Torts- October 4, 2017

1. PSBA vs. CA, 209 SCRA 47

Facts:

1. Carlitos Bautista was a 3rd-yr Commerce student at the Philippine School of Business Administration. On
August 30, 1985, he was stabbed to death inside the school premises by assailants who were not members
of the school’s academic community.
2. Carlito’s parents sued the school and its corporate officers, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
parents allege that the school and its officers must be held liable because of negligence, recklessness and
lack of security precautions that led to their son’s untimely death.
3. The school and the officers countered that according to jurisprudence, Article 2180 does not cover
academic institutions such as PSBA.

Issue:

Can the school be held liable? Yes.

Ruling:

1. In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage
should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this does not mean that the
school has no liability.
2. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
3. Learning institutions has a built-in obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Necessarily, the
school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
4. In a case like this, the school’s liability is anchored on a breach of contract. It must be established,
therefore, that the school committed a breach through its negligence in providing the proper security
measures. As pronounced in Air France, liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for
conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially
true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been
reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to
expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed
inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the
breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the
omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.
2. Child Learning Center vs. Tagario, G.R. No. 150920, Nov. 25, 2005

Facts:

1. Timothy Tagorio was a Grade 4 student at Marymount School, ran by petitioner Child Learning Center. One
afternoon, Timothy went to the boy’s restroom and got trapped inside due to a faulty door lock. He banged
the door and shouted for help out of panic but no one came. He decided to get out through the window, but
as he was opening the window, he fell 3 floors down. He sustained injuries that required serious medical
treatment. It was claimed that the said faulty door lock had caused accidents before.

2. Timothy’s parents sued Child Learning Center and its Board of Directors. In this tort case, the parents allege
that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two
instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2)
failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from.

3. In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door
and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had
exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and
convenience of its students.

4. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Timothy’s parents. Hence the petition.

Issue:

Is the school liable? Yes.

Ruling:

1. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence
in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained. Timothy climbed out of the window because he
could not get out using the door, negates petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the
accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from CLC’s own
negligence.

2. The door knob was defective. After the incident of March 5, 1991, said door knob was taken off the door of
the toilet where Timothy was in. The architect who testified during the trial declared that although there
were standard specifications for door knobs for comfort room[s], and he designed them according to that
requirement, he did not investigate whether the door knob specified in his plans during the construction
[was] actually put in place. This is so because he did not verify whether the door knob he specified w[as]
actually put in place at the particular comfort room where Timothy was barred from getting outside.

3. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times
in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that
something was wrong with the door.
3. Safeguard Security Agency vs. Tangco, G.R. No. 165732, Decemebr 14, 2000

Facts:

1. In the afternoon of November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to the Katipunan branch of Ecology Bank to
renew her time deposit and to sign a specimen signature card. Evangeline carries with her a firearm as she
is a duly licensed firearm holder. Upon entering the bank, the security guard Pajarillo inspected her bag and
as she pulled her gun to deposit it to the guard for safekeeping, the security guard shot her with his service
shotgun. She was shot in her abdomen, which caused instant death.

2. Tangco’s husband and his 6 minor children filed a criminal case of homicide against the security guard and
a separate civil case for damages against the security guard and the security agency. Pajarillo and Safeguard
Security denied the material allegations in the complaint that there was negligence and alleged that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo;
that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. The
security guard claims that he had seen Evangeline roaming around the area prior to the incident. That
Evangeline then was staging a bank robbery, and aimed the gun at him.

3. The lower courts ruled in favor of the Tangcos and held that being the guard on duty, the situation
demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him
to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly. It was also ruled that Safeguard as employer of
Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that
Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was
no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend
trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes
not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property,
for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and
instructions are faithfully complied with. However, Safeguard’s liability was found only to be subsidiary.

Issues:

(1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and

(2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.

Ruling:

1. As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both.
The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.

2. Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank
and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to Pajarillo's
negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
3. Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank
and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to Pajarillo's
negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
4. As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by
the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by
operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer
exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its
employee.
5. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of
employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures
upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable
to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.36 To establish
these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.
6. The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security
guard's performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by
Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with
Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be
guarded and protection of the life of the employees.43
7. It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further
training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business
with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in
a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.44
8. Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of
immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank
clients and on human psychology.
9. Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two
times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever
presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious
act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
4. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phils. 398

Facts:

1. Metropolitan Water District operated recreational swimming pools in Diliman, Quezon City. In the
afternoon of July 1952, Dominador Ong and his brothers went for a swim. Dominador told his brothers that
he will just get a bottle of Coke, so the brothers transferred to the bigger pool thinking that Dominador will
stay in the small pool. However, they did not know that Dominador also left to get Coke and followed them
in the big pool. Their little brother drowned and died.

2. According to the investigator’s reports, a bather had informed the lifeguard on duty that one person had
been swimming in the pool for a noticeably long time. Upon hearing this, the lifeguard jumped into the pool
and retrieved Dominador’s body from the bottom of the pool. Immediately, the lifeguard applied manual
artificial respiration. Soon after, a nurse came to assist the lifeguard carrying a medical kit. Another
employee fetched the doctor, who then also tried to revive the boy, to no avail.

3. Spouses Ong filed a claim for damages against Metropolitan Water imputing negligence, such that it failed
to take the necessary precaution to protect the lives of its patrons by not placing at the swimming pools
efficient and competent employees who may render help at a moment's notice, and they ascribed such
negligence to appellee because the lifeguard it had on the occasion minor Ong was drowning was not
available or was attending to something else (chatting with the security guard) with the result that his help
came late.

Issue:

Is Metropolitan Water liable? No.

Ruling:

1. The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the new Civil Code. The rule is
well settled that the owners of resorts to which people generally are expressly or by implication invited are
legally bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the management and maintenance of such resorts,
to the end of making them reasonably safe for visitors.

2. Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed is
that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or
negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees.

3. There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to
the lives of its patrons or prevent accident, which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the
swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a
first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility.
There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use
of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose
and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and
arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There
is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are
security guards who are available always in case of emergency.

4. The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the
employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. Thus, after he was placed at the
edge of the pool, lifeguard Abaño immediately gave him manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter, nurse
Armando Rule arrived, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an oxygen
resuscitator. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected
him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the
oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they
sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however came late because upon examining
the body he found him to be already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is
humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to
hold it liable for his death.
5. Gotesco Investment Corp. vs. Chatto, G.R. No. L-87584, June 16, 1992

Facts:

1. In the afternoon of June 4, 1982, Gloria Chato and her 15-yr old daughter Lina Chato went to Superma I
theater owned by Gotesco, to watch the movie, Mother Dear. They bought balcony tickets. Barely 10
minutes inside the theater, the ceiling of the balcony collapsed and the theater plunged into darkness.
Gloria and Lina were pinned under the fallen ceiling but they managed to crawl out and bring themselves to
the nearby FEU hospital.

2. The next day, they transferred to UST Hospital. They sustained multiple physical injuries which rendered
them incapacitated from 2-4 weeks. Gloria Chato sustained more serious injuries that she had to go to the
US for medical treatment. She was confined at Cook County Hospital at Chicago Illinois for 3 months.

3. Gloria and Lina filed for an action to recover damages. Gotesco negates liability asserting that the collapse
of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from
any structural or construction defect.

4. The lower courts ruled in favor of the Chatos on the ground that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's
balcony was due to construction defects and not to force majeure. Gotesco tried to prove due diligence by
raising that frequent inspections of the building were conducted.

Issue:

May Gotesco be held liable? Yes.

Ruling:

1. The rule is well settled that the owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants
that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are
designed. The implied warranty gives rise to the rule that there is a presumption of negligence on the
part of the theater or any other public amusement center if a patron is injured if the thing that caused
the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the owner.

2. The presumption was not overturned and the court ruled that that the collapse was due to construction
defects. It could have been easily established if indeed the collapse was due to force majeure. The
building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that
any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the
collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due
diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr.
Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.

3. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the
building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects
in the construction.

4. Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the
collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence,
which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's
elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have
exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
6. Juan Nakpil and Sons vs. CA - G.R. No. L-47851, and L-47896, Oct. 3, 1986

Facts:

1. The Philippine Bar Association commissioned 2 contractor for the construction of its building in
Intramuros, Manila. Juan Nakpil & Sons prepared plans and specifications for the building and United
Construction undertook the actual construction of the building.

2. Two years after the building was done, a strong earthquake hit Manila and its environs and the building in
question sustained major damage. The front columns of the building buckled, causing the building to tilt
forward dangerously. The tenants vacated the building in view of its precarious condition.

3. PBA commenced an action for the recovery of damages arising from the partial collapse of the building against
United Construction, Inc. and its President and General Manager Juan J. Carlos as defendants. Plaintiff alleges
that the collapse of the building was accused by defects in the construction, the failure of the contractors to follow
plans and specifications and violations by the defendants of the terms of the contract.

4. United Construction in turn, commenced filed a third-party complaint against Juan Nakpil & Sons and its
architects who prepared the plans and specifications, alleging that the collapse of the building was due to the
defects in the said plans and specifications.

5. A Commissioner was appointed to settle the technical aspect of the case. According to his report, both contractors
were negligent in the sense that, there were defects in the plans prepared by Juan Nakpil & Sons’ architects; that
United Construction deviated from the prepared plans and failed to observe the requisite workmanship in the
construction of the building and of the contractors and failed to exercise the requisite degree of supervision in the
construction of subject building.

6. To further give light to the case, the United Architects of the Philippines, the Association of Civil Engineers, and
the Philippine Institute of Architects filed with the Court a motion to intervene as amicus curiae. They proposed
to present a position paper on the liability of architects when a building collapses and to submit likewise a critical
analysis with computations on the divergent views on the design and plans as submitted by the experts procured
by the parties.

7. The amicus curiae gave the opinion that the plans and specifications of the Nakpils were not defective. However,
the Commissioner added that even if it can be proved that the defects in the construction alone (and not in the
plans and design) caused the damage to the building, still the deficiency in the original design and jack of specific
provisions against torsion in the original plans and the overload on the ground floor columns (found by an the
experts including the original designer) certainly contributed to the damage which occurred.

Issue:
May Nakpil & Sons and United Construction be held liable considering that the immediate cause of the
collapse is an act of God? Yes.

Ruling:

There should be no question that the NAKPILS and UNITED are liable for the damage resulting from the partial and
eventual collapse of the PBA building as a result of the earthquakes.

1. The applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties herein is Article 1723 of the New
Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for
damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason of a defect
in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the
damage if the edifice fags within the same period on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials
of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect
supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by reason
of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

2. The court cited Art. 1723 with the general rule that no person shall be responsible for events which could
not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable (Act of God- An act of God has been defined as an
accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of
foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented.).
3. To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due
to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of
the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free
from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553;
Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon
Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).

To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by which may be a cause of the loss or damage.

4. The negligence of the defendant and the third-party defendants petitioners was established beyond
dispute both in the lower court and in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United Construction Co., Inc.
was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications. and to have failed to observe the
requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision; while the
third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications prepared by
them. As correctly assessed by both courts, the defects in the construction and in the plans and specifications were
the proximate causes that rendered the PBA building unable to withstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968. For
this reason the defendant and third-party defendants cannot claim exemption from liability.
5. The Supreme Court cited the CA decision that There is no question that an earthquake and other forces of
nature such as cyclones, drought, floods, lightning, and perils of the sea are acts of God. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that specific losses and suffering resulting from the occurrence of these natural force are also acts
of God. We are not convinced on the basis of the evidence on record that from the thousands of structures in
Manila, God singled out the blameless PBA building in Intramuros and around six or seven other buildings in
various parts of the city for collapse or severe damage and that God alone was responsible for the damages and
losses thus suffered.

The record is replete with evidence of defects and deficiencies in the designs and plans, defective
construction, poor workmanship, deviation from plans and specifications and other imperfections. These
deficiencies are attributable to negligent men and not to a perfect God.

6. Finally, the court said, one who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the
natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not
responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.

As already discussed, the destruction was not purely an act of God. Truth to tell hundreds of ancient
buildings in the vicinity were hardly affected by the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal difference; gross
negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage would not have occurred.

7. The contractors were held solidarily liable.

7. Cargolift Shipping vs.L. Actuario Marketing, G.R. No. 146426, June 27, 2006
Facts:

1. Acuario Marketing and Skyland Brokerage entered into a time charter agreement whereby Acuario leased
to Skyland its barge so that Skyland may use it to transport electrical posts from Manila to Limay, Bataan.
Skyland then entered into a separate agreement with Cargolift whereby Cargolift’s tugboat shall tow the
leased barge.

2. When the operations were done and the barge was brought to Acuario’s shipyard, Acuario’s drydocking
officer discovered that the barge was damaged resulting to a leak. The skipper of the tugboat said that the
damage was sustained during the unloading operations in Bataan.

3. A report was prepared and a copy was sent to Skyland although during the inspection, there was no
representative from Skyland. Acuario filed a case for damages against Skyland pursuant to their agreement
that "(a)ny damage or loss on the barge due to the fault or negligence of charterers shall be the
responsibility of the (c)harterer or his representative."

4. Skyland in turn, filed a third-party complaint against Cargolift pointing it to be liable to the damage
suffered by the barge.

5. According to Acuario’s witness, the weather drastically changed upon the barge’s arrival in Bataan. That
the strong winds caused the barge’ hull to repeatedly hit the wall. This prompted the barge patron to alert
Cargolift’s captain to tow the barge farther out to the sea. However, this was not done as the tugboat
suffered engine malfunction.

6. Skyland denied that the barge had been damaged. One of its witnesses, Salvador D. Ocampo, claimed that he
was involved in all aspects of the operation and that no accident of any sort was brought to his knowledge.
He alleged that the barge patron and tug master made no mention of any maritime casualty during the
clearing of the vessels at the Philippine Ports Authority in Limay, Bataan. The barge was in good condition
and was not damaged when it was turned over to Acuario.

7. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of Acuario’s witnesses that the barge sustained damage
while it was being chartered by Skyland. It held that the positive testimonies of Acuario’s witnesses,
coupled with documentary evidence. It further ruled that held that Skyland was liable under its time
charter agreement with Acuario pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which states that "contracts have
the force of law between the contracting parties." Skyland must bear the consequences of the tugboat’s
incapacity to respond to the barge’s request for assistance because Acuario had no control in the selection
of the tugboats used by Skyland. But since the ultimate fault lies with Cargolift, justice demands that
Cargolift reimburse Skyland for whatever it may be adjudged to pay Acuario. CA affirmed the ruling.

Issue:

May the towage company Cargolift be held liable? Yes.

Ruling:

1. Cargolift’s tugboat failed to tow the barge farther away due to engine breakdown, thus causing the barge to
sustain a hole in its hull. These testimonies were duly supported and corroborated by documentary
evidence detailing the damage and repairs done on the barge. Its assertion that there was no inclement
weather was not established. The court also frowns in its assertion that if indeed the barge was damaged, it
could not have sailed back to Manila. The court found that there was damage though not that extensive to
render the barge incapable of staying afloat.
2. In the performance of its contractual obligation to Skyland, Cargolift was required to observe the due
diligence of a good father of the family. the Court explained that a tug and its owners must observe ordinary
diligence in the performance of its obligation under a contract of towage. The negligence of the obligor in
the performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages for the resulting loss suffered by the
obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and prudence in the
performance of the obligation as the nature of the obligation so demands.

3. The exercise of ordinary prudence by petitioner means ensuring that its tugboat is free of mechanical
problems. While adverse weather has always been a real threat to maritime commerce, the least that
petitioner could have done was to ensure that the M/T Count or any of its other tugboats would be able to
secure the barge at all times during the engagement. This is especially true when considered with the fact
that Acuario’s barge was wholly dependent upon petitioner’s tugboat for propulsion. The barge was not
equipped with any engine and needed a tugboat for maneuvering.

4. If Cargolift only subjected the M/T Count to a more rigid check-up or inspection, the engine malfunction
could have been discovered or avoided. The M/T Count was exclusively controlled by petitioner and the
latter had the duty to see to it that the tugboat was in good running condition. There is simply no basis for
petitioner’s assertion that Skyland contractually assumed the risk of any engine trouble that the tugboat
may encounter. Skyland merely procured petitioner’s towing service but in no way assumed any such risk.

5. That petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the barge cannot be doubted. Had its
tugboat been serviceable, the barge could have been moved away from the stone wall with facility.

6. The court also disagrees with Cargolift when it claimed that it could not be held liable for the damage
sustained by Acuario’s barge because Acuario sought to recover upon its contract with Skyland, to which
Cargolift was not a party. Since it had no contractual relation with Acuario, only Skyland should be held
liable under the contract. Besides, Skyland contractually assumed the risk that the tugboat might encounter
engine trouble when it acknowledged in its contract with petitioner that the latter’s vessels were in good
order and in seaworthy condition. At any rate, it was neither negligent in the performance of its obligation
nor the proximate cause of the damage.

7. It is not correct for petitioner to assert that Acuario could not recover damages from it due to lack of privity
of contract between them. It is not Acuario that is seeking damages from petitioner but Skyland, with
whom it undoubtedly had a juridical tie. While Acuario could hold Skyland liable under its charter
agreement, Skyland in turn could enforce liability on petitioner based on the latter’s obligation to Skyland.
In other words, petitioner is being held liable by Skyland and not by Acuario.
8. Dart Phils. vs. Sps. Calogcog, G.R. No. 149241

Facts:

1. Dart Philippines is engaged in the business of importing Tupperware products into the Philippines. It
entered into a distributorship agreement with Sps. Calogcog. The spouses failed to meet the terms of their
agreement specifically the remittance of sales that Dart Philippines subjected the spouses to an audit. Dart
intimated that they will not renew their contract with the Calogcogs anymore, however, eventually, it was
agreed that the spouses may continue being a distributor on a pre-paid basis.
2. Before the expiry of their most recent contract, Sps Calogcog sued Dart for damages alleging that Dart
abused its rights when it caused the audit of their account and when it only honored their orders if they
were pre-paid, thereby causing damages to them of around ₱1.3M. They also raised that Dart refused to
award benefits to their sales force that many of them opted to transfer to another distributor. They also
raised that they had invested so much into the business that they caused a building to be constructed. They
also claim that the subsequent audit is just to harass them that there is no valid reason in not renewing
their agreement.
3. RTC and CA ruled in favor of the spouses.

Issue:

Whether or not Dart Philippines intended to prejudice the sps in causing the audit, shifting to prepaid basis
and in not renewing the contract, making it liable for damages

Ruling:

1. No. The court explained that under the Civil Code, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. To find the existence of abuse of right under the said article, the following elements must be
present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.31 Accordingly, the exercise of a right shall always be in accordance with
the purpose for which it has been established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh—there must
be no intention to injure another.32 A person will be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.33

2. Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind
which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to prove the same.

3. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose
or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
motive.

4. As found, no bad faith can be attributed to Dart Philippines. It was the spouses who violated the terms
of the agreement. That Dart even gave them another chance when they asked for it in the form of a
handwritten promise. The audit was not intended to harass the spouses, but was a necessary step to
protect Dart’s business.

5. The exercise of its rights was not impelled by any evil motive designed, whimsically and capriciously, to
injure or prejudice respondents. The rights exercised were all in accord with the terms and conditions
of the distributorship agreement, which has the force of law between them.39 Clearly, petitioner could
not be said to have committed an abuse of its rights. It may not be amiss to state at this juncture that a
complaint based on Article 19 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to support it but
innuendos and conjectures.
9. Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, Dec. 28, 1979

Facts:

1. Engr. Espino, who was also an executive of Procter & Gamble Philippines, went shopping with his wife and
daughters in South Supermarket in Makati. While his wife went to the groceries section, Engr. Espino went
to look for a “rat-tail file” which he needed for his hobby. When he found it, he decided not to put it in their
shopping cart as it might be lost because it is just a small item.
2. At that moment, Engr. Espino saw his aunt’s maid and began talking to her. In the course of their
conversation, Engr. Espino shoved the file into his pocket in a manner that a portin of it is still visible.
3. The family went to the counter to pay for their items but Engr. Espino forgot about the item in his pocket.
When the family was leaving the Supermarket, Engr. Espino was apprehended by an uniformed security
guard. He was told that he has something in his pocket that he had not paid for. Upon realizing the guard is
correct, he apologized and offered to pay for the item, but the guard refused and instead escorted him to
the back of the supermarket.
4. A lot of customers saw Engr. Espino being escorted to a cubicle where he was asked for his personal
information that is to be included in the Incident Report. When the report was handed to an officer of the
supermarket, the officer quipped, “Ano, nakaw na naman to?” When Espino tried to explain, the officer said,
“That’s what all they say..” Engr. Espino was accused of shoplifting. When he tried to pay for the
merchandise worth P3.00, he took a P5.00 bill from his pocket and was told that he has give all the P5.00 as
a fine, which will then be given as incentive to the guards that apprehended him.
5. Espino felt embarrassed and humiliated that he said he just wanted to disappear especially when people
who heard the exchange of words kept staring at him. He said he thought of going back to the Supermarket
at night to throw stones at it but reason prevailed. He filed a claim for damages.
6. RTC dismissed the complaint, but the CA granted the award of moral and exemplary damages along with
attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

Issue:

Was the award of exemplary damages correct? No.

Ruling:

1. The grant of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages is unjustified. Exemplary or
corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, New Civil Code). Exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they could be adjudicated (Art. 2223, New Civil
Code). Considering that exemplary damages are awarded for wanton acts, that they are penal in character granted
not by way of compensation but as a punishment to the offender and as a warning to others as a sort of deterrent,
We hold that the facts and circumstances of the case at bar do not warrant the grant of exemplary damages.

Petitioners acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their property, a right which the law accords
to them. Under Article 429, New Civil Code, the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has a right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof and for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. And
since a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office exempts him from
civil or criminal liability, petitioner may not be punished by imposing exemplary damages against him. We agree
that petitioners acted upon probable cause in stopping and investigating private respondent for taking the file
without paying for it, hence, the imposition of exemplary damages as a warning to others by way of a deterrent is
without legal basis. We, therefore, eliminate the grant of exemplary damages to the private respondent.
10. Albenson Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118231, July 05, 1996
Facts:

 Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. mild steel plates. As part of the payment, a
Pacific Banking Corporation Check drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks was given.

 However, when presented for payment, the check was dishonored.

 Upon investigation, Albenson discovered that E.L. Woorworks is owned by Eugenio S. Baltao, who is also
the President of Guaranteed. Moreover, that the signature is signed by Baltao himself.

 Albenson made an extrajudicial demand against Baltao. The latter denied issuing the check and transacting
with Albenson. Thus, Albenson filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

 Upon reinvestigation, the Provincial Fiscal moved for the dismissal of the complaint. It turned out that
Private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who is the one who transacted with
Guaranteed.

 Baltao then filed a complaint for damages for the the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him.

Issue:

WON Albenson et al. can be held liable for damages. No.

Ruling:

 Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to
file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to
collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them
by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check. Moreover,
Albenson made an extrajudicial demand against Baltao however, he failed to mention of the fact that there
are three (3) persons with the same name, one being his son who in fact issued the check.

 They cannot also be held liable for malicious prosecution. Petitioners were not motivated by malicious
intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to
protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent.

 There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case
against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by
petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948
dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao. SO ORDERED.
11. G.R. No. 151866 September 9, 2004
SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.

Facts:
1. Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their
church wedding on 10 October 1996.
> At about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were
billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already there. Among those present was
petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.
> Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the
principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid
the suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went back to the suite.
> Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner
allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala
mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then
ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag.
> It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the
pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost.
> The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond rings, one (1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and
necklace with a total value of about one million pesos.
> The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was
allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by
the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." Valmonte’s car
also yielded nothing.
2. Petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be
circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioner’s
imputations against her.
3. Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the RTC.
4. RTC: Dismissed. CA: Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by petitioner as the one
responsible for the loss of her jewelry.

Issue: WON Valmonte should be awarded moral damages.

Ruling. YES.

Court found sufficient evidence on record tending to prove that petitioner’s imputations against respondent was
made with malice and in bad faith.

Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioner’s testimony. Quite credibly, she has narrated in great
detail her distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to how rudely she was treated by petitioner
right after she returned to the room. Petitioner immediately confronted her and uttered the words

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or
negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. First
of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. It provides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." To find the existence of an abuse of right, the
following elements must be present:
(1) there is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable. One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which
would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a
person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which
read, thus:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage. In the case
at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own
account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag.

Moral damages only; no actual damages: claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory
evidence during the trial and must therefore be denied. Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of
moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
12. UE vs. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, Feb. 17, 2000

Facts:

1. Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I
in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of
his college approved his application to take a removal examination.

2. In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list (This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon
these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports) of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in
the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he
attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated. When his name was called, he went to the stage with his
mother and was given a rolled white paper by the dean, which is symbolic of a diploma. He tendered a blow-out
that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming
bar examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out

3. On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in
Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and
was not able to take the bar examinations.

4. He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence. He
claims to have suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings
and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations. The trial court ruled in his favor and
was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The CA
awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam.

5. UE denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for
a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students. UE pointed that
it was Jader who was negligent and that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by
the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal
exam.
Issue:
Is Jader entitled to exemplary damages? Yes.
Ruling:

1. The court ruled that indemnity should be granted in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act
is not illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused
thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith,
but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

2. UE, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when
he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence
of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit
for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain
from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with
the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the
school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act
and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt
submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational
institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their
compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that
exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of
reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any
control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.
13. CONRADO BUNAG, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

Facts:
 At about 4 in the afternoon, while Zenaida Cirilo was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to
the San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack, Bunag came riding in a car driven by an unidentified male
companion.
 Zenaida and Bunag were sweethearts, but two weeks before, they had a quarrel, and Bunag wanted to talk
matters over, so he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant.
 Thus, Zenaida rode in the car with Bunag and his companion. The car travelled north on its way to the
restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street, it turned abruptly to the right, to which Zenaida protested, but
which the duo ignored and instead they threatened her not to make any noise.
 The car travelled until they reached a motel. Zenaida was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will.
She was brought inside the hotel where Bunag deflowered her against her will and consent.
 After such incident, she asked Bunag to allow her to go home but the latter would not consent and stated that
he would only let her go after they were married, as he intended to marry her. Thus, she promised not to
make any scandal and to marry him.
 They proceeded to the house of Bunag’s grandmother. Bunag’s father assured Zenaida that the following
day, she and Bunag would apply for a marriage license.
 The following day, Zenaida and Bunag filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar. He then brought her back to the house of his grandmother they lived together as
husband and wife for 21 days.
 Zenaida’s uncle also testified that he went to Bunag’s grandmother’s house to see Zenaida. It was there that he
met Bunag’s father who told him, "Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle the matter and have
them married."
 After the 21 days, Bunag left and never returned, humiliating Zenaida and compelling her to go back to her
parents. Bunag also filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
 Zenaida was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against
her by the Bunags.
 On the other hand, Bunag claims that bitter disagreements over money and threats made to his life prompted
him to break off their plan to get married.
 A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by Zenaida against Bunag and
his father.

 The RTC ordered Bunag to pay Zenaida P80,000 as moral damages, P20,000 as exemplary damages, P20,000 by
way of temperate damages, and P10,000 for and as attorney's fees, as well as costs of suit. His father was
absolved from any liability. CA affirmed in toto.
 Bunag asserts that since the action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in
awarding damages.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in awarding damages, since the action involves a breach of promise to
marry

Held: No. In this jurisdiction, an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally,
therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said
Article 2219, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy
for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private
respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her
in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her
for 21 days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate
and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral
and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229
and 2234 of Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby
AFFIRMED.
14. MANILA GAS CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and ISIDRO M. ONGSIP
G.R. No. L-44190 October 30, 1980, Makasiar, J:
FACTS:
 Isidro Ongsip applied for gas service connection with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation. A 1 x 4 burner gas
was installed by the Manila Gas Corporation’s employees in Ongsip’s kitchen at his residence.
 Respondent Ongsip requested petitioner to install additional appliances as well as additional gas service
connections in his Apartment located also in the same compound. In compliance with said request,
petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water storage heaters and two heavy-duty gas burners and
replaced the original gas meter with a bigger 50-light capacity gas meter.
o In May and June of 1966 no gas consumption was registered in the meter, prompting petitioner to
issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the gas meter in respondent's residence.
 One afternoon, while respondent Ongsip was taking a nap, Manila Gas Corporation’s employee led by
Mariano Coronel, the then Chief of the Distribution Department, went to Ongsip's place. After Identifying
themselves to the houseboy therein that they are from the Manila Gas Corporation, but without notifying or
informing respondent Ongsip, they changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections.
 At about 5 o'clock, petitioner's employees returned with a photographer who took pictures of the premises.
Respondent Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but the latter simply gave him a
calling card with instructions to go to his (Coronel's) office. There, he was informed about the existence
of a by-pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he gave Coronel P3,000.00, he
would be deported.
o Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money. By the end of August, a reading was made on the
new meter and expectedly, it registered a sudden increase in gas consumption.
 Later, a complaint for qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent Ongsip.
o Pending investigation of the criminal complaint, petitioner disconnected respondent's gas service
for alleged failure and/or refusal to pay his gas consumptions fwhich is in violation of petitioner's
regulation agreed upon in the 'Application for Gas Service.'
o Subsequently, the complaint was dismissed by the city fiscal of Pasay City.
 Following the dismissal of the complaint and the disconnection by petitioner of his gas service, respondent
Ongsip filed a complaint with the CFI for moral and exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas
Corporation based on two causes of action:
o firstly: the malicious, oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal complaint.
o secondly: the illegal closure of respondent Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and
without notice of warning
o Motion to Dismiss by petitioner, but was DENIED.
 Petitioner’s answer: filing of the criminal complaint was precipitated by the discovery of an illegal by-pas
tube or "jumper" in the kitchen cabinet and immediately below the gas burners in respondent's residence.
Further, the cutting-off or the disconnection of private respondent's gas service was on account of the
latter's failure to settle and pay outstanding and due payments representing gas consumptions.
o In both instances, there was no intent to threaten, ridicule, embarrass or humiliate respondent
Ongsip, petitioner then filed a counterclaim against respondent.
 CFI and CA = in favor of respondent Ongsip.1

ISSUE:
1. Whether there was malicious prosecution (YES.)

RULING:
 Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." On the other hand, Article 2229 provides
that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition, to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages"

1
(1) P50,000.00 as moral damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION; (2) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION; (3)
P30,000.00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION; (4) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION; (5)
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (6) the costs of the suit; AND (b) Dismissing the defendant's counterclaim
  The first cause of action, for which respondent Ongsip was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively, is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which
states that "moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: .. . (8) malicious
prosecution;
 To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
siniter design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case
to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. (DOCTRINE)
 There is reason to believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft.
This intent is traceable when petitioner's employees, upon being ordered, came to private respondent's
residence and changed the defective gas meter and tube connections without notice. In other words,
respondent Ongsip had no opportunity to observe the works. Nonetheless, if indeed he had installed an
illegal by-pass tube or jumper, he could have easily asked for its immediate removal soon after his
houseboy told him what petitioner's employees did. As established by the facts, he had not even attempted
to refuse entrance to petitioner's employees headed by Mariano Coronel nor to question their authority
upon their return later that same afternoon with a photographer (pictures used as evidence against him.)
 It bears noting that when he was informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection,
respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or remorse and did not yield to the threatening demand of
Coronel. Experience tells us that this is not the attitude of a guilty person. On the contrary, this is the
attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where his principles and rights are concerned. To
prove his innocence, he was even willing to have his place excavated but petitioner would not dare
take the consequences.
 Petitioner Manila Gas Corporation, in failing to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect
recording, sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the complaint for qualified theft against respondent
Ongsip knowing it to be false. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate private respondent and to
blacken his reputation not only as a businessman but also as a person. Qualified theft is a serious
offense indicating moral depravity in an individual. To be accused of such crime without basis is shocking
and libelous. It stigmatized private respondent causing him emotional depression and social degradation.
The fact that the complaint for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no consolation. The
damage had been done. Necessarily, indemnification had to be made.

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER MANILA GAS CORPORATION IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY

(1) RESPONDENT ISIDRO M. ONGSIP P25,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AND P5,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES FOR THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, P15,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AND P5,000.00 AS
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, AND P10,000.00 AS ATTORNEY'S FEES; AND
(2) THE COSTS.

MODIFIED AS ABOVE STATED, THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN
ALL OTHER RESPECTS
15. Blas Ople vs. Ruben Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

FACTS:
 President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System” establishing a National Computerized Identification Reference System.
- It aims to provide a facility for Filipino citizens and foreign residents to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities through a
computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security
and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations. 

 Petitioner Blas Ople (member of the Senate) in filing instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308, prays that it be invalidated
for violating the right to privacy since A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and
more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
- Anchoring his argument on 2 constitutional grounds, viz.:
(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
(2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
 Solicitor General urges the Court to validate A.O. No. 308’s abridgment of the right of privacy by using the
rational relationship test, stressing that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the
implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3)
generate population data for development planning. He concludes that these purposes justify the incursions
into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end

ISSUES: Whether implementation of A.O. No. 308 will violate the peoples’ right to privacy enshrined in the
constitution? Yes.

Ruling:

1. The right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution.[33] It is
expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:

"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:[34]

"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

x x x.

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

x x x.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

2. Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and
punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another.[35] It also
holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and
liberties of another person,[36] and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications.[37] The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer,[38]the revelation
of trade and industrial secrets,[39] and trespass to dwelling.[40] Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
the Anti-Wiretapping Law,[41]the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act[42] and the Intellectual Property Code.[43] The Rules of
Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.[44]

3. AO was declared unconstitutional.

16. Jose Cordero et al. vs. Alicia B. Buigasco, G.R. No. 34130-R, April 17, 1972

Facts:

 The defendant is Alicia Buigasco, author of the article “Malagim Na Wakas ng Isang Pag-ibig”, the Liwayway
Publications, Inc. w/c owns the Aliwan magazine and editor Hilario Coronel editor of the said magazine in
which that article appeared.
 “Malagim Na Wakas ng Isang Pag-ibig” or Love’s Tragic End, the story in question contains the details of the
private and personal affairs of Joselito Gomez and Anida Cordero (the lovers), whose real names were used.
 It was just written just after the publication of the news reports on the death of Anida Cordero, on March 20,
1961, in a motor vehicle mishap in front of the Brown Derby at QC, where she and her boyfriend, Joselito
Gomez, were then going for a snack.
 An action for damages was instituted by Joselito Gomez and the spouses Jose Cordero and Eusebia Cordero
(Cordero spouses) pursuant to the 1st and 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the NCC.
 Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offence, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief:
1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence:
2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

ISSUE:

Whether defendants are liable for damages under Article 26 of NCC.

RULING:

1. YES! That these matters were given undue and unwarranted publicity by the Gomez and Coronel w/o the
consent or authorization of the persons involved in a manner w/c openly revealed the identities of the
lovers, either through the use of their real names, their pictures, or their description w/c could have left no
room for doubt as to the identity of the subject being described.
2. The rationale for Art. 26 has been stated by the Code Commission – “The sacredness of human personality
is a concomitant of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of laws, of the
culture and civilization of every country, IS HOW IT DIGNIFIES MAN.
3. The law in question was enacted in view of the recognized inadequacy or insufficiently of the existing laws
on libel and other related pieces of legislation purposely to exalt, enhance, and protect the human
personality from uncalled for intrusions or humiliation. The said article is decidedly broader in meaning
and application than the laws on defamation.
4. For the love affair between Joselito Gomez and late Anida Cordero; how that affair was conceived, born,
nurtured, and ended; the attitude of Anida’s parents tried to control and steer their daughter away from
such an affair, are matters which are strictly and essentially private and purely personal to the parties
concerned over w/c the public obviously can claim no legitimate interest whatsoever.
5. That these matters were given undue and unwarranted publicity by the appellants w/o the consent or
authorization of the persons involved in a manner w/c openly revealed the identities of the lovers, either
through the use of their real names, their pictures, or their description w/c could have left no room for
doubt as to the identity of the subject being described, have all been competently established by appellee’s
evidence and not disproved by Buigasco and Coronel.
6. The unwarranted publication of a person’s name, or the unauthorized use or publication of his photograph
or other likeness, constitute the most common means of invasion of the right to privacy.

Elements of actionable violation of the right to privacy:

1) Publicity is given to any private or purely personal information about a person
2) without the latter’s consent
3) regardless of whether or not such publicity constitutes a criminal offense, like Libel or Defamation the
circumstance that the publication was made with the intent of gain or for commercial and business purpose
invariably serves to aggravate the violation of the right.
Finally, while it is true that the right of privacy is a purely personal right which cannot, as a general rule, be
asserted by anyone other than by him whose privacy is invaded, it is equally true that cases abound where courts
have allowed recovery of damages for the unauthorized use of the name or picture of a deceased person for
advertising or trade purposes. Thus, where a photographer was employed to make a photograph o the corpses of
twin children, who had been born partially joined together, and to make 12 copies of the picture, but contrary to
agreement, it was held that parents o the children can recover damages against the photographer for humiliation
and wounded feeling and sensibilities resulting from the exhibition of photographs to others.
17. JACUTIN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R No. 140604; March 6, 2002
Petitioners: Dr. Rico S. Jacutin
Respondents: People of the Philippines

Facts:
 Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22 – year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on November 28, 1995 her father
accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. (Juliet’s father and
petitioner were childhood friends)
 The following day, Juliet and her father returned to the City Health Office, and they were informed by
petitioner that a medical group from Texas was coming to town in December and to look into putting up a
clinic where she might be considered.
 On December 1, 1995, she and her father went back to petitioner’s office. The latter informed her that there
was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city. And if she’s interested, he could interview her for the
job.
 Petitioner then later offered her the job where she would be the subject of a “research” program. She was
requested to be back after lunch.
 When she got to the office, petitioner made several phone calls. Not finding any available opening for her,
petitioner again offered her a job in family planning research undertaking. She expressed her
hesitation if a physical examination would include “hugging” her but petitioner assured her that he was
only kidding about it.
 Petitioner Jacutin then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja Street so people
would not see them on board the same car together. When they were inside the car, petitioner held her
pulse and told her not be scared.
o While driving, He asked whether she had varicose veins, which she said “no”. Petitioner told her to
raised her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm.
o Petitioner pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. He placed his hands insider her
panty until he reached her pubic hair (surprised, she exclaimed “hala ka!” and instinctively pulled
her pants up.)
o Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment.
o Petitioner also instructed her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps (she
hesitated for a while, but eventually raised it up to her navel), Petitioner then fondled her breast.
o He begged her not to tell anybody about what just happened. Before she alighted from the car, he
then handed her 300.00 for her expenses.
 Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin but she did not give the rest of the
story.
 On December 4, 1995, Juliet went to the clinic to return the money but petitioner refused to accept it.
 A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On December 16, 1995, she attempted to slash her
wrist.
 The family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for counseling. Dr. Adaza testified that Juliet appeared to be
emotionally disturbed. That Juliet’s frustration was due to post trauma stress.

Jacutin’s Defense/Alibi:
- When the alleged incident happened, he was in a meeting in the Mayor’s office.
- And On December 4, 1995, when Juliet went to his office, he was scheduled to leave for Davao even
submitting a photocopy of his plane ticket.
- The cases filed against him are forms of political harassment. (cases filed against him by Vivan Yu, Iryn
Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva and Pamela Rods)

Sandiganbayan decision: Jacutin is guilty of the crime of sexual harassment under RA 7877 (Anti- Sexual
Harrasment Act of 1995)
o 300,000.00 – (moral damages)
o 200,000.00 – ( exemplary damage)

Issue: Whether RA 7877 (Anti- harassment Act of 1995) is applicable to this situation. - YES
Ruling:

1. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:

SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee.

2. This is clearly applicable in this case since Jacutin was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro city, a position
he held when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment.
He offered her a job in a family planning research project where there would be a physical examination. Even if the
City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, a recommendation from Jacutin in the
appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight and he used this as leverage to
take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet.

Petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high
position in the City health Office of Cagayan de Oro City.

Also, The findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioner’s secretary
between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health
nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.

Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi by the petitioner.

o Why was Petitioner’s witness Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance logbook and how was she
able to personally bring the same in court when she testified on September 8, 1998, she admitted that she
retired from the government service on December 1, 1997, Surely, Myrna Maagad could not still be the
custodian of the logbook when she testified.

Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan must be
respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal, no cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now
hold otherwise.

With prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary damages by the Sandiganbayan must be
tempered to reasonable levels. The award of Moral damages must not appear to be the result of passion or undue
prejudice and it must always reasonably approximate extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong
committed.

Dr. Adaza, a psychological expert, found Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed. The Court finds it
fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee. 30,000.00 moral damages and 20,000.00 exemplary damages.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23799,
finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo Guilty of the crime of Sexual harassment defined and punished under Republic
Act No. 7877, particularyly Section 3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with imprisonment of six month and to pay
a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvenvy, is AFFIRMED. The
Sandiganbayan’s award of moral and exemplary damages are MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is order to indemnify
the offended party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of 30,000.00 and 20,000.00 by way of, respectivelt, moral and
exemplary damages costs against petitioner.