Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE
DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S.
MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B.
FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V.
BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.

BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by
the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent
implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they
direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC)
performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being
violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that copies
thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action as
they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with petitioner. To
further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable parties
in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by
law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the
Convention be made respondents. After the petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel
Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and
considering that with the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would be adequately
protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the Convention
who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus,
Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna,
Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to intervene jointly.
The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly and
amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding motions for leave to intervene
or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties,
the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case with the records
and the Court acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the extensive study that has been
undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint
sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention
were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.
The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall
have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted
to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed
originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1,
1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its
first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at
about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and
are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year
and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in
November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of
suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the
1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution.
 Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or
from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should
there be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-
1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the
Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the
Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention implement this
resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P.
MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the
plebiscite on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election
returns and tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment
of said ballots and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they
could be distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample
ballots to be used in the elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of the
above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement
the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then
transmitted them to the Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of
the plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters
of transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution
authored by Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from
November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of
Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto
attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz
confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1,
including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with said
implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they
provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and
municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to
carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and
holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and
may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed
amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and intervenors posit that
the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment
the Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and
part of its power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such amendments either
individually or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task
now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue
before Us is a political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and
as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it is
to be noted that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant
and Auditor of the convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that the
issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v.
Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the
other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished
counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would misapply
them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality
of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention
called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former. A
simple reading of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering
misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court — speaking through one
of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional
Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto
as a political one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in
Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the
people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The
force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81
Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28,
1957) and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the
officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of
that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine
the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by
Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act,
on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators
belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in
the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the
representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment
had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus
we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised were political
questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It
is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such
as ours (Section 1, Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to amend their
own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the
same explicitly grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as
members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such,
the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, (Of amending the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of government including the
Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not
have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise,
they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a
government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed
by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to
lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution),
despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly —
violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review,
and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
(supra) the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous
on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in
his petition and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents and
intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of
the same nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of the
Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case of a revolutionary convention
which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born of either a war of liberation from a mother
country or of a revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to
such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely without restrain and omnipotent all
wise, and it is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of
1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention came
into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by
authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the
control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with
the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the
Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its
officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force
and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates
even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of its
task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other
authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can
rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the
equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing
Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private
property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare war
or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render
judgment in a controversy between private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in violation of the
distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in
the light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a
citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing Constitution, who can decide
whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the
Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would have to
confess that the integrated system of government established by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no
intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and craftsmanship in
constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of
principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.,
134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and
balances and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if
the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment and the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in
any living Constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike conclusions unrelated
to actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not
"the chief palladium of constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also
be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on
the authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than
in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed
the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has
by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly;
notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as
contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect.
But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating
its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935,
by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of
American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The
Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not
be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions
prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a
recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are
bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921
expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap.
IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitution are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123,
Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass
upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will
determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void
be thus created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
 exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the
opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do
not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all
such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other
constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent
assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and
none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not
apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as
already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes
without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to
the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the
rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the
solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and
intervenors have joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said
resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and unequivocal statement
of the real issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the
constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or
sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the
proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition
being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution of the Philippines
even if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees
it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of whether or not it is within the
power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment
proposed in the abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said resolution as well as
in the subject question implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its
proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is,
in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments affecting other parts of the existing
Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed
"shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other portions of the entire Constitution." In other words,
nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the
individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-
year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the
mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the
said proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to
the absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of
adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line
of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in
a great measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various elements of
the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about
meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and governmental institutions, including the
provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic security of the underprivileged classes of
our people as well as those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources and the national
patrimony, as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the
excesses of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas
and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion and disorder,
anarchy and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they
strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things in this Republic of ours. It would be
tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case
to be carried astray by considerations other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of
the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds other departments of the government or any
other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the
Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking
down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of
being convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to
put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there are respectable sectors
opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision,
Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part
of it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is
that only the collective judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the present condition of things, as they see
it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence the complete substitution
of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve,
this grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in which it should
discharge its constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which
respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not
necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be of
the utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its
constitutionally as signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to clear
up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it would be
necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it
is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be resolved by the Supreme Court
only when there is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of respect that the
Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the government, and certainly, the Constitutional
Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came into being by a
call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in this
opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned
mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all
the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that
the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the
same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued power, second to
none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and
which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes,
future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and those subject to its
sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it
is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly,
any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be
conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original
constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they
may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent conventions called to amend the original
constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily
mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are
supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to
the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated
by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them
limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their
amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in
the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such conditions because they
are as powerful and omnipotent as their original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the scope and
extent of the amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass on the
issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for
the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be
exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the
Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question,
grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the members of
the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this
case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling, being nigh,
We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more appropriate
case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of
the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the
amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or
plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first
amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same
for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution,
hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress
sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose.
The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any
amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision
unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already
stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any
amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an
integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the
one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties,
ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is
inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other
parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original
constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution
is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or
reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves
from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole.
And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion
they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of
its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3
of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will
be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the
Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible
to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter
would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances,
and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not,
because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the
constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing
whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention
may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into.
The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial
changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the
present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of
the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not
given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution
may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of
the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to
form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started
considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the
people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the
present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are
in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present
Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole
purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification
of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the
language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less
does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like
the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate
cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the
best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has
finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's
Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the condition in
Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments
the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are
only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately
from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the
holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying
therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer,
Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in
compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this
decision immediately executory. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —

I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient majority of the Court on just one ground,
which to be sure achieves the result from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the
validity of the premises postulated and conclusions reached in support of the dispositive portion of the decision.
However, considering the urgent nature of this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion on the
particular issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and the fact that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily
be inconclusive unless the other issues raised in the petition are also considered and ruled upon — a task that would
be premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to this reservation.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual inimitable, forthright and vigorous style.
Like him, we do not express our individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment, which is
not in issue here because it is a matter that properly and exclusively addresses itself to the collective judgment of the
people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional dimension which, although they would seem
to be superfluous because of the reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion,
nevertheless appear to us to be just as fundamental in character and scope.
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal amendments and submit each
separately to the people for ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of
title proposed amendment in question within the meaning and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election is not the proper election envisioned by the same provision of the
Constitution.
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on Elections,2 expounded his view, with
which we essentially agree, on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be
a proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment. This is what he said:
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not
to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to
mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly
insidious influences. We believe the word "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform citizen of the provisions to be amended,
and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be
understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then
there is no submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution.
What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten
the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For we have earlier
stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers of this concurring opinion, in the
following words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such amendment should be
submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon is
to be diverted by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The
framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it
as much stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any amendments thereto should be
debated, considered and voted upon an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention
to the subject.4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do you not want the 18-year old to be
allowed to vote?," would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which
appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all.
A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average voter. Why should the voting
age be lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And
why not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old so that there is no need of an
educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied
upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed
amendment is voted down by the people, will the Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is
there an unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional Convention in having this particular proposed amendment
ratified at this particular time? Do some of the members of the Convention have future political plans which they want
to begin to subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is approved, does it thereby
mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be
required to render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual consent be reduced to 18
years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .
The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the bounds
of which are not immediately ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already long litany. And
the answers cannot be had except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded
undivided attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently
informed of the meaning, nature and effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded
ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from a full and
dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive
involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the
proposed amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the words, "at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, has not been met.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its
manifestation of fealty to the rule of law couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution
occupies the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than
this Court, must bow to its supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of what is
allowable, if not indeed required by the Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the
conclusion reached. The question presented is indeed novel, not being controlled by constitutional prescription,
definite and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the
Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot discern any objection to the validity of its action there
being no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach all the more commends itself to me
considering that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according to our
Constitution, sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself unable to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved by reliance on, implicit in the petition
and the answer of intervenors, such concepts as legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by
petitioner on the one hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is
gratifying to note that during the oral argument of petitioner and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there
apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy
of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted by this Court, should be controlling on both
Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in at least one American state, that is Pennsylvania,
there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a constitutional convention are
dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly by the fundamental law. The result
is a convention that is subordinate to the lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to
the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made subordinate to the legislature.
Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its
holding though finds no support under our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an
attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in
whom sovereignty resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency
entrusted with the responsibility of high import and significance it is true; it is denied unlimited legal
competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to yield to the superior force of the
Constitution. There can then be no basis for the exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people.
It is to be admitted that there are some American state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v.
Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different conclusion. The doctrine
therein announced cannot bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that the power of a constitutional
convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately termed constituent, limited as it is to the purpose of drafting
a constitution or proposing revision or amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to popular
approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by the
Constitution, are coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of
proposing amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of
autonomy consistently with the Constitution which can be the only source of valid restriction on its competence. It is
true it is to the legislative body that the call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be
interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate,
and paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate
departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme within its field and has exclusive
cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the appropriate principle that should
govern the relationship between a constitutional convention and a legislative body under American law is that found
in Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was absolute. The convention was
sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it by
the legislative call. A third and intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is
a body independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as
to the extent of its constituent power. This view has become increasingly prevalent in the state decisions."4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously stressed in the opinion of the Court,
that any limitation on the power the Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads:
"The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at
an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two steps, proposal and thereafter
ratification. Thus as to the former, two constituent bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the
mode therein provided, and a constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once assembled, a
constitutional convention, like the Congress of the Philippines, possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power.
Inasmuch as Congress may determine what amendments it would have the people ratify and thereafter take all the
steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be obtained, the convention likewise, to my
mind, should be deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to assure that whatever amendments it seeks to
introduce would be submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would appear to me that to view
the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to
place it in an inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and constitutional convention are
agencies for submitting proposals under the fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the other.
No justification for such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.
Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary legislation before the convention could
be enabled to have its proposals voted on by the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive
branches that could, whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the amending process. I am the first to
admit that such likelihood is remote, but if such a risk even if minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the
compelling force of an applicable constitutional provision requires otherwise. Considering that a constitutional
convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions on the powers of either the executive or legislative
branches, or, for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better policy to interpret Article XV in such a way
that would not sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized as vested in a constitutional convention.
There is nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a reasonable interpretation of Article XV. It
certainly is one way by which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to accommodate a constitution to
the needs of an unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that time inevitably brings in
its wake.
From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the
power of the convention. That would be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of
appraising the legitimate scope of its competence. That would be, for me, to give added vigor and life to the
conferment of authority vested in it, attended by such grave and awesome responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV providing that such amendment shall be
valid when submitted and thereafter approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar to
the proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that there is to be only one election and that
therefore the petition must be sustained as only when the convention has finished its work should all amendments
proposed be submitted for ratification. That is not for me, and I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It
is true that the Constitution uses the word "election" in the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should
be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a compelling force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be
sought not from specific language in the singular but from the mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It
could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does not commend itself. The words used in
the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed. Petitioner's
stress on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for me, carry the day.
It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional and therefore is not such as was
contemplated in this article. I do not find such contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did
seek to consult the wishes of the people by the proposed submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an
argument for its validity. It might be said of course that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed
upon by the electorate. There is plausibility in such a view. A literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The
spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From its silence I deduce the inference that there is no
repugnancy to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the popular will. In that sense, the
Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is not silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem
the more important consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his source of authority in
either Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their sovereign powers
by the express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to my way of thinking be inconsistent with
the fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.
4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority, an action to restrain or prohibit
respondent Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the
Commission on Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional
agency to take charge of all laws relative to the conduct of election. That is a purely executive function vested in it
under Article X of the Constitution.5 It is not precluded from assisting the Constitutional Convention if pursuant
to its competence to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in this case, to submit a proposal, even if
admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be implied that under the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to aid it
in the legitimate discharge of its functions.6
The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force that I mind myself unable to overcome,
leave me no alternative but to dissent from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic
premises, the conclusion arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a
high order.

Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down by a sufficient majority of the Court on just one ground,
which to be sure achieves the result from the legal and constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the
validity of the premises postulated and conclusions reached in support of the dispositive portion of the decision.
However, considering the urgent nature of this case, the lack of time to set down at length my opinion on the
particular issue upon which the decision is made to rest, and the fact that a dissent on the said issue would necessarily
be inconclusive unless the other issues raised in the petition are also considered and ruled upon — a task that would
be premature and pointless at this time — I limit myself to this reservation.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo in his usual inimitable, forthright and vigorous style.
Like him, we do not express our individual views on the wisdom of the proposed constitutional amendment, which is
not in issue here because it is a matter that properly and exclusively addresses itself to the collective judgment of the
people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of constitutional dimension which, although they would seem
to be superfluous because of the reach of the basic constitutional infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion,
nevertheless appear to us to be just as fundamental in character and scope.
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose piecemeal amendments and submit each
separately to the people for ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded that (1) that there is no proper submission of
title proposed amendment in question within the meaning and intendment of Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, and (2) that the forthcoming election is not the proper election envisioned by the same provision of the
Constitution.
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs. Commission on Elections,2 expounded his view, with
which we essentially agree, on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be
a proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment. This is what he said:
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not
to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to
mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly
insidious influences. We believe the word "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform citizen of the provisions to be amended,
and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be
understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then
 there is no submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution.
What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten
the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For we have earlier
stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by one of the writers of this concurring opinion, in the
following words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its framers that such amendment should be
submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention thereon is
to be diverted by other extraneous issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The
framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it
as much stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any amendments thereto should be
debated, considered and voted upon an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention
to the subject.4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed amendment, "Do you or do you not want the 18-year old to be
allowed to vote?," would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which
appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all.
A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and logically assail the average voter. Why should the voting
age be lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the new voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And
why not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the 21-year old so that there is no need of an
educational qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied
upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed
amendment is voted down by the people, will the Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment? Why is
there an unseemly haste on the part of the Constitutional Convention in having this particular proposed amendment
ratified at this particular time? Do some of the members of the Convention have future political plans which they want
to begin to subserve by the approval this year of this amendment? If this amendment is approved, does it thereby
mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will he be
required to render compulsory military service under the colors? Will the age of contractual consent be reduced to 18
years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not be unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .
The above are just samplings from here, there and everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the bounds
of which are not immediately ascertainable. Surely, many more questions can be added to the already long litany. And
the answers cannot be had except as the questions are debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded
undivided attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently
informed of the meaning, nature and effects of the proposed constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded
ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from a full and
dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive
involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the
proposed amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that the intendment of the words, "at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, has not been met.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its
manifestation of fealty to the rule of law couched in eloquent language, that commands assent. As the Constitution
occupies the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms, Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than
this Court, must bow to its supremacy. Thereby constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of what is
allowable, if not indeed required by the Constitution, my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the
conclusion reached. The question presented is indeed novel, not being controlled by constitutional prescription,
definite and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the
Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot discern any objection to the validity of its action there
being no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such an approach all the more commends itself to me
considering that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the people in whom, according to our
Constitution, sovereignty resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself unable to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue posed could not be resolved by reliance on, implicit in the petition
and the answer of intervenors, such concepts as legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to by
petitioner on the one hand or, on the other, the theory of conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is
gratifying to note that during the oral argument of petitioner and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there
apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy
of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as interpreted by this Court, should be controlling on both
Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though that in at least one American state, that is Pennsylvania,
there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the powers to be exercised by a constitutional convention are
dependent on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority conferred directly by the fundamental law. The result
is a convention that is subordinate to the lawmaking body. Its field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to
the latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity. It is thus made subordinate to the legislature.
Nowhere has such a view been more vigorously expressed than in the Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its
holding though finds no support under our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an
attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in
whom sovereignty resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency
entrusted with the responsibility of high import and significance it is true; it is denied unlimited legal
competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to yield to the superior force of the
Constitution. There can then be no basis for the exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people.
It is to be admitted that there are some American state decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v.
Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that yield a different conclusion. The doctrine
therein announced cannot bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that the power of a constitutional
convention is not sovereign. It is appropriately termed constituent, limited as it is to the purpose of drafting
a constitution or proposing revision or amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to popular
approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by the
Constitution, are coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of
proposing amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of
autonomy consistently with the Constitution which can be the only source of valid restriction on its competence. It is
true it is to the legislative body that the call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be
interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate,
and paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate
departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme within its field and has exclusive
cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A succinct statement of the appropriate principle that should
govern the relationship between a constitutional convention and a legislative body under American law is that found
in Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been that a convention was absolute. The convention was
sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the other hand, Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it by
the legislative call. A third and intermediate view is that urged by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is
a body independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as
to the extent of its constituent power. This view has become increasingly prevalent in the state decisions."4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution alone then, as so vigorously stressed in the opinion of the Court,
that any limitation on the power the Constitutional, Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It reads:
"The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at
an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are concerned, there are two steps, proposal and thereafter
ratification. Thus as to the former, two constituent bodies are provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the
mode therein provided, and a constitutional convention that may be called into being. Once assembled, a
constitutional convention, like the Congress of the Philippines, possesses in all its plenitude the constituent power.
Inasmuch as Congress may determine what amendments it would have the people ratify and thereafter take all the
steps necessary so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be obtained, the convention likewise, to my
mind, should be deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to assure that whatever amendments it seeks to
introduce would be submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose. It would appear to me that to view
the convention as being denied a prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as a constituent body would be to
place it in an inferior category. Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and constitutional convention are
agencies for submitting proposals under the fundamental law. A power granted to one should not be denied the other.
No justification for such a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.
Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to require ordinary legislation before the convention could
be enabled to have its proposals voted on by the people would be to place a power in the legislative and executive
branches that could, whether by act or omission, result in the frustration of the amending process. I am the first to
admit that such likelihood is remote, but if such a risk even if minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the
compelling force of an applicable constitutional provision requires otherwise. Considering that a constitutional
convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions on the powers of either the executive or legislative
branches, or, for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better policy to interpret Article XV in such a way
that would not sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized as vested in a constitutional convention.
There is nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a reasonable interpretation of Article XV. It
certainly is one way by which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be easier to accommodate a constitution to
the needs of an unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to the challenge that time inevitably brings in
its wake.
From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the
power of the convention. That would be to brush aside the web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of
appraising the legitimate scope of its competence. That would be, for me, to give added vigor and life to the
conferment of authority vested in it, attended by such grave and awesome responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the last sentence of Article XV providing that such amendment shall be
valid when submitted and thereafter approved by the majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar to
the proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by my brethren that there is to be only one election and that
therefore the petition must be sustained as only when the convention has finished its work should all amendments
proposed be submitted for ratification. That is not for me, and I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It
is true that the Constitution uses the word "election" in the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should
be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a compelling force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be
sought not from specific language in the singular but from the mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It
could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does not commend itself. The words used in
the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed. Petitioner's
stress on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for me, carry the day.
It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed amendment is provisional and therefore is not such as was
contemplated in this article. I do not find such contention convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did
seek to consult the wishes of the people by the proposed submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an
argument for its validity. It might be said of course that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed
upon by the electorate. There is plausibility in such a view. A literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The
spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From its silence I deduce the inference that there is no
repugnancy to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the popular will. In that sense, the
Constitution, to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is not silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem
the more important consideration is that while a public official, as an agent, has to locate his source of authority in
either Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only be limited in the exercise of their sovereign powers
by the express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary would to my way of thinking be inconsistent with
the fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people alone, that sovereignty resides.
4. The constitutional Convention having acted within the scope of its authority, an action to restrain or prohibit
respondent Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the
Commission on Elections in thus being charged with such a duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional
agency to take charge of all laws relative to the conduct of election. That is a purely executive function vested in it
under Article X of the Constitution.5 It is not precluded from assisting the Constitutional Convention if pursuant
to its competence to amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in this case, to submit a proposal, even if
admittedly tentative, to the electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be implied that under the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act, it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention to aid it
in the legitimate discharge of its functions.6
The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for me have a force that I mind myself unable to overcome,
leave me no alternative but to dissent from my brethren, with due acknowledgement of course that from their basic
premises, the conclusion arrived at by them cannot be characterized as in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a
high order.
Javellana vs Executive Secretary
Plebiscite; Comelec; Justiciable Question

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. NO. 36142. March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.

Facts:

The Plebiscite Case

1.On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by
Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines.
2.Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24,
1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on
November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
3.While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081
placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
4.On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No.
73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as
setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
5.On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of
the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing
Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia,
that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the
setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to
be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution,
lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed
Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being
no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”
6.On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
7.On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when
General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be
postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the
“order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of
free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”
8.Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it
fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the
conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again,
Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973,
and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the
legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could
do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after
consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed
it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
9.“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,”
praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
10.The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than
Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners
in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion
of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining
respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head,
Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the
National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies,
subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from
collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-
called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met
during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in
paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”
11.On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case
G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,”
and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the
date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that,
upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of
Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the
Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in
 connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to
information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.
The Ratification Case

1.On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases,
Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of
the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a
Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens
and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate
implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.
2.Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution
upon ground that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by
the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was
not a free election, hence null and void.
3.Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and objective.

Issues:

1.Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.

2.Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

3.Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the
people.

4.Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

5.Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

Rulings:

1.It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

1.To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled
that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of
the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
 2.The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
2.The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.

1.The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and
having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
2.The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be
separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must
be considered null and void.
3.Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
envisages with the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons
taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we
had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots
prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records
that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.
4.The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means
of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another
patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in
the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s will.
For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to
have ratified the revised Constitution
3.No majority vote has been reached by the Court.

1.Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people
have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
2.Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no
expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the
proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine
stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new
Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not
at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has
elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of
debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”
3.Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of
 martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no
means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”
4.The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line
with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

2.A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do
not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The
compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the
proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or
instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto,
amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and
inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.
3.As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the same
refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses,
concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the
President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the
1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.
4.In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given
due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in
by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935
Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and
XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such
plebiscite.
2.Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect.

2.Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in
force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is
not in force.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by
petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain
that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation
for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to
provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state
-
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase
the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other
Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/
OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00
per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10
October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for
Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of
the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS
refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC
may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995
the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En
Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for
oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian
firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is
not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x
Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down
conditions under which business may be done.[9]
 Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not
fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first
and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel
and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more,
the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands.Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC
cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition
of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should
have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules
which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate
that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only
takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since
Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the
condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had
not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion
should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious,
whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not
have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute
and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in
other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law
or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out
the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than
non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. [15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the
floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS,
can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not
qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against whom? As
against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word QUALIFIED
because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions under
which business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as
not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around
the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add
to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was
not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of
the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available.[17] Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is
not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10,
second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs
of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument
is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by
its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one
part and non-self-executing in another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional
provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically
not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to
legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life,[22] the vital role of the
youth in nation-building,[23] the promotion of social justice,[24] and the values of
education.[25]Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional
provisions on social justice and human rights[27] and on
education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the
promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of the
youth in nation-building[32] and the promotion of total human liberation and
development.[33] A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are
not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only
principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that
- qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission[34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to
our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands,
forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our
people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912,
it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it
has since then become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was
the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine
Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel:
The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the hotel was converted
by the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the
American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final
stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of
political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the
hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international
recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the
hotel was the site of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president
was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood.Verily, Manila Hotel has become part
of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo amendment. And the
amendment would consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the
following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH
CITIZENS.

xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we have to
raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it
preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What about a
corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the preference
should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer
only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]

xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word Filipinos
here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate
his amendment so that I can ask a question.
 MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified and a Filipino
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will
the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner

Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called
Filipino First policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of
concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony.[42]

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission

regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner
Nolledo[43] -
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic
concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was
never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be
made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen
over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered
by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-
qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the
sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity
ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by
arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires
implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear
constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only too distressing. To
adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to
the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which
evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can
be the source of a judicial remedy.We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or
guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on
constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility
for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for
an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional government operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to
the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and
distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that
the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of
the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly
pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly
involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It
is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of state
action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people
but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed
among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is
not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance
that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation
to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative
of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which
violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of
a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be
to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines
are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or
with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the
beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is
meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the
bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if
the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had
not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right
or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly,
only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard
by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of
action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard
unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila
Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension
of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion
while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative
but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only
with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The
refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of
the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied
in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future
legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court
to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign
investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this
matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice
Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they
are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the
Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no
matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business
viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset,
should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a
budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material
values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper
governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a
democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people
and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the
happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can
have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must
adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible,
is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of
the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We
are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a
strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state
function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has
played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of
twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become
truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most
historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in
Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of
the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is,
in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be
equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila
Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national
pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-
meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly
watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter
to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue
the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr.,
JJ, concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo, J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion
 Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.
Panganiban J., with separate dissenting opinion.

EN BANC

REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. G.R. No. 143855

ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO
AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS,
RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY,
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI and FRANKLIN
BAUTISTA,
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
- versus - BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,* and
SERENO,** JJ.
HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (Executive
Secretary), HON. MAR ROXAS (Secretary of
Trade and Industry), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA
(Secretary of National Economic and
Development Authority), GOV. RAFAEL
BUENAVENTURA (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
and HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission),
Respondents. Promulgated:

September 21, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and determine the
constitutionality of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which has been assailed
as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

The Facts and the Case

On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762,
also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A.
1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade
business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories:

Category A Less than Exclusively for Filipino

US$2,500,000.00 citizens and corporations
wholly owned by Filipino
citizens.
Category B US$2,500,000.00 up but For the first two years of
less than US$7,500,000.00 R.A. 8762s effectivity,
foreign ownership is
allowed up to 60%. After
the two-year period, 100%
foreign equity shall be
allowed.
Category C US$7,500,000.00 or more May be wholly owned by
foreigners. Foreign
investments for establishing
a store in Categories B and
C shall not be less than the
 equivalent in Philippine
Pesos of US$830,000.00.
Category D US$250,000.00 per store of May be wholly owned by
foreign enterprises foreigners.
specializing in high-end or
luxury products

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and
now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights
as Filipino citizens.

On October 11, 2000 petitioners Magtanggol T. Gunigundo I, Michael T.

Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin S. Lim, Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong,
Sergio Apostol, Robert Ace S. Barbers, Enrique Garcia, Jr., Raul M. Gonzales, Jaime
Jacob, Apolinario Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor, Ma. Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero
Pichay, Juan Miguel Zubiri and Franklin Bautista, all members of the House of
Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on
the following grounds:

First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which
enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve
equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full employment, and
protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.

Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade,
which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in
the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.

Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-
sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.

Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the
passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or
combinations in restraint of trade.

Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary
Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe
Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:

First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact
that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public
funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members of Congress since they made
no claim that the law infringes on their right as legislators.

Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners of course
claim that, as members of Congress, they represent the small retail vendors in their
respective districts but the petition does not allege that the subject law violates the rights
of those vendors.

Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A.

8762. Indeed, they could not specify how the new law violates the constitutional
provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions that are judicially demandable.

Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign
investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so
dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to
make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the
entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino
citizens.
 The Issues Presented

Simplified, the case presents two issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and

2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.

The Courts Ruling

One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of a law must have a
standing to do so.[1] Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come
to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his
personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a
result of the passage of that law.[2] To put it another way, he must show that he has been
or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he
is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the law he complains
of.[3]

Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as
taxpayers[4] or as legislators.[5] Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since
the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when as in this case the public interest so requires or the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.[6]

Two. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which read as
follows:
 Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure
the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

xxxx

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National Economy and Patrimony under
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

xxxx

Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.

Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.
But, as the Court explained in Taada v. Angara,[7] the provisions of Article II of the
1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts.

The Court further explained in Taada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays
down the ideals of economic nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make
them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.[8]

In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the
economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests
from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference
in all areas of development.

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it
requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms
and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of
industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the
protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair.[9]
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments,
goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.[10] The key, as in all
economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and
allowing the entry of foreign investments and services.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the
discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation
of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine
what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can
enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas
of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively
to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.

The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an
exercise of the police power of the State. A persons right to property, whether he is a
Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him without due process of
law.In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that
restricts the retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the
validity of such Act for violation of the foreigners right to substantive due process of law,
the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of police
power.[11] The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and
R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.

Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the
restraint on the foreigners right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business,
it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos right to property and to
due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail
business to which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A.
8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is
no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not
convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control
of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong
argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign
participation in that business. Thus

First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-
enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in
countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail
trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in
certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or
rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants
and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has prejudiced and
can prejudice the local small and medium enterprises since its implementation about a
decade ago.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave) (On Official Leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave) (On Official Leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 (On Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest
Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA
6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of
the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7
and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the
Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s
petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people’s
initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature
and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the third
mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the
legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a
valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-25916. April 30, 1970.]

GAUDENCIO A. BEGOSA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAIRMAN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION; and MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, Defendants-Appellants.

Jose V . Rosales for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Solicitor General, for Defendants-Appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PARTIES; DOCTRINE OF NON-SUABILITY OF STATE, EXCEPTION.— It is well settled that where a litigation may
have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against
not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where
the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public
funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner

2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY UNNECESSARY WHERE QUESTION IS LEGAL;
CASE AT BAR.— It is well established that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable ‘where
the question in dispute is purely a legal one,’ or where the controverted act is ‘patently illegal’ or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a department Secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. Where
there is a stipulation of facts, as in this case, the question before the lower court being solely one of law and on the face of the decision, the
actuation of appellants being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does not come into play.

3. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF REGULATORY AGENCIES ENTITLED TO RESPECT.— It has often been announced, and rightly so, that as much
as possible the findings of regulatory agencies which are expected to acquire expertise by their jurisdiction being confined to specific matters,
deserve to be accorded respect and finality. There is a limit, however, to such a deference paid to the actuations of such bodies. Clearly, where
there has been a failure to interpret and apply the statutory provisions in question, judicial power should assert itself. Under the theory of
separation of powers, it is to the judiciary, and to the judiciary alone, that the final say on questions of law in appropriate cases coming before it is
vested.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

Plaintiff Gaudencio A. Begosa, now appellee, sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he believed he was entitled under the
Veterans’ Bill of Rights. 1 To such a move, there was an insistent objection, both vigorous and persistent, on the part of defendants, the chairman
and the members of the Philippine Veterans Administration, now appellants. The lower court, then presided by the then Judge, now Justice of the
Court of Appeals, the Honorable Edilberto Soriano, found for plaintiffs, after a careful and meticulous study of the applicable statutory provisions.
Not being satisfied with such a judgment, defendants appealed, relying once more on the principal grounds raised below that plaintiff should have
exhausted his administrative remedies before coming to court and that he was in fact suing the State without its consent having been obtained. As
neither defense is sufficiently meritorious, we affirm the lower court decision.

As noted in such decision, appellee’s complaint was predicated on his having been "an enlisted man in good standing of the Philippine
Commonwealth Army, inducted in the service of the USAFFE" and having taken "active participation in the battle of Bataan" as well as the
"liberation drive against the enemy" thereafter having become "permanently incapacitated from work due to injuries he sustained in line of
duty . . ." 2 It was likewise asserted in his complaint that after having submitted all the supporting papers relative to his complaint, there was a
disapproval on the part of defendants on the ground of his having been dishonorably discharged, although such an event did not take place until
almost five years after the end of the war on November 7, 1950 and while he was in the service of a different organization that such a penalty was
imposed on him. 3

Then came the allegation that there was an approval on his claim on September 2, 1964 but effective only as of October 5 of that year, and for
amount much less than that to which he was entitled under the law. 4 The relief sought was the payment, as of the date to which he believed his
right to pension should have been respected, of the sums, which he felt were legally due and owing to him. c hanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The then Judge Soriano noted that there was an admission of certain allegations to the complaint with others being denied, and that the following
affirmative and special defenses were interposed: "Defendants’ answer admits certain allegations of said complaint, while denying others; set up
the following affirmative and special defenses: (1) payment of disability pension under Republic Act No. 65, as amended, by the Philippine
Veterans Administration commences from the date the proper application therefor is approved; (2) plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative
remedies before resorting to court action, hence the present action is premature; (3) inasmuch as the instant action pertains to money claim against
the Government, it must first be presented before the Auditor General as provided by existing law on the matter (C.A. 327); and (4) plaintiff’s
claim is in reality a suit against the Government which cannot be entertained by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the Government has not
given its consent, . . ." 5 The case was then submitted on an agreed statement of facts and the respective memoranda of the parties.

In the decision now on appeal, the question of when appellee is entitled to his pension as well as how much it would amount to were fully
discussed by the lower court. Thus, as to the former: "From the facts just set out, it will be noted that plaintiff filed his said claim for disability
pension as far back as March 4, 1955; that it was erroneously disapproved on June 21, 1955, because his dishonorable discharge from the Army
was not a good or proper ground for the said disapproval, and that on reconsideration asked for by him on November 1, 1957, which he continued
to follow up, the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, composed of herein defendants, which took over the duties of the
Philippine Veterans Board, finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964, at the rate of P30.00 a month." 6 After stating that in fairness and
good conscience the said claims could be made effective as of June 21, 1955, when it was erroneously disapproved by appellants, and not on
September 2, 1964 when it was approved on reconsideration, as appellee should not for obvious reason be made to suffer for the error of another,
the then Judge Soriano observed further: "Had it not been for the said error, it appears that there was no good ground to deny the said claim, so the
latter was valid and meritorious even as of the date of its filing on March 4, 1955, hence to make the same effective only as of the date of its
approval on September 2, 1964 — according to defendant’s stand —would be greatly unfair and prejudicial to plaintiff. This is especially true in
the light of the well-known intent of the legislature in passing these pension laws of war veterans, and the no less well-known spirit in which they
should be construed or interpreted by the courts in favor of their beneficiaries." 7

On the question of how much plaintiff should receive according to law, the appealed decision contains the following: "The next question for
resolution refers to the monthly rate or amount to which plaintiff is entitled by way of pension. According to plaintiff, he should be given a
disability pension of P50.00 a month from June 21, 1955 (the effective date of his claim as above found by this Court) until June 21, 1957, and
P100.00 a month for life from June 22, 1957 when Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended by Republic Act No. 1362, was further amended
by Republic Act No. 1920). This contention is well taken because the very letter of the Philippine Veterans Administration to plaintiff (Annex F of
the [Agreed Statements of Facts]) contains the following: ‘Note: Re-rating is not required, permanent disability.’ By ‘permanent disability’, as this
Court understands it, is meant that plaintiff is permanently incapacitated from work. Under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1362, which was the law in force when plaintiff’s claim for pension should have been approved on June 21, 1955, he was
entitled to a pension of P50.00 a month as such permanently incapacitated person, which monthly rate or amount was increased to P100.00 a
month when the said Section 9 was further amended by Republic Act No. 1920 on June 22, 1957." 8 Why the action of appellants in the form of
resolution could not prevail as against the law was made clear by the decision in this wise: "For one thing, the said resolution may not change or
amend the meaning of the term ‘permanent disability’ as used by Congress itself in enacting the said Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as
amended. For another, as of June 21, 1955 and as of June 21, 1957, plaintiff was already entitled to the said pension of P50.00 and P100.00 a
month respectively, and his said right cannot be adversely affected by a resolution which was allegedly adopted only in 1963." 9 Necessarily,
there was in the decision likewise a recognition of the monthly allowance for each of appellee’s unmarried minor children below 18 years of age
at the time he was entitled to the pension to which under the statute he could validly lay claim.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After rejecting as untenable the defenses that there was no exhaustion of administrative remedies, that the action is in the nature of money claim
which should first be presented before the Auditor General, and that said action is in reality a suit against the Government without the latter’s
consent, the decision concludes with the following:" [Wherefore], judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff’s
amended complaint, to wit, that defendants make plaintiff’s pension effective June 21, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 at
the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month each for his four unmarried minor children below 18 years old from June 22, 1957 up to
September 1, 1964; and the difference of P70.00 a month, plus P10.00 for his one unmarried minor child below 18 years old from September 2,
1954, and thereafter, with costs against said dependents." 10

Appellants elevated the matter to us. The careful and painstaking way in which the controlling statutory provisions were considered and applied
by the then Judge Soriano must have impelled them to place their faith in the alleged failure to respect the doctrines of non-suability and
exhaustion of administrative remedies to obtain a reversal. The appealed decision, however, as will now be shown is not subject to such a
reproach. The appeal then, as noted at the outset, is not to be attended with success.

1. The fourth assignment of error assails what it considers to be the failing of the lower court in not holding that the complaint in this case is in
effect a suit against the State which has not given its consent thereto. We have recently had occasion to reaffirm the force and primacy of the
doctrine of non-suability. 11 It does not admit of doubt, then, that if the suit were in fact against the State, the lower court should have dismissed
the complaint. Nor is it to be doubted that while ostensibly an action may be against a public official, the defendant may in reality be the
government. As a result, it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-
suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of
his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Such is the present
case.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

The doctrine announced by us in Ruiz v. Cabahug 12 finds relevance: "We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended
complaint, which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to
compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and
recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work
done." 13 As a matter of fact, in an earlier case where we sustained the power of a private citizen claiming title to and right of possession of a
certain property to sue an officer or agent of the government alleged to be illegally withholding the same, we likewise expressed this caveat:
"However, and this is important, where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of
said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government
itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government." 14

2. Nor is the third assignment of error to the effect that the lower court did not require appellee to exhaust his administrative remedies before
coming to court any more persuasive. An excerpt from the leading case of Gonzales v. Hechanova, 15 the opinion being penned by the present
Chief Justice, clearly demonstrates why appellants’ argument in this respect is unavailing: "Respondents assail petitioner’s right to the reliefs
prayed for because he ‘has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court.’ We have already held, however,
that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable ‘where the question in dispute is purely a legal
one’, or where the controverted act is ‘patently illegal’ or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent
is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually
disapproved by him, or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention." 16 The Gonzales doctrine, it is to be noted,
summarized the views announced in earlier cases. 17 The list of subsequent cases reiterating such a doctrine is quite impressive. 18 To be more
specific, where there is a stipulation of facts, as in this case, the question before the lower court being solely one of law and on the face of the
decision, the actuation of appellants being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does not come into play.

3. The other errors assigned, namely the alleged failure of the lower court to comply with the law in fixing the amounts to which appellee is
entitled instead of following the rules and regulations on veterans’ benefits promulgated by appellants and the alleged interference with the purely
discretionary matter of a coordinate administrative agent, the Philippine Veterans Administration, can easily be disposed of. It is to be admitted
that appellants as chairman and members of the Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, are officials of an
administrative body. 19 Nor may exception be taken to the general principle that as much as possible the courts should view with the utmost
sympathy the exercise of power of administrative tribunals whether in its rule-making or adjudicatory capacity. It has often been announced, and
rightly so, that as much as possible the findings of these regulatory agencies which are expected to acquire expertise by their jurisdiction being
confined to specific matters, deserve to be accorded respect and finality. There is a limit, however, to such a deference paid to the actuations of
such bodies. Clearly, where there has been a failure to interpret and apply the statutory provisions in question, judicial power should assert itself.
Under the theory of separation of powers, it is to the judiciary and to the judiciary alone, that the final say on questions of law appropriate cases
coming before it is vested. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

When the then Judge Soriano, therefore, as he was called upon to do, saw to it that there was strict compliance with the amounts of pension
required by the law to be granted plaintiff and disregarded the regulation promulgated under the rule-making power of appellants, the effect of
which would make appellee suffer the consequences of an error committed by them, it cannot be truly said that his decision may be assailed as
being offensive to authoritative doctrines. On the contrary, it can stand the test of the utmost scrutiny. Precisely because the commands of the law
were duly carried out, it cannot be set aside.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the then Judge Edilberto Soriano of the Court of First Instance of Manila promulgated on January 22, 1966, is
affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Barredo, J . is on leave.
G.R. No. 102667 February 23, 2000
AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC., and JOSE IGLESIAS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 27244, which set aside the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 88-43887, and ordered petitioner Amado J.
Lansang to pay private respondent Jose Iglesias P50,000.00 in moral damages, P10,000.00 in exemplary damages and
P5,000.00 in attorney's fees.
Like public streets, public parks are beyond the commerce of man. However, private respondents were allegedly
awarded a "verbal contract of lease" in 1970 by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government
initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks, including Rizal Park,1 but actually administered by
high profile civic leaders and journalists. Whoever in NPDC gave such "verbal" accommodation to private
respondents was unclear, for indeed no document or instrument appears on record to show the grantor of the verbal
license to private respondents to occupy a portion of the government park dedicated to the national hero's memory.
Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. One
such kiosk was located along T.M. Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private respondent General
Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived from operating the
kiosks,2 without again anything shown in the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used or
spent.
With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought
to clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February
29, 1988, petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the
premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park.3 In another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents
were given until March 8, 1988 to vacate.4
The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its
contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He was allegedly
told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice.
Although blind, Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business.
On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the Regional Trial Court
against petitioner, Villanueva, and "all persons acting on their behalf".5 The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order on the same day.6
The TRO expired on March 28, 1988. The following day, GABI was finally evicted by NPDC.
GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the complaint was
actually directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruled that
GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was a mere accommodation
concessionaire. As such, it could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from the conclusion.
The trial court noted that no such proof was presented. 1âwphi1.nêt

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity is
not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.7 Granting that
petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and capricious manner in which that authority
was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be held liable for damages"8 according to the Court
of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals noted that, as the trial court observed, the eviction of GABI came at the heels of two significant
incidents. First, after private respondent Iglesias extended monetary support to striking workers of the NPDC, and
second, after Iglesias sent the Tanodbayan, a letter on November 26, 1987, denouncing alleged graft and corruption in
the NPDC.9 These, according to the Court of Appeals, should not have been taken against GABI, which had been
occupying Rizal Park for nearly 20 years. GABI was evicted purportedly for violating its verbal agreement with
NPDC.10 However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that NPDC failed to present proof of such violation.11
The Court of Appeals found petitioner liable for damages under Articles 19, 21, and 24 of the Civil Code.12
The Court of Appeals absolved from liability all other persons impleaded in GABI's complaint since it appeared that
they were merely acting under the orders of petitioner. The new officers of NPDC, additionally impleaded by GABI,
were likewise absolved from liability, absent any showing that they participated in the acts complained of. Petitioner
was ordered to pay private respondent Iglesias moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition, in which petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT AGAINST PETITIONER, AS CHAIRMAN OF NPDC, AND HIS CO-
DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 88-43887, IS IN EFFECT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE WHICH
CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.
 II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S ACT
OF TERMINATING RESPONDENT GABI'S CONCESSION IS VALID AND DONE IN THE LAWFUL
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY.13
Petitioner insists that the complaint filed against him is in reality a complaint against the State, which could not
prosper without the latter's consent. He anchors his argument on the fact that NPDC is a government agency, and that
when he ordered the eviction of GABI, he was acting in his capacity as chairman of NPDC. Petitioner avers that the
mere allegation that he was being sued in his personal capacity did not remove the case from the coverage of the law
of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity.
Petitioner points out that Iglesias signed the notice of eviction to indicate his conformity thereto. He contends that as
evidence of private respondents' bad faith, they sued petitioner instead of complying with their undertaking to vacate
their library and kiosk at Rizal Park.
Petitioner adds that during the actual eviction, no untoward incident occurred. GABI's properties were properly
inventoried and stored.
According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals' observation that the eviction was prompted by Iglesias' support for
striking NPDC workers and the letter-complaint sent to the Tanodbayan is merely conjectural.
Finally, petitioner avers that the move to evict GABI and award the spaces it occupied to another group was an
executive policy decision within the discretion of NPDC. GABI's possession of the kiosks as concessionaire was by
mere tolerance of NPDC and, thus, such possession may be withdrawn at any time, with or without cause.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that petitioner acted beyond the scope of his authority when he showed
malice and bad faith in ordering GABI's ejectment from Rizal Park. Quoting from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, private respondents argue that petitioner is liable for damages for performing acts "to injure an individual
rather than to discharge a public duty."14
While private respondents recognize the authority of petitioner to terminate the agreement with GABI "if [the contract]
is prejudicial to the interest of the NPDC,"15 they maintain that petitioner's personal interest, and not that of the
NPDC, was the root cause of GABI's ejecment.
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the
performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the
judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as
appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.16
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and
injurious to the rights of others.17 Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising
from acts committed in bad faith.18
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal
capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. The
complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of the NPDC, but did not
categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity.19 Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said complaint that
petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
4. Defendant AMADO J. LANSANG, JR., the Chairman of the National Parks Development
Committee, acting under the spirit of revenge, ill-will, evil motive and personal resentment against
plaintiff JOSE IGLESIAS, served on the plaintiff corporation a letter, dated February 23, 1988 terminating
 plaintiffs lease agreement with a demand for the plaintiff corporation to vacate its office
premises. . .20 (Emphasis supplied.)
The parties do not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered the ejectment of GABI from their office and kiosk at
Rizal Park. There is also no dispute that petitioner, as chairman of the NPDC which was the agency tasked to
administer Rizal Park, had the authority to terminate the agreement with GABI21 and order the organization's
ejectment. The question now is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private
respondents.
We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. As earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the
commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract.
That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of
accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly discontinue the
accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private
respondents cannot and does not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.
The Court of Appeals awarded private respondent Iglesias moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
However, we find no evidence on record to support Iglesias' claim that he suffered moral injury as a result of GABI's
ejectment from Rizal Park. Absent any satisfactory proof upon which the Court may base the amount of damages
suffered, the award of moral damages cannot be sustained.22
Neither can we sustain the award of exemplary damages, which may only be awarded in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages.23 We also disallow the award for attorney's fees, which can only be recovered
per stipulation of the parties, which is absent in this case. There is no showing that any of the exceptions justifying the
award of attorney's fees absent a stipulation is present in this case.24
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27244 is
hereby SET ASIDE, and the DISMISSAL of the complaint for damages by the trial court for want of merit is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt

Bellosillo, Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena, J., on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON
MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA,
PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC,
BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.

CORTES, J:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security
System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally,
it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees
from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial
court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition,
reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page
order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting
of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of
the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a
resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on March
9,1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the Court of
Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No.
97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied
in view of this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the instant petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners
from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered
the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS
and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of
Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by
civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since
neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees
from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of
Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may
be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing
with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the
case and enjoined the strike are as follows:
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from
continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim
I
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the public
sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the
Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec.
2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right
to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[tlhe right to self-organization shall
not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by
Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed this
amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it does not mean that because
they have the right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are
only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to strike, everyone will
remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations or societies
whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to
prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising government functions, that could be done
because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal union.
And that provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those
from the government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but they are prohibited from
striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice- President is unfounded. It does not mean that because we
approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of
fact, that subject is now being discussed in the Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to
find a solution to this problem. We know that this problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody
in the government to strike, then what will happen if the members of the Armed Forces will go on
strike? What will happen to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion in the
Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an organization does not carry with it the
right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in
1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental
functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
 .Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The terms and conditions of employment
in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by
law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such
employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to
join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to employees employed in
governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary functions of the Government
including but not limited to governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the right of employees of
government corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in the
civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70
in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all government employees,
including employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government
employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No.
807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the
President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress."
The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any
legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the
right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O.
No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-
controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the
civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the
SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No. 60403,
August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the
private sector and government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law"
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D.
No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to
 secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is
that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining.
In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power,
the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this
is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position paper submitted to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the public employer and
the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike given to
unions in private industry as not applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has
been stated that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people
in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor
relations could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they employ. [At pp.
16-17; also quoted in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313, January 17,1985,134
SCRA 172,178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees, while
clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of
employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except those that are
fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees' organizations
and appropriate government authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the
public sector to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be
followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees. In
case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws
and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor- Management]
Council for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the
betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved
grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But
employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers
in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III
of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization,
which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations
with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes
thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction
may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC
and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the
strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government
employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive
writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been granted by
law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not
the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded with caution.
Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of
public service, the respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved controversies
emanating from their employer- employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for
appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated in their reply and
supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the individual
petitioners and they pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction to restrain the
SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental reply,
petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the
SSSEA who are not preventively suspended and who are reporting for work pending the resolution of the
administrative cases against them are entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and affirmed
the previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that petitioners' remedy is not to
petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid order, if it has already become
final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is
hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is
AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO
MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul Certain orders of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending
before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without bond.
The action in question was — upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU)
Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting prosecutor of the
Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department
of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin
Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the
employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise
of their right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to
discourage them from pursuing the union activities.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the
charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things,
that respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended
pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations
petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not
an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government
functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could
be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised
by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such
jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order
dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing
are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this
order having been also denied by the court in banc, the petitioners brought the case to this Court through the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of
the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those
processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by
law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev.
Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act.
Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in
business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the
conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done
only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the
overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon
its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly
proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for private persons, we find that such work is done
upon request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government work will permit"
(sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department
Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works consist of
orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government officials, and for printing of checks of private banking
institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use,
is embossed, and on the bank cheeks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official
documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is
only one-half of 1 per cent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include
profit because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private
printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it
executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in
character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from
those employed in its general governmental functions.
From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the
respondent Bureau of Printing, and is thus devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has
already held in a long line of decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the
complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not organized for profit and, consequently,
not an industrial or business organization. This is so because the Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to
industrial employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for
purposes of gain, and their industrial employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-
15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L-13748, October 30, 1959; La
Consolacion College vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.) .
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot
be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect,
would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the
Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz.
2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et. al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December
28, 1957).
The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of
the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said
administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by
inciting the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted
officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute and investigate
administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed
before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of government
employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials. WHEREFORE,
the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair
labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51806 November 8, 1988
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNEST E. SIMKE, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Ledesma, Guytingco, Veleasco & Associates for respondent Ernest E. Simke.

CORTES, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court
decision which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of
P15,589.55 as full reimbursement of his actual medical and hospital expenses, with interest at the
legal rate from the commencement of the suit; the amount of P20,200.00 as consequential damages;
the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages; the amount of P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; the
further amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs [Rollo, p. 24].
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent is a naturalized Filipino citizen and at the time of the incident was the Honorary Consul Geileral of
Israel in the Philippines.
In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private respondent with several other persons went to the Manila International
Airport to meet his future son-in-law. In order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group
proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
While walking on the terrace, then filled with other people, private respondent slipped over an elevation about four (4)
inches high at the far end of the terrace. As a result, private respondent fell on his back and broke his thigh bone.
The next day, December 14, 1968, private respondent was operated on for about three hours.
Private respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VII against petitioner Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity empowered "to administer,
operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport ... ." [Sec. 32 (24), R.A. 776].
Said claim for damages included, aside from the medical and hospital bills, consequential damages for the expenses of
two lawyers who had to go abroad in private respondent's stead to finalize certain business transactions and for the
publication of notices announcing the postponement of private respondent's daughter's wedding which had to be
cancelled because of his accident [Record on Appeal, p. 5].
Judgment was rendered in private respondent's favor prompting petitioner to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The latter
affirmed the trial court's decision. Petitioner then filed with the same court a Motion for, Reconsideration but this was
denied.
Petitioner now comes before this Court raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that the present the CAA is really a suit against
the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent, which was not given in this
case.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the injuries of respondent Ernest E. Simke were
due to petitioner's negligence — although there was no substantial evidence to support such finding;
and that the inference that the hump or elevation the surface of the floor area of the terrace of the fold)
 MIA building is dangerous just because said respondent tripped over it is manifestly mistaken —
circumstances that justify a review by this Honorable Court of the said finding of fact of respondent
appellate court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622; Ramos v. CA, 63 SCRA 331.)
3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ordering petitioner to pay actual, consequential, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees to respondent Simke — although there was no
substantial and competent proof to support said awards I Rollo, pp. 93-94 1.
I
Invoking the rule that the State cannot be sued without its consent, petitioner contends that being an agency of the
government, it cannot be made a party-defendant in this case.
This Court has already held otherwise in the case of National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. [91 Phil. 203
(1952)]. Petitioner contends that the said ruling does not apply in this case because: First, in the Teodoro case, the
CAA was sued only in a substituted capacity, the National Airports Corporation being the original party. Second, in
the Teodoro case, the cause of action was contractual in nature while here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-
delict. Third, there is no specific provision in Republic Act No. 776, the law governing the CAA, which would justify
the conclusion that petitioner was organized for business and not for governmental purposes. [Rollo, pp. 94-97].
Such arguments are untenable.
First, the Teodoro case, far from stressing the point that the CAA was only substituted for the National Airports
Corporation, in fact treated the CAA as the real party in interest when it stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
... To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil
Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its
own rights and in its own name. The better practice there should have been to make the Civil
Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation.
[National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra, p. 208.]
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the Teodoro case did not make any qualification or limitation as to whether or not the CAA's power to sue and
be sued applies only to contractual obligations. The Court in the Teodoro case ruled that Sections 3 and 4 of Executive
Order 365 confer upon the CAA, without any qualification, the power to sue and be sued, albeit only by implication.
Accordingly, this Court's pronouncement that where such power to sue and be sued has been granted without any
qualification, it can include a claim based on tort or quasi-delict [Rayo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, G.R. Nos.
55273-83, December 19,1981, 1 1 0 SCRA 4561 finds relevance and applicability to the present case.
Third, it has already been settled in the Teodoro case that the CAA as an agency is not immune from suit, it being
engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity.
xxx xxx xxx
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a
body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary
function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime
objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged
in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the
construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. [National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro,
supra, p. 207.]
 xxx xxx xxx
True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was promulgated was Exec. Order 365 (Reorganizing the
Civil Aeronautics Administration and Abolishing the National Airports Corporation). Republic Act No. 776 (Civil
Aeronautics Act of the Philippines), subsequently enacted on June 20, 1952, did not alter the character of the CAA's
objectives under Exec, Order 365. The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly Secs. 3 and 4 of
Exec. Order 365, which led the Court to consider the CAA in the category of a private entity were retained
substantially in Republic Act 776, Sec. 32 (24) and (25). Said Act provides:
<äre||anº•1àw>

Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general — control and supervision of
the Department Head, the Administrator shall have among others, the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport
and all government-owned aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines including such powers and duties as: (a) to plan, design, construct, equip, expand,
improve, repair or alter aerodromes or such structures, improvement or air navigation facilities; (b) to
enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private
corporation or entity; ... .
(25) To determine, fix, impose, collect and receive landing fees, parking space fees, royalties on sales
or deliveries, direct or indirect, to any aircraft for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare
parts, accessories and supplies, tools, other royalties, fees or rentals for the use of any of the property
under its management and control.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or non-governmental functions which operate
to remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the Tedoro
case states:
xxx xxx xxx
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity
functions suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The
rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to
act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain
corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a
governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The
latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for
by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so
far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the
corporation. (59 C.J., 313) [National Airport Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-
207; Emphasis supplied.]
This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v. Philippine National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930,
August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 631, where it was held that the Philippine National Railways, although owned and
operated by the government, was not immune from suit as it does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and
business functions. Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of airport operations which
primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies
performing strictly governmental functions.
II
Petitioner tries to escape liability on the ground that there was no basis for a finding of negligence. There can be no
negligence on its part, it alleged, because the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for being on the terrace
and was never intended to trip down people and injure them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain water on
the floor area of the terrace" [Rollo, P. 99].
To determine whether or not the construction of the elevation was done in a negligent manner, the trial court
conducted an ocular inspection of the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
... This Court after its ocular inspection found the elevation shown in Exhs. A or 6-A where plaintiff
slipped to be a step, a dangerous sliding step, and the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury...
xxx xxx xxx
This Court during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and defective condition of the
open terrace which has remained unrepaired through the years. It has observed the lack of
maintenance and upkeep of the MIA terrace, typical of many government buildings and offices. Aside
from the litter allowed to accumulate in the terrace, pot holes cause by missing tiles remained
unrepaired and unattented. The several elevations shown in the exhibits presented were verified by
this Court during the ocular inspection it undertook. Among these elevations is the one (Exh. A)
where plaintiff slipped. This Court also observed the other hazard, the slanting or sliding step (Exh. B)
as one passes the entrance door leading to the terrace [Record on Appeal, U.S., pp. 56 and 59;
Emphasis supplied.]
The Court of Appeals further noted that:
The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for as stated by the said witness, it is neither a ramp
because a ramp is an inclined surface in such a way that it will prevent people or pedestrians from
sliding. But if, it is a step then it will not serve its purpose, for pedestrian purposes. (tsn, p. 35, Id.)
[rollo, p. 29.]
These factual findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Hence, the CAA cannot disclaim its liability for the
negligent construction of the elevation since under Republic Act No. 776, it was charged with the duty of planning,
designing, constructing, equipping, expanding, improving, repairing or altering aerodromes or such structures,
improvements or air navigation facilities [Section 32, supra, R.A. 776]. In the discharge of this obligation, the CAA is
duty-bound to exercise due diligence in overseeing the construction and maintenance of the viewing deck or terrace of
the airport.
It must be borne in mind that pursuant to Article 1173 of the Civil Code, "(t)he fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing
deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to
the viewing deck to watch the planes and passengers, their tendency would be to look to where the planes and the
incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck. The CAA should have
thus made sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue harm
to the public.
The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides
that "(w)hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done... As the CAA knew of the existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims though, was made
precisely in accordance with the plans and specifications of the building for proper drainage of the open terrace [See
Record on Appeal, pp. 13 and 57; Rollo, p. 391, its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the
existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon CAA.
The Court finds the contention that private respondent was, at the very least, guilty of contributory negligence, thus
reducing the damages that plaintiff may recover, unmeritorious. Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the
Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate
cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being the
defendant's lack of due care. In the instant case, no contributory negligence can be imputed to the private respondent,
considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably
said: Reasonable men-overn their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to
them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected
to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent
man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it
was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v. Smith, supra, p. 813; Emphasis supplied.]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen
the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private respondent had
been looking where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction. As the
trial court found:
In connection with the incident testified to, a sketch, Exhibit O, shows a section of the floorings oil
which plaintiff had tripped, This sketch reveals two pavements adjoining each other, one being
elevated by four and one-fourth inches than the other. From the architectural standpoint the higher,
pavement is a step. However, unlike a step commonly seen around, the edge of the elevated pavement
slanted outward as one walks to one interior of the terrace. The length of the inclination between the
edges of the two pavements is three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had stepped on the inclination
because had his foot landed on the lower pavement he would not have lost his balance. The same
sketch shows that both pavements including the inclined portion are tiled in red cement, and as
shown by the photograph Exhibit A, the lines of the tilings are continuous. It would therefore be
difficult for a pedestrian to see the inclination especially where there are plenty of persons in the
terrace as was the situation when plaintiff fell down. There was no warning sign to direct one's
attention to the change in the elevation of the floorings. [Rollo, pp. 2829.]
III
Finally, petitioner appeals to this Court the award of damages to private respondent. The liability of CAA to answer
for damages, whether actual, moral or exemplary, cannot be seriously doubted in view of one conferment of the power
to sue and be sued upon it, which, as held in the case of Rayo v. Court of First Instance, supra, includes liability on a
claim for quasi-dilict. In the aforestated case, the liability of the National Power Corporation to answer for damages
resulting from its act of sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of the Angat Dam, which caused the death of
several residents of the area and the destruction of properties, was upheld since the o,rant of the power to sue and be
sued upon it necessarily implies that it can be held answerable for its tortious acts or any wrongful act for that matter.
With respect to actual or compensatory damages, the law mandates that the same be proven.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one are entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to
as actual on compensatory damages [New Civil Code].
Private respondent claims P15,589.55 representing medical and hospitalization bills. This Court finds the same to
have been duly proven through the testimony of Dr. Ambrosio Tangco, the physician who attended to private
respondent (Rollo, p. 26) and who Identified Exh. "H" which was his bill for professional services [Rollo, p. 31].
Concerning the P20,200.00 alleged to have been spent for other expenses such as the transportation of the two lawyers
who had to represent private respondent abroad and the publication of the postponement notices of the wedding, the
Court holds that the same had also been duly proven. Private respondent had adequately shown the existence of such
losses and the amount thereof in the testimonies before the trial court [CA decision, p. 81. At any rate, the findings of
the Court of Appeals with respect to this are findings of facts [One Heart Sporting Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 5379053972, Oct. 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 4161 which, as had been held time and again, are, as a general rule,
conclusive before this Court [Sese v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66186, July 31, 1987,152 SCRA 585].
With respect to the P30,000.00 awarded as moral damages, the Court holds private respondent entitled thereto because
of the physical suffering and physical injuries caused by the negligence of the CAA [Arts. 2217 and 2219 (2), New
Civil Code].
With respect to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code explicitly, states:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages, are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, liquidated or compensatory
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
Gross negligence which, according to the Court, is equivalent to the term "notorious negligence" and consists in the
failure to exercise even slight care [Caunan v. Compania General de Tabacos, 56 Phil. 542 (1932)] can be attributed to
the CAA for its failure to remedy the dangerous condition of the questioned elevation or to even post a warning sign
directing the attention of the viewers to the change in the elevation of the floorings notwithstanding its knowledge of
the hazard posed by such elevation [Rollo, pp. 28-29; Record oil Appeal, p. 57]. The wanton disregard by the CAA of
the safety of the people using the viewing deck, who are charged an admission fee, including the petitioner who paid
the entrance fees to get inside the vantage place [CA decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 25] and are, therefore, entitled to expect a
facility that is properly and safely maintained — justifies the award of exemplary damages against the CAA, as a
deterrent and by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of P40,000.00 by the trial court as
exemplary damages appropriately underscores the point that as an entity changed with providing service to the public,
the CAA. like all other entities serving the public. has the obligation to provide the public with reasonably safe service.
Finally, the award of attorney's fees is also upheld considering that under Art. 2208 (1) of the Civil Code, the same
may be awarded whenever exemplary damages are awarded, as in this case, and,at any rate, under Art. 2208 (11), the
Court has the discretion to grant the same when it is just and equitable.
However, since the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) has taken over the management and operations of
the Manila International Airport [renamed Ninoy Aquino International Airport under Republic Act No. 6639] pursuant
to Executive Order No. 778 as amended by executive Orders Nos. 903 (1983), 909 (1983) and 298 (1987) and under
Section 24 of the said Exec. Order 778, the MIAA has assumed all the debts, liabilities and obligations of the now
defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the liabilities of the CAA have now been transferred to the MIAA.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.