Silverio v. Republic October 22, 2007 (GR. No.

174689)

petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name
“Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth
certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment.
He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and
acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining
that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex
alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases
where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or
write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The
petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery.
The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law
allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas,
a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work commitments. He returned to
Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to
Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig
City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering that his
marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized
judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was
subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a
Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign divorce
decree

HELD:

The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The
legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital status of the Filipino
spouse.

However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive
presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with confirmity to the alien's
national law.

The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce decree without
judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be void.

Santos vs. Santos

G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
Statement of the Case:

In his petition for certiorari, petitioner Celerina J. Santos assails the Court of Appeals'
resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. Celerina filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment
of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

Facts of the Case:

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.
Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.

Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents
in Cubao, Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also
inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any
information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional
Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October
2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief,
or other appropriate remedies.

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued
that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According
to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue,
Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989
until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was
deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead.

Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never
resided in Tarlac and never left to work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also
claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware
that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal
dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. Celerina referred to a joint
affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false
allegations in his petition. Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a newspaper. She added
that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not
furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement
before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the
Family Code.

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Issue:

Whether or not Court of Appelas erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground
that the proper remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her
reappearance as stated in Article 42 of the Family Code

Ruling:

Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment,
order, or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.

This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi. For fraud to become
a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when
a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real
contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain
admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage. The Family Code also provides that the
second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse
when he or she reappears. Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals
that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several
conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the
parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either
be undisputed or judicially determined. The existence of these conditions means that
reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the
termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the
Family Code are present. Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the
absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has
already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence;
(3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is
disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such
fact of reappearance.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive

death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second
marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital
relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed
valid. The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved
rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the
status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed
that the other spouse was absent.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous

subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present: (1) The
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years; (2) The spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; (3) There
must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse; and (4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse.

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law. Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad
faith is also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for
being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage still applies.

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination
of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared
presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact,
recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in
court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution
or termination of the subsequent marriage.

Celerina seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy
because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the

Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate, and the property relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same
as in valid marriages. If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real party in
interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the
second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of
nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's
choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.

Disposition:

The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of
extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity or annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of
the petition.

MULLER vs MULLER
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY;

G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006

Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands.

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house
owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from
his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and

maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed
the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title
during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent
cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7,
Article XII of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of
the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of
the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered
the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the
house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Ruling:

No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

Ratio Decidendi:

There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.

Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put
the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.

With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.

Mallilin v Jamesolamin

Facts:

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering
from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital
life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity
became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear
manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment,
and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it
was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a
petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their
marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of
both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision
was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).

Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as
she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Issue:
Whether to consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under
Article 36 is proper and controlling.

Ruling:
No.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph
of Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not
intend to include. What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking
their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if
not inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36

would be legislating from the bench.1âwphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or
decisive.
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C.
QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012
REYES, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in 1977 and got four
children. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage.

In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with
another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the
legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55, thereby awarding the custody of
their three minor children in favor of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject
to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the
trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ
was partially executed.

After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC
to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating
that net profit earned shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the
Family Code. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last
ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the properties in
the conjugal partnership.
Held:
In the case at bar, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.

The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily,
what remains in the listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses
and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

So, as not to be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.