PUBLIC CORP FINALS TRANSCRIPT
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
QUALIFICATIONS
Section 39. Qualifications. –
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-one (23) years of age on
election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities,
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on
election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age
but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
2005 Bar: In the May 8, 1995 election for local officials whose terms were to commence on June
30, 1995, Ricky filed on March 20, 1995 his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Governor of
Laguna. He won, but his qualifications as an elected official was questioned. It is admitted that he
is repatriated Filipino citizen and a resident of the Province of Laguna. To be qualified for the office
to which a local official has been elected, when at the latest should he:
(a) A Filipino citizen? Explain.
(b) A resident of the locality? Explain.
→ Answer:
- Question (a): The citizenship requirement in the LGC refer to that of “Elective” officials,
not of “Candidates”, hence, this qualification needs to be possessed by the official not at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy but at the time of the commencement of
office, after he takes his oath of office and assumes his post. (Frivaldo case)
*FRIVALDO DOCTRINE – the date of repatriation shall retroact to the date of the
application for repatriation.
- Question (b): The term residence is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention, at least 1 year immediately preceding the election.
(Gallego case)
• Qualifications:
a) Citizen of the Philippines
By: RLB
b) Registered voter in the locality/district where he intends to be elected
c) Resident in the locality/district where he intends to be elected at least 1 year immediately
preceding the election
d) Able to read and write Filipino or any local language or dialect.
e) Age: 23, 21, 18, 15-18
A. Citizenship
→ Natural-born; or
→ Naturalized
NOTE: citizenship requirement does not specify that the local elective official be a natural
born, unlike the President, VP, Senators, House of Representatives, Justices of the SC,
Ombudsman and the members of the Constitutional Commissions that they must be natural-
born Filipinos. In the case of local elective officials, it is not required. So even if a naturalized
Filipino can be a mayor.
• Frivaldo vs Comelec
- The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).
- So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be
noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of
"ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be
required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise
expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be
possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time
he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Thus,
if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to
another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the
elected official and at the start of his term.
- Therefore, the citizenship requirement in the LGC is to be possessed by an elective
official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of
office to which he has been elected. Registration under PD 725 (Repatriation) is
valid and effective and retroacts to the date of the application. Thus, Frivaldo’s
repatriation is to be given effect as of the date of his application therefor.
B. Residence (Residence is synonymous with “domicile” in election laws.)
→ Residence: (1) temporary – physical presence for particular or temporary purpose or
calling; or (2) permanent
→ Domicile: permanent (coupled with animus manendi)
• When is residence temporary or permanent?
- Residence is temporary depending on the purpose. It’s not the length but the
purpose.
o If the purpose for being there physically is temporary, then that place is
your temporary residence. A purpose is temporary if there is a
definite beginning and a definite end, such as:
- studying (from enrollment to graduation, unless otherwise
expelled earlier. haha)
- business
- exercise of profession
- working abroad looking for greener pasture.

o Otherwise, it is permanent. SC said that a permanent undertaking or
purpose is to live in a family or conjugal dwelling (because “till death do
us part” mana dili mana “till annulment, do us part.”)
→ For purposes of Election Law, there are 2 kinds of domicile:
(1) Domicile of origin – domicile of your parents at the time of your birth.
(2) Domicile of choice – when you change your domicile of origin and acquire a
new one, then that is now your domicile of choice.
*VERY IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE: there can only be one domicile at a time. But there can be
two ore more residences at a time.
MCQ Problem: X, a natural-born Filipino citizen, studied law in the University of San Carlos in
Cebu City from 1990 until 1994. He became a member of the Philippine Bar in 1995. In 1998,
he went to Harvard University in the USA and studied Master of Laws (LLM) in International
Law. (murag educational background lagi ni Atty. DBL aaaai..) He finished his LLM-
International Law degree in 2001 after which he worked as paralegal of an American law firm
specializing in International Law practice until 2007. In 2008, he came back to the Philippines
and is now contemplating of running for Governor in the Province of Cebu in the 2013 local
elections. What should X prove in order to establish that he has complied with the residence
requirement? Answer: C
A. Physical presence in Cebu Province since 2008, animus manendi in the
Philippines, and animus non-revertendi to the US;
B. Physical presence in the Philippines since 2008, animus manendi in the
Philippines, animus revertendi in the Philippines;
C. Animus manendi in the Philippines and animus revertendi to the Philippines;
D. Animus manendi in the Philippines and animus non-reventendi to the US.
Example: Assuming Mr. Tiu is married, his wife and children resides in Surigao City but Mr.
Tiu is living in Cebu City to study law. Assuming he is already a lawyer, he plans to run for
Mayor of Surigao City. His opponent questioned his candidacy and argued that Mr. Tiu is not
anymore a residence of Surigao City because you have acquired a new residence, Cebu City.
What does Mr. Tiu needs to establish in order to qualify to run for Mayor in Surigao City?
Answer: Mr. Tiu has to established non-abandonment of domicile. And it would
require facts to established such non-abandonment, such as: (1) I have not
abandoned my domicile in Surigao City because my wife is still there (although I
hate her) and I still have my children there in Surigao City; (2) We still have our
conjugal dwelling and business in Surigao City.
And in contrast, while I am physically here in Cebu City, I have not performed acts
indicative of the intention to live permanently in Cebu City because of the following:
(1) I’m just residing in an apartment, so it’s temporary because it is an apartment;
(2) I have not acquired big assets, I have not transferred my business here.
• Proof of Non-Abandonement of Domicile
- Animus manendi (the intent to live permanently) and
- Animus revertindi (the intention to return to the domicile, meaning, this
presupposes that you have been absent for a while)
Another Example: In lieu with the previous example, instead of running for mayor in
Surigao City, Mr. Tiu is now running for Mayor in Cebu City. His opponent in Cebu is
questioning his residency and Mr. Tiu that he is actually a resident of Surigao City. Therefore,
By: RLB
Mr. Tiu is disqualified to run for Mayor in Cebu City. What does Mr. Tiu needs to establish in
order to qualify to run for Mayor in Cebu City?
Answer: No, I have abandoned Surigao City already. Wai ayu ang Surigao City.
Because (1) I am in actual physical presence in the new domicile, evidenced by a
certification issued by the Brgy. Captain showing that I have a residence and
community tax; (2) I have acquired a new residential house, an indication that I
intent to live permanently in Cebu City; (3) I have asked my family to come live
with me in Cebu City and I have sold my conjugal dwelling and business in Surigao
City, showing my intention not to go back there.
• Proof of Abandonment of Old Domicile (Gallego vs Romualdez Case):
- Actual physical presence in the new domicile
- Animus manendi in the new domicile, and
- Animus non-revertendi (intention not to return) to domicle of origin
*Rest house is not proof of the intent to live permanently, on the contrary, it is proof of
intent not to live permanently. No matter how long you stay in a rest house, it shall
never be considered as a domicile. Why? The purpose of going to a rest house is TO
REST. It’s not permanent, it’s temporary. (The only permanent purpose that has to do
with rest is rest in peace. HAHA) – Domino vs Comelec
• Faypon vs Quirino
- Mere absence from one's residence of origin – domicile – to pursue studies, engage
in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or
loss of such residence. The determination of a person's legal residence or domicile
largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and
utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or lost his residence
of origin must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss. A
previous registration as voter in a municipality other than that in which he is elected
is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.
- A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for “greener pastures”, as the
saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held,
the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot, but for professional or business reasons, or for any
other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his professional or
business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has the qualifications to be
one and it not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who
are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration,
the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, has not
forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire
and longing of every person to return to the place of his birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one’s birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another.
• Coquilla vs Comelec
- The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring
to "dwelling" or "habitation", but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain (animus manendi)." A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the
same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

- naturalization in foreign country results in abandonment of residency, not citizenship
because of RA 9225
• Caasi vs CA
- immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to
reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines.
• S. Jalosjos vs Comelec
- To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place
where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere
purchase of a parcel of land does not make it one's residence. The fact that the
residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction
on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical
residence in the barangay.
- A temporary stay in a stranger's house cannot amount to residence. Petitioner's stay
in the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray was only a temporary and intermittent
stay that does not amount to residence. It was never the intention of petitioner to
reside in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times when she was in
Baliangao while her house was being constructed. Her temporary stay in Brgy.
Punta Miray cannot be counted as residence in Baliangao.
- Approval of voter registration does not presupposes six-month residency in the
place prior to registration. It is not conclusive and at best, the approval of her
registration as a voter carries a presumption that the registrant will be able to meet
the six-month residency requirement for the elections in which the registrant
intends to vote. It does not prove that the registrant has resided in the locality for
more than one year prior to the elections.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Additional Disqualifications:
R.A. 8295 (Lone Candidate Law): Section 4. Disqualification – In addition to the
disqualifications mentioned in Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 40 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, whenever the evidence of
guilt is strong, the following persons are disqualified to run in a special election called to fill the
vacancy in an elective office, to wit:
By: RLB
h) Any elective official who has resigned from his office by accepting an appointive office
or for whatever reason which he previously occupied but has caused to become vacant
due to his resignation; and
i) Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses, intimidates
or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage,
loss or disadvantage to any person or persons aspiring to become a candidate or that of
the immediate member of his family, his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all
other potential candidate.
ü Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code – insane, incompetents, guilty of acts of disloyalty to the
government, etc…
ü Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code – vote buying, acts of terrorism, and other election
offenses
ü Sec. 69, Omnibus Election Code – Nuisance candidate
→ The disqualifications of elective officials and candidate are not exclusively listed in the
LGC. Section 40 of the LGC is not the only source of grounds for disqualifications. There
are many other laws that also provide for disqualification.
Problem: In 2008, X was convicted of Violation of BP Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and was
sentenced to serve a maximum six months of imprisonment. X wants to run for Governor of the
Province of Cebu in the 2013 elections.
A. Is X disqualified to run for local position by reason of his conviction?
B. Will your answer be the same if X had instead applied for and was granted probation?
→ Answer:
- Question A: Section 40(a) of the LGC states that those persons sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence is
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
But the problem is silent if the conviction is by final judgment. And the phrase “was
sentenced to serve” does not mean he actually served the sentence. SO QUALIFY
NALANG KA SA IMUNG ANSWER…
Assuming that there was no appeal, and he in fact served the sentence, he is disqualified
because BP Blg. 22 is a violation involving moral turpitude, as held in Moreno vs
Comelec.
- Question B: Moreno vs Comelec — An order/grant placing defendant on probation is
not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. The
period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the
sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of
probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely
required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.
A. Sentenced by final judgment for (1) offense involving moral turpitude or (2) offense
punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after service of sentence.
→ The disqualification applies if there is service of sentence and is good only for 2 years
after service of sentence. NOT PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION.
→ If you get convicted with a crime involving moral turpitude by final judgment and after
serving the sentence, the disqualification extends to 2 years after serving of sentence. It
means that after 2 years, you become qualified to run.

→ Also, if you have been sentenced with final judgment of an offense with a penalty of “1
year or more” and after service of sentence, the disqualification stays for 2 years. After
that, you become qualified.
→ The phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" is interpreted and understood
to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the
comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of
the Local Government Code.
• Meaning of Moral Turpitude
-­‐ Defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals;
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
-­‐ Whether it is “malum prohibitum” or “malum in se”, it is not the test.
• Examples of MORAL TURPITUDE crimes:
→ Hanrieder vs De Rivera (Bouncing Checks Law)
- The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for disciplinary action. The Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service states that conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a grave offense and upon the first offense, the
penalty of dismissal must be meted out. Further, this Court characterized the
violation of B.P. 22 as a crime involving moral turpitude because in issuing a
check with the knowledge of insufficiency of funds, it is a showing of a lack of
moral values.
→ De la Torre vs Comelec (Anti-Fencing Law)
- Dili ni katung anti-fencing that you cannot construct a fence without permit.
Kabaw namu unsa ni… It’s is a crime involving moral turpitude.
- Petitioner's conviction of fencing, which we have heretofore declared as a
crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification
found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a
criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation,
although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.
• Effect of Probation – refer to Moreno vs Comelec
-­‐ If you apply for probation, the consequence is you do not serve your sentence.
Thus, according the Supreme Court, the period of disqualification could not even
begin to run.
Question: If you get convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and this crime is
punished the RPC with a penalty that carries an accessory penalty of absolute perpetual
disqualification to hold public office. So 2 years after serving your sentence, are you qualified
to run?
→ Jalosjos vs Comelec (June 18, 2013)
- Art. 40 of the LGC and Perpetual Disqualification to Hold Office under RPC
- While Section 40 (a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective
office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence,
the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law
imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of
disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.
- Section 40 (a) of the LGC refers to a temporary disqualification and SC has
qualified such temporary disqualification by the RPC. Therefore, if the penalty
By: RLB
imposed, either as perpetual or accessory, is a PERPETUAL
DISQUALIFICATION to hold office, it is a permanent disqualification.
B. Removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
→ The removal contemplated here means that it is an administrative penalty. The official
has been removed because he was disciplined and punished. E.g. misconduct and other
disciplinary grounds. (murag mugawas jud ni sa exam kay ana xa, “aku class kay honest
man ku, aku g.present ni daan pra ig.exam kay wa’i mahayay. Wa na jud ku’i sala ana.
HAHAHAH)
→ Excluded in this situation is when you’re removed from office if, for example, assuming
there’s a case pending against the official by the COMELEC, and you were ordered to
vacate the office because of the rule that you are disqualified to hold office, it’s not a
removal as a result of an administrative case.
Problem: X, was the City attorney of Cebu City in 1985. He was accused of having received
bribes from businessmen in exchange for favorable legal opinions. Mayor Y initiated an
administrative case that resulted to the removal of X, sometime in 1988. X, who had been
living a private life since 1988, is now planning to run for Mayor for the City of Cebu in the
2013 elections against Mayor Z, the incumbent mayor and son of Mayor Y. Mayor Z is
questioning his eligibility on the ground that he was earlier removed form office as a result of
an administrative case. X counter-argued that the disqualification will not apply to him
because he was removed from an “appointive”, not from an “elective” office (OBO).
→ At the time an official is removed, is it necessary to determine whether he is holding
an elective position? NO. Because the provision only states, “removed from office”,
and SC said it could be ANY office, whether elective or appointive. Further, SC held
the provision under Article 40 (b) of the LGC is a new provision, hence, it cannot be
given retroactive application. Therefore, if the candidate was earlier removed before
the effectivity of the 1991 LGC, the said disqualification will not apply to him. But
the if the candidate was removed from office during the effectivity of the LGC, the
disqualification applies.
• Prospective application, thus, only applicable to those persons removed from office as
a result of an administrative case during the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, meaning if
removed from office as a result of an administrative case before the LGC of 1991, it’s not
a ground for disqualification.
→ Grego vs Comelec
- There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same
operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code is not applicable to the present case." (Underscoring
supplied). That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date
of a candidate's removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense
should not deter us from applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in
legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively
provides the qualification sought by petitioner. A statute, despite the generality
in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or
matters, which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The
law looks forward, not backward.
• Any “office” – whether removed from an office held as an elective or appointive official
because what’s important is you’ve been removed as a result of an administrative case.
→ Osorio vs Comelec
- Article 40 (b) of the LGC states "removed from office" without any
qualification. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that when the law
does not distinguish, we must not distinguish, in accordance with the maxim
ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

C. Convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
→ Espionage; Rebellion; Coup d’état; Sedition; Treason.
→ Apparently the Court has not enumerated all offenses or crimes that belong to crimes
involving oath of allegiance.
D. Those with dual citizenship
→ Dual citizenship here means dual allegiance. It is dual allegiance that is declared by the
Constitution as inimical to the national interest, not dual citizenship, and must be dealt
with by law. Indeed there is danger in having a person showing dual allegiance, naa man
gali na ang danger sa husband showing dual allegiance, dba? Kana na nuon national
security matters.
• 3 ways of Naturalization in the Philippines:
1) Judicial – go to court, but expensive and lengthy process because you have
a lot of expenses and must comply with the residency requirement of 10 years
or 5 years, as the case maybe. And after judgment, there is a 2 year-probation
before the judgment becomes final.
2) Direct act of Congress – quick but most expensive because nothing will
happen to your request if you don’t ask a congressman to faithfully and
expeditiously process such bill to confirm citizenship to an individual. In short,
mag.under the table ka sa congressman kay you cannot have it all man jud
class. Give and take situation. You want it done swiftly, you pay.
3) Administrative – (applicable only to aliens or foreigners born in the
Philippines and have been residing in the Philippines since birth) Go to the
special committee of naturalization at the office of immigration. Not so
expensive because the filing fee is only 40K then 20K for each beneficiaries,
like if a spouse or minor children will also acquire citizenship, otherwise called
derivative citizenship;
• Mercado vs Manzano
-­‐ Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such
a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine
of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause
(Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to posses dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers' country such children are citizens of that
country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
-­‐ Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. With
respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
By: RLB
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
-­‐ The phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) must be understood
as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status,
for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, pointed
out: "Dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of
the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother.
But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something
completely beyond our control." By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates
at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the
point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
-­‐ By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen.
• There are at least 2 ways by which a person can acquire dual citizenship:
a) By birth – where there is a concurring application of jus soli and jus sanguini
principles
b) Apply for naturalization in the foreign country and before availing of RA
9225 (Dual Citizenship Reacquisition Retention Act of 2003)
*RA 9225:
-­‐ elements—(1) former natural-born Filipino; (2) apply for
naturalization in a foreign country; (3) take oath of allegiance
-­‐ are deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, and can
require it by taking the oath of allegiance
-­‐ What necessarily is the consequence to the 2nd citizenship when the
person takes his oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when our laws
do not have any effect at all on foreign laws? Dba? So it is still
possible to have, technically, dual citizenship.
• Cordora vs Comelec
-­‐ Tambunting has dual citizenship. His trips showed that he is both American and
Filipino. (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes
of citizens of the Philippines opposes dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that
country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission theyare
deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
-­‐ Dual Citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running from any elective
local position.
-­‐ Dual Citizenship is different from Dual Allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary and
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
This means that a person who has dual citizenship already acquired both
citizenships since birth. No act done to acquire the citizenship Like any other

natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public
office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance
contained therein. Dual allegiance is brought about by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization process. Tambunting did not fail to meet the
residency requirement. The residency requirement is not dependent upon
citizenship.
• Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013; July 2, 2013)
-­‐ The use of foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one's nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
-­‐ By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself
as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America.
-­‐ The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
-­‐ This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is fatal
to Arnado's bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to
run for an elective local position.
-­‐ Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired
through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the
oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization,
on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in
order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
-­‐ This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read
together with Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code which disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy
that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport — which indicates the recognition of a foreign
state of the individual as its national — even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
E. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political crimes here or abroad
→ includes “fugitives from prosecution” – those who flee after the charge to avoid
prosecution, which involves a question of intent
• Fugitive from justice can be interpreted in 2 ways:
a. Flee to avoid prosecution
b. Flee to evade punishment
Problem: X was an accountant of a private company in California, USA. The Company, after
suffering from huge losses, decided to close its business last January 2012. X decided to go
back to the Philippines and booked last March 2012 a ticket for a September 9, 2012 trip to
the Philippines. In April of 2012, X accepted a part-time job from ABC Financing Company in
California. X arrived in the Philippines last September 10, 2012 and is now planning to run for
Governor in the Province of Cebu next year.
A. Assume that a case for Estafa was filed by ABC Financing against X on September
20, 2012.
By: RLB
B. Assume that a case for Estafa was filed by ABC Financing against X on September 8,
2012.
Answer: Rodriguez vs Comelec
-­‐ A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." The
definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be
an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the
fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.
-­‐ Fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person
seeking to run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in the
MARQUEZ Decision, to wit: "A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution." Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must
therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at
least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive
from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
gubernatorial post.
*So apparently, even if you have received a demand letter stating that “you hereby being
asked to return the misappropriated amount of 1M USD. And you don’t answer the
demand letter and you booked a flight, go back to the Philippines, you did not even know
that a charge was filed against you. Do you think that’s a sound threshold that there
must be a charge? Then you have to establish knowledge? In order to connect that the
purpose of the flight was really to avoid prosecution? YES.
ü Narrow application of the Principle of Fugitive from Justice
(1) There must first be a charge
(2) There is the act of fleeing
(3) Then you establish knowledge that the act of fleeing is because of
the indictment
F. Permanent Residents in foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code
→ Another disqualification is when you acquire permanent immigrant status abroad.
G. The insane and the feeble-minded.
→ You know these people. IT TAKES ONE TO KNOW ONE. HAHAHA
VERY IMPORTANT: The disqualifications in Section 40 are CONTINUING disqualifications. It’s not
that you only consider Section 40 upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy because these are
continuing.
Example: So even if during his first term X was eligible, but in the middle of his term he acquired
permanent immigrant status in the US or became insane. Then he is now susceptible to a quo
warranto case filed against him because he becomes ineligible already.
Question: What about ecclesiastic? Are they qualified or disqualified? – DISQUALFIED. But what
about Ed Panlilio? Why did he became Governor? Being governor is not a municipal official while
the Admin Code refers to municipal office.
→ In the old Administrative Code, there was a provision, Section 2175, that states that “in
no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office: (1) ecclesiastics; (2)

soldiers in active service; (3) persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial
or national funds; or (4) contractors for public works of the municipality.”
• Pamil vs Teleron
-­‐ The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible
ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the
religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a
religious test. Being an ecclesiastic, therefore, professing a religious faith suffices to
disqualify for a public office.
MANNER OF ELECTION
Section 41. Manner of Election. –
(a) The governor, vice-governor, city mayor, city vice-mayor, municipal mayor, municipal
vice-mayor, and punong barangay shall be elected at large in their respective units by
the qualified voters therein. However, the sangguniang kabataan chairman for each
barangay shall be elected by the registered voters of the katipunan ng kabataan, as
provided in this Code.
(b) The regular members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
and sangguniang bayan shall be elected by district, as may be provided for by law.
Sangguniang barangay members shall be elected at large. The presidents of the
leagues of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall
serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. The
presidents of the "liga ng mga barangay and the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan" elected by their respective chapters, as provided in this Code, shall serve as ex
officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and
sangguniang bayan.
(c) In addition thereto, there shall be one (1) sectoral representative from the women,
one (1) from the workers, and one (1) from any of the following sectors: the urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, disabled persons, or any other sector as may be
determined by the sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days prior to the
holding of the next local elections as may be provided for by law. The COMELEC
shall promulgate the rules and regulations to effectively provide for the election of such
sectoral representatives.
RA 8553 - Section 1. Sec. 41(b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows:
(b) The regular members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
and sangguniang bayan shall be elected by district as follows:
- First and second-class provinces shall have ten (10) regular members;
- third and fourth-class provinces, eight (8);
- fifth and sixth-class provinces, six (6):
Provided, That in provinces having more than five (5) legislative districts, each
district shall have two (2) sangguniang panlalawigan members, without
prejudice to the provisions of Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 6637.
Sangguniang barangay members shall be elected at large. The presidents of the leagues
of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall serve as ex officio
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. The presidents of the liga ng mga
barangay and the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan elected by their respective
By: RLB
chapters, as provided in this Code, shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan.
• LCE and Vice – at large
• Sanggunian Members of Province, City and Municipality – by district
• Sanggunian Members of Barangay – at large
DATE OF ELECTION
Section 42. Date of Election. –
Unless otherwise provided by law, the elections for local officials shall be held every three
(3) years on the second Monday of May
→ Schedule: Every 3 years on the 2nd Monday of May, unless otherwise provided for by law.
→ For Local Elections: the constitutional mandate is synchronization of local and national
elections. (Kida vs Senate case)
TERM OF OFFICE
Constitution: Section 8, Article 10 – The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
*Thus, involuntary relinquishment of office is considered an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
RA 8524 -
Section 1. Sec. 43 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 43. Term of office. –
(a) The term of office of all elective officials elected after the effectivity of this
Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such
date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials
and members of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, That all local officials
first elected during the local elections immediately following the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of
barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, That the
sangguniang kabataan members who were elected in the May 1996 elections
shall serve until the next regular election of barangay officials.
RA 9164 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN
ELECTIONS, AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991", AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 2. Term of Office. –The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official was elected.
Section 3. Registration. – For purposes of the July 15, 2002 synchronized barangay
and sangguniang kabataan elections provided under this Act, a special registration of
voters for the sangguniang kabataan shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Subsequent registration of barangay and sangguniang kabataan voters shall
be governed by Republic Act No. 8189.
Section 6. Section 424 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. – The katipunan ng kabataan shall be
composed of Filipino citizens actually residing in the barangay for at least six
(6) months, who are fifteen (15) but less than eighteen (18) years of age on
the day of the election, and who are duly registered in the list of the
sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the
barangay secretary.
Section 7. Section 428 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 428. Qualifications. – An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan
must be a Filipino citizen, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a
resident of the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to election,
at least fifteen (15) years but less than eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of the election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and
must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Section 9. Applicability of Other Election Laws. – The Omnibus Election Code and other
existing election laws, as far as practicable, shall apply to barangay and sangguniang
kabataan elections.
RA 9340 - AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9164, RESETTING THE BARANGAY AND
SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9164 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SECTION 1. Date of Election. - There shall be synchronized barangay and
sangguniang kabataan elections which shall be held on July 15, 2002.
Subsequent synchronized barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections shall
be held on the last Monday of October 2007 and every three (3) years
thereafter.
SEC. 2. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9164 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Assumption of Office. - The term of office of the barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials elected under this Act shall commence on
August 15, 2002, next following their elections. The term of office of the
barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials elected in the October 2007
By: RLB
election and subsequent elections shall commence at noon of November 30
next following their election.
SEC. 3. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9164 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 5. Hold Over. - All incumbent barangay and all sangguniang kabataan
officials shall remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for cause
until their successors shall have been elected and qualified Provided, however,
That barangay and all sangguniang kabataan officials who are ex officio
members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
panlalawigan as the case may be shall continue to serve as such members in
the sanggunian concerned until the next barangay election. The Liga ng mga
Barangay at the municipal, city, and provincial levels shall, within thirty (30)
days after the next barangay election, conduct elections for ex officio positions
in the sanggunians under the supervision of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government.
SEC. 4. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9164 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 8. Appropriations. - The amount necessary for the implementation of
this Act shall be taken from the appropriation of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) under the General Appropriations Act and/or supplementary
appropriations thereafter.
In addition, the savings of the COMELEC not exceeding Three hundred million
pesos (P300,000,000.00) shall be used to augment said appropriations as
authorized under COMELEC Special Provision No. 2 of Republic Act No. 9162.
The funds mentioned above may be augmented by an amount not exceeding
ten percent (10%) of the sangguniang kabataan funds reserved pursuant to
Section 532(c) of Republic Act No. 7160.
→ Term of office – determined by the constitution and statute
→ The term of office of all local elective officials, except barangay officials, is fixed by the
constitution. While the term of office of barangay officials is fixed by law.
• Article 10, Section 8 of the Constitution – 3 years (2006 Bar)
• Terms of Barangay Officials:
- RA 8524 (1998) – 5 years
- RA 9164 (2002) – 3 years up to 3 terms only and to begin in year 1994.
- RA 9340 (2005) – Extended the term (which ended on Nov. 30, 2005) to Nov. 30, 2007
NOTE: “Hold-over principle” validly applies to barangay officials only. The reason is that since
barangay officials are heading the most fundamental and basic political unit of our society,
pragmatism should allow, otherwise, it would prejudice the delivery of basic services or create
hiatus in government service. Thus, hold-over is allowed for barangay officials, but not allowed to
all others unless the law allows it. (Sambarani vs Comelec)
Sec. 5 RA 9164 - Hold Over. –
All incumbent barangay and all sangguniang kabataan officials shall remain in office unless
sooner removed or suspended for cause until their successors shall have been elected and
qualified Provided, however, That barangay and all sangguniang kabataan officials who are ex
officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
panlalawigan as the case may be shall continue to serve as such members in the sanggunian
concerned until the next barangay election. The Liga ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city,

and provincial levels shall, within thirty (30) days after the next barangay election, conduct
elections for ex officio positions in the sanggunians under the supervision of the Department
of the Interior and Local Government."
• Three Term Limit Rule
- Elements:
(1) That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and
(2) That he has Official fully served three consecutive terms.
Problem 1:
- 1993: X, the VM succeeded Y, the M who died, by operation of law. X served as Mayor
until 1995.
- 1995-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor
- 1998-2001: X was re-elected and again served as Mayor
- 2001 Elections: Was X barred to run as Mayor?
Answer: NO. Because the 3-term limit rule under the law states that the official must be
elected for the same local government post for 3 consecutive terms. And in 1993, his 1st term,
he was not elected as mayor but as vice-mayor and he just succeeded as mayor by operation
of law and not through an election.
• Borja vs Comelec
- The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was
elected.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on
the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a
term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official
he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term
not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
- The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
Problem 2:
- 1988-1995: X was elected and served as Mayor for 2 consecutive terms
- 1995: X was re-elected and started serving as Mayor
- 1997: Comelec ruled that X was not validly proclaimed and X stepped down as ordered
by the Comelec.
- 1998 elections: Was X barred to run as Mayor?
Answer: NO. The 3-term limit rule applies when the official has fully served for three
consecutive terms for the same position. But while serving his 3rd term, X stepped down
pursuant to Comelec’s decision that he was not validly proclaimed, thus, there is involuntary
relinquishment of office. And an involuntary relinquishment of office serves as an interruption
of his term.
• Lonzanida vs Comelec
- Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that:
“No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.”
- The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
By: RLB
- Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by
law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service
and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Question: would your answer be the same if, instead of being ordered to stepped down in
1997, he just resigned as mayor?
→ No. My answer would be different. In the same case, a voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term
limit. Therefore, X is deemed to have fully served his 3rd term.
Problem 3:
- 1992-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor for 2 consecutive terms
- 1998: X ran as Mayor but lost to Y
- 2000: Y faced a recall election and X was elected in the recall election and served as
Mayor
- 2001: Was X barred to run as Mayor?
Answer: NO. The 3-term limit rule refers to 3 consecutive terms. When X ran as Mayor but
lost to Y in 1998, he was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. There was no consecutiveness
in this case.
• Adormeo vs Comelec
- The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. The two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: a) that the official concernedhas been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post; and b) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
- COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
should be upheld. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
1998 elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he
was elected. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
- The Court held that private respondent cannot be construed as having been elected and
served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the May 1998 elections was considered by
the Court as an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two
years, private respondent therein lived as a private citizen.
Problem 4:
- 1992-2001: X was elected and served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms
- 2001 elections: X did not run; Y was elected Mayor
- 2002: Y faced recall election and X filed certificate of candidacy for the recall elections
- Q: Can X participate in the recall elections?
Answer: YES

• Socrates vs Comelec
- The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining
the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
- After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-
election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-
election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
- Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution
prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a
fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive
term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
- Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to
run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
- The principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service
of terms, and that there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of
his third term and before the recall election.
ü How long should be their break?
- If you are to test the law, even a 1-day break will be sufficient, because it’s a break just
the same. Although it is not physically possible.
Problem 5:
- 1992-2001: X was Mayor of a municipality for 3 consecutive terms
- Before May 2001 elections: The municipality became a new city
- 2001 elections: X filed COC for mayor of the new city
- Was X qualified to run for Mayor of the new city?
Answer: NO.
• Latasa vs Comelec
- The Court noted that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did
not change even by an inch the land are a previously covered by the Municipality of
Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos
continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new
city officials. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct
fromthat of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of
applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would
now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city
mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that
of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants ofthe municipality are the same as
those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for
nineyears.
- It can be seen from Lonzanida and Adormeo that the law contemplates a rest period
during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise
By: RLB
power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit.
- To allow Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the
framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive
terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as
chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Problem 6:
- 1995-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor
- 1998-2001: X was re-elected and served as mayor, but an election protest was filed
against X in 1998
- 2001-2004: X was re-elected and served as mayor, and the 1998 election protest was
decided against X
- 2004 elections: Was X qualified to run as mayor?
Answer: NO. For the following reasons:
(1) ingun ang SC, Hoy Mr. X kung dili ikaw ang mayor sa 1998, kinsa man? Ang pikas?
Nga wa galingkud?
(2) He was a de facto officer. Whether he was de facto or de jure officer, he was still an
officer but de facto lng. It should be counted against him.
(3) During electoral protest, whoever is the protestee, until the election process is
decided, is the presumptive winner.
• Francis Ong vs Comelec
- For the three-term limit for electivelocal government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and
(2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
- The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis
from running for mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
ü How to be qualified?
- First, call and pressure the COMELEC (i don’t know how you will do it) to come up with a
resolution before the end of your 3rd term.
- When there is already a resolution, do not question it anymore. Instead, obey it and you
step down before noon of June 30.
- After stepping down as ordered by the COMELEC, you can now avail of the interruption—
the “break” thing.
- Then when you run for 2004 election, you will be qualified. It’s as simple as that. IT
WORKS!
Problem 7:
- 1995-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor
- 1998-2001: X was re-elected and served again as Mayor, but a protest was filed in 1998
- 2001-2004: X was re-elected and served again as Mayor, but in July of 2001, the 1998
protest was decided against X.

- 2004 elections: X filed COC for mayor but it was cancelled, although he won and was
proclaimed Mayor
- May 17, 2007: X stepped down as mayor as ordered
- 2007: X was elected again as mayor
- Was X qualified to run as mayor for 2007?
Answer: YES
• Dizon vs Comelec
- We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following
periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30
June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However, because of his
disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither
did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term.
- Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was
ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the
position of mayor from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for
purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30
June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1
July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the
three-term limit rule.
Problem 8:
- In 1994, 1997 and 2002: X was elected Punong Barangay
- 2004: X ran and won as municipal councilor, leaving his post as punong barangay
- 2007: X filed COC for the position of punong barangay (the same barangay)
- Is he qualified?
Answer: NO.
• Bolos, Jr. vs Comelec
- Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the
first condition for disqualification. However, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a
vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his office as
Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as
Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation
of the Office of Punong Barangay.
Problem 9:
- X was elected mayor 3 times during the terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004 and 2004-2007
- In September 2005, X was ordered “preventively suspended” by the Sandiganbayan
- In 2007, X filed a COC and ran for mayor.
- Was X qualified to run for the 2007 elections?
Answer: NO.
• Aldovino vs Comelec
- Preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended
public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should
not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
- “Interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is
one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. An officer who is
preventively suspended is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office but
title to office is not lost.
By: RLB
2008 Bar: Abdul ran and won in the May 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections for Vice-Governor of
Tawi-Tawo. After being proclaimed Vice-Governor in 2004 elections, his opponent, Khalil, filed an
election protest before the Commission on Elections. Ruling with finality in the protest, the
COMELEC declared Khalil as duly elected Vice-Governor though the decision was promulgated only
in 2007, when Abdul had wholly served 2004-2007 term and was in fact already on his 2007-2010
term as Vice Governor. What will be your advice? Francis Ong case
2011 Bar: Alfredo was elected municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms. During his third term, the
municipality became a city. Alfredo ran for city mayor during the next immediately succeeding
election. Voltaire sought his disqualification citing the 3 term limit for elective officials. Will
Voltaire’s action prosper? Latasa case
2011 Bar: Adela served as Mayor of Kasim for 2 consecutive terms. On her third term, COMELEC
ousted her in a election protest that Gudi, her opponent, filed against her. 2 years later, Gudi faced
recall proceedings and Adela ran in the recall election against him. Adela won and served as Mayor
for Gudi’s remaining term. Can Adela run again for Mayor in the next succeeding election without
violating the 3-term limit? Socrates case
VACANCIES AND SUCCESSIONS
Permanent Vacancies
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor. –
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor
or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined
herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest
ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved
by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official
fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall
be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning
candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately
preceding local election.
Section 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. –
(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic succession provided above
do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following manner:

(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component
cities and the sangguniang bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon
recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned.
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under
which the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the
position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be
appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same
political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve
the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a
nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of
the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without
such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for
administrative action against the official responsible therefore.
(c) In case or permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the
sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the
sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the
organization concerned.
• Factors to consider: P-R-L
- Meaning of “permanent vacancy”
- Method of “ranking”
- Meaning of “last vacancy in the Sanggunian”
*because whoever caused the last vacancy in the sanggunian, his political
affiliation will matter, in which case, his party will have the right to nominate
the official who will fill-up the vacancy
• Official
1) Fills a higher vacant position
2) Refuses to assume office
3) Fails to qualify
4) Dies
5) Removed from office
6) Resigns
7) Permanently Incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office (either physically or
otherwise)
• Ranking
- Formula:
Votes Obtained
Total Registered Voters in each
district (not votes cast)
Note: A tie between and among the highest ranking sanggunian members
shall be resolved by “drawing of lots”.
By: RLB
• Vacancy: How to fill up?
-­‐ It depends on the kind of LGU and it depends on whether the one who “caused the last
vacancy” is a member of a political party or not.
o If not a member of political party, the Sanggunian concerned “recommends” to
either the President (Prov, HUC, ICC) or the Governor (CC & Mun), as the case may
be.
o If a member of political party, the party of the official who “caused the last vacancy”
shall nominate to the President or the Governor, as the case may be. If in the
Barangay Sanggunian, since there is no political party, the Sanggunian concerned
recommends to the Mayor.
Illustration 1:
Mayor: X (XXX)
Vice-Mayor: Y (PPP)
Councilors:
1st A (KKK)
2nd B (XXX)
3rd C (XYZ)
4th D (PPP)
5th E (KKK)
6th F (Independent)
7th G (YYY)
8th H (XYZ)
-­‐ Let’s kill X, the Mayor, so he dies. How many vacancies will occur?
o 10 vacancies. (from the mayor to the 8th councilor) But that is not to say that you
will fill up the 10 positions by different persons because under section 45, the law
already provides for the rule on succession that the next in line will occupy the
vacant higher positions.
o That means that Y will become the mayor and A will become the vice mayor. And so
on….
-­‐ Who will fill the 8th councilor?
o Fariñas vs Barba
- There is only one rule governing appointments to the Sangguniang Barangay.
Any vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member must be
made by the mayor upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason
is that members of the Sangguniang Barangay are not allowed to have party
affiliations.
- Indeed there is no reason for supposing that those who drafted §45 intended
to make the manner of filling vacancies in the Sanggunians, created by
members who do not belong to any political party, different from the manner
of filling such vacancies when created by members who belong to political
party or parties. The provision for the first must approximate the provision for
the second situation. Any difference in procedure must be limited to the fact
that in the case of vacancies caused by those who have political affiliations
there is a party which can nominate a replacement while there is none in the
case of those who have no political affiliation. Accordingly, where there is no
political party to make a nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy
occurs, must be considered the appropriate authority for making the
recommendation, by analogy to vacancies created in the Sangguniang
Barangay whose members are by law prohibited from having any party
affiliation.
- Having determined that appointments in case of vacancies caused by
Sanggunian members who do not belong to any political party must be made

in accordance with the "recommendation" of the Sanggunians concerned
where the vacancies occur, the next question is: Is the appointing authority
limited to the appointment of those "recommended" to him? We think an
affirmative answer must be given to the question.
- The appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended to him
by the Sanggunian concerned. The power of appointment is a discretionary
power. On the other hand, neither is the appointing power vested with so large
a discretion that he can disregard the recommendation of the Sanggunian
concerned, Since the recommendation takes the place of nomination by
political party, the recommendation must likewise be considered a condition
sine qua non for the validity of the appointment, by analogy to the provision of
§45(b).
- The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino
nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the
preceding discussion, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo.
For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he
was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other
hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang
Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed
him.
-­‐ Who caused the last vacancy?
o Navarro vs CA
- The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a
replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to
maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.
- The "last vacancy" in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of
the member formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had
become vacant by any of the causes already enumerated. The term "last
vacancy" is thus used in Sec. 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy
previously created. The term by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8
position which occurred with the election of Rolando Lalas to the seventh
position in the Sanggunian. Such construction will result in absurdity.
• What are the conditions when the political party will make the nomination?
→ Damasen vs Tumamao
- The conditions for the rule of succession are:
(1) the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the
Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy.
(2) the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of Membership
(bona fide membership) from the highest official of the political party
concerned.
- Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred because of the elevation
of LDP member Alonzo to vice-mayor, it follows that the person to succeed her
should alsobelong to the LDP so as to preserve party representation.
Illustration 2:
Mayor: X (XXX)
Vice mayor: Y (PPP)
Councilors:
1st A (Independent)
2nd B (XXX)
3rd C (PPP)
4thD (PPP)
5thE (KKK)
6thF (Independent)
By: RLB
7thG (YYY)
8thH (PPP)
- Same facts. Let’s kill the Mayor. How to fill up the vacancy when the official who cause the
vacancy is an independent candidate?
o Since there is no political party involved, it is the Sanggunian who will nominate. If the
vacancy was in a municipality, it is not the Mayor who will appoint. But the Governor will
appoint. If it is an independent component city, highly-urbanized city and province, it will
the President who will appoint. In the case of Barangay Sanggunian, the Mayor will
appoint. (Fariñas case)
2008 Bar: On August 8, 2008, the Governor of Bohol died and Vice-Governor Cesar became the
Governor by operation of law. Accordingly, Benito, the highest ranking member of the
Sanngguniang Panlalawigan was elevated to the position of Vice Governor. By the elevation to the
office of the Vice-Governor, a vacancy in the Sanggunian Panlalawigan was created. How should
the vacancy be filled? 3%
Answer: Ang answer ni Atty. DBL—The vacancy in this case may be filled depending on whether
or not Benito is a member of a political party or an independent candidate. Then qualify nlng ka.
hahaha
Problem: X, Y and Z were the candidates for Mayor in Municipality of ABC. Y had earlier filed a
petition for the cancellation of X’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that X failed to comply
with the 6-month residency requirement. During the election, and while the disqualification case
was still pending, X received the highest number of votes followed by Y. Thereafter, the COMELEC
disqualified X. W, the elected Vice-Mayor, insisted the he should become the Mayor. Should W be
allowed to assume the office of the Mayor?
Answer: The Second Placer rule will not apply in this case. Ergo, applying the discussion below
about disqualifications, the Vice Mayor cannot assume the position of the Mayor because there is
no vacancy. Y is legally the true winner. X is the de-facto while Y is the de-jure officer.
There are 2 grounds of disqualifications:
(1) grounds that will affect the validity of certificate of candidacy
- the grounds refer to the eligibility to become a candidate (citizenship,
residency, etc.) under section 39 of the LGC and thus, making his certificate of
candidacy void from the very beginning. Thus, making him not a valid
candidate.
- The Second Placer rule will not apply.
(2) grounds that will not affect the vailidity of certificate of candidacy
- refers to the acts that the candidate made after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy (during the election) like vote-buying, terrorism or etc….
- the Second Placer rule will apply.
*Under the Second Placer rule, the 2nd placer, being the defeated candidate, cannot take
the place of the 1st placer when the 1st placer gets disqualified because as willed by the
people, it is the 1st placer who was chosen by them. And the mere fact that he finished
second shows that he was not the choice of the people so why should he be allowed to
take the position of the 1st placer. Therefore, the Second Placer rule bars the 2nd placer
to take the place of the disqualified 1st placer.
• S. Jalosjos vs Comelec
- There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was
proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the
ineligibility.

- The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in
instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over.
The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in
the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the
rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position.
Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the LCE
Section 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. –
(a) When the governor, city or municipal mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily
incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited
to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city or
municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall
automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the local chief
executive concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which
can only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working
days.
(b) Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate
sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has
reported back to office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal causes,
the local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents showing that
said legal causes no longer exist.
(c) When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside
his territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3) consecutive days, he may
designate in writing the officer-in-charge of the said office. Such authorization shall
specify the powers and functions that the local official concerned shall exercise in the
absence of the local chief executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss
employees. (S-A-D)
(d) In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to
issue such authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the
highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be, shall have the right
to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the said office on the fourth (4th) day of
absence of the said local chief executive, subject to the limitations provided in subsection
(c) hereof.
(e) Except as provided above, the local chief executive shall in no case authorize any
local official to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the office, other than the
vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member, as the case may be.
• Instances:
- leave of absence
- travel abroad
- suspension from office
- other temporary incapacity for physical or legal reasons
• In case of temporary incapacity, the vice or the highest ranking sanggunian member (HRS)
shall automatically exercise the powers and functions of the LCE.
Problem: Mayor X of Cebu City went to the US for one month. Vice-Mayor Y, acted as Mayor in
the meantime.
A. What powers may and may not be exercised by Y? Can Y solemnize marriage? YES.
B. While Y is acting as Mayor of Cebu City, may the SP elect a new Presiding officer? YES.
By: RLB
Answer in QA:
-­‐ All powers and functions of the LCE can be exercised by the vice or the HRS, except the
powers to appoint, suspend or dismiss (SAD) employees, unless the temporary incapacity
exceeds 30 days, in which case, the acting official may now exercise the SAD powers.
-­‐ Hence, in People vs Bustamante, the vice mayor (who was the acting mayor) was
held to have the power to solemnize marriage, which is a power belonging to the mayor
under the LGC. It’s not one of the SAD powers.
Answer in QB:
-­‐ A Vice-Governor who acts as Governor effectively creates a temporary vacancy in the
position of Presiding Officer of the SP entitling therefore the SP to select an acting
Presiding Officer during the period that the Vice-Governor acts as Governor. (Gamboa
vs Aguirre)
Problem: Mayor X of Cebu City went to Manila for 3 days to attend a 2-day seminar.
A. Will Y, the VM, act as Mayor during X’s absence? YES.
B. Who shall perform the powers and functions of the Mayor of Cebu City during X’s absence and
what are the scope and limitations to such powers and functions?
• How do you distinguish an OIC from an acting official? (gwapu ni pang-essay question karun
Sunday)
-­‐ OIC is to be designated and in the designation, the Mayor will define the scope of the
powers of the OIC. Unlike in the case of an acting officer, the law already provides for
the kinds of powers and functions that he can exercise.
• The Officer in Charge (OIC)
-­‐ The OIC is to be designated by the LCE when he is “traveling within the country but
outside his territorial jurisdiction” for a period not exceeding 3 days; while the acting
official shall automatically exercise the powers of the LCE when he is traveling outside
the country or traveling abroad
-­‐ The OIC (which the mayor may appoint, either the vice or HRS) shall perform the powers
and functions as may be delegated to him by the LCE except the powers to appoint,
suspend or dismiss employees; while the acting official exercises all powers and functions
of the LCE except the SAD powers
-­‐ If the LCE has not designated an OIC, the Vice or the HRS has the right to assume the
office of the LCE on the 4th day as acting official.
APPROVAL OF LEAVE OF ABSENCES
Section 47. Approval of Leaves of Absence. –
(a) Leaves of absence of local elective officials shall be approved as follows:
(1) Leaves of absence of the governor and the mayor of a highly urbanized city
or an independent component city shall be approved by the President or his
duly authorized representative;
(2) Leaves of absence of vice-governor or a city or municipal vice-mayor shall
be approved by the local chief executive concerned: Provided, That the leaves
of absence of the members of the sanggunian and its employees shall be
approved by the vice-governor or city or municipal vice-mayor concerned;
(3) Leaves of absence of the component city or municipal mayor shall be
approved by the governor; and

 
(4) Leaves of absence of a punong barangay shall be approved by the city or → If you are to seek disciplinary action, we have the ombudsman or you can avail of the LGC
municipal mayor: Provided, That leaves of absence of sangguniang barangay provisions. It’s a choice on the part of the aggrieved party. (Concurrent jurisdiction sila)
members shall be approved by the punong barangay. → But as a matter of rule in administrative law: The tribunal that first acquires jurisdiction over
the case shall continue to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other one. Otherwise, it
(b) Whenever the application for leave of absence hereinabove specified is not acted will be a case of forum shopping.
upon within five (5) working days after receipt thereof, the application for leave of
absence shall be deemed approved. • When can you say that the tribunal has acquired jurisdiction?
- The body where the complaint was filed first; AND
• Approved by: - Opts to take cognizance of the case
-­‐ President – if it is the LCE of Province, Highly-Urbanized City and Independent
Component City NOTE: Only the proper COURT can order the REMOVAL of the official.
-­‐ LCE – if it is the Vice
-­‐ Vice – if it is the Sanggunian members and employees
-­‐ Governor – if it is a component city and municipality mayor FILING OF COMPLAINT
-­‐ Mayor – if it is the Punong Barangay
-­‐ Punong Barangay – if it is the SB members Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. –
A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:
Note: Inaction within 5 days – deemed approved. (a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the
President;
DISIPLINARY ACTIONS
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the
GROUNDS sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the
President; and
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. –
An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the (c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the
following grounds: sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; and executory.

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at
least prision mayor;
• These are the tribunals or offices that have jurisdiction over disciplinary action, if you are to
file the administrative case under the Local Government Code:
- Office of the President: Province, HUC and City
- Sangguniang Panlalawigan: Municipality - appealable to the Office of the President
- Sangguniang Panlungsod (if city) or Sangguniang Bayan (if municipality):
Barangay - final and executory

(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang
bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and
→ In the case of Barangay, the decision of the SP is final and executory, unlike in the case
of a municipality that it can be appealed to the President. But as you know, you can
invoke Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the grounds of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
*You will notice that it actually depends on the affiliation of the respondent. If he belongs to
the Liberal Party, for example, like our incumbent Governor, you don’t file the administrative
case in the Office of the President. (kapartido man si Noynoy ug Junjun Davide)

(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of
the proper court.
→ Pursuant to the constitutional mandate that there must be a provision on accountability in the
LGC.
→ Purpose: To discipline local elective officials.
→ It has the nature of an administrative proceeding. Therefore, it imposes administrative
penalties. And the highest penalty that may be imposed is only SUSPENSION.
• Concurrent Jurisdiction with the Ombudsman
Alejandro vs Office of the Ombudsman
- The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies.
- The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked
to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for
impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act and the Local
Government Code both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials, the
seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in cases decided by this
Court.

By: RLB
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

- we pointed out that "there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it
has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman
Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent . . . as to
compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other." The two laws may be
reconciled by understanding the primary jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
- Any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than
27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or
other investigative agencies.
- In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance
of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman, occupying a position
corresponding to salary grade 14.
- Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the
sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.
*So typically, the usual mode of disciplinary action is through the ombudsman. For the following
reasons:
(1) It is not expected to be highly politicized now, compared to before when the it was
administrated by Gutierrez but now it is under the EVER straight and strict retired SC
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales. Naa tanan! Maldita, strikta, straight!
(2) if you tend to seek imposition of preventive suspension, mas taas ang ombudsman, 6
months of preventive suspension. Whereas, in the case of LGC, 60 days and if multiple,
90 days.
• Rules and Prohibitions during Investigation:
(1) Investigation shall commence 10 days after respondent answers;
(2) Investigation shall be held only in the place where the respondent holds office;
(3) No investigation within 90 days immediately prior to local election and no
preventive suspension shall be imposed within said period (if already imposed, it
should be lifted ipso facto);
*2nd rule is the venue of the investigation
*What is important here is the 3rd rule. Because this is to prevent the mechanism of
disciplining an official as a method or tool for political harassments.
NOTE: what cannot be done during the 90-day period, mentioned in the 3rd rule, are:
(a) Investigation
(b) Preventive suspension
which means that if what is imposed is already the PENALTY of suspension, then your 90-day
prohibited period will not apply because there is already a hearing and decision has already
become final and executory.
NOTICE OF HEARING
Section 62. Notice of hearing. –
(a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent
to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and
commence the investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of such answer
of the respondent.
By: RLB
(b) When the respondent is an elective official of a province or highly urbanized city,
such hearing and investigation shall be conducted in the place where he renders or holds
office. For all other local elective officials, the venue shall be the place where the
sanggunian concerned is located.
(c) However, no investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days immediately prior to
any local election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period.
If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day period immediately
preceding local election, it shall be deemed automatically lifted upon the start of
aforesaid period.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
Section 63. Preventive Suspension. –
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a
highly urbanized or an independent component city;
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component
city or municipality; or
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when
the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses
or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided,
That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond
sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are
filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than
ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known
at the time of the first suspension.
(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall be
deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
time he was formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the
proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal
duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
termination of the case.
(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized
as abuse of authority.
→ It is not a penalty; Hence invocation of due process is generally not appropriate.
→ Due process is irrelevant. There is no denial of life, liberty or property because public office is
not a property, public office is a public trust.
→ In Bunye vs Escareal and Ganzon vs CA, SC held that the sole objective of an
administrative suspension is:
- To prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records and other
evidence; and
- To assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official.

• Authority to impose preventive suspension:
1) President – in the case of Province, HUC and ICC;
2) Governor – in the case of CC and Municipality;
3) Mayor – in the case of barangay.
• Conditions sine qua non: (Section 63; Joson III vs CA)
a) Issues have already been joined;
b) After filing of the answer (any pleading filed whether it is the formal answer or not),
which may be in various forms so long as it will render the allegations be considered
as issues
c) Evidence of guilt is strong;
d) Given the gravity of the offense, respondent might influence witnesses or pose a
threat to records/evidence.
Ø In a case, when are issues considered joined? What is an issue?
Answer: In legal parlance, an issue is an allegation that is denied by the other party
because allegation that is admitted is not an issue. Therefore, issues are joined upon the
filing of a responsive pleading.
• Length of preventive suspension:
- Single offense – 60
- Multiple offense – 90
*In the case of the Ombudsman, you can ask for a 6 months preventive suspension.
Note: Prior hearing is not required in preventive suspension because it is not a penalty and
will not violate due process
• Why is the preventive suspension under the LGC shorter?
Garcia vs Mojica
- Under the LGC, preventive suspension may only be imposed after the issues are joined,
and only for a maximum period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was suspended without
having had the chance to refute first the charges against him, and for the maximum
period of six months provided by the Ombudsman Law. But administrative complaints
commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local
Government Code. The shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code is
intended to limit the period of suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor,
or the President, who may be motivated by partisan political considerations. In contrast
the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely
to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body. The distinction is valid but
not decisive of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of
preventive suspension.
SALARY OF RESPONDENT PENDING PREVENTION SUSPENSION
Section 64. Salary of Respondent Pending Suspension. - The respondent official
preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary or compensation during such
suspension; but upon subsequent exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or
compensation including such emoluments accruing during such suspension.
RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENT
Section 65. Rights of Respondent. - The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to
appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
By: RLB
against him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary
process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
• Rights:
- Hearing
- Counsel
- Cross-Examine witnesses
- Compulsory Process
- Period of Investigation - 90days
- Period to Decide - 30days
- Penalty of Suspension
ü Limitation on the imposition of the above-mentioned penalty of suspension:
- shall not exceed the unexpired term
- a maximum period of six (6) months per administrative case
- not a bar to candidacy
Question: For example, if before the expiration of the term of the Governor, which expires
on noon of June 30, 2013, and the suspension was imposed on March 2013, so the 6 months
suspension was not fully consumed/served. Can it be carried over, assuming that the
Governor gets reelected?
→ NO because of the limitation that it shall not exceed the unexpired term.
Question: What is an instance that bars a person for candidacy?
→ Penalty of REMOVAL from office under Section 40 of the LGC. Provided that the removal
was a result of: (1) an administrative case and (1) it was made or effected during the
effectivity of the LGC of 1991.
• Aguinaldo Doctrine
- The philosophy behind this doctrine is the principle of condonation. Wherein a
misconduct committed by an elected public official during a prior term will be considered
as having been condoned or forgiven by the electorates, if the said elective official
happens to be reelected.
- It is called “Aguinaldo Doctrine” not because it was a landmark case but simply because
the Aguinaldo vs Santos case was the first case that applied the principle of condonation
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
- Applies only in an administrative proceeding.
• Aguinaldo vs Santos
- The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation
of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefrom. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
- It applies only to administrative case for misconduct, so the official may still be held
criminally or civilly liable for the same act under the “Three-fold Liability Rule”.
• Three-Fold Liability Rule
- For a single and the same act of misconduct, it may give rise to at least 3 cases: (1)
Administrative case; (2) Criminal case; or (3) a civil case.
- These cases are separate, distinct and independent from each other. Thus, it means that
the outcome of 1 case should not affect the other cases. Such as when there is an
acquittal in the criminal case, the said decision of acquittal cannot be considered as basis
for the dismissal of the administrative and the civil cases.
- More so, these 3 cases observe different degrees of proof required:
ü In criminal cases, you need proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ü In civil cases, you need preponderance of evidence.
ü In administrative case, you only need mere substantial evidence, which is
defined as evidence that any reasonable mind may accept as sufficient and
logical to support in making a conclusion.
NOTE: Hierarchy in the degrees of proof required:
(1) Proof beyond reasonable doubt
(2) Preponderance of evidence
(3) Clear and convincing evidence, in special cases like extradition
(4) Mere substantial evidence.
Atty DBL’s side discussion: Therefore, it seems that the principle of condonation or otherwise
called Aguinaldo Doctrine means that if you condone and forgive a person it is but essential
that the person granting such forgiveness should have known the commission of the act.
Otherwise, unsa man iyang i.forgive kung wa siya’y knowledge.
Also, there are some opinions and done in actual practices where an official is allowed to avail
the Aguinaldo Doctrine even if it is not a case of reelection. Like when a mayor committed
misconduct during his mayoralty term and after his term, the mayor becomes a governor, or
member of provincial board, or congressman. But it shouldn’t be like that because the
priniciple of condonation should only be applied when there is reelection. Even in the US. I
took pain on researching on that. It has to be the same constituents and the same office.
• Garcia vs Mojica
-­‐ The alleged misconduct (signing of irregular contract) was committed 4 days before
election day and it was not known to the public/voter until Mayor Garcia was already re-
elected and served his new term.
-­‐ It was argued that since the electorates did not have knowledge of such misconduct at
the time they voted for Garcia, it could not be said that they had condoned the
misconduct of Garcia.
-­‐ Supreme Court disagreed because it is really impossible to determine actual or lack of
knowledge by the electorates about the misconduct at the time they cast their votes.
What can be determined is that the misconduct was committed during a prior term. The
fact that the misconduct was committed during the prior term, Aguinaldo
Doctrine applies.
NOTE: AGUINALDO DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO AN APPOINTED OFFICIAL WHO COMMITTED
MISCONDUCT WHILE IN HIS APPOINTIVE OFFICE AND WHO WAS LATER ON ELECTED INTO
OFFICE.
- It should be re-election
- Same constituents
- Same office
2011 Bar: Governor Paloma was administratively charged with abuse of authority before the
Office of the President. Pending hearing, he ran for re-election and won a second term. He then
moved to dismiss the charged against him based on this supervening event. Should the motion be
granted? YES.
- Apply the Aguinaldo Doctrine
• Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos vs Martinez
- Only the court (RTC, CA or Sandiganbayan) can remove an elected official.
- It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from
service is lodged exclusively with the courts. The law on suspension or removal of
elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom
such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith,
for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people
through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to
By: RLB
naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining
authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not
be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
- The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official
from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether
or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the
courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of
the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority.
- Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a
trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can
ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings. Elevating the
removal of an elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court
case may be justified by the fact that such removal not only punishes the official
concerned but also, in effect, deprives the electorate of the services of the official for
whom they voted.
- As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure
for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective
barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under
Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the
barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of
removal from office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court
assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently
apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On
the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension; if
it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve
that the proper charges be filed in court.
PENALTY AND ITS EFFECTS
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. –
(a) The investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from the
start thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall
immediately be furnished the respondent and all interested parties.
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or
a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a
bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office.
(c) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall
be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position.
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
Section 67. Administrative Appeals. –
Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to
the following:
The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod
of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and

The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component
cities.
Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
Section 68. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming
final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive
suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the
appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the
pendency of the appeal.
RECALL
SECTION 69. By Whom Exercised. — The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs.
Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. — (as amended by RA 9244)
(a) The Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official shall be
commenced by a petition of a registered voter in the local government unit concerned
and supported by the registered voters in the local government unit concerned during
the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected subject to the
following percentage requirements:
(1) At least twenty-five percent (25%) in the case of local government units
with a voting population of not more than twenty thousand (20,000);
(2) At least twenty percent (20%) in the case of local government units with a
voting population of at least twenty thousand (20,000) but not more than
seventy-five thousand (75,000): Provided, That in no case shall the required
petitioners be less than five thousand (5,000);
(3) At least fifteen percent (15%) in the case of local government units with a
voting population of at least seventy-five thousand (75,000) but not more than
three hundred thousand (300,000): Provided, however, That in no case shall
the required number of petitioners be less than fifteen thousand (15,000); and
(4) At least ten percent (10%) in the case of local government units with a
voting population of over three hundred thousand (300,000): Provided,
however, That in no case shall the required petitioners be less than forty-five
thousand (45,000).
(b) The process of recall shall be effected in accordance with the following procedure:
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed by the representatives of the
petitioners before the election registrar or his representative, shall be filed with
the Comelec through its office in the local government unit concerned.
(2) The petition to recall shall contain the following:
(a) The names and addresses of the petitioners written in legible
form and their signatures;
By: RLB
(b) The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative district and
the province to which the petitioners belong;
(c) The name of the official sought to be recalled; and
(d) A brief narration of the reasons and justifications therefor.
(3) The Comelec shall, within fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition,
certify to the sufficiency of the required number of signatures. Failure to obtain
the required number of signatures automatically nullifies the petition;
(4) If the petition is found to be sufficient in form, the Comelec or its duly
authorized representative shall, within three (3) days from the issuance of the
certification, provide the official sought to be recalled a copy of the petition,
cause its publication in a national newspaper of general circulation and a
newspaper of general circulation in the locality, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners and at the same time post
copies thereof in public and conspicuous places for a period of not less than
ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20) days, for the purpose of allowing
interested parties to examine and verify the validity of the petition and the
authenticity of the signatures contained therein.
(5) The Comelec or its duly authorized representatives shall, upon issuance of
certification, proceed independently with the verification and authentication of
the signatures of the petitioners and registered voters contained therein.
Representatives of the petitioners and the official sought to be recalled shall be
duly notified and shall have the right to participate therein as mere observers.
The filing of any challenge or protest shall be allowed within the period
provided in the immediately preceding paragraph and shall be ruled upon with
finality within fifteen (15) days from the date of filing of such protest or
challenge;
(6) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the Comelec or its duly authorized
representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and
thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the
official sought to be recalled.
SEC. 71. Election on Recall. — Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall with the appropriate
local office of the Comelec, the Comelec or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of
the election or recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days upon the completion of the
procedure outlined in the preceding article, in the case of the barangay, city or municipal officials,
and forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial officials. The officials sought to be recalled shall
automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions
and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon. (as amended by RA 9244)
SECTION 72. Effectivity of Recall. — The recall of an elective local official shall be effective
only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled
receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in
office.
SECTION 73. Prohibition from Resignation. — The elective local official sought to be recalled
shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.

SECTION 74. Limitations on Recall. —
(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his
term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
SECTION 75. Expenses Incident to Recall Elections. — All expenses incident to recall
elections shall be borne by the COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct of
recall elections.
→ Definition: Recall is a mode of removing an elected official by the people before the end of his
term.
→ Ground: LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
→ No more preparatory recall assembly (PRA) as a mode of initiating recall.
→ There is only one mode of initiating recall: By the Registered Voters (following certain
percentage)
*In the Philippines, we only apply recall to local elective officials.
- The incumbent official, who is the subject of the recall proceedings, will automatically
becomes a candidate for that recall election, whether he likes it or not. In fact, he cannot
resign. Then, Comelec will invite other persons to file COC for the recall election.
o If the incumbent official will win the recall election, it means that the recall
election failed since it has been shown that the people still have their trust and
confidence on the incumbent.
o If somebody else wins the recall election, then it means that the recall election
succeeded, since it has been shown that the people lost their trust and
confidence on the incumbent.
- The reason behind the requirement of certain percentages is that it cannot be that, every
now and then, each time a local elective official sits in the office that he will face a recall
election. To give semblance of legitimacy to a grievance by the electorates, the
registered voters needs the support of 25%, 20% etc. as the case may be.
• Prohibition in Recall Proceedings:
(a) No resignation during recall process;
(b) Recall election should only be once during the term of the official.
NOTE: it speaks of “election”, not “proceeding”, thus, initiation can be done more than
once.
(c) No recall election shall take place:
- within one (1) year from date of official’s assumption to office or
- one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election (day of election and that
election affecting the office of the official concerned)
*Hence, a recall election can only be scheduled during the middle of the incumbent
official’s term. The reason in the first prohibition, it is too early to tell that the people had
already lost their trust and confidence and it is not a good practice. Also, it is to give him
a chance to prove himself. While in the second prohibition, it is too close to the next
regular election, thus, it wouldn’t be prudent to insist on a recall election when the voters
can still manifest their decision on the incumbent official in the next regular election. It is
also a waste of money and resources.
By: RLB
HUMAN RESOURCE AND DEVELOPMENT
(I think ang important kay ang Section 90 on practice on profession kay mao man iyang g.discuss
ra. But aku na lang gibutang ang codal jud sa tanan kay basin MCQ niya J )
SECTION 76. Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern. — Every local government unit
shall design and implement its own organizational structure and staffing pattern taking into
consideration its service requirements and financial capability, subject to the minimum standards
and guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
SECTION 77. Responsibility for Human Resources and Development. — The chief
executive of every local government unit shall be responsible for human resources and
development in his unit and shall take all personnel actions in accordance with the constitutional
provisions on civil service, pertinent laws, and rules and regulations thereon, including such
policies, guidelines and standards as the Civil Service Commission may establish: Provided, That
the local chief executive may employ emergency or casual employees or laborers paid on a daily
wage or piecework basis and hired through job orders for local projects authorized by the
sanggunian concerned, without need of approval or attestation by the Civil Service Commission:
Provided, further, That the period of employment of emergency or casual laborers as provided in
this section shall not exceed six (6) months.
The Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration organized pursuant to
Presidential Decree Numbered Eleven Hundred thirty-six (P.D. No. 1136) is hereby abolished and
its personnel, records, equipment and other assets transferred to the appropriate office in the Civil
Service Commission.
SECTION 78. Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations, and Other Related Issuances. —
All matters pertinent to human resources and development in local government units shall be
governed by the civil service law and such rules and regulations and other issuances promulgated
pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified in this Code.
SECTION 79. Limitation on Appointments. — No person shall be appointed in the career
service of the local government if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity to the appointing or recommending authority.
SECTION 80. Public Notice of Vacancy; Personnel Selection Board. —
(a) Whenever a local executive decides to fill a vacant career position, there shall be
posted notices of the vacancy in at least three (3) conspicuous public places in the local
government unit concerned for a period of not less than fifteen (15) days.
(b) There shall be established in every province, city or municipality a personnel selection
board to assist the local chief executive in the judicious and objective selection of
personnel for employment as well as for promotion, and in the formulation of such
policies as would contribute to employee welfare.
(c) The personnel selection board shall be headed by the local chief executive, and its
members shall be determined by resolution of the sanggunian concerned. A
representative of the Civil Service Commission, if any, and the personnel officer of the
local government unit concerned shall be ex officio members of the board.
SECTION 81. Compensation of Local Officials and Employees. — The compensation of local
officials and personnel shall be determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That the
increase in compensation of elective local officials shall take effect only after the terms of office of
those approving such increase shall have expired: Provided, further, That the increase in
compensation of the appointive officials and employees shall take effect as provided in the
ordinance authorizing such increase: Provided, however, That said increases shall not exceed the
limitations on budgetary allocations for personal services provided under Title Five, Book II of this

Code: Provided, finally, That such compensation may be based upon the pertinent provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-seven fifty-eight (R.A. No 6758), otherwise known as the
"Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989".
The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan chairman,
the barangay treasurer, and the barangay secretary shall be entitled to such compensation,
allowances, emoluments, and such other privileges as provided under Title One, Book III of this
Code.
Elective local officials shall be entitled to the same leave privileges as those enjoyed by appointive
local officials, including the cumulation and commutation thereof.
SECTION 82. Resignation of Elective Local Officials. —
(a) Resignations by elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance
by the following authorities:
(1) The President, in the case of governors, vice-governors, and mayors and
vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities; casia
(2) The governor, in the case of municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city
mayors and city vice-mayors of component cities;
(3) The sanggunian concerned, in the case of sanggunian members; and
(4) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials.
(b) Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together with the action
taken by the aforesaid authorities, shall be furnished the Department of the Interior and
Local Government.
(c) The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority
concerned within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof. cdasia
(d) Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon
presentation before an open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its
records: Provided, however, That this subsection does not apply to sanggunian members
who are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribe the manner
of acting upon such resignations.
SECTION 83. Grievance Procedure. — In every local government unit, the local chief executive
shall establish a procedure to inquire into, act upon, resolve or settle complaints and grievances
presented by local government employees.
SECTION 84. Administrative Discipline. — Investigation and adjudication of administrative
complaints against appointive local officials and employees as well as their suspension and removal
shall be in accordance with the civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws. The results of
such administrative investigations shall be reported to the Civil Service Commission.
SECTION 85. Preventive Suspension of Appointive Local Officials and Employees. —
(a) The local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding sixty
(60) days and subordinate official or employee under his authority pending investigation
if the charge against such official or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the
respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
(b) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended official or employee
shall be automatically reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
By: RLB
administrative proceedings against him until its termination. If the delay in the
proceedings of the case is due to the fault, neglect or request of the respondent, the
time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.
SECTION 86. Administrative Investigation. — In any local government unit, administrative
investigation may be conducted by a person or a committee duly authorized by the local chief
executive. Said person or committee shall conduct hearings on the cases brought against
appointive local officials and employees and submit their findings and recommendations to the local
chief executive concerned within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the hearings. The
administrative cases herein mentioned shall be decided within ninety (90) days from the time the
respondent is formally notified of the charges.
SECTION 87. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — Except as otherwise provided by law, the local chief
executive may impose the penalty of removal from service, demotion in rank, suspension for not
more than one (1) year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months salary, or
reprimand and otherwise discipline subordinate officials and employees under his jurisdiction. If the
penalty imposed is suspension without pay for not more than thirty (30) days, his decision shall be
final. If the penalty imposed is heavier than suspension of thirty (30) days, the decision shall be
appealable to the Civil Service Commission, which shall decide the appeal within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof. acd
SECTION 88. Execution Pending Appeal. — An appeal shall not prevent the execution of a
decision of removal or suspension of a respondent-appellant. In case the respondent-appellant is
exonerated, he shall be reinstated to his position with all the rights and privileges appurtenant
thereto from the time he had been deprived thereof.
SECTION 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. —
(a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or
indirectly, to:
(1) Engage in any business transaction with the local government unit in which
he is an official or employee or over which he has the power of supervision, or
with any of its authorized boards, officials, agents, or attorneys, whereby
money is to be paid, or property or any other thing of value is to be
transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the resources of the local government
unit to such person or firm;
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local
government unit;
(3) Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of such local
government unit for unpaid taxes or assessment, or by virtue of a legal
process at the instance of the said local government unit;
(4) Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with the local
government unit for which a surety is required; and
(5) Possess or use any public property of the local government unit for private
purposes.
(b) All other prohibitions governing the conduct of national public officers relating to
prohibited business and pecuniary interest so provided for under Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-seven thirteen (R.A. No. 6713) otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" and other laws shall also be
applicable to local government officials and employees.

SECTION 90. Practice of Profession. —
(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who
are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is
the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of
the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation
to his office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving
the local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work
only on occasions of emergency: Provided, that the officials concerned do not derive
monetary compensation therefrom.
SECTION 91. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. — (a) Officials and employees of local
government units shall file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, lists of relatives
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service, financial and
business interests, and personnel data sheets as required by law.
SECTION 92. Oath of Office. — (a) All elective and appointive local officials and employees shall,
upon assumption to office, subscribe to an oath or affirmation of office in the prescribed form. The
oath or affirmation of office shall be filed with the office of the local chief executive concerned. A
copy of the oath or affirmation of office of all elective and appointive local officials and employees
shall be preserved in the individual personal records file under the custody of the personnel office,
division, or section of the local government unit concerned. aisa dc
SECTION 93. Partisan Political Activity. — No local official or employee in the career civil
service shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any
election, initiative, referendum, plebiscite, or recall, except to vote, nor shall he use his official
authority or influence to cause the performance of any political activity by any person or body. He
may, however, express his views on current issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for
public office whom he supports. Elective local officials may take part in partisan political and
electoral activities, but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates
or subject these subordinates to any of the prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code.
SECTION 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who
Lost in an Election. —
(a) No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation
in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. cdt
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no elective
or appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
By: RLB
(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any
election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
government or any government-owned or -controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries.
SECTION 95. Additional or Double Compensation. — No elective or appointive local official or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized
by law, nor accept without the consent of Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any
kind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
double, or indirect compensation.
SECTION 96. Permission to Leave Station. —
(a) Provincial, city, municipal, and barangay appointive officials going on official travel
shall apply and secure written permission from their respective local chief executives
before departure. The application shall specify the reasons for such travel, and the
permission shall be given or withheld based on considerations of public interest, financial
capability of the local government unit concerned and urgency of the travel. Should the
local chief executive concerned fail to act upon such application within four (4) working
days from receipt thereof, it shall be deemed approved.
(b) Mayors of component cities and municipalities shall secure the permission of the
governor concerned for any travel outside the province.
(c) Local government officials traveling abroad shall notify their respective sanggunian:
Provided, That when the period of travel extends to more than three (3) months, during
periods of emergency or crisis or when the travel involves the use of public funds,
permission from the Office of the President shall be secured.
(d) Field officers of national agencies or offices assigned in provinces, cities, and
municipalities shall not leave their official stations without giving prior written notice to
the local chief executive concerned. Such notice shall state the duration of travel and the
name of the officer whom he shall designate to act for and in his behalf during his
absence.
• Resignation of an Elective Official
- Effective upon acceptance by President, Governor, Sanggunian, or Mayor, as the case
may be.
- If not acted upon by the authority within 15 working days from receipt, deemed
accepted.
NOTE: An elected official cannot resign when (a) facing recall process; or (b) facing administrative
proceeding.
Question: Who among the following local elective officials can practice his profession?
A. Mayor X who is a doctor
B. Vice-Mayor Y, who is an Engineer
C. Councilor Z, who is a lawyer
Answer in A: X, being a local chief executive, he is barred from practicing his profession, any
profession for that matter, and also barred in engaging in any occupation. The reason is that a LCE
is a full time job. But if there is an emergency and even during office hours, X, who is a doctor of
medicine, may practice provided that it is without compensation.
Answer in B: Y, being a vice mayor, so technically, he is a member of the sanggunian, and under
the LGC, members of the sanggunian can practice his profession except during session hours.

Answer in C: Z, a lawyer and a councilor, may practice his profession but he cannot appear in
court in any civil case where the adverse party is the government, he cannot appear in court in any
criminal case where an employee of the government is accused of an offense related to the office
of Councilor Z, he cannot collect any fee for his appearance in an administrative proceeding in
involving his LGU and he cannot use the property or personnel of the government unless Z is
defending the interest of the same.
• Practice of Profession
→ General Rule:
- All LCEs cannot practice profession nor engage in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as LCEs.
→ Exception:
- If he is a doctor, in which case, he can practice such profession but only in
case of emergency even during session hours without compensation.
- SP Member can practice profession or engage in any occupation except during
session hours, with certain limitations to Lawyers on grounds of conflict of
interests.
- Doctors can practice in case of emergency even during session hours without
compensation.
RECAP: Under Section 90 of the LGC, all LCE is prohibited to practice his profession other than
being an LCE. But an official can practice profession if the following concurs:
ü If the official is a LCE and also a doctor of medicine (even during office hours) —
- It is an emergency
- Without compensation (the only way to circumvent this, is not to issue a receipt.
Haha)
ü If the official is a member of the Sanggunian, he may practice his profession, engage in
an occupation or teach in a school, provided that:
- During session hours, he cannot practice
ü If the official is a lawyer, he may practice his profession, engage in an occupation or
teach in a school, but subject to the following:
- In any civil case, he cannot appear as counsel in court wherein the adverse party is
the government or any of its instrumentality.
- In any criminal case, he cannot appear as counsel in court wherein the accused who
committed an offense is an official or employee related to his office.
- In any administrative case involving the LGU of which he is an official, he cannot
collect a fee for his appearance.
- Unless he is defending the interest of the government, he cannot use any property
or personnel of the same.
LOCAL LEGISLATIONS
ORDINANCE VS RESOLUTION
ARTICLE 107 of IRR of LGC. Ordinances and Resolutions. — The following rules shall govern
the enactment of ordinances and resolutions:
(a) Legislative actions of a general and permanent character shall be enacted in the form
of ordinances, while those which are of temporary character shall be passed in the form
of resolutions. Matters relating to proprietary functions and to private concerns shall also
be acted upon by resolution.
By: RLB
(b) Proposed ordinances and resolutions shall be in writing and shall contain an assigned
number, a title or caption, an enacting or ordaining clause, and the date of its proposed
effectivity. In addition, every proposed ordinance shall be accompanied by a brief
explanatory note containing the justification for its approval. It shall be signed by the
author or authors and submitted to the secretary to the sanggunian who shall report the
same to the sanggunian at its next meeting.
(c) A resolution shall be enacted in the same manner prescribed for an ordinance, except
that it need not go through a third reading for its final consideration unless decided
otherwise by a majority of all the sanggunian members.
(d) No ordinance or resolution shall be considered on second reading in any regular
meeting unless it has been reported out by the proper committee to which it was
referred or certified as urgent by the local chief executive.
(e) Any legislative matter duly certified by the local chief executive as urgent, whether or
not it is included in the calendar of business, may be presented and considered by the
body at the same meeting without need of suspending the rules.
(f) The secretary to the sanggunian of the province, city or municipality shall prepare
copies of the proposed ordinance or resolution in the form it was passed on second
reading, and shall distribute to each sanggunian member a copy thereof, except that a
measure certified by the local chief executive concerned as urgent may be submitted for
final voting immediately after debate or amendment during the second reading.
(g) No ordinance or resolution passed by the sanggunian in a regular or special session
duly called for the purpose shall be valid unless approved by a majority of the members
present, there being a quorum. Any ordinance or resolution authorizing or directing the
payment of money or creating liability, shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of
all the sanggunian members for its passage.
(h) Upon the passage of all ordinances and resolutions directing the payment of money
or creating liability, and at the request of any member, of any resolution or motion, the
sanggunian shall record the ayes and nays. Each approved ordinance or resolution shall
be stamped with the seal of the sanggunian and recorded in a book kept for the purpose.
→ It maybe that in a particular legislative measure, it is denominated as a resolution. But if it
shown that the resolution partakes the nature and character of an ordinance, like the
legislative measure is enacted for a permanent purpose, and it undergoes the same process
as an ordinance, like there is a 3rd reading. It may still be treated as an ordinance. It is in the
nature and process.
• Municipality of Parañaque vs V.M. Realty Corp.
- We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and
"ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of
a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODIES
SECTION 48. Local Legislative Power. — Local legislative power shall be exercised by the
sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the
sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay. cdtai

SECTION 49. Presiding Officer. —
(a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan; the
city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the municipal vice-mayor of the
sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the sangguniang barangay. The
presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian
session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten (10) days from the
passage of ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session
over which he temporarily presided. cda
SECTION 50.Internal Rules of Procedure. —
(a) On the first regular session following the election of its members and within ninety
(90) days thereafter, the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules of
procedure.
(b) The rules of procedure shall provided for the following:
(1) The organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers as well
as the creation of standing committees which shall include, but shall not be
limited to, the committees on appropriations, women and family, human rights,
youth and sports development, environmental protection, and cooperatives;
the general jurisdiction of each committee; and the election of the chairman
and members of each committee;
(2) The order and calendar of business for each session;
(3) The legislative process;
(4) The parliamentary procedures which include the conduct of members
during sessions;
(5) The discipline of members for disorderly behavior and absences without
justifiable cause for four (4) consecutive sessions, for which they may be
censured, reprimanded, or excluded from the session, suspended for not more
than sixty (60) days, or expelled: Provided, That the penalty of suspension or
expulsion shall require the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) vote of all
the sanggunian members: Provided, further, That a member convicted by final
judgment to imprisonment of at least one (1) year for any crime involving
moral turpitude shall be automatically expelled from the sanggunian; and
(6) Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt.
SECTION 51. Full Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests of Sanggunian
Members. —
(a) Every sanggunian member shall, upon assumption to office, make a full disclosure of
his business and financial interests. He shall also disclose any business, financial, or
professional relationship or any relation by affinity or consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree, which he may have with any person, firm, or entity affected by any ordinance or
resolution under consideration by the sanggunian of which he is a member, which
relationship may result in conflict of interest. Such relationship shall include:
(1) Ownership of stock or capital, or investment, in the entity or firm to which
the ordinance or resolution may apply; and
(2) Contracts or agreements with any person or entity which the ordinance or
resolution under consideration may affect.
By: RLB
In the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory provision applicable to this
situation, "conflict of interest" refers in general to one where it may be reasonably
deduced that a member of a sanggunian may not act in the public interest due to some
private, pecuniary, or other personal considerations that may tend to affect his judgment
to the prejudice of the service or the public.
(b) The disclosure required under this Act shall be made in writing and submitted to the
secretary of the sanggunian or the secretary of the committee of which he is a member.
The disclosure shall, in all cases, form part of the record of the proceedings and shall be
made in the following manner: cd
(1) Disclosure shall be made before the member participates in the
deliberations on the ordinance or resolution under consideration: Provided,
That, if the member did not participate during the deliberations, the disclosure
shall be made before voting on the ordinance or resolution on second and third
readings; and
(2) Disclosure shall be made when a member takes a position or makes a
privilege speech on a matter that may affect the business interest, financial
connection, or professional relationship described herein.
SECTION 52. Sessions. —
(a) On the first day of the session immediately following the election of its members, the
sanggunian shall, by resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its regular sessions. The
minimum number of regular sessions shall be once a week for the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, and twice a month for
the sangguniang barangay.
(b) When public interest so demands, special sessions may be called by the local chief
executive or by a majority of the members of the sanggunian.
(c) All sanggunian sessions shall be open to the public unless a closed-door session is
ordered by an affirmative vote of majority of the members present, there being a
quorum, in the public interest or for reasons of security, decency, or morality. No two (2)
sessions, regular or special, may be held in a single day.
(d) In the case of special sessions of the sanggunian, a written notice to the members
shall be served personally at the member's usual place of residence at least twenty-four
(24) hours before the special session is held.
Unless otherwise concurred in by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the sanggunian members
present, there being a quorum, no other matters may be considered at a special session
except those stated in the notice.
(e) Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its proceedings which may be
published upon resolution of the sanggunian concerned. cd
QUORUM
SECTION 53. Quorum. —
(a) A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified
shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. Should a question of quorum be
raised during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately proceed to call the roll of
the members and thereafter announce the results.

(b) Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess until such time
as a quorum is constituted, or a majority of the members present may adjourn from day
to day and may compel the immediate attendance of any member absent without
justifiable cause by designating a member of the sanggunian, to be assisted by a
member or members of the police force assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned, to arrest the absent member and present him at the
session.
(c) If there is still no quorum despite the enforcement of the immediately preceding
subsection, no business shall be transacted. The presiding officer, upon proper motion
duly approved by the members present, shall then declare the session adjourned for lack
of quorum.
→ Definition: Quorum refers to the required number of members who needs to be present so
that the legislative assembly can validly or lawfully transact business.
→ In the Sanggunian,
- The quorum is the majority (50% plus 1) of all the members who have been elected
and qualified.
- Has the coercive power to compel the attendance of absent members through an arrest
order with the help of the PNP or other agencies concern.
- Unlike the Senate and House of Representatives, the Sanggunian does not possess the
power to issue subpoena or the power to cite a person in contempt in case of
disobedience.
o Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs Sanggunian Panlungsod of
Dumaguete
- The contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature.
They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist
as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local
legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without
express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
- Therefore, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, cannot be
deemed implied in the delegation of certain legislative functions to local
legislative bodies. These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter
since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena
power in any government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of
individual rights, i.e. compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to
testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have impliedly granted such
powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the
sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed
these powers in all government agencies. The intention of the sovereign
people, through their representatives in the legislature, to share these unique
and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must therefore clearly
appear in pertinent legislation.
- There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local
legislative bodies the power to issue compulsory process and the power to
punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of
power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.
Problem: The Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Politika City is composed of X, the Vice
Mayor/Presiding Officer, 10 regular members (Councilor A-J), 2 ex officio members (Liga ng Mga
Barangay and SK Presidents).
A. What is the quorum of the SP of Politika City?
B. If councilor A is on leave and Councilor B is outside the country, what is the quorum of the SP of
Politika City?
C. How many votes are required in order to suspend Councilor C for disorderly behavior?
By: RLB
Answer A: The majority of all the members of the SP who have been elected and qualified.
*Is the vice mayor/vice governor a member of the sanggunian? YES. According to Justice
Brion in the La Carlota case, in order to determine quorum, you have to include the
presiding officer because under Section 457 the Vice Mayor as presiding officer is
considered a member of the Sanggunian for purposes of quorum determination only.
Answer B: Same answer in A. Because while in the national government, in order to have a
quorum in the Senate or House of Representative, what is required by the Constitution is majority
of each house. But in the case of the members of the Sanggunian, what is required is majority of
all the members who have been elected and qualified to constitute a quorum. Thus, even if
Councilor A is on leave or Councilor B is outside the country, to constitute a valid quorum, it should
be the majority of all the members.
Answer C: Under the LGC, it is required that there should be a concurrence of at least 2/3 votes
of all the members. In determining the 2/3 votes, you do not include the presiding officer because
normally the presiding officer does not vote unless there is a tie.
• La Carlota City vs Rojo
- RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang Panlungsod "shall be composed of the
city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president
of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the panlungsod na
pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as
members." Black's Law Dictionary defines "composed of" as "formed of" or "consisting
of." As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the
presiding officer votes when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the
votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a "member" of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod considering that he is mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to
break a tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd situation
where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not
considered a "member" of the Sanggunian.
- Therefore, under the Local Government Code of 1991, the vice-governor, the city vice-
mayor, and the municipal vice-mayor, as presiding officers of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, are members
of their respective sanggunian.
- Citing Zamora vs Gov. Caballero, the court held that:
"Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally
assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper
business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass
upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act.
"Majority," when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater
than half or more than half of any total.
In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in computing the
quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely
states that "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum," Section 53 of
the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the "majority of all members of the
sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute a quorum.
Thus, the trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence
of a quorum on the total number of members of the Sanggunian without
regard to the filing of a leave of absence by Board Member Sotto. The fear that
a majority may, for reasons of political affiliation, file leaves of absence in
order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is already addressed by the

grant of coercive power to a mere majority of sanggunian members present
when there is no quorum.
A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and
duty of the sanggunian, requires the participation of all its members so that
they may not only represent the interests of their respective constituents but
also help in the making of decisions by voting upon every question put upon
the body. The acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the
parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned are legally infirm, highly
questionable and are, more importantly, null and void. And all such acts cannot
be given binding force and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done
during an unauthorized session.
- Therefore, in stating that there were fourteen (14) members of the Sanggunian, the
Court in Zamora clearly included the Vice-Governor, as presiding officer, as part of the
entire membership of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which must be taken into account
in computing the quorum.
NOTE:
• 2/3 votes of all the sanggunian members – presiding officer is NOT INCLUDED.
• Majority of all the members – presiding officer is INCLUDED
APPROVAL OF ORDINANCES and VETO POWER OF LCE
SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. —
(a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal
mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he
shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and
return the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider
the same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive
by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution
effective for all legal intents and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the
sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the
case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if
he had signed it.
(c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the
majority of all its members, be signed by the punong barangay.
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. —
(a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or
prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto
any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution
adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance
directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not
affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not
take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided;
otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year
corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted. cd
By: RLB
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The
sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of
all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the
local chief executive concerned.
→ Similar to your national law-making body, the LCE may veto or approve an ordinance. If he
approves, the ordinance becomes a validly enforceable ordinance. If he vetoes the same,
there is also the remedy of over-riding the veto of the LCE by the Sanggunian through a 2/3
votes of its members. A veto can be exercised only once.
Note: the Punong Barangay does not have a veto power nor partial veto power. So once the
Sanggunian barangay has approved an ordinance, it goes through the Punong Barangay, pirma
dayun si kapitan.
• Is partial veto allowed in the case of LGU or not?
- General Rule: if the LCE exercises veto power, he is either to veto the entire legislative
measure or approve it. Partial veto is not allowed.
- Exception: a partial veto may be done in the case of item veto, like in a appropriation
ordinance.
REVIEW OF ORDINANCES
SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. —
(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of
approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and
public investment programs formulated by the local development councils. cdtai
(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions,
the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the
provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt
examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten
(10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing
of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang
panlalawigan in making its decision.
(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond
the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The
sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the
corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken. aisa dc
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days
after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed
consistent with law and therefore valid.
SECTION 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan. —
(a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish
copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or
municipal ordinances.
(b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to
take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the
same shall be deemed approved. casia
(c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the
barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the
sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same
with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for
adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay
ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.
SECTION 58. Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances or Resolutions. — Any attempt to
enforce any ordinance or any resolution approving the local development plan and public
investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or
dismissal of the official or employee concerned.
→ The reviewing sanggunian is given 30 days within which to review an ordinance. Let’s say, a
barangay ordinance is submitted to the sanggunian panlungsod for review, and the said
sanggunian is given 30 days to review the same. And if there is inaction on the part of the
sanggunian, the ordinance is deemed approved.
→ The law says if it is not acted upon. The problem here will arise when for example Barangay
Kasambagan has enacted an ordinance ipadala didto sa sanggunian panlungsod, Cebu City.
1st, i-enter siya sa calendar and then i-refer pa man ug committee nya didto mana magdugay
kay dili usahay ma-calendar para second reading or ang committee wala pa kahimu ug report
and etc. so mulapas jud na ug 30 days. So daghan mu reklamu. But if you analyze it, when it
was already entered in the calendar and referred to the committee, it is already acted upon.
Action naman na, wala pa lang result.
That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any
newspaper of general circulation.
Articles 113 – 114 of IRR of LGC
ARTICLE 113. Effectivity of Ordinances and Resolutions. — Unless otherwise stated in the
ordinance or resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the
same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board
at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be,
and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the LGU concerned.
ARTICLE 114. Posting and Publication of Ordinance with Penal Sanctions. —
(a) Ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at conspicuous places in the
provincial capitol, or city, municipal or barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum
period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the
LGU concerned, except in the case of barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided
therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or at the
end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.
(b) Any public officer or employee who violates an ordinance may be meted
administrative disciplinary action, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate civil or
criminal action.
(c) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall transmit official copies of such
ordinances to the chief executive officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7) days
following the approval of said ordinance for publication. The Official Gazette may publish
ordinances with penal sanctions for archival and reference purposes.

→ There are ordinances that will only take effect upon compliance of certain publication
EFFECTIVITY OF ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS requirements. And under the LGC, if the ordinance has a penal provision, it must be
published. But please read Article 113 and 114 of the IRR where it mandates that there must
SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. — be posting. Awa na ninyo ha. Awa na ninyo. (basin mugawas siguro ni sa MCQ.)
(a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local
development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten
(10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of
the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at
least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned. cd

(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or
resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city,
municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local
government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or
English and in the language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the
local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such
fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.

(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned
belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province,
posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province
where the sanggunian of origin is situated. cda

(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features
of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted,
be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided,

By: RLB