Silverio v. Republic October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)
CA CASTRO 236 SCRA 257
PARTIES: petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
respondent: Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his
first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to
female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for
reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male
transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is
consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of
name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration
but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by
reason of sex reassignment.
HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed
in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or
difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the
change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of
his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that
his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the
change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the petition.
REPUBLIC VS.
FACTS:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married
in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and
was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.Defendant
Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife
since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to
live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The
cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple
parted ways. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro
wanted to put in order he marital status before leaving for the U.S.
She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking
for the judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no
marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization
of their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license
prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled
that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?
HELD:
At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970,
the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law
provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of
the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would
render the marriage void ab initio.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony
performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of
those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or
both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage
between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the parents of
the former.
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.
Facts:
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the
Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time,
Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two children were born out of
the marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s residence.
Filipina filed for legal separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and
granted the custody of their children to her.
Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and
was even choked by him when she started spanking their son when
the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new
action for legal separation was granted by repeated physical violence
and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her
petition to this Court, she assailed for the first time that there was no
marriage license during their marriage.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at
the time of the ceremony; and
2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated
at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its
absolute nullity.
Ruling:
The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is
admitted both by petitioner and private respondent. The pieces of
evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio.
In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither
petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one
year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. those
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character, are void ab initio. This is clearly applicable in this case. The
remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent
need no longer detain the Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that
the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS,
respondent. G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
Facts:
Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein
respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by machination, duress,
and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her
father. He was forced to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita
Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales.
Moreover, he alleged that there was no marriage license presented
before the solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila. Actually, it was certified 3 times on
the following dates: March 11, September 20, 1994 and July 25, 2000
that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted
these allegations of Jaime and claims that they were first civilly
married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a church on May
31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were
alleged to be recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped
from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married
to her for 25 years.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of
marriage of the parties based on the petitioner’s allegations that no
marriage license was presented before a solemnizing officer. And that
without the said marriage license, being one of the formal requisites
of marriage, the marriage is void from the beginning. This was based
on the 3 certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar Manila that
marriage license number 220792 was fictitious.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the decision of the trail court in favor of the marriage, because
the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said license with due
effort as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former
Local Civil registrar had already retired. The petitioner then filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals.
thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan that Marriage License No. 2770792, as appearing in the
marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to declare the marriage
void from the beginning
Held:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of
Marriage License No. 2770792. In the absence of showing of diligent
efforts to search for the said logbook, we can not easily accept that
absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries
therein.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
lived together for several years producing two offsprings, now adult
themselves. Thus, the instant petition was denied.
JUVY N. COSCA vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR.
Facts: Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and
Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and
Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia
B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of
Court II of the same court.
Complainants filed an administrative complaint with the OCA on
October 5, 1992 on the following charges: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery
in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of
receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of
detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from
exempted entities. The case was thereafter referred to Executive
Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for
investigation report and recommendation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge illegally solemnized
marriages.
RULING: Yes. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage
license, he is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying
(with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the
Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.The fact alone that he did not sign the
marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the
parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the
marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not
solemnize the marriage.
Contracting parties declare that they take each other as husband and
wife before the solemnizing officer. This alleged practice and
procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal,
because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the
solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband
and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
(2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage
contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. We
here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every
employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position,
from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-
bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a
Court of justice.
Requisites of marriage. On the charge regarding illegal marriages the
Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on
respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that
any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will
definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy
is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
ARANES VS OCCIANO A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge
with Gross Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of
the MTCt of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this
marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the
marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise
deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge
for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly
caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in gross ignorance of the
law when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner
HELD:
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is
limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of
the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the
law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Court
held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives
the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized
the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in
gross ignorance of the law.
Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004
Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at
the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four
years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact
with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card
from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia
returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990,
Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant
to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married. Lucia reported back
to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant
Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City.
Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others,
the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground
that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was
charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground
that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded
not guilty to the charge.
Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his
defense of good faith.
Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One
who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if
the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to
a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before
he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and
the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of
an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances
of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not
committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic.
Alcantara vs. Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007; 531 SCRA 446
FACTS:
• Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) filed a petition for annulment
of his marriage with Rosita Alcantara (respondent) before the RTC of
Manila alleging that on December 8, 1982, without securing the
required marriage license, he and respondent went to the City Hall of
Manila to look for a person who could arrange a marriage for them.
• They met a “fixer” who arranged their wedding before Rev.
Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel. They got married on that
same day, December 8, 1982. The wedding took place at the stairs in
the Manila City Hall and not in the CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.
Navarro belongs.
• They also got married at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in
Tondo, Manila on March 26, 1983.
• The alleged marriage license, appearing on the marriage
contract, was procured in Carmona, Cavite, neither party was a
resident of Carmona.
• On the request of the respondent, the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite issued a certification that Marriage
License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of the parties on December
8, 1982. However, the marriage contract states that the Marriage
License No. is 7054033.
• The petition for annulment was dismissed by the RTC of
Manila and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
• Whether the marriage is void ab initio on the ground that no
valid marriage license existed during the solemnization of the
marriage.
HELD:
• No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract or
at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. The
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite enjoys the presumption that official duty was performed and
the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct
of official business.
• Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect
its validity but the party/ies responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
• A closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the
overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license
may either read as 7054133 or 7054033. It does not detract from the
conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.
NOLLORA VS REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011 [Article 349 Revised Penal Code -
Bigamy; Article 35 - Marriage void ab initio]
FACTS:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors
that her husband of two years has another wife. She returned to the
Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted
second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8,
2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy.
When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that
money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just
asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000.
Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed
that he was a Muslim convert way back to 1992. He presented
Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he
allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim
convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the
Islam belief.
Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage.
She claimed that she does not know Jesusa and only came to know
her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is the one lawfully
married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and a
Catholic, as he told her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of
the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim
convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he
also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second
marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the
Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that
1) Atilano is legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not
been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; 3)that
Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena;
and 4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
except for the lack of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage.
and should any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be
constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to the
proposed marriage, the Court shall subject to Article 27, decide
whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal
Laws)
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil
status is "single." Both of his marriage contracts do not state that he
is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of
one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for
marriage, his omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy.
His false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded
by these omissions.

Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim
religion as his sole defense. Granting arguendo that he is indeed of
Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, he cannot
deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in
accordance with Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws .
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt
to escape criminal liability, he recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure
the criminal liability that has already been violated.

In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not in
accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the
Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim that
his marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus,
regardless of his professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from
liability for the crime of bigamy.

His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim male can
have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal
companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and
only in exceptional cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a
Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second, third or
fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife or wives,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. VS. ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
FACTS:
Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before
the sala of Judge Calo in Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their
marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her,
the marriage was a marriage in jest because she only wed the
American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged to pay him
$2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a married
state and complying with their marital obligations. The court even
sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the
marriage was void ab initio for lack of consent because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to
acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC.
According to the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a
real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented
to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.
ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent?
RULING:
NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective
by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be
(1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly
and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. None of these are present in the case.
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
Syed Azhar Abbas vs Gloria Goo-Abbas
February 12, 2014
In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of
Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to
participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the
Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the
ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage
contract signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who
celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the
alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
which states that the marriage license, based on its number, indicated
in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to someone
else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no diligence to search
for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas (for it
could be that the marriage license was issued in another
municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void
ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of
marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil
registrar’s certification enjoyed probative value as her duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of
the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this
presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it
conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued to him
nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio.” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.
GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Abbas vs Abbas
Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the
ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of
the Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When
they arrived in the Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony was
conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and
witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present
also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he
and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know the
nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage
License No 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the
MCR being issued to other couple.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.
Ruling: No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized
on January 9, 1993, the Family Code is the applicable law, particularly
Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides
the effects of the absence of the essential and formal requisites. And
Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages which are
solemnized without a license are void from the beginning in exception
to those covered by the preceding chapter.
Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the
marriage contract and testimonies to prove the existence of the said
license.
Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.
Sally Go-Bangayan vs Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre.
In 1982, while Alegre was outside the Philippines, Benjamin
developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sally’s father was
against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin
to sign a purported marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally
filed a bigamy case against Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand
filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent.
To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage
license allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is
bigamous.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license
presented by Sally was not authentic as in fact, no marriage license
was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged marriage. The
marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with
the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous
marriage to speak of.
Kho vs. Republic
Raquel Kho vs. Republic of the Philippines and Veronica Kho
G.R. No. 187462 June 16, 2016
(Void and Voidable marriages in Persons and Family Relations;
Petition for Review on Certiorari in Civil Procedure; Certification to
prove the absence of records in Evidence)
FACTS
In May 31, 1972, Raquel Kho’s parents called a clerk in the office of
the municipal treasurer to instruct him to arrange the necessary
papers for the intended marriage of their son, Raquel Kho and
Veronica Kho. In June 1, 1972, the two were married at 3 in the
morning at a church.
Claiming that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil
Registrar to apply for a marriage license and had not seen nor signed
any papers in connection to the procurement of a marriage license,
and considering the ONE DAY difference between the time the clerk
was told to obtain the papers to the actual moment of the marriage,
no marriage license could have been validly issued, Raquel Kho filed
an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage.
The RTC ruled that the marriage was void due to the lack of the
requiresite marriage license and ruled in favor of Raquel Kho.
Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the RTC and
ruled in favor of Veronica Kho.
Raquel Kho filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES
1. Whether the issues presented by the petitioner in the petition for
review on certiorari are factual in nature and whether it is proper for
the Supreme Court to delve into these issues;
2. Whether the certification issued by the local civil registrar which
attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license, must
categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office
despite diligent search;
3. Whether the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary
evidences of the lack of a marriage licence and giving weight to
unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent; and
4. Whether the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts
judgment declaring the marriage a nullity for the absence of the
requisite marriage license.
RULING
1. No, the issues in the petition are not factual in nature. However,
the rule that a question of fact is not appropriate for a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not without
exceptions, which are the following:
(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, and conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, when beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evience on which they are based;
(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(j) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record.
In the case, of the RTC and CA on the issue on whether there was a
marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent are
conflicting. Hence, it was proper for the Supreme Court to review
these findings.
2. No, in a previous case (Nicdao Carino vs. Yee Carino), the Supreme
Court considered the certification issued by the local civil registrar,
that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to
prove the non-issuance of said license.
Article 58 of the Civil Code (Note: at the time of the marriage, the
Family Code was not effective yet) makes explicit that no marriage
shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the local civil
registrar. In addition, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that
a marriage performed without a marriage license is void.
4. Yes, the CA erred in setting aside or reversing the lower courts
judgment declaring the marriage a nullity for the absence of the
requisite marriage license because the petitioner has successfully
overcome the presumed validity of the marriage by presenting the
certification of the civil registrar which was sufficient to prove the
absence of the marriage license. In addition, the respondent was not
able to prove that the marriage as valid as it is she who alleges such
validity.
Based on the certification issued by the civil registrar and the
respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license
or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was
issued. Hence, the marriage performed is null and void.
*The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside.

In the present case, the petitioner was able to present a certification

issued by the civil registrar attesting that the Office of the local civil
registrar “has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued
between the parties.”

3. Yes, the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary

evidences of the lack of a marriage licence and giving weight to
unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent because the
certification issued by the Civil Registrar coupled with the testimony
of the former Civil Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to
prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,
an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree
of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an
Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-
Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
“single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly
had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his
Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly
dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and
while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending , respondent
was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace
Recio dissolved on the ground that the Australian divorce had ended
the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to
nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated
to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce
decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce
decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot
grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
REPUBLIC vs IYOY
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Crasus Iyoy was married to Fely Iyoy in 1961 and
this marriage gave birth to five children.
Fely Iyoy eventually left for the States to provide for their family in
1984 and in less than a year sent Crasus documents to sign with
regard to a divorce that she applied for.
Crasus eventually found out that Fely married Stephen Micklus in
1985 and their relationship has conceived of a child.
Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Fely’s subsequent
marriage. The Court of Appeals in deciding this case sided with Fely.
ISSUE: Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from
the United States is valid and recognized in the Philippines?
RULING: The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate
Court’s decision. Basing from the facts, Fely only became a citizen in
1988 and acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying Micklus a year after.
This means that paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such
a way that, Fely is not yet considered an alien at the time the divorce
was acquired and therefore she does not have the capacity to
remarry and the marriage is still considered as subsisting. The Civil
Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to family laws and
status are governed by Philippine laws regardless of where they are.
Fely, being a Filipino Citizen then, is not permitted by our laws to
acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized in the
Philippines.
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
472 SCRA 114, GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 [Article 26;Divorce]
FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife
went to US to work and later became a US citizen. Thereafter he
learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce and married
another man. Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under
the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted
his petition. The SolGen's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).
RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration
of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the divorce decree is
obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry.
However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not
present competent evidence showing his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010 The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is
reversed and Court ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court
Facts: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian for further proceedings in light of the ruling.
citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the respondent
but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous
to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce
decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the foreign
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent
failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the
basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed
before the Court.

Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to

aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Decision: The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph
of Art 26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it
establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse
can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family

Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is
clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign
divorce decree with conformity to alien’s national law.

The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the
foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s
marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said
decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is void.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, GR No. 196049,
2013-06-26
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines[2]
on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment
be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;[5] and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines[11]
on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of
a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must...
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule
of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if
it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the...
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages
are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Principles:
Civil Law
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of
a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must...
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule
of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if
it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the...
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to... the rules of evidence.