SUCCESSION:

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER:

1. Modes of Acquiring or Transferring Ownership:

a. Occupation;
b. Law;
c. Donation;
d. Tradicion (Delivery);
e. Intellectual Creation;
f. Prescription; and
g. Succession.

2. Kinds of Mode:
a. Original;
b. Derivative

3. Bases for the Law on Succession (Mison):

a. Capitalist Economy – Property owners are given the freedom to dispose of their property in
accordance with their own desires.
b. Family Relations – By virtue of strong family ties, persons are presumed to own property for
their relatives.
c. Attribute of Ownership – The power to dispose is an inherent attribute of ownership.
d. Eclectic Theory – Combination of right of the family and right on private ownership.
i. Individual Necessity – It is an individual necessity to preserve the property generally
within the family based on man’s affection for his blood relatives.
ii. Social Necessity – It is a social necessity to preserve the property for certain group
of persons to ensure the continuity of ownership.

4. Bases for the Law on Succession: Family Relations and the Right of Property (Tolentino)

5. Bases for the Law on Succession (Paras):

a. Natural law obliges a person to provide for those he would leave behind;
b. Socio-economic postulate which would prevent wealth from becoming inactive or stagnant;
c. Implicit attributes of ownership would be imperfect, that is, the person is not allowed to
dispose of his property when he is already dead.
GENERAL PROVISIONS:

Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others either by his will or by operation of law.

Article 775. In this Title, "decedent" is the general term applied to the person whose property is
transmitted through succession, whether or not he left a will. If he left a will, he is also called the
testator.

NOTES:
1. Elements of Succession:
a. Mode of acquiring ownership;
b. Gratuitous Transmission;
c. Transmission of property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
to another;
d. Transmission is by virtue of death;
e. Transmission occurs either by will or by operation of law.

2. GR: All properties are transmissible.

a. Exceptions:
i. Property of Public Dominion;
ii. Human Corpse (Not a Property, According to Tolentino and Paras)
1. EXCEPTION: RA 7170. (It seems that the parts of the human corpse was
considered as property in this law)

3. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. (Article 427)

4. Rights that are not purely personal in nature are transmissible.

5. GR: Obligations are generally transmissible.

a. Exceptions:
i. Not transmissible by law;
ii. Stipulated by the parties to be non-transmissible; and
iii. Not transmissible by nature.

6. MISON CASES:
a. Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety (1956):
i. Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible
by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. (Citing Article 1311 of NCC)
ii. Contacts of suretyship (contingent liability) are transmissible.
 b. Sicad v CA (1998):
i. The decisive characteristics of a donation mortis cause was that the donor not only
reserved for herself all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but also without
the knowledge and consent of the debtor, the donated properties could not be
disposed of in any way. (Citing Bonsato v. CA)
ii. A donation that purports to be inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to
dispose of the donated property during the lifetime of the donor is in truth a donation
mortis causa.
iii. In donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the done while
the donor is still alive.

c. Scherer v. Hyland (1977, US CASE):

i. Constructive or symbolic delivery is sufficient to vest title in the donee, where there
has been unequivocal proof of deliberate and well-considered donative intent on the
part of the donor;
ii. Wagner’s act of endorsing the check and leaving it in the apartment where only
Scherer has access constituted constructive delivery which was adequate to support
a gift mortis causa.

d. Newman v. Dore (1937, US Case):

i. Straus left a last will. However, 3 days before his death, he executed trust agreements
transferring all his properties to the trustees, which affected the widow’s inheritance.
ii. The Court held that these agreements were void. There must be good faith on the
part of the husband, which does not refer to the purpose of affecting his wife, but
refers to the intent to divest himself of the ownership of the property.

Article 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.

NOTES:
1. Succession vs Inheritance:
a. Inheritance – universality or entirety of the property, rights and obligations of a person who
has died.
b. Succession – legal mode by which the inheritance is transmitted to the persons entitled to it.

2. Properties – includes real and personal properties and accessions to the properties accruing from the
moment of death to the actual receipt by the transferee.

3. Judicial administration is not essential when the deceased left no pending administration. To compel
such is unnecessary and superfluous.

4. Cause of action survives if it involves property and property rights, the injuries to the person being
merely incidental; otherwise, it does not survive.
5. PARAS CASES:
a. Nacar v. Nistal (1982):
i. Person has no obligation to pay for the debts of his stepfather.

b. Anderson v. Perkins (1961):

i. Sale by special administrator without first resolving the issue of ownership of the
exclusive property of the surviving spouse is premature.

c. Magallanes v. Kayanan (1976):

i. Probate court has no jurisdiction for final adjudication of the issue of ownership. It
must be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. It may
determine such issue, but is not conclusive.
ii. It may also determine questions of title to property if the parties voluntarily
submitted to its jurisdiction, and introduced evidence to prove ownership.

d. Mabalot v. Madela (1983)

i. MTC has jurisdiction in unlawful detainer suit an issue was whether the heirs could
continue the lease as a result of inheritance. This issue is only incidental in
determining whether the petitioners are entitled to the possession.

e. Noel v. CA (1995)
i. Right to inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity of the Civil Code are
governed by the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code.
ii. Prescriptive period to recover the share in the property sold to a 3rd person accrues
from the date of registration of the deed of sale with the RD, not from the moment
of death.

f. Viardo v. Belmonte (1962)

i. Children cannot be held personally liable despite substitution. The claim must be
against the estate of the deceased.

g. Pampalona v. Moreto (1980)

i. Heirs inherit obligations of the deceased. The heirs must deliver land sold by the
decedent before his death, but was not yet delivered.

h. Montesa v. CA (1983)
i. If the parties say that the properties were inherited from their parents and
grandparents, the properties are assumed conjugal lots of said grandparents. A
contrary conclusion would be very technical.

i. Rabadilla v. CA (2000)
i. Rights and obligations from the Codicil were transmitted to the heirs.

j. Guico v. Bautista (1960)

i. Extrajudicial settlement or ordinary partition without special proceeding for
appointment of administrator is allowed of the decedent left no debts and the heirs
are all of legal age, or if minors, represented by their judicial guardians.
6. TOLENTINO CASES:
a. Conde v. Abaya:
i. Right to claim acknowledgement or recognition as a natural/legitimate child is not
transmissible.
b. Hu Niu v. Collector of Customs
i. Assumption that the mere fact of death of a merchant makes his wife and children
merchants is not necessarily true.
c. Araneta v. Monetlibano
i. The guardian/tutor of the minor heirs may be compelled to execute the public
instrument to convey land under the contract entered by the decedent.
d. Ledesma v. McLachlin
i. Grandchild is not liable for father’s debt when the former did not inherit from the
latter.
ii. The inheritance of the grandchild from the grandparent is also not liable.

Rights EX Rights NE Obligations EX

Intransmissible personal rights Action for forcible entry or Purely Personal (Support)
by nature unlawful detainer;
1. Family Rights,
2. Marital and Parental
Authority;
3. Support;
4. Action for legal
separation/annulment/
declaration of nullity;
5. Partnership;
6. Agency;
7. Life annuity
Right to claim Compel execution of document By Contract/Stipulation
acknowledgement or necessary for convenience;
recognition as natural child
Right to hold public or private Right to continue lease contract, By Law
office of job unless otherwise provided;
Rights arising from marriage, Property right in an insurance Criminal Responsibility
either with respect to persons policy, unless otherwise
or property of the spouses provided.
Usufruct
Patria Potestas
Right of the guardian
Right to revoke donation
Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

NOTES:
1. Two Kinds of Death:
a. Actual;
b. Presumed

2. Two Kinds of Presumed Death:

a. Ordinary – 10 years or 5 years, if more than 75 years old.
b. Extraordinary – 4 years, based on circumstances provided in Article 391.

3. Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

4. Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
a. A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
b. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;
c. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four years.

5. From the moment of death, heirs acquire an interest in the undivided estate. They are co-owners.

6. Future Inheritance – any property or right not in existence or incapable of determination at the
time of the contract which a person may in the future acquire by succession.

7. Requisites for transmission of successional rights:

a. Express will of the testator within the limits prescribed by law, or in the absence of a will,
by provision of law;
b. Death of the decedent;
c. Acceptance of the inheritance
8. MISON CASES:
a. Uson v. Del Rosario (1953):
i. Future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.

b. De Borja v. Vda. De Borja (1972)

i. Presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and the settlement and
distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will is
against law and public policy.
ii. The Compromise agreement was still valid. There was no attempt to settle or
distribute the estate before the probate of the will. The object of the contract
was the conveyance of the share in the estate. The hereditary share is vested
immediately at the moment of death of the decedent. This is notwithstanding
that the actual extend of such share is not yet determined.

c. Bonilla v. Barcena (1976)

i. Rights of the heirs was vested at the moment of death, even before any judicial
declaration of heirship.
ii. The heirs may substitute the decedent in the pending civil action to quiet title.

d. Go Ong v. CA (1987)
i. The mortgage is void with regards to the rest of the estate, except Julita’s share.
ii. Judicial approval is not necessary since the mortgage was entered into in her
personal capacity, not as an administrator.
iii. The fact that the property is in custodial legis is immaterial. From the moment of
death, she became the absolute owner of her hereditary share.

e. Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons (1962)

i. Despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final
distribution of the estate in the testate proceedings, an heir may exercise the
right of legal redemption.

f. Reganon v. Imperial (1968)

i. A property in custodial egis is not attachable under the new ROC.
ii. Interest of an heir may be attached for purposes of execution even if the estate
is still in the process of settlement.

g. Ramirez v. Baltazar (1968)

i. Formal declaration or recognition of successional rights needs judicial
confirmation. However, this is subject to exceptions, such as when the
administrator fails or refuses to act. In this case, collusion was alleged hence the
heirs may institute the action to annul the foreclosure proceedings.
 h. Noceda v. CA (1999)
i. From the moment of death, the heirs become co-owner of the estate. They become
individual owners through partition. It may be done extra judicially.
ii. In this case, there was an extrajudicial settlement. Furthermore, the survey plan
delineated in red lines the portion owned by the heirs. Although there was some
discrepancies in area between these two, the Court held that the areas were
identifiable.

i. Nufable v. Nufable (1999)

i. Angel has no right to mortgage the whole property. From the moment of death, the
other heirs acquired successional rights over the property.

j. Blas v. Santos (1961)

i. Exhibit A is a compromise and a contract.
ii. It is not a contract on future inheritance because the promise was to give ½ of her
conjugal share which she will receive by operation of law. These are already in
existence at the time of execution of Exhibit A. It does not refer to any properties that
the she would inherit upon the death of her husband.

9. TOLENTINO CASES:
a. Uson v. Del Rosario (1953)
i. The decedent died in 1945. The new civil code cannot apply retroactively since there
was already vested rights in favor of the heirs.

b. Jayme v. Gamboa
i. There was no vested right for the heirs yet until the moment of death. Transitory
provisions cannot apply; hence, the natural child can inherit.

c. Quizon v. Salud
i. Title immediately passes at the moment of death. It is subject to claims of
administration, but it does not prevent immediate passage of title.
ii. Without showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed, the rights of the
plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

d. De Vera v. Galairan
i. Unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate, the
heirs may commence an ordinary action, without necessity of a previous and separate
judicial declaration of their status as such.

e. Fule v. Fule
i. When the heirs are of lawful age and the decedent left no debts, there is no reasons
for an administrator.

f. Dais v. CFI
i. Heirs have a right to intervene when they believe that the administrator’s acts are
prejudicial to their interests.

g. Arayata v. Joya
i. Administrator is entitled to possession of the property. The heir can only possess the
property if he consents to the heir’s continuing possession.
10. PARAS CASES:
a. Gabil v. Perez (1989)
i. Rights are transmitted to the heirs from the moment of death;

b. Maria Vda. De Reyes (1991)

i. Rights are transmitted from the moment of death. Estate would be held in co-
ownership by the heirs. Heir may validly dispose of his share or interest in the
property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted
to him.

c. Suarez v. CA (1992)
i. Property was sold in auction for mother’s debt. Rights are transmitted from the
moment of death. Children become co-owners of the property not because of their
mother, but through their deceased father. Petitioners are not barred from
instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.

d. Tribunal Supremo (1908)

i. For ordinary presumption, death is presumed to have occurred at the end of 10 or 5
years.

e. Judge Advocate General v. Gonzales (CA Case)

i. For extraordinary presumptive death, the person is presumed to have died at the
time of disappearance, not at the end of 4 years.

f. Jayme v. Gamboa
i. Successional Rights are governed by the law in force at the time of death. Rights are
transmitted from the moment of death. No vested rights are impaired.

g. Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon (1983)

i. If wife sells conjugal property without the husband’s consent, the heirs may question
the transaction after the death of the husband, only insofar as their inherited share
is concerned.

h. Saturnino v. Paulino (1956)

i. A co-heir may ask for cancellation of the sale of the estate by another co-heir insofar
as his share is concerned even if there are still administration proceedings.

i. Ibarle v. Po (1953)
i. Widow’s sale of conjugal property after husband’s death is not valid insofar as the
other heirs are concerned. This is so even without a formal judicial declaration of
ownership of the children.

j. Gayon v. Gayon (1970)

i. Heirs may be sued in their own right as owners even without a prior declaration of
heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding where the estate is to be
settled.
k. Palicte v. Hon. Ramolete (1987)
i. From the moment of death, the heirs own the property subject to liabilities. They may
dispose of the same even while the property is under administration. They may also
redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an administrator.

l. Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario (1999)

i. Declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, not in an
independent civil action. It involves establishment of a status or right.

m. Silverio Sr. v. CA (1999)

i. Probate court may disregard the order of preference to the administration.
ii. Probate court is not vested with the power to order the special administrator to sell
real properties pending determination of the validity of the regular administrator’s
appointment.

n. Lagonera v. Macalalaog
i. For purposes of prescription, the time during which the property was being
administered should be counted in favor of the heir.

o. Carreon v. Agcaoili (1961)

i. The right of an heir or other person unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the
estate to compel settlement of the estate in the courts for the purpose of satisfying
such lawful participation is effective only for a period of 2 years.

p. Lorenzo v. Posadas
i. The value of the estate tax is based on the value of the estate at the time of death.

q. Aruego v. CA (1996)
i. The present Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect. It will prejudice the
vested right of the private respondent. The right was vested to her by the fact that
she filed her action under the Civil Code. The action was not yet barred
notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already
deceased since private respondent was still a minor when it was filed. The trial court
never lost jurisdiction over the case despite the passage of the Family Code.

r. Sanchez v. CA (1997)
i. The waiver was valid. They waived a known and existing interest which was already
vested in them by ART 777. There is no legal obstacle to an heir’s waiver even if the
actual share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Such is
consistent with the intent of the law advocating compromise as a vehicle for the
settlement of civil disputes.

s. SSS v. Aguas (2006)

i. Where both parent’s death occurred before enactment of the new civil code, the two
groups (children of first and second marriage) shall share equally in accordance with
the old civil code.