Case 1
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of
the Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Phil-
ippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern,
the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and fur-
nish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of
public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be
declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the
MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to in-
formation on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation un-
der RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivi-
sion not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to con-
form to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Lib-
eration Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the
respondents to consult the local government units or communi-
ties affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded
their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to
the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of para-
mount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court
grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal
stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
1
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our con-
stitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the
dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not ne-
gate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Con-
stitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions in-
volving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consulta-
tion under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty
of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information neces-
sitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure de-
rive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declar-
ing that the right to information contemplates steps and negotia-
tions leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence
finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consul-
tations on both national and local levels and for a principal fo-
rum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presiden-
tial Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to
seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommenda-
tions from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivi-
sion not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an as-
sociated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is rec-
ognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship
with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies pow-
ers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to
any local or regional government. It also implies the recogni-
tion of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, how-
ever, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transi-
tory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory
for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous
region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an ex-
panded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with
the national government being fundamentally different from that
of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it
meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined ter-
ritory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations
with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not neces-
sarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animat-
ing it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of as-
sociation – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the na-
tional government and the BJE being itself contrary to the pre-
sent Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the
BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE
is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming
that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the consti-
tutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in
conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to con-
form to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD
requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal frame-
work,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accom-
modate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed
to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in
her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution.
Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing
her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend pro-
posed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper proce-
dure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere rec-
ommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
2
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to pro-
pose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any
third party that the required amendments will eventually be
put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most
she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations ei-
ther to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are
vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Lib-
eration Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of
all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines
“Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their
spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of
the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally under-
stood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of
choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this free-
dom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The
MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro
people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties
to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not
form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and de-
lineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things,
the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the In-
digenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably,
the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any gov-
ernment agency the power to delineate and recognize an ances-
tral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations be-
foreany project or program critical to the environment and hu-
man ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in such locality, is imple-
mented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that une-
quivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to
the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of in-
habitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed
grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the perti-
nent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic
Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process
by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsi-
cal, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a vir-
tual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitu-

tion and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very con-
cept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envi-
sioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for
the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.

3
Case 2 archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters
MAGALONA VS ERMITA enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool
G.R. No. 187167 16Aug2011 to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental
Prof. Merlin Magalona, et al., Petitioners, Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit def-
vs inition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita in his capacityas Executive Secretary, et
al., Respondents.

Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to com-
ply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on Feb-
ruary 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA
9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the
national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular ar-
guments are as follows:
1st RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically,
the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in viola-
tion of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
2nd RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, un-
dermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, con-
Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory
Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continen-
tal Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Terri-
tory. It is a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime
zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation
of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental
shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal wa-
ters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as af-
firmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic
State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by
the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic
sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic wa-
ters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed
and subsoil and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mech-
anisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimita-
tions. It serves as a notice to the international family of states
and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlarge-
ment or diminution of territories.

travening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging

marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional pro-

visions.

3rd RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not

only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prej-

udices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and pro-
hibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines
and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline
Law is unconstitutional.

Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archi-
pelagic doctrine, which we connect the outermost points of our

4
Case 4
G.R. No. L-32052
65 SCRA 416
July 25, 1975

Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration

Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for

their alleged overtime services (in excess of their 8 regular hours
a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

 Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by

another shall not be of more than eight (8) hours daily.


Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and ju-

risdiction.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the cor-

poration is exercising governmental functions and is therefore ex-
empt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC
and CA. Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not

proprietary functions and is exempt from CA No. 444.

HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government

required to support its people and promote their general welfare.
This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government
necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the gen-
eral welfare.

The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and
ministrant functions, which the Chief Justice points out, is al-
ready irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He
says that "The growing complexities of modern society have ren-
dered this traditional classification of the functions of government
obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant
functions is now considered obsolete.

The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Mo-
tion for Reconsideration be DENIED.

5
Csse 5

ACCFA Vs CUGCO EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969

FACTS:
ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No. 821, as
amended. Its administrative machinery was reorganized and its
named changed to Agricultural Credit Administration under the
Land Reform Code or RA 3844. ACCFA Supervisors' Associa-
tion and the ACCFA Workers' Association were referred to as
Union in the ACCFA.

The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining

agreement effective for a period of one year. Few months have
passed, however,The Unions, together with the CUGCO, filed a
complaint against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed
acts of unfair labor practices and non implementation of said
agreement. Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to
cease from committing further acts tending to discourage the Un-
ion members in the exercise of their right to self-organizatoin, to
comply with and implement the provisions of the CBA, and to
bargain with good faith with the complainants. ACCFA moved to
reconsider but it was turned down in a resolution. ACCFA ap-
pealed by certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental functions.

RULING:
Yes. The implementation of the land reform program of the gov-
ernment according to Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a
governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for that purpose
Executive Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Re-
form Project Administration.

The law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with
the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer
in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the
National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumen-
tality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and
to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries,
any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its func-
tions

6
GP VS MONTE DE PIEDAD
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, repre-
sented by the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appel-
lee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MA-
NILA, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines some-
times in 1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000 were col-
lected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of
an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched.
The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more
working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer
of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte
de Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to
comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Fi-
nance had the right to order the reimbursement.
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to
file the case as parens patriae in representation of the legitimate
claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public in-
terests, where no other person is entrusted with it.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal
person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions,
and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity,
and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capa-
ble of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to
the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that
this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the
change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it
now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into
exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right,
and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as
in any other cases whatever.

On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Is-

lands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the
Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with in-
terest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due
trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum
of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together
with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the
cause.

The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made

by the defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff
(government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could
be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by
their heirs.

Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a
complaint against the respondent bank for the reimbursement of
the money of the intended beneficiaries?

Discussions:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The govern-
ment being the protector of the rights of the people has the inher-
ent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the
public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right
hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to
take back the money intended for the people.

Rulings:

7
 case 7

San Juan Dela Cruz vs Gracia, GR 177728

enie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capac-
ity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the
document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Fa-
ther (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signa-
ture of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of
wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and
has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.”

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/reg-

istration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if
Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwrit-
ten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recog-
nition of paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the de-
ceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a recogni-
tion of paternity.

RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, per-
mits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if
the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten in-
strument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must
be a signature by the putative father in the private handwritten
instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the

signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or il-
legitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece

of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied

by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and hand-
written by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative
of such other evidence.

8
Case 8
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISIONGR No. L-1648 August 17, 1949PEDRO
S !UIA, GON"ALO S !UIA, AND LEOPOLDO S !UIA,
PETITIONERS,VNATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPE", #UDGE
O$ MUNICIPAL COURT O$ MANILA, CONRADO V.
SANC%E",#UDGE O$ COURT O$ $IRST INSTANCE
O$ MANILA, GEORGE $. MOORE ET AL., RESPOND-
ENTS
.
$&'ts
The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all sur-
named Syquia, are the undivided ointo!ners of three apartment
buildin"s situated in the #ity of Manila $no!n as the %orth
Syquia &partments,South Syquia &partments and Michel &part-
ments located at ''(' M. ). del Pilar, ''*' M. ). del Pilar andat ''++
&. Mabini streets, respectively.&bout the middle of the year ' -
*, said plaintiffs e ecuted three lease contracts in favor of
the/nited States of &merica. The term or period for the
three leases !as to be 0for the duration of the !ar andsi months
thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the /nited States of &mer-
ica.0 The apartment buildin"s !ere used for billetin" and quar-
terin" officers of the /. S. armed forces stationed in the Ma-
nila area.The petitioners filed before the Municipal #ourt of Ma-
nila an action for unla!ful detainer1desahucio2 a"ainst Moore
and Tillman and the 3- persons occupyin" apartments. The Mu-
nicipal #ourtdismissed the action !ith costs a"ainst the plaintiff
on the "round that the matter included or involved in theaction
should be a proper sub ect matter of representations bet!een the
Government of the /nited Statesof &merica and the Philip-
pines.The #ourt of 4irst 5nstance of Manila affirmed the order of
the municipal court dismissin" plaintiffs6complaint on the
"round that said suit must be re"arded as one a"ainst the /nited
States Governmentitself, !hich cannot be sued !ithout its consent,
specially by the citizens of another country.The #ounsel for the
petitioners insisted before the Supreme #ourt that the latter
should render adecision,
on the merits, particularly on the question of urisdiction of the
Municipal #ourt over the ori"inal action, notonly for the satisfac-
tion of the parties involved but also to serve as a "uide in future
cases involvin" cases of similarnature such as contracts of lease
entered into bet!een the Government of the /nited States of
&merica on one sideand 4ilipino citizens on the other re"ardin"
properties of the latter.
Issu(s
7hether or not the decision of %&T5859&9 &LM:9& L;P:<,
=/9G: ;4 M/%5#5P&L #;/RT ;4M&%5L&
and #;%R&9; 8. S&%#):<, =/9G: ;4 #;/RT ;4 45RST 5%ST&%#
: ;4 M&%5L&constitutional or not.
Ru)*+g
The Supreme #ourt found that the
Municipal #ourt of Manila committed no error in dismissin" the
casefor lac$ of urisdiction and that the #ourt of 4irst 5nstance
acted correctly in affirmin" the municipal court>s order ofd-
ismissal. case dismissed, !ithout pronouncements as to costs.

9
Case 8

Pedro Syquia et. al. vs. Natividad Almeda Lopez, Et. al. G.R.
No. L-1648 August 17, 1949

Facts: Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint

owners of properties in Manila, namely, the North Qyauia Apart-
ments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In
1945, they executed contracts for lease of the apartments to
USA, with the term being until the war has ended and six months
after, or unless terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings were
used for billeting and quartering officers of te US armed forces
stationed in the Manila Area. George Moore, a Commanding
General of the US Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief of the Real
Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who was under the
command of Moore, was said to be in control of the apartment
buildings and had authority in the name of USA to assign offic-
ers of the army to the buildings or order them to vacuate the
same. When Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, the lease
would be terminated six months after. The petitioners ap-
proached the predecessors of Moore and Tillman and requested
the buildings to be returned to them, as per contract agreement.
However, they were advised that the US Army wanted to con-
tinue their occupancy of the buildings, and refused to execute
new leases but advised that they will vacate the premises before
February 1, 1947, not the original terms of the contract agree-
ment. Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of
Manila with the demand to get the properties as their agreement
supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals
until the premises were vacated. Respondent-defendants were
part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the suit for
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The MC of Manila
granted the motion to dismiss the suit, sustained by the CFI of
Manila, hence the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction,

considering, under the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, that
USA has not given their consent to be a respondent.

Ruling: The case was dismissed, the Supreme Court affirming in

majority the decision of the Municipal Court of Manila.

Reason: Considering the circumstances, the real defendant party

is the United States of America, as it was the U.S. Army who
were occupying the buildings, with the rent being paid for by
their government. USA has not given their consent to be sued in
this case, and any action against them without the consent would
constitue a lack of jurisdiction.

10
 Case 9

Mijares v. Ranada Recognition of Foreign Judgments

SEPTEMBER 3, 2018

FACTS:

Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human

rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the
hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime,
filed with the US District Court, Hawaii, against the Estate Fer-
dinand E. Marcos.

Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a Final Judgment

and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor
of the plaintiff class with an award of a total of One Billion Nine
Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty
Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90)

The present petitioners filed Complaint with the Makati RTC for
the enforcement of the Final Judgment.

Respondent Judge Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the sub-

ject Orderdismissing the complaint without prejudice. He opined
that the subject matter of the complaint was capable of pecuniary
estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court
ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for
easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment.

The RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approx-
imately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obvi-
ously had not been paid.

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary esti-

mation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a
foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of
money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to re-
quire the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Mil-
lion Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and
render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of
Court, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.

ISSUE:

What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the fil-

ing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?

RULING:

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Respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he con-
cluded that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the
schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to
a claim against an estate based on judgment.

A proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a

foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.

The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have es-

tablished a usage among civilized states by which final judg-
ments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that
may vary in different countries.

The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition

and enforcement of a foreign judgment has remained un-
changed.

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment

of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pro-
nounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is

conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is pre-

sumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their suc-
cessors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by ev-

idence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, col-
lusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an

action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the for-
eign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing,
while in an action inpersonam, the foreign judgment is presump-
tive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to

defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local fo-
rum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to chal-
lenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdic-
tion to properly determine its efficacy.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the

burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

Petition is GRANTED.

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