PP vs Ave
The slug entered the abdominal cavity and hit the right lobe of the liver and
The appellant, DAN AVE, was charged with the crimes of Frustrated Murder
and Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
The prosecution established that in the evening of August 24, 1996, Pedro
Valenzuela, Jr., Atty. Napoleon Valenzuela, Isidro (Benito) Ave, Calixto
Valenzuela, Leopoldo Valenzuela, and Rogelio Gacad had a drinking spree in
the vicinity of the house of Pedro Valenzuela, Jr. in Barangay Camantiles,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.6 A rectangular bamboo bed served as their
makeshift table. The place was well lighted by a 100-watt Philipps bulb placed
just above them and by the lights coming from the house of Pedro. During the
revelry, Pedro was seated beside his cousin, Atty. Valenzuela.
At about 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Gacad found the need to answer the call of
nature. With his back facing his companions, he relieved himself on a spot
about five (5) or six (6) meters away from them.
Out of nowhere, the appellant appeared. Unnoticed by the group, the
appellant stood behind Pedro and fired at him with a long firearm from a
distance of about three (3) meters. Pedro was hit at the back of his head and
he slumped on the makeshift table. Atty. Valenzuela stood up and checked
on Pedro. However, the appellant shot Atty. Valenzuela, the bullet hitting his
stomach. The group scampered to safety.
Leopoldo, brother of Pedro, helped Atty. Valenzuela hide inside their house.
They heard another gunshot. Thereafter, the appellant left the crime scene.
Three (3) minutes later, Leopoldo and his companions got out of the house
and saw Pedro lying in a pool of blood. Atty. Valenzuela was rushed to the
hospital while Pedro was taken to the morgue.
Atty. Valenzuela survived the attack due to the immediate medical treatment
he received from Dr. Candido San Juan of the Urdaneta Sacred Heart
Hospital (USHH). The extent of the injury inflicted on Atty. Valenzuela and the
operation that he underwent on account of such gunshot wound, were as
follows:
“x x x xxx xxx
DIAGNOSIS:
= Gunshot wound, RUQ, Abdomen, Penetrating, Lacerating (R) Lobe, Liver,
Perforating ascending colon, T&T slug lodging at the retroperitoneal space,
pelvic area (R) no point of exit
OPERATION:
= Explor-lap, Hepatorrhapy, Colorrhapy and Exteriorization of Ileocecal
portion,
= Evacuation of Blood clots and peritoneal lavage and repair of Gunshot
wound.
xxx xxx x x x”
Dr. San Juan explained that the bullet’s point of entry was in the abdomen.
the ascending portion of the large intestine or colon. The slug lodged near the
pelvic area, at the back, of Atty. Valenzuela. He was confined at USHH for
seven (7) days, from August 24-31, 1996, and was later transferred to a hospital
in Quezon City.
Dr. San Juan could not indicate the healing period of Atty. Valenzuela
because he had to undergo another operation in the ileocecal portion (the
junction between the small and large intestines). He opined that Atty.
Valenzuela would have died if not for the immediate medical assistance he
got at the hospital. Considering the location of the gunshot wound, Dr. San
Juan said that the assailant could have been facing Atty. Valenzuela, or
could have been standing beside him during the attack.
Pedro Valenzuela, Jr. was autopsied by Dr. Ramon B. Gonzales, Jr., Rural
Health Physician of the Municipal Health Office in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The
Autopsy Report reads:
“x x x xxx xxx
SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
Ecchymosis both upper eyelids
Gunshot wound head, left parietal region 5mm. x 5mm. x 6 cm. deep directed
upwards.
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
Fracture, circular left parietal bone.
Slug recovered at right frontal area between brain and right frontal bone.
Cerebral hemorrhage and injury, left parietal lobe to right frontal lobe brain.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cerebral Hemorrhage and Injury, left parietal
Ruling:
When it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not
overturn the findings of trial courts.—The first error involves a calibration of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is an established rule that when it
comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not overturn
the findings of trial courts. The latter are in a best position to ascertain and
measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual
observation of the witnesses’ manner of testifying, demeanor, and behavior in
court. In the cases at bar, the trial court was highly impressed by the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses.
Relationship could strengthen the witnesses’ credibility, for it is unnatural for an
aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit.—
The blood relationship of Leopoldo and Atty. Valenzuela to Pedro would not
make their testimonies unworthy of belief. On the contrary, relationship could
strengthen the witnesses’ credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative
to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit. Their natural interest
in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating a
person other than the true offender.
Although there may be inconsistencies on the testimonies of witnesses on
minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailants.
In sum, we are morally convinced of appellant’s guilt. Significantly, the records
show that he took flight after the killing—the shooting incident happened on
August 24, 1996 while the appellant was arrested only on August 18, 1998,
almost two (2) years later. The appellant did not offer any explanation for his
long absence. Flight, when unexplained, is an indicium of guilt. Indeed, the
innocent is as bold as a lion, while the guilty runs even when no man pursues
him.
There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately
and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person.
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the Information the aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in committing the crime of murder
prevents the Court from imposing the death penalty even if the same was
proved at the trial.
PP vs TOgahan
On 12 May 2000, at around 6:30 p.m., Magdalena Villar (Mrs. Villar), her
daughter Vilma Villar-Richardson (Mrs. Richardson), son-in-law Richardson,
grandchildren Kenneth, Kevin, Junelyn, Jovelyn and Michelle, and brother
Pedro Castillo were all watching television in the living room of their residence
in Spring, Amaga, Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Without warning, two armed men
wearing bonnets suddenly arrived. At that time, the victim Villar, husband of
Mrs. Villar, was in his room. When Villar heard the commotion, he went to the
door and tried to prevent the armed men from entering, but he was shot
twice, pulled towards the balcony and clubbed to death.6
One of the armed men, later identified as Togahan, pointed a gun at Mrs.
Richardson and pulled the trigger thrice. The gun did not fire however. The
other man, later identified as Lauro, approached Richardson and likewise
pointed a gun at him. When Mrs. Richardson heard gunfire, she asked the
men: “Who are you, what do you want?” To this, Lauro replied: “We are here
for war.”7 Mrs. Richardson told her husband to run away but the latter, in an
attempt to protect his wife, struggled and tried to wrestle the gun away from
Togahan instead. In the course thereof, Lauro shot Richardson then ran out of
the house with Richardson’s 3-year old son.8 Richardson, in spite of his wound,
chased Lauro but was later found sitting on the mud, unable to talk and
dying. The rest of the family had fled during the commotion and sought
refuge. Villar and Richardson were brought to DO Plaza Memorial Hospital in
Patin-ay, Prosperidad, Surigao del Sur but were dead upon arrival.9
In her testimony, Mrs. Richardson narrated that during the struggle between
her husband and Togahan for the gun, the mask of the latter was removed by
Richardson; thus, she was able to recognize Togahan as the assailant who
poked and tried to fire the gun at her. Mrs. Richardson was able to identify
Lauro through his voice and physical appearance as the one who remarked
“We are here for war.”10 Lauro was alleged to be responsible for shooting her
father, Villar, twice and also for shooting her husband, Richardson.
Eyewitness Lowelito Villar (Lowelito), grandson of victim Villar, testified that on
the evening of the incident, he was in his home about fifteen (15) meters
away from his grandparents’ house when he heard a gun burst. He
immediately ran towards the house of his grandparents and hid behind a
coconut tree, also about fifteen (15) meters from victim Villar’s house. He
claims to have seen three (3) armed and masked men he identified as
Togahan, Lauro and Balindo enter the victims’ house. According to the
witness, Lauro shot Richardson in the house whereas Lauro and Balindo shot
and clubbed his grandfather in the balcony. After the attack, all the accused
ran out of the house, removing their masks in the process. Witness Lowelito
maintained that he had been friends with the accused for five (5) years and
recognized them because of their physical features and movements and that
he could see the events that transpired as there were fluorescent lamps lit
inside and outside the house.11
The prosecution likewise presented witnesses to fortify the charges of
participation against appellants. Witness Rosemarie Enriquez, a former
sweetheart of Togahan, testified that the pair of slippers recovered from the
scene of the crime belonged to the latter.12 It was witness Federico Sayson,
Barangay Kagawad of Purok 1, Spring, Amaga, Barobo, Surigao del Sur, who
discovered the pair of slippers and a dirty white jacket about thirty (30) meters
from the house of Villar.13
SPO2 Santo Ocate, the firearm examiner of the Philippine National Police,
Caraga Region who conducted the physical examination of two bullets
recovered from the crime scene, testified that the bullets were discharged
from a .38 caliber revolver.14
Upon request of Mrs. Richardson, Dr. Edgar Savella, Medico-Legal Officer of
the National Bureau of InvestigationCaraga Region, conducted an autopsy of
the bodies of the victims. Dr. Savella testified that the gunshot wound
sustained by Richardson on his abdomen was fatal and caused his death, the
bullet having hit the sciatic artery on his right leg, as well as his vertebrae in the
lumbar area.15 Villar, on the other hand, died of multiple gunshot wounds to
his chest and abdomen.16 Dr. Savella found no indication of self-defense or
struggle-related injuries on both Villar and Richardson.17

Dr. Tomas Centino testified that he conducted the examination of the bodies
of the victims who were both clinically dead upon arrival at the DO Plaza
Memorial Hospital.18 He likewise opined that the respective gunshot wounds
sustained by Villar and Richardson were fatal and the immediate cause of
their death.
Ruling:
In the absence of any evidence showing reason or motive for the witness to
perjure, their testimony and identification of the assailant should be given full
faith and credit.
It is unnatural for a victim’s relative interested in vindicating the crime to
accuse somebody other than the real culprit.
Witnesses need not know the names of the malefactors so long as they
recognize their faces.
Certain discrepancies between declarations made in the affidavit and those
made at the witness stand seldom discredit the declarant.
While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not
necessarily follow from their disagreement that all of them should be
disbelieved as liars and their testimonies completely discarded as worthless.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he
was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity.
By the concurrent acts of barging into the residence of the victims, holding
them at gunpoint and shooting and attacking the victims, the co-accused
are deemed to have agreed to commit the crime of murder.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance
to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.
MAHAWAN vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Private complainant Diosdada S. Paradero operates a store on the
ground floor of her house in B. Aranas Extension, Cebu City. On 5 October
1996, Paradero was tending her store when petitioner Fernando Estabas
Mahawan arrived and asked her for a bottle of beer. She told petitioner that
there was no more beer. When she was about to open the refrigerator in the
store to show petitioner that there was really no more beer, petitioner sneaked
inside the store. Suddenly, petitioner pulled out a gun (caliber .38 revolver)
and shot her on the left chest. She retreated and fell on the ground. Private
complainant grabbed a kitchen knife nearby to defend herself. Petitioner shot
Paradero again but the bullet this time merely grazed her left earlobe.
Petitioner snatched the kitchen knife from her hand and escaped from the
store.
Paradero’s sister and some neighbors brought her to Chong Hua Hospital
where the gunshot wound in her left chest was treated. She also underwent a
surgical operation on her colon, liver and diaphragm as these vital organs
were hit by the trajectory of the bullet. After the incident, petitioner
immediately went to his brother’s house and thereupon called via telephone
a policeman named SPO2 Quevedo. He told SPO2 Quevedo that he wanted
to surrender. On 18 October 1996, an Information 4 was filed before the RTC
charging petitioner with frustrated homicide.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not petitioner failed to establish unlawful aggression on
the part of Paradero
(2) Whether or not second and third elements of self-defense are
wanting in the case at bar
(3) Whether or not petitioner had intent to kill
Held:
(1) Yes, petitioner failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part
of Paradero. The fact that petitioner sustained injuries on his hand
and stomach, allegedly caused by Paradero’s knife, does not
signify that he was a victim of unlawful aggression. The medical
certificate presented by petitioner states that the latter sustained
incised wounds on the 2nd and 5th fingers measuring 2 centimeters
and abdominal abrasion measuring 2.5 centimeters. Petitioner
was discharged on the same day he was treated in the hospital. It
is clear from the foregoing that the injuries he sustained were not
serious or severe. The superficiality of the injuries was not an
indication that his life and limb were in actual peril.
(2) Yes, both second and third elements are wanting in the case.
Second Element: Reasonable means employed to prevent or repel it. The
second element of self-defense requires that the means employed by the
person defending himself must be reasonably necessary to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression of the victim. There was no reason or necessity for
petitioner to shoot Paradero with a gun. Paradero was merely tending her
store and did not attack or place in danger the life of petitioner during the
incident. Further, when Paradero allegedly approached and tried to stab him,
petitioner was not trapped or cornered in a specific area such that he had no
way out.
Third Element: Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person making
the defense. Petitioner shot Paradero when she told him there was no more
stock of cigarettes. Paradero then was forced to grab a knife to defend
herself. Clearly, petitioner provoked Paradero and not the other way around.
Hence, the element of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
making the defense is also wanting in the present case.
(3) Yes, there was intent to kill on the part of the petitioner. An
essential element of homicide, whether in its consummated,
frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offender to kill the
victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. The injury on Paradero’s colon was fatal and would have
caused her death were it not for the timely medical attention
given her. The seriousness of Paradero’s injuries was also shown by
the fact that she was confined and operated on twice in different
hospitals for the wound sustained in the colon. Verily, the
foregoing circumstances clearly manifest intent to kill on the part
of petitioner.
RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: Kapunan
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall
bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the
surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them
that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as
planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the
anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing
Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched operation
was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College
of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the
anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony
showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not
exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the
anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to
undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in
intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a
“good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable
for the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after
the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the
DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The
CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
Ruling:
The conduct of a preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an
operation, whether elective or emergency, cannot be dispensed with—such
evaluation is necessary for the formulation of a plan of anesthesia care suited
to the needs of the patient concerned.
To “auscultate” means to listen to the sounds arising within organs as an aid to
diagnosis and treatment, the examination being made either by use of the
stethoscope or by direct application of the ear to the body.
What is left to be determined therefore is whether Erlinda’s hapless condition
was due to any fault or negligence on the part of Dr. Gutierrez while she
(Erlinda) was under the latter’s care. Dr. Gutierrez maintains that the
bronchospasm and cardiac arrest resulting in the patient’s comatose
condition was brought about by the anaphylactic reaction of the patient to
Thiopental Sodium (pentothal). In the Decision, we explained why we found
Dr. Gutierrez’ theory unacceptable. In the first place, Dr. Eduardo Jamora, the
witness who was presented to support her (Dr. Gutierrez) theory, was a
pulmonologist. Thus, he could not be considered an authority on anesthesia
practice and procedure and their complications.
The standard practice in anesthesia is that every single act that the
anesthesiologist performs must be recorded. In Dr. Gutierrez’ case, she could
not account for at least ten (10) minutes of what happened during the
administration of anesthesia on Erlinda.
Under the Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, a surgeon is likened to a captain of
the ship, in that it is his duty to control everything going on in the operating
room.
That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-
of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that the Supreme Court will ipso facto
follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining
in the instant case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine.
The long period—three hours—that the surgeon made the patient wait for him
certainly aggravated the anxiety that the latter must have been feeling at the
time, such that it could be safely said that her anxiety adversely affected the
administration of anesthesia on her.
A surgeon’s irresponsible conduct of arriving very late for a scheduled
operation is violative, not only of his duty as a physician but also of Article 19
of the Civil Code.
The contract between a medical consultant and his patient is separate and
distinct from the contract between the hospital and said patient. There is no
employer-employee relationship between a hospital and medical consultants.
no evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner
Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for
hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment.
PSI vs AGANA
FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be
suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior
resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left
ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes
to perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed
his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr.
Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the
procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of
Operation: “sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but
to no avail continue for closure” (two pieces of gauze were missing). A
“diligent search” was conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil
then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but
the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr.
Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the
cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months
of consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of
cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5
in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring
Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she
sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was
found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical
City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable
for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body,
and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also
filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice
against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr.
Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the
cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children).
RULING:
The doctrine in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999), still obtains,
i.e., for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases,
an employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and their
consultants.
While in general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor-physician, the hospital may be liable if the physician is the
“ostensible” agent of the hospital, an exception also known as the “doctrine
of apparent authority” or sometimes referred to as the apparent or ostensible
agency theory. In this regard, the hospital need not make express
representations to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of
the hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied.
The act of a hospital in displaying the names of physicians in the public
directory at the lobby of the hospital amounts to holding out to the public that
it offers quality medical service through the listed physicians; Under the
doctrine of apparent authority, the question in every case is whether the
principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a
person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature
of the particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority
to perform the particular act in question.
The duty of providing quality medical service is no longer the sole prerogative
and responsibility of the physician because the modern hospital now tends to
organize a highly-professional medical staff whose competence and
performance need also to be monitored by the hospital commensurate with
its inherent responsibility to provide quality medical care. Such responsibility
includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical staff.
Accordingly, the hospital has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor
and oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians
practicing in its premises.
The corporate negligence doctrine imposes several duties on a hospital: (1) to
use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and
equipment; (2) to select and retain only competent physicians; (3) to oversee
as to patient care all persons who practice medicine within its walls; and (4) to
formulate, adopt, and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality
care for its patients. These special tort duties arise from the special relationship
existing between a hospital or nursing home and its patients, which are based
on the vulnerability of the physically or mentally ill persons and their inability to
provide care for themselves.