PRESIDENT SUSPENDS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
CARANDANG REMEDIAL LAW; SUI GENERIS. Section 18, Article VII
Gonzales vs. Office of the President (2014)
POLITICAL LAW; INDEPENDENCE OF THE OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN. Section 8(2) of RA 6770
vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the
Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but
seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman itself.
Section 8(2) of RA 6770 insofar as the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President over the Special Prosecutor
is constitutional. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
not constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman
and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter
enjoys under the Constitution.
PERJURY FOR NON-DISCLOSURE OF NAME OF
LEGAL WIFE IN SALN
CRIMINAL LAW; PERJURY. The deliberate failure to
indicate the name or writing “N/A” or not applicable in the
space provided for the name of one’s legal spouse in the
SALN, despite being fully aware of the pendency of the
petition for declaration to nullify marriage, amounts to
perjury.
EXPIRATION OF TERM OF COMELEC
COMMISSIONERS
POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. The
Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. X X X. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.
PROCLAMATION NO. 216 OR THE
DECLARATION MARTIAL LAW AND
SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO
Lagman vs. Medialdea (2017)
of the Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court may
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis x x x.” The phrase “in
an appropriate proceeding” should be treated as sui
generis. It does not refer to a petition for certiorari whose
purpose is to determine whether or not there is grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It refers to any action initiated by a citizen for
the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency
powers. It could be denominated as a complaint, a
petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
POLITICAL LAW; SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL
BASIS. In determining the sufficiency of the factual
basis, the Court should look into the full complement or
totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Further, the recommendation/ consultation
with the Secretary of Defense is not a condition for the
President to declare martial law. It would be contrary to
common sense if the decision of the President is made
dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
POLITICAL LAW; POWER TO REVIEW OF COURT
vs. POWER OF REVOCATION OF CONGRESS. The
Court considers only the information available to the
President prior to, or at the time of the declaration; it is
not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress
may take into consideration not only the data available
prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration.
Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute
correctness of the factual basis, Congress could delve
into the accuracy of the facts.
The Court’s review power is passive; it is only initiated
by the filing of a petition in an appropriate proceeding by
a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review
mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be
activated by Congress at any time after the declaration
was made.
POLITICAL LAW; EXTRAORDINARY POWERS.
“GRADUATION” OF POWERS. The President as the
Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers
(from the most to the least benign) of: a) calling out the
armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial law.
The graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope
and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a
sequence, arrangement, or order, which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called
"graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the
manner by which the President decides which power to
choose.
The power of judicial review does not extend to
calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which
extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and
an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least
initially, lies with the President.
POLITICAL LAW; VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the
ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase
"other rebel groups” In its Whereas Clause and for lack
of available guidelines specifying its actual operational
parameters.
accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a
travesty of justice.
PLEA BARGAINING IN DRUG CASES
Estipona vs. Lobrigo (2017)
REMEDIAL LAW; RULE MAKING POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT. Section 23 of RA 9165 which
prohibits plea-bargaining in all violations of the said law
is unconstitutional taking into account Sec. 5(5) Art. VIII
of the Constitution which vests the Supreme Court the
power to “promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts.” Plea bargaining is
a rule of procedure.

Vagueness doctrine applies only in free speech cases.

Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights that may
be facially challenged. What it seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech. The term "other rebel groups" in
Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in
the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the
text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel
groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by
way of reference in its Whereas clauses. Further,
operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for
the implementation of the proclamation.

CRIMINAL LAW; TERRORISM VIS-À-VIS

REBELLION. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs
rebellion. while the scope of terrorism may be
comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined.
The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and create a
condition of widespread fear among the populace in
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as
previously discussed, is political. And while rebellion is
one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot
absorb the other as they have different elements.

“WOMEN’S HONOR” DOCTRINE IN RAPE CASES

People vs. Amarela (2018)

CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE. The Court has abandoned the

“women’s honor” doctrine (No young Filipina of decent
repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually
abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural
instinct to protect her honor). This misconception,
particularly in this day and age, not only puts the