Carillo v. People
G.R. No. 86890 January 21, 1994
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Leandro Carillo, an
anesthetist and Dr. Emilio Madrid, a surgeon
were convicted of the crime of simple negligence
resulting in homicide, for the death of their
thirteen (13) year old patient
Catherine Acosta. Facts show that after the
patient went through an operation because of
her appendicitis, Dr. Madrid prescribed the
application of an experimental drug, called
Nubain, to the patient without following the
requirement that a patient be weighed first
before it is administered. It was alleged that
petitioner failed to correct the anomaly in the
prescriptions made by Dr. Madrid and exhibited
only a low level of diligence in the prescription of
medication to his patient. This allegedly resulted
to the post-operative complication of cardiac
arrest which led to the comatose and
subsequently the death of the patient.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Dr. Carillo,
along with Dr. Madrid, was guilty of simple
negligence which resulted in homicide.
Ruling: The SC held that the conduct of the
petitioner and Dr. Madrid constituted inadequate
care of their patient in view of her vulnerable
condition and that they were guilty of the crime
of simple negligence. Under the law, simple
negligence is defined as a mere lack
of prevision in a situation where either the
threatened harm is not immediate or the
danger not openly visible. In the case at bar,
both doctors failed to appreciate the serious
condition of their patient whose adverse physical
signs were quite manifest right after surgery.
After reviving her heartbeat, both doctors failed
to monitor their patient closely. In addition, the
low level of care and diligence exhibited by
petitioner in failing to correct Dr. Madrid's
prescription of Nubain for post-operative pain,
the extraordinary failure or refusal of petitioner
and Dr. Madrid to inform the parents of
Catherine Acosta of her true condition after
surgery, in disregard of the requirements of the
Code of Medical Ethics, and the failure of
petitioner and Dr. Madrid to prove that they had
in fact exercised the necessary and appropriate
degree of care and diligence to prevent the
sudden decline in the condition of Catherine
Acosta and her death three (3) days later, leads
the Court to the conclusion, with moral
certainty, that petitioner and Dr. Madrid were
guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide.
Batiquin v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996
Facts: Dr. Victoria Batiquin of Negros Oriental
Provincial Hospital performed a Caesarian
section on Mrs. Flotilde Villegas for the delivery
of her first child, Rachel Acogido. Days after,
Mrs. Villegas felt recurring abdominal pains and
complained of being feverish. She consulted Dr.
Batiquin and was given prescription medications
for her to take. Thereafter, Dr. Batiquin issued a
medical certificate to Mrs. Villegas certifying to
her physical fitness to return to her work.
Despite the medications administered by Dr.
Batiquin, the pains became unbearable and Mrs.
Villegas consulted another doctor. Upon
examination and surgery, Dr. Ma. Salud Kho
found a torn piece of foreign material sort of like
a rubber glove near Mrs. Villegas’ uterus which
caused the infection of the ovaries and
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by
Mrs. Villegas after her delivery. Mrs. Villegas
sued Dr. Batiquin for damages.
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Batiquin was liable in
negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in
private respondent Villegas's abdomen and for
all the adverse effects thereof.
Ruling: The SC held that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies in this case. The doctrine
provides that: "Where the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen in
those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care." In
the case at bar, all the requisites for recourse to
the doctrine are present. First, the entire
proceedings of the caesarean section were under
the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this
light, the private respondents were bereft of
direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the
exact cause of the foreign object finding its way
into private respondent Villegas's body, which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through
the intersection of negligence. Second, since
aside from the caesarean section, private
respondent Villegas underwent no other
operation which could have caused the offending
piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands
to reason that such could only have been a by-
product of the caesarean section performed by
Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard,
failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence arising from resort to the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore
liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of
rubber in private respondent Villegas's abdomen
and for all the adverse effects thereof.
Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio
G.R. No. 118141 September 5, 1997
Facts: Florencio Rueda, husband of petitioner
Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent a surgical
operation at the UST Hospital for the removal of
a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by
Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon,
while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the
anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery,
Florencio died of complications of “unknown
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cause.” Not satisfied with the findings of the
hospital, the petitioner requested the NBI to
conduct an autopsy on her husband’s body.
Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencio’s
death was due to lack of care by the attending
physician in administering anaesthesia. This
prompted the petitioner to file a criminal case
against Dr. Antonio and Dr. Balatbat-Reyes for
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence.
Issue: Whether or not there was medical
malpractice committed on the part of the
attending physicians.
Ruling: The SC held that there are 4 elements
of medical negligence which are: duty, breach,
injury and proximate causation. In the case at
bar, upon employment of the services of the
attending physicians, there was indeed a duty
on their part to use at least the same level of
care that any other reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the
same circumstances. The breach of these
professional duties of skill and care by the
physicians whereby the patient is injured in
body or in health constitutes malpractice.
Moreover, a causal connection is discernible
from the occurrence of the victim’s death after
the negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in
administering the anesthesia. The allegation of
negligence is not entirely baseless. The NBI
deduced that the attending surgeons did not
conduct the necessary interview of the patient
prior to the operation. It appears that the cause
of the death of the victim could have been
averted had the proper drug been applied to
cope with the symptoms of malignant
hyperthermia. In addition, the SC cannot ignore
the fact that an antidote was readily available to
counteract whatever deleterious effect the
anaesthesia might produce. Why these
precautionary measures were disregarded must
be sufficiently explained.
Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital
G.R. No. 130547. October 3, 2000
Facts: Jorge Reyes, the husband of petitioner
Leah Reyes, was brought to the Mercy
Community Clinic. Upon examination,
respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico suspected that Jorge
could be suffering from typhoid fever as this was
prevalent in the locality. She ordered a Widal
Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to be
performed on Jorge. After an hour, the medical
technician submitted the results of the test from
which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive
of typhoid fever. After her shift, Dr. Rico
indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes.
She ordered that a compatibility test with the
antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. As
there was no adverse reaction by the patient to
the antibiotic, Dr. Blanes ordered the first 500
milligrams of said antibiotic to be administered
at around 9 pm and a second dose was
administered to him about three hours later just
before midnight. At around 1 am, Jorge began
to experience chills and exhibited respiratory
distress, nausea, vomiting and convulsions. Dr.
Blanes applied emergency measures, however,
Jorge did not respond to the treatment and
slipped into cyanosis (a bluish or purplish
discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane
due to the deficient oxygenation of the blood).
Thereafter, Jorge died. Petitioners filed a
complaint for damages against respondents
contending that Jorge’s death was not due to
typhoid fever but was due to the wrongful
administration of chloromycetin.
Issue: Whether or not there was medical
malpractice committed.
Ruling: The SC held that there was no medical
malpractice committed. The Widal test was
properly conducted as it is normally used in
cases when typhoid fever is suspected. In the
case at bar, the 1:320 results of the Widal test
on Reyes gave the impression that the patient
was suffering from typhoid fever. As to the
administration of the antibiotic, chloromycetin
was a proper prescription as best established by
medical authority. Said antibiotic is the drug of
choice for typhoid fever and that no drug has
yet proven better in promoting a favorable
clinical response. It was also found that despite
the measures taken by the respondent doctors
and the intravenous administration of two doses
of chloromycetin, complications of the disease
could not be discounted. The law does not
require doctors to predict every possible reaction
to all drugs administered. There is no need to
expressly require of doctors the observance of
“extraordinary” diligence. As it is now, the
practice of medicine is already conditioned upon
the highest degree of diligence. The standard
contemplated for doctors is simply the
reasonable average merit among ordinarily good
physicians. That is reasonable diligence for
doctors or the reasonable “skill and
competence . . . that a physician in the same or
similar locality . . . should apply.”
Ruñez v. Jurado
A.M. No. 2005-08-SC December 9, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Samuel Ruñez, Jr. filed a
letter-complaint with the Office of the Chief
Justice against the respondent Dr. Marybeth
Jurado for the alleged lack of attention given to
his father when the latter went to the Supreme
Court’s clinic complaining of dizziness. He claims
that Dr. Jurado merely advised his father to go
to the hospital and then allowed him to travel to
Manila Doctors Hospital despite the availability
of an ambulance at the disposal of the clinic.
Ruñez, Jr. submits that his father would not
have suffered a stroke, and subsequently died, if
not for the neglect of Dr. Jurado.
Issue: Whether or not the acts or omission of
Dr. Jurado amounted to simple neglect of duty.
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Ruling: The SC held in the negative. Under the
law, simple neglect of duty is failure to give
proper attention to a task expected of an
employee resulting from either carelessness or
indifference or signifies a disregard of duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference. A
physician is expected to apply in his practice of
medicine that degree of care and skill which is
ordinarily employed by the profession, generally,
and under similar conditions. In the case at bar,
Dr. Jurado cannot be held liable for his conduct
in allowing Ruñez, Sr. to walk out of the clinic
despite her earlier diagnosis of his condition.
She did not have the authority to stop him just
as other doctors have no power to force patients
into staying under their care. Dr. Jurado relied
on Ruñez, Sr.’s representation that he would
return in order to be brought to the hospital but
made no undertaking to wait for him beyond the
clinic hours or to look for him if he did not
return. Thus, when Ruñez, Sr. failed to show up
as of closing time, and could not be found by the
male nurse who looked for him at her
instructions, Dr. Jurado had reason to think that
he had decided to disregard her medical advice,
which he in fact did when he and Ruñez, Jr.
decided to go to the hospital on their own. Dr.
Jurado was obligated to care for Ruñez, Sr.
when the latter asked for medical treatment,
which she did, but when he left on his own
accord Dr. Jurado was not expected, much less
duty-bound, to seek out her patient and
continue being his doctor. Thus, the Dr. Jurado
cannot be said to be guilty of simple neglect of
duty.
Cantre v. Sps. Go
G.R. No. 160889 April 27, 2007
Facts: Respondent Sps. John and Nora Go filed
a complaint for damages against petitioner Dr.
Milagros Cantre after Nora Go suffered a skin
burn in the inner portion of her left arm. It was
allegedly caused by the droplight used to warm
her and her baby after her delivery in the
hospital. Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Dr. Milagros
Cantre is liable for the injury suffered by
respondent Nora Go.
Ruling: The SC held in the affirmative. Whether
the injury was caused by the droplight or by the
blood pressure as the petitioner contends is of
no moment. Both instruments are deemed
within the exclusive control of the physician in
charge under the "captain of the ship" doctrine.
This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an
operation liable for the negligence of his
assistants during the time when those assistants
are under the surgeon’s control. In the case at
bar, it can be logically inferred that petitioner,
the senior consultant in charge during the
delivery of Nora’s baby, exercised control over
the assistants assigned to both the use of the
droplight and the taking of Nora’s blood
pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and
the blood pressure cuff is also within petitioner’s
exclusive control and petitioner can be held
liable for the injury suffered by respondent Nora
Go.
Ilao-Oreta v. Sps. Ronquillo
G.R. No. 172406 October 11, 2007
Facts: Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo
and Noel Benedicto Ronquillo filed a complaint
against petitioner Dr. Concepcion for breach of
professional and service contract and for
damages after the latter failed to arrive at the
scheduled time for the laparoscopic procedure.
Petitioner contends that she believed in utmost
good faith that she would be back in Manila in
time for the scheduled procedure and that said
failure to arrive on time was not due to her
fault.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can be held
liable for gross negligence.
Ruling: The SC held in the negative. Although
the petitioner failed to take into consideration
the time difference between the Philippines and
Hawaii, the situation then did not present any
clear and apparent harm or injury that even a
careless person may perceive. Petitioner could
not have been conscious of any foreseeable
danger that may occur since she actually
believed that she would make it to the operation
that was elective in nature, the only purpose of
which was to determine the real cause of
infertility and not to treat and cure a life
threatening disease. Thus, in merely fixing the
date of her appointment with respondent Eva
Marie Ronquillo, petitioner was not in the pursuit
or performance of conduct that any ordinary
person may deem to probably and naturally
result in injury. When she was scheduling the
date of her performance of the procedure,
Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was
preparing for her honeymoon, and it is of
common human knowledge that excitement
attends its preparations. Her negligence could
then be partly attributed to human frailty which
rules out its characterization as gross.
PMA v. Board of Medical Examiners
G.R. L-25135 September 21, 1968
Facts: Respondent Jose Ma. Torres was granted
a certificate to practice medicine in the
Philippines without the examination required in
Republic Act No. 2882, otherwise known as the
Medical Act of 1959. Thereafter petitioner
Philippine Medical Association filed an action
contending that the grant of the respondent’s
certificate for the general practice of medicine in
the Philippines without the examination
prescribed by law is violative of the law and that
the respondent Board of Medical Examiners had
exceeded its authority in passing the resolution
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that granted respondent Torres said certificate. the prescribed requirements by law. The
Respondent contends that under the Treaty on discovered deficiencies as a medical college
the Validity of Academic Degrees and The (i.e., the inadequate faculty with no prospects
Exercise of the Professions between the Republic for satisfactory growth and development, and
of the Philippines and the Spanish State, she can the total lack of serious development efforts in
be allowed to perform general practice of academic medicine) are so serious a character
medicine in the country without taking the as to be irremediable. Under the law, the
required examination. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports have
the power to enjoin compliance with the
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be requirements laid down for medical schools and
allowed to perform the general practice of to mete out sanctions where he finds that
medicine in the Philippines even without taking violations thereof have been committed. In the
the examination required by law. case at bar, Secretary Quisumbing correctly
ordered the closure of the College after it had
Ruling: The SC held that the benefits of the been given several opportunities to comply with
aforementioned Treaty merely extended to certain requirements yet it failed to do so. It
diplomas issued or degrees conferred by was grave abuse of discretion for respondent
educational institutions of Spain the same judge to issue the questioned injunction and
recognition and treatment that the Philippines thereby thwart official action.
accord to similar diplomas or degrees from local
institutions of learning. Thus, holders of said
Spanish diplomas or degrees must take the
examination prescribed by the Philippines’ laws
for holders of similar diplomas or degrees from
educational institutions in the Philippines. The
resolution No. 25, series of 1965, of respondent
Board is violative of Republic Act No. 2882 and
hence, null and void; and that, respondent
Board of Medical Examiners should be, as it is
hereby ordered to cancel the certificate of
registration, for the practice of medicine in the
Philippines, issued in favor of respondent Jose
Ma. Torres.

Board of Medical Education v. Alfonso

G.R. 88259 August 10, 1989

Facts: Upon finding, after conducting several

inspections and evaluations, that the respondent
Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine
Foundation, Inc. fell very much short of the
minimum standards set for medical schools, the
petitioner Board of Medical Education
recommended to the DECS the closure of the
said College. Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing of
DECS ordered the closure of the said College.
The College appealed to the Office of the
President, however, the contested decision was
affirmed. Thereafter, the College filed a case
against Secretary Quisumbing in her capacity as
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
questioning the decision as illegal, oppressive,
arbitrary and discriminatory. The trial court
ruled that there was no basis in ordering the
closure of the College, as there was no evidence
supporting such findings. It ordered a writ of
injunction for the closure order made by
Secretary Quisumbing. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Muslim-

Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc.
should be closed.

Ruling: There have been several evaluations

conducted on the College and all yielded to the
findings that it have failed to fully comply with