the writ of preliminary attachment sustained by the Cuencas and
Tayactac.
The RTC held Maranon and SICI jointly and solidarily liable for
damages to Cuenca and Tayactac and ordered them to pay the
following:
1. P 1,000,000 representing the amount of the bond;
2. P 100,000 for moral damages;
3. P 50,000 for exemplary damages;
4. P 100,000 for attorney’s fees;
5. To pay the cost of suit.
Only SICI appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC
finding no reversible error; CA later on denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by SICI.
Hence this appeal by petition for review on Certiorari filed by SICI.
Issues:
WON the lower courts erred in ruling the liability of SICI:
1. to pay respondent Cuenca et al who are not the owners of the
properties; thus are not the proper parties to claim any damages
arising from their attachment;
2. when the purported damages were due to the negligence of the
sheriff of the Trial Court and his failure to comply with the rules of
court pertaining to the attachment of properties;
3. for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of
suit, since its guaranty is limited only to P 1,000,000.
Held:
Petition for review was found meritorious.
Even if it was not raised in the CA, the supreme court found merit in
the issue that respondents Cuenca et al are not proper parties to file
action; the Court asserts that, “actual legal interest of the parties in
the subject litigation is a matter of substance that has jurisdictional
impact, even on appeal before this Court”;
There is no question that a litigation should be disallowed
immediately if it involves a person without any interest at
stake…Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that unless
otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
The purpose of the rule are as follows:
1. To prevent prosecution of actions by persons without any right,
title or interest in the case;
2. To require that actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to
prosecute the action;
3. To avoid multiplicity of suits; and
4. To discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds,
pursuant to sound public policy
The properties attached belong to Arc Cuisine, Inc. and not of the
Cuencas et al; and even if the latter stands to benefit in the
successful prosecution of the case as stockholder, employee or
otherwise, it is not controlling in identifying the real parties in
interest to the litigation.
The Cuencas et al could bring the action in behalf of Arc. Cuisine Inc.,
but such should be brought in the name of the corporation. In the
present case, they presented the claim in their own names.
In view of the outcome reached in the first issue, the Court deems it
unnecessary to give any extensive consideration in the remaining
issues.
19. Leticia Diona vs Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo
Balangue and Esteban Balangue, Jr
G.R. No. I73559
By Joebert
Facts:
A violation of the party’s right to due process may be declared void
ab initio.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari which assails the
Resolution of the CA which granted the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment.
Respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from Petitioner payable
in six months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-
square meter property located in Marulas, Valenzuela and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). When the debt became due,
respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, petitioner
filed a Complaint with the RTC.
Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny
Balangue (Sonny) with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza of the
Public Attorney’s Office; they filed a Motion to Extend Period to
Answer. Despite the requested extension, they failed to file any
responsive Pleadings. Thus, upon motion of the petitioner, the RTC
declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her
evidence ex parte. In a Decision, the RTC granted petitioner’s
Complaint that the Respondents shall pay the unpaid principal
amount of P45,000.00 plus interest of 5% per month, Attorney’s
Fees plus cost of suit and if the respondents fail to satisfy the
aforesaid obligation, an order of foreclosure shall be issued for the
sale at public auction of the subject property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title and the improvements thereon.
Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and
To Set Aside Execution Sale claiming that the parties did not agree in
writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for
a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC
awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60%per annum) until full payment.
Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest
from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from P124,400.00 to
P652,000.00. In an Order dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted
respondents’ motion and accordingly modified the interest rate
awarded from 5% monthly to 12%per annum. Then on August 2,
2002, respondents filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign
Judgment Obligation in the total amount of P126,650.00. Displeased
with the RTC’s May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to
the CA. The CA rendered a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded
its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the same
time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12%per annum.
Respondents filed with the same court a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages. They contended that
the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly
interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court and of their right to due process. According to
respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the verbal
agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioner’s family can
continue occupying respondents’ residential building for free until
said loan is fully paid.
The CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is void for being
in excess of the relief sought in the Complaint. Thus, respondents’
motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and its previous resolution
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner sought reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution.
Issues:
I. THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW
WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST
APPEAL.
II. THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR AND
MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED
RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL AND ALREADY
EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF
JUDGMENT.
Held:
The SC agreed with respondents that the award of 5% monthly
interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the same
may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. An exception to the final
judgment rule. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to
avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, for relief or other
appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not
available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the
party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. “The
underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final
judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final should be laid to rest.”
While under Section 2, Rule 4733 of the Rules of Court a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes
lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. It is
settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the
pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They
cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require
that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings
and evidence presented in court.
It provides: Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.
Petition is hereby DENIED.
20. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, Bonifacia Mercado, Damian
Mercado and Emmanuel Mercado Bascug (petitioners) VS Spouses
Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina (respondents)
GR. No. 173987
By RJ
Facts:
The petitioners claim to be the owners of a 338 sq. meter parcel of
land now owned by the respondents located in Poblacion, Maasin,
Southern Leyte being the heirs of the original owners (late spouses)
Santiago and Sofronia Mercado. Sometime in 1996, the respondents
alleged that they have purchased the said land from Josefa
Mercado, who bought it from Genivera Mercado Kavanaugh, who
bought it from Escolastico Mercado who also bought it from
Santiago Mercado (the original owner). The petitioners claim that all
these contracts and transactions never happened and they asked
the court to nullify the Transfer Certificate of Title and award them
actual, moral and exemplary damages plus atty’s fees.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
RTC has no jurisdiction because the petitioners failed to state the
assessed value of the property and that the action is barred by
prescription, and that the case holds no sufficient cause of action
because respondents are deemed to be in good faith because
petitioners did not allege bad faith in their case.
The RTC denied the motion and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the case was brought to CA via certiorari
assailing the orders of RTC. The CA has denied the case and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners have filed an Amended Complaint in the RTC to include
the assessed value of the property. The respondents, on the other
hand filed a motion to dismiss amended complaint due to
prescription, laches, indefeasibility of title and lack of cause of
action. The RTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondents filed an action for certiorari before the CA assailing the
latest ruling or the RTC. The CA GRANTED the petition and set aside
the ruling of the RTC and enjoined it from the proceedings.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but such was denied.
This is why the petitioners brought the case before the Supreme
Court via PETITION for REVIEW on CERTIORARI.
Issues:
1. Procedurally, WON CA erred in giving due course to respondent’s
motion to dismiss the AMENDED COMPLAINT. [the petitioners claim
that this is not right because the motion was filed beyond the period
allowed by the Rules of Court]
2. Substantively, WON CA erred in ordering RTC to dismiss the case
and enjoin it from the proceeding on the ground of indefeasibility of
title, prescription/laches. [here the petitioners claim that the ground
of indefeasibility of title in the motion to dismiss filed by the
respondents is not an authorized ground under Rule 16 of the ROC]
Held:
1. There is no dispute in the issue of timeliness. The issue in the
amended complaint (re: the assessed value) cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal because such was not raised in their comment
when they filed the petition for certiorari. They only mentioned it in
their motion for reconsideration. “it is well established that issues
raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings
in the lower court are barred by estoppel.”
The court also said that the respondents have the right to file a
motion to dismiss amended complaint because it is deemed that the
original complaint is withdrawn and replaced by the amended one.
2. The court ruled that the case lacked sufficient cause of action
because petitioners failed to alleged bad faith of the respondents.
There was a mention of fraud in the course of the transactions but
the petitioners did not allege that those were committed by
respondents. Also, since this land is covered by the Torrens System,
the respondents are not really compelled to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title. When they got the title, it was a
clean title (allegations of fraud pertained to an earlier purchase).
They are considered innocent purchaser for value (again because
there was no allegation to the contrary).
Petition for review on certiorari is denied.
21. SPOUSES DACUDAO vs GONZALES
By Cybill
Facts:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the
investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the
Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them
check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands
for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a
number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr.,
et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of
Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State
Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward
all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the
Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
Issues:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus directly to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO No. 182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009
violate petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights?
Held:
1. Dismissed. Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the
hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with their
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering
therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the
direct filing of the petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to
issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warrant,
habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard
of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the
dismissal of the recourse.
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the
only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress
of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a
court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the
petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of
courts, x x x x.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer
or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed
in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its
appellate jurisdiction or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
2. The Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively
against petitioners. DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its
validity. DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in any degree of
their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them
by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist
petitioners and others like them expedite the prosecution, if
warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the wrong
through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and
prosecution attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and
comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the
cases.

3. No. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not

require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court
has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a
rational relationship to some legitimate government end.

In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the

Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between
Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against the Legacy
Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations
would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account
that the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office
of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the
considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro
City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases
commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. The
classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice
was really valid.