Professional Documents
Culture Documents
members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and
A. The Barangay cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation
process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage
1. Katarungang Pambarangay indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged
dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it.
MORATA vs GO Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse, it
FACTS: would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say
October 5, 1982: SPS. Victor and Flora Go in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from
- Filed a case against Petitioners, Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of
Morata for Sum of Money plus Damages amounting to PhP 49, the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D.
400 at CFI Cebu 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of
Petitioners: Motion to Dismiss dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the
- On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties- log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not
litigants are all residents of Cebu Cityciting as grounds therefor, have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.ch
the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the
plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon
1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or "the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, . . .," its obvious
reached by the parties. intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an
- The motion was opposed by private respondents. authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the
Respondent Judge Valeriano Tumol: denied the MTD aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and easily
MR: denied thwarted if the Lupon’s authority is exercised only in cases falling within
SC: by reason of MTDs denial the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
- Resolution dated Dec. 2, 1982: SC required respondents to
file an Answer, and likewise granted a temporary restraining Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22
order enjoining respondent judge from requiring petitioners to issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, embodying the directive "to
file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154. desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in
cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not
ISSUES: only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the
1. W/N a conciliation proceeding under PD 1508 is also a pre- courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts
requisite in filing a case in court for cases falling under the RTC? and courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial courts under
B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E. Marcos
HELD: YES in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first
paragraph of which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-
"SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all
complaint. — No complaint, petition, action for proceeding government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of
involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all
in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably
government office for adjudication unless there has been a settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that
by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a
been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for
the following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library cases falling under the exclusive competent of the metropolitan and
[1] Where the accused is under detention; municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal as well.
liberty calling for habeas corpusproceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support UY vs CONTRERAS
pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of FACTS:
Limitations." library Felicidad Uy: subleased from Susana Atayde the other half of the
2nd floor of the a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. — Streets, Makati
The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring - She operated a beauty parlor
together the parties actually residing in the same city or - Sublease Contract: expired on April 15, 1993
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: o However, she was not able to remove all her movable
j properties
" [1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or April 17, 1993: An argument arose between Uy and Atayde when
instrumentality thereof; the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her
" [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing
" [3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or - Resulted to a scuffle between Uy and Atayde, and several of
a fine exceeding P200.00; Atayde’s employees, including Winnie Javier (Private respondent)
" [4] Offenses where there is no private offended April 21, 1993: Private Respondents have themselves medically
party:jgchanrobles.com.ph examines for alleged injuries inflicted by Uy
" [5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may April 23, 1993: Private Respondents filed a Complaint with the
in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Barangay Captain of Valenzuela, Makati
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government."cralaw April 28, 1993: Confrontation Schedule
virtua1aw library - Only Uy appeared
- Reset on May 26, 1993
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of May 11, 1993: Office of the Prov. Prosec of Rizal filed 2
the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes Informations for Slight Physical Injuries against Uy with MTC Makati,
involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The Br. 61
law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to May 21, 1993: Judge Maximo Contreras ordered Uy to submit her
the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the Counter-Aff
barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed Uy’s CounterAffidavit:
upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its 1. Petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of the
authority over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon’s criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings as
authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and she and the private respondents are residents of Manila
comprehensive term "all", to which usage. We should neither add 2. She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of
nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an
construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not ongoing conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner in
distinguish." Barangay Case No. 1023
Uy: filed a Motion to Dismiss for non-compliance with the
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the
Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule Code, considering that per the medical certificates[22] the injuries sustained
on Summary Procedure, as a ground by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of
MTC Judge: denied MTD complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries incapacitated
MR: denied them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The
SC: Certiorari penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos and censure." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the
ISSUE: W/N respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion Revised Penal Code and would prescribe in two months pursuant to Article
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss 90.
considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases
the Local Government Code of 1991 and further required under the 1991 Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter.
Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private
HELD: YES respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April
1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22
The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D. June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said
No. 1508 which was enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is
Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which
thereof,[13] revised the law on the katarungang pambarangay. As a to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there
consequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception
pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code. provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.
In the proceedings before the court a quo, the petitioner and the Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that
respondents had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further the petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings
invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused
decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant and the complainant are residents of different barangays." The petitioner
petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of
Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the
the weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer scheduledconciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of
their grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree, referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.[23]
changed tack. In their Comment, they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde
"filed a complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondents that
BarangayValenzuela,Makati, in compliance with the requirements of theKat the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request
arungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code."[20] Yet, in the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action.[24] The request is
a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it dated 23 June 1993,[25] or nearly one and a half months after Criminal
disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. Evidently,
applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner this was done to support their contention in the said court that, in any
and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or event, there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to
municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the said thelupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to
cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were
assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.
substantially complied with it.
The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.
enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral to
Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the
the lupon was necessary before filing the informations.
vital role which the revised katarungang pambarangay law plays in the
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of delivery of justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and
the Local Government Code of 1991, more specifically on the progress therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and
provisions on the katarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by thelupon should,
should have taken judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with
required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines." for non-compliance thereof.
We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
WINGARTS vs MEJIA
rules.[21] He should have applied the revised katarungang
pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had FACTS:
he done so, this petition would not have reached us and taken
Johan L.H Wingarts and Ofelia Wingarts: jointly filed 3 letter
valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to
complaints against Judge Servillano Mejia of MTC Sta. Maria, Bulacan
more important cases.
- These complaints were offshoot of the 3 criminal cases decided
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first by Judge Mejia involving Wingarts and Col. Rodulfo Munar
scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation a. Malicious Mischief and Grave Threats: Wingarts
was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical was the accused for both cases
injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time b. Usurpation of Authority: Countercharge of
before such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 Wingarts
and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature 1ST Administrative Complaint (relative to Malicious Mischief)
and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local 1. Judge was charged with Malicious Delay in the administration of
Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have justice.
granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot 2. The case allegedly dragged for one year and four months in
justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 respondent's sala and was ultimately dismissed in a decision
(more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code dated June 8, 1994.
of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court 2nd Administrative Complaint (relative to Grave Threats)
where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier 1. incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for
stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2664, entitled "People vs.
prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum Leo Wingarts," for grave threats and for issuing a warrant of
period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private arrest against him despite lack of prior barangay conciliation.
respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, The said case was later dismissed and indorsed to the barangay
Makati. official concerned.
3rd Administrative Complaint (relative to Usurpation)
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay 1. unjust decision in usurpation of authority.
Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing Judge Mejia: COMMENT
the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of 1. he took cognizance of the case for Grave Threats in the belief
trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the that there had been substantial compliance with the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law since a
with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak certification of the barangay captain regarding a confrontation of
havoc on the barangay conciliation system. the parties, the fact that no amicable settlement was reached by
them, and that he was endorsing the filing of the case in court,
Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical had been duly submitted to respondent judge
injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would only be slight
physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal (hindi ko na nilagay mga di related sa LGC)
Office of the Court Administrator:
o Charge of incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority: meritorious
Had respondent Judge exercised greater
prudence, he could have known at the outset
that under Art. 408 (c), Chapter 7, Title One,
Book III, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the BONIFACIO LAW VS. JUDGE BELLOSILLO
Local Government Code of 1991 (The Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law), offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one
(1) year or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) require prior barangay
conciliation. The crime of grave threats
punishable under Art. 282 of the Revised Penal
Code falls within the (p)urview of that section.
Had respondent Judge observed the mandate of
the aforequoted provision of law he could have
remanded the case to the lupon instead of taking
cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing the
warrant of arrest against the accused.
Administrative Sanction: was imposed against Judge Mejia
ISSUES:
1. W/N Judge Mejia is liable for incompetence and
ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of the case
for Grave Threats despite the legal obstacles thereto?
MENDOVA VS. JUDGE AFABLE
HELD: YES
On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed APOLINARIO MUÑEZ V JUDGE CIRIACO ARIÑO
their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11, 2002, the
Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicameral Committee) of the Senate AM MTJ-94-985 Feb. 21 1995
and the House came out with a Report13 recommending approval of the
reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 205014 and House Bill No. Facts: Mayor Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned to his office
4456.15 The Bicameral Committee's consolidated bill reset the SK and herein complainant Apolinario S. Muñez for conference respecting a land
Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in dispute which Muñez had with one Tirso Amado. As complainant failed to
the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. attend the conference, Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him.
On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition. Complaint was filed against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and
usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the Ombudsman as well as
On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committee's administrative complaint4 for violation of the Constitution, misconduct in
consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law on Agusan del Sur.
March 19, 2002.
After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer of the Office of the
Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed Ombudsman filed a case5 for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor
bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual Asuero Irisari in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Loreto, Agusan del Sur.
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review Originally raffled to the judge of that court, the criminal case was later
because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño
duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal
effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to Accused Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the
declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that acts complained of did not constitute a crime under the law. He contended
would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act that under § 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (Batas
of Congress. Pambansa Blg. 337), mayors were authorized to issue warrants of arrest.
The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject Respondent Judge Ariño denied the motion to quash on the ground that
of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review the power of mayors to issue warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of
the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to February 2, 1987 when the Constitution took effect.
Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress
by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, For its part the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative
to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would complaint against the mayor, found him guilty of misconduct in office and
destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the abuse of authority and accordingly ordered him suspended for eight (8)
Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches months without pay. On appeal, however, the Department of Interior and
of government. Local Government (DILG) reversed on the ground that what the mayor had
issued to the complainant, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was
The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote actually just an invitation or a summons.
or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to youths
at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those Mayor Irisari filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial of
who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to respondent judge, invoking the resolution of the DILG.
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years
old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members, and cannot Respondent Judge Ariño reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to decide case.
whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners' remedy is legislation, not
judicial intervention. Upon receipt of this order, complainant Muñez sent two letters dated July
5 and 12, 1933 to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission charging
Issue: WON the lowering of the age from 15-21 to 15-18 is respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño with knowingly rendering an unjust
unconstitutional judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari. The matter was
indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman which, as already stated,
Held: No, Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for referred it to this Court for possible disciplinary action against respondent
SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment judge.
in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK
membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on Issue: WON the respondent judge correctly dismissed the complaint
a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from
voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected Held: No, the issuance of the warrant when there was before him no
by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. criminal case, but only a land dispute as it is now being made to appear,
Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the only made it worse for the mayor, for it would then appear that he
statutory right. assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not have done. All
the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have dismissed the
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, criminal case against the mayor.
a "[P]ublic office is a public trust." No one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or
summon Muñez to his office because he had precisely done this the day
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from before he issued the warrant of arrest, and he ordered the arrest of
the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office. While the complainant because the latter had refused to appear before him. The
law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the
legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary difference between a summons and a warrant of arrest.
right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils.
The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any WHEREFORE, a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge
proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing "equal Ciriaco Ariño. He is enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the
access to opportunities for public service" cannot bestow on petitioners a performance of his duties as a judge and warned that a repetition of the
proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex- similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
officio public offices.
On July 13, 1988, petitioner filed the instant petition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction or Bistro filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt against Lim and the policemen
restraining order aimed at the reinstatement of the Mayor's permit and the who stopped Bistros operations. At the hearing of the motion for contempt
curtailment of the municipality's collection of market fees and market on January 29, 1993, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim
entrance fees. The Court did not issue the preliminary reliefs prayed for. would respect the courts injunction. However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26
and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and
Respondent asserted that as the local chief executive, the Mayor may policemen, again disrupted Bistros business operations. Meanwhile, on
issue, deny or revoke municipal licenses and permits. They contended that February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of
the resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan, the basis of Executive Order No. January 20, 1993 and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a
1, s-88, was a legitimate exercise of local legislative authority and, as such, mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff
the revocation of petitioner's permit was not tainted with any grave abuse is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or
of discretion. revoke business permits and licenses. This statutory power is expressly
provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City
Petitioner replied that since it had not violated any law or ordinance, there of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government
was no reason for respondents to revoke the Mayor's permit issued to it. Code of 1991. The trial court denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction
and to dismiss the case.
In their Rejoinder, respondents pointed out that petitioner had violated an
existing municipal ordinance when it failed to disclose the true status of Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
the area involved in the permit and when it did not secure separate mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. CA denied petitioner’s
permits for its two businesses, i.e., one as "real estate dealer" and another motion for reconsideration and ruled out that respondent Judge did not act
as "privately-owned public market operator." Respondents referred to improvidently in issuing the assailed orders granting the writ of preliminary
Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code which, inter alia, enjoins an injunction in order to maintain the status quo, while the petition is pending
applicant for a Mayor's permit from making a false statement in his resolution on the merits.
application and provides for the penalties for violation of any existing
ordinance regulating business establishments. ISSUE: 1. DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
Respondents claim that petitioner (1) deliberately made a false statement ISSUING HIS SAID ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDERS?(No)
in the application form when it failed to provide the information that their
place of business is the subject of adverse claims; and (2) failed to apply HELD: The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is
for two separate permits for the two lines of business it proposed to beyond question. The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11
engage in. (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads:
HELD:
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the
The law contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional
nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine
Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the
Government whether under public international or internal Philippine law.
National Government. President Aquino issued E.O. 426, entitled “Placing
In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the
the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the DPWH within the ARMM
creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.
under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other
purposes.”Nearly nine (9) years later, then DPWH Secretary Gregorio R.
Vigilar issued D.O. 119(Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in
which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the
facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose"
Sur.)Almost two years later, President Estrada approved and signed into [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this majority
law R.A. 8999(establishing engineering district in lanao del sur).Congress means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in
later passed R.A. 9054, entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for both? We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.
the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734,entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.”On 23 July 2001, If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a
petitioners addressed a petition to DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong, majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated.
seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution
8999. No action, however, was taken on the petition.[Petitioners allege shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that itviolates cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the
the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which reads:
challenged Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved to the The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. Petitioners also by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas
and thoroughly studied, and that the explanatory note to House Bill No. voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
995 (H.B. 995) from which the law originated is questionable. Petitioners region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].
assert as well that prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public hearing
nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House Committee
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made
on Public Works and Highways (Committee) failed to invite a single official
to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will
from the affected agency. Finally, petitioners argue that the law was
of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso municipalities and barangays in the autonomous regions until such time as
underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was the regional government concerned shall have enacted its own local
to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply government code."
adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the
Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
Section 526, however, should apply only to autonomous regions created
when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose." after the effectivity of the 1991 LGU Code, or in the absence of a statute
governing a specific situation within a region. Otherwise, Section 526 of
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple the 1991 LGU Code will collide directly with Section 3, Article XVIII of the
majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units Organic Act of 1989.
and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together,
as well as in the individual constituent units. Thus, even after the passage of the 1991 LGU Code, the Secretary of
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the Health continued to be the appointing power of provincial health officers
sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under who remained national government officials. The Secretary of Health also
Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they
continued to exercise the authority to assign provincial health officers to
ratified the Constitution.
any province within the region. This situation, however, was only
temporary, arising from the need for a phased transfer of the personnel,
PANDI v CA
equipment, properties and budgets of the Department of Health in the
Facts: Assailed decision: The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for a ARMM to the Regional Government pursuant to Section 4, Article XIX of
Writ of Quo Warranto filed against petitioners Dr. Lampa I. Pandi and Dr. the Organic Act of 1989.
Jarmila B. Macacua. After which declared Dr. Amer A. Saber declared
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
entitled to the position of Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial
Court of Appeals dated April 15, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32242 is SET
Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital ("IPHO-APGH" for brevity),
ASIDE. The designation on September 15, 1993 of Dr. Amer A. Saber as
Lanao del Sur.
Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del
Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the Sur is declared void. On the other hand, the designation on November 6,
Department of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 1993 of Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated
("DOH" and "ARMM", respectively, for brevity), issued a Memorandum Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur, and the assignment on
designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, November 6, 1993 of Dr. Mamasao Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office
as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. In the same in Cotabato City, are declared valid. No costs.
Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani ("Sani" for brevity),
SO ORDERED.
then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the
DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. The next month, Lanao del
G. Cordillera Administrative Region
Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07
designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del
ORDILLO v COMELEC
Sur.
FACTS: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet,
Sani filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of
Branch 10, Marawi City challenging the August 9, 1993 Memorandum Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No.
transferring him to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as provincial Autonomous Region.”
health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite
Saber filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of
5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected
prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is the lawfully
by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No.
October 14, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or
order enjoining Pandi from further discharging the functions and duties as ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur
CA: rendered the assailed decision - denied Pandi and Macacua's motion The petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification
for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the of the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can
decision be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit.
ISSUE: WON the quo warranto filed was valid? And WON there was an
amendment of the Organic act of 1989 after promulgating LGU code?
ISSUE: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province
of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of
HELD: An act of the Regional Assembly of ARMM cannot amend the the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute
Organic Act nor can it amend the 1991 LGC. The 1991 LGC and the 1987 such Region.
Administrative Code cannot amend the Organic Act.
RULING: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Provincial Governor Mutilan's authority to appoint Saber is misplaced. It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which provides that "[T]he keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense
municipal governments," is not a grant of power to governors and mayors means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that
to appoint local health officers. It is simply a directive that those the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
short, the appointment of local health officers, being essential for Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must
public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
vested by law with the power to appoint them. Moreover, the 1991 areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other
LGU Code did not amend the Organic Act of 1989.
relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in
this case.
The 1991 LGU Code, however, although a later law like the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, did not amend the Organic Act of 1989 Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the
because the Organic Act could only be amended through the ratification Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera
process laid out in the Organic Act itself. Section 526 of the 1991 LGU government consisting of the Regional Government and local government
Code provides that: units. It further provides that:
(3) WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee
of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga- (3) No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local
Apayao and Mountain Province) andcity (Baguio City) which compose the autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of
CAR? local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is not
RULINGS: unique to the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the
1973 Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee under
(1) Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy
envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185),
services of line departments and agencies of the National Government which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of
in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step local autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the creation of
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities
Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own
local executive and legislative assemblies. Pending enactment of this law,
government with a basic structure consisting of ane xecutive
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the
department and a legislative assembly and special courts with Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz.:
personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions. As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere “Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may
transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area.”
process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 392 and
subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. When R.A. No. 7924
took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a “special development and
Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the administrative region” and the MMDA a “special development authority”
creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the whose functions were “without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected
covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure local government units.”
speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the
invalidation of E.O. No. 220. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 (An Act Creating the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, defining its powers
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
and functions, providing funds therefor and for other
SO ORDERED. purposes)that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power.Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units,
there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA
or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
H. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative
vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent. G.R. No.
councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at
135962, March 27, 2000 Sec. 11, Art. X, Constitution R. A. 7924
bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court
of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
FACTS
MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special
Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non- metropolitan political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11,
stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a “special
Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Neptune Street is owned by metropolitan political subdivision” requires the approval by a
respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
residential subdivision in the heart of Makati City. It runs parallel to directly affected. R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the
two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall.Respondent received from MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by
petitioner a notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
vehicular traffic. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may
perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan be assigned to him by the President,57 whereas in local
Avenue would be demolished. government units, the President merely exercises supervisory
authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction to enjoin the MMDA.
opening of Neptune Street and prohibit the demolition of the perimeter
wall. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
the implementation of the MMDA’s proposed action. The appellate court
rendered a decision finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the
MMDA v GARIN G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005
opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the Section 11, Art. X, Constitution
City Council of Makati by ordinance. R.A. 7924
ISSUE FACTS
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of R.A. 7924 creating the
Whether MMDA has the power to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to
and appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro
confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of
Manila. (No);
traffic laws and regulations.
Whether MMDA is a “special metropolitan political subdivision” as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. (No) The issue arose from an incident involving respondent Dante O. Garin, a
lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s
HELD: The governing board and policy-making body of the MMDA is the license confiscated for parking illegallyon 05 August 1995.
Metro Manila Council. For the purpose of establishing and administering
programs providing services common to the area, Metropolitan Manila ISSUE
had a “central government,” i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative
Whether MMDA is authorized to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s
and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and
municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC. licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations without need of
any other legislative enactment. (No)
The Constitutionrecognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions
not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential HELD
equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao. Section 11, Article X of the A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may
1987 Constitution thus provided:
withhold in the exercise of its police power. The MMDA is not vested with
police power.
“Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative the Court categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.” functions are administrative in nature.We restate here the doctrine in the
said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, having been
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law,
lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by any
create “special metropolitan political subdivisions” which shall be subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units (LGUs).
Accordingly, respondent was proclaimed vice mayor of the City of On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a
Makati. Hence, this petition. voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. On February 27, 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2) years.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Manzano is qualified to run for and or
hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati. (Yes)
Respondent Neil M. Alvarez sought the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made
HELD: To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that
allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent
he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such
his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any The Second Division of the COMELEC granted private
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both respondents petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners
states. certificate of candidacy for being short of the one-year residence
requirement before the May 14, 2001 elections. COMELEC en banc
affirmed. Hence this petition.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of ISSUE: Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
an individuals volition. Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as
what he represented in his COC. (No)
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides:
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and HELD: First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160)
shall be dealt with by law. Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on provides:
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence,
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No.
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case
7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
district where he intends to be elected; a resident
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
therein for at least one (1) year immediately
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
preceding the day of the election; and able to
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
read and write Filipino or any other local language or
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
dialect. (Emphasis added)
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. By
electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby The term residence is to be understood not in its common
terminate their status as dual citizens. acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile
or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
(animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.
until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with
choice).
the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by
or should interfere with its operation and application. becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then
on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
a visitor or as a resident alien. By having been naturalized abroad, he lost
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen. Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he
reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to
prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Certificate in that year and by constantly declaring to his townmates of his
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist,
elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be
and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a
election of Philippine citizenship.
resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the
same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 of the Philippine
of merit. Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)
and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may
COQUILLA v. COMELEC and ALVAREZ acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473,
G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002 as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in
FACTS: Petitioner Teodulo Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as
Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined a non-resident alien.
the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S.
citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when
on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from
he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October
the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement Philippine Immigration
Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5,
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription good for one year stay. Under
took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term
to the United States. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in
under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on Naturalization which was a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is
entitled, among others, to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period
of one (1) year (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not
the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for
visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of
can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non- candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public
resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government
the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a
to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar. permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a
period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that
Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter
municipality on January 18, 1988.
of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his
residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent
year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting
six months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray, to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines.
case questioning a candidates lack of residency. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable
waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years at the time he filed
elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to
such certificate is not true. Petitioner made a false representation of
run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation.
WHEREFORE, the election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
2. Disqualifications
MARQUEZ v COMELEC
CAASI v. CA and MERITO C. MIGUEL G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
FACTS:
FACTS: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His of the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted
disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being
the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private disqualified as a candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is
respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.
permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by xxx
the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here
resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for or abroad
convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his
periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
COMELEC held that the possession of a green card by the charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
his residence in the Philippines. Hence this petition. Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained
unserved because he already went to the Philippines then.
ISSUES: Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
permanent resident of the United States. (Yes) punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid
2. Whether or not respondent Miguel had waived his status as a prosecution.
permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local
elections on January 18, 1988. (No) Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight
Committee who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the
deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as to the
HELD: Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is
Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his
convicted by final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of
children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the
the IRR.
intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of
ISSUE:
his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC
authority to reside there permanently.
is said to be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a
warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice”.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it. RULING:
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of NO. Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
permanent residence. Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive
from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived the law.
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by
the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither
such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.
68, Omnibus Election Code).
There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec
never made a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice.
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, Case was remanded to Comelec.
which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United
States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had
waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of
Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
RODRIGUEZ v COMELEC The elements of the crime of fencing which are:
G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
FACTS:
In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of 2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery
Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
via a Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of
grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice. the said crime;
COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
was held that: Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
after conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who after being crime of robbery or theft; and
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded to the
COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. 4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.”
In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a
Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by
is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC then consolidated both cases and the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same
found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which
arrest at LA Court and of the felony complaint. animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of
moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the
Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and
the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him. the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful
dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process “private
Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to
Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari. xxx accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or
good morals.” The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired
either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key
Issue: provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “SolutioIndebiti.
Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice as defined by the
Court in the MARQUEZ Decision? 2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the
sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally
RULING: unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of
conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused
No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee application for probation.
to avoid prosecution.” This indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and Magno vs. COMELEC
there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the G.R. No. 147904; October 4, 2002
fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a Facts: Carlos Montes filed a petition for the disqualification of Nestor
candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May
been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time 14, 2001 elections on the ground that the latter was previously convicted
of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery. COMELEC granted
arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the petition and declared Magno disqualified from running for the position
the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, citing
of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides as follows:
clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony
complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared
fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
yet at such time. sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime
be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate
and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon,
or granted amnesty.
DELA TORRE v COMELEC
G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996 According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno completed the service of
his sentence on March 5, 1998 when was discharged from probation, his
FACTS: five-year disqualification will end only on March 5, 2003. COMELEC denied
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995
elections on the ground that he was convicted by the MTC of violation the Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of Likewise, he claims that Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the
1991 which provides as follows: Local Government Code of 1991, is the law applicable to the case, not the
Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC. Said provision reads:
“Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position: Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are
“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving disqualified from running for any elective local position:
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
sentence;” moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
Petitioner contended that the provision is not applicable to him because he sentence.
was granted probation by the MTC. xxx
Issues: Magno insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998
when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability. Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, he was qualified to
run in the 2001 elections.
RULING:
Issue: 1) Whether or not direct bribery is a crime involving moral
1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or turpitude (Yes)
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to 2) What law should apply in the case? (LGC prevails vs.
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right Election Code)
and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. Held:
1) Moral turpitude is defined as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity In the May 2001 Elections, Lingating and Sulong both ran for the position
in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in of Mayor of Lapuyan. On May 3, 2001, Lingating file a petition for
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty disqualification of Sulong on the ground that the latter is disqualified from
between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, running for any elective local position having been removed from office
modesty, or good morals.” during his first term (1988-1991) as a result of an administrative case (AC
No 12-91) pursuant to Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code.
However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It frequently Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No 12-91 had ever
depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. In this become final and executory since up to the filing of the disqualification
case, by applying for probation, Magno in effect admitted all the elements case, no comment has been filed nor has the appeal been resolved. After
of the crime of direct bribery: the parties had filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution. The COMELEC, however, was unable to render judgment before
1. The offender is a public officer; the elections of May 14, 2001, where Sulong was elected and proclaimed
Mayor of Lapuyan.
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or
present by himself or through another; In a resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELEC declared respondent
Cesar B. Sulong disqualified adhering to section 40(b) of the Local
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be Government Code. Respondent Sulong filed an MR arguing that the
received by the public officer with a view to committing some decision in AC No. 12-91 has not become final and executory; that at no
crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does time had he been removed by virtue of the said decision, and that the
not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain issue was moot and academic having been "overtaken by the local
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and elections of May 11, 1992."
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he Lingating filed an opposition to the MR contending that the fact that
executes is connected with the performance of his official duties. Sulong was succeeded by Vice Mayor Imbing was proof that AC No. 12-91
had indeed become final. Lingating also prayed that he be installed as
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact Mayor of Lapuyuan in view of Sulong's disqualification.
that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and
deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an The COMELEC First Division denied Lingating’s motion on the ground that
official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious the disqualification of an elected candidate does not entitle the candidate
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which who obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office
he owes his fellowmen and society in general. vacated. Lingating then filed a motion for reconsideration of this order.
Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the first division, citing
a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct Aguinaldo v. COMELEC that re-election renders an administrative case
clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, moot and academic. It also ruled that respondent Sulong was not entitled
honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime to occupy the office thus vacated.
involving moral turpitude.
Lingating contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling
2) The Omnibus Election Code was enacted in 1985 while the in Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC. Instead, Lingating argues that the applicable
Local Government Code became a law in 1992. It is basic in case is Reyes v. COMELEC where the court held that an elective local
statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for
between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local
more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores elective position under Section 40(b) of the LGC. Hence, this petition.
contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed
to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it. Issue: Whether or not Sumulong is disqualified to run for local election
(NO)
Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of the Local Government
Code states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, Held: The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong prevented the
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. There is thus
part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of as the Sangguniang
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In accordance Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having become moot and
therewith, Section 40 of the LGC is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of academic because it was overtaken by the local elections of May 11,1992.
the OEC. Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente
Imbing, to the office of mayor be considered proof that the decision in AC
Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made
only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a pursuant to Sec. 68 [16] of the Local Government Code, which
subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.
enactment, the latter is deemed repealed. The intent of the legislature
to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local Considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve
positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the respondents motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially
law. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is since, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the decision of the
the manifest intent. Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago.
FACTS
FLORES VS. DRILON
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14,
2001 elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent mayor. Private
respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full
term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he
lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on
the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for
three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992,
3. Election Cases INVOLVING Local Elective Officials where he served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he
again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000,
where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to
GALIDO VS. COMELEC Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy
as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.
Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for
three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was
a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat in the 1998 elections. Petitioners contention that COMELEC in
allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates
Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. Neither can respondent’s victory
in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
SOCRATES VS.COMELEC circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of
FACTS
a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts
Recall Assembly (PRA for brevity) to initiate the recallofVictorino Dennis M. to an interruption of continuity of service.
Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa’s mayor on June 30,
In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office,
2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn,
although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in
president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the
the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require
PRA.
the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent
PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 which declared its loss of confidence in is that interruption for any length of time, as long as the cause is
Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local officials’ continuity of
schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the service.
Recall Resolution. Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, to nullify
One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his
and deny due course to the Recall Resolution. The COMELEC gave due
predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election.
recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy interruption in continuity of service. A winner in the recall election
for mayor in the recall election. Petitioners filed a petition before the cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for
COMELECto disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials
cancel his certificate of candidacy anchored on the ground that Hagedorn terms in office.
is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been
Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to
elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive
full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. the sovereign will of the people.
Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from
proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to SUMMARY: Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002
give effect to the will of the electorate. recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his
ISSUE: Whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30,
election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002. 2001;
2. Hagedorns continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily
RULING: YES. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during
in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution which is also reiterated in Section which time he was a private citizen;
43 (b) of RA No. 7160. These constitutional and statutory provisions have 3. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004
two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth
for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit consecutive term; and
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any 4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and
after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms. MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and LEONARDO B. ROMAN
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot [G.R. No. 149736. December 17, 2002]
seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the
the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a petition.
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period FACTS
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Petitioners would seek the disqualification of respondent Leonardo B.
What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth Roman on the ground of his having transgressed the three-term limit
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does under Section 8, Article X, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43 of
not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Mr. Roman won in the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A 1993 recall election for governor of the Province of Bataan, assumed office
recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a on June 28, 1994, and served the remainder of the term which ended June
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third 30, 1995. Thereafter, he was reelected in 1995, 1998 and 2001. Thus, he
term.Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking is now serving his ninth consecutive year as governor of Bataan. On 22
immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the February 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of
same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is candidacy for the same post in the 14th May 2001 regular elections. On 16
a consecutive fourth term. The framers of the Constitution did not intend May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
the period of rest of an elective official who has reached his term limit to Canvassers of Bataan.
be the full extent of the succeeding term.
ISSUE: WON private respondent Roman exceeded the three-term limit for
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September
elective local officials, expressed in the Constitution and the
24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term
LocalGovernment Code,should respondent’s incumbency to the post of
which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the
Governor following the recall elections be included in determining the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?
elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and RULING: NO
1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of In order that the three-consecutive term limit can apply, two conditions
Puerto Princesa. Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the must concur (1) that the elective local official concerned has been elected
2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he for three consecutive terms to the same local government position, and (2)
became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 that he has served three consecutive full terms, albeit a voluntary
when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.This renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be deemed to be
period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as
an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which
mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive terms ended on June 30, he is elected. Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution is explicit that the
"term of office of elective local officials . . . shall be three years" which Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and
phrase is forthwith followed by its mandate that "no such official shall Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which
serve for more than three consecutive terms," and that" (v)oluntary succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall election is held
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official has
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution
(is) elected." The law evidently contemplates a continuous full three-year does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
term before the proscription can apply. The Constitutional Commission, in consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit
its deliberations, referred to a full nine (9) years of service for each interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are
elective local government official in the application of the prohibition, not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent.
envisioning at the same time a continuous and uninterrupted period of Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which
nine years by providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of
voluntarily gives up the office. a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14,
2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two
A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local consecutive terms (1995–1998 and 1998–2001), his election on that day
official merely serves the balance of the latter’s term of office; it is not a was actually only his third term for the same position.
full three-year term. It also goes without saying that an incumbent elective
local official against whom a recall election is initiated and who PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He
nevertheless wins in a recall election must be viewed as being a continuing argued that a recall term should not be considered as one full term,
term of office and not as a break in reckoning his three consecutive terms. because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents.
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced
the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in the
full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast. He
a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the
three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any electorate, because in a democracy the people should, as much as legally
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an possible, be governed by leaders freely chosen by them in credible
interruption of continuity of service." elections. He concluded that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal
positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be tilted
If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s in favor of the people’s overwhelming choice.
being unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid
recall proceedings negates "one term" for purposes of applying the three- AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that
term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed by the it is clear from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies
newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be only if the terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous.
one term in reckoning the three-term limit. In both situations, neither the Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of voluntary
elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local renunciation, should not count to disqualify an elective local official from
official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local running for the same position. This case is different from Socrates, where
official following the recall election could be considered to have served a the full three consecutive terms had been continuously served so that
full three-year term set by the Constitution. Consistently, it has held that disqualification had clearly attached.
the term of a newcomer in recall elections cannot be counted as a full term
and may not thus be included in counting the three-term limit prescribed On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J.,
under the law and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ., concurred,
holds the view that the recall term served by respondent Roman,
Respondent Roman has won the election to the post of Governor of Bataan comprising the period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be
with a comfortable margin against his closest opponent. Where a considered as one term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive
candidate appears to be the clear choice of the people, doubts on the terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his election on May 14,
candidate’s eligibility, even only as a practical matter, must be so resolved 2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. X, Sec. 8 of the
as to respect and carry out, not defeat, the paramount will of the Constitution. For this reason, she voted to grant the petition and to declare
electorate. While the Constitution would attempt to prevent the respondent’s election on May 14, 2001 as null and void.
monopolization of political power, indeed a wise rule, the precept of
preserving the freedom of choice of the people on who shall rightfully hold CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO-MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to
the reins of government for them is no less than fundamental in looking at grant the petition. He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that
its overriding intent.chanrob1e to totally ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would
allow local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary
To summarize, in applying the three-term limit, the term during which
to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution. He contended
succession takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted,
that respondent Roman’s election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the
either with the three consecutive terms preceding, or with the three
three-term limit imposed by the Constitution.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
consecutive terms succeeding, such term. It should not be counted not
1ibrary
because of any interruption in the continuity of the service but because
such term is for less than three years. Hence, the unexpired portion of a
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS DISMISSED.
term, whether filled by succession or by election in a recall, cannot be
considered one full term. In the case at bar, since respondent Roman’s
first election in 1993 was in consequence of a recall and not a regular 5. Tenure of Office
election and he had not fully served three consecutive terms when he was
elected on May 14, 2001, his last election is valid.
OSMENA V COMELEC
(TENURE OF OFFICE)
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the
petition. FACTS:
Petitioners argue that:
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition.
He contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional 1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the
Commission, the Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday
service for three full terms before the proscription applies. Therefore, not of May 1992;
being a full term, a recall term should not be counted or used as a basis
for the disqualification whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent 2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof,
(as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full three-term limit. providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall
hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall
have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined, voted to dismiss (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;
the petition on the ground that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr.
v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639,
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, Held: Yes
shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the
2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the The Law on Public Officers is clear. There is no vacancy whenever
Constitution; the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu
contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the
provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title “Commission on Elections” Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that
of the Constitution; the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-
Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. There is no
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned satisfactory showing that Petilla, notwithstanding his succession to
in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the the Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously exercise the duties
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call
less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is
Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic assumption to
itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the
parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government
problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self- was prompted to appoint the Menzon shows the need to fill up the position
correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or during the period it was vacant.
revision.
Secretary of Local Government had the authority to designate
ISSUE: 1. WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional Menzon.
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional. The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the
event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However,
1. It provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating that the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in
there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in law is wanting. The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed
the mentioned in the Constitution was used synonymously as the phrase a necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two
holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de
Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte. The exigencies of
will synchronize future elections to once every three years. public service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment
of an acting Vice-Governor.
2. R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. It is not competent for the of succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed
legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office.
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution
has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the DOCENA VS SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF EASTERN SAMAR
Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no (Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunian)
legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though
the successors fail to qualify within the time. Facts:
3. R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Docena was appointed by DILG Secretary to succeeda member of the
Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, Sanggunian Panlalawagian of Eastern Samar(SPES) who died in
except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be office. Docena took his oath of office and assumed office as a
held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be member of the SPES.
elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from On the following day,Socrates Alar was also appointed by DILG
November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years. Secretary to the position already occupied by Docena.
2ndappointment was subsequently withdrawn to reinstate the
4. The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution 1stappointment, but this was later itself recalled in favor of the
by changing the campaign period. 2nd appointment.
SPES passed a resolution reiterating its previous recognition of the
Menzon vs Petilla Socrates’s appointment.
(SUCCESSION AND VACANCY) DILG Secretary issued another Recall order this time in favor of
Docena
Docena filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to
Facts:
recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the SPES.
By virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed yet in the
Issue: Which appointment is valid?
province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Governmentdesignated the
Vice-Governor, Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte.
Held: Docena’s appointment. Having been issued and accepted earlier,
and having already assumed office, Docena could not thereafter be just
Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also
recalled and replaced. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for
designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor.
the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor’s term. Petitioner had
Menzon took his oath of office.
already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed
therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure,
The Provincial Administrator inquired from the Undersecretary of the prescribed by the LGC. These requirements could not be circumvented by
DILG as to the legality of the appointment of the Menzon to act as the simple process of recalling his appointment.
the Vice-Governor.
• In the case at bar, there was no previous notice, much less a hearing David: The term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years.
accorded to the latter. This is reiterated in Republic Act No. 6679, approved on November 4,
1988, which reset the barangay elections from the second Monday of
November 1988 to March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1 thereof that
such five-year term shall begin on the first day of May 1989 and ending on
the thirty-first day of May 1994. Petitioners further aver that although Sec. SEC. 43. Term of Office. --
43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to (c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the
three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials because sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after
(1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May,
a general law which applies to all other local government units; (2) RA 1994
7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of
barangay officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987 (2) The composition of the Sangguniang Barangay and the manner of
Constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the electing its officials were altered, inter alia, the barangay chairman was to
same provision states that the term of barangay officials shall be be elected directly by the electorate, as follows:
determined by law; and (4) thus, it follows that the constitutional intention SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. -- (a) There shall be in each barangay
is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years; otherwise, a punong barangay, seven (7) sanggunian barangay members, the
there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to sanggunian kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay
except barangay officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) treasurer.
Article X of the Constitution.
SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body
Comelec: Petitioners cannot claim a term of more than three years since of the barangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as presiding
they were elected under the aegis of the Local Government Code of 1991 officer, and the seven (7) regular sanguniang barangay members elected
which prescribes a term of only three years. at large and the sanguniang kabataan chairman as members.
Brief Historical Background of Barangay Elections: SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x x punong barangay shall be
As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of elected at large x x x by the qualified voters in the barangay.
the Philippines. The word barangay is derived from the Malay balangay, a (Underscoring supplied.)
boat which transported them (the Malays) to these shores. Quoting from
Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado Pursuant to the foregoing mandates of the Local Autonomy Code, the
Benitez wrote that the barangay was ruled by a dato who exercised qualified barangay voters actually voted for one punong barangay and
absolute powers of government. While the Spaniards kept the barangay as seven (7) kagawads during the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994. In
the basic structure of government, they stripped the dato or rajah of his other words, the punong barangay was elected directly and separately by
powers. Instead, power was centralized nationally in the governor general the electorate, and not by the seven (7) kagawads from among
and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and the themselves.
gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de
barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing property. The ISSUE 1: Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA
position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a mere government 7160 or RA 6679?
employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no matter how low,
accepted the post. HELD: RA 7160 governs. Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term
to Three Years
After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became
known as barrios. For some time, the laws governing barrio governments RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It
were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of
Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Barrios were granted autonomy by different vintages, the later enactment prevails. Petitioner may be correct
the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi- in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating
municipal corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. It is a special law insofar as it
martial law regime, barrios were declared or renamed barangays -- a governs the term of office of barangay officials. There being a clear
reversion really to their pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD No. repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they
557. Their basic organization and functions under RA 3590, which was cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in
expressly adopted as the Barangay Charter, were retained. However, the accordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent law encompasses
titles of the officials were changed to barangay captain, barangay entirely the subject matter of the former enactments, the latter is deemed
councilman, barangay secretary and barangay treasurer. repealed.
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, a Punong Barangay ISSUE 2: Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years
(Barangay Captain) and six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay constitutional?
(Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer and HELD:Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively
were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six years which Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states, the term of office of elective
began on June 7, 1982. local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed the term of office of local consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
elective officials at six years. Under this Code, the chief officials of the time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
barangay were the punong barangay, six elective sangguniang barangay service for the full term for which he was elected.
members, the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a
barangay treasurer. Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of
office for barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated that barangay officials to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition,
shall hold office for six years, and stated that their election was to be held thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on accordance with the exigencies of public service.
the same day every six years thereafter.
Therefore, to the question at issue here on how long the term of barangay
This election scheduled by B.P. Blg. 881 on the second Monday of May officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: As
1988 was reset to the second Monday of November 1988 and every five may be determined by law; more precisely, as provided for in the Local
years thereafter by RA 6653. Under this law, the term of office of the Autonomy Code. And the Local Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits
barangay officials was cut to five years[25] and the punong barangay was their term to three years.
to be chosen from among themselves by seven kagawads, who in turn
were to be elected at large by the barangay electorate. ISSUE 3: Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that
provided under RA 7160?
But the election date set by RA 6653 on the second Monday of November HELD: Yes. Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year
1988 was again postponed and reset to March 28, 1989 by RA 6679,[27] Terms
and the term of office of barangay officials was to begin on May 1, 1989
and to end on May 31, 1994. RA 6679 further provided that there shall be If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then Petitioner
held a regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May David should not have run and could not have been elected chairman of
1994 and on the same day every five (5) years thereafter. Their term shall his barangay because under RA 6679, there was to be no direct election
be for five years x x x. Significantly, the manner of election of the punong for the punong barangay; the kagawad candidate who obtained the
barangay was changed. Sec. 5 of said law ordained that while the seven highest number of votes was to be automatically elected barangay
kagawads were to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay, the chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong barangay should have
candidate who obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of votes among
barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the kagawads -- 150, which was much more than Davids 112; (3) the
the supervision of the Commission on Elections. electorate should have elected only seven kagawads and not one punong
barangay plus seven kagawads.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160,several provisions
concerning barangay officials were introduced: In other words, following petitioners own theory, the election of Petitioner
David as well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was
(1) The term of office was reduced to three years, as follows: illegal.
The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners theory is that barangay Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be
officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse
ran for and were elected to, under the law governing their very claim to party in a case involving the provincial government or another
such offices: namely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code. Petitioners municipality or city within the province.
belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office
in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance The municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. lawyer" and that "the interests of the municipality would be best protected
if a government lawyer handles its litigations."
2. Local Government Units cannot hire private counsels
But would these proscriptions include public officials? Not necessarily. It
can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official
ALINSUG vs. RTC OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his
authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been
PETITIONERS:Zonsayda L. Alinsug underwritten by the people's money which ordinarily should have been his
RESPONDENTS: Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, San Carlos City, Negros personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him
Occidental, Presided By Hon. Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr.; Rolando P. Ponsica As without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of
Municipal Mayor Of Escalante, Negros Occidental; Municipality Of his own choice. The Court held that in the discharge of governmental
Escalante, Negros Occidental, And Patricio A. Alvarez As Municipal functions, "municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its
Treasurer Of Escalante, Negros Occidental officers, except if and when, the only to the extent that, they have acted
DOCKET NO.:G.R. No. 108232. by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof."
DATE:August 23, 1993
PONENTE:Vitug, J. Where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in
TOPIC: LGU cannot hire private counsels court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid
grievance and the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for
FACTS: moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by
• The petitioner Alinsug, had been a regular employee of the municipal them in their private capacity, the hiring of a private counsel would be
government of Escalante, Negros Occidental, when she received a proper.
permanent appointment as Clerk III in the office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator of the same municipality. Also, a public official (eg: OSG) who is sued in a criminal case is actually
sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can
• On 19 June 1992, Zonsayda absented herself from work allegedly to never be the author of a wrongful act, much less commit a crime.
attend to family matters. She had asked permission from the
personnel officer but not from the mayor.
The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local government
• Thus, Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending official may secure the services of private counsel, in an action
Zonsayda for one month and one day commencing for a simple filed against him in his official capacity, lies on the nature of the
misconduct which can also be categorized as an act of action and the relief that is sought.
insubordination which carries with it forfeiture of benefits such as
salary and PERA and leave credits during the duration of its While the petition below was filed against respondents as public officials,
effectivity. its allegations were also aimed at questioning certain acts that can well
• Forthwith, Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petitionfor "injunction with bring the case beyond the mere confines of official functions.
damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction" against Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer.
• Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer filed an answer to the MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL V. CA
petition, through private practitioner Samuel SM Lezama, alleging
that the petitioner had not exhausted administrative remedies and FACTS:
that her suspension was in accordance with law. BACKGROUND:
o Atty. Felix E. Mendiola served as counsel for the
Petitioner: Praying that the answer be disregarded and expunged from Municipality of Pililia in a collection suit for unpaid business
the record, and that the respondents be all declared in default on the taxes, storage permit fee, mayor’s permit fee, sanitary
ground that since the respondents were sued in their official capacities, inspection fee, and the cost of the suit against private
"not including their private capacities," they should have been represented respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC).
by either the municipal legal officer or the provincial legal officer or o Pililla won in the trial court, and the SC affirmed the
prosecutor as provided for by Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3] of the Local decision of the RTC.
Government Code. It also cited Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 10 and Art. 177 of o The judgment became final and executory and the records
the Revised Penal Code which penalizes usurpation of public authority. were remanded to the trial court for execution.
Respondents: It was "unnecessary to provide such a provision because In connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix E.
there (exist) administrative and judicial rulings sustaining the validity of the Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality for the
employment of a private counsel by municipal officials. Moreover, since the examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976
petitioner prayed for the award of moral damages, their hiring of a private to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing business tax.
counsel was justified. PPC filed a manifestation that Pililla Mayor NicomedesPatenia received
from it the sum of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the above-
RTC: Appointment of a legal officer was optional on the part of the mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court, as evidence by the
municipal government and the municipality of Escalante had not, in fact, release and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor.
designated any such legal officer, petitioner's move to declare respondents RTC: denied the motion for examination and execution of judgment
in default "for having retained a private counsel" was not thereby legally on the ground that the judgment had already been satisfied.
sustainable. CA: dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel
in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the
ISSUES: (a) whether or not a private counsel may represent municipal filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the
officials sued in their official capacities proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
(b) whether or not respondents had been in default on account of their
having filed their answer through a private counsel. ISSUE: WON Atty. Felix E. Mendiola can represent the Municipality of
Pililla
HELD: Respondents were properly represented by a private counsel,
whose legal fees shall be for their own account. HELD:
No.
Sec. 443 (b) of the Local Government Code,the mayor may appoint a The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no
municipal legal officer. Section 481, Article 11 of Title V of the Code which authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the
provides for the appointment of local officials common to all municipalities, Municipality of Pililla. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code
cities and provinces, states that "the appointment of a legal officer shall be provides:
mandatory for the provincial and city governments and optional for the
municipal government." The same section specifies the functions of the Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial
legal officer, and one of them being that he shall: subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the
(i)Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any
special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the
official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, that Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district
in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to
is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another some other municipality or municipal district in the same province.
component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be When the interests of a provincial government and of any political
employed to represent the adverse party;
division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf 2. If an unauthorized lawyer represents a municipality what is the
of the province. effect of his participation in the proceedings?
3. Parenthetically, does a motion to withdraw the appearance of
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any the unauthorized counsel have to comply with Rule 15 of the
municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special Rules of Court regarding notice and hearing of motions?
attorney may be employed by its council.
HELD:
Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a 1. Only provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can
province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. In
The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to Appeals, set in clear-cut terms the answer to the question of
represent it. who may legally represent a municipality in a suit for or against
it, thus: we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a
The fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the province or municipality in lawsuits.
municipality's case must appear on record. In the case, there is
nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the
appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law. Sec. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and
provincial subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall
The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough represent the province and any municipality or municipal district
to apply to situations where the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the thereof in any court, except in cases whereof (sic) original
case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality is not a legal justification. A fiscal cannot refuse to municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to
perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without the provincial government or to some other municipality or
violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a
special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of provincial government and of any political division thereof are
Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
It should also be noted that the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola, municipality or other political subdivision of a province a special
was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and attorney may be employed by its council.
opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien, which
was filed by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3,
said municipality. Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only provincial
The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The
municipality is untenable. The legality of his representation can be municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
questioned at any stage of the proceedings. limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent it. For the aforementioned exception to
Also, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to
Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have handle the municipality's case must appear on record. In the
been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the
municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the
a compromise agreement with PPC. Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein
private counsel is without authority of law. The provincial fiscal's
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the functions as legal officer and adviser for the civil cases of a
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. province and corollarily, of the municipalities thereof, were
subsequently transferred to the provincial attorney.
SALALIMA V. GUINGONA
FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case against the Province of
Albay questioning the validity of the auction sale, which theProvince
conducted because of NPC’s failure to pay real property taxes
assessed.
The AlbaySangguniangPanlalawigan, through a resolution, authorized
respondent Governor to engagethe services of a Manila-based law
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
firm (Cortes & Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case against NPC.
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
o Later, the Province also engaged the services of Atty.
vs.
Cornago. This is despite the availability of theProvincial
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Legal Officer, Atty. Ricafort, who already filed the Province’s
Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his
comment on the NPC petition.
capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local
o A retainer agreement was entered into which provided that
Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.
Atty. Cornago and the law firm shall receiveP50,000 as
acceptance fee and 18% of the value of the property
subject matter of the case which is P214 Million.
o The province had already paid P7,380,410.31 as attorney’s
fees when the COA disallowed furtherdisbursements for
lack of the requisite prior written conformity and
acquiescence of the Sol Gen and thewritten concurrence of
the COA as required by COA Circular No. 86-255.
An administrative complaint was then filed against Gov. Salalima, Vice
Gov. Azaña, and other AlbaySangguniangPanlalawigan Members
relative to the questioned retainer contract and the disbursementof
public funds in payment thereof.
HELD:
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
Yes.
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents
vs.
exceeded their authority and violated a provision of the LGC and a THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his
Supreme Court doctrine. Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
irregularities. respondent
Ratio: FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints
were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of
Sec. 481 LGC: requires the appointment of a legal officer to office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension
represent the LGU in all civil actions and specal proceedings orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against
wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his official capacity him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon
is a party appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by
o EXCEPTION: In actions or proceedings where a component city the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not
or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove
or to another component city or municipality, a special legal local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local
officer may be employed to represent the adverse party autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok: LGUs cannot be Constitution was mere supervisory power.
represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial
Fiscal who can rightfully represent them ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
Attendant Irregularities: President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
o No prior written approval of the Sol Gen and COA before the
disbursements were made HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left
o The resolution passed by the Sanggunian only authorized the the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the
Governor to sign a retainer contract with the Cortes & Reyna power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
Law Firm and yet he also signed with Atty. Cornago, a different disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
entity “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of Order which we issued on August 6, 1991, and therefore has already been
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
the power of control given to him over executive officials of our continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him.
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, petitioner,
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former vs.
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform HON. LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of the Department of Local
their duties. Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting Governor of
Cagayan, respondents.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or G.R. No. 94115 August 21, 1992
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for FACTS: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of
that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably Cagayan. After December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent
inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, to petitioner
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in requiring him to show cause why should not be suspended or remove from
his opinion the good of the public service so requires. office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from
receipt thereof.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the
by imposing a 600 day suspension Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by
VeronicoAgatep, Manuel Mamba and OrlinoAgatep, respectively the mayors
of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against
petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was
G.R. No. 100874 February 13, 1992 required to file a verified answer to the complaint.
GOVERNOR BENJAMIN I. ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. In reply to respondent Secretary's letter requiring him to explain
NELSON B. MELGAR and HON. JUDGE MARCIANO T. VIROLA, why should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty. In his
respondents. letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic
FACTS: to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
A letter-complaint with the Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro (herein Respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty
petitioner Governor Benjamin I. Espiritu) accusing Mayor Melgar of grave (60) days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation
misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, and culpable violation of the into the charges against him.Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered
Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of public service, the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering
and requested that the mayor be under preventive suspension pending the his removal from office.
investigation of the charges. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his
Mindoro required Mayor Melgar to answer the complaint, and after certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the
evaluating the complaint, as well as the answer of the Mayor, the May 11, 1992 elections.The Commission on Elections upon several
Sanggunian passed a resolution, recommending to the Provincial Governor petitions made the resolution ordering petitioner’s disqualification. Pending
that the respondent Mayor be preventively suspended for forty-five (45) the outcome of the disqualification case, thereby allowing the canvassing
days pending investigation. Thus, Governor Espiritu put Melgar under of the votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. However, the Commission
preventive suspension.Mayor Melgar received the Order of Suspension. He was ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided the
forthwith filed a "Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with case.Petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections.
prayer for Restraining Order" in the Regional Trial Court of Oriental
Mindoro alleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogant, despotic ISSUES: WON the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove
and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor, RTC Judge Virola issued a local government officials as alter ego of the President, and as embodied in
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which is now
implementing the Order of suspension against Mayor Melgar. Governor vested in the courts
Espiritu filed a motion to dismiss and/or for reconsideration which Judge WON Petitioner is disqualified on the ground that he
Virola. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioner avers, had been removed from office by resolution of respondent Secretary
as Provincial Governor, is empowered by Section 63 of the Local
Government Code to place an elective municipal official under preventive RULING:
suspension pending decision of an administrative case against the elective 1. No. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local
municipal official: government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory
grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by
ISSUE: Whether or not the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the
authorized by law to preventively suspend municipal mayor Naujan at President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
anytime and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments,
and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are
HELD: YES. Clearly, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by
authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan him. The statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional
at anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following roots, having been enacted by the then BatasanPambansa pursuant to
grounds were shown to exist: Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2.
1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has 2. No. Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term
committed the act or acts complained of; are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially
true were the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceeding for
2. When the evidence of culpability is strong; removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and
disqualification from holding office for a term for which the officer was
3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or elected or appointed. The underlying theory is that each term is separate
from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a
4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and right to remove him therefor.
other evidence.
The Court should ever remove a public officer for acts done prior
Since respondent mayor believed that his preventive suspension was to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, not from the courts. The man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
regional trial court had no jurisdiction the case and gravely abused its life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
discretion in refusing to dismiss the case.There may exist honest misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason
differences of opinion with regard to the seriousness of the charges, or as of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
to whether they warrant disciplinary action. However, as a general rule,
the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or suspension
should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. So,
unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown, public
policy and a becoming regard for the principle of separation of powers
demand that the action of said officer or body should be left
undisturbed.However, in this particular case, since the 60-day preventive
suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her
vs. domicile of choice in the USA.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B.
TAN, Respondents WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of
G.R. No. 207264 | October 22, 2013 the petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.
She is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the
HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to the Visayas, petitioner,
due process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise vs.
required by the constitution. HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII,
Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor
FACTS: Petitioner Reyes filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the ALFREDO M. OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAÑETE
position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent and Mandaue City SangguniangPanlungsod Member RAFAEL
Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, MAYOL, respondents.
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of G.R. No. 108072 | December 12, 1995
petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended
petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material FACTS:The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and
misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, administrative complaints, on 22 July 1992, against herein respondents
date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an Mayor Ouano, Vice-Mayor Cañete and SangguniangPanlungsod Member
American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City
to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit. Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged
cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of as amended, Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but denied byCOMELEC 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers).
en banc.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension,
elections. respondent officials, on 05 August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the
On June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013. jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local
executory. officials, as well as to affect their preventive suspension, had now been
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for vested with the Office of the President.
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
ISSUE: injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent
officials with the RTC Mandaue City. Acting favorably on the pleas of
WON the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a restraining
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for order directed at petitioner, enjoining him. Subsequently injunction was
the position of member of the House of Representative issued. MR by petitioner was denied by RTC. Hence, this petition.
WON the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No.
run for office 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested
of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective
RULING: officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
1. Yes. Petitioner, is in error when she posits that at present it is the
HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a WON 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section
Member of the House of Representatives.COMELEC retains 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive
jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even
jurisdiction of HRET begins only after the candidate is considered as a now maintain its application
Member of House of Representatives. For one to be considered as a
member, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: 1. Valid RULING:
proclamation 2. Proper oath and 3. Assumption of office. Unavailable
to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at 1. No. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate
present. As she has not yet assumed office yet. And proper oath was that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
not validly complied as must made 1. Before the speaker of HoR and provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter
in open session. Here although she made the oath before Speaker in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us
Belmonte, there was no indication that it was made during plenary or to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that
in open session and thus, it remains unclear whether the required repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must
oath of office was indeed complied. generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before
2. No. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and the inference of implied repeal may be drawn.The authority to conduct
become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over
accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister
Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman
Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and
of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government
administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what
petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the
as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, President.
the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen
who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile 2. No. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify
of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No.
that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against
positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave
the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should
showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay
pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can
her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether
domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand,
Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension
18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local
residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that
she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is
strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in Ruling: NO. Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code under which
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to petitioner anchors Bascos alleged disqualification to run as City Councilor
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. states:
[G.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997] SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and running for any elective local position:
HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents.
xxxxxxxxx
Facts: On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena
Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the x x x x x x x x x.
Second District of the City of Manila during the January 18, 1988, local
elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office. In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only
on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive
After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized effect and applied to Bascos dismissal from office which took place in
national elections. Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as 1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not
one of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his victory this time did not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in
remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found order for disqualification thereunder to attach. We do not, however,
himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to subscribe to petitioners view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to
dislodge him from his position. All these challenges were, however, the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
dismissed, thus, paving the way for Basco’s continued stay in office. compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom.
Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a
ran again for councilor in the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third candidates removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense
and final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle should not deter us from the applying the law prospectively. The basic
for six councilor seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not
again contested. On May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego, claiming to be a retroactively provides the qualification sought by petitioner. A statute,
registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to
the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Bascos overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex
disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.[14]
declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of
Manilas Second District. In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not
having been attended by grave abuse of discretion. There is then no more
The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it legal impediment for private respondents continuance in office as City
ordered the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. Councilor for the Second District of Manila.
Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila
City BOC proclaimed Basco on May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed resolution of respondent
who vied for the seats. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is SPA 95-212 dated July 31, 1996 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
In view of such proclamation, petitioner lost no time in filing an Urgent
Motion seeking to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty SO ORDERED.
proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by the Manila City BOC. He
reiterated Bascos disqualification and prayed anew that candidate
Romualdo S. Maranan be declared the winner.
[G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998]
On June 5, 1995, Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss Serving As Answer HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
pursuant to the reservation he made earlier, summarizing his contentions RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL
and praying as follows: GOVERNMENTS
Respondent thus now submits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief for Facts: On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office
the following reasons: of the President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging
petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private
1. The respondent cannot be disqualified on the ground of Section 40 respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were
paragraph b of the Local Government Code because the Tordesillas at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the
decision is barred by laches, prescription, res judicata, lis pendens, bar by Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the
prior judgment, law of the case and stare decisis; Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered
threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were several men with
2. Section 4[0] par. B of the Local Government Code may not be validly long and short firearms who encircled the area. Private respondents claim
applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva
which impairs vested rights. It is also a class legislation and Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that
unconstitutional on the account. private respondents opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija
had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred without
After the parties respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELECs prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that the provincial
First Division resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification on October budget officer and treasurer had earlier disclosed that the province could
6, 1995, ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme not afford to contract another obligation. Private respondents prayed for
Court on respondent Basco on October 31, 1981 was wiped away and the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the
condoned by the electorate which elected him and that on account of provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan
Bascos proclamation on May 17, 1965, as the sixth duly elected councilor in light of the financial condition of the province.
of the Second District of Manila, the petition would no longer be viable.[6]
The President acted on the complaint by writing on its margin
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied the following:
by the COMELEC en banc in its assailed resolution promulgated on July 31,
1996.[7] Hence, this petition. 1. Noted. There appears no justification for the use of force, intimidation
or armed followers in the situation of 12 Sep at the Session Hall. 2. Take
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any appropriate preemptive and investigative actions. 3. BREAK NOT the
elective position since he had been removed from office as a result of an PEACE.
administrative case pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code (the Code), which took He thus instructed the then Secretary of the Interior and Local
effect on January 1, 1992.[8] Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to "[t]ake appropriate preemptive and
investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not the peace." The letter-complaint
Petitioner wants the Court to likewise resolve the following issues, namely: together with the President's marginal notes were sent to Secretary Robert
Z. Barbers on September 20, 1996. Acting upon the instructions of the
Issue: Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January him[4] and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its
1, 1992; annexes. In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to
submit [his] verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss,
together with such documentary evidence that [he] has in support thereof,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt."[5] Petitioner was again ordered to file joinder of issues is squarely met with respondent's waiver of right to
his answer to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt. In a submit his answer.
letter dated December 9, 1996, petitioner moved for another extension of
thirty (30) days to file his answer. On January 7, 1997, petitioner Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition
requested for another extension of thirty (30) days to file his answer as he of preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioner's failure to file
was still on the process of choosing a lawyer. Three months later, on April his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a
22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of
DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in default and to have waived this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined. The Executive
his right to present evidence. Private respondents were ordered to present Secretary also found that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was
their evidence ex-parte. strong and that his continuance in office during the pendency of the case
could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive of the evidence against him.
Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President,
placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending 3. We now come to the validity of the January 8, 1998 Resolution of the
investigation of the charges against him.[17] Executive Secretary finding petitioner guilty as charged and imposing on
him the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months from office
On January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, without pay.
adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He
imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is
months without pay erroneous. Petitioner's right to a formal investigation is spelled out in the
following in A.O. 23.
Issues: 1. WON the doctrine of qualified political agency is applicable to
this case. The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the
2. WON DILG erred in recommending that Respondent be placed preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the
under preventive suspension. parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This
provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
3. WON the Resolution adopted on January 8, 1998 is proper. determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The records
show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent,
Ruling: 1. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against he is accorded several rights under the law, to wit:
elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority
and the Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23. "Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. -- The respondent shall be accorded full
opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the
the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in
Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the his favor through compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces
Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an tecum."
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the
exclusive Investigating Authority. An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of
an accused.[68] These rights are essentially part of procedural due
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against process.[69] The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend
elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-
local governments under Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory
power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. These
see that the subordinate officers perform their duties."[48] If the rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the Local Government
subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may Code[70] and in A.O. No. 23.[71] Well to note, petitioner formally claimed his
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their right to a formal investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam has been
duties.[49] The President's power of general supervision means no more admitted by Undersecretary Sanchez.
than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that
subordinate officers act within the law.[50] Supervision is not incompatible Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the
with discipline.[51] And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and
an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases
the good of the public service so requires.[52] against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers.
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the public
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government respondent Executive Secretary is declared null and void and is set
officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the aside. No Cost.
DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner SO ORDERED.
Joson's claim.
Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism
FACTS: for recall of local elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the
respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process of and election
These two (2) consolidated petitions have their origin
on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary
in en banc Resolution No. 90-0557 issued by the respondent Commission
rules and regulations.
on Elections which approved the recommendation of the Election Registrar
of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold and conduct the signing of the petition for We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent
recall of the incumbent Mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, on 14 July 1990. COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent
COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set the
Felipe Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat,
date for the signing of said petition.
Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988 local
elections. On 14 February 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victorino E. Aclan The next issue for resolution is whether or not the TRO issued by this
and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held
of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
On 10 July 1990, Evardone filed before this Court a petition for prohibition In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of
with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ Recall filed by Apelado, et al. on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced
of preliminary injunction. On 12 July 1990, this Court resolved to issue a by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and
temporary restraining order (TRO), effective immediately and continuing determining the outcome of such notice.
until further orders from the Court, ordering the respondents to cease and
desist from holding the signing of the petition for recall. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality
of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of
On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by the the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar
Central Office of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern
1990 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Paredes vs.
telegraphic notice of the TRO - a day after the completion of the signing Executive Secretary[7] there is no turning back the clock.
process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.
"The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or
In an en banc resolution (No. 90-0660) dated 26 July 1990, the appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the
respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic
Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court in G.R. No. control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the
94010. Apelado, et al., filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29 idea that a public office is 'burdened' with public' interests and
August 1990, the respondent COMELEC denied said motion holding that: that the representatives of the people holding public offices are
simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and
"x x x. The critical date to consider is the service or notice of the
specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in
Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the Commission
their respective offices."[8]
on Election, and not upon its agent in the field."[1]
Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost
Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC by virtue of its
confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to
powers under the Constitution and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.[9] "Loss of
Government Code) is the main issue. The resolution embodies the general
confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a
rules and regulations on the recall of elective provincial, city and municipal
person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the
officials.
same electorate."[10] The constituents have made a judgment and their will
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has already been ascertained
repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held
Congress. Said Section 3 provides: last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P.
Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.
"Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, which states:
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
"SEC. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
May not be Held. - x x x
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units." (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of
the official's assumption of office or one year immediately
preceding a regular local election."
Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local
government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987
The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election
Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected
prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII,
government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for
Sec. 5 - on the second Monday of May, 1992.[11] Thus, to hold an election
COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case
on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election
at bar is premature.
will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government
The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment (G.R. No. 94010), avers that: Code (B.P. Blg. 337).
"The constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government ACCORDINGLY, both petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot
code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the and academic. SO ORDERED.
guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the
present Local Government Code. Pending the enactment of the ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,
amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code remains operative. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
ISSUE: WON the Resolution by Comelec is valid. Yes MORONG, BATAAN, respondents.
HELD: We find the contention of the respondent COMELEC meritorious. In May 11, 1992, Enrique Garcia (petitioner) was elected governor of
Bataan. In the early evening of July 1, some mayors, vice-mayors and
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all members of the Sangguinang Bayan of the 12 municipalities of Bataan met
existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain at the NPC Compound and the following day, they proceeded to constitute
operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRAC) to initiate the recall
providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the election of PETITIONER. They chose Mayor De los Reyes (Mariveles) as
President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as Presiding Officer and Mayor Payumo (Dinalupihan) as Secretary of the
provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government assembly. Vice-Mayor Roque (Limay) moved that a resolution be passed
Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old for therecall of PETITIONER on the ground of “loss of confidence”, which
was “unanimously seconded”. In July 7, PETITIONER filed with COMELEC a of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be
petition to deny due course to Resolution No. 1 alleging failure of PRAC to premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our
comply with the"substantive and procedural requirements" laid down in Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition
Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (LGC). parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system.
Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against
COMELEC dismiss the petition, schedule recall elections on October 11. local officials belonging to the minority.
PETITIONER filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the
preliminary injunction to annul COMELEC Resolution (arguments): recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by
extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall
a. Sec. 70, LGC unconstitutional because: assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The
law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly
(1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to state,
to initiate recall proceedings, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be
no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the
(2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the COMELEC.
political minority to equal protection of law.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and MALONZO V. COMELEC
sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are
made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. FACTS: The Court is called upon to strike down Resolution 96-026, dated
Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is November 18, 1996, of the respondent Commission on Elections
given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory (COMELEC) calling for an Election for the Recall of the Petitioner Reynaldo
recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in O. Malonzo, the incumbent Mayor of Caloocan City.
the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability
is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the
Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995,
Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official
is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the winning over former Mayor MacarioAsistio, Jr. Barely one year into his
PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives term, petitioner's office as Mayor was put to serious question when on July
7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members First, §74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled
and SangguniangKabataan chairmen, constituting a majority of the "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, §69 provides that "the power
members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met, of recall . . . shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of Preparatory government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the
Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96, expressing loss of confidence in power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall
Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in
him. Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other
filed with the COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Mayor Malonzo words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election,
filed a Petition with the respondent Commission alleging, principally, that excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall
the recall process was deficient in form and substance, and therefore, with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of
illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the petition devoid of merit and the voters for a petition for recall.
declared the recall proceedings to be in order. Petitioner insists that the
initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall
Liga ng mga Barangays. election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two
limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall
ISSUE: Whether or not the the LIGA ng mga Barangay is authorized to shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of
initiate the recall and convene the Preparatory Recall Assembly. the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one
year immediately preceding a regular local election. Hence, in this case, as
RULING: The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary
captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first
also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the year in office of a local official.
absence of the barangay chairman."7 The Liga ng mga Barangay is
undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just (2)The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place
so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election."
are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period,
whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, 10 it could have
the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in expressly said so.
accordance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and
Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during
Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election
of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective
denied merit on this ground. local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period
is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of
May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15
days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as
CLAUDIO V. COMELEC including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months.
Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the
FACTS: Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly right of recall which is designed to make local government units "more
elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed responsive and accountable."
office on July 1, 1998.
2. Discipline Over Local Appointive Officials
Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several
barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a MENDEZ V. CSC
petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19,
1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Facts: Then Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City Vicente N. Coloyan
filed an administrative complaint against the Froilan A. Mendez (petitioner),
Zone 4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee
a legal research assistant in the Quezon City Office of the City Attorney, for
for the purpose of convening the PRA. On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty, allegedly for having torn off a portion of
of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and a Transfer Certificate of Title from the registry book of Quezon City and for
sangguniangkabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S- having pocketed it.
1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O.
CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. As After three months of investigation, then Quezon City Mayor Adelina
scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by Rodriguez dismissed the said complaint against the petitioner for
insufficiency of evidence. Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems
an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor.
Protection Board (MSPB) which rendered judgment reversing the Mayor’s
Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner, alleging procedural and decision. Mendez was thus found guilty as charged and dismissed from the
substantive defects in the petition. service.
ISSUE: WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of Said decision was affirmed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on
1991 (R.A. No. 7160) appeal.
A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, assailing the reversal of
convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall the city mayor's decision by the MSPB and the CSC on the ground that
Coloyan is not an aggrieved party or "party adversely affected by the
resolution.
decision" allowed by law to file an appeal. Moreover, the petitioner claimed
that his exoneration by the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Section
B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) 37, paragraph (b) of P.D. 807.
includes the election period for that regular election or simply the date of
such election. The CSC, however, denied said motion for reconsideration ruling that there
is nothing in the said law which precludes an appeal from the decision of
RULING: the disciplining authorities to determine, among others, whether the
decision rendered is supported by the facts on record and the law.
(1) Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory
Issue: WON Coloyan is allowed by law to file an appeal.
recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the Ruling: No. It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory
filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the provision of law.
the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in
paragraph (b) of §74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil
which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect Service Law" shows that said law does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
his replacement.
Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
“The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary Chang also claimed that a government officer is not suspended until
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than someone has assumed the post and the officer subject of the suspension
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in order has ceased performing his official function.
rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. ... (Emphasis
supplied)” Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the Order of Preventive
Suspension became effective upon receipt thereof by respondent Chang
Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D and not upon the designation of an officer-in-charge to replace him; that
805 which contemplates: the Order of Preventive Suspension became effective before the issuance
of Executive Order No. 392 and, therefore, can no longer be enjoined by
“Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected reason of the alleged transfer of the power to suspend from the Secretary
by the decision ... “ of Finance to the President of the Republic of the Philippines and that the
power to suspend and remove municipal officials is not an incident of the
The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the power to appoint.
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, Issue: WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In Preventive Suspension against the acting municipal treasurer of Makati,
the instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an Metro Manila.
aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the administrative
case below. Ruling: Yes. 1) Order of Preventive Suspension became effective
upon receipt thereof by respondent Chang.
Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city mayor,
as head of the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment with In the questioned decision of the lower court, it was pointed out that in
finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and order that a preventive suspension will be implemented, there are two
forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring employees. steps involved, viz: 1) service of a copy of said order on the respondent
and 2) designation of his replacement. The trial court ruled that until an
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in acting municipal treasurer is appointed to replace the respondent, the
a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against order of preventive suspension dated October 6, 1989 is incomplete and
him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in cannot be said to have taken effect.
this case, there is no occasion for appeal.
This ruling of the trial court is untenable.
Facts: Petitioner Lorinda M. Carlos (Carlos for short, Executive Director, “Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may
Bureau of Local Government ) signed a formal administrative charge preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his
approved by petitioner Victor C. Macalincag (Macalincag for short, authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or
Undersecretary of Finance, then acting Secretary ) for dishonesty, neglect employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect
of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service, committed in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the
as follows: respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from
service (Emphasis supplied)”
1. That during the 45-day election ban period, before the 1988 local
elections, you disbursed an amount to the Head of Department, in It will be noted that under the aforesaid law, designation of the
violation of the Omnibus Election Code; replacement is not a requirement to give effect to the preventive
suspension.
2. That you (Roberto E. Chang, Respondent) disbursed an amount,
allegedly as financial assistance extended by the municipality to around On the contrary, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
400 bereaved families; Government Code, provides in Section 156, Article 5, Chapter 3, Title II
thereof for the automatic assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer
3. That you disbursed an amount to cover expenses for merienda of or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal treasurer, to
municipal employees; wit:
4. That in violation of PD 477 and PD 1445, you incurred cash overdrafts in “Sec. 156. TEMPORARY DISABILITY. — In the event of inability of the
the General Infrastructure and Trust Funds; treasurer to discharge the duties of his office on account of a trip on
official business, absence on leave, sickness, suspension, or other
5. That you transferred an amount from the Treasurer/Cashier's safe to temporary disability, the assistant municipal treasurer or, in his absence,
the Realty Tax Division's safe, thus subjecting said municipal funds to the treasury official next in rank in the municipality shall discharge the
possible loss; and duties of the office subject to existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)”
6. That you continually failed to remit to the Bureau of Treasury the Specifically, it is provided under Section 233(2)of BP 337, that:
national collection.
Until otherwise provided by law, nothing in this code shall be understood
On the same date, petitioner Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive to amend or repeal the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 824 and BP 20,
Suspension against Chang. and all presidential decrees and issuances relevant to Metropolitan Manila
and the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.
The day after, petitioner Macalincag sent a letter to the Governor of Metro
Manila Commission recommending that an Officer-in-Charge be Accordingly, there appears to be no question that: the Order of Preventive
immediately designated from the ranks of qualified Municipal Treasurers Suspension of respondent Chang became effective upon his receipt
and Assistant Municipal Treasurers in Metro Manila. By virtue of the said thereof, which is presumed when he filed a complaint in the trial court
letter, the Officer-in-Charge, MMC Finance Office furnished respondent preventing the implementation of such Order of Suspension. Otherwise
Chang, by ordinary mail, with a copy of the Order of Preventive stated, the designation of the OFFICER-IN-CHARGE to replace respondent
Suspension. Chang is immaterial to the effectivity of the latter's suspension. A contrary
view would render nugatory the very purpose of preventive suspension.
Chang filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against petitioners 2) Implementation of the questioned suspension order was not
Macalincag and Carlos, invoking Section 8 of the recently issued Executive overtaken by the issuance the said Executive Order.
Order No. 392 entitled "Constituting the Metropolitan Manila Authority,
providing for its powers and functions and for other purposes." Chang argued that by virtue of Executive Order No. 392, it is the President
who may suspend or remove him.
Chang argued that the said Executive Order vested in the President of the
Republic of the Philippines the power to appoint municipal treasurers in Relative thereto, Sec. 8 of Executive Order No. 392, however, provides:
Metro Manila. As the power to suspend and remove a municipal official is
an incident of the power to appoint, he maintained that it is the President Sec. 8. All city and municipal treasurers, municipal assessors and their
who may suspend or remove him. Thus, Chang claimed that that the assistants as well as other officials whose appointment is currently vested
implementation of the questioned suspension order was overtaken by the upon the Metropolitan Manila Commission shall be appointed by the
issuance the said Executive Order and that the power to discipline is President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Council, subject
vested solely on the person who has the power to appoint. to the Civil Service law, rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied).
Earlier, prior to Executive Order No. 392, the power to appoint the
aforesaid public officials was vested in the Provincial Treasurers and
Assessors of the Municipalities concerned, under P.D. No. 477 and later commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or
transferred to the Commissioner of Finance under P.D. No. 921, but under employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
both decrees, the power of appointment was made subject to Civil Service Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department,
Laws and the approval of the Secretary of Finance. the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit,
the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn
Verily, the intention of the aforesaid legislations to follow the Civil Service written complaint.
Laws, Rules and Regulations is unmistakable.
Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary
Correspondingly, the power to discipline is specifically vested under Sec. proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee. Local
37 of P.D. No. 807 in heads of departments, agencies and Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85, which was issued by the
instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities who have original Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now
jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or
action. Stated differently, they are the proper disciplining authority referred an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against
to in Sec. 41 of the same law. officers or employees subordinate to them.
The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under the In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority
Department of Finance as provided for in Sec. 3, P.D. No. 477. Hence, the referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The term
Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue the agency refers to any of the various units of the government including a
preventive suspension order. More specifically acting Secretary of Finance, department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned
Macalincag, acted within his jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid order. or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the
By and large, even assuming that the power to appoint, includes the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer
power to discipline as argued by Chang, acting Secretary Macalincag as under him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who
Secretary of Finance is an alter ego of the President and therefore, it is could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order
within his authority, as an alter ego, to preventively suspend respondent against him.
Chang.
Petitioners contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him
is not persuasive. Section 455 (b-1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code
states that the city mayor may cause to be instituted administrative or
GARCIA V. PAJARO AND CITY OF DAGUPAN judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city. This rule is
not incongruent with the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code, which
Facts: Evidence for the petitioner tends to show that petitioner authorizes the heads of agencies to discipline subordinate employees.
SEBASTIAN GARCIA, 61, married, employee at the City Treasurers Office, Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city mayors the
Dagupan City and resident of Lucao, Dagupan City, has been employee sole power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative actions
thereat since 1974 as Revenue Collector. against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. In fact, there is
no provision under the present Local Government Code expressly
He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro from 1990 to rescinding the authority of the Department of Finance to exercise
1992 and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal disciplinary authority over its employees.By the same token, there is
Charge filed against him. He resumed work in 1992 as Local Treasury nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against
Officer III. When he was suspended, his position was Local Treasury petitioner.
Officer and Revenue Officer.
From 1990 up to 1992, he had been reporting for work because he did not
honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the 4. Practice of Profession
complainant, investigator and judge and there was no complaint against
him from the Office of the City Mayor. He did not believe in the Order; he
did not submit himself for investigation.
JAVELLA V. DILG
He was not paid his salary because of the suspension order which caused
his sleepless nights, his two (2) children stopped schooling, he has to beg Facts:
from his relatives. He has a wife with four (4) children in college, one in
Commerce, another taking up Dentistry. During the 1990 earthquake, Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City,
there was calamity loan granted to employees but he could not avail of it Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
because the City Treasurer would not approve the loan. He is asking Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of
P1,000,000.00 for his mental anguish and sufferings. From July to October, Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38
1987 the City Treasurer refused to give him his COLA, differential, cash dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58
gift, salary and mid-year bonus up to the present. and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
Issue: WON the city treasurer of Dagupan can discipline petitioner. and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of
authority.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner claims that the officer empowered to institute
disciplinary proceedings against him is the city mayor of Dagupan -- not Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of
the city treasurer.He further asserts that under Section 78 of the Local the City Council or SanggunianPanglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by
Government Code of 1983, the city treasurer does not have the power to profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without
discipline him. securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department
of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38
We are not persuaded. in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same
department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero
At the outset, it should be pointed out that under the old and the present and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C.
Local Government Codes, appointive officers and employees of local Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with
government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, Damages" putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as
regulations and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto, unless counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior
otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication of authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum
administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees, Circular No. 80-38
as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in accordance with the
Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws. On September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to
continue his practice of law. And on the same date, Sec. Santos replied in
The Administrative Code of 1987,-- specifically Book V on the civil service - affirmative provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
- is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the with his official functions.
government. This Code enumerates the grounds for disciplining them.
They may be removed or dismissed summarily (1) [w]hen the charge is Javellana then filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against
serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and
recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable. 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and
Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; due exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. However the said
process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in Motion to Dismiss was denied by DILG.
the strict judicial sense.
Consequently, Javellana filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new
Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies and Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null
instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to void.
Issues: in Iriga City. Subsequently, on November 3, 1997, Secretary Gloria
designated Dr. Malaya as Schools Division Superintendent
1. Should Atty. Javellana be held administratively liable. of Camarines Sur, and Dr. Osea as Schools Division Superintendent
of Iriga City.
2. WON DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90
of the new Local Government Code (RA 7160) are unconstitutional. In dismissing petitioners protest, the Civil Service Commission held that
Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 contemplates a situation
Held: where the Department of Education, Culture and Sports issues the
appointments, whereas Dr Malaya’s appointment was made by no less
1. Yes. than the President, in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the
designation of Dr. Malaya as Schools Division Superintendent
As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions of Camarines Sur and of Dr. Osea as Schools Division Superintendent
and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments, in which case
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed consultation with the local school board was unnecessary.
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations
CA – affirmed CSC
entrusted to their jurisdiction. With respect to the present case, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Issue:
Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG
Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to WON Dr. Malaya’s appointment is null and void.
dismiss the administrative charge against him.
Held:
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating
or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed No.
with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is
a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to appointments
Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. This is because
the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner at the time of the enactment of the Local Government Code, schools
Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer division superintendents were appointed by the Department of Education,
Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. Culture and Sports to specific division or location. In 1994, the Career
By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of
prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner 1994, placing the positions of schools division superintendent and assistant
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of schools division superintendent within the career executive
RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private service.Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive
practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests service positions was transferred from the Department of Education,
adverse to the government. Culture and Sports to the President. The appointment may not be specific
as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their
2. No. particular stations was vested in the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports Secretary, pursuant to the exigencies of the service, as provided in
As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions Department of Education, Culture and Sports Order No. 75, Series of 1996.
and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations In the case at bar, the appointment issued by President Ramos in favor of
respondent to the Schools Division Superintendent position on September
entrusted to their jurisdiction (Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,
192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657). With respect to the 3, 1996 did not specify her station. It was Secretary Gloria who, in a
Memorandum dated November 3, 1997, assigned and designated
present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in respondent to the Division of Camarines Sur, and petitioner to the Division
issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying of Iriga City.
petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him.
We agree with the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals that,
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Schools
or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of
with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is appointment. Her designation partook of the nature of a reassignment
a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and from Iriga City, where she previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-
Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against Charge-Schools Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly,
the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the Local Government Code of
Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer 1991 of prior consultation with the local school board, does not apply. It
Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. only refers to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture
By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to and Sports. Such is the plain meaning of the said law.
prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of The plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is thus
RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and
practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
adverse to the government. without attempted interpretation.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: (g) A statement acknowledging the powers, rights and obligations as set
forth in Section 36 of this Title.
Petitioner theorizes that what PD 198 created was the Local Waters
Utilities Administration (LWUA) and not the LWDs. Petitioner claims that
LWDs are created pursuant to and not created directly by PD 198. Thus, Nothing in the resolution of formation shall state or infer that the local
petitioner concludes that PD 198 is not an original charter that would place legislative body has the power to dissolve, alter or affect the district
LWDs within the audit jurisdiction of COA as defined in Section 2(1), Article beyond that specifically provided for in this Act.
IX-D of the Constitution. Petitioner elaborates that PD 198 does not create
LWDs since it does not expressly direct the creation of such entities, but If two or more cities, municipalities or provinces, or any combination
only provides for their formation on an optional or voluntary basis. thereof, desire to form a single district, a similar resolution shall be
Petitioner adds that the operative act that creates an LWD is the approval adopted in each city, municipality and province.
of the Sanggunian Resolution as specified in PD 198.
COURT RULING: x xx
The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to Sec. 25. Authorization. The district may exercise all the powers
private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to which are expressly granted by this Title or which are necessarily
government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. implied from or incidental to the powers and purposes herein
stated. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Act, a district
In accordance with Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution, Congress
is hereby granted the power of eminent domain, the exercise thereof shall,
cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special
however, be subject to review by the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations
may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must Clearly, LWDs exist as corporations only by virtue of PD 198,
necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations which expressly confers on LWDs corporate powers. Section 6 of PD
created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under 198 provides that LWDs shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges
existing laws, that general law is the Corporation Code, except that the given to private corporations under existing laws.Without PD 198, LWDs
Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. would have no corporate powers. Thus, PD 198 constitutes the special
enabling charter of LWDs. The ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or
government-owned and controlled corporations with a special charter.
controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations
cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create Furthermore, The Local Government Code does not vest in the
corporations with special charters only if such corporations are Sangguniang Bayan the power to create corporations. What the Local
government-owned or controlled. Government Code empowers the Sangguniang Bayan to do is to provide
for the establishment of a waterworks system subject to existing laws. The
Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system only in accordance
with the provisions of PD 198. The Sangguniang Bayan has no power to
create a corporate entity that will operate its waterworks system. However, the lessee requested for a five-year extension of the original lease period,
the Sangguniang Bayan may avail of existing enabling laws, like PD 198, to which the Municipality also granted by virtue of Resolution 222. Therafter,
form and incorporate a water district. the municipal council of Naujan, this time composed of a new set of
members, adopted Resolution 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222,
series of 1951. On the same date, the new council also passed Resolution
If LWDs are neither GOCCs with original charters nor GOCCs without
11, revoking Resolution 229 of the old council which confirmed the
original charters, then they would fall under the term agencies or
extension of the lease period. The lessee requested for reconsideration and
instrumentalities of the government and thus still subject to COAs audit
recall of Resolution 3, on the ground, among others, that it violated the
jurisdiction. However, the stark and undeniable fact is that the government
contract executed between him and the municipality. The request,
owns LWDs. Section 45[27] of PD 198 recognizes government ownership of
however, was not granted.
LWDs when Section 45 states that the board of directors may dissolve an
LWD only on the condition that another public entity has acquired the
assets of the district and has assumed all obligations and liabilities
attached thereto. The implication is clear that an LWD is a public and not a
private entity. The lessee instituted this proceedings in the court below seeking to have
Resolution 3, series of 1952, of the municipal council of Naujan, declared
In virtue of the forgoing, LWD being a GOCC with an original charter, COA null and void, for being unconstitutional, and praying for an order enjoining
have the power and authority to audit GOCC with an original charter. the defendant municipality from conducting a public bidding for the leasing
of the Naujan fisheries to any person. The defendant asserted the validity
2. No. Section 20 of PD 198 declared unconstitutional. of Resolution 3, series of 1951, alleging by the way of special defense that
the resolution authorizing the original lease contract, reducing the lease
Section 20 of PD 198 provides: rentals and renewing the lease are null and void for not having been
passed in accordance with law.
Sec. 20. System of Business Administration. The Board shall, as soon as
practicable, prescribe and define by resolution a system of business After trial, the lower court rendered judgment upholding the validity of the
administration and accounting for the district, which shall be patterned lease contract, as well at is extension, and declaring Resolution 3, series of
upon and conform to the standards established by the 1952, null and void. The municipality of Naujan has taken this appeal.
Administration. Auditing shall be performed by a certified public
accountant not in the government service. The Administration may, ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222,
however, conduct annual audits of the fiscal operations of the district to be series of 1951, of the municipal council of Naujan is valid
performed by an auditor retained by the Administration. Expenses incurred
in connection therewith shall be borne equally by the water district HELD: Yes. The law (Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative Code)
concerned and the Administration. (Emphasis supplied) requires that when the exclusive privilege of fishery or the right to conduct
a fish-breeding ground is granted to a private party, the same shall be let
Section 20 of PD 198 cannot prevail over the Constitution. No to the highest bidder in the same manner as is being done in exploiting a
amount of clever legislation can exclude GOCCs like LWDs from COAs audit ferry, a market or a slaughterhouse belonging to the municipality. The
jurisdiction. Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution outlaws any scheme requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting
or devise to escape COAs audit jurisdiction, thus: competition and to guard against favoritism, fraud and corruption in the
letting of fishery privileges.
Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or
its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, Hence, there is no doubt that the original lease contract in this case was
from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. awarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the
extension of the term of the lease appear to have been granted without
In addition, the framers of the Constitution added Section 3, Article IX-D of previous public bidding. Thus, it is the opinion of the Court that the said
the Constitution precisely to annul provisions of Presidential Decrees, like agreement executed and entered into without previous public bidding, is
that of Section 20 of PD 198, that exempt GOCCs from COA audit. null and void, and cannot adversely affect the rights of third parties and of
the public in general. As observed by the Court, when a formality observed
Thus, SC ruled that the second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198 is
before the original contract was awarded, with more reason should the
unconstitutional since it violates Sections 2(1) and 3, Article IX-D of the
rule requiring such public bidding be strickly applied in the instant case
Constitution.
where no such authority to alter or amend the terms of the contract was
3. No. reserved.
Section 18 of RA 6758 states: Furthermore, it has been ruled that statutes requiring public bidding apply
to amendments of any contract already executed in compliance with the
law where such amendments alter the original contract in some vital and
Sec. 18. Additional Compensation of Commission on Audit Personnel and of
essential particular. Inasmuch as the period in a lease is a vital and
other Agencies. In order to preserve the independence and integrity of the
essential particular to the contract, we believe that the extension of the
Commission on Audit (COA), its officials and employees are prohibited from
lease period in this case, which was granted without the essential requisite
receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments
of public bidding, is not in accordance with law. And it follows the
from any government entity, local government unit, government-owned or
Resolution 222, series of 1951, and the contract authorized thereby,
controlled corporations, and government financial institutions, except
extending the original five-year lease to another five years are null and
those compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations
void as contrary to law and public policy.
and contributions.
Also, the lower court, in holding that the defendant-appellant municipality
The Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s contention has no basis. Section has been estopped from assailing the validity of the contract into which it
18 of RA 6758 prohibits COA personnel from receiving any kind of entered on December 23, 1951, seems to have overlooked the general rule
compensation from any government entity except compensation paid that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal
directly by COA out of its appropriations and corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to make or which
contributions. Thus, RA 6758 itself recognizes an exception to the it is authorized to make only under prescribed conditions, within prescribed
statutory ban on COA personnel receiving compensation from GOCCs. limitations, or in a prescribed mode or manner, although the corporation
has accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed
his part of the agreement, or has expended large sums in preparation for
Municipal Liability
performance. As pointed out above, "public biddings are held for the best
protection of the public and to give the public the best possible advantages
A. Liability on Contracts by means of open competition between the bidders." Thus, contracts
requiring public bidding affect public interest, and to change them without
1. Ultra Vires Act complying with that requirement would indeed be against public policy.
SAN DIEGO vs MUNICIPALITY OF NAUJAN Hence, the Resolution passed and adopted by the Municipality of Naujan
extending the period of the contract and reducing the rental was declared
FACTS: Following a public bidding conducted by the municipality of as null and void.
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro for the lease of its municipal waters, Resolution
46, series of 1947 was passed by the municipal council thereof awarding
the concession of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to the highest
bidder Bartolome San Diego. Consequently, a contract was entered into MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS vs RIVERA
between the said San Diego and the municipality, stipulating that for a
period of five (5) years the former was to be the lessee of "the exclusive FACTS: The municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, called for bids for the supply
privilege of erecting fish corrals along the Butas River beginning from its of road construction materials to repair the road of the municipality. Herein
junction with the San Agustin River up to the Naujan Lake itself." petitioners Rivera bid was the lowest. Subsequently, the acting municipal
Subsequently, the lessee requested for the reduction of their annual rental treasurer informed the petitioner that the contract had been awarded to
which was granted by the Municipality by virtue of Resolution 59. Likewise, him and requested him to call at his office for the execution of the
contract, which was likewise signed by the Mayor. The contract stipulates present action against defendant-appellee in his personal capacity
that the petitioner was to furnish and deliver to the municipality of Malolos pursuant to the said provision.
2,700 cubic meters of crushed adobe stone (cascajo) and 1,400 cubic
meters of gravel. In compliance with the contract, the petitioner delivered The trial court dismissed the complaint, stating that inasmuch as in the
crushed adobe stone and gravel to the municipality at the places previous case the contract entered into between appellant and the
designated by the municipal mayor. Thereafter, petitioner requested for Municipality of Malolos had been declared null and void by this Court, "it
the payment of his deliveries but the municipality failed to pay him. cannot produce any legal effect for which thereafter no recovery can be
made."
Thus, petitioner filed a complaint against the municipality of Malolos in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan to collect the sum of money. However, ISSUE: WON the trial court was correct in dismissing the case reasoning
the court dismissed the case. Hence, petitioner sought the intervention of that the Contract between Rivera and Maclang produced no legal effects
the Presidential Complaints and Committee, which forwarded the since it has been declared as null and void by the Court.
petitioner's claim on the ground that as there was no sum of money
appropriated to meet the obligation incurred before the execution of the HELD: No, the dismissal is erroneous. The Court’s ruling in the previous
contract, as required by section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code, case is that the contract was null and void visa-vis the Municipality of
the said contract is void, as provided in section 608 of the same Code; and Malolos, by reason of non-compliance with the requirement of section 607
that even if there was such sum appropriated to meet such obligation, the of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that "except in the case
alleged deliveries of crushed adobe stone and gravel could no longer be of a contract for supplies to be carried in stock, no contract involving the
verified by the Provincial Auditor of Bulacan or his representative. The expenditure by any province, municipality, chartered city, or municipal
petitioner contends that the respondent should not be allowed to invoke district of two thousand pesos or more shall be entered into or authorized
legal technicalities to delay or refuse payment after its municipal council until the treasurer of the political division concerned shall have certified to
has acknowledged the indebtedness, because the respondent municipality the officer entering into such contract that funds have been duly
had received an annual allotment or a certain percentage of the amount appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the
collected under the provisions of Act No. 3992, known as the Motor Vehicle proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof."
Law, out of which it could pay said indebtedness, and that there is no
issue as to the validity of the contract entered into and by and between It should be noted that the present action is against defendant-appellee in
the petitioner and the respondent, nor is there any question as to delivery his personal capacity on the strength of section 608 of the same code,
by the petitioner and receipt by the respondent of the road construction which provides as follows:
materials.
SEC. 608. Void contract — Liability of officer. — A purported contract
ISSUE: WON the Contract between Rivera and the Municipality was valid, entered into contrary to the requirements of the next preceding section
hence, petitioners Rivera are entitled to the sum of money to be paid by hereof shall be wholly void, and the officer assuming to make such
the Municipality. contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for
any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been
HELD: No. The Court held that if If the law requires that before a contract wholly between private parties.
involving the expenditure of P2,000 or more may be entered into or
authorized, the municipal treasurer must certify to the officer entering into The position of defendant-appellee, as the officer who signed the contract
such contracts that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose with appellant in violation of section 607, comes squarely under the
and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract-is available provision just quoted. His liability is personal, as it the transaction had
for expenditure on account thereof; and that purported contract entered been entered into by him as a private party. We take it that the intention
into contrary to the requirements just stated is wholly void, the petitioner's of the law in this respect is to ensure that public officers entering into
claim that there is no longer any question as to the validity of the contract transactions with private individuals calling for the expenditure of public
entered into by and between the petitioner and the municipal mayor of funds observe a high degree of caution so that the government may not
Malolos is not correct. be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action by those assuming to
represent it.
The Court further held that the Auditor General was correct in denying the
petitioner's claim. Section 73, Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the Motor The judgment appealed from is reversed and defendant-appellee is
Vehicle Law, as amended by section 2, Republic Act No. 314, invoked by ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum P19,235.00, with legal interest
the petitioner, merely allocates 10 per cent of the money collected under from the date the complaint was filed, and costs.
its provisions to the road and bridge funds of the different municipalities in
proportion to population as shown in the latest available census, for the B. Liability on Torts (Quasi-delict)
repair, maintenance and construction of municipal roads. This alone is not
sufficient appropriation and authority to disburse part of the 10 per cent PALAFOX ET. AL. VS. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE
collected under the Motor Vehicle Law for the purpose of paying the claim
of the petitioner.
FACTS: The municipality of Malolos called for bids for furnishing and
delivering materials to be used in the maintenance and repair of barrio
roads. Appellant won in the bidding and was asked by the Municipal
Treasurer to come to his office for execution of the corresponding contract.
The contract was signed by appellant and by defendant-appellee Carlo P. TUZON AND MAPAGU VS. CA AND JUARADO
Maclang in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Malolos. Pursuant thereto
appellant subsequently delivered to the municipality gravel and adobe
stones. Therafter, the municipal council of Malolos passed a resolution
approving the contract, but in spite of repeated demands by appellant the
price of the materials was not paid. Hence, appellant sought the
intervention of the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission, which
referred the matter to the General Auditing Office. That office turned down
the claim for payment, whereupon appellant filed in this Court a petition
TORIO VS. FONTANILLA
for review. Court sustained the action of the General Auditing Office and
held that the contract in question was void as far as the municipal
government of Malolos was concerned on the ground that no money had
been appropriated to meet the obligation prior to the execution of the
contract, as required by section 607, Revised Administrative Code.
However, in the same decision this Court indicated that section 608 of the
same Code afforded appellant a remedy. Consequently, he filed the