01. EDU v.
ERICTA Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order are constitutional and
G.R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970 FACTS:
The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or
disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred
meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such
vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is
placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every
motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other
similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and
back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters
away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in
this subsection shall be registered." It is thus obvious that the challenged
statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public
safety.
Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as
Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police
power for being violative of the due process clause. Galo also manifested
that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O.
No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such
legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.
ISSUE:
valid.
HELD:
Yes, both are valid.
Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote
public safety and order. Police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state."
As to the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his
official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, it is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power
to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception
that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise.
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the
statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority.
For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves
a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done,
and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be
made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the
legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
In sum, the court ruled that the delegation in this case complied with both
the completeness and sufficient standard tests.
#02 Vera vs. Cuevas
FACTS: The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs- private
respondents to withdraw from the market all of
their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by
Section 169 of the Tax
Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit
warning that failure of
plaintiffs’ private respondents to comply with said order will result in the
institution of the
necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order. Section 169
of the Tax Code reads
as follows: Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. — All
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the
fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers,
and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the
words, “This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age,” or with
other equivalent words.
On 1971, the respondent court restrain the defendant, Commissioner of Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk, the general
Internal Revenue, his clause is restricted by the

agents, or employees from requiring plaintiffs to print on the labels of specific term “skimmed milk” under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis
their filled milk products that general and

the words: “This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than unlimited term are restrained and limited by the particular terms they
one year of age” or follow in the statute.

words with equivalent import and declaring as nun and void and without Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the “Definitions,
authority in law. Standards of Purity,

Rules and Regulations of the Board of Food Inspection,” skimmed milk is

milk in whatever form
ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 169, which requires the inscription “This milk
is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age,” on from which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other
skimmed milk applies to filled milk hand, is any milk, whether

or not condensed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated,

to which has been
HELD: Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis, that is where general added or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other
than milk fat so that
words follow an enumeration of person or things, by words of a particular,
and specific meaning, the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or skim
milk.“ The difference,
such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are
to be held as applying therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the
fatty part has been
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is ͳ. Whether or not respondent acted with dishonesty and incompetence as
substituted with refined a Judge

coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed ʹ. Whether or not a judge may perform non-judicial work, such as being
that Section 169 detailed in the Department of Justice and tasked to assist the Secretary of
Justice.
applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.

03 PAZ GARCIZ v. CATALINO MACARAIG

HELD
FACTS

ͳ. No. Respondent’s inability to perform his judicial duties under these

Respondent Catalino Macaraig took his oath as Judge of CFI of Laguna and
circumstances does not constitute incompetence. Admittedly, respondent
San Pablo City with a station at Calamba on June ʹ9, ͳ97Ͳ. The court, being
has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments
one of the newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch.
and status of cases in his sala, which are required of judges under existing
However, respondent wasn’t able to immediately execute his duties as a
laws and circulars of the DOJ. However, these do not apply to respondent
judge because his courtroom could not be established due to problems
because these laws and circulars contemplate judges who are actually
with the location and necessary appropriations. When he later realized
holding trials, hearings, making decisions, and orders. On the other hand,
that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court,
respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, as he had a
he applied for an extended leave. The Secretary of Justice, however, told
validly confirmed appointment in his favor. That he could not actually hold
respondent to forego his leave and instead assist him, without being
office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his own making.
extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to
Under the law respondent could have been assigned to another court
the needs of his court.
pending these preparations, but that is something within the initiative
ISSUES control of the Secretary of Justice with the permission of the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its judicial power.
ʹ. No. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in
collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other
great departments of the government must always be kept clear and
jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on
which our
subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they
can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or
this Supreme Court, as the case may be.

04 NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE

government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be

gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in NATURE:
the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the
necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction
limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check and balance
between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more
paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental FACTS:
conveniences or exigencies.
• Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified
Commissioner of Land Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151,
the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation,
It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present
emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First
constitutional scheme of government that no judge or even the lowest
Instance."
court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his
actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be
• On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a
letter requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should
be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering
areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas
answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the
rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same
manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the
papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for
action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No.
296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the
Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on
"finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and
conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby
suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above
charges."
• On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the
contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack
of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In
their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as
Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the
petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview
of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of
investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive
in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-
judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of
the separation of powers.
ISSUE:
WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by
the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and
Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance.
HELD:
it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land
Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.
- petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First
Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the
Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature
had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.
- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the
Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be
#5 Evangelista vs. Jarencio 68 SCRA 99
removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the
Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through
the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2). “When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether
- such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature there is probably violation of the law. In sum, it may be stated that a
when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry in (1)
of First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite;
removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to and (3) the information is reasonable relevant.”
other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal
language.

- if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of

"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First
Facts:
Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be
suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then
such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate
the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court
with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive Thru Executive No. 4 of 1966, the President created the Presidential
officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Agency on Reforms
Executive over such officials.

and Government Operations (PARGO) and it also vested all the powers of
Decision: Writs denied, petition dismissed. an investigating committee including the power to summon witness by
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation.
 witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the
investigation” with the authority “to require the production of documents
Evangelista, as Undersecretary of PARGO, issued to Manalastas a
under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the
subpoena to testify in a certain investigation pending in PARGO.
same restrictions and qualification as apply in judicial proceedings of a
Manalastas filed with the CFI an Amended Petition for prohibition,
similar character.”
certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order and assailed the legality of the subpoena. CFI, granted the petition
of Manalastas, restraining PARGO to issue subpoenas in connection with
When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
the fact-finding investigation and from instituting contempt proceedings
administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether
against Manalastas.
there is probably violation of the law. In sum, it may be stated that a
subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry in (1)
within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite;
Issues: Whether PARGO, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to
and (3) the information is reasonable relevant.
issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

No doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by PARGO

upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City
Ruling: Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the PARGO’s
sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from
Manalastas is reasonably relevant to the investigations.

PARGO draws it subpoena power from Exe. Order No. 4 which Order of Judge Jarencio is set aside and declared of no force and effect.
empowered it to “summon

6 AUSTIN HARDWARE COMPANY, INC. vs. CA
operation emits a foul odor, causing air pollution dangerous to the pupils'
health; (4) it is possible that chemicals and other combustible materials are
stored inside the factory, which materials constitute fire lizards to the
school and other nearby residential houses; (5) drainage system of
petitioners' compound is faulty thus causing seepage of liquid into the
neighborhood, and

(6) that the warehouse causes so much noise even at nighttime, by reason
of the machineries therein installed, that restlessness is caused in the
G.R. No. L-41754 February 27, 1976 FACTS:
community.
In 1969, the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal issued a business license and/or
permit authorizing petitioner Austin Hardware Company, Inc. to engage in
the business of general hardware manufacture at No. Acting upon the complaints, the Mayor referred the matter to the
Municipal Engineer and to the Municipal Health Officer. The matter was
115 Lope K. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal. All Steel Products, Inc. was also
likewise referred by the Mayor to the Municipal Council for investigation.
issued license as manufacturer of steel products. In accordance with the
In turn, the Council referred the same to the National Pollution Control
licenses thus issued, petitioners Austin Hardware Company, and All Steel
Commission for verification. In their reports, it stated that although at the
Products, Inc. have been engaged in the business therein described, and in
time of the inspection, the noise level was normal — it is apparent that the
good faith invested considerable amounts s capital.
noise created during actual construction would be above normal. They
recommended that the "municipality should be very careful in issuing
building permits specially for structures that will be used for industrial or
In 1973, concerned residents of Lope K Santos expressed their grievances
manufacturing purposes, that will be located in residential areas."
to the Mayor through letters addressed to the latter alleging that the
operations of the two petitioners produce nuisance, by reason of the facts
that (1) Lope K. Santos being a very narrow street, the heavy trucks by
The Municipal Council rendered its decision on the matter recommending
petitioners cause a traffic jam thereon and the blowing of horns disturbs
to the Municipal Mayor should cancel and/or revoke the license and/or
the classes going on in the school; (2) the unloading of steel bars creates
permit to operate the manufacturing activities of the Austin Hardware Co.,
much noise detrimental to the pupils learning; (3) the shop already in
Inc. and the All Steel Products, Inc. Accordingly, the Mayor addressed a
letter to the petitioners, advising them that their licenses were revoked,
effective five days from notice.

Two motions for the reconsideration of the revocation having been denied
by the Mayor, petitioners filed an ordinary action for injunction in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 19233), alleging among
others, that the revocation of their licenses or permits violated the
requirements of procedural due process because the investigation which
led to the revocation of their licenses/permits was not to determine the
presence of a ground for revocation, namely, violation of a zonification
ordinance of San Juan, but an alleged nuisance produced by their
operations.
CFI issued the restraining order. Private respondents intervened in the
above-named case and filed therein a motion to lift the restraining order
but the same was denied by the court in an order dated Thereupon,
private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the
Court of Appeals praying for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
respondent judge from continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No.
19233, and, after due hearing, declaring the writ of injunction
permanent, ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 19233, setting aside as
null and void all the proceedings thereon, and such other relief as may be
just and equitable under the premises.
The Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction complained
of in this petition.
Private respondents also filed a petition in the appellate, court citing
petitioners for contempt because they were allegedly still operating
despite the order. During the hearing, petitioners raised the issue that the
restraining order should not have included the stopping of their hardware
business, since Austin Hardware's license to operate a hardware store with
storage facilities is not involved in Civil Case No. 19233 because neither the
Municipal Council nor the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, cancelled or revoked it.
The Appellate Court found petitioners' contention devoid of merit,
declared them guilty of contempt and imposed upon them a fine of
P500.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
issuing the writ and in declaring the petitioners in contempt for
disregarding such order.
RULING:
No. The petition is without merit.
The Appellate Court's action is based on careful examination of pleadings
and annexes. It is neither based on speculation nor on a misapprehension
of facts, but on substantial evidence. Among those considered is the
report of the Deputy Clerk of Court of the Division who was ordered to
inspect to the premises to verify whether or not the steel production has
been stopped. The representative of the court confirmed from the ocular
inspection that the operations of the petitioners never ceased in clear
defiance of the lawful order of the Appellate Court.
The power to license necessarily carries with it the authority to provide
reasonable terms and conditions under which the licensed business shall
be conducted. The authority which grants the license always retains the
power to revoke it, "either for cause of forfeiture or upon a change of
policy and legislation touching the subject.
In the case at bar, the permit to the Austin Hardware Company, Inc. and
the All Steel Products, Inc. was granted subject to the provisions of
existing ordinances. Likewise, petitioners' permit to construct a
warehouse at 115 L.K. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal was subject to the
condition that its construction or use will not conflict with the provisions
of the zoning ordinance, otherwise the construction will be removed by
the government at the expense of the permitee or licensee.
It is not disputed that the business establishments of petitioners were
situated within the residential zone and, therefore, the issuance of a
license or permit in favor of the petitioners appears violative of Section 2
of Municipal Ordinance No. 90, Series of 1968, of San Juan, which provides
that "No building permit, business license, or any other certificate of
approval shall be issued by the municipality for commercial or industrial
establishments which shall be erected, operated, and maintained within
any residential zone, unless the site has been or so declared as commercial
or industrial zone in the municipal council." It is precisely for this reason
that the Municipal Mayor of San Juan cancelled or revoked the business
license of the petitioners. Since the obvious purpose of zoning is the
protection of public safety, health, convenience and welfare, it would have ordered another investigation to be made but before said investigation
been has finished, the Secretary rendered a decision dismissing the appeal.

A complaint was filed before CFI of Tarlac where petitioner alleges denial
of due process and grave abuse of discretion, and that he was not formally
represented by counsel at any stage of the proceedings before the
Director of Forestry and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, plus there was no showing that notice was sent to him so as to
afford him an opportunity to obtain the services of a lawyer. However, this
case before the CFI was dismissed upon motion of Villena for lack of
7 TITLE: MAGNO MANUEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARIANO VILLENA,
jurisdiction.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL

RESOURCES, Defendants-Appellees. This instant case is now an appeal from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac dismissing the complaint wherein the plaintiff sought
annulment of the decision of Secretary of ANR dismissing his application
FACTS: Magno Manuel had been in continuous possession of a 20-hectare for a Tree Farm Permit over a 20-hectare parcel of public land, which was
parcel of public land since 1939. Being an ignorant farmer he did not file his included in a 66-hectare area covered by a similar application of private
Tree Farm application (No. 13312) until June 1954. When he filed, the defendant Mariano Villena.
Director of Forestry rejected the same because a prior application (No.
3852) had been filed by Mariano Villena in November 1955; He filed for a
motion for consideration, which was rejected. Manual appealed to the ISSUE: WON the Order of the Secretary of ANR should be set aside.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (ANR). The Secretary to
found that the previous investigation conducted by the District Forester
was not in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bureau, and so
RULING: NO. Under Section 1838 of the RAC, The case (Tree Farm
Application) falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of Forestry with the
approval of the Secretary of ANR.
The power thus conferred on the Director of Forestry with the approval of
the Secretary of ANR is basically executive or administrative in nature. And
courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with the proceedings undertaken by
the administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative
functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better equipped
technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors,
such as government policy on the matter, are usually involved in the
decisions.
There are of course, limits to the exercise of administrative discretion.
Administrative proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon the
showing that “the board or official has
gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or
clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse
of discretion” or that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or
mistake.
It is clear that Sec. 1838 of the RAC does not require the investigation be in
the nature of a court trial. In deciding administrative questions,
administrative bodies or officials generally enjoy wide discretion. Technical
rule of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in the
strict judicial sense is not indispensable. It is sufficient that substantive due
process requirement of fairness and reasonableness be observed. Absence
of previous notice is not itself a substantial defect, what the law abhors is
the lack of opportunity to be heard.
It was not essential that Manuel be represented by a lawyer. The
investigation conducted by Bureau of Forestry was purely fact-finding. It
was not required to be in a form of a trial where both parties, each
represented by a counsel, confront each other and their witnesses. In any
case, Manuel does not allege that the presence of a lawyer could have
altered the result of the investigation. He does not even cite any
substantial error in the findings of the Director of Forestry which could
have been avoided, if a lawyer had represented him.
It should be noted that in the order of the Acting Secretary of ANR, a
formal investigation of the case was ordered. That the investigation was
actually conducted was not denied, and is borne out by the decision of the
Secretary dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal.
We have examined the documents and pleadings reproduced in the
appellant’s record on appeal, particularly the decision of the Secretary of
ANR which is sought to be set aside, and we find that the said decision is
based on a thorough analysis of the facts as revealed by evidence.
8 CASE TITLE: US vs Ang Tang Ho ϰϯ Phil 1
Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and
Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary
circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive
Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed
the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a
rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO.
The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was
charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and
was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He
appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: The said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform
policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of
a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the
act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its
terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.
9 PEOPLE vs VERA (65 Phil 56)
Doctrine of Undue Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies
FACTS: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He
filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were
denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting
new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the
crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal
to the Insular Probation Office.
The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City
Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng
under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power
to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law
is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is
covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides
absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power.
The challenged provision of the said Act was Section 11 thereof which
reads: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
ISSUE: WON the provision constitutes as an undue delegation of legislative
power, thus unconstitutional and void.
RULING: Yes. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it.
The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and
impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does not
seemingly, on its own authority, extend the benefits of the Probation Act
to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of
the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all.
The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to
have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The
plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation.
This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the
provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with
the simple transference of details of execution or the promulgation by
executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into
effect the provisions of a law. It is true that laws may be made effective on
certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption
by the people of a particular community. The legislature may delegate a
power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing
essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as
the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
The legislature, then may provide that a law shall take effect upon the
happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other person
or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has
arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation
of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be
ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the
entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board.
The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited.
A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or
await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule,
— limited by no principle of expediency announced by the legislature. It
may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may
not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any
reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the
salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its
pleasure. The fact that at some future time — we cannot say when — the
provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation
officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will
not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would
yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the
happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment
of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature
SHORT VERSION: The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221
itself.
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or the authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress
individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation.
must be general and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the
localities. constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is
a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged
NOTE: Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Powers: Corollary of separation of
section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall
powers doctrine. - This rule which follows as a necessary corollary of the
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the delegation of legislative
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
power, the vesting of judicial officers with non-judicial functions, as well as
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
the investing on nonjudicial officers with judicial powers. Any attempt at
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction
such delegation is unconstitutional and void. The distinction is between a
of the Probation Office. The provincial boards of the various provinces are
delegation of power to make the law, which involves a discretion as to
to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to
what the law shall be, which delegation is void; and the delegation of
their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
authority or discretion as to the execution of a law to be exercised under,
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
and in pursuance of the law, to which delegation no objection can be
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province,
made. The legislature may delegate its authority to make findings of fact,
all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
and the fact-finding power may be conferred for putting into effect,
salary of a probation officer.
suspending, or applying the law. But where delegation to a fact-finding
body empowers it to create the conditions which constitute the fact, the 10 CASE TITLE: Emmanuel Pelaez v Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825
delegation is invalid. The test of completeness has been said to be (15 SCRA 569), 24 December 1965
whether the provision is sufficiently definite and certain to enable one to
know his rights and obligations thereunder.
FACTS:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities, purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part: The President may by
executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require xxx
Then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as taxpayer, filed a special civil
action – a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction – to restrain the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said
that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code had been impliedly
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by
Act of Congress. Pelaez argues that if the President cannot even create a
barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only
barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities
are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without
creating barrios. The Auditor General further maintains that through Sec.
68 of the Revised Administrative Code, Congress has delegated such
power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether Congress has delegated the power to create
municipalities to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code
RULING:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance
of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public
welfare may require”, which would mean that the President may exercise
such power as the public welfare may require, still, such will not replace
the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains that: The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The
power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. However, this power
is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. The fundamental law permits him to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or
the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of
their authority. The alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an
authority even greater than that of control which he has over the
executive departments, bureaus or offices.
The Executive Orders are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
Auditor General is permanently restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or
any disbursement by the municipalities referred to. The Supreme Court
declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and
eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive)
11 GR L-17821 | Nov 29 1963
PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY MONTILLA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, and BENJAMIN YONZON, defendants-appellants.
FACTS: The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said
municipality to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable
river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions (dams and
dikes) be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056.
After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the
constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his
decision, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5)
closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their
removal at the expense of the respondent. Respondent filed a petition in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from
enforcing his decision, which was granted.
ISSUES: W/N there was unlawful delegation of judicial power to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications by RA 2056
ARGUMENT: The position of the plaintiffs-appellees was that Republic Act
No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and
unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or
stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such
waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law
applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
writs of injunction issued therein are annulled and set aside. The
objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
2056, not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of
Public Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not
tenable
RATIO: It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the
Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon
public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled
to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and
ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession (Palanca vs.
Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act
necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as
the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these
functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the
exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear
that they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the
party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by
Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.
That the creek was navigable in fact before it was closed was also testified
to by the government witnesses, whose version is corroborated as we
have seen.
Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive
decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from
the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion
(Com. of Customs vs. Valencia, 54 O.G. 3505), none of which has been
shown to exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the court below
erred in rejecting the
 Nevertheless, we, agree with appellees that they can not be charged with
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, for the Secretary's decision is
that of the President, in the absence of disapproval.

Finally, there being a possibility that when they purchased the property in
question the appellees Lovina were not informed of the illegal closure of
the Bulati creek, their action, if any, against their vendor, should be, and is
findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works. hereby, reserved.

The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not
laid down before him, for that would be tantamount to holding a new
investigation, and to substitute for the discretion and judgment of the 11 GR L-17821 | Nov 29 1963
Secretary the discretion and judgment of the court, to whom the statute
had entrusted the case. It is immaterial that the present action should be
one for prohibition or injunction and not one for certiorari, in either event PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY MONTILLA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
the case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and
since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de
Communications, and BENJAMIN YONZON, defendants-appellants.
novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not
in violation of the constitution or of the laws, and are free from fraud or
imposition, and whether they find reasonable support in the evidence.
Here, the proof preponderates in favor of the Secretary's decision. FACTS: The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said
municipality to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable
river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions (dams and
dikes) be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056.
After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the
constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his
decision, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5)
closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their
removal at the expense of the respondent. Respondent filed a petition in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from
enforcing his decision, which was granted.
ISSUES: W/N there was unlawful delegation of judicial power to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications by RA 2056
ARGUMENT: The position of the plaintiffs-appellees was that Republic Act
No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and
unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or
stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such
waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law
applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
writs of injunction issued therein are annulled and set aside. The
objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
2056, not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of
Public Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not
tenable
RATIO: It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the
Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon
public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled
to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and
ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession (Palanca vs.
Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act
necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as
the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these
functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the
exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear
that they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the
party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by
Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.
That the creek was navigable in fact before it was closed was also testified
to by the government witnesses, whose version is corroborated as we
have seen.
 Nevertheless, we, agree with appellees that they can not be charged with
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, for the Secretary's decision is
Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive
that of the President, in the absence of disapproval.
decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from
the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion
(Com. of Customs vs. Valencia, 54 O.G. 3505), none of which has been
Finally, there being a possibility that when they purchased the property in
shown to exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the court below
question the appellees Lovina were not informed of the illegal closure of
erred in rejecting the
the Bulati creek, their action, if any, against their vendor, should be, and is
hereby, reserved.

findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works.

The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not
laid down before him, for that would be tantamount to holding a new
investigation, and to substitute for the discretion and judgment of the
Secretary the discretion and judgment of the court, to whom the statute
had entrusted the case. It is immaterial that the present action should be
one for prohibition or injunction and not one for certiorari, in either event 12 ALEGRE v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
the case must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the Secretary,
since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de
novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not Facts: Section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, read as
in violation of the constitution or of the laws, and are free from fraud or follows:
imposition, and whether they find reasonable support in the evidence.
The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for
Here, the proof preponderates in favor of the Secretary's decision.
the various
commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be applied for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, but
produced on the Philippine was denied by the

Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and respondent. He was advised by the respondent that he would not be
designation which, permitted to export the

together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined, abaca in question without a certificate from the Fiber Standardization
shall be defined by the Board.

said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the
Secretary of Agriculture provisions of the

and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers
the same shall be are unconstitutional

supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal and void for being a delegation of legislative power.
presidents, and to such

other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor.

Issue: Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization
Section 1788 of the Administrative Code was amended to read as follows: Board is a delegation of

No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the legislative power.
Philippine Islands in quantity

greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being
Ruling: No. The legislature has enacted a law which provides for the
graded, baled, inspected,
inspection, grading and
and certifies as in this law provided.
baling of hemp before they can be exported to other countries and the
Petitioner is engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to creation of a board for
foreign markets. He
that purpose, vesting it with the power and authority to do the actual it may delegate to administrative agencies the authority to exercise such
work. legislative power as is

Such authority is not a delegation of legislative power and is nothing more necessary to carry into effect the general legislative purpose. The rule-
than a delegation of making power must be

administrative power in the Fiber Standardization Board to carry out the confined to details for regulating the mode of proceedings to carry into
purpose and intent of effect the law as it has

the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, been enacted and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
grade and bale the statutory requirements or to

hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested embrace matters not covered by the statute
in a board or

commission.

Ratio: Delegation to Administrative Agencies. The legislature must declare

13 PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
a policy and fix a
vs.
standard in enacting a statute conferring discretionary power upon an
administrative agency, CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office, respondent.
but the agency may be authorized to “fill up the details” in promoting the
purposes of the G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
legislation and carrying it into effect. When the legislature laid down the
fundamentals of a law,
FACTS OF THE CASE: Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction
against respondent Agrava, the Director of Philippines Patent Office due
to a circular the latter issued scheduling an examination for determining
who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines
Patent Office.
Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is
in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent
Office, and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of
the law for requiring such examination as condition precedent before
members of the bar may be allowed to represent applicants in the
preparation and prosecution of applications for patents. Undaunted,
Agrava argued that that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law and that the Rules of Court do not
prohibit the Patent Office from requiring further condition or qualification
from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office.
ISSUE: Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation
and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included
in the practice of law.
RULING OF THE COURT: Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
Although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use
and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all
such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as
well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Patent Office in accordance with law. All these things involve the
applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for
legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar
has been prepared.
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the
Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in
good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
since much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and
determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are,
taken to the Supreme Court. Respondent Director is prohibited from
requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or
tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice
before the Patent Office.
14. People v. Maceren equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic
animals within its cuffed reach. Dismissed in RTC because the fisheries law
-lawmaking body cannot delegate to an administrative official the power
does not clearly prohibit electrofishing as it is not a poisonous substance
to declare what act constitutes a criminal offense, it can authorize the
but a form of energy. Fisheries law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in
poisonous substance" in fishing. On june 28 1967, secretary of agriculture
the law itself
and natural resources issued fisheries administrative order no 84-1
amending sec 2 of admin order no. 84 by restricting the ban against
electrofishing.
-secretary of agriculture and natural resources and the commissioner of
fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing fisheries administrative order
nos, 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the
Issue: was the act of electrofishing by the accused penalized under the
fisheries law. Act no, 4003 and under the law creating the fisheries law
fisheries law?
does not expressly prohibit electrofishing, as such, the secretary of
agriculture and natural reaources are powerless to penalize it.
Administrative orders 84 and 84-1 is penalizing electrofishing, are devoid
Held: NO The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit
of any legal basis.
electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative
-in a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it must clearly
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any
appear that the order falls within the scope of the authority conferred by
legal basis.
law
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal
provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old
Facts: on march 7, 1969, five accused resorted to electro fishing in a barrio Fisheries Law.
using their own motor banca, with attached dynamo and electrocuting
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or
device on a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was
explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful
attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or
taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of
licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a
other violations. revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and
fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269),
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative
expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.
Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such
an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as
already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to
15 People v. Que Po Lay
the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances,
fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other
violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries
Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to G.R. No. L-6791
declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the
March 29, 1954
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in
the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p.
11 32).
Facts:
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all
waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water
Que Po Lay was adjuged guilty violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in
connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to
fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The charge was
circumstance strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting
forms of electro fishing. of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about
$7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is
punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely
one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by
Circular No. 20.
On appeal, Que Po Lay asserts that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to
the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect.
The Solicitor General answering this contention says that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in
the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law
in order to have force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not such circular is required to be published?
Held: Yes, SC reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant.
Ratio:
Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes
passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at
the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication
of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the NCC equally provides
that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law
but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled
jurisprudence.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty
for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on
the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties
16 US vs. Panlilio (G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914)
Doctrine:
The orders, rules, and regulations of an administrative officers or body
issued in pursuance of the authority conferred by a statute, while they
have, in a sense, the force of law, are not statutes and particularly not
penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense not a
penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation
thereof unlawful and penalizes it.
Facts:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI of the Province of Pampanga
convicting the accused of a violation of the law relating to the
quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or
contagious diseases.
Act No. 1760 prohibits and pronounces the following acts of any person,
firm or corporation as unlawful:
• Sec. 3- knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine
Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous
communicable disease, or any of the effects pertaining to such animal
which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands;
• Sec. 4- knowingly to ship, drive or otherwise take or transport from
one island, province, municipality, township, or settlement to another any
domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable disease or
to expose such animal either alive or dead on any public road or highway
where it may come in contact with other domestic animals; and
• Sec.5-To transport in any form without a certificate issued by
authority of the Director of Agriculture whenever the Secretary of the
Interior shall declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease
prevails in any island, province, municipality, township, or settlement and
that there is danger of spreading such disease.
All of the carabaos belonging to the above-named accused having been
exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest,
were, in accordance with an order of a duly-authorized agent of the
Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of
Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga. on said date and
at said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily
and without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against
said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be
taken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted
from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his
servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove
them from one place to another for the purpose of working them.
The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the
quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or
contagious diseases. The contention of the accused is that the facts
alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a
violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.
Issue:
Whether the accused may be convicted for violation of the quarantine
order issued by the Director of Agriculture, assuming there was a violation.
Held:
No. The court held that the only sections of Act No. 1760 which prohibit
acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall
17. US vs FRANK TUPASI MOLINA
within any of them. The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue,
that section 6 is applicable to the case at bar. Section 6 simply authorizes
the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them, paragraph
(c) "to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous FACTS:
communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in
On February 6, 1914, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Ilocos Sur
quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him
filed a complaint against the defendant charging him with the crime of
necessary to prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law,
perjury.
however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a
violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that "any person violating any
It was alleged that Defendant Frank Tupasi Molina did on September 10,
of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of
1912 for the purpose of gaining admission to the examinations for the
not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than
municipal police service in the Province of Ilocos Sur, willfully, unlawfully,
six months, or
and criminally took a false oath by affirming and asserting in an oath that
he knew to be false, in an examination application which he himself filled
out and signed, that he had never been indicted, tried, or sentenced for
by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for
the violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation in any court, when he
each offense." ’A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as
knew that he had been twice indicted for disturbing the public peace, and
authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provisions of the Act.
for injurias graves, and sentenced to pay a fine and undergo imprisonment
The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to
therefor, by the justice of the peace court of Tayum and the Court of First
have the force of law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes,
Instance of Ilocos Sur.
and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute
itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it.
Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial, the judge found the
Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way
defendant guilty of the crime charged. He was sentenced to imprisonment
therein.
for 2 months, and a fine of 200 pesos. The defendant was further
sentenced to be disqualified from holding any public office or from giving
testimony in any court in the Philippine Islands until such time as the
sentence against him is reversed.
Defendant appealed to this court alleging, among others, that the trial
court erred in holding section 3 of Act No. 1697 to be applicable in this
case, and that the trial court manifestly erred in sentencing the appellant
for violation of said Act, when the prosecution did not present any
evidence demonstrating that he had willfully and corruptly sworn or taken
an oath.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Defendant Molina may be held liable for the crime of
perjury, applying Act No. 1697, in the case at bar.
HELD:
The Court affirmed the Decision of the lower court finding the defendant
guilty of the crime of perjury.
Under Act No. 1697, any person who, having taken an oath before a
competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the
Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he
does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished, x x
x.
In accordance with the requirements of Act No. 2169, the Director of
Constabulary prepared an examination manual, prescribing at the same
time rules for conducting examinations, which examination manual was
approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Police, and
thereby was given the force of law. Said manual prescribed a form in
blank, which form each applicant was required to fill, in order to be
permitted to take said examination. Said application required the applicant
to swear to the facts stated therein. We have, therefore, a law which
authorizes the administration of an oath in the present case.
By reference to Exhibit A (the application made and sworn to by the
defendant), this Court finds that the oath was taken before a notary
public, a person qualified to administer an oath, in accordance with the
provisions of law.
As opposed to Defendant’s allegation that the lower court committed an
error in finding that he had committed the crime of perjury voluntarily and
corruptly, this Court found that there is nothing in the record which shows
that he did not present to the proper authorities Exhibit A voluntarily.
Furthermore, the defendant admitted that he could read and understand
Spanish. It is to be noted that at the very beginning of said application
there are three paragraphs devoted to instructions to the applicant, which
he should have read and no doubt did. Said instructions were sufficient to
indicate to the defendant that if there were any questions which he did
not fully understand, he should have acquired a full understanding of the
same before answering them. If there was any fault in understanding any
question therein, it was wholly due to his own negligence.
Under Act No. 1697, three things are necessary, in order to constitute the
crime of perjury:
1. The person must have taken an oath, in a case where the law
authorizes an oath, before a competent person, or a person authorized to
administer an oath;
2. That the person who has taken the oath will testify, declare,
dispose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration,
deposition or certificate by him subscribed is true;
3. That he willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter, "which he does not believe to be true."
As opposed to the contention of the Defendant, this Court finds it difficult
to understand how a person can state, under oath, that a fact is true or
subscribe a document, asserting that the same is true, which he does not
believe to be true. If, under his oath, he declares that said facts are true,
we must conclude that he believed that they were true. If, as a matter of
fact, they were not true, and he had full knowledge of the fact that they
were not true, then his declaration that they were true would certainly be
a sworn statement that a certain fact was true which he did not believe to
be true and, therefore, he must have made a false statement knowingly.
Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that whoever makes a statement or
subscribes a document, under the circumstances mentioned in said section
3, which is false and which he, at the time he makes the same does not
believe to be true, is guilty of the crime of perjury.
18. Ynchausti Steamship Co v Public Utility Commissioner (1922)
1. BASIS FOR RATES – The present value of a vessel, its worth as a
going concern, or its physical value is the true basis for determining the
value of the investment upon which to fix rates which will produce as fair
return.
2. EVIDENCE OF PRESENT VALUE – In arriving at the present or
market value of the vessel, its original cost, the cost of reproduction and
any other evidence, which will tend to show its present or market value,
should be considered. The original cost of a vessel should only be
considered for the purpose of determining its present or market value.
3. TIME WHEN RATE SHOULD BE DETERMINED – Under normal
circumstances the value of the vessel is to be determined as of the time
when the rate of investigation is made.
4. PUBLIC UTILITY SHOULD HAVE FAIR RETURN ON ITS INVESTMENT
– a public utility is entitled to just compensation and a fair return upon the
reasonable value of its property while it is being used by the public.
5. WHILE OPERATED A PUBLIC UTILITY IS A “PRO TANTO”
APPROPRATION TO A PUBLIC USE – when property becomes a public
utility, for operating purposes, it ipso facto amounts to a taking and
appropriation of the property to the public use so long as it is a public
utility.
6. RATES SHOULD BE REASONABLE TO OWNER AND PUBLIC – In
fixing the rate for a public utility, it is not fair to the public to base it upon a
peak cost. Neither is it fair to the owner to base it upon a minimum cost. A
just rate must be founded upon conditions which are fair and reasonable
to both the owner and the public.
FACTS:
The petitioners are members of the Philippine Shipowners' Association
and engaged in the operation of vessels in and around the Philippine
Islands. By reason of a decrease in the volume of business handled by its
members and for and on their behalf, it duly filed with the Public Utility
Commissioner of the Philippine Islands a declaration that on and after May
1, 1920, it would make a 10 per cent increase in shipping rates above those
allowed under Order No. 16 of the Board of Rate Regulation.
This increase was allowed and became effective by an order of the Public
Utility Commissioner dated April 24, 1920, and final on May 1, 1920.
In a short time and on account of low wages, there was a general strike of
the seamen and officers operating the vessels owned by the members of
Steamers Owned by —
the association and it became necessary to increase the wages paid the
men and to make other concessions which materially increased operating
expenses, by reason of which the 10 per cent increased rate
Sorsogon ........................................................ Ynchausti Steamship Co.

Vizcaya ........................................................... Ynchausti Steamship Co.

was insufficient to meet the increased operating expense. June 21, 1920,
the association filed an amended declaration with the Public Utility Panglima ......................................................... Ortiga Hermanos.
Commissioner, praying for a further raise of 10 per cent on freight rates
Gabrielle Poizat ............................................... Juan M. Poizat and Co.
over those established May 1, 1920, to the effect that from and after July
20, 1920, it would make a 15 per cent increase on the freight rates fixed by Cebu .............................................................. Compania Maritima
Order No. 16, and that the increase would be in addition to all others which
Perla .............................................................. Ruiz y Rementeria, S. en C.
had been approved and authorized by the Public Utility Commissioner.

Granted an increase of 10 per cent to the Steamers Owned by —

The proposed 15 per cent increase was suspended and a hearing was
ordered. At this the Commissioner ordered that a representative of each
shipowner in interest should appear and submit an operating account of
each of their steamers, one covering the expenses for the month of
December, 1919, another for the period from January 1 to April 30, 1920,
and the third from May 1 to June 30, 1920, with the exception of some of
the steamers, among which were the Cebu and the Vizcaya, which were
requested to submit reports for the year 1919. The accounts were
presented as requested, and on October 19, 1920, the Commissioner
refused to make any increase on the rates for the following:
Churruca ......................................................... Ty Camco Sobrino.
San Vicente ..................................................... Li Seng Giap.
and 20 per cent to the steamer Maria Luisa owned by Teodoro R. Yangco,
and allowed an increase of 25 per cent over the rates fixed by Order No. 16
of the Board of Rate Regulation, on the rest of the steamers, the names
and owners of which are not before this court.
As to the parties here, it appears that the rate allowed by the
Commissioner was based on the original cost of the vessel as distinguished
from its present value, and that the 5 per cent per annum depreciation was
allowed upon the original value of the vessel as opposed to the cost of
replacement. From this decision a hearing was granted and heard before
the Board of Appeal, under section 30 of the Public Utility Act No. 2307, as
amended, and on April 15, 1921, that board affirmed the decision of the
Public Utility Commissioner, and the proceedings are brought here for
review.
The petitioners assign several different errors, contending among other
things that there is no evidence to reasonably support the decision; that
the 5 per cent depreciation is based on the original cost of the ship and not
on replacement; that the allowance of 10 per cent per annum on the
investment is based on the original cost of the ship and not on its present
value; and that the average cost of repairs for the past five years should
not be substituted for the actual cost of such repairs for the operating
period which was submitted to the board.
ISSUE:
WON the act of Commissioner in basing the rates on the original cost of
the vessel was just and reasonable?
HELD:
No.
There is a legal presumption that the fixed rates are reasonable, and it
must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the Government, through its
authorized agents, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion and,
unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the courts will not interfere.
Also that, although the fixing of rates is a legislative and governmental
power over which the Government has complete control, it has no power
to fix rates that are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily, and that
as to whether a given rate is fair and reasonable is a judicial question over
which the courts have complete control. In addition to what is known as
the net earnings rule, there are four different theories of ascertaining
what constitutes a reasonable rate, each of which is supposed to give a
fair return on the reasonable value of the property. First, the original cost;
second, cost of reproduction; third, outstanding capitalization; and,
fourth, present value. After discussing the merits of these different
theories, Pond on Public Utilities, section 484, says:
Present value true test. — While all accurate available evidence of the
original cost as well as the cost of reproduction is desirable and helpful in
determining the extent of the actual investment necessary to render the
service in any particular case, neither these nor the amount of
capitalization are conclusive. The present market value of the plant or its
worth as a going concern in the ultimate practical basis for determining
the value of the investment upon which to fix a rate which will produce a
fair return. . . .
It is the theory of the law that a public utility should have a fair and
reasonable return upon its property which is used by the public, and,
under the modern authorities, the rate is based upon the physical
valuation of the property, because in effect the property is both used and
consumed by the public. In an action to condemn land to a public use, it
would not be contended that the measure of damages to the owner
would be the original cost of the land, or that if at one time the land was of
a much greater value and had depreciated, the owner would then be
entitled to recover the once greater value. In such a case the measure of
damages would be the actual value at the time of the appropriation. So,
on principle, the vessel here is deemed taken and condemned by the
public at the time of the filing of the
petition, and the rate should go up and down as the physical valuation of
the vessel goes up and down, and the purpose of the hearing is to place a
physical valuation upon the vessel and then base a reasonable rate upon
that valuation. Hence, the original cost of the vessel is not the basis for the
valuation and is not important, except in so far as it may enable the
Commissioner to determine the present value of the vessel.
When a public utility once enters the public service, it is no longer a free
agent and the control and operation of its property is subject to
reasonable rules and regulations by the public, and to that extent and for
that purpose it is a taking of the property by the public. As one of the
conditions upon which you can operate a public utility, the public says you
must operate it under reasonable rules and regulations, otherwise you
cannot operate a public utility. Hence, when property becomes a public
utility, it ipso facto, for operating purposes, amounts to an actual taking
and appropriation of the property to the public use, so long as it is a public
utility. In legal effect such operation amounts to a pro tanto taking and
appropriation.
It is elementary constitutional law that private property cannot be taken
for public use without just compensation is first assessed and tendered.
But where the taking is not full, final, or complete, but is in the nature only
of a continuous daily taking and appropriation, it must follow that there
will be a fluctuation in the market value of the property during the period
of public service, which, as to a vessel, would change with the cost of labor
and material necessary for its construction. But in fixing the rate, it would
not be fair to the public to base it upon a peak cost, and, for the same
reason, it would not be fair to the owner of the property to place it upon a
minimum cost. Neither would it be fair to either party to base the rate
upon any abnormal condition. A just rate must be founded upon
conditions which are fair and reasonable both to the owner and the public.
The purpose of the hearing was to determine what was a just and
reasonable rate. Under the authorities from previous rulings, such a rate
should not be based upon the original cost of the vessel. Neither, under
existing conditions, should it be based upon the estimated cost. The one is
not fair to the shipowner, and the other is not fair to the public. For
example, the original cost of the Venus was P115,000, and the estimated
cost of reproduction was P409,446.03. The original cost of the Vizcaya was
P120,000, and the estimated cost was P533,318.73. The figures of these
two vessels fairly show the relative difference in the cost of reproduction
and the original cost of the different vessels, and are strong evidence of
the existence of abnormal conditions. In addition, this court will take
judicial knowledge of the recent World War and that Peace was declared in
November, 1918, and the amended declaration upon which the hearing
was had was filed June 21, 1920, a little more than eighteen months after
peace was declared, and that conditions were then more or less abnormal.
If, as the Attorney-General says, the Commissioner based the annual
income rate on the original cost of the vessel, it was legal, prejudicial error,
and was not fair to the owner.
The original cost of a vessel should only be considered for the purpose of
determining its present or market value. Although it may be true that it
was the duty of the owner of the vessel to have submitted evidence to the
Commissioner of the present or market value
of the vessel under normal conditions, yet the failure to do this would not
justify the Commissioner in basing the rate on the original cost. As a fair
and impartial tribunal, it should require competent proof of the necessary
facts upon which to base the rates, and where, as in this case, the only
proof offered was the original and estimated costs, neither of which is
competent except as it tends to show the present or market value of the
vessel, the Commissioner had no right to accept either rate as the true
basis, or one to the exclusion of the other, and should have required that
proof should be furnished of the present or market value of the vessel
under reasonably normal conditions. The basing of the rate on the original
cost of the vessel was prejudicial, legal error. This same principle should
apply to the 5 per cent depreciation. The percentage for depreciation
should be based on the market value and not on the original cost of the
vessel. Complaint is made that 10 per cent return on the investment is not
sufficient. The question as to what is a reasonable rate is one which largely
rests in the discretion of the Commissioner, with which, without some
good reason, this court is not disposed to interfere. Complaint is also made
that "the average of repairs for the past five years is substituted in place of
actual expenditures for repairs during the period covered by the operating
statements thus bringing into the average a period when labor and
material costs were far below what they were today." Under normal
conditions this contention would be sound, but as shown here the
conditions were not normal.

It is the order of this court that this cause be reversed and remanded with
directions to the Commissioner to require and take proof of the present or
market value of the vessel, and that, in arriving at such value, he consider
the actual cost of the vessel, its cost of reproduction, and any other
evidence which will tend to show its present or market value, and that
when the present or market value of the vessel is thus determined, he
shall then fix a reasonable return on the investment based on such value,
and that also the depreciation percentage be based on the same value. On
all other questions this court declines to interfere with the order of the
Commissioner.
19 RUPERTO V. TORRES
Special civil action by certiorari was instituted against an administrative
agency exercising only investigatory and advisory powers.
Facts: A complaint was filed against Ruperto, petitioner-appellee, charging
him with disloyalty to service, partiality, favoritism, violation of his oath of
office and acquisition of a big real-estate beyond his income received from
the government. A copy of the complaint was submitted to the Integrity
Board, of which the respondents-appellants were members. The Board
found after hearing that the charges of prosecution and partiality were
sufficiently established and concluded that petitioner had made use of his
public office to serve and favor his friends and to prosecute the enemies of
the latter, instead of observing absolute impartiality and fairness in the
performance of his official duties. In view of its findings,the Board
recommended that petitioner-appellee be reprimanded with the warning
that any repetition of any misconduct on his part will be more severely
dealt with.
The Integrity Board was created by Executive Order No. 318, dated May 25,
1950. A cursory reading of Executive Order No. 318 readily reveals that the
duties and functions of the Integrity Board are to "proceed to a
thorough and complete investigation of any specific case of graft,
corruption, dereliction of duty or irregularity in office and to submit to the
President the record of such investigation together with its findings and
recommendation."
On December 30, 1953, the Integrity Board was superseded by the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, with the same powers,
duties and functions as the Integrity Board. The members of this
Commission have since then been substituted in this case in place of the
original respondents. The first assignment of error made in the appeal is
that certiorari does not lie against the Integrity Board as it exercises only
investigatory and advisory powers.
Issue:
Was the defunct Integrity Board or its successor, Presidential Complaints
and Action Commission, a board exercising judicial functions?
Held: 20. JOSE L. GUEVARA vs COMELEC

No. (1) Board's function limited to conducting investigations and making

findings. -"The board neither adjudicates upon nor determines the rights
FACTS:
and interests or duties of parties; it is limited to investigating the facts and
making findings in respect thereto. After an investigation by the Integrity There was a controversy in the COMELEC procurement of 34,000 ballot
Board, the officer that ultimately passes upon and adjudicates the rights of boxes in which one of the Winning suppliers had his order cancelled due to
the parties is the President, not the Integrity Board, or its successor, the his alleged failure to sign the supply contract within the period required by
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission. COMELEC regulations. Aggrieved the supplier issued a motion for
reconsideration to the COMELEC. The seriousness of the grounds for the
While it is true that the Integrity Board in performing its duties and
MR especially pertaining to the conduct of the two other winning bidders
exercising its functions may exercise what is known as judicial discretion,
caused the COMELEC initiate an official investigation on the procurement
because it evaluates the evidence submitted to it on the facts and
negotiations. Petitioner Guevara was a media Columnist who covered the
circumstances presented, such judicial discretion is only for the purpose of
said controversy when he allegedly published an article critical of the
evaluation and for the determination of disputed facts."
COMELEC’S handling of the said issue.
(2) Test of judicial functions. -"Not every function wherein judgment and
Guevara was then ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should
discretion are exercised is a judicial function. The test of a judicial function
not be punished for contempt for having published in the newspaper an
is not the exercise of judicial discretion, but the power and authority to
article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. As the
awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of ballot boxes;
Board lacks the power and authority to adjudicate upon the matters
and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and
submitted to it for investigation and make the final pronouncement
undermine the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its
thereon affecting the parties, the second requisite for the availability of
Chairman
the action of certiorari is wanting." (Ruperto v. Torres, [unrep.J 100 Phil.
1098 [1957/.) Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the
Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of
the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution nor in
statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same.
 which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity. It only
discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such
ISSUE:
being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as
postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this
Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
contempt proceedings against Guevara in connection with the publication proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates
of an article. of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice". Therefore
the Court is persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has
no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its
RULING: purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article
mentioned in the charge under consideration.
NO. COMELEC cannot conduct contempt proceedings in relation to purely
administrative and ministerial matters.

The Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to
try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also
punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided 21
therein. In this sense, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a
court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article
VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body, it may however
exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express
provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the
negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971
between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty

PABLO CATURA and LUZ SALVADOR, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CELESTINO TABANIAG, et
meeting so that petitioners could be confronted about the status of union
funds, but Pablo Catura cancelled such meeting. Succeeding resolution
reiterating previous demands and the duly issued subpoenas by the
Department of Labor were not successful.

al., respondents.
Thereafter, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other members,
sought an injunction to prevent now petitioner Pablo Catura who was
again elected as President in an election from taking his oath of office in
view of the aforementioned demands.
FACTS:

Then came the order by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador which,

Petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President and Treasurer,
instead of granting the injunction sought, limited itself to requiring and
respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees
directing personally the Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador to deliver and
Association, a legitimate labor organization duly registered, was charged
deposit to the court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank
for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds" by Private Respondents,
accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other
Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more than ten
documents related to the finances of the said labor union.
percent of the entire membership of such labor organization, and the
latter on various occasions demanding from the former "a full and detailed
report of all financial transaction of the union and to make the book of
accounts and other records of the financial activities of the union open to Upon appeal, said order was sustained in a resolution by the Public
inspection by the members. Respondent Court en banc.

In the complaint, it was further asserted that the executive board of such ISSUE:
labor organization passed a resolution calling for a general membership
Whether respondent Court, in the exercise of its power of investigation,
can require a labor organization's "books of accounts, bank accounts,
pass books, union funds,
receipts, vouchers and other documents related to [its] finances" be
delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such
investigation in accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials
of such labor organization being heard prior to the issuance of such order.
RULING:
The order as issued by Public Respondent Court must be sustained.
The complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as President
and Treasurer of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized
disbursement of union funds as well as the failure to make a full and
detailed report of financial transactions of the union and to make the book
of accounts and other records of its financial activities open to inspection
by the members. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious enough by the
prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise of the statutory
power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation so as to assure
that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization as
specifically set forth in Section 17 be respected. All that the challenged
order did was to require petitioners, as President and Treasurer of the
labor organization, to "deliver and deposit" with respondent Court all of
its book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts,
vouchers and other documents related to its finances at the hearing of the
petition before it on January 3, 1967.
On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the
statutory power conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of
law allegedly violated may not be effectively complied with. The authority
to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held
as having acted contrary to law. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power
to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires
an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be
produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether
or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not
for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative
agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case
intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. The
matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to
give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power
sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of
petitioners entitled to priority.
Nor is the validity of the order in question to be impugned by the
allegation that there was a denial of procedural due process. The pertinent
section of the Industrial Peace Act makes clear that such books of
accounts and other records of the financial activities are open to
inspection by any member of a labor organization.
'What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.' As was
stated in a recent decision, what
'due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it
requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being
paramount,' the conclusion being that the hearing on a motion for
reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due process."
22 QUA CHEE GAN, et al. ǀs THE DEPORTATION BOARD
FACTS:
On May of 1952, a complaint is charged against the petitioners before the
Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S Dollars in the total sum of
$130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the
Philippines and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong
and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio
King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United
States Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division
of the Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in
order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars
Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of
said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board.
Upon their filing of a bond herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally
set at liberty.
On September of 1952, the petitioners filed a joint motion to dismiss the
charges against them in the deportation board that the charges do not
constitute legal grounds for deportation from this country and that the
deportation board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges.
After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January of 1956,
upholding the validity of the delegation by the president to the
Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose
of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be
injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court,
likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of
arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending
investigation of charges against him, on the theory that the power to
arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to
and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the petitioners instituted the
present appeal.
Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens
and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Board of the
ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in
the Legislature. In other words, it is claimed, for the power to deport to be
exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same. They also
contend that even granting that the President is invested with power to
deport, still he may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 613
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President’s authority to conduct investigation carries
with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the
Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the
same may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board
RULING:
The President has not been vested with such authority to order an arrest
pending investigation. What is only granted to the President is the
authority to conduct investigation and cause the deportation of an alien
upon finding of reasonable grounds. The President and any of his
delegated agencies has no authority to determine probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. An arrest can only be effected by President
and any of the delegated agencies, only after investigation has been made
and that the alien is subject to deportation or there is an order of
deportation because then, the arrest would be necessary to enforce the
authority to deport.
Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an
undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President,
after due investigation, pursuant to Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code (in
the same provision it also provided that such power may be delegated by
him to his authorized agents), and by the Commissioner of Immigration,
upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Sec. 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike
Commonwealth Act No. 613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration
was specifically granted authority, among others, to make arrests, fails to
provide the President with like specific power to be exercised in
connection with such investigation.
Art. 3, Sec. 1 of the Phil. Constitution provides, “The right of the People to arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against indispensable that the alien be arrested.
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 23 MARTINIANO P. VIVO, as Acting Commissioner of Immigration,

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and DEPORTATION

The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case
and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one
suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of
the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a
violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is
different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a
violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly
authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in
the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for
example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of
deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is
necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when,
as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the
order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the
OFFICER, Bureau of Immigration,petitioners,
vs.
HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XIX,
JOSE CALACDAY, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-24576 July 29, 1968 FACTS OF THE CASE:
Private respondents Juan, Pedro, Julio, Marcelo, Jose, Manuel and Benito,
all surnamed "Calacday" arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong on 1959.
Upon their arrival they sought admission as Filipino citizens and was found
to be legitimate sons of Isaac Calacday, a Filipino citizen, after an
investigation.
In 1963, Isaac confessed before an immigration official that the
respondents were not his sons. Later the same year, he retracted his
statement in an investigation in the DOJ, claiming that the prior confession
was a result of his anger towards his sons for not giving him money.
As a result, the Commissioner of Immigration Vivo issued warrants against
the respondents for having entered the Philippines “by means of false and
misleading statements” stating in their warrants their deportability under
Philippine Immigration Act. Manuel was then arrested, while the others
were at large.
1965, the respondents filed before the respondent court a petition,
praying for three principal reliefs, namely: to restrain the arrest of those
petitioners who have not been arrested; to release Manuel Calacday who
had been arrested; and to prohibit the deportation of all the petitioners, all
upon the claim that they are Filipino citizens.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent Acting Commissioner of Immigration (therein
petitioner) can summarily order the arrest and deportation of the
petitioners (therein respondents) without giving them a chance to be
heard as Filipino citizens
RULING OF THE COURT:
The court has no jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of
the respondents. Said proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the
Immigration authorities under the Philippine Immigration Act. That
jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the
Commissioner or Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary;
and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the issue of
citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of
judicial review of administrative decisions
When the petition for certiorari and prohibition (the respondent judge
considered it as such) was filed, deportation proceedings had been started
against the respondents (petitioners below) but had not been completed.
In view of the non-completion of the proceedings, the Board of
Commissioners has not rendered as yet any decision. The respondents
Calacdays, therefore, are not being deported. Before the Board reaches a
decision, it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be the
citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so
far for the courts to review.
Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that, the issuance of warrants of
arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration, solely for purposes of
investigation and before a final

order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of
Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution.
The order issued in Civil Case of the Court of First Instance of Manila is set
aside, and the proceedings ordered discontinued. But the warrants of
arrest heretofore issued by the petitioner, Immigration Commissioner,
against herein respondents Calacdays are declared null and void, without
prejudice to said respondents being required to furnish bonds in such
reasonable sums as the Immigration Commissioners may fix, in order to
guarantee their appearance at the hearings and other proceedings in their
case, until final determination of their right to stay in the Philippines.
#24 American Tobacco Company vs. Director of Patents
67 SCRA 287
FACTS: The American Tobacco Company (ACT) was a party to a trademark
case pending before the Philippine Patent Office. ATC challenged the
validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine
Patent Office in Trademark Cases” as amended, authorizing the Director of
Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear “inter
partes” proceedings.
ATC argued that the same set of Rules provides that “all judgments
determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly
prepared by the Director and signed by him” hence it is improper for the
director to designate a lower ranking official as hearing officers to hear the
case; that it is clear that under the Rules, the Director must personally hear
the case otherwise, there will be a violation of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of hearing officers other than the
Director of Patents is a violation of due process.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the power to decide resides
solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a
delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the
decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires
an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does
not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the
facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient
that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer
authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements
of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the
same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is
not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the
record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair
trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the
part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is
made by said officer. It is, however, required that to “give the substance
of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon
evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and
appraise the evidence which justifies them.”
#25 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE
PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-26765. August 31, 1970.]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ET AL., petitioners v. PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, Respondent. [G.R. No. L-26779. August 31, 1970.]
PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE
PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee. [G.R. No. L-26799. August 31, 1970.]
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On September, 1964, the Public Service Commission assessed several
public utilities for supposed supervision and regulation fees for that year,
as follows: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company — P214,353.60;
Manila Electric Company — P727,526.00; Bolinao Electronics Corporation
— P11,610.40 Philippine Steam Navigation Company — P23,921.60; and
General Shipping Company — P33,146.80, based upon the value of their
respective properties or equipment. The assessments were allegedly made
pursuant to Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act, as amended by
Republic Act 3792.
After paying under protest the demanded amounts, the above mentioned
corporations sent separate letters to the Commission, except the
Philippine Steam Navigation Company which filed a formal petition
instead, 1 requesting for reconsideration of the assessments on the
ground that under Section 40 (e) of the Public Service Act, as amended,
such assessments should be based not on the value of the properties but
upon the subscribed and paid up capital stocks of the corporations.
On 28 September 1966, the Public Service Commission rendered judgment
on the petition of the Philippine Steam Navigation Company, denying the
request for reconsideration of the assessment, for the reason that under
the amended provision of the Public Service law the amount of supervision
fee payable by a public utility shall be based on its capital stock if a stock
corporation on the capital invested, if a non-stock corporation; or on the
property and equipment of such stock or non-stock entities, whichever is
higher. As said decision was declared applicable to other operators of
public services that similarly sought reconsideration of the action of the
Commission, and which were considered intervenors in the case.
The petitioners Philippine Steam Navigation, the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, Manila Electric Company, Bolinao Electronics
Corporation, and General Shipping Company individually came to court to
court to seek remedy on the particularly on the issue of proper
assessment-base to be used in imposing the prescribed supervision and
regulation fees on public utilities.
2. Whether or not the alleged disproportion of the total amount to be
collected as supervisory fees when contracted with the possible amount
expendable in supervising public service?
3. Whether or not the fees prescribed in Section 40, as amended, are
confiscatory and violative of substantive due process?
4. Whether or not there was error on the part of the commission in
collecting the fees in question on the basis of the original cost of their
property and equipment without due allowance for depreciation

In denying petitioner’s prayer for reconsideration and upholding the

correctness of the assessed fees, the Commission reasons out that the
HELD:
clause "or of the property and equipment, whichever is higher" inserted or
added to Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as an alternative base for
supervision fees collectible thereunder applies to both stock and non-
stock corporations
As to the first issue, SC did not find this argument adequately cogent, since
ISSUES:
it is based on a hypothesis not backed by evidence. There is no showing in
1. Whether or not the Commission erred in ruling that the value of the record that the Commission has met with difficulty in ascertaining the
property and equipment should be used as an alternative base for fixing actual capital investment of public service operators that do not issue
the rates in case of public services; shares of capital stock. Section 17 of the Public Service Act authorizes the
Commission to require public services to submit annual reports of finances
and operations, and we can not assume a priori that the reports submitted
by operators that do not issue shares of capital stock are or will be the original cost a theoretical figure that does not correspond to reality;
untruthful. and as a matter of fact, the computation of the reasonable profits that
operators are allowed to make, and the fixing of the rates that they can
charge to the public, are based on actual value of their properties and
As to 2nd Issue, SC ruled that the very statute indicates that such fees as equipment in use, not the original cost thereof.
are therein fixed were designed to raise revenue for the general expenses
of the Commission, and were not limited to reimbursement of actual
expenditures in supervision. For the last paragraph of Section 40 of the
Public Service Act, as amended, explicitly prescribes that "any unexpanded
balance of the fees collected by the Commission under this section shall be
constituted receipts automatically appropriated each year and . . . shall be Digested by: Christine Montesa
disbursed . . . for additional needed personal services, maintenance and
operating expenses, acquisition of urgently needed vehicles, furniture and
equipment," reference library and buildings.
26 Case Title: CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.

G.R. No. L-40245 1975 April 30

As third issue, the petitioners have not submitted any evidentiary data to
substantiate this point. That the amounts to be collected are large do not,
per se alone, suffice to establish their confiscatory character.
In this case is "the question of whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Board
has authority under the Civil Aeronautics Act to impose penalties"
pursuant to its administrative functions.

As to the 4th issue, SC ruled that the Commission committed an error in

Facts of the Case:
collecting the fees in question on the basis of the original cost of their
property and equipment without due allowance for depreciation. Once
said properties and equipment are in use, depreciation sets in, and renders
The Philippine Airlines Inc. is a grantee of a legislative franchise, Public Act
No. 4271, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2360 and 2667, where under
the said airline provides both domestic and international air service. In its
domestic service PAL provides, among others, services between
Tuguegarao and Manila (designated as Flight 213) and between Baguio and
Manila (designated as Flight 205).
109(70)". It is argued that "the power and authority to impose fines and
penalties is a judicial function exercised through the regular courts of
justice, and that such power and authority cannot be delegated to the Civil
Aeronautics Board by mere implication or interpretation".

Issue: Whether or not CAB possesses the necessary legal authority to

On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of twenty (20) passengers from
impose a fine.
Baguio to Manila who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To
accommodate these twenty passengers, PAL required the aircraft
operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio City on its way
to Manila and pick up these passengers. Flight 213 at that time was
carrying only five (5) passengers.
Ruling:

Yes but only as a civil penalty.

Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CAB
There exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.A.B. is fully
before operating the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of
authorized by law (Republic Act 776) to impose fines in the nature of civil
Republic Act No. 776, the CAB imposed a fine of P5,000.00 upon PAL in a
penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the C.A.B. of
resolution. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by PAL, the CAB reduced
that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent
the fine to P2,500.00.
legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to
The appellant PAL in its motion for reconsideration of the above CAB determine
Resolution contended that "there is simply nothing in Republic Act No. 776
in general, nor in Section 42(k) thereof in particular, which expressly
empowers this Honorable Board (CAB) to impose a fine and order its whether to "impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise" "fines and
payment in the manner pursued in this case and under CAB Resolution No. civil penalties", a power which is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics
Administrator whose orders or decision may be reviewed, revised,
reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the C.A.B.
of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general
supervision and control over air carriers if they can just disregard with
impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and
convenience in air transportation. If everytime the C.A.B. would like to
impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and
regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted
litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent,
efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital
role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air
transit.
There is no doubt that the fine imposed on appellant PAL in CAB resolution
109(70) and 132(70) is that fine or civil penalty contemplated and
mentioned in the foregoing provisions of Republic Act 776 and not a fine in
the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in the Revised Penal Code,
because the "fine" in this case was imposed by the C.A.B. because of
appellant PAL's violation of C.A.B. rules on flagstops without previous
authority on "May 12, 1970 and on previous occasions", said C.A.B.
explaining clearly in its resolution No. 132(70) that the "imposition of the
fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the
need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of
existing rules, regulations or requirements of the government regulating
agency. In other words, it is an administrative penalty which administrative
officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution.
27 CASE TITLE: Rubi, Et. Al. Vs Provincial Board of Mindoro ͵9 Phil. ͸͸Ͳ
– Political Law – Delegation of Powers – Liberty and due process
FACTS: Rubi and various other Manguianes ȋMangyansȌ in the province of
Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove
their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on
a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain
there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had
been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of
cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non- Christian tribe
who were considered to be of Dzvery low culturedz. One of the
Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later
caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped
from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on
behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by
virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the
reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case,
the validity of Section ʹͳͶͷ of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor
of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order,
to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board. was challenged.
 restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go
ISSUE: Whether or not Section ʹͳͶͷ of the Administrative Code constitutes
back to our
undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of
their liberty.

definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there
exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to
HELD: I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the
the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a
constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the
class.dz
doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine
whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is
optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances
28
may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate People v. Rosenthal & Osmena
official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts,
final on questions of fact. II. No. Among other things, the term Dznon- People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee v. Jacob Rosenthal & Nicasio
Christiandz should not be given a literal meaning or a religious Osmena, defendants-appellants
signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization.
June 12, 1939
The term Dznon-Christiandz it was said, refers not to religious belief, but
in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the
Facts:
Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote
peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of
them down where they can adapt to the changing times. The Supreme the O.R.O. Oil Company. The main objects and purposes of the company
Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other
neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: oil products.
Dz. one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of
selling their shares to individuals without first obtaining the corresponding
written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines.
This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as
the Blue Sky Law.
Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association,
or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative
securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file
previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers
enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.
The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially
depended upon a promise of future promotion and development of the oil
business, rather than on actual tangible assets.
On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional
on three grounds:
1) That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the
Insular treasurer
2) that it does not afford equal protection before the law
3) that it is vague and ambiguous

Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that “whatever the said Treasurer of
the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination Issue: WON the law is unconstitutional in any of the three grounds
herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation
is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided
for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, Held: The law is CONSTITUTIONAL on all grounds alleged by the
association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, appellants.
partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions
of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation,
its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said
certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall furthermore have
authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel Ratio:
said certificate or permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the WON it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular
Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the treasurer
Secretary of Finance.”
The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in
reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate
or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite
that the person ,partnership, association or corporation applying therefor
“has complied with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement,
construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a
certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the
provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the
authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is
expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the
public interest.” In view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to
protect the public against “speculative schemes which have no more basis
than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock infly-by-night
concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent
exploitations”, we hold that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient
standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter
pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.
Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec of
Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Treasurer can act and
decide without any restraining influence.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to
secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which
necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby
obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the “rule of law” was
established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it
subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the rule
prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time
American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative
power must be exercised by the legislative alone. It is frankness, however,
to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements, he
finds a great deal of confusion.
the maxim “delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non
potest delegare” has beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of
the principle of “subordinate legislation”, in practically all modern
governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the authority.
While courts have undertaken to laydown general principles, the safest is
to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind
the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved.
Hall v Geiger-Jones: it is well-settled principle of law in this state that by
legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the
existence of facts, upon the finding of which may depend the right to
continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business.
WON it does not afford equal protection before the law
Another ground relied upon by appellants in contending that Act No. 2581
is unconstitutional is that it denies equal protection of the laws because
the law discriminates between an owner who sells his securities in a single
transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive
transactions.

Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co: "Prominent among such discriminations are . . .
between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one
who disposes of them in successive transactions; . . . " If a class is deemed
to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to
prevent, the 14th Amendment allows it to be dealt with although
otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not
embraced in the law
WON it is vague and ambiguous
People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad. An Act will be declared void and
inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a
showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine,
with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended.
In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that
“legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if
susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it
effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the
ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for
which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and
provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution
are within the reach of those intrusted therewith.”
Judgement of lower court is affirmed, with modifications that the fines are
reduced.
29
CASE TITLE: Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU),
etc., vs. Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks
FACTS:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional because their provisions which confer on the Secretary of
Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
They specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended,
provides:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a
general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the
Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the
public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them,
and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative
shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and
colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the
same,
The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 which provides:
The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and publish
in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of primary,
intermediate, and high schools, and colleges granting the degrees of
Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other academic degree. It
shall also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the
minimum standards required of law, medical, dental, pharmaceutical,
engineering, agricultural and other medical or vocational schools or
colleges giving instruction of a technical, vocational or professional
character.
The petitioners contend that as the legislature has not fixed the standards,
"the provision is extremely vague, indefinite and uncertain"—and for that
reason constitutionality objectionable. This is because such “section leaves
everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or
his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the
standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of
Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate
standard."
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2706 should be declared unconstitutional
for conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards which therefore constitutes an
unlawful delegation of legislative power.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
Act No. 2706 is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of
Education to prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and
efficient instruction to be observed by all such private schools and colleges
as may be permitted to operate. Despite such alleged vagueness, the
Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and
efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising
curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission
and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education
has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only
shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the educational
experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education
to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction
as the basis of government recognition of any private school.
Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered
sufficient, in the same way as "public welfare" "necessary in the interest of
law and order" "public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial
At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any
merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards
of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for
justifying delegation of authority to regulate. (See Tañada and Fernando,
them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by
Constitution of the Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.)
the Secretary of Education.

On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue
True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and
delegation of legislative power.
regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such discretionary power
has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of
private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those
30
regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper
administrative or judicial proceedings—not to invalidate the law. For it Cenon S. Cervantes Vs. The Auditor General
needs no argument to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the
execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1952
of such statute.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Anyway, we find the defendants' position to be sufficiently sustained by
the decision in Alegra vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon holding
the statute that authorized the Director of Agriculture to "designate
standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey and sisal" against
vigorous attacks on the ground of invalid delegation of legislative power.
It appears that petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the
National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as NAFCO,
with a salary of Php. 15,000 a year. By resolution of the Board of Directors
of this corporation approved on January 19 of that year, he was granted
quarters allowance of not exceeding Php. 400 a month effective the first
of that month. Submitted to the Control Committee of the Government
Enterprise Council for approval, the said resolution was disapproved on
August 3, 1949.
The Government Enterprise Council was created by the
President under Executive Order No. 93 pursuant to Republic Act No. 51
authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect
such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled
corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy, and
efficiency in their operation. The council, contending that Executive Order
No. 93 was an undue delegation of power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 is null and void because
it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of
legislative power to the President.
RULING OF THE COURT:
No. As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the
legislative “lays down a policy and a standard is established by the
statute” there is no undue delegation. Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing
the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and
changes in government – controlled corporation, lays down a standard
and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant
upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the
Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency in their
operations. The standard was set and policy fixed. The President had to
carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in
question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute undue
delegation of legislative power.
RATIO:
Delegation to Administrative Agencies. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out boundaries of the delegate authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
To promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency is a sufficient
standard.

31 Ang Tibay vs. CIR
FACTS
Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of
leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the
National Labor Union. According to the Union however, this was merely a
scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work, and that
the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of
unfair labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against
the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers
Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer. The Court
of Industrial Relation decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme
Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay
filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
The motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU, there are
documents that are so inaccessible to them that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That these
documents, which NLU have now attached as exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein.
ISSUE
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents
obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were
evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further,
the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance
and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records
include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not
strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply
to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due
process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
32 Air Manila, Inc. vs Balatbat, GR No. L-29064, April 29, 1971
FACTS: On 1 April 1968, the Philippine Air Lines, petitioned the Civil
Aeronautics Board for approval of a proposed schedule introducing seven
nights and the adjustment of the flight schedule that may thus be affected
(CAB Case No. 1414). On 22 April 1968, the Board passed Resolution No. 109
(68), referring PAL's petition to a hearing examiner for economic
justification. Accordingly, the designated hearing officer set the initial
hearing thereof. It appears, however, that on 15 May 1968, PAL filed an
Urgent Petition for approval of a consolidated schedule of jet and jet prop
flights, with an interim DC-3 schedule to different secondary and feeder
points (DTS-35). On 28 May 1968, the Board issued its Resolution No. 139
(68), approving DTS-35 for a period of 30 days, effective 1 June 1968,
subject to the conditions. After the examiner's report, several of the
proposed flights were approved for 30 days from 31 July 1968. On 31 May
1968, Air Manila, Inc., filed the instant petition claiming that the
respondent Board acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution No. 139 (68). It is petitioner's
allegation that the proposed new schedule, involving an increase of
frequencies, would not only saturate the routes served also by petitioner,
but would also affect its schedule; that the Board's approval of said
Domestic Traffic Schedule without receiving the evidence of the parties
constituted a deprivation of petitioner's right to be heard; and that such
authorization to PAL to operate the proposed schedule without economic
justification amounted to a capricious and whimsical exercise by the Board
of its power amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Board's approval of said Domestic Traffic
Schedule without receiving the evidence of the parties constituted a
deprivation of petitioner's right to be heard.
RULING: No, there was no deprivation of petitioner’s right to be heard. In
the present case, it can not truthfully be said that the provisional approval
by the Board of PAL's proposed DTS35 violates the requisites of
administrative due process. Admittedly, after PAL's proposal to introduce
new Mercury night flights (in CAB Case No. EP-1414) had been referred to a
hearing examiner for economic justification, PAL submitted a so-called
consolidated schedule of flights, DTS-35, that included the same Mercury
night flights involved in Case EP-1414, and this was allowed by Board
Resolution No. 139 (68).
Neither can the provisional authorization of DTS-35 be said to have done
away with the requisite hearing and investigation of the new flight
schedules and, consequently, to have deprived the petitioner of its right to
be heard. Note that in allowing the operation or effectivity of PAL's
consolidated flight schedule, it was precisely prescribed that "all schedules
under the DTS-35 for which no previous approval has been granted by the
Board, are hereby referred to a hearing examiner for reception of evidence
on its economic justification." 3 It has not been denied that such hearings
were actually conducted by the hearing examiner and a report on the
result thereof was submitted to the Board. And the Board, considering the
report of the hearing examiner, passed Resolution No. 190 (68) 4
approving, for a period of 30 days starting 31 July 1968, only three or four
frequencies of the seven proposed new flights (F338, F591, F531/532,
F555/556, F527/528, F561/562, and F515/516). There is no proof, not even
allegation, that in all those bearings petitioner was not notified or given
opportunity to adduce evidence in support of its opposition.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain
basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process
requirements in investigations and trials. 1 And this administrative due
process is recognized to include (a) the right to notice, be it actual or
constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person's legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his
rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal
so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance
of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent Jurisdiction; and (4) a
finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed
to the parties affected.
33
CASE TITLE: VENANCIO LIM, SR., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE SUGAR QUOTA
ADMINISTRATOR AND
THE SUGAR QUOTA BOARD, Defendants-Appellants. BENITO ROCES,
intervenor. G.R. No. L-26990. August 31, 1970.
shown in a first endorsement of the Director of Lands to then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, enclosing communications from the
plaintiff dated November 6, 1958; February 9, 1959; and August 3, 1959. As
a result, one year and one month later, on December 8, 1959, with the
existing five-year lease contract in favor of intervenor Roces having four
more years to run, another contract of lease for the same sugar plant
marketing allotments was executed by the then Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and plaintiff.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Then came, on July 5, 1961, the order of revocation by the then Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Cesar M. Fortich. It was the
conclusion arrived at "that the execution of the contract of lease between
The case involves revocation of a lease contract by defendant Secretary of
the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Mr.
Agriculture and Natural Resources 1 was challenged in an ordinary action
Venancio Lim, Sr. covering matters still embraced in a subsisting contract
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal by plaintiff Venancio Lim, Sr.,
was improper, irregular and arbitrary. It is improper and irregular because
now appellee.
the contract was executed barely a year after the lease contract with Mr.
Roces which calls for a period of five crop years was entered into. When
the contract in question was executed, the contract with Mr. Roces has
On August 5, 1958, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
four more years to go. At the time, it was, therefore, too premature to
Resources, on behalf of the Government as lessor, and a certain Benito
even consider any application or request to lease the sugar plant
Roces, who intervened in this suit as lessee, executed a lease contract
marketing allotments which were still covered by the subsisting contract
covering sugar plant marketing allotments of the Mindoro Mill District for
of Mr. Roces. It is also arbitrary because Mr. Roces was not accorded the
five consecutive crop years from and including the 1958 and 1959 season at
opportunity to be heard on the allegations that practically describes him to
a yearly rental at the rate of fifty centavos per picul. After barely three
be an unqualified lessee. The records do not show that Mr. Roces was
months, plaintiff Venancio Lim, Sr. took steps to lease the same sugar
notified to the effect that after the expiration of his contract, the sugar
plant marketing allocations for a period of ten crop years beginning with
plant marketing allotments covered thereby were to be leased to Mr.
the 1963-1964 season at a yearly rental of fifty-five centavos per picul, as
Venancio Lim, Sr. The proceedings appear to have been all taken without
the knowledge of Mr. Roces.
The then Executive Secretary, the late Rufino G. Hechanova, acting by
authority of the President, on August 8, 1963, informed plaintiff of his
affirmance of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources of the previous administration "revoking the lease contract
executed in your favor and directing the Director of Lands to reimburse
you the amount already paid as advance rental as well as the denial of your
subsequent requests for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Was the revocation of the lease contract valid?
RULING OF THE COURT:
After a careful study of the relevant facts and the controlling doctrines, we
have reached a different conclusion. We reverse. The court did not uphold
the decision of the lower court.
The role incumbent upon the judiciary in the appraisal of any
administrative action, especially so of a department secretary, has been
delineated in our previous decisions. "It is a well-recognized principle that
purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered
with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the
government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the
exercise of judgment or
discretion, and findings of fact." It is only when there is a grave abuse of
discretion which is equivalent to a "capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment" or "where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to
an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law" that, as pointed out by
Justice Barrera, there is a justification for the courts setting aside the
administrative determination reached.
The totality of the circumstances disclosed in the present litigation is
incompatible with any other assumption except that of a conscientious
effort on the part of defendant Secretary to assure that the action taken
by him in revoking the lease contract would best subserve public interest.
There is this other circumstance of weight. As set forth by the present
Chief Justice in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, there must be an awareness
that what is being judicially reviewed in cases of this character is to be
attributed not only to "the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, but, also, [to] the President of the Philippines," an implication
which follows from the fundamental postulate that the acts of
department secretaries performed in the regular course of business are,
unless they are disapproved or reprobated, presumptively the acts of the
Executive.
What further fortifies the stand taken by defendant Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources was the express affirmance made by
the Executive secretary of a succeeding administration, acting by authority
of the President, of the decision revoking the lease contract. If the task of
overturning a decision of a department head is attended with difficulty,
the burden of persuasion becomes much heavier when the challenged
action is before the judiciary encased in the armor of an explicit
presidential approval. It would be to cast an undeserved reflection on a
coordinate branch of the government to impute to a decision reached by it
after a careful study of the facts the vice of unfairness or arbitrariness. Due
regard for the principle of separation of powers would caution against
such a hasty condemnation. This is not to say that it could not happen. It is
merely to emphasize that the facts as stipulated by the parties reject such
a conclusion. Lending support to such a judicial approach is the
recognition that must be paid to the constitutional command that the
President exercise control over all departments, bureaus and offices.
The lower court ought to have reached a conclusion affirming the action
taken by defendant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Proceeding from the premise, however, that plaintiff’s contract was
undoubtedly a property right coming within the purview of the due
process clause of the Constitution, it was its view that plaintiff was denied
procedural due process when it was revoked. 25 Thus: "This Court believes
that no less than notice and hearing under the circumstances will satisfy
due process, and total lack thereof as in the case at bar is a gross illegality
and abuse of discretion by an administrative officer from which relief can
be obtained upon review by this Court."
It was likewise the finding of the lower court: "Moreover, this Court agrees
with plaintiff’s contention that the order of Revocation would be
tantamount to an impairment by the government of the obligations of his
contract." Even on the assumption that there was an obligation of
contract which could not be impaired by law, this portion of the decision
now on appeal is likewise open to objection. For it is well-settled that a law
within the meaning of this constitutional provision has reference primarily
to statutes and ordinances of municipal corporations. Executive orders
issued by the President whether derived from his constitutional powers or
valid statutes may likewise be considered as such. It does not cover,
therefore, the exercise of the quasi-judicial power of a department head
even if affirmed by the President. The administrative process in such a case
partakes more of an adjudicatory character. It is bereft of any legislative
significance. It falls outside the scope of the non-impairment clause. In
that sense, the conclusion arrived at by the lower court that the order of
revocation was tantamount to a violation of this constitutional guarantee
cannot stand the test of scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of May 3, 1966 annulling the
order of revocation by defendant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is reversed.
guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a
faculty investigating
committee. On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate
another charge of a

similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the
postponement of

the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was denied. The
committee then

proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on 12/5/74,

submitted its report

recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On

12/12/74, the University

applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner’s employment.

Meanwhile, petitioner

filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages.

Judgement was rendered in

petitioner’s favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found
petitioner’s dismissal to be
#34 Montemayor vs. Araneta
justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
FACTS:

Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On

ISSUE:
7/8/74, he was found
Does academic freedom include the right of schools to dismiss teachers? powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments. For the

sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is ‘a right claimed by the accredited

RULING:
educator, as teacher and as
Yes. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where,
investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions
against the plea of
without being
academic freedom and security of tenure of a professor, the school was
35
allowed to separate a
CASE TITLE: FORTUNATO F. HALILI vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and
professor who after due process had been found guilty of violating
CAM TRANSIT CO., INC., GR NO. L-5948, April 29, 1953
behavioral standards.

The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure

is reinforced by the

provision on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the
Constitution. It was pointed out
in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission, Committee that academic freedom “is
more often Identified
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner herein is the holder of various certificates of public convenience
to operate auto-truck services between Balara and various points in the
city of Manila and its suburbs.

with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular
specialty and thereafter
to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that
retribution would be
visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or
objectionable to the
On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc., filed a petition with the respondent
Commission, alleging that the route authorized in its City Hall (Manila)-
Balara line, and passing along the Marikina-Barangka road, Marikina-San
Juan road, and Highway 54, is entirely different from that supported by
the evidence presented in the hearing, and praying that the certificate be
amended so that the route authorized should be along Highway 54,
Silañgan Avenue, U.P. site, ending at Balara, instead of Highway 54,
Marikina San Juan road, Barangka road, ending at Balara.
Acting upon this petition, the respondent Commission on the following
day, July 3, 1952, and without a previous notice to the petitioner or a
previous hearing thereon, ordered the modification of the line in
accordance with the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the order for each amendment of the route, without notice to
the petitioner and other interested parties, or hearing in which the latter
may be given opportunity to be present, was lawfully and validly issued by
the Commission.
RULING OF THE COURT:
It will be noted that the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146)
expressly defines the powers of the respondent Commission which may be
exercised by it "upon proper notice and hearing," or without previous
hearing. (Section 16 and 17.) The act of the Commission in issuing the order
of July 3, 1952, does not fall under any of the powers enumerated in the
above sections of the law, and consequently the question at issue must be
resolved in accordance with fundamental principles of law and justice.
A cursory perusal of the existing routes readily discloses that the change
or amendment ordered by the respondent Commission in the route of
respondent operator is one of substance, not nominal or innocent change.
It does not seem to us to be a correction a mere clerical, innocent mistake
or error. To us the grant of the route along the Barangka and the Marikina
roads to respondent operator was for the purpose of giving service to
people living along these roads and at Balara. On the other hand,
petitioner herein Halili, then oppositor to the application of respondent
operator's predecessor in
interest, was already given the University of the Philippines, Silañgan
Avenue, to Kamuning line, to serve students of the University and people
living along this route. Inasmuch as the terminal of respondent operator's
line is Balara, not the University, it could not have been the purpose and
intention of the original certificate issued to allow it to serve students of
the University of the Philippines. The supposed justification for the
issuance of the disputed order therefore, is not borne out by the original
decision granting the certificate of respondent operator's predecessor.
But assuming, for the sake of argument, that the respondent Commission
committed an error, in the appreciation of the supposed evidence offered
(which was not mentioned), it appears that the change in the route
authorized in the order clearly affects the right and privilege granted the
petitioner in his certificate of public convenience to pass from Kamuning
road through Silañgan Avenue, to the University of the Philippines, who
without a change in the respondent operator's line, could not ride in the
latter's buses because these operate only up to Balara, without reaching
the University of the Philippines,and pass only through Barangka and
Marikina roads. The amendment, therefore of the respondent operator's
lines affect the rights granted and guaranteed by the certificate of public
convenience of the petitioner. To allow the respondent Commission to
authorize the amendment, without giving the petitioner opportunity to be
heard and express his objections thereto, is clearly a deprivation of a
precious right and privilege without due process of law.
36
CASE TITLE: ALIPIO SICAT, ET AL. vs. HON. PASTOR P. REYES, ETC., ET AL.,
G.R. NO. L-11023, DECEMBER 14, 1956
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Arcadio Lagman was a tenant of Francisco Liongson since 1932 up to, 1951
of three parcels of ricelands belonging to the latter situated in Bacolor,
Pampanga.
Sometime in May, 1951, due to his failure to pay the rentals agreed upon,
Lagman was dispossessed of the land by his landlord who then and there
gave it to Alipio Sicat.
Since then Sicat worked the land until he was ejected therefrom by the
sheriff on July 6, 1956. This came about when a petition was filed by
Lagman on September 1, 1952 with the Court of Industrial Relations against
his landlord Liongson praying that he be reinstated as tenant of the land
he was working because his dispossession had been done without just
cause.
After issues were joined, this case was amicably settled by virtue of an
agreement, entered into between tenant and landlord wherein, among
other things, they stipulated that Lagman should be reinstated to his
landholding beginning the crop year 1956-1957 and that the present
tenant, Sicat, should vacate the land. And on the strength of this
agreement, the court issued an order on January 23, 1956 approving the
same and ordering that it be given effect as a decision on the merits.
On July 6, 1956, said order having become final, the court ordered its
execution, which was carried out by the sheriff on the same date by
ejecting Sicat from the land in question. Sicat lost no time in filing a motion
for reconsideration contending that the orders of ejectment, as well as the
writ of execution, were illegal in so far as he is concerned, because they
were issued without having been given his day in court. And when this
motion was denied, he interposed the present petition for certiorari.
The above agreement, which served as basis for the ejectment of Sicat,
cannot be binding and conclusive upon the latter, who is not a party to the
case. Indeed, that order, as well as the writ for execution, cannot legally
There is no question that in the tenancy case instituted by Lagman against
be enforced against Sicat for the simple reason that he was not given his
his landlord Liongson before the Court of Industrial Relations (now Court
day in court. It is well-settled that "No person shall be deprived of life,
of Agrarian Relations), Sicat was not a party even if he was the tenant
liberty, or property without due process of law . . .” (Section 1, Article III,
placed in the land by the latter to take the place of the former. However,
Constitution of the Philippines) and by "due process of law" we mean” 'a
when that case was called for trial on the merits, the parties submitted an
law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and
amicable agreement wherein, among other things, they stipulated as
renders" judgment only after trial. . .' (4 Wheaton, U. S., 518, 581)", or as
follows:
this Court has said: "Due process of law contemplates ' notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one's
person or property" (Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil., 23, 32). It is,
"4) That the parties respectfully pray this Hon. Court to order the therefore, evident that the order of the lower court dated January 23,
reinstatement of the petitioner Arcadio Lagman as tenant of the 1956, as well as the writ of execution of July 6, 1956, are null and void, the
respondent in the said remaining portion of his holding beginning the crop same having been issued by it in excess of its jurisdiction.
year 1956-1957 and to order the present tenant, Alipio Sicat, to vacate said
remaining landholding, and the dismissal of the respective claims of the
herein parties."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sicat was afforded due process.

RULING OF THE COURT:

38
Suntay v People; G.R. No. L-9430; 29 Jun 1957; 101 Phil 833
FACTS:
On January 10, 1955, petitioner Emilio Suntay applied for and was granted
a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. On January 20, 1955, he
left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at
present enrolled in school. The respondent Secretary on March 7, 1955
instructed the Ambassador to the United States to order the Consul
General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner
and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal
charges against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport without
hearing violates his constitutional right to due process.
RULING:
NO. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the
withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful.
But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts
and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport
already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in
withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an
officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a
serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be
dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his
passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law
clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him
cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of
such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the
due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary
injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.
Petition is DENIED.
39
De Bisshop vs. Galang 8 SCRA 244 (1963) G.R. No. L-18365
May 31, 1963
 Whether the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to
conduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens,
Fact:
and in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written
decisions in such cases?

Petitioner-appellee, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this

country for three years, expiring he applied for extension of stay with the
Held:
Bureau of Immigration. In view, however, of confidential and damaging
reports of the Commissioner of Immigration, in a communication of
Customs of Iloilo demanded from petitioner, advised him that his
The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be
application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been
followed in these cases, this would not violate the due process clause if it
denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5
took into account that, in this particular case, the letter of appellant-
days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the
commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality,
adverse decision said Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of
a
Immigration replied that, pursuant to immigration practice and procedure
and as is usual in such cases where the result is a vote for denial, for
reason of practicability and expediency, no formal decision, order
resolution is promulgated by the Board. Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in
simply advised of said denial. No request for reinvestigation was made appellant’s answer to the complaint, the “requirement to leave before the
with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his arrest and the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that
filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for
the present case on 18 September 1959. his expulsion”. It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in
court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. That due
process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by
means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society
Issue:
maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due
process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of
right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise
Hearings were conducted by the hearing examiner, Atty. Emiliano Tabigne,
since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore,
at which both parties, represented by counsel, appeared. After the
of all administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of
presentation of the evidence, the hearing examiner rendered his report
contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to
stating that the charge of unfair labor practice has not been substantiated
due process of law.
by the evidence and recommending its dismissal. He also found that the
dismissal of petitioner was for sufficient cause.

40

GRACIANO INDIAS, petitioner, vs. On May 20, 1955, the court approved the hearing examiner's
recommendation stating that, after a perusal of the record of the case, it
PHILIPPINE IRON MINES, INC., respondent.
"finds no sufficient justification for modifying said recommendation,
findings and conclusions, and consequently, this case is hereby dismissed."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Industrial court en banc.
Relations

dismissing the complaint of petitioner against respondent for unfair labor

practice and, indirectly, denying his prayer that he be reinstated as an ISSUE: "May the Court of Industrial Relations issue an order dismissing a
employee of respondent. case without stating the facts and the law support thereof?"

In 1954, a complaint was filed by petitioner alleging that respondent has RULING:
engaged in unfair labor practice. Respondent answered denying the
material allegations of the complaint and, as a special defense, alleged
that petitioner was dismissed from the service for cause. The order now assailed by petitioner reads:

Hearing Examiner Mr. Tabigne recommends the dismissal of this case on
the ground that the evidence by the complainant did not support the
charges of unfair labor practice. The facts are stated in the Hearing
Examiner's dated May 16, 1955.
After a perusal of the record of the case, the Court finds no sufficient
justification for modifying said recommendation, findings and conclusions,
and consequently, this case is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
It is contended by petitioner that the aforequoted order runs counter to
the Constitution which provides that "No decision shall be rendered by any
court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based" (Article VIII, section 12); and to Rule 35,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which provides that a court decision shall
state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." And
the claim is made in view of the fact that the order does not contain either
a discussion of the evidence or any finding of fact
based on said evidence, which counsel claims does not meet the
requirements of the law and the Constitution.
We find no merit in this contention. The order, it is true, does not make its
own discussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact, but such is not
necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of its examiner or referee
which already contains a full discussion of the evidence and the findings of
fact based thereon. The situation differs if the court disagrees with the
report in which case it should state the reasons for its disagreement. If it is
in full accord with the report, it is purposeless to repeat what the referee
or examiner has already found in it. Such is the present situation. The court
approved the report of the hearing examiner "after a perusal of the record
of the case." This presupposes that it has examined the evidence and
found no justification for modifying his findings and conclusions. This is a
substantial compliance with the law.
41. Gracilla v CIR
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint with respondent court raying that he
be paid for his unpaid services for Sundays and legal holidays during the
whole period of his employment, that he be given additional
compensation for night services, and that he be credited with his earned
vacation and sick leave pay as well as back wages from the date of his
illegal dismissal up to the time he is actually reinstated. He would thus hold
liable jointly and severally for the aforesaid money claim not only
respondent Fuller Paint Manufacturing Co. (Phil.) Inc., but likewise the
Republic Protection Agency, where he was connected long before his
services were availed of by the former. CIR dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. It added further; "For humanitarian reason, however,
complainant Gracilla should be afforded preferential opportunity by
respondent Republic Protective Agency, for assignment [to] any place
other than the Puller Paint Manufacturing Co. (Phil.), Inc.; else, it is
suggested that he be extended separation fee. MR was filed but it was
denied.
us of reviewing decisions and orders of the Public Service Commission. * *
* It is all the more essential then that each and every application should be
considered strictly on its merits and the relevant facts in support of an
order, ruling or decision be carefully inquired into and clearly set forth.
Otherwise, the exercise of the power of review by this Court might be
condemned to futility. The case was remanded to respondent court.
42 Neria vs. Commissioner of Immigration
May ʹ͸, ͳͻ͸ͺ

G.R. No. L-ʹ4ͺͲͲ

ISSUE: WON there was denial of due process. Yes

RULING: "The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial

questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the FACTS:
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it. The failure of respondent court, then, to pass
upon the monetary claims raised by petitioner, amounted to a disregard of
On July ͻ, ͳͻ͸ͳ the petitioner, with three other persons, supposedly his
such a cardinal right embraced in due process, namely, that the issues
widowed mother ȋDolores NeriaȌ and two younger brothers ȋFelix and
raised by a party should not be ignored or left undecided. Especially so,
Manuel NeriaȌ, arrived at the Manila International Airport from
should it be in this case, where the monetary claims were timely raised and
Hongkong. The petitioner was armed with Certificate of Registration and
insisted upon at all stages of the proceeding. The gravity of such a failing is
Identity ͸ʹͳ issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong.
underscored not only by deprivation of a right to which petitioner is
entitled, but also by the obstacle placed on the responsibility entrusted to
The immigration inspector at the airport, not satisfied with the petitioner’s
travel documents and those of his companions upon primary inspection
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Then he
thereof, referred the matter of their admission to the Board of Special
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to restrain the Commissioner
Inquiry for investigation Dzto determine filiation and paternity to a Filipino
of Immigration and the Board of Immigration from arresting and expelling
citizen.dz
him but the same was dismissed without prejudice and without costs.

On July ͳͶ, ͳͻ͸ͳ, the Board of Special Inquiry No. ͳ conducted a hearing
He then filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that the respondent’s
and petitioner gave oral arguments and presented evidence to support his
agents picked him up at Rosario St., Manila on the supposed claim that he
claim for admission as Filipino citizen. After the conclusion of the
was not properly documented for admission as a Filipino citizen when he
investigation, the said board on August ʹ, ͳͻ͸ͳ, unanimously voted for
entered the Philippines. On June ͳͺ, ͳͻ͸ͷ, the lower court dismissed the
petitioner’s admission. The board on the same date rendered its decision
petition on the ground that the Board did not act without due process of
and the written decision was subsequently submitted to the members of
law, in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. On June ʹ͵,
the Board of Commissioners. On September ͳ, ͳͻ͸ͳ, the Immigration
petitioner moved for reconsideration of said decision while the
authorities issued Identification Certificate to the petitioner. On
respondent filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration, to which
September Ͷ a copy of the decision was received by petitioner’s counsel.
the petitioner filed a reply.

Due to Memorandum Order ͻ issued by the Secretary of Justice, all cases

After appeal, the lower court amended its decision and granting the writ
before the Board including petitioner’s are under review. The new Board
of habeas corpus. It held that: Dzthe decision rendered by the new Board
of Immigration Commissioners found that the petitioner had not
of Commissioners is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and no
satisfactorily established his claim for admission as a Filipino citizen and,
administrative action being possible because the question involved in this
consequently, reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. ͳ,
case
and ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the Philippines as an
alien not properly documented for admission and be returned to the port
from whence he came or to the country of which he is a national.
is purely a legal question, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies has no application in this case.
dzISSUE/S & RATIO:
WON the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was promulgated on
August ʹ, ͳͻ͸ͳ when it was actually rendered or September 4, ͳͻ͸ͳ when
the petitioner was actually notified thereof and a copy received by his
counsel.
Ruling:
No amount of hair-splitting in regard to the words "rendition" and
"promulgation" would convey different meanings. This Court defined
promulgation as "the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing
and publication".͸ The word "promulgate" was viewed by the majority in
People vs. Dinglasan ȋ͸͸ Phil. ͸͸ͶȌ as the entry made by the clerk of a
judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments made by said clerk.͸
The petitioner's argument, at all events, is without merit. Section ʹ͸ ȋbȌ,
supra, provides that proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry — its
appraisal of a case on the merits, the result of its deliberation, its decision
and notice thereof to an alien, and the time when an appeal may be
brought therefrom — "shall be conducted under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration." Quoted hereunder for
ready reference are the pertinent sections of the Immigration Rules and
Regulations:
If the result of the deliberation shows that at least two members vote for
landing, a note thereof shall be made and the alien shall without waiting
for the decision to be put in writing, be released from custody, if the other
member of the board does not dissent and give notice of his desire to
appeal; otherwise, the alien shall remain in the detention station. If a
dissenting member appeals from the decision of the other two members,
the case shall be taken before the Board of Commissioners for decision.
ȋsec. ͷ͸Ȍ
When an alien is excluded by a board of special inquiry he shall be advised
of the decision together with the reason or reasons therefor; also of his
right to appeal his case to the Board of Commissioners. In every case the
alien shall be furnished with a copy of the decision upon promulgation
thereof. If the applicant appeals, he shall thereupon be informed of his
right to be represented by attorney or counsel in prosecuting his appeal.
An attorney or counsel representing an appellant shall have access to the
records of the proceedings of the board in the particular case, and may
also appear in person before the Board of Commissioners on behalf of his
client. ȋsec. ͷ4Ȍ
If, as provided in section ͳʹ above, "the result of the deliberation [of the
Board of Special Inquiry] shows that at least two members vote for
landing, a note thereof shall be made and the alien shall, without waiting
for the decision to be put in writing, be released from custody", then
promulgation can take place even before a decision is actually written and
a copy thereof served
upon the alien. Again, if, as provided in section ͳͶ above, "[i]n every
case the alien shall be furnished with a copy of the decision upon
promulgation thereof," then notice of a decision of the board shall be
made only after or upon promulgation, and not before. In both sections ͳʹ
and ͳͶ, therefore, promulgation always takes place before copy of the
written decision of the board is furnished to an alien. Of course, section ͳʹ
contemplates an alien who is under "custody", while section ͳͶ
contemplates a case of an alien "excluded by a board of special inquiry".
Nonetheless, there seems to be no reason why the same rule would not
apply to the case at bar, where the petitioner, who was "unanimously
voted" for admission by the Board of Special Inquiry No. ͳ, was at liberty
pending the conclusion of the investigation of his filiation and paternity to
a Filipino citizen. And in any of these circumstances, the date of
promulgation is the date when the Board of Special Inquiry in question
voted and resolved to admit an alien, and this date can be ascertained
from the minutes of the proceedings had before such board.ͺ
This Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that "the operative
date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion
was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when
the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed.,
In this case, August ʹ, ͳͻ͸ͳ was the date when the Board of Special Inquiry
No. ͳ concluded its hearing of petitioner's case ȋI.C. ͸ͳ-ʹ͵ͳʹ-CȌ, deliberated
on it, and voted for his admission as a citizen of the Philippines. August ʹ,
ͳͻ͸ͳ was also the date when the decision in extenso was rendered. That
date and not September Ͷ, ͳͻ͸ͳ, therefore, is the date of promulgation of
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. ͳ, which decision
should "prevail and shall be final ... unless reversed by the Board of
Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings
within one year from the promulgation of said decision."ͳͲ Computing the
one- year period from August ʹ, ͳͻ͸ͳ, the Board of Immigration
Commissioners had until August ʹ, ͳͻ͸ʹ within which to review the
proceedings motu proprio.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

43 SCOTYS DEPARTMENT STORE V MICALLER ISSUE: Whether the industrial court erred in finding that petitioners can be
legally punished by a fine of P100/Whether the Court of Industrial Relations
has no jurisdiction to impose the penalty
FACTS:
HELD:

Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store

Yes
situated Manila. This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard
Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Pursuant to of the Industrial Peace Act,
Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her above
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that, “Any person who
employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her
violates the provisions of section three this act shall be punished by a fine
membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation,
of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or
said employers had been questioning their employees regarding their
by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year, or
membership in said union and had interfered with their right to organize
both by such free and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court.
under the law.
Any other violation of this Act which is declared unlawful shall be punished
The employers denied the charge. They claim that the complainant was
by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred pesos for each
dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious
offense.”
disrespect to the management and her co- employees.

However, the court found respondents, now petitioners, guilty of unfair

labor practice and ordered them to pay a fine of P100. The above provision is general in nature for its does not specify the court
that may act when the violation charged calls for the imposition of the
penalties therein provided. It merely states that they may be imposed "in
the discretion of the court."
After mature deliberation, the Court has reached the conclusion that, said
provision notwithstanding, that word cannot refer to the Court of
Industrial Relations for to give that meaning would be violative of the
safeguards guaranteed to every accused by our Constitution.that
- Article III, section 1, (15) "No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law" [Article III, section 1, (15),
Philippine Constitutional], and
- "In all criminal prosecution the accused . . . shall enjoyed the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf" [Article III,
section 1, (17)]..
TAKE NOTE: THIS CASE WAS DECIDED 1956
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial
Relations in dealing with the unfair labor practice cases negates those
constitutional guarantee to the accused. And this is so because, among
other things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in
court for the courts of law or equity cannot be controlling and it is the
spirit and intention of this act that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and
its members and its Hearing Examiners shall be use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objective and without regards to technicalities of law of procedure."
It is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not be bound solely by the
evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of all other
means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of
well-informed persons which results must be made a part of the record"
[section 5 (b), Republic Act No. 875]. All this means that an accused may
be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be
convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and not beyond
reasonable doubt. This is against the due process guaranteed by the
constitution. It may be contended that this gap may be subserve strictly
the rules applicable to
criminal cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but this
would be tantamount to amending the law which is not within the
province of the judicial branch of our Government.
That the power to impose the penalties provided for in section 25 of
Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of
Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court"
contained in section 2(a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the industrial
court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and
should be nullified.
44 G.R. No. L-͵Ͳ77ʹ October ʹ9, ͳ97ͳ
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX R. DOMINGO and JUAN MAFE, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Juan Mafe, a mechanic in the employ of the Philippine
National Railways was charged in an information for qualified theft the
filed with respondent court, for having stolen one brass bearing valued at
PͶͷ.ͲͲ from his employer's shop.
Respondent, on his part, disowned any criminal intent claiming he was on
his way to return the brass bearing and repudiated his extrajudicial
confession, asserting that he was coerced into signing the same without
being allowed to read its contents, which were different from what he
stated at the police investigation.
Respondent court, in its decision of January ͳͺ, ͳͻ͸ͻ, ruled that "the
prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt" and rendered judgment "acquitting the accused on
reasonable doubt."
After promulgation on February ͸, ͳͻ͸ͻ of the verdict of acquittal,
however, respondent-accused filed on February ͳͻ, ͳͻ͸ͻ a motion for
amendment of respondent court's decision, alleging for the first time that
respondent had already been dismissed from the service of the Railways
as of July Ͷ, ͳͻ͸͸ "with prejudice to reinstatement" per the Railways'
board of directors' resolution of January ͳͻ, ͳͻ͸ͺ, because of the very
incident subject matter of the criminal charge of which respondent court
had acquitted him, and praying that respondent court amend its decision
so as to include therein his reinstatement, with payment of back salaries
and restoration of all accrued rights and privileges.
Respondent court in its order dated March ͵, ͳͻ͸ͻ set hearing of the
motion on March ͳͷ, ͳͻ͸ͻ and ordered that the parties and the general
manager of the Philippine National Railways be notified thereof, and
thereafter issued its "amendatory decision" dated March ʹ͸, ͳͻ͸ͻ, noting
that there was no appearance nor opposition from the Railways at the
hearing and granting respondent's motion, by adding the following
paragraph to the dispositive part of its original decision, as follows:
The General Manager of the Philippine National Railways, Manila, is hereby
ordered to reinstate the accused immediately to his position from which
he was dismissed on July Ͷ, ͳͻ͸͸ and to pay his ȋaccusedȌ salary in full
during the period beginning July Ͷ, ͳͻ͸͸ to the date of reinstatement, and
The general rule that the court has no such authority has long been
to restore the said accused to such benefits and rights and privileges
uniformly pronounced by the Court. In People v. Mañago, involving an
arising from the position that he held which should have accrued to him
accused employee acquitted of the charge of malversation of public funds,
during the period aforesaid.
the Court held that "In a criminal proceeding against an accused, the
judgment that. the law authorities to be rendered, is either one of
acquittal or of conviction with indemnity and the accessory penalties
Hence, the present action filed by petitioner Philippine National Railways,
provided for by law. The payment of salary of an employee during the
after respondent court had denied its motion to set aside the amendatory
period of his suspension cannot, as a general rule, be properly decreed by
decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over it and over the subject
the trial court in a judgment of acquittal."
matter of reinstatement and back salaries and of lack of due process.
Upon petitioner's motion and bond, the Court issued on August ʹ͸, ͳͻ͸ͻ a
writ of preliminary injunction.
In the analogous case of Manila Railroad Co. v. Baltazar, ͷ where the two
accused employees were acquitted of qualified theft, the Court further
elaborated that" ȋIȌn -criminal cases courts of first instance may dismiss
Issue:
an information, try and acquit or convict and impose upon the defendant
the penalty provided by law. The only civil responsibility that may be
imposed by the court is that which arises from the criminal act
Whether the trial court in a criminal case, in rendering a judgment of
acquittal, may properly decree the payment of salaries during the period
of the accused employee's suspension from the service, and where the
The owner of a stolen property in a case of qualified theft is a party in the
employee was dismissed, order his reinstatement in the service.
case if he does not reserve his right to bring a separate civil action. In that
event the court will order the defendant criminally liable to return the
property stolen, to repair the damage caused or done, if any, and to
Held: indemnify the offended party for consequential damages. But whether a
defendant acquitted of a criminal charge is entitled to his salary during
NO.
suspension is not within the power of the court to grant in the criminal accused is acquitted, is without power to order the payment of his salary
case where the defendant is acquitted. Neither the Revised Penal Code nor during the period of his suspension.
the Rules of Court on criminal procedure vests in the court authority to
grant such a relief.
The reason is that the only issue joined by the plea of not guilty is whether
or not the accused committed the crime charged in the information, and in
Respondent court, therefore, had no authority or power in the criminal such case, the only judgment that the court is legally authorized to render
case below to order the general manager of the Philippine National is either one of acquittal or of conviction with the indemnity to the injured
Railways to reinstate respondent to the position from which he had been party and the accessory penalties provided for by law.
duly dismissed, much less to order the payment of his wages in full from
the date of his suspension and effective date of dismissal on July Ͷ, ͳͻ͸͸
to date of reinstatement with restoration of all accrued benefits, rights The rule governing cases of this nature may be restated as follows:
and privileges, and the petition must be granted as prayed for. Besides,
respondent court had no authority nor jurisdiction to issue its
"amendatory decision" dated March ʹ͸, ͳͻ͸ͻ granting such reinstatement
— The Court’s jurisprudence uniformly holds that the trial court in the
with back wages, since its original decision of acquittal became
criminal case, has no authority, in the event of an acquittal of the accused
immediately final, upon promulgation on February ͸, ͳͻ͸ͻ and could no
employee, to order payment of back salaries.
longer be recalled for amendment or modification.

— Daleon’s doctrine is hereby reaffirmed. While an acquitted accused

Thus, in People v. Daleon, ͸ Mr. Justice Reyes so reiterated for the Court its
may in appropriate cases claim payment of back salaries during the period
previous jurisprudence and the rationale therefor:" ȋTȌhe question is not
of his suspension, or reinstatement in the case of his dismissal, his relief
new. In at least three cases previously decided by this Court ȋPeople v.
lies not in the same criminal case wherein he is acquitted but in the proper
Mañago, ͸ͻ Phil. Ͷͻ͸; Pueblo v. Lagutan, ͸Ͳ Phil. Ͷͺͳ; Manila Railroad Co.
administrative or civil action prescribed by law.
v. Baltazar, Et Al., L-ͷͶͷͳ, September ͳͶ, ͳͻͷͺȌ, we have ruled that the
trial court, in a criminal action for malversation of public funds wherein the
— The reason for the rule is that generally acquittal in the criminal
case does not carry with it relief
from administrative liability. The administrative case may generally
proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the
same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to
establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the criminal charge, as in the analogous cases provided by Art. ͵͵ of the Civil
Code. ͳͳ
ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted as
prayed for. The amendatory decision dated March ʹ͸, ͳͻ͸ͻ and order dated
May ͵Ͳ, ͳͻ͸ͻ of respondent court are annulled and set aside, and the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against their enforcement is
hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.
45
CASE TITLE: TWIN PEAKS MINING ASSOCIATION v. HON. PEDRO C.
NAVARRO, GR No. L-49835, Dec 18, 1979
FACTS OF THE CASE:
This certiorari and prohibition case is about the jurisdiction of a Court of
First Instance to entertain a dispute as to the enforcement of mining
contracts, a matter allegedly falling within the exclusive province of the
Bureau of Mines under section 7(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1281.
On September 1, 1978, Philex Mining Corporation filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch II a complaint against the Twin Peaks
Mining Association and its four partners. It prayed for a judgment
declaring as valid and binding on Twin Peaks the two agreements for the
exploration, operation and exploitation of two hundred ninety (290) lode
mineral claims located at Tuba, Benguet. The agreements were entered
into between Philex and the late geodetic engineer, Andres K. Espiritu,
who represented himself to be the general manager of Twin Peaks but
who was not a partner thereof.
The firm filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
cause of action, because the afore-cited section 7(c) of Presidential Decree
No. 1281 provides that the Bureau of Mines has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving enforcement of mining
contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner to abide by the terms and
conditions thereof".
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It sustained plaintiff's stand
that the validity of the said mining contracts is a justiciable question that
should be resolved by the courts and that the complaint states a cause of
action against the defendants.
ISSUE:
W/N the regular court has jurisdiction over cases involving enforcement of
mining contracts. NO!
RULING OF THE COURT:
The trial court has no jurisdiction over the case and that the issue of
whether the two contracts are valid falls within the exclusive competence
of the Bureau of Mines as clearly indicated in section 7(c) of Presidential
Decree No. 1281 which took effect on January 16, 1978.
That decree revised Commonwealth Act No. 136 (the law creating the
Bureau of Mines) for the purpose of making that agency "a more potent
and effective arm of the Government in the administration and disposition
of our mineral resources and responsive to the needs of the Filipino
people, in general, and the mining industry, in particular. "
placed into actual operations within the period stipulated therein; and (c)
cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of
the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof.
And it is noteworthy that the trend is to make the adjudication of mining
cases a purely administrative matter. Thus, it cannot escape notice that
under section 61 of the Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, as
amended by Republic Acts Nos. 746 and 4388, appeals from the decision
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Minister of
Natural Resources) on conflicts and disputes arising out of mining
locations may be made to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as
the case may be.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted and the lower court's order
denying the motion to dismiss is reversed and set aside.

Section 7 of the same decree, already cited, confers upon the Bureau the
following quasi-judicial powers:
46
“SEC. 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over
companies, partnerships or persons engaged in mining exploration, CASE TITLE: Glenia Uy, for and in behalf of her minor brother Reynaldo and
development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have original and minor sisters Maria Elena and Conchita, all surnamed UY; GR No. L-43389;
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: (a) a mining April 28, 1980
property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder
thereof with several mining operators; (b) complaints from claimowners
that the mining property subject of an operating agreement has not been
FACTS: Kim Lam Uy was an overseer of Lucy Perez in here rice mill
business. Kim Lam Uy was killed in a robbery in keeping the business of
Lucy Perez. The heirs of Kim Lam Uy filed a claim on Workers
Compensation Commission being an employee of Lucy Perez. When the
Workers Compensation Commission gave due notice to Lucy Perez
requiring the latter to submit the WCC forms, the latter failed to comply so
the WCC imposed penalties to Lucy Perez to pay the heirs of the deceased
the compensation. Lucy Perez denied that the deceased were her
employee as there was no employee-employer relationship existed. This
issue has reached to the Workers Compensation Commission on appeal
and the WCC rendered a decision that there was no employer – employee
relationship so no compensation was needed to speak of. Aggrieved by
the decision, the heirs of Kim Lam Uy filed a petition for Certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Private respondent contends that what is raised by the claimants-
petitioners are findings of facts of the respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission which is definitely within the province of
appeal and not for certiorari.
HELD This contention, according to the SC’s opinion, was untenable. The
SC ruled that while it is true that the remedy of certiorari is generally
resorted to only in cases where the remedy of appeal is unavailable. The
rule, however, is not so rigid and strict as not to admit of any exception.
The SC in a long line of decisions laid down the ruling that certiorari is
available despite the existence of the remedy of appeal where public
policy so dictates or the broader interests of justice so require. In the light
of those rulings laid down by the SC, it is clear that dismissal of the instant
petition which seeks to enforce the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, a benign legislation intended to
implement the social justice guarantee mandated by the Constitution is a
foul blow to the humanitarian design of the law. Thus, the respondent
WCC’s decision was set aside and reversed.
47
Uy v. Palomar
G.R. No. L-23248 February 28, 1969
FACTS:
Manuel Uy is a duly authorized agent of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), a government entity created and empowered
by law to hold sweepstakes draws and lotteries for charitable and public
purposes. As such agent of the PCSO, Uy is engaged in the sale and
distribution of sweepstakes and lottery tickets, and he also employs sub-
agents. With the consent of the PCSO, Uy agrees to give 50% of the agent's
prize to the sub-agent selling the prize-winning ticket. The agent's prize is the Postmaster acted arbitrarily or gravely exceeded his authority, and/ or
10% of the prize won by the ticket sold. committed an error of law.

The Postmaster answered that the Postal Law served as basis for his
action, which authorizes him to issue fraud orders upon satisfactory
For the Grand Christmas Sweepstakes Draw of December 1963, the PCSO
evidence that any person or company is engaged in conducting any
directed its agents to undertake every means possible to help achieve its
lottery, gift enterprise scheme, etc. through the mails. (Sec. 1982), that as
P6 Million sales goal. The prizes were fixed at P700,000, P350,000, and
Postmaster General he has the authority to issue the fraud order in
P175,000 for 1st, 2nd and 3rd prize. Uy devised a “Grand Christmas Bonus
question and he did not abuse his discretion in doing so; and that Manuel
Award” plan, where both his sub-agents and purchasers of winning
Uy had not exhausted all the administrative remedies before invoking
sweepstakes tickets, in addition to the regular prize money, would each
judicial intervention.
win bonuses and awards. (1st prize is a Volkswagen sedan; 2nd prize is a
Television; 3rd prize is a refrigerator; 4th prize is a sewing machine; and The CFI Manila ruled that the fraud order is contrary to law; it issued a writ
charity prize is a radio). Sub-agents and purchasers of sweepstakes tickets of preliminary injunction against the Postmaster General.
did not have to pay any amount on top of the amount paid for the ticket,
ISSUE:
to benefit from the plan.
1. WON the Postmaster’s decision to issue a fraud order can be
Such plan is a modification of the original scheme presented by Uy to the
reviewed by the Court.
Assistant Postmaster General, which the latter considered as violative of
the Postal Law. Uy advertised his "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan in
metropolitan newspapers of nationwide circulation weekly, for almost a
month. Because of this, the Postmaster General Enrico Palomar issued a 2. WON the "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan constitutes a
Fraud Order No. 3. Uy learned of the order two weeks after its issuance, lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme proscribed by the Postal Law.
when his parcels containing sweepstakes tickets and other mail matters of
purely personal nature, were refused for acceptance for mailing.

Uy filed a complaint with the CFI Manila against the Postmaster General,
praying for an injunction to restrain said Postmaster General from HELD:
enforcing Fraud Order No. 3, alleging that in issuance of the fraud order,
1. Yes. The Postal Law contains no provision for judicial review of the
decision of the Postmaster General. However, even if the Postal Law
Also, the assertion of the Postmaster that the action of Uy was premature
contains no provision for judicial review of decisions of the Postmaster
for failure to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
General, the Court, however, has ruled in several cases that the action of
remedies has no merit. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
the Postmaster General is subject to revision by the courts in case he
is not a hard and fast one. It admits of exceptions, amongst which are: (1)
exceeded his authority or his act is palpably wrong, and that the courts
where the question involved is purely a legal one, and (2) where there are
may interfere with the decision of the Postmaster General if it is clearly of
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The question
opinion that the Postmaster was wrong. The Court, by ruling thus,
involved in the present case is legal: whether or not the "Grand Christmas
recognizes the availability of judicial review over the action of the
Bonus Award" plan based upon the facts as stipulated, is a lottery or gift
Postmaster General, notwithstanding the absence of statutory provision
enterprise. We take note that the Grand Christmas Sweepstakes draw in
for judicial review of his action.
conjunction with which Uy’s plan was offered, was scheduled for
2. For lottery to exist, three elements must concur, namely: December 15, 1963, or barely five days from December 10, 1963, the date
consideration, prize, and chance. In the "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" when Uy learned of the issuance of the fraud order. Time was of the
plan, there is absence of the element of consideration, that is, payment of essence to Uy.
something of value, or agreement to pay, for the chance to win the bonus
or award offered. Here, the prizes offered by Uy were to be taken from his
share in the agent's prize, which was 10% of the amount of the prize won 48 [G.R. No. L-25641. December 17, 1966.]
by each ticket sold. Since none of the prizes (awards and bonuses) offered
in Uy’s plan were to come directly from the aggregate price of the RAFAEL M. ABAYA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, ET AL.,
sweepstakes tickets sold by Uy, as a part thereof, no consideration exists Respondents. ABELARDO SUBIDO, Respondent-Appellant.
for the chance to win said prizes. Since in the instant case the element of
consideration is lacking, the plan or scheme in question is also not a "gift
enterprise" or a "similar scheme" proscribed by the Postal Law. FACTS

Petitioner Rafael M. Abaya passed the civil service examination for

patrolman held on November 24, 1962. On March 3, 1964, he was
appointed Manila patrolman by respondent mayor Antonio J. Villegas. The
Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent Abelardo Subido, approved this
appointment on May 20, 1964 with the following conditions: (a) subject to
the usual physical and medical examination; (b) provided that there is no
pending administrative case against the appointee; no pending protest
against the appointment; and no decision by competent authority that will
adversely affect the approval of said appointment.
On October 16, 1964, petitioner started service.
On May 18, 1965, the Commissioner addressed to the Mayor a
communication advising that because petitioner gave a false answer on
question whether he “had been accused of, indicted for or tried for the
violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation, before any court, or have
you ever been charged with or tried for any breach or infraction of
military, naval, or constabulary discipline before any military, naval, or
constabulary
tribunal or other authorities”, which the petitioner answered “NO” to his
application for patrolmen’s examination, the fact, however, was that at
the time of the filing of the application there were cases pending against
him in the Fiscal’s Office and in the City Court of Manila, he (Commissioner)
cancelled petitioner’s civil service eligibility derived therefrom, and that
accordingly petitioner’s appointment was anchored on eligibility
fraudulently obtained. He directed that petitioner’s employment "be
terminated immediately."
The Mayor sought the opinion of the City Fiscal of Manila. The latter, on
June 7, 1965, opined that termination of petitioner’s employment "without
prior hearing on the alleged violation of law and civil service rules, would
be violative of the due process clause and the security of tenure
guaranteed civil service employees.
On June 9, 1965, the Mayor wrote the Commissioner, informing that in
view of the City Fiscal’s opinion he was proceeding administratively against
petitioner.
But, on June 15, 1965, the Commissioner sent the Mayor another directive
stating that a hearing would be "a useless act" ; reiterating that
petitioner’s services be terminated; and reminding the city executive of
the penal liability under Section 44 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 in the
event of his failure to comply therewith.
The Mayor required petitioner to explain. In his answer, dated June 18,
1965, petitioner admitted having made a negative reply to the question.
In a letter of October 18, 1965, the Mayor terminated petitioner’s services
in the Manila Police Department, effective immediately.
Since May, 1965, respondent City Treasurer withheld petitioner’s salary.
On November 2, 1965, petitioner went to the Manila court on prohibition
and mandamus. Upon the petition therefor and the answer thereto, and
the stipulation of facts, the trial court, on June 15, 1966, rendered
judgment ordering the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into the
service, to pay his salaries accruing since May, 1960, without prejudice to
initiating the proper proceedings for the removal of the petitioner.
ISSUE
Whether or not the order of the trial court is correct.
RULING
1. The constitutionally protected security of tenure is: No officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law.
Section 32 of the Civil Service Law of 1959 echoes this precept with the
provision that" No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process:"
Said Section 32 adds that the officer or employee complained of "shall be
entitled to a formal investigation if he so elects, in which case, he shall
have the right to appear and defend himself at said investigation in person
or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him,
and to have the attendance of witnesses and production of documents in
his favor by compulsory process or subpoena or subpoena duces tecum."
A civil service employee should be heard before he is condemned.
Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such unrelented grasp that by
now it would appear trite to make citation thereof.
Two acts adverse to petitioner were done: Appellant Commissioner’s
cancellation of his eligibility, and respondent Mayor’s order of dismissal.
Concededly, however, there was no investigation prior to the cancellation
of petitioner’s civil service eligibility and before he was eased out of the
service. Consequently, petitioner was denied due process.
2. The appellant’s argument that formal investigation is unnecessary
because petitioner has admitted that he made negative reply to the
question in his application for examination does not give the presumption
that the petitioner made it intentionally.
Rule II, Article 4, of the Civil Service Rules, provides "That when an
applicant for examination intentionally make a false statement of any
material fact in his application, or practices or attempts to practice any
deception or fraud in connection with his examination, the Commissioner
shall invalidate his examination and such offense shall be ground for his
removal from the service."
The accent is on the word intentionally. The fact that petitioner made an
answer which is at war with the truth does not connote the idea that it
was intentionally made. Conceivably, situations may exist which could
bring up that answer to the level of one given in good faith. Without
evidence, we are loathe to tar and feather petitioner as a perjurer. Short of
an inquiry which proves that the false answer was intentionally made, we
cannot attribute thereto a meaning which would make a felon out of
petitioner. It should then go without saying that the vitality of the
constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken by
sanctioning cancellation of an employee’s civil service eligibility and/or his
dismissal from service — without hearing — upon a doubtful assumption
that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against civil service rules. It is
pertinent here to recall that good faith is always presumed. In the context
just presented, we are constrained to state that petitioner received less
than a fair treatment.
And again we say that petitioner was not accorded his right to due
process.
3. The prematurity of petitioner’s complaint is not relied upon by
appellant. Appellant’s thesis on this score is that petitioner has not
exhausted administrative remedies — he did not appeal from the order of
dismissal, but went straight to court.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule.
Such exhaustion is not necessary here. And for a number of reasons. First,
because in the situation in which petitioner was found, dismissed from the
job, denied his pay and with a family to support, it is easy to perceive that
he had to look up to the courts for speedy relief. In this factual
environment, administrative remedy — appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals — is not expeditious and adequate. 13 Second, the question
presented is "purely a legal one" ; the controverted act is "patently
illegal." 14 and "nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be
done." 15 Third, petitioner was denied due process. 16 Each of the three
instances just mentioned — and they are all present here — is an
exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Petitioner’s reinstatement becomes ministerial; payment of his back salary
merely incidental to reinstatement.
49. VICENTE DE LARA, JR, et.al. vs GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, et.al.
FACTS:
Vicente de Lara, Jr. was granted on August 5, 1957 a timber license to log
over an area of about 300 hectares in Claveria, Misamis Oriental, for which
he was authorized to cut annually about 600 cubic meters of timber.
Although De Lara failed to undertake any operation in the area covered by
his license, he was able to secure its renewal from year to year up to 1961,
while his latest renewal for 1962 was
rejected by the Bureau of Forestry.
During De Lara’s period of non-renewal of his timber license, the
application for a similar forest concession filed by P & B Enterprises
Co., Inc. was processed, the same having been approved on September 25,
1961 over a forest area of approximately 25,000 hectares also situated in
Claveria, Misamis Oriental. Immediately after the granting of its timber
license and by virtue of the authority granted by said Bureau, the company
commenced the construction of a logging road and procured heavy
equipment and introduced substantial improvements thereon, which
extended not along the plaintiff’s concession but partially within the area
covered by De Lara’s timber concession. In the meantime, De Lara’s
petition for renewal of his license for 1963 was approved, as amended,
included a portion of the forest concession area originally granted to P
& B Enterprises Co., Inc., whereupon the latter protested against such
approval, but the protest was overruled. Hence, the company appealed
the Director of Forestry’s decision to the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Pending appeal, De Lara, however, aided by his men as well as by Acting
Governor Maximo G. Rodriguez of Misamis Oriental, continued his logging
operation using the road constructed by P & B Enterprises to which
the company protested before the Director of the Bureau. The Director of
the Bureau acting on the company’s protest, prohibited De Lara from
entering and operating the contested area but the same was
countermanded, prompting the company to appeal to the Sec. of
Agriculture, who on June 7, 1963 issued an order prohibiting De Lara from
entering and operating within the contested area. However, despite this
orders De Lara continued to operate and cut logs. Hence, P & B filed a
complaint before the Court of First Instance of manila for Injunction and
damages against De Lara.
The respondent Court issued ex parte the writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining De Lara from logging in the area. De Lara filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action in
that the plaintiff (P & B) has failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies it appearing that the appeal to the Sec. of Agriculture regarding
the conflict was still pending determination by said official. De Lara
interposed the present petition for certiorari praying to maintain the
status quo of the logging operations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint fails to state a cause of action for failure of
the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies.
RULING:
Because of the conflict existing between petitioner and respondent
company regarding the portion of the logging area awarded to them, as
well as the use of the logging road constructed by the company, the case
was taken to the Sec. of Agriculture for his final resolution, who in the
meantime directed petitioner “ to refrain from entering and operating
within the contested area until said case shall have been finally decided,”
but before such resolution could come De Lara disregard the directive and
continued operating within the contested area to the irreparable damage
and injury of the company. This act of defiance prompted the company to
take the needed appropriate action. In the circumstances, we find the
action taken by respondent court proper and justified even if no final
decision has as yet been rendered by the Sec. of Agriculture. Respondent
court did nothing but to maintain and put into effect the directive issued
by said official. WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed.
50
G.R. No. L-10182 December 24, 1957
JOSE GEUKEKO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
HON. SALVADOR ARANETA, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, etc., respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
Jose Geukeko is a lessee of a certain lot of the Tambobong estate owned
by Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, a portion of which he sub-leased
to Elena Jacinto et al. When the Republic of the Philippines acquired the
Tambobong Estate pursuant to Commonwealth Act. No. 539, Jose
Geukeko filed an application with the Director of Lands, to purchase the
lot leased by him, but the sub-leases opposed and likewise filed
applications to purchase the respective portions actually occupied by
them. This was filed in the Bureau of Lands.
The Director of Lands ruled in favor of Geukoko and dismissed the protest
of the subleases. The subleases then filed an action in the CFI seeking to
annul the decision and for approval of their application.
Two years later the court dismissed the civil case filed by the subleases
saying that they had not exhausted all the administrative remedies
available to them by failing to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources before going to Court.
The sub-lessees then appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Due to this, Geukoko filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition for mandamus and prohibition praying that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources be restrained from taking cognizance of
the appeal on grounds that the period to appeal had already prescribed.
ISSUED: WON THE SUBLEASES CAN INVOKE THE ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF
OF APPEAL TO SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
RULING: YES, the relief could still be availed by the aggrieved parties.
As provided under the Section 2 of the Land Administrative Order No. 6,
promulgated by the Secretary of Agricultural and Commerce
SEC 2. APPEAL FROM DECISION OR ORDER OF THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.—An
appeal shall lie from a decision of the Director of Lands to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce within a period of sixty (60) days to be counted
from the date the interested party received notice thereof unless a motion
for reconsideration is filed within the said period, in which case, appeal
shall be made within sixty (60) days from his receipt of notice of the order
or decision of the Director of Lands disposing of the motion for
reconsideration.
It was clear that the appeal to the Secretary of Agricultural and Commerce
was made more than 2 years from the date of their receipt of the decision
of the Director of Lands had elapsed.
However, The Secretary of Agriculture maintains that the period of 60
days provided for by section 2 of the Lands Administrative order No. 6
aforequoted has not yet prescribed saying that it has been the adopted
policy of Secretary of Agriculture to consider the filing of civil actions in
court as suspending the running of the presctiptive period. It must be
remembered that Administrative Order No. 6 is in the nature of procedural
rules promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
pursuant to the power bestowed on said administrative agency to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the proper discharge and
management of the functions imposed by law upon said office.
The underlying idea seems to be that those officials are considered in a
better position to decide controversies regarding the disposition of said
Estate.
Recognizing the existence of such rule making authority.

Authorities sustain the doctrine that the interpretation given to a rule or

regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest HENCE, the decision appealed from and the order denying the motion
weight and respect by the Court construing such rule or regulation, and for reconsideration thereof are barely affirmed, with cost against
such interpretation will be followed unless it appears to be clearly appellant. It is so ordered.
unreasonable or arbitrary.

51 R. MARINO CORPUS, petitioner-appellant vs. MIGUEL CUADERNO, SR.,

It also been said that: THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MONETARY BOARD
AND MARIO MARCOS, respondents-appellees; G.R. No. L-17860
March 30, 1962
An Administrative body has power to interpret its own rules which have
the force and effect of law, and such an interpretation becomes part of
the rule (Foley vs. Benedict, 122 Tex 193, 55 SW [2d] 805, 86 ALR 477).

FACTS OF THE CASE

The interpretation given by the Department of Agriculture and Natural

Resources to the provisions of section 2 of Lands Administrative Order No.
6 appears to be reasonable for it merely reflects the intent of the law in
placing the disposition of lands within the Tambobong Estate in the hands
of the official as of the Land Department
Several employees in the export department administratively charged
petitioner R. Marino Corpus, the “Special Assistant to the Governor, In
Charge of the Export Department” of the Central Bank, a position declared
by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature, with
dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority,
Whether or not the Petitioner should have exhausted his administrative
oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public official and of violation of the
remedies with the Central Bank Monetary Board first.
internal regulations of the Central Bank. The Monetary Board suspended
the petitioner from office and created a three-man investigating
committee. A thorough investigation of the committee found no basis to
recommend disciplinary action and recommended the immediate RULING OF THE COURT
reinstatement of the respondent. However, the Board issued a resolution
considering the respondents’ resignation as of the day he was suspended
due to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss ”True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the
confidence of the respondent. President or the Civil Service Commission. However, it is our opinion that a
report to these administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive, taking
into account the facts obtaining in this case.
Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the
Board denied it. He filed an action for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto
and damages with preliminary injunction at the Court of First Instance of (1) There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case like the
Manila. The Court rendered judgment declaring the Board resolution null one at bar. The fact that the President had, in two instances cited in the
and void and ordered for the payment of damages. The appeal of the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from decisions of the Monetary
Central Bank and its Monetary Board is planted on the proposition that Board of the Central Bank, should not be
officers holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for
regarded as precedents, but at most may be viewed as acts of
lack of confidence by the appointing power and that such power of
condescension on the part of the Chief Executive. (2) While there are
removal is implicit in Section 1, Article 12 of the Constitution and that the
provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner
respondent should have exhausted his administrative remedies first
of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, We believe the
before elevating the case to the courts.
petitioner is not bound to observe them, considering his status and the
Charter of the Central Bank. In Castillo vs. Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L-14375,
January 13, 1960, We said that Section 14, Republic Act 265, creating the
ISSUE
Central Bank of the Philippines, particularly paragraph (c) thereof, "is
sufficiently broad to vest the Monetary Board with the power of
investigation and removal of its officials, except the Governor thereof. In
On the other hand, the doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or
other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for the
implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such
investigation, suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas
remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislature
Section 14 is a special provision of law which must govern the
intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative
investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the Central Bank,
remedy has not been exhausted (42 Am. Jur. 583).”
though they may be subject to the Civil Service Law and Regulations in
other respects." In this case, the respondent Monetary Board considered 52. QUINTOS v. NATIONAL STUD FARM
petitioner resigned from the office to which he has been legally appointed
as of the date of his suspension, after he has been duly indicted and tried G.R. No. L-37052, November 29, 1973
before a committee created by the Board for the purpose. An appeal to
the Civil Service Commission would thereby be an act of supererogation,
requiring the presentation of practically the same witnesses and FACTS:
documents produced in the investigation conducted at the instance of the
Plaintiff is the legitimate owner of a race horse named "King's Toss" which
Monetary Board. Moreover, Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Law provides
was duly and officially registered with defendant National Stud Farm and
that "except as otherwise provided by law," the Commissioner of Civil
which certificate of Registration was issued by said defendant for said race
Service shall have "final authority to pass upon the removal, separation
horse, thereby acknowledging it to participate in horse races and
and suspension of all permanent officials and employees in the
sweepstakes draws that were held and are being held in legally authorized
competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the
racing, clubs or tracks. In line with the standard operating procedure and
conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officials and employees; ...."
usual racing practices for horse owners to apply for and submit the names
Considering again the fact that the Charter of the Central Bank provides
of race horses for inclusion in a particular race at least three days, the
for its own power, through the Monetary Board, relative to the
plaintiff applied for and submitted the name of his race horse "King's
investigation, suspension or removal of its own employees except the
Toss" to the defendant Philippine Racing Club, Inc., at Makati, Rizal, for
Governor, coupled with the fact that petitioner has admitted that he
either the races programmed for June 17, or 18, 1972, which application
belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service, it is evident that an
was duly accepted and approved by said defendant, consequent to which
appeal by petitioner to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or
race horse "King's Toss" was declared eligible to participate and take part
at most is permissive and voluntary.
in the actual race that was conducted on June 17, 1972, more particularly in
Race No. 15 thereof, resulting in the inclusion of said race horse in the
racing list or program "Lucky Choice" for the scheduled race on June 17,
1972.
On June 17, 1972, the very day when plaintiff's race horse "King's Toss" was
scheduled to participate in race No. 15 at the racing tracks of defendant
Philippine Racing Club, Inc., an announcement was made through the
public address system before the start of Race 13 that plaintiff's race horse
"King's Toss" is being scratched or excluded from taking part in Race 15
where it is supposed to run that racing day.
It was then alleged that such withdrawal or cancellation of the certificate
of registration of plaintiffs race horse was arbitrary and oppressive, due
process being denied him in the absence of a formal investigation or
inquiry prior thereto. However, the lower court dismissed the case for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to exhaust administrative remedies in this case
warrants its dismissal.
HELD:
Yes. Plaintiff is not unaware of the impress of authoritativeness affixed to
the basic principle of administrative remedies having to be fully utilized
before resort to courts is allowable. Nonetheless, he would seek its
operation in the case at hand by the invocation of the alleged denial of due
process. It is to be admitted that under certain circumstances, such a plea
would not go unheeded because of the inadequacy of the remedy that
could be supplied administratively. Before its invocation, however, is to be
accorded a degree of plausibility, it must first be ascertained whether from
the standpoint of what still could be done by the higher authorities in the
Executive branch, plaintiff would really have a valid cause for complaint.
Despite this knowledge on June 17, 1972, appellant did not appeal the
resolution in question to the Executive Secretary. Instead he premature
instituted a suit in court for damages. The reason for this short circuiting of
administrative processes is not explained by appellant. He gives no reason
for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Indeed there is none.
The order of dismissal therefore, cannot considered as being in derogation
of the due process guarantee.
What further lends support to the decision now on appeal is that the
failure to apply such a basic concept as exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be attended with consequences adverse to such equally
well-settled postulates in administrative law of primary jurisdiction and
ripeness of review. It is true that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or
prior resort goes no further than to determine whether it is the court or
the agency that should make the initial decision. When, therefore, as was
likewise adverted to by the Solicitor General, the judicial forum was sought
by plaintiff, there was in effect an unwarranted disregard of the concept
of primary jurisdiction. In the traditional language of administrative law,
the stage of ripeness for judicial review had not been reached.
53
G.R. No. L-22748 | July 29, 1977
which are accorded only to Filipino citizens, such as suffrage, ownership of
real property.
They filed a motion to dismiss with the Deportation board stating that it
lacked jurisdiction for the reason that they are citizens of the Philippines,
which was was denied as was a subsequent motion for reconsideration.
They did exhaust their administrative remedy, an appeal to the President
being fruitless.

Thereafter, they filed the special civil action of prohibition and habeas
GREGORIO CO and HERCULANO CO (Petitioners-appellees)
corpus, with the CFI, which ruled that petitioners were Filipinos. Hence,
v the appeal by the deportation board.

DEPORTATION BOARD (Respondent-appellant)

ISSUE: Whether the judiciary may entertain an action for prohibition and
habeas corpus filed against the Deportation Board, during the pendency of
FACTS: Petitioners Gregorio Co and Herculano Co was born in Aparri, an inquiry against Gregorio and Herculano Co, that may possibly lead to
Cagayan. Their father, Co Pengco, was a Chinese merchant and their their expulsion from the country.
mother was Maria Tan Comin, whose nationality was disputed. A Special
Prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed charges against petitioners
alleging that as Chinese subjects residing in the Philippines, who failed to
RULING: The decision of respondent Judge Jesus de Veyra, holding that
register as Chinese nationals with the Bureau of Immigration, they violated
petitioners are Filipino citizens and that the Deportation Board was
the law, compounded by the fact that they represented themselves as
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the deportation proceedings
Filipinos. They were thus enabled to enjoy certain rights and privileges
filed against them, is affirmed.

RATIO:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in deportation
proceedings, thus precluding judicial intervention until completed.
Nonetheless, the opinion made express mention of the exception to the
rule as set forth in the Chua Hiong decision.
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board set for the following exception: "When
the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship,
the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts
should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings." Nor is it required
that such standard be rigidly adhered to, as pointed out in the opinion of
Justice Labrador: The difficultly arises when the evidence is not conclusive
on either side, as in the case at bar. Should the deportation proceedings be
allowed to continue till the end, or should the question of alienage or
citizenship of respondent be allowed to be decided first in a judicial
proceeding, suspending the administrative proceedings in the meantime
that the alienage or citizenship is being finally determined in the courts?
The highest judicial authority in the United States has answered the
second question in the affirmative." It was likewise stressed that judicial
determination is allowable "in cases when the courts themselves believe
that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim
is correct, In other words, the remedy should be allowed only in sound
discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding." That sound
discretion was properly exercised by the then Judge de Veyra in the
judgment now on appeal.
The only question that remains is whether on the test prescribed as to the
quantum of evidence required to justify judicial intervention before the
termination of the deportation proceedings, the judgment reached by the
lower court may be termed as suffering from the corrosion of substantial
legal error.
The finding of the lower court as to Maria Tan Comin (petitioners mom)
being a Filipina had not been shown to be without basis. It is to be noted
that even the brief for appellant could not assert categorically that the
mother of petitioners was an alien. All that it did say was that her
nationality "is disputed." Again, with candor, there was an admission that
she was born in Iguig, Cagayan in 1892, the father being a Chinese and the
mother being a Filipino. It was on the basis of such fact that the lower
court, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, also in the light of applicable
authorities, reached the conclusion that her illegitimate children were
entitled to Filipino citizenship.
Nor was that the only basis for reaching such a conclusion. It did take into
consideration the birth certificates showing that they are Filipinos. Then
there was proof from at least two government agencies recognizing such
status as Filipino citizens. The Commissioner of Immigration did so as well
as the City Fiscal of Quezon City when he sustained the legality of
petitioner Co's applying for a loan from the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation mortgaging his real property therein located. Moreover, it
was likewise proven that they exercised as Filipinos the right of suffrage as
set forth in their brief. There is warrant for the conclusion reached by the
lower court as to their citizenship following the doctrine announced in
Talaroc v. Uy. Justice Tuason, speaking for this Court, specifically made
mention of respondent Uy having been allowed to exercise the right of
suffrage, to hold public office and to take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
It is thus clear that to impute error to the lower court for sustaining the
prohibition proceedings against the Deportation Board in view of the
status of petitioners having been duly established, finds no support from
the authoritative doctrines of this Court.
#54 Ursal v. CTA
G.R. Nos. L-10123 and L-10355
April 26, 1957
Facts:
Ursal is a City Assessor of Cebu City, and that in the exercise of his
powers he assessed for taxation certain real properties of Consuelo Noel
and Jesusa Samson in the City of Cebu. Upon protest of the taxpayers, the
Cebu Board of Assessment Appeals reduced the assessments. Ursal then
took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals insisting on his valuation; but
said Court refused to entertain the appeal saying it was late, and, besides,
the assessor had no personality to bring the matter before it under section
11 of Republic Act No. 1125.
Issue: Whether or not had the personality to bring the matter to the CTA?
Held: No, the appellant did lack of personality before the Court of Tax
Appeal hence the challenged order of the Board is hereby affirmed.
Ratio:
The rulings of the Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely
affect" him. At most it was the City of Cebu that had been adversely
affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty taxes
from the abovementioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had
been overruled; but the overruling inflicted no material damage upon him
or his office.
And the Court of Tax Appeals was not created to decide mere conflicts
of opinion between administrative officers or agencies. Imagine an income
tax examiner resorting to the Court of Tax Appeals whenever the Collector
of Internal Revenue modifies, or lower his assessment on the return of a
tax payer.
#55 Aratuc vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of
respondent COMELEC. A supervening panel headed by COMELEC had
conducted hearings of the complaints of the petitioner therein alleged
irregularities in the election records. In order for the Commission to decide
properly. It will have to go deep into the examination of the voting records
and registration records and it will have to interview and get statements
from persons under oath from the area to determine whether actual
voting took place. The COMELEC then rendered its resolution being
assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC committee committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
Ruling:
No. Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 “ the
commission on elections shall have direct control and supervision over the
board of canvassers”. In administrative law, a superior body or office
having supervision or control over another may do directly what the latter
is supposed to do or ought to have done. The petition is hereby dismissed,
for lack of merit.
#56 Cabanero v Torres
Facts:
The Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association had, for many years, been
licensed by the Government to recruit, contract and embark laborers for
the Territory of Hawaii. On February 25, 1935 the association made an
application for the renewal of its license. The herein petitioners objected
to said application on the ground that the association had no juridical
personality, in that it was neither incorporated nor licensed to do business
in the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the Corporation
Law. In
view of this objection, the respondent Secretary of Labor issued what he
calls in his answer to the petition herein, “a provisional license, authorizing
the said Association to recruit, embark and contract laborers for the
Territory of Hawaii from Manila, Cebu, Illocos Norte and Ilocos Sur; but
subject to the condition that the license will ipso facto expire 90 days from
the issuance when a new license will be issued to the Association upon a
satisfactory showing that it had already acquired a juridical personality
under the laws of the Philippine islands by registration as a foreign
corporation, company or association”
Petitioners filed for a writ of prohibition whereby the petitioners seek to
have declared illegal, null and void the license to recruit laborers issued to
the respondent Hawaiian Sugar Planter’s Association, and to prohibit the
other respondents from renewing the same or issuing any new license.
Issue: Whether or not the writ of prohibition should be issued
Held: No. the function of the writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of
some acts which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a
remedy for acts already accomplished. If the thing be already be done, it is
manifest the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that would require an
affirmative act;
and the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action, and to
prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction. Even if the
Secretary of Labor had acted illegally or in excess of his authority when he
issued the provisional or temporary license in question, prohibition is not
the proper remedy.
57 Ramon Blanco, et al vs Board of Medical Examiners, GR No. 22911,
September 23, 1924
FACTS: Fifteen participants in the last medical examinations, in a complaint
in mandamus, ask
the court to order the Secretary of the Interior to confirm the final results
of the examinations.
The petitioners, along with other qualified persons, took the examination
prescribed by law for
a physician's certificate on May 13 to 16, 1924, and apparently passed the
same. The Board of
Medical Examiners thereupon submitted the final results of the
examinations to the Department
Head for confirmation. But the Secretary of the Interior held the matter in
abeyance, pending
the outcome of an investigation conducted by the Under-Secretary of the
Interior. The finding
of the special investigator was that the questions on the subjects of the
medical examinations
RULING: Under the plain terms of the Medical law, it is the discretionary
held on May 13 to May 16, 1924, had leaked out before said dates. duty of the Secretary
Following the
of the Interior to confirm or not to confirm — to confirm or, as in this
recommendation of the Under-Secretary, the Secretary of the Interior instance, to annul — the
annulled the results of the
report of the medical examiners. It is elementary law that the writ of
examinations. mandamus will not issue to

The last paragraph of section 776 of the Medical Law, as found in the control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer. Where the
Administrative Code, and law imposes upon a

as last amended by section 10 of Act No. 3111, provides that "The results of public officer the right and duty to exercise judgment, in reference to any
all examinations matter to which he is

(medical), including the average and grades obtained by each applicant, called upon to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
shall be submitted for the court. ". . . If the

confirmation to the Department Head (the Secretary of the Interior) and law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide
made known to the how or when the

respective candidates within one month after the date of the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. . . ."
examination."
It is likewise elementary law that mandamus may issue to correct abuse of
discretion, if the

ISSUE: Whether or not the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to confirm case is otherwise proper. But here, the record discloses that the Secretary
or not to confirm the of the Interior did

report of the medical examiners is discretionary or ministerial in nature.

not exercise the power granted to him with manifest injustice, or with and that by having consented to their admission to this country with such
gross abuse. limitation petitioners are now

estopped from claiming that they are entitled to stay permanently. The
lower court ordered that petitioners

have no right to stay any longer in the Philippines and they should be
deported, in accordance with our
58. Chang Yung Fa v Gianzon
laws, to their country where they have come from. "Accordingly, the court
FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment praying that the dismissed the petition for lack
Commissioner of Immigration has a
of merit.
right to limit their period of stay in the Philippines as immigrants and if
Opinion No. 314, series of 1952, of
Appellants contend that having been classified as "non-quota immigrants"
the Secretary of Justice on the same subject matter is valid and
under section 13 of
constitutional. The Government’s
Commonwealth Act No. 613, they should have been admitted for
defense is that petitioners were admitted to the Philippines with express
permanent residence in this country
condition that their stay shall not
because the word "immigrant" is defined to be a person who comes into a
be more than two years; that this condition is not violate of the law merely
country for permanent
because under section 13(a) of
residence, and, therefore, the imposition of the condition limiting their
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, known as Commonwealth Act No. 613,
stay to not more than two years by
they could have come under
the Commissioner of Immigration is in violation of law
the category of non-quota immigrants who may be admitted for
permanent residence in the Philippines;
ISSUE: WON the limitation of 2 years is in violation of law. No. Decision of
lower court affirmed.
RULING: While the term "immigrant" under its ordinary definition denotes
one who comes for permanent
residence, there is nothing in the law which would preclude the view that
term may also refer to an alien
who come to this country either to reside permanently or for a limited
duration. They only definition given
by our law to the term "immigrant" is what is stated in section 50(j) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, to wit,
"any alien departing from anyplace outside the Philippines destined for the
Philippines, other than a nonimmigrant.
. The only classification of immigrants we find in the law is that of "quota
immigrants" and
"non-quota immigrants", but such qualifications has reference merely to
the number of aliens who may be
allowed to enter and no to the duration of their residence.
Immigrant includes aliens coming both for permanent or temporary
purposes, it cannot be correctly
pretended that the limitation imposed upon petitioners as regards their
stay in the Philippines by the
Commissioners of Immigration does violence to the law since it does not
clearly appear therein that such
class of aliens can only be admitted with the status of permanent
residence. On the contrary, the power of
the Commissioner of Immigration under section 20 of Commonwealth Act
No. 613 would appear to be
broad enough to include the authority to impose such limitation, for if the
Commissioner has the power to
deny completely the admission of an alien who seeks to enter this country
on a pre-arranged employment
by withholding the issuance of an immigration visa on the ground of public
interest, with more reason can
he impose a condition which is less onerous such as limiting the duration
of his stay in the country.
In any event, it appearing that petitioners were admitted to the Philippines
subject to the express
condition that their stay would only be for two years and they consented
to their admission under such
FACTS:
condition, they cannot now be heard to complain that the Commissioner
Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to the
of Immigration acted in excess of
Philippines as a secret
his power in imposing that limitation. They are now estopped from
operative by the Japanese force during the latter’s regime. He was then
disputing such power even if when
arrested as a Japanese spy after the Philippine liberation. Thereafter, he
they entered they were not disqualified for admission as permanent was ordered to be released. However, it was found out after investigation
residents because of their failure to by the Board of Commissioners of Immigration that Mejoff illegally
entered the Philippines without inspection and admission by the
ask for the cancellation of such limitation. They have perhaps labored
immigration officials at a designated port of entry. He was then ordered to
under the impression that if they
be deported to Russia on the first available transportation to said country.
had asked for their unconditional admission the immigration authorities But Russian ships refused to take him due to their alleged lack of authority
would have denied altogether to do so. He was then transferred to the Bilibid Prison and was kept in
detention as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is of best
their entry into this country. And such apprehension is well within the interest to detain the unwanted alien while arrangements for his
realm of possibility considering the deportation are being made.
broad power granted by law to the Commissioner of Immigration with
regard to the entrance of aliens into
ISSUE: Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison pending his
the Philippines. deportation

HELD: Yes.
59 MEJOFF V DIRECTOR OF PRISONS The court temporarily detained Mejoff as a necessary step in the process
of exclusion or
expulsion undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his
deportation, the government has the right to hold the undesirable alien
under confinement for a reasonable length of time. However the court
warned that too long detention may justify the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.
After 2 years have elapsed since the decision of the temporarily detaining
Mejoff, there was still no way and means of removing Mejoff out of the
country. A petition of habeas corpus was then filed.
In the case of Staniszewski v Watkins, a stateless person, formerly a Polish
national, resident in the United States since 1911 and many times serving as
a seaman on American vessels both in peace and in war, was ordered
excluded from the United States and detained at Ellis Island at the
expense of the steamship company, when he returned from a voyage on
which he had shipped from New York for one or more European ports and
return to the United States. The grounds for his exclusion were that he
had no passport or immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted
of perjury because in certain documents he presented himself to be an
American citizen. Upon his application for release on habeas corpus, the
Court released him upon his own recognizance.
Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the case aforecited
affords a happy solution which is sensible, sound and compatible with law
and the Constitution. And since the Philippine law on immigration was
patterned after or copied from the American law and practice, the
reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski decision were adopted with
some modifications.
It was alleged that the petitioner was engaged in subversive activities, and
fear was expressed that he might join or aid the disloyal elements if
allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its
answer that "the herein petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the
Japanese forces," and the fact that Japan is no longer at war with the
United States or the Philippines nor identified with the countries allied
against these nations, the possibility of the petitioner's entertaining or
committing hostile acts prejudicial to the interest and security of this
country seems remote.
If granting, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the
petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and
the Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a
danger that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrollable.
The court the order that the writ will be issued commanding the
respondents to release the
petitioner from custody upon these terms:
a. The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration
authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed
adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him.
b. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness
shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila
for decision in case of abuse.
c. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of
P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of
Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act
No. 613.
60 MARIANO G. PINEDA, ARCADIO E. YABYABIN and MAXIMINO PIZARRO,
petitioners,
 vs.
 HON. GREGORIO T. LANTIN, District Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC. and J.
AMADO ARANETA, respondents; GR No. L-15359,Nov.30,1962
Facts: A letter complaint was filed by minority stockholders Teresa
Cuaycong La and Apeles H. Lopez before the SEC regarding the acts of the
respondent corporation and J. Amado Araneta which were prejducial to
the interest of the minority stockholders. Acting on the said complaint,
Petitioner Pineda ordered investigators Yabyabin and Pizzaro to
investigate. Pursuant to the order, a subpoena duces tecum were
addressed to Araneta and Bacolod-Murcia. As a consequence, the Araneta
and Murcia filed a “Petition to Reconsider Order and to Set Aside
Subpoena Duces Tecum." Petitioner Pineda denied the said petition.
Subsequently, respondents Bacolod-Murcia and Araneta filed a motion to
Quash and Discontinue proceedings which was also denied by Pineda.
Aggrieved, respondent corporation and Araneta filed a civil action for
certiorari with prohibition against Yabyabin and Pizarro. It was docketed in
the Sala of Judge Lantin. Petitioner Yabyabin and Pizzaro then moved to
dismiss the petition on the ground that the writ prayed for would amount
to a review, modify or set aside the order of the SEC and therefore,
beyond the jurisdiction of the CFI. The said motion to dismiss was denied
by the Judge. A sequent MR was also denied. Thus, petitioners Yabyabin
and Pizzaro elevated this case to the SC via review on certiorari with
prayer for preliminary injunction.
Issue: W/N THE CIVIL CASE FOR PROHIBITION FILED BY THEREIN
RESPONDENTS PROPER AND WITHIN IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE?
Held:
This SC held that under the Rules of Court and the law applicable to the
case at bar, a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive
reliefs against the Securities and Exchange Commission. That power is
lodged exclusively with the SC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides;
SECTION 1. Petition for review. — Within thirty days from notice of an
order or decision issued by the Public Service Commission or the Securities
and Exchange Commission, any party aggrieved thereby may file, in the
Supreme Court, a written petition for the review of such order of decision.
Furthermore, Section 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by
Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, provides the following:
SEC. 35. Court review or orders. — (a) Any person aggrieved by an order
issued by the commission in any proceeding under this Act to which such
person is a party or who may be affected thereby may obtain a review of
such order in the Supreme Court of the Philippines by filing in such court
within thirty days after the entry of such order a written petition praying
that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in
part.
Beyond doubt, therefore, whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagrees
with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, his
remedy is to come to this Court on a petition for review. He is not
permitted to seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction. The two
provisions quoted above clearly pronounce that only the SC possesses the
jurisdiction to review or pass upon the legality or correctness of any order
or decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and, as
circumstances might warrant, to modify, reverse, or, set aside the same.
61 Lambino v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. L-18434 December 29, 1962
FACTS:
Deceased Juan Mercado was employed as laborer of the City of Manila, as
early as 1919, interrupted by the World War of 1941, and resumed working
in 1946, until he was bedridden in April 1952 and died on May 7, 1953. It was
alleged that sometime in November 1952, Mercado contracted
rheumatism, which had worsened, due to his daily work as sweeper, for
having been exposed to heat and cold in the open air. At the same time, he
was assigned to work in the construction of the International Fair Grounds,
where he was often overtaken by rain, wetting him all over, and constantly
exposed to the heat of the sun. In April 1952, he fell ill, and was found to
be afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis, far advanced. On 1953, he died of
tuberculosis. A claim for death compensation was filed by Martina
Lambino, widow of deceased Juan Mercado. Del Rosario, being the
Chairman of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC), denied the
claim for failure to present evidence to support said claim.
Claimant moved for the reopening of the case and presented evidence,
which was properly, entertained, but found to be wanting by the
Commission. The Commission ruled that there is no established connection
between the alleged tuberculosis of deceased (Juan Mercado) and that of
the nature of his work.; and that neither can claimant contend that the
deceased was exposed to sudden changes in temperature, inasmuch as
the nature of his work required him to stay in the open, he worked at will,
without any close supervision and, as such, he could avoid rain or
sunshine, by arranging his work hours. The claimant filed a motion for
reconsideration of said decision, which the WCC en banc denied, hence she
filed a petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON the said claim falls under Section 2, Act No. 3428 (Workmen’s
Compensation Law), as amended.
HELD:
Yes.
As laborer (street cleaner or sweeper) from 1919 to 1952 (except the
period 1941-1946), the deceased was naturally exposed to all kinds of dust
and dirt on the city streets and to the elements. To conclude that because
the deceased worked in the open air his employment was healthful and
had invigorating effect on his health, without taking into account the
particular job he was doing is, to say the least, unjustified. Considering the
undeniable fact that on occasions for days and sometimes weeks, rain
continuously fills in this city flooding the streets and accumulating thereon
garbage, mud and filth, this must be removed and disposed of by the
street cleaners as the deceased.
It also does not appear that when the deceased entered the employ of the
City of Manila in 1919 as laborer he was already suffering from tuberculosis.
The records, however, disclose that when he fell ill in April 1952 during his
employment and was medically examined, he was found to be suffering
from advanced pulmonary tuberculosis. Despite said illness, however, he
was reinstated to his work in November 1952 and assigned to the
construction at the International Fair Grounds. This fact undoubtedly
aggravated his ailment to such all extent.
The deceased Mercado's illness (pulmonary tuberculosis) of which he died,
was caused by the nature of his work as laborer-street cleaner or sweeper,
or at least aggravated by it, and therefore, compensable under Section 2
of Act No. 3428.