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Abstract
This article examines ways in which nationalism, as a concept, is gendered and the
impact that that perspective had on women in the Balkans during the wars in the
1990s. The impact on women was especially severe, given the number who were raped
or displaced hy the wars. In this article, the authors address the ways in which (male)
nationalist leaders used citizenship and the imagery of women to alter the perception
that the state and society had toward women in general, and to those in ethnically
mixed marriages in particular. Importantly, paying attention to the lives of women in
ethnically mixed marriages can shed light on the dynamics of civil wars, on their
consequences and on the very politics of state-defined citizenship.
Keywords
Bosnia, citizenship, ethnic conflict, former Yugoslavia, gendered nationalism, identity,
marriage, Serbia
The reality usually proves that regardless of culture and place, women's roles
revert to traditional ones, and nationalistic loyalties are more highly valued
than is gender equality.
(McKay 1998: 356)
It has been well established that war often takes its greatest toll on civilian
members of the society who are often the most innocent victims of the
conflict, primarily women, children and the elderly. The wars that wracked
the Balkans intermittently from 1991 through 1999 are no exceptions.' There
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
It is not terribly insightful to realize that most of the decisions that affected
women in the Balkans were made by men, a reality that is true in most
Feminist theories, which speak out of the various experiences of women - who
are usually on the margins of society and interstate politics - can offer us some
new insights on the behavior of states and the needs of individuals, particularly
those on the periphery of the international system.
{1992: 18)
women are mothers, daughters and wives - symbols of purity, nurturers and
transmitters of national values, and reproducers of the nation's warriors and
rulers, but also victims - vulnerable to seduction, open to physical invasion and
contamination, and symbols of territorial vulnerability and national defilement.
(Mostov 2000: 98)
Tickner (1992: 43) asserts that, 'The collective identity of citizens in most
states depends heavily on telling stories about, and celebration of, wars of
independence or national liberation and other great victories in battle'. This
assertion can be supported directly in the case of Yugoslavia. In Serbia, for
example, Slobodan Milosevic's construction of his version of 'Serb identity',
and a Serbian state, played a major part in shaping the wars involving Serbia
from 1991 through Kosovo in 1999. Milosevic articulated his ideas clearly in
his speech at the Field of Blackbirds in June 1989 commemorating the 600th
anniversary of the battle of Kosovo. Consistent with Tickner's assertion about
the role of'stories', it is important to note that many of the details surrounding
this battle of 1389 have long-since been lost. What is known is that the
fighting was intense with heavy losses on both sides. However, over time a
mythology grew up about this battle, which became important to the notion
of Serb identity but also to the notion of the 'masculine hero' who had to
defend Serbia and, by implication, keep it pure.'*
At the time of the speech, Milosevic adopted the slogan that 'Serbs win
wars, but lose the peace', a reference to the fact that no formal Serb state
was created after either world war (Woodward 1995: 92). But, more important,
in that speech Milosevic played upon the myth of Serb victimization from
the time of the Ottomans through the Tito years. And it was that same 'myth'
of victimization that encouraged the men of Serbia to assert themselves as a
way of gaining back power and reconstructing the state. And often that
assertion was directed against those who were least able to fight back - the
women.^
Yet it is also clear that women were central to the mythology. As Branka
Andjelkovic (1998: 240-1) notes, 'the nationalist discourse in the former
Yugoslavia was redefining women's roles in line with traditional patriarchal
expectations.' And in the case of Serbia particularly, she identifies '[T]he
redefinition of women's roles away from the socialist "working women"
toward the newly resurrected "mother of the nation"'. In other words, the
redefinition of the Serb state and with that, Serb nationalism, depended upon
a revised concept of the Serb woman specifically tied to family and pro-
creation.
Importantly, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia clearly affected women's
positions in society. In theory, one of the major tenets of the communist/
Marxist ideology was the advancement of all people, regardless of gender.
Hence, in many of the countries in the Soviet and Eastern bloc, women were
Serbian authorities and local Serbs working with international aid organizations
viewed these women as 'belonging to their husbands' in Bosnia and thus refused
to consider their requests for protection and assistance independently. If their
husbands were not ethnically Serb, the women were especially mistrusted and
denied benefits. If their husbands were Serbs, the women were still assumed to
be willing to return to Serbian-controlled parts of Bosnia.
(Mertus 2000: 22)
Moreover, as Maja Korac (Korac 1999: 198) notes, the citizenship of refugee
women in mixed marriages could only be passed on to her children if she
gave up the ' "improper" citizenship inherited from their father'. In this way,
the 'particular intervention by the new nation-states [was] intended to return
"women traitors" to their nationally important role as bearers of culture or
to exclude them from the ethnic-national collectivity and the nation-state'.
In the end, women in mixed marriages faced violence from men of other
ethnic groups, and their own husbands, as well as disapproval from members
of their own ethnic group.
CONCLUSIONS
While they are far from definitive nor can we generalize from them, case
studies can offer interesting insights into the actual women whose stories are
hehind the data. The book, Women, Violence and War: Wartime Victimization
of Refugees in the Balkans, by Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic, uses a number of
case studies to support its points. Many of those stories are of women in
ethnically mixed marriages, and the synopses of their situations as presented
in this volume support our assertions.
The following case offers another story of a woman in a mixed marriage.
While not meant to be defmitive, it is illustrative of the dilemmas women in
mixed marriages faced."
Tanja is a woman in her mid-to-late 30s who left Sarajevo late in 1992 or
early 1993 with her then-young daughter in order to escape the war. She fled
first to Germany and then came to the United States where she is now a high
school science teacher. Tanja is an educated woman who was a doctor in
Sarajevo; she is also a Serb who was married to a Croat. Her husband did not
leave with her, but in the belief that the war would not last long, stayed in
Sarajevo. It would be a number of years before he was able to join his wife
and daughter in the USA.'"
A conversation with Tanja offered a number of important insights into the
construction of identity. First, Tanja felt that age is an important determinant
of identity. For example, those Croats, Muslims and Serbs who were alive
during World War II had different experiences that, in turn, shaped their own
identities than did those who were born after the war. The Croats were aligned
with the Nazis during the war and occupation of Yugoslavia, while the Serbs
were more closely tied to the communists. Those distinctions influenced the
perception that the groups had of one another well after the war.
She also noted that an important distinction needed to be made between
those who lived in the cities, especially Sarajevo, and those who lived in the
more rural villages. In the former, the people tended to be more educated and
sophisticated and, based on her experiences, their identity was tied more to
being a 'Sarajevan' than a Serb, Croat or Muslim. Within Sarajevo, mixed
marriages were the norm, with many people not even willing to accept a
single identity. Rather, here the distinction was drawn based on those who
stayed in the city, versus those who left and were seen as 'traitors' for doing
so, regardless of nationality. Her perception was that there was an animosity
toward those who left because everyone was seen as important to protect and
defend the city, but that this was not based on nationality.
Tanja also noted that there was a difference between Sarajevo and the rest
of Bosnia. Her sense was that Sarajevo fostered a feeling of inclusion and
support for all groups, whereas outside the city Bosnia was more segregated
which, in turn, contributed to the growth of nationalism and the 'ethnic
cleansing' that resulted. She also noted that there are a number of ex-patriot
Joyce P. Kaufman
Department of Political Science
Whittier College
PO Box 634
Whittier, CA 90608, USA
E-mail: jkaufman@whittier.edu
Kristen P. Williams
Department of Government
Clark University
950 Main Street
Worcester, MA 01610, USA
E-mail: Kwilliams@clarku.edu
Notes
1 These include the Slovene and Yugoslav-Croatian wars of 1991, the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992-5 and the war in Kosovo in 1999.
2 See, for example, selected articles from Lorentzen and Turpin (1998); and also
Ramet (1999) and Mertus (2000).
3 Lister (2000: 55). The issue for many feminist scholars and others is whether
citizenship and its concomitant rights should be gender-neutral or gender-
differentiated (debate between equality and difference): in other words, are
women different by virtue of being able to have children and play the predominant
caregiver role and thus their citizenship rights should reflect that, or should
conceptions of citizenship be gender-neutral? Lister, (2000: 51): Siim (2000: 6).
4 The details of the battle and the origins of the mythology surrounding it are
described in detail in chapter 4, in Malcolm (1998: 58-80).
5 One way that men asserted their power was through rape. Rape is used as a
means of signaling to males of other ethnic groups as well as reinforcing
masculine and feminine roles-gender identity.
6 As Lenard J. Cohen (1993: 51] notes, 'Throughout Yugoslav communist history,
interethnic rivalry was viewed by some party leaders more as an opportunity
than a danger'.
7 During the period of state-building following World War II, Tito perceived ethnic
divisions as a danger to the state (particularly given the ethnic conflicts that had
occurred during the war between Croats, Muslims and Serbs). To overcome the
ethnic divisions, Tito sought to create a federal structure under the control of a
single party, as well as to foster a Yugoslav identity. Over time, the recognition
of continued ethnic divisions led to constitutional changes in the 1970s that gave
is also a ritual act of male bonding in the most primitive sense, a ritual of
marking territory and desecrating the enemy man's 'property.' The man who
is not able to defend his 'property' is humiliated and his masculinity is
questioned.
(Kesic 1999: 193)
As Enloe asserts,
10 This assumption about the child assuming the ethnicity of the father rather than
the mother flies in the face of established Catholic and Jewish doctrine, for
example. In both cases, the assumption is that the child will accept the religious
and ethnic characteristics of the mother in the belief that the mother is known
while the father can be questioned. Hence, the lineage goes through the mother.
11 As Maja Korac notes, women in ethnically mixed marriage were often seen as
'traitors' to the state's cause of creating an ethnically based state.
12 It is interesting to note here that Tito himself was a product of a mixed Croat-
Slovene marriage.
13 One of the authors of this article was introduced to Tanja relatively early in the
Acknowledgement
References