1

POLITICAL LAW

G.R. No. 175162 October 29, 2008

ATTY. ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III and CHRISTINE S. DAYRIT, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DAISY AFABLE, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition assails the 24 February 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
63280 denying petitioners’ petition for review and directing the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch 11, to proceed with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038, as
well as the 23 October 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 17 September 1999, respondent Daisy Dadivas-Afable simultaneously filed two criminal

complaints against petitioners for Grave Coercion and Trespass to Dwelling. The complaints read,
thus:

Art. 286 (Grave Coercion)

That on the 14th day of September 1999 at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning more or less, in Brgy.
Iba, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of law, by
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping to (sic) one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously forced to go with them one DAISY DADIVAS-AFABLE and against the
latter’s will.

Art. 280, par. 2 (Trespass to Dwelling)

That on the 14th day of September 1999 at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning more or less, in Brgy.
Iba, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then a (sic) private persons, by
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping to (sic) one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house owned by one DAISY DADIVAS-AFABLE by opened the
gate and against the latter’s will.1

On 18 October 1999, petitioners filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit.2 Thereafter, or on 21 December

1999, petitioner Tabujara filed a Supplemental Counter-Affidavit.3

Petitioners denied the allegations against them. They argued that on 14 September 1999, they went
to the house of respondent to thresh out matters regarding some missing pieces of jewelry.
Respondent was a former employee of Miladay Jewels, Inc., a company owned by the Dayrits and
who was then being administratively investigated in connection with missing jewelries. Despite
several summons to appear, respondent went on AWOL (absence without official leave).
 2

Judge Calixtro O. Adriatico of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch II,
conducted the preliminary examination. On 7 January 2000, he issued an Order dismissing the
complaints for lack of probable cause, thus:

After a careful perusal of the allegation setforth in the complaint-affidavit, taking into consideration
the allegation likewise setforth in the counter-affidavit submitted by the respondents and that of their
witnesses, the Court finds no probable cause to proceed with trial on the merits of the above-entitled
cases.

The Court believes and so holds that the instant complaints are merely leverage to the estafa4 case
already filed against private complainant herein Daisy Afable by the Miladay Jewels Inc. wherein
respondent Atty. Tabujara III is its legal counsel; while respondent Dayrit appears to be one of the
officers of the said company.

As could be gleaned from the record, private complainant herein Daisy Afable is being charged with
the aforestated estafa case for having allegedly embezzled several pieces of jewelry from the
Miladay Jewels Inc., worth ₱2,177,156.00.

WHEREFORE, let these cases be dismissed for lack of probable cause.5

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that when she filed the complaints for grave
coercion and trespass to dwelling on 17 September 1999 against petitioners, no information for
estafa has yet been filed against her. In fact, the information was filed on 5 October 1999.

In their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argued that even before respondent
filed the criminal complaints for grave coercion and trespass to dwelling, she was already being
administratively investigated for the missing jewelries; that she was ordered preventively suspended
pending said investigation; that the theft of the Miladay jewels was reported to the Makati Police on 7
September 1999 with respondent Afable being named as the primary suspect; that on 17 September
1999, which corresponded to the date of filing of the criminal complaints against petitioners, the
employment of respondent with Miladay, Jewels, Inc. was terminated. Petitioners further alleged that
respondent filed the criminal complaints for grave coercion and trespass to dwelling as leverage to
compel petitioners to withdraw the estafa case.

On 2 May 2000, Judge Adriatico issued an Order reversing his earlier findings of lack of probable
cause. This time, he found probable cause to hold petitioners for trial and to issue warrants of arrest,
thus:

Acting on the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the private complainant herein on January 17,
2000, with "Opposition…" filed by the accused on January 27, 2000, taking into consideration the
"Manifestation/Brief Memorandum" filed by the said private complainant on March 4, 2000, the Court
found cogent reason to reconsider its order dated January 7, 2000.

The sworn allegation/statement of witness Mauro V. de Lara, which was inadvertently overlooked by
the undersigned, and which states, among other things, that said witness saw the private
complainant herein being forcibly taken by three persons, referring very apparently to the accused
herein, from her residence is already sufficient to establish a prima facie evidence or probable cause
against the herein accused for the crimes being imputed against them. It is likewise probable that
accused herein could have committed the crime charged in view of their belief that the private
complainant herein had something to do with the alleged loss or embezzlement of jewelries of the
Miladay Jewels.
 3

WHEREFORE, in order to ferret out the truth/veracity of the complainant’s allegation and in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice, let the above-entitled cases now be set for trial.

Let therefore warrant of arrest be issued against all the accused in Criminal Case No. 99-29038
(Grave Coercions), fixing their bail for their provisional liberty in the amount of P12,000.00 for each
of them.

As regard Criminal Case No. 99-29037 (Trespass to Dwelling) the same shall be governed by the
Rules on Summary Procedure.6

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that the alleged affidavit of Mauro V. de Lara
on which the court a quo based its findings of probable cause was hearsay because it was not sworn
before Judge Adriatico; that De Lara did not personally appear before the investigating judge during
preliminary investigation. However, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied in the Order
dated 14 July 2000, thus:

Acting on the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the accused, thru counsel. With comment from
the counsel of the private complainant, the Court resolves to deny the same there being no cogent
reason to reconsider the Court order dated May 2, 2000.

The Court has resolved to try the above-entitled cases on the merits so as to ferret out the truth of
the private complainant’s allegations and there being probable cause to warrant criminal prosecution
of the same.

The accused’s contention that the statement of witness Mauro de Lara is bereft of credibility and that
the complaints at bar were initiated merely for harassment purposes could be ventilated well in a full
blown trial.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reason, let the trial of these cases proceed as already
scheduled.7

Petitioners moved for clarificatory hearings which were conducted on 23 August 2000 and 31 August
2000. However, before the court a quo could render a resolution based on said clarificatory
hearings, petitioners filed on 15 September 2000 a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction.8 Petitioners sought to annul the 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders of the court a
quo for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners argued that the court a
quo gravely abused its discretion in issuing said Orders finding probable cause and ordering the
issuance of warrants of arrest based solely on the unsworn statement of Mauro V. de Lara who
never appeared during preliminary investigation and who was not personally examined by the
investigating judge.

On 18 September 2000, Executive Judge Danilo A. Manalastas of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 7, issued an Order9 granting a 72-hour temporary restraining order and
enjoining the Municipal Trial Court from proceeding with the prosecution of petitioners in Criminal
Case Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038.

The case was thereafter raffled to Branch 79 which rendered its Decision10 denying the petition for
annulment of the 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders of the Municipal Trial Court. The Regional
Trial Court found that after conducting clarificatory hearings, the court a quo issued an Order on 18
September 2000, finding probable cause. The Regional Trial Court further ruled that any defect in
the issuance of the 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders finding probable cause based solely on
 4

the unsworn statement of Mauro V. de Lara who failed to appear during the preliminary examination
and who was not personally examined by the investigating judge, was cured by the issuance of
the 18 September 2000 Order. The Regional Trial Court reasoned, thus:

While it is true that respondent Judge Hon. Calixto O. Adriatico dismisses both criminal cases last
January 7, 2000 finding no probable cause and later on reverse himself by issuing the question
Order dated May 2, 2000 alleging among others that said Judge inadvertently overlooked the
statement of witness Mauro V. De Lara, the stubborn facts remain that whatever defects, or
shortcomings on the parts of the respondent Judge was cured when he conducted clarificatory
examination on the dates earlier mentioned in this Order.11

The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, reads:

RESPONSIVE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition for the Annulment of the Orders of
the respondent Judge dated May 2, 2000 and July 14, 2000 in criminal cases nos. 99-29037 and 99-
29038 (MTC-Meycauayan, Branch 2) should be as it is hereby denied for lack of merit.

ACCORDINGLY, the Presiding Judge of branch II, the Hon. Calixto O. Adriatico may now proceed to
hear and decide crim. Cases nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038 pending before that Court.12

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals asserting that the court a
quo acted with grave abuse of discretion in basing its findings of probable cause and ordering the
issuance of warrants of arrest solely on the unsworn statement of Mauro De Lara who never
appeared during preliminary investigation and who was not personally examined by the investigating
judge. Moreover, they argued that the 18 September 2000 Order was void because it was issued by
the Municipal Trial Court while the temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court
enjoining the court a quo to proceed further with the criminal complaints was in force.

However, the Court of Appeals denied the petition on the ground that petitioners resorted to the
wrong mode of appeal; i.e., instead of an ordinary appeal, petitioners filed a petition for
review. 13 The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The
Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch II is directed to proceed with the trial of
Criminal Case Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038 and to dispose of them with deliberate dispatch.14

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.15 Hence, the instant petition raising
the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN BASING ITS FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO
HOLD PETITIONERS FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF
ARREST AGAINST THEM, UPON AN UNSWORN STATEMENT OF A WITNESS WHO NEVER
APPEARED BEFORE, NOR WAS PERSONALLY EXAMINED BY, THE TRIAL COURT.

A. THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THAT NO WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE

EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AND
AFTER PERSONALLY EXAMINING UNDER OATH THE COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES.
 5

II.

PETITIONERS ASSERT THEIR RIGHT GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION WHICH TAKES

PRECEDENCE OVER RULES OF PROCEDURE OR TECHNICALITIES.

A. IT IS WELL-SETTLED THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT IS BOUND BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN

THE PETITION AND NOT BY ITS CAPTION.16

Petitioners insist that the Orders of the court a quo dated 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 should be
annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion because the finding of probable
cause was based solely on the unsworn statement of Mauro De Lara who never appeared during the
preliminary examination. Petitioners also allege that since De Lara never appeared before the
investigating judge, his statement was hearsay and cannot be used as basis for finding probable
cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest or to hold petitioners liable for trial. Granting that the
statement of De Lara was subscribed before "Judge Paguio," the same cannot be used as basis
because the law requires that the statement be sworn to before the investigating judge and no other.

In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines argue that the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioners’ petition because they resorted to the wrong mode of appeal.

On the other hand, respondent avers that the issue on the propriety of the issuance by the court a
quo of the 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders has become moot because clarificatory hearings
were thereafter conducted and another Order dated 18 September 2000 was issued finding probable
cause against petitioners; and, that the statement of Mauro De Lara was subscribed and sworn to
before Judge Orlando Paguio although it was Judge Calixtro Adriatico who acted as the investigating
judge.

The petition is meritorious.

Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals properly denied the petition for review filed by the petitioners under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court.

In denying the petition for review under Section 1,17 Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court filed by
petitioners, the appellate court stressed that they availed of the wrong mode of review in bringing the
case to it since the petitioners filed an original action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the RTC,
the remedy availed of should have been an appeal under Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –

(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases
of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record
on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is only when the decision of the RTC was rendered in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction would a
petition for review under Rule 42 be proper18
 6

We do not agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.

The present controversy involved petitioners’ sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected by the
Constitution. No person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.19

While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of
justice, and while the swift unclogging of the dockets of the courts is a laudable objective, it
nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice.20

The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and
lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It
is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford
the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of
cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.21

In those rare cases to which we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a
clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have
always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the
guarantee that every litigant is given the full opportunity for a just and proper disposition of his
cause.22

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time
and again, we have consistently held that rules must not be applied so rigidly as to override
substantial justice.23

The Court of Appeals should have looked beyond the alleged technicalities to open the way for the
resolution of the substantive issues in the instance case. The Court of Appeals, thus, erred in
dismissing petitioners’ petition for review. By dismissing the said Petition, the Court of Appeals
absolutely foreclosed the resolution of all the substantive issues petitioners were repeatedly
attempting to raise before the Court of Appeals.

We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues raised by the petitioners.

Section 2, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon finding of probable cause
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he/she may produce, and particularly describing the person to be seized.
 7

To determine the existence of probable cause, a preliminary investigation is conducted. A

preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.24

A preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information

for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day without
regard to the fine.25 Thus, for cases where the penalty prescribed by law is lower than 4 years, 2
months and 1 day, a criminal complaint may be filed directly with the prosecutor or with the
Municipal Trial court. In either case, the investigating officer (i.e., the prosecutor or the Municipal
Trial Court Judge) is still required to adhere to certain procedures for the determination of probable
cause and issuance of warrant of arrest.

In the instant case, respondent directly filed the criminal complaints against petitioners for grave
coercion and trespass to dwelling before the Municipal Trial Court. The penalty prescribed by law for
both offenses is arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months. Thus, Section 9,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court applies, to wit:

SEC. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. –

xxxx

(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. – If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal
Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in
section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after
personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however, require the
submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the
existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the additional
evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the
case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order
if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is
satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue
summons instead of a warrant of arrest. (Emphasis supplied.)

Corollarily, Section 6 of the same Rule provides:

SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – x x x

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. – x x x [T]he judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Clearly, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in issuing the assailed 2 May 2000 and 14
July 2000 Orders finding probable cause to hold petitioners liable for trial and to issue warrants of
arrest because it was based solelyon the statement of witness Mauro De Lara whom Judge Adriatico
did not personally examine in writing and under oath; neither did he propound searching questions.
He merely stated in the assailed 2 May 2000 Order that he overlooked the said statement of De
Lara; nevertheless, without conducting a personal examination on said witness or propounding
 8

searching questions, Judge Adriatico still found De Lara’s allegations sufficient to establish probable
cause. Plainly, this falls short of the requirements imposed by no less than the Constitution.

In Sangguniang Bayan of Batac v. Judge Albano,26 the Court found respondent judge guilty of
ignorance of the law because he failed to comply with the procedure on the issuance of warrant of
arrest, thus:

Failure to comply with such procedure will make him administratively liable. In the case at
bar, respondent judge issued several warrants of arrest without examining the complainant
and his witnesses in writing and under oath, in violation of Section 6 of Rule 112 which
provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – x x x

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. – If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation
is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.

The records show that respondent judge has violated the rules on preliminary investigation and
issuance of a warrant of arrest since the start of his term as municipal judge in Batac, Ilocos Norte in
September 1991. The gross ignorance of respondent judge has immensely prejudiced the
administration of justice. Parties adversely affected by his rulings dismissing their complaints after
preliminary investigation have been denied their statutory right of review that should have been
conducted by the provincial prosecutor. His practice of issuing warrants of arrest without
examining the complainants and their witnesses is improvident and could have necessarily
deprived the accused of their liberty however momentary it may be. Our Constitution requires
that all members of the judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.
Respondent judge’s stubborn adherence to improper procedures and his constant violation of the
constitutional provision requiring him to personally examine the complainant and the witness
in writing and under oath before issuing a warrant of arrest makes him unfit to discharge the
functions of a judge.

When the investigating judge relied solely on the affidavit of witness De Lara which was not sworn to
before him and whom he failed to examine in the form of searching questions and answers, he
deprived petitioners of the opportunity to test the veracity of the allegations contained therein.
Worse, petitioners’ arguments that De Lara’s affidavit was hearsay was disregarded by the
investigating judge despite the fact that the allegations therein were completely rebutted by
petitioners’ and their witnesses’ affidavits, all of whom appeared before and were personally
examined by the investigating judge. It was thus incorrect for the court a quo to rule thus:

The accused’s contention that the statement of witness Mauro de Lara is bereft of credibility and that
the complaints at bar were initiated merely for harassment purposes could be ventilated well in a full
blown trial.27

In sum, De Lara’s affidavit cannot be relied upon by the court a quo for its finding of probable cause.

In addition, this Court finds that the warrants of arrest were precipitously issued against
petitioners. Deprivation of a citizen’s liberty through the coercive process of a warrant of arrest is
1avvphi1

not a matter which courts should deal with casually. Any wanton disregard of the carefully-wrought
out processes established pursuant to the Constitution’s provisions on search warrants and warrants
 9

of arrest is a serious matter primarily because its effects on the individual wrongly-detained are
virtually irremediable.28

The procedure described in Section 6 of Rule 112 is mandatory because failure to follow the same
would amount to a denial of due process. With respect to the issuance by inferior courts of warrants
of arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that probable cause exists: 1) through an
examination under oath and in writing of the complainant and his witnesses; which examination
should be 2) in the form of searching questions and answers. This rule is not merely a procedural
but a substantive rule because it gives flesh to two of the most sacrosanct guarantees found in the
fundamental law: the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and the due process
requirement.29

The issuance of warrants of arrest is not mandatory. The investigating judge must find that there is a
necessity of placing the petitioners herein under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.30 Perusal of the records shows no necessity for the immediate issuance of warrants of
arrest. Petitioners are not flight risk and have no prior criminal records.

Respondent’s contention that any defect in the 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders of the court a
quo has been cured by its 18 September 2000 Order is flawed. It will be recalled that on 15
September 2000, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. On 18 September 2000, Executive Judge Manalastas issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the court a quo from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Cases
Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038. However, in contravention of said restraining order, the court a
quo issued its Order on even date, i.e., 18 September 2000, finding probable cause against
petitioners holding them liable for trial and ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest. Considering
that the court a quo’s 18 September 2000 Order was issued during the effectivity of the temporary
restraining order, the same is considered of no effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed 24 February 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63280 denying petitioners’ petition for review and directing the Municipal
Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch 11, to proceed with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 99-
29037 and 99-29038, as well as the 23 October 2006 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch 11, is DIRECTED to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038 for lack
of probable cause and to quash the warrants of arrest against petitioners for having been irregularly
and precipitously issued.

SO ORDERED.
 10

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 161083
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO ZUO, State Present:
Prosecutor GERONIMO SY and Prosecution
Attorney IRWIN MARAYA, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Petitioners, NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
- versus - MENDOZA, JJ.

HON. BASILIO R. GABO, in his capacity as

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch II and WILSON CUA
TING, EDWARD NGO YAO, WILLY SO TAN and
CAROL FERNAN ORTEGA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

August 3, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
July 24, 2003 Decision[2] and October 3, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
71985.
The facts of the case, as culled from the petition, are as follows:

On May 14, 2001, around 12:15 a.m., a fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware Plastic Products
Manufacturing Corporation (Sanyoware) located at Km. 8, McArthur Highway, Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan. The Sanyoware plant had four single-storey buildings, enclosed in concrete walls with steel
tresses and galvanized iron sheet roofing.

Sanyoware 2, Warehouse 2, the building that was razed by fire, was located at the right innermost
portion of the plant facing north. Sanyoware occupied the right, western portion of the said building,
while New Unitedware Marketing Corporation (Unitedware) rented the other half, located at the left,
eastern portion. The building was divided at the center by a tall concrete firewall with a steel gate.
 11

Investigations were conducted by the Philippine 3rd Regional Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG) and the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force (IATF) of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government. Pursuant to the August 1, 2001 letter[4] of CIDG Regional Officer P/Supt. Christopher A.
Laxa to the Secretary of the Justice; the IATFs October 25, 2001 Indorsement;[5] and the October 8, 2001
letter[6] of Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) Chief Sr. Supt. Victoriano C. Remedio to the Prosecutor of the
DOJ, the following were accused of destructive arson before the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor,
namely: Samson Cua Ting, alias Ding Jian Zhi, External Vice-President; Wilson Cua Ting, Plant Manager;
Edward Ngo Yao (Yao), President of New Marketing Corporation; Willy So Tan, alias Chen Yi Ming, Vice-
President for Operations; Carol Fernan Ortega, Assistant to the External Vice-President; and John Doe
and Peter Doe.

In support of the accusation, petitioner submitted the Sworn Statements of Richard Madrideo, Jaime
Kalaw, Raymund Dy, Chit Chua, Jennifer Chua Reyes, Shanda Amistad, SPO1 Valeriano Dizon and
Inspector Allan N. Barredo.

In his sworn statement,[7] Richard Madrideo, a supervisor at Sanyoware said that there were two
separate sets of fire in the Sanyoware Warehouse and that it was different from, but occurred
simultaneously, with the fire at the Unitedware Warehouse. Madrideo claimed that respondents Wilson
Ting and Yao instructed him that if anyone should ask about the fire, he should say that the fires did not
break out simultaneously and the cause thereof was defective wiring. In his additional sworn statement,
Madrideo claimed that, days after the fire, he was threatened by respondents and was being forced to
write a sworn statement against his will.

Jaime Kalaw, a former head of the Maintenance Department of Sanyoware, alleged in his sworn
statement[8] that the cause of the fire could not have been faulty electrical wiring, because the
warehouse was relatively new and that, on the day of the fire, the plant was not in operation so there
was no heavy load of electricity and all the circuit breakers were shut down. Kalaw noted that a week
before the fire occurred, almost 300 unserviceable molds were transferred to the burned Sanyoware
warehouse. A day before the fire, expensive finish products were loaded in delivery trucks. In addition,
Kalaw alleged that he saw respondent Yao a day before the fire driving to the Unitedware
warehouse. Once inside, respondent Yao took a rectangular shaped object from his vehicle.

Raymond Dy, a warehouse supervisor at Sanyoware stated in his sworn statement[9] that a week before
the fire occurred, he observed that saleable products from the burned warehouse were transferred to
the Sanyo City Warehouse, while unusable components from the Sanyo City warehouse were
transferred to the burned warehouse. Dy alleged that the transfer of the products was upon the orders
of Charles Lee, the plant manager of Sanyoware, who allegedly told the employees to finish the
transfers on May 12, 2001.

Chit Chua, an employee at the Accounting Department of Sanyoware, claimed in her sworn
statement[10] that Sanyoware was indebted to a number of banks and corporations and that Sanyowares
outstanding obligations amounted to P95,000,000.00 to P96,000,000.00. Jennifer Chua Reyes, a
secretary at Sanyoware, alleged in her sworn statement[11] that Sanyoware has an outstanding loan
of P180,000,000.00 to various individuals.

Shanda Amistad, a former stay-in worker at Sanyoware, alleged in her affidavit[12] that, around 8:00 a.m.
of May 13, 2001, she saw respondent Yao driving a Canter truck of Unitedware loaded with
 12

goods. Yao went to Sanyoware three times that day. Amistad found it unusual, since Yao did not
normally go to Sanyoware on Sundays and there were available drivers at that time. Around 2:00 p.m. of
the same day, respondent Wilson Ting arrived.

SPO1 Valeriano Dizon (SPO1 Dizon), a fireman assigned at the Meycauayan Fire Station, Bulacan, stated
in his sworn statement[13] that he conducted the examination of the fire that occurred on May 14, 2001.
He alleged that he took the statement of the witnesses, but Sr. Supt. Enrique Linsangan of the BFP
Regional Office, Region III, took the witnesses statements from him before he could prepare the Final
Investigation Report (FIR). Thereafter, Sr. Supt. Linsangan summoned him, Inspector Allan Barredo and
BFP C/Ins. Absalon Zipagan, Municipal Fire Marshall of Bocaue, Bulacan, and showed them the copy of
the FIR and made them sign it. Inspector Barredo, in his affidavit,[14]corroborated SPO1 Dizons allegation
as to how Sr. Supt. Lansangan summoned and ordered them to sign the FIR.
In their defense, respondents submitted a Counter-Affidavit[15] to refute the allegations made against
them, the significant portions of which read:
7. Principally on the basis of the Salaysay of Richard Madrideo attached Annex A to the Affidavit of Carol
Ortega Fernan dated September 22, 2001, and on the basis of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ricky A. Hista
and of the Karagdagang Salaysay of Bobby Bacang and on the basis of our inquiry from others, we have
good reason to believe that one claiming to be a representative of CRM Adjustment Corporation had
indeed offered money and jobs to persons to give perjured statements to make it appear that there was
arson and that we committed it. (The Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan, together with the Salaysay of
Richard Madrideo as Annex A thereto, the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ricky A. Hista and the Karagdagang
Salaysay of Bobby Bacang were all submitted last September 22, 2001 to the Inter Agency Anti-Arson
Task Force, Office of the Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government.

8. We would like to stress the fact that during the supposed investigation of this arson case by
complainant 3rd Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, not one of us was invited by
complainant to answer the allegations of witnesses against us. As far as we know, complainant did not
even make an ocular inspection of the place where fire occurred.

9. Although the CIDG investigators were allegedly informed by Mrs. June Go, a clerk of Sanyoware, that
nobody could assist the team in the ocular inspection, said investigators did not proceed to conduct an
ocular inspection when they actually did not need any assistance and when nobody was preventing
them from conducting the inspection.

10. Although Senior Police Officer Regino Raquipiso claims that when he and SPO1 John Tabago
returned to the factory, the ocular inspection was not pushed through for alleged lack of clearance from
the company owners, there is no showing that said police officers insisted or demanded to conduct then
and there an ocular inspection.

11. Apparently, complainant solely relied on the statements of Jaime Kalaw, Raymond Dy and Richard
Madrideo in deciding to file the case at bar against us.

12. Richard Madrideo executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before SPO4 Regino D. Raquipiso, Jr. last June
29, 2001 wherein he claims, among others, that there was a simultaneous fire that occurred in two
places in Sanyoware warehouse and in a place in Unitedware. However, said claim is a blatant lie and
perjured statement.
 13

13. In his Salaysay (Annex A to the Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan submitted last September 22, 2001
to the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force), Richard Madrideo admitted to the fact that he received the
sum of P1,000.00 from Atty. Lugtu and that he subsequently received another sum of P15,000.00 from
Atty. Lugtu. Richard Madrideo was also given a cellphone and was promised a job. According to said
Salaysay, Atty. Lugtu instructed Madrideo to state, among others, in his Salaysay that Madrideo saw a
simultaneous fire that occurred in two sides of the plant of Sanyoware.

14. In the Karagdagang Salaysay of Richard Madrideo, he repudiated his Salaysay by claiming that he
was threatened and coerced by Respondents into executing said Salaysay. Said claim is a blatant lie. In
essence, the story contained in the Karagdagang Salaysay regarding alleged threats and coercion is
nothing but a fabricated lie for the truth of the matter being that his Salaysay was executed by him
freely and voluntarily last July 30, 2001 at the conference room of Sanyoware. He was not threatened by
anyone. He was neither paid nor promised any consideration for executing said Salaysay.

15. At any rate, I, Wilson Ting, and the security guards on duty can attest to the fact that fire started at
the warehouse of Unitedware and that it did not occur simultaneously in different places.

16. In the Sworn Statement of Raymond Dy, he claims that Richard Madrideo had told him that while
the fire was on going at the Unitedware warehouse, Madrideo saw the fire on top of the stock piles
inside the Sanyoware warehouse aside from that fire at the Unitedware. However, Jaime Kalaw, who
was allegedly informed about the fire by Raymond Dy, did not mention in his Sworn Statement about
any simultaneous occurrence of the fire in different places. Jaime Kalaw even further stated in his Sworn
Statement that upon his inquiry from the employees, he was allegedly told that the fire originated from
Unitedware warehouse that spread to Sanyoware warehouse.

17. The allegation of Jaime Kalaw in his Sworn Statement that all circuit breakers were off position so
that there was no flow of electric current that may cause fire on the warehouses and the allegation of
Raymond Dy that during his roving before the fire, all the lights were off are not true for the truth being
that management had required that some lights be put on every night in all the warehouses so that they
can be well guarded. Besides, I, Wilson Ting, and the guards on duty can attest to the fact that there
were lights in all the warehouses during the subject incident.

18. Raymond Dy claims that the keys were usually kept by the guard on duty, but that on this occasion,
he learned from Shandra Amistad, a stay-in helper, that the keys were then kept by Wilson
Ting. Obviously, said claim is based on hearsay and thus, should not be given any credence and besides,
I, Wilson Ting, deny said claim for the truth of the matter being that the keys of Sanyoware are kept
inside its main office and are not kept by the guard on duty.

19. Raymond Dy also claims that the lights were 3 to 4 meters away from the stocks, so that it could be
impossible that stocks will be caught by fire if and when the lights or electrical system leak
down. However, said claim is not true for the fact of the matter is that in the Unitedware warehouse
and in Sanyoware warehouse, there were so much pile[s] of stocks that some pile[s] almost reached the
lights.

20. There is also no truth to the allegation of Raymond Dy that a week before the fire, saleable finished
products from Sanyoware and Unitedware were removed and transferred
to Sanyo City warehouse. There is also no truth to the allegation that non-useable components were
removed from Sanyo City and transferred a week before the fire to the warehouses that got
 14

burned. Likewise, there is no truth that Charles Lee gave a deadline until Saturday (May 12) to transfer
non-useable components to the burned warehouses. Said allegations are all fabricated lies designed to
make it appear that there was arson.

21. Long before the subject incident, I, Wilson Ting, had ordered to have the stock piles that were in
between the steel gate dividing Unitedware and Sanyoware warehouses moved, not to have a pathway,
but for the purpose of closing the said steel gate. After said stock piles were moved, the steel gate was
padlocked.

22. There was nothing extraordinary or irregular for several delivery trucks filled with stocks to stay at
the parking area for the night and to leave very early in the morning to avoid traffic. Considering the
huge volume of deliveries being made regularly by Sanyoware and Unitedware, delivery trucks with
finished products were often times parked in the evening and during Sundays and holidays at the
compound of Sanyoware and they usually moved out very early in the morning from Monday to
Saturday. Thus, there was nothing extraordinary or irregular for some delivery trucks with stocks at the
parking area on the night of May 13, 2001, considering especially that it was a Sunday.

23. Being the operations manager of Sanyoware, I have no fixed time and schedule of work. Even on a
Sunday or holiday, I, Wilson Ting[,] sometimes visit the plant. Thus, there was nothing unusual that I,
Wilson Ting, went to Sanyoware last May 13, 2001. Due to several incidents of thefts that took place
inside the compound of Sanyoware and because of reports that the delivery trucks at the parking lot
might contain some items that were not included in the inventory for delivery, I, Wilson Ting, as
operations manager, decided to be at Sanyoware on that Sunday (May 13, 2001) principally to check the
goods inside the delivery trucks. With the help of security guards Bobby Bacang and Ricky Hista, I,
Wilson Ting, checked the goods in all the delivery trucks.

24. Being the President and practically the owner of Unitedware, a marketing area of Sanyoware and the
lessee of Sanyowares warehouse, I, (Edward Yao), visit Sanyoware and Unitedware from time to time.

25. As my (Edward Yaos) mother-in-law asked from me (Edward Yao) some chairs and drawers, I
(Edward Yao) drove my Pajero and went to Sanyoware. I (Edward Yao) called up Wilson Ting and
informed him that Ill be getting some chairs and drawers from Sanyoware for my mother-in-law. From
the plant of Sanyoware, I (Edward Yao) got some chairs and drawers.When said chairs and drawers
could not fit in my (Edward Yao) [P]ajero, I (Edward Yao) left to get a van. I (Edward Yao) came back later
driving a van where the said chairs and drawers were placed. I (Edward Yao) brought said chairs and
drawers to my mother-in-law who selected and got only some items and so, I (Edward Yao) returned to
Sanyoware the remaining items. Before I (Edward Yao) left again, Wilson Ting asked me to come back
for some chat and so, I (Edward Yao) returned in my [P]ajero. However, after chatting with Wilson Ting, I
(Edward Yao) left at around 9:00 oclock in the evening of May 13, 2001. Thus, just before the incident
when the fire occurred, I (Edward Yao) was not in the compound of Sanyoware.

26. There is no truth, however, to the claim that I (Edward Yao) had entered the warehouse of
Unitedware and that I (Edward Yao) got a rectangular shape black object from my vehicle while inside
the warehouse for the truth of the matter being that I (Edward Yao) did not enter said warehouse and I
(Edward Yao) did not get any object from my vehicle. I (Edward Yao) got the said chairs and drawers
from the plant of Sanyoware.
 15

27. There is no truth that the company is suffering losses even before the fire occurred. The loan of
Sanyoware with Metrobank is fully secured by a real estate mortgage wherein the value of the real
estate, together with the improvements thereon that was mortgaged is more or less double the amount
of the said loan and, thus, said real estate value is more than sufficient to cover said loan of
Sanyoware. On the other hand, the loan with Equitable Bank is also fully secured by a real estate
mortgage.

28. Before the subject incident, Sanyoware was making profits. There was no year that Sanyoware
incurred losses. Its business was going every year. Prior to the subject incident, the record of Sanyoware
with the banks was quite good.

29. Likewise, prior to the fire, Unitedware was steadily growing. Every year, its profit continued to go
up. Last year, Unitedware made a huge profit from its operation and it is expected that, despite the fire
that burned the warehouses, Unitedware will still make a good profit this year.

30. Complainant did not conduct any investigation, except to get the statements of its
witnesses: Madrideo, Kalaw and Dy. Likewise, the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force did not also
conduct any investigation, except in essence to ask the witnesses of complainant to identify under oath
their sworn statements executed before the complainant and to ask respondents to submit their sworn
statements and later to identify the same under oath.

31. On the other hand, the elements of Bocaue Fire Station and OPFM Bulacan BFP Region 3 Intel and
Inves Section conducted a thorough investigation of the origin of the fire.Statements of security guards
Bobby A. Bacang and Mark Anthony Gabay were taken. Statement of the operations manager Wilson
Ting was also taken. The subject place was inspected.Pictures were taken. Specimens were obtained
from the place where fire occurred and submitted to the laboratory for examination. Said elements
undertook other activities in line with proper investigation.[16]

After preliminary investigation, then State Prosecutor Carlos C. Pormento issued a Resolution,[17] the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that an information for Destructive

Arson be filed against Wilson Ting, Edward Yao, Willy So Tan and Carol Ortega. That the case against
Samson Ting be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to indict him under the charge.

As to the charge of Accessories against herein three (3) Fire Officers, let that case be remanded to TF-
IATF for further investigation.[18]

Pursuant to the foregoing Resolution, an Information[19] for Arson was filed against Wilson Cua Ting,
Edward Ngo Yao, Willy So Tan, Carol F. Ortega, John Doe and Peter Doe, of the crime of arson, to wit:

That on or about May 14, 2001, in the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and
mutually helping one another, acting in common accord, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, destroy the warehouses known as Sanyoware Plastic Products Manufacturing Plant and New
Unitedware Marketing Corporation, including the stocks of raw materials and finish products,
machineries and various equipments by maliciously burning the same for the purpose of concealing or
 16

destroying evidence of another violation of law, and to conceal bankruptcy to defraud creditors and to
collect from insurance.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[20]
The Information was raffled to Branch XI, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos Bulacan, 3rd Judicial
Region. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 300-47M 2002.

Prior to the arraignment of respondents and before warrants of arrest could be issued, respondents
filed a Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest Pending Determination of Probable Cause.[21]

On February 27, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[22] dismissing the case, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

Accordingly, for lack of probable cause, the instant case is DISMISSED as ordained under Sec. 6, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The RTC applied the equipoise rule in dismissing the case, because of its observation that the sworn
statements submitted by petitioner and respondents contained contradictory positions.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[24] which was, however, denied by the RTC in
an Order[25] dated March 25, 2002.

On August 8, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
71985. On July 24, 2003, the CA issued a Decision denying the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondent, the assailed Orders dated February 27, 2002 and March 25, 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto and the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is, accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.[26]

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution[27] dated October 3, 2003.

Hence, this instant petition, with petitioner raising the following ground for this Courts consideration, to
wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY AND GROSSLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADOPTING THE EQUIPOISE RULE IN THE CASE AT BAR.[28]
 17

Before anything else, this Court shall address a procedural issue raised by respondents
that certiorari does not lie considering that such special civil action is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, or more importantly, a lapsed appeal.[29]

Respondents position is well taken.

It is well settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only
when, there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
and certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the
availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lost appeal.[30]

A perusal of the records will show that petitioner received the assailed CA Resolution on October 10,
2003. From that time on, petitioner had 15 days, or until October 25, 2003, to file an appeal by way of a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, instead of filing the appeal on the last
day of reglementary period, petitioner simply allowed it to lapse. Clearly, petitioner had an appeal,
which under the circumstances was the adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On this point
alone, petitioners petition must be dismissed, as herein petition is without a doubt a substitute for a lost
appeal. In any case, even if this Court were to set aside the procedural infirmity of the petition, the same
still fails on the merits.

In a petition for certiorari, the court must confine itself to the issue of whether or not respondent court
lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.[31]

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the preliminary investigation proper, which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged is the function of the investigating prosecutor.[32]

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.

xxxx

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order of the accused had
already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case
of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint or information.[33]
 18

As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[34] the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with
the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any offense
included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable
cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it
requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.[35] The purpose of the mandate of the judge to
first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those
falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.[36]

Based on the foregoing, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it dismissed the case on lack of
probable cause as the same is sanctioned under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The
penultimate question to be resolved then is was such exercise of jurisdiction attended by grave abuse of
discretion?

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.[37]

Petitioners main argument hinges on the propriety of the RTCs use of the equipoise rule in dismissing
the case which was affirmed by the CA. Specifically, petitioner contends that the equipoise rule cannot
be used by the RTC merely after the filing of the information, thus:

Since there must be a proper determination of the presence or absence of evidence sufficient to support
a conviction, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, the equipoise rule shall properly come into play when
the parties have already concluded the presentation of their respective evidence. It is only at this stage,
not at any prior time and certainly not merely after the filing of the information, can the trial court
assess and weigh the evidence of the parties and thereafter determine which party has the
preponderance of evidence. If both parties fail to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases,
an adverse decision would be rendered against the party which has the burden of proof.[38]

Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt on
which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule
finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then
the evidence does not suffice to produce a conviction.[39]
To this Courts mind, the reliance of the RTC in the equipoise rule is misplaced as a review of previous
Court decisions would show that the position of petitioner is in fact correct. The equipoise rule has been
generally applied when the parties have already concluded the presentation of their respective evidence
as shown in a plethora of cases such as Abarquez v. People,[40] Tin v. People[41] and People v. Leano.[42]

While the use of the equipoise rule was not proper under the circumstances of the case at bar, the
same, however, does not equate to an abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, but at most, merely an
 19

error of judgment. More importantly, this Court finds that the RTC had in fact complied with the
requirement under the rules of personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence and that the assailed Order was arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto, thus:

By this statement of Madrideo, it would appear fire broke out in two (2) places, which, presupposes or
implies that some sort of incendiary or flammable substances were ignited to start the fire. The
investigation conducted by the Bocaue Fire Station, however, appears to have ruled out the use of
incendiary or inflammable substances. Annex E of the Complaint, Chemistry Report No. C-054-2001 of
the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office indicated that the specimen submitted by the Bocaue
Fire Station in connection with the fire in question was found negative of any flammable substance. This
finding was never debunked or repudiated, which makes the misgivings of the police investigators about
its veracity unfounded. Thus, pitted against the allegation of Madrideo, this physical evidence puts the
truth of the latter in grave doubt. Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses (People vs. Sacabin, 57 SCRA 707). Physical evidence are mute but
eloquent manifestations of truth and they rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence (People vs.
Uycoque, 124 SCRA 769).

At this stage, it must be stressed that the Fire Investigation Report prepared by the Bocaue Fire Station
(Annex D) and the Certification made by the Provincial Fire Marshall, Absalon Zipagan, point to the
faulty wiring as the cause or origin (sic) of the conflagration at bar. The Office the Regional Fire Marshall
also came out with the same findings. (Annexes B and C) All the above reports and investigation stand as
the official report of the fire in question. Contrary to the Resolution, we find nothing in the respective
sworn statements of Supt. Absalon Zipagan, Sr. Supt. Enrique Linsangan and Insp. Allan Barredo that
deviated much less repudiated the aforesaid reports and findings. Far from impugning their own
investigation, the three (3) fire officials simply narrated the steps that were taken at the provincial and
regional levels in the investigation of the Sanyo fire. Needless to state, the investigation reports and
findings carry the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. A mere affidavit cannot
overcome this presumption. (Transport Corporation vs. CA, 241 SCRA 77) Government officials are
presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this
presumption. (Tata vs. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 235)

The significance of the above reports and findings cannot be overlooked. Note that F/CINSP. Absalon
Zipagan, F/Insp. Allan Barredo and SPO1 Valeriano Dizon, Jr. were included as accessories in the
complaint by the DILG, Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force but the State Prosecutor did not rule on their
liability, which thus enhances all the more the probative value of the said reports and findings.

This Court, likewise, noted that although the Inter Agency Anti Arson Task Force was quick to rule out
faulty electrical wiring, it did note arrive at a definite theory how the fire started, leaving everything
hanging in mid-air.

This Court is also hard put to make out a case from the actuations of some of the accused before, during
and after the fire. For one, the presence of Wilson Ting and Edward Yao in the Sanyo premises before
the fire is not criminal per se. Both apparently have their own explanations, and following the equipoise
rule as elucidated above, no adverse implications can be inferred therefrom. So are with the alleged
utterances made by the accused during and after the fire, having been said in the midst of tenseful
happening these can be attributed to their desperation over the loss of some of their properties. And,
consistent with the equipoise rule, if ever said statements were uttered at all, they cannot serve as
evidence against the accused for the offense charged.[43]
 20

The conclusions of the RTC which led to the dismissal of the information against respondents cannot, in
any sense, be characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken, or whimsically or
capriciously arrived at. The worst that may perhaps be said of it is that it is fairly debatable, and may
even be possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made with grave abuse of
discretion.[44]

Based on Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the RTC judge, upon the filing of an Information, has
the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable
cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from
notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the information.[45]
The judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause.[46] To this Courts mind, the RTC had complied with its duty of personally evaluating the
supporting evidence of the prosecution before arriving at its decision of dismissing the case against
respondents.

While petitioner mainly argues against the use of the equipoise rule, it cannot escape this Courts
attention that ultimately petitioner is asking this Court to resolve the propriety of the dismissal of the
case by the RTC, on the basis of the Information and the attached documents it had filed. This Court
however, will defer to the findings of fact of the RTC, which are accorded great weight and respect,
more so because the same were affirmed by the CA. In addition, it bears to stress that the instant case is
a petition for certiorari where questions of fact are not entertained.[47]

The sole office of writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and does not include correction of public
respondents evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon.[48] An error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special civil
action of certiorari.[49]

In any case, the dismissal of herein petition does not preclude petitioner from availing of any other
action it deems appropriate under the premises. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused
has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.[50] Moreover,
while the absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a ground for the dismissal
of the case, the same does not result in the acquittal of the said accused.[51]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The July 24, 2003 Decision and October 3,
2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 71985, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 21

EN BANC
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L.
MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C.
VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court,
at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE
PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of
Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos.
82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were
denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently,
by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through
the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners'
contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost
factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of
law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
 22

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and
clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This,
continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying
on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such
a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
 23

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect"
on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused
their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585,
82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en
banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its
opening statement. However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of
the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I believe
this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should not
hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice
where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is
involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic and
one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist,
the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and the business manager in
a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted personal
attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to cause
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple prosecution
for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the investigation and
prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned
that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the
press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals
and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the
harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an
unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of sensitive
issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the demarcation line.
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that
"(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer
under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to be
expected and should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such
exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye
of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and
has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)
 24

In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous
and libelous charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It would
seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person should be examined from
various perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again, the Supreme Court should draw
this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that
a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the
free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue, where
after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous, there is likely to be a
chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen, especially editors and
publishers to courageously perform their critical role in society. If, instead of merely reading more
carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column, the editors tell their people to lay off certain
issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must call
attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the
guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez v. Court
of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).
The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to
give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of
state law. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S Ct 328.
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace,
obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the other various other formulae for the
repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew
that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that
it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. ...
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... (at pp.
700-701)
Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that Messrs.
Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas knowingly
participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of these
petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping
up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes publishers and editors but
perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to publishers and editors vis-a-vis
newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech
clause but we have to understand that some provocative words, which if taken literally may appear
to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public issues
when uttered or written by a media personality. Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of case
 25

now before us dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate? There are many other
questions arising from this unusual case which have not been considered.
I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to narrowly
drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them. The first issue
on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently
amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest. Anent
the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President should not be
sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if
somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.
The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception. I
know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any
considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public duty. But why
should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility of the trial court
treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore the more
important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government power and freedom
of expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself to
reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v.
Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:
If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that
criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when
applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of
expression should be faithfully applied.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its
opening statement. However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of
the libel case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I believe
this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should be resolved now rather that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should not
hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice
where it is not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is
involved but broader considerations of governmental power versus a preferred freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic and
one who enjoys unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist,
the publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and the business manager in
a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted personal
attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to cause
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple prosecution
for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the investigation and
prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned
that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the
press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals
and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the
harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an
unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to question government handling of sensitive
issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the demarcation line.
 26

As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that
"(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer
under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to be
expected and should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such
exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye
of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and
has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of affording immunity from slanderous
and libelous charges, would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It would
seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical person should be examined from
various perspectives if directed at a high government official. Again, the Supreme Court should draw
this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that
a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the
free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue, where
after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous, there is likely to be a
chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen, especially editors and
publishers to courageously perform their critical role in society. If, instead of merely reading more
carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column, the editors tell their people to lay off certain
issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must call
attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the
guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez v. Court
of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra). <är e|| anº• 1àw>

The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:

In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to
give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of
state law. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S Ct 328.
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace,
obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the other various other formulae for the
repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
They recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew
that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that
it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. ...
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
 27

sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... (at pp.
700-701)
Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there a prima facie showing that Messrs.
Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas knowingly
participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of these
petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping
up everybody with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes publishers and editors but
perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular effectivity to publishers and editors vis-a-vis
newspaper columnists. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech
clause but we have to understand that some provocative words, which if taken literally may appear
to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public issues
when uttered or written by a media personality. Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of case
now before us dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate? There are many other
questions arising from this unusual case which have not been considered.
I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to limit the issues to narrowly
drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them. The first issue
on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently
amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest. Anent
the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President should not be
sued. At the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if
somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.
The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception. I
know that most of our fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any
considerations of possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public duty. But why
should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the possibility of the trial court
treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore the more
important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government power and freedom
of expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself to
reiterating the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v.
Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:
If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that
criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when
applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of
expression should be faithfully applied.
 28

G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO,
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents,
LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor.
G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents.
G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995
ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE
GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN,
and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO,
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to: (1)
annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E.
de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from
conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case
or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein.1
From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons,2 with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary investigation3 of those charged
with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde;4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde,5 and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF
Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn statement dated
May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission
of the crime;7 (2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the
persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S.Gaviola;8 (3) the sworn-statement of Carlos
J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808
bound for New York and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in
the trip; (4) the sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who
narrated the manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar;9 (5) the sworn
statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn
 29

statements of Normal White, a security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy
reports of the victims were also submitted and they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds,
Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen (19).10 The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the
presence of spermatozoa.11
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for
Production And Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the following:
(a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and
stay of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;
(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A.
Cabanayan, M.D.;
(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7,
1991);
(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the
investigation;
(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;
(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated
September 2, 1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;
(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro
(other than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police
agencies;
(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by
Superintendent Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;
(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their
respective positions and duties;
(j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.
The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. It
alleged it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro. This compelled petitioner
Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the
purpose, among others, of obtaining the original of said sworn statement. He succeeded, for in the
course of its proceedings, Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., produced a copy of said original in
compliance with a subpoena duces tecum. The original was then submitted by petitioner Webb to
the DOJ Panel together with his other evidence. It appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to
obtain from the NBI the copy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request
for its production.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar
as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27,
1992. 12 His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina
Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela Francisco.13 To further support his defense,
he submitted documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the
United States on said dates14 and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No.
A8818707 on June 14, 1991.15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of
Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm,
among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United
Airlines Flight No. 808.
The other respondents — Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony Boy"
Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong — submitted sworn statements,
responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the
Vizcondes.16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio "Dong" Ventura failed to file their counter-
affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known address.17 In his sworn
statement, petitioner Gatchalian alleged that from 11 o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3
o'clock in the morning of the following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and
Andrew Syyap, at New Alabang Village, Muntinlupa watching video tapes. He claimed that his co-
petitioner Lejano was with him.
 30

On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against
petitioners and their co-respondents,18 On the same date, it filed the corresponding
Information19 against petitioners and their co-accused with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by
respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing
judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11,
1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his
impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of
arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners
Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions
before us.
In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding
that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel
denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4)
the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in
the Information as an accused.
We find the petitions bereft of merit.
I
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May 22,
1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They
hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995
sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair
as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn
statements of the witnesses for the NBI.
We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule
112 provides that a preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the procedure in conducting a
preliminary investigation, thus:
Sec. 3. Procedure. — Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following
manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be
accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two
(2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the
 31

respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall

have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the
respondent shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof
and copies thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit
counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base
his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may
set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without
the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit
questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or
witnesses concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating
officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus
adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall
certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that
a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof . . ."
The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature . . ."20 An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates
the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.21 Probable cause to warrant
arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that
they are facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.22 Other jurisdictions
utilize the term man of reasonable caution 23 or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man.24 The terms are legally
synonymous and their reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the
street.25 It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which
all reasonable men have an abundance.
Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused
its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. Petitioners belittle the
truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner
Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2)
sworn statement, thus:26
xxx xxx xxx
To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn
statements of Alfaro:
On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question
First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.
Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."
On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies
First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night.
She just said "on the following day I read in the newspaper that there
were three persons who were killed . . ."
Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw
two bodies on top of the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert
on top of Carmela."
On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde
 32

First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.

Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top
of Carmela and pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning
and I saw tears on her eyes."
On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little
more than a meter high."
Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."
On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: She never entered the house.
Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty
kitchen."
In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies
did not erode the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent ruling, viz.:27
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument
merely that she is a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a co-
conspirator may be taken as evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator's
participation in the commission of the crime (see People vs. Lumahang, 94 Phil.
1084).
Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would
such a prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal
undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy
may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that the several accused had acted in concert or in
unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, 210 SCRA 402 [1992], citations omitted; People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA
699).
Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two
sworn statements. In Angelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a
witness accusing therein petitioner for the slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even
though said witness failed to name Angelo in his affidavit which was executed five (5)
months earlier. Granting, the Court continued, that a part of the witness' testimony is
untrue, such circumstance is not sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the
witness.
On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his
memorandum suggesting that the instant complaint "should not be decided within the
month to give time to the NBI to coordinate with the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the
whereabouts of Hubert Webb . . . and to check on our U.S.-based witnesses."
In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's
statements, among others. This is untenable. As held in Angelo:
There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of
the testimony of a witness as worthy of belief and from
simultaneously rejecting other parts which the court may find
incredible or dubious. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is
not a rule of law, let alone a general rule of law which is universally
applicable. It is not a legal presumption either. It is merely a latinism
describing the conclusion reached by a court in a particular case after
ascribing to the evidence such weight or lack of weight that the court
deemed proper.
 33

In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having
reservations when she first executed the first statement and held back vital
information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes
that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently
explained especially specially so where there is no showing that the inconsistencies
were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of
Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit. As it has been often noted, ex
parte statements are generally incomplete because they are usually executed when
the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to
comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents which
transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been
committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by
the complainant indicate a prima facie case that respondents conspired in the
perpetration of the imputed offense.
We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance of
counsel28 and consists of six (6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the crime was
planned and then executed by the petitioners. In addition, the DOJ Panel evaluated the supporting
sworn statements of Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J.
Cristobal, a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808 and Lolita Birrer, a paramour of Gerardo
Biong. The Panel assayed their statements as follows:29
xxx xxx xxx
According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June
29, 1991, between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home
inside his room with two male visitors. She knew it because she and her co-
housemaid, Loany, were instructed by Hubert to bring them three glasses of juice. It
was the last time she saw Hubert and was later told by then Congressman Webb that
Hubert was in the United States.
While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served
as a laundry woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa
Rosales, that on June 30, 1991, she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as
what she used to do, she entered the rooms of the Webbs to get their clothes to be
washed. As a matter of fact, in that early morning, she entered Hubert's room and
saw Hubert, who was only wearing his pants, already awake and smoking while he
was sitting on his bed. She picked up Hubert's scattered clothes and brought them
together with the clothes of the other members of the family to the laundry area. After
taking her breakfast, she began washing the clothes of the Webbs. As she was
washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she noticed fresh bloodstains in his shirt. After
she finished the laundry, she went to the servant's quarters. But feeling uneasy, she
decided to go up to the stockroom near Hubert's room to see what he was doing. In
the said stockroom, there is a small door going to Hubert's room and in that door
there is a small opening where she used to see Hubert and his friends sniffing on
something. She observed Hubert was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and from
inside his room.
On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and
came back at around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the
secret door of the house. It was the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the
Webb family.
On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00
in the morning, he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then
scheduled to take the United Airlines Flight No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New
York. At the airport's lobby, he saw then Congressman Freddie Webb with a male
companion. He greeted him and Webb answered: "Mabuti naman, at ito, ihahatid ko
 34

ang anak ko papuntang Florida." He knew Freddie Webb because he often watched
him then in a television show "Chicks to Chicks." He observed that the man whom
Freddie Webb referred to as his son, was of the same height as Freddie. The son
referred to has fair complexion with no distinguishing marks on his face. He (son of
Webb) was then wearing a striped white jacket. When he and his children were
already inside the plane, he did not see Freddie anymore, but he noticed his son was
seated at the front portion of the economy class. He never noticed Freddie Webb's
son upon their arrival in San Francisco. He claims that, while watching the television
program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he saw the wife of Freddie Webb with her
lawyer being interviewed, and when she described Hubert as "moreno" and small
built, with a height of five feet and seven inches tall, and who was the one who left for
United States on March 9, 1991, he nurtured doubts because such description does
not fit the physical traits of the son of Freddie, who left with him for United States on
the same flight and date.
Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with
him for almost three (3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four
(4) years old. Their relationship started in February, 1991 until she broke up with him
in September 1993. She recalls that on June 29, 1991, at around 6:00 p.m., Biong
invited her to play mahjong at the canteen of a certain Aling Glo located at the back
of the Parañaque Municipal Hall.
At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the
Parañaque police told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio
room, she was instructed to take him over and after somebody won the game, she
followed Biong at the radio room where she overheard him uttering,
"Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan, Paano, o sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na taxi, o
sige." When he put the phone down, Biong told her, "Mayroon lang akong
rerespondehan, ikaw muna ang maupo" and then, he went outside the canteen
apparently waiting for somebody. Twenty minutes later, a taxi, colored yellow, arrived
with a male passenger sitting at the backseat and parked near the canteen. After it
made some signals by blinking its headlight, Biong rode thereat at the front seat
beside the driver and then, they left. She was not able to recognize the male
passenger because the window of the taxi was tinted. Biong came back at around
7:00 of the same morning and when he arrived, he immediately washed his hands
and face, and took his handkerchief from his pocket which he threw at the trash can.
She asked him why he threw his handkerchief and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy
tae." She inquired what happened in BF Homes and he replied, "Putang inang mga
batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."
Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she
observed him doing something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy.
Moments later, Galvan, another policeman of Parañaque, arrived and said, "Oy
Biong, may tatlong patay sa BF, imbestigahan mo" to which Biong answered, "Oo
susunod na ako." Biong went to the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who offered to
accompany him and with whom she asked permission to go with them. Before they
proceeded to the place where the killings happened, she asked Biong if he knew the
exact address and the latter immediately responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was
surprised because Galvan never told him the place of the incident.
As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the
housemaids to contact the victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the
barangay chairman and the president of the Homeowners Association. When all
these persons were already in the house, Biong started recording the wounds of the
victim. Inside the master's bedroom, she saw Biong took a watch from the jewelry
box. Because she could not tolerate the foul odor, she and Capt. Bartolome went out
of the room and proceeded to the dining area. On top of the dining table, she saw the
 35

scattered contents of a shoulder bag. Moments later, Biong came out from the room
and proceeded to the front door to remove the chain lock; asked the keys from the
housemaid and it was only then that the main door was opened. Biong noticed a
stone in front of the broken glass of the door and requested Capt. Bartolome to go
inside the servant's quarters as he doubted the housemaids' claim that they heard
nothing unusual. Using the handle of his gun, Biong broke the remaining glass of the
door panel. Bartolome then came out of the room and told Biong that he can hear the
sound of the glass being broken. At the garage, Biong also noticed same marks on
the hood of the car.
On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with
the Vizconde housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him
remove from his pocket the things she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit:
calling cards, driver's license, ATM card, a crossed check worth P80,000.00,
earrings, a ring, bracelet, necklace, and the watch he took from the jewelry box
inside the room of the Vizcondes. These jewelry items were later pawned by Biong
for P20,000.00 at a pawnshop in front of Chow-Chow restaurant in Santos Avenue,
Parañaque. The next day, she saw Biong took from his locker at the Parañaque
Police Station an imported brown leather jacket, which the latter claimed to have
been given to him by the person who called him up in the early morning of June 30,
1991.
Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in
1993. She observed that Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of
the Vizconde case. In fact, when Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian
and brought him to the Parañaque Police Station, she was surprised that Biong
halted the investigation when Gatchalian was profusely sweating while being
interrogated. After the father of Gatchalian talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called
up and instructed Biong to bring Gatchalian to him (Colonel Pureza) and that was the
last thing she remembered regarding this case.
The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory evidence of
petitioners. It ruled: 30
xxx xxx xxx
The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his
defense of denial and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough
evaluation of the records, believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted
by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a
prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of positive
identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and
relatives (People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA
316 and a long line of cases).
Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters
(People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA 687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and
becomes even more weaker when arrayed against the positive identification by the
witness for the prosecution (People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62 [1994]).
Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he
claimed was with him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than
claiming that he "was not and could not have been at or near the area of the
Vizconde residence at the time of the alleged commission of the crime,"
respondent Lejano proffered no evidence to substantiate his claim of alibi.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi
in the form of documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when
the incident occurred. We have carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence
 36

submitted by respondent Webb in support of his absence from the country since
March 9, 1991 to October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting to exonerate him of
the offense charged. The material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While
respondent Webb may have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a
California driver's license on June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not
have been in the country on the dates above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in
the allegation that respondent Webb personally bought a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in
California in view of his positive identification by Alfaro and the two (2) househelps of
the Webb family who testified that he was here in the country on said dates.
Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a bicycle in California
is no conclusive proof that the name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the
merchandise.
Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that the
DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the
petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,31 while probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . .
conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not
a pronouncement of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable
cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to
call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for
clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the
investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator
need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part
of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In
the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced
to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.
II
We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners support their stance by
highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest in a matter of few hours;
(2) the failure of said judges to issue orders of arrest; (3) the records submitted to the trial
court were incomplete and insufficient from which to base a finding of probable cause; and
(4) that even Gerardo Biong who was included in the Information as a mere accessory had a
"NO BAIL" recommendation by the DOJ Panel. Petitioners postulate that it was impossible to
conduct a "searching examination of witnesses and evaluation of the documents" on the part
of said judges.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by no
less than the fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
 37

The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect
to issuance of warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities and differences of their
requirements ought to be educational. Some of them are pointed out by Professors LaFave
and Israel, thus:32 "It is generally assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required
whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. But
each requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances,
and thus one can exist without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be
supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of
being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be
searched. It is not also necessary that a particular person be implicated. By comparison, in
arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any showing that
evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's control." Worthy to note,
our Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of
warrants of arrest and search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule
112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused." In contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing
search warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 126 provide:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is thereupon satisfied of
the facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to
believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the
form prescribed by these Rules.
We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search
warrants in Soliven vs. Makasiar,33 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of
the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran
that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
 38

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law34 repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching
examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject
petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant
of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a
warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2)
sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita
Birrer35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital
and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges
that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress
that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not
the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported
by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by
merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours
to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they
made no personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.36
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is
predicated on the utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Not
even the corpus delicti of the crime was established by the evidence of the prosecution in
that case. Given the clear insufficiency of the evidence on record, we stressed the necessity
for the trial judge to make a further personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses to reach a correct assessment of the existence or non-existence of probable
cause before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The case at bar, however, rests
on a different factual setting. As priorly discussed, the various types of evidence extant in the
records of the case provide substantial basis for a finding of probable cause against the
petitioner. The corpus delicti of the crime is a given fact. There is an eyewitness account of
the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also disputed by
sworn statements of their former maids. It was therefore unnecessary for the respondent
judges to take the further step of examining ex parte the complainant and their witnesses
with searching questions.
III
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and
malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial
publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the
preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove
 39

lack of probable cause against them. The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed in the
Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General, viz.:
Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the
opportunities to be heard. Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary
investigation by appearing in the initial hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the
second hearing on July 14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion for Production and
Examination of Evidence and Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a "Reply
to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and
Examination of Evidence" on July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment and
Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July 14,
1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to Resolve" on August 1, 1995. Numerous
letter-requests were also sent by the petitioner Webb's counsel to the DOJ Panel
requesting the latter to furnish him a copy of the reports prepared by the FBI
concerning the petitioner's whereabouts during the material period (Annexes "L", "L-
1" and "L-2" of the Supplemental Petition dated August 14, 1995). In fact, not
satisfied with the decision of the DOJ Panel not to issue subpoena duces tecum to
Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a "Petition for Injunction, Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Makati in
order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the first sworn statement of Alfaro
for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court dismissed the petition
after Mercader produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first sworn statement of
Alfaro, without ruling on the admissibility and credence of the two (2) conflicting and
inconsistent sworn statements of the principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached hereto is a
copy of the order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-Makati, Branch 63 dated July
28, 1995) marked as Annex "F."
It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the
preliminary investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14,
1995, the panel continued to conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the
photo-copies of the submitted documents with the originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7,
Petition) The panel even entertained the "Response" submitted by accused Miguel
Rodriguez on July 18, 1995. (p. 17 Resolution) In addition to these, the panel even
announced that any party may submit additional evidence before the resolution of the
case. (p. 8, Petition) From the time the panel declared the termination of the
preliminary investigation on July 14, 1995, twenty-seven (27) days elapsed before
the resolution was promulgated, and the information eventually filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque on August 10, 1995. This notwithstanding the directive of
Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the investigating officer shall
resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary
investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence
in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This
directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with
indecent haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners. During the period of twenty-
seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and present additional evidence
before the DOJ Panel.
Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the
conduct of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated
the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against them.
Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them
for rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in
accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We
quote its pertinent sections, viz.:
 40

Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a

resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City
Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave
abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been
arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said
appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause,
however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
Sec. 2. When to appeal. — The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period
shall be interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10)
days from receipt of the resolution and shall continue to run from the time the
resolution denying the motion shall have been received by the movant or his counsel.
(Emphasis supplied)
Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in court
after the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still exercise
the right to seek a review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.
Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering
her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion
of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program
And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10,
which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a
crime and desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined
in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the
following circumstances are present:
(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under
the R.P.C. or its equivalent under special laws;
(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed;
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in
order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he
complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the
discharge of an accused so that he can be used as a Witness under Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-
inclusion in the criminal Complaint or Information, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. — The certification
of admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit
by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE
WITNESS IN THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and if included
therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a
State Witness. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused
from the information.
 41

Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from
criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or
used and all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.
The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that they
constitute ". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the
power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness."
The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 11938which gives the court the prerogative to
approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks
appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial
function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In
truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally
impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the
power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted
immunity from prosecution.39Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the
power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this
provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has
already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is
part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function.
Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by
legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one
of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime, one
certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well
put by the Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic
dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal
complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed
for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal
justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain
rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative bodies/courts."40 Petitioner
Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.
Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during
their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn
statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report. The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it
urges an expansive reading of the rights of persons under preliminary investigation it
deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on Criminal Procedure do not
expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation stage of a
criminal proceeding.41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to
move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in
possession of the prosecution.42 But these provisions apply after the filing of the Complaint or
Information in court and the rights are accorded to the accused to assist them to make an
intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare for trial.43
This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not,
however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his
constitutional right to life, liberty and property. Preliminary investigation is not too early a
stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a
potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary investigation is to
determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a
probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or
diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for
 42

they are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary
investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation
conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial.44 As this Court emphasized
in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals,45 "the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right." A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material
damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from their
prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the
FBI Report during their preliminary investigation considering their exculpatory character, and
hence, unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on
the constitutional protection of due process which we rule to be operational even during the
preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It is also implicit in section (3) (a) of Rule
112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn complaint, which
shall ". . . state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents . . ."
In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from other
jurisdictions. In the 1963 watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United States Supreme Court held
that "suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt
or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Its progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney
v. Holohan 47 which laid down the proposition that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony to procure conviction
violates due process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense exculpatory
evidence in its possession.48 The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady49 — "society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair." Indeed, prosecutors should not treat litigation like a game of poker where surprises can
be sprung and where gain by guile is not punished.
But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in their
favor, we are not prepared to rule that the initial non-production of the original sworn
statement of Alfaro dated April 28, 1995 could have resulted in the reasonable likelihood that
the DOJ Panel would not have found probable cause. To be sure, the NBI, on July 4, 1995,
upon request of petitioners, submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn
statement. It explained it cannot produce the original as it had been lost. Fortunately,
petitioners, on July 28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original from Atty. Arturo
Mercader in the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 951099.50 As petitioners admit,
the DOJ Panel accepted the original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn statement as a part of
their evidence.51 Petitioners thus had the fair chance to explain to the DOJ Panel then still
conducting their preliminary investigation the exculpatory aspects of this sworn statement.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found probable cause to charge them
despite the alleged material discrepancies between the first and second sworn statements of
Alfaro. For reasons we have expounded, this finding of probable cause cannot be struck
down as done with grave abuse of discretion.52On the other hand, the FBI Report while
corroborative of the alibi of petitioner Webb cannot by itself reverse the probable cause
finding of the DOJ Panel in light of the totality of evidence presented by the NBI.
Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to
the prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while
undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early
invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary
investigation.
In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in
constitutional law where the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the press, the
public's right to information, and an accused's right to a fair and impartial trial collide and
compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing where the balance should be struck has
 43

divided men of learning as the balance keeps moving either on the side of liberty or on the
side of order as the tumult of the time and the welfare of the people dictate. The dance of
balance is a difficult act to follow.
In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and
oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high
velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily
diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still
bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even
the principal actors in the case — the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers — have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and
their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the
press and the public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,53 it was
wisely held:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American
justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open,
thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned
and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of
public trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of
outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice
serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern,
hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal
process "satisfy the appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14,
99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe
such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as
valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of
justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication
on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such
as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the
right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees;
the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of
trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at
the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also
relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a
catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which
it was deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally — and
representatives of the media — have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees
to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of
enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press
could be eviscerated.
 44

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus,
in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,54 we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in
the records that will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of
the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the
DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State
Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their
26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The
length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of
their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any
member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity.
It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as petitioners
will now have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable cause is not
synonymous with guilt and while the light of publicity may be a good disinfectant of
unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's right to fair trial. Without
imposing on the trial judge the difficult task of supervising every specie of speech relating to
the case at bar, it behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile
criminal cases to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice.55 The Court
reminds judges that our ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in
every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure
fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done — and that is the only way for
the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED
 45

G.R. No. 171465 June 8, 2007

AAA *, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 27, Regional
Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari1 assails the December 16, 20052 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983, dismissing the rape case filed against
private respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack of probable cause; and its February 3, 20063 Order
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center from February
28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a
book to an office located at another building but when she returned to their office, the lights had
been turned off and the gate was closed. Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told her to go
near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the
pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept
and cried out for help but to no avail because there was nobody else in the premises.
Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But when
she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the incident to
her parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.
On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a Resolution4 finding
probable cause and recommending the filing of an information for rape. Arzadon moved for
reconsideration and during the clarificatory hearing held on October 11, 2002, petitioner testified
before the investigating prosecutor. However, she failed to attend the next hearing hence, the case
was provisionally dismissed.
On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint5 with a comprehensive account of the
alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina
Hidalgo. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner appeared for clarificatory questioning. On
June 11, 2003, the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution6 finding that a prima facie case of
rape exists and recommending the filing of the information.
Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be constituted to
review the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after the clarificatory questioning, the
panel issued on October 13, 2003 a Resolution7 finding probable cause and denying Arzadon’s
motion for reconsideration.
An Information8 for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La
Union on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415. Thereafter, Arzadon filed a
"Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court Proceedings Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and
to Determine Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest."9 On March 18, 2004,
respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her
witnesses to take the witness stand for determination of probable cause.
Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause before the
Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas Gutierrez found
no probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case No. 6415.10
Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales
reversed the July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution11 finding that probable cause
exists. Thus, a new Information12 for rape was filed against Arzadon docketed as Criminal Case No.
6983.
 46

Consequently, Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the
Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest."13 In an Order dated August 11, 2005, respondent Judge
Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand.
Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the
documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. Pending resolution
thereof, she likewise filed a petition14 with this Court for the transfer of venue of Criminal Case No.
6983. The case was docketed as Administrative Matter No. 05-12-756-RTC and entitled Re:
Transfer of Venue of Criminal Case No. 6983, formerly Criminal Case No. 6415, from the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando City, La Union, to any Court in Metro Manila.
In a Resolution15 dated January 18, 2006, the Court granted petitioner’s request for transfer of
venue. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-242289. However, the proceedings have been suspended pending the
resolution of this petition.
Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues:16
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND THE
SUBSEQUENT DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED FURTHER ACTS CONSTITUTING GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED
THE COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES TO TAKE THE STAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE REFUSED TO
INHIBIT FROM FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE DESPITE WHISPERS OF DOUBT ON HIS BIAS
AND PARTIALITY
IV
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED THE
ORDER OF FEBRUARY 3, 2006, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, DESPITE
THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 18, 2006, GRANTING THE TRANSFER OF
VENUE
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. She argues that respondent Judge Carbonell should have taken into consideration the
documentary evidence as well as the transcript of stenographic notes which sufficiently established
the existence of probable cause.
Arzadon claims that the petition should be dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of appeal, it
appearing that the issues raised by petitioner properly fall under an action for certiorari under Rule
65, and not Rule 45, of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment17 that the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was justified in requiring petitioner
and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine probable cause.
The issues for resolution are 1) whether the petition should be dismissed for being the wrong mode
of appeal; and 2) whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
The petition has merit.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
in that the former brings up for review errors of judgment while the latter concerns errors of
 47

jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 may be considered a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the
respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions, as in the instant case.18 While
petitioner claims to have brought the instant action under Rule 45, the grounds raised herein involve
an alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Carbonell. Accordingly, the
Court shall treat the same as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, we must point out the procedural error committed by petitioner in directly filing the instant
petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals, thereby violating the principle of judicial
hierarchy of courts. It is well-settled that although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.19 In this case, however, the gravity of the
offense charged and the length of time that has passed since the filing of the complaint for rape,
compel us to resolve the present controversy in order to avoid further delay.20
We thus proceed to the issue of whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
We rule in the affirmative.
Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the
ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the witness stand.
Thus –
In RESUME therefore, as indubitably borne out by the case record and considering that the Private
Prosecutor, despite several admonitions contumaciously nay contemptuously refused to
comply/obey this Court’s Orders of March 18, 2004, August 11, 2005 and eight (8) other similar
Orders issued in open Court that directed the complainant/witnesses to take the witness stand to be
asked probing/clarificatory questions consonant with cited jurisprudential rulings of the Supreme
Court, this Court in the exercise of its discretion and sound judgment finds and so holds that NO
probable cause was established to warrant the issuance of an arrest order and the further
prosecution of the instant case.
Record also shows in no unclear terms that in all the scheduled hearings of the case, the accused
had always been present. A contrario, the private complainant failed to appear during the last four
(4) consecutive settings despite due notice without giving any explanation, which to the mind of the
Court may indicate an apparent lack of interest in the further prosecution of this case. That failure
may even be construed as a confirmation of the Defense’s contention reflected in the case record,
that the only party interested in this case is the Private prosecutor, prodded by the accused’s alleged
hostile siblings to continue with the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for utter lack of probable cause, the instant case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.21
He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar,22 the Court explained that this constitutional
provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses. Thus:
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
 48

cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.23
We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon,24 where we held that before issuing
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused.
In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.
They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to
see if it is supported by substantial evidence.25
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of
probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor.26
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is not
mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence
of probable cause.27 Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should
not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez,28 we stressed that
the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and
the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as
well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.29 If the
report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable
cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be
conducted.
In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 without taking into
consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina
Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005
Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause against
Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof. Respondent judge’s
finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the complainant’s and her witnesses’
absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of
probable cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang Salaysay30 dated July
24, 2002 and Complaint-Affidavit31 dated March 5, 2003. She attended several clarificatory hearings
that were conducted in the instant case. The transcript of stenographic notes32 of the hearing held on
October 11, 2002 shows that she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and the specific time
and place of the incident. She also claimed that she bore a child as a result of the rape and, in
support of her contentions, presented the child and her birth certificate as evidence. In contrast,
Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the weakest of all defenses.
After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause. The gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private
 49

complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.33 Petitioner has categorically stated that Arzadon raped her, recounting her ordeal in detail
during the preliminary investigations. Taken with the other evidence presented before the
investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient for purposes of establishing probable cause. It is well-
settled that a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. 34
It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in dismissing
Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses
failed to take the witness stand. Considering there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record
to support a finding of probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to take the further step of
examining the petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioner’s absences
in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting the case. In fact, the
records show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth.35 As it were, the incidents
of this case have been pending for almost five years without having even passed the preliminary
investigation stage. Suffice to say that the credibility of petitioner may be tested during the trial
where the respective allegations and defenses of the complainant and the accused are properly
ventilated. It is only then that the truth as to Arzadon’s innocence or guilt can be determined.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
Fernando, La Union dated December 16, 2005, and February 3, 2006 dismissing Criminal Case No.
6983 for lack of probable cause are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Information in the said
case is hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila is DIRECTED to take
cognizance of the case and let the records thereof be REMANDED to the said court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 50

G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and
RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry
Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as
well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an
altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at
Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso
reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report
the incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve)
dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render
assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano
Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the
alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police
officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The
petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding,
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified
with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by
overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed
weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation12 on
the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest
took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the
crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest
proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been
performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC
for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
 51

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.17 The CA
ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of
a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of
Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so
that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it
was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the
RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17,
2008;18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A
WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY
WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON
WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever
issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They
even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112,
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police
officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid
warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the
crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against
the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its
resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the
proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this
case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the
Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the
present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current
applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the
1935,20 197321 and 198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great
Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on
the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta
 52

Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain
liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna
Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free
Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no
man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision
does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are
unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test
of reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests.
The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the
Court, were not different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless
arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the
Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as
the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under
statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers
established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a
warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based
on common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then
Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of
public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional
Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113,
Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the present
case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in
its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine
jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
 53

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court

Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on
warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited
Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons
whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the
authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of
confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of
confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption
that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives
sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may
reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try
him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although
no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to
a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested
participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided
that certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and
arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances,
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or
breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons
walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime,
although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for
an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in
believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is
another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if
the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not
necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What
was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act
having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person
sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings
that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the
warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the
arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act
or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless
arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion
(probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated
in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting
officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
 54

B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially
incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably,
the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules,
the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless
arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied
both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has
committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be
actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable
suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has
committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting
officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-
worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In
cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced
under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the
commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just
committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for
purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
 55

Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of
Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by
the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be
arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the
arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests
based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the
element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and
the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable
cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting
officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of
determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable.
According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth Amendment
limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is
not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and
"reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis
supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in
a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a
warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the
arrest and not on the information acquired later.56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and
practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic
question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular
offense involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession,
his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the
requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
 56

suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal
knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a
crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held
for triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet
tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient
that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of
arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or
reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer
arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial,
as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable
cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the
available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the
 57

same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as
set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination
of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their
determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in
warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that
one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but
must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence
shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the
warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was
only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis
of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo
Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of
facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless
arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a
threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was
dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid
considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the
information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards
the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been
committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense
was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the
arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he
was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter.
Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime.
Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway
tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only
on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was
held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had
no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the
victim. The information upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to
 58

take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of
the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In
this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of
his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and
his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of
the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The
warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received
information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting
officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the
man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v.
Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the
crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after
the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of
the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the
warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately
responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort
Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the
group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was
valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was
then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the
radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the
report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search
of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements
of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the
arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does
not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa
Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the
incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita
III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria
looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria
requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be
involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his
residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III
opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers
confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to
get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the
offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. However,
we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. "
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or
 59

observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has
not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the
determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This
required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts
or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police
officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained
after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the
crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated
and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element
of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or
uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard
for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless
arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be
present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the
arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be
determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the
existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of
compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with,
namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer
have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and
3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the
petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted
murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in
its decision.81From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in
effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the
facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the
warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged
crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police
Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20,
2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one
hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place
two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.
 60

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the
scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered
blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that
they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by
East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty.
Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings:
"Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital
hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth
digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no
visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of
contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than
one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty.
Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the
same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting
officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
narrated a different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the
time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time
of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are
within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty.
Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the
persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners
agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but
voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even
admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another
version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to
consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination
of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately
dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact
alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that
a crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a
crime had been committed. 1âw phi1

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that
the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its
occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation
that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper.
 61

Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the
circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second
issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint
of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the
intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to
apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police
station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be
an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired
personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the
petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in
connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the
time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station
for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners'
urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the
evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and
convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to
pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in
resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed
evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in
the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is
only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only
prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the
validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY
the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April
17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is
hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED
62