PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ISSUE:
Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have
CHI MING TSOI VS. C.A. & GINA LAO-TSOI JANUARY 17, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact
between them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Medical examinations
showed that the wife was healthy, normal and still a virgin, while
the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse
since he was not impotent.
The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using
his mother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed
that her husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. On the other
hand, the husband claimed that it was his wife who was
psychologically incapacitated to perform basic marital obligations.
He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to have
sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wife filed
the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return
the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and that he might consummate
their marriage. He also insisted that their marriage would remain
valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The trial court declared their marriage void on account of
psychological incapacity of the husband. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
RULING:
Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual
cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. The husband’s senseless and protracted refusal to fulfill
his marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
to “procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. Decision
affirmed and petition denied for lack of merit.
SANTOS v. CA -240 SCRA 20- January 4, 1995
FACTS:
Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be
an eventful day for both of them for they got married on September
20, 1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents
into the young spouses’ family affairs. Occasionally, the couple
would also start a “quarrel” over a number of things like when and
where the couple should start living independently from Julia’s
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parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s
spending a few days with his own parents.
On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse
despite his husband’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven month’s after
her departure, Julia called Leouel for the first time. She promised
to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U.S., where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts were of no
avail.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the
very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
RULING:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases
of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity and like
circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated, psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse
to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code, which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be “legitimate.”
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful
or even desirable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA and MOLINA
February 13, 1997
FACTS:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo
Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband
and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was
never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition
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for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by
the CA.
ISSUE:
Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
constitute psychological incapacity?
RULING:
There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and
her husband could not get along with each other. There had been
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition.
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The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.
FERRARIS V. FERRARIS 17 July 2006
FACTS:
This is a resolution of the Supreme Court on the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioner regarding the dismissal of
her petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to the
respondent.
ISSUE:
How shall psychological incapacity be proven?
RULING:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 13 As all people may
have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner’s evidence
showed that respondent’s alleged failure to perform his so-called
marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-
seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To
be sure, the couple’s relationship before the marriage and even
during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all
bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was
happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent.
In fact, by petitioner’s own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when
petitioner started doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only when
they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent
began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform
his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand
petitioner’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He
thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to
her anger, temper and jealousy.
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her
diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called
"schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In
fact, Dr. Dayan’s statement that one suffering from such mixed
personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks
specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical
speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan’s information that respondent had
extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive
and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his
family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondent’s parents having difficulties in their relationship. But
this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent’s
parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening
disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral
element" in respondent’s character that effectively incapacitated
him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential
marital obligations.
We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the
"leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
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tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
While petitioner’s marriage with the respondent failed and
appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however
is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is
not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state. Petition dismissed with
finality.
ANTONIO V. REYES 10 March 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists
up to the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself,
the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things, to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as
the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about
the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
sources after their marriage.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician,
Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated
with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single
member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities
with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon
show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and
even presented an invitation to that effect but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel
that no such occasion had taken place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez,
and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming
to be from Blackgold and touting her as the “number one
moneymaker” in the commercial industry worth P2 million.
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who
wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in
one of their quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes Santos and
Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she
altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher
income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing
money from other people on false pretexts.
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(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent
of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he
could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her
in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her
behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr.
Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective,
shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they
observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to
petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They
further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair
with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence
and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost
anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to the
trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered
her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage null and void
RULING:
“It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by
the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic
on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person
unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly
be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to
reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments.
“From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded
that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave. But the requirement
that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be
divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no
categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
“From the totality of the evidence, however, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological
incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
RP V. IYOY 21 Sept. 2005
FACTS:
After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the
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youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent
Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request.
Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely
came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at
Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother
to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear
the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the
Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their
eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely
continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A.
She had been openly using the surname of her American husband
in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus,
Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as
"Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it
had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent
Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation
between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint
that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and
clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable
and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Should the marriage be declared void under Art. 36?
RULING:
The evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had
such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the
essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.
Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves.
It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt
and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.
Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with
her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was
not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified,
then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to
be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that
it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a
psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in
Marcos v. Marcos, respondent Crasus must still have complied
with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully
explained.
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In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage. No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.
SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO -October 4, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel
were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic
Church on August 11 1973. After discovering that they could not
have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in
1977, who they named Jeremy. On 25 September 1997, or after
twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel
filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout
their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him. In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged
that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal
home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories
against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour. The
trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita
psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both Manuel and Juanita are psychologically
incapacitated.
RULING:
The presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar,
respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for
him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts
and her controlling nature, and her inability to endear herself to
his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither
is there any showing that these “defects” were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In fact,
the psychiatrist reported that petitioner was psychologically
capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr.
Garcia, showed that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior
is traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required
by law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her
in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood, her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him,
and her inability to conceive.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with
a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is reinstated and
given full force and effect.
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RP V. HAMANO MAY 20, 2004
FACTS:
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that in October 1986,
she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They
later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went
back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge
Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated
to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became
manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and
their child.
ISSUE:
Is abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological
incapacity?
RULING:
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving
that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified
on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological
disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just
an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of
the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and
Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a
"mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We
disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We
cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of
human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
MACARRUBO V. MACARUBBO 27 FEBRUARY 2004
FACTS:
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Complainant averred that respondent, a member of the bar,
started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a
bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was
celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J.
Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in the latter's Manila
office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute
of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent
admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982,
he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends
that his previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred
that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine
T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their
children without providing them any regular support up to the
present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to
complainant, insisting instead that complainant was fully aware of
his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she
dragged him against his will to a "sham wedding" to protect her
and her family's reputation since she was then three-months
pregnant. Respondent submitted in evidence the final and
executory October 30, 2000 Decision of Branch IV of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City in Civil Case No. 5617,
"Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves," declaring his
marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew attention to the
trial court's findings on the basis of his evidence which was not
controverted, that the marriage was indeed "a sham and make
believe" one, "vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and intimidation, and
further exacerbated by the existence of a legal impediment" and
want of a valid marriage license. Respondent also submitted a
certification from the National Statistics Office that complainant's
name does not appear in the National Index of Marriages for
Bride; another certification from the National Statistics Office-
Office of Civil Registrar General that it has no record of the
December 28, 1991 marriage of complainant and respondent; and
an attestation from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite that Marriage License No. Municipal Civil
Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite that Marriage License No. 772176221
which was used in complainant and respondent's marriage is not
on file in its records.
Admitting having sired complainant's two children, Juris Alexis
and Gabriel Enrico, respondent denied ever abandoning them.
Respondent claimed that he left complainant and their two
children with her consent after explaining to her that the pain and
shame of living in sin and ridicule was unbearable. In both his
marriages to his first wife and to complainant, respondent claimed
that he was made to enter into the marital union against his will.
ISSUE:
Is a “sham” marriage a null and void one?
RULING:
That claim is an affront to the intelligence of the members of this
Court to distinguish fact from fiction, reality from fantasy. It is not
easy to believe that a lawyer like respondent could easily be
cowered to enter into any marriage. One incident of a "shotgun
marriage" is believable, but two such in succession would tax one's
credulity. And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine T.
Constantino which is again the subject of another annulment case.
It would not come as a surprise if in that pending case, he would
again put blame on his third wife in order to send the marriage to
oblivion.
Respondent here has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple
marriages and then leaving them behind by the mere expedient of
resorting to legal remedies to sever them. The impact of
respondent's conduct is incalculable upon his ex-wives as well as
the children he had by them, their lives having been dislocated
beyond recall. Respondent's assertion that he has not failed to
support his children by complainant is not totally supported by the
evidence on record. He may have secured educational plans for
them and doled out some sums of money in the past, but it appears
that he has failed to provide them regular, monthly support. In
fact, he admitted that even before he left complainant's residence
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in 1995, he was only giving intermittent support to his children
with her.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the
institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society
looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities,
and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. This must be
checked if not stopped.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral
character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such,
including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty
of gross immorality and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is
supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his
two children by complainant. Let respondent's name be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys.
DAVID B. DEDEL vs. CA & SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL
January 29, 2004
FACTS:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28,
1996 and May 20, 1967 in a civil and church wedding, respectively.
They had four children. David instituted a case for the nullity of
their marriage on account of Sharon’s psychological incapacity to
perform basic marital obligations. He claimed that Sharon had
extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in the
AFP, a lieutenant in the Preisdential Security Command, and a
Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by a clinical
psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian, whom she married and with whom she had two
children. When the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon
returned to David bringing along her two children by the
Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even considered
the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned
David to join the Jordanian national with her two children. Since
then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of David and found him to be conscientious,
hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and
projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in
whatever he does. On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that
Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed
several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live with
David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of
her family are indications of the said disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.
The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground
of the psychological incapacity of Sharon to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the
trial court’s judgement and ordered the dismissal of the petition.
David’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he appealed
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically
incapacity.
RULING:
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No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically
incapacity.
As held in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, “psychological incapacity”
should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
law intended to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity”
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not
by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality, which make the respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for
declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity, include physical
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.
Decision affirmed. Petition denied.
REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425
FACTS:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on
September 7, 1975. They begot two children. A week after the
wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation.
He would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for
a few months. He was always drunk and would forced his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on her if
she refused.
On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him
again. Erlinda was forced to work and learned that Avelino was
imprisoned and that he escaped from jail.
Erlinda filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
grounds of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be
located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda
presented Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological
incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered a decision in favor
of respondent without waiting for the prosecutor’s manifestation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed trials’ court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated?
RULING:
The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline
No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from
justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor
was likewise not given an opportunity to present controversy
evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA April 17, 2001
FACTS:
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Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first
met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound
for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on
03 March 1975. They did not live together as petitioner was still a
student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the
country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the
marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their
residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own
house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful
marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that
they could stay together – when respondent was on vacation.
It started in 1988 that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
“psychological incapacity” to perform his marital covenant. His
"true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a
habitual drinker.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the
conjugal. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive
respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to
change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected.
Indeed, matters became worse. Petitioner sued respondent before
the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the psychological incapacity is present in this case.
RULING:
The phrase “psychological incapacity,” borrowed from Canon law,
is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the
relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has
escaped jurisprudential attention. At all events, petitioner has
utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot
be equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable
social institution and the foundation of the family that the State
cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with
petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent,
totally terminating that relationship, however, may not
necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law
has not quite given up, neither should we
BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS October 19, 2000
FACTS:
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and
they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide
material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse
and abandonment. Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the
marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the
marriage null and void under Article 36 which was however
reversed by the CA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the
respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case
show psychological incapacity.
RULING:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be
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examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua
non for such declaration.

Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent

failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his
acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact

that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said

period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage

for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
in Molina.

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