1
1. G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working
as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February
6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed
between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-
monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was
intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner
St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who
was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial
assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of
gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then
took over the management of the business. She then discovered that
there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees,
although the records purported to show that the same were already paid.
Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the
management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and,
therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the
NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to
the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a
"volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from
February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and
(3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between
him and petitioner.4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the
questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated
August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,6 hence the present petition alleging that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court
feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional
validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has
long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The
increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and
the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and
Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that
procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first
established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14,
1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the
Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines,
the same to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and
regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the
Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination
only.9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an
aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the
Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said
provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then
been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision
for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as
last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that
the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of
the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and
executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this
Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly
of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate

review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that
there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of
review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep
the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial
rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this
Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent
remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the
reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously,
although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may
already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it
has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition
for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within
the reglementary period under Rule 65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No.
129 originally provided as follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall
exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
2
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by
R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the
Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed
within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the
lower appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the original
provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No.
7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of
the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted
and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited
powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed
to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause
therein now provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code
of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the
quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of
purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review
over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be
by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of
course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional
issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that
have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129
now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all
final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial
agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others,
"those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict
what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from
decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally
construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of
Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that
the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases
in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be
properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
3
Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by
transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor
Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have
intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code
the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for
that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902
persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the
deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used
therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the
adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there
was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This
conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been
drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report
on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his
sponsorship speech 19 from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate
jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of
Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and
of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of
the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review
of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever
benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last
paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes
from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the
Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495

seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and,
additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court
of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees
Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated
to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of
the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former
Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of
the Supreme Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the
Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which
present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact
and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly
devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its
mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the
guarantor of the people's basic rights and additional task expressly
vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land,
Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases
some five years ago. I understand we are now back to
400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the
appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to
the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all
the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice
and Human Rights requests the support and collegial
approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee
Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following
proceedings transpired: 20
4
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So
that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the
Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be
deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House
of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the
House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No.
1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its
unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The Conference
Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452,
having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the
same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme
Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the
proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the
word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could
have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original
action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and
with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil
 5

action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this
Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of
sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495. courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein.
initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
aggrieved party on this reasoning: otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the
therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said
be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly
the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition
and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A
for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof
perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in
ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action
nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute
and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth,
resolutions. 24
without pronouncement as to costs.

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the

SO ORDERED.
matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated
to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained
to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous
factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and
that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor
cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to

supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted
and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially
filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in
accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago
vs. Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:

2. G.R. No. L-62255 January 30, l986
ALFREDO BAGSICAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO AGOT and LECATEDRA
AGOT, respondents.
CUEVAS, J.:p
Petition for review of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 10054-CAR, entitled "Alfredo Bagsican, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Pedro
Agot and Lecatedra Agot, Defendants-Appellants", which reversed and set
aside the decision of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations-Branch 111,
Ozamis City, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment
is hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring the plaintiff herein, Alfredo Bagsican, the
lawful tenant on the coconut landholding in question,
situated at Buntawan, Oroquieta City;
(2) Ordering the defendants to reinstate immediately
plaintiff thereon;
(3) Ordering the defendants to pay, as damages, to
plaintiff the following:
(a) The sum of Eighty Pesos (P80.00) for the last quarter
of the year 1973 and P80.00 every quarter thereafter until
reinstated;
(b) the sum of Twenty-Five Pesos (P25.00) as actual
expenses for transportation and meals.
(4) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims for lack
of proof.
Subject matter of the instant controversy is a 4-hectare landholding
situated at Buntawan, Oroquieta City. It forms part of a big tract of land
consisting of 114 hectares, more or less, originally owned by the late
Severo Jonson, father of private respondent Lecatedra Jonson Agot.
6
The aforementioned 4-hectare landholding was originally worked on and
tenanted by Juan Bagsican, father of the herein petitioner Alfredo
Bagsican. After Juan's death, his wife, assisted by the herein petitioner,
continued tenanting the aforesaid landholding. Petitioner's mother on the
other hand died in 1940, and from then on herein petitioner continued in
working and tenanting the landholding in question thereby planting an
additional 267 coconut trees, bananas, fruit trees, cassava and other root
crops.
Severo Jonson died sometime in 1948. The big tract of land was then
partitioned among his children and the portion being worked on and
tenanted by the petitioner was alloted to Lecatedra Jonson Agot, the
herein appellee. After the partition, herein petitioner nevertheless
continued with his occupation and tenancy of the questioned landholding
thereby delivering to herein private respondent her share as an owner, on
a 50-50 sharing basis, until September, 1973 when he was ejected
therefrom by the herein private respondent that culminated in the filing by
the petitioner of a complaint for Reinstatement with Damages, 1 against
herein private respondents before the Court of Agrarian Relations.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner with the
disposition as herein earlier stated. From the aforesaid judgment, private
respondents appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which reversed and
set aside the decision appealed from. 2
Petitioner now comes before Us through the instant petition contending
among other things, that (1) the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the
"preponderance of evidence rule" instead of the mere "substantial
evidence rule" in the resolution of the instant case, the same being an
agrarian case; (2) the Court of Appeals cannot disturb the findings of fact
of the Court of Agrarian Relations on the mere issue of credibility of
witnesses; and (3) that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a
misapprehension of facts,
We find merit in petitioner's submittal that in agrarian cases, all that is
required is mere "substantial evidence". That has been the consistent
ruling of this Court in a long line of cases. 3 This substantial evidence rule
was later incorporated in P.D. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 and
has been expressly made applicable to agrarian cases. Section 18 of the
said decree provides:
The Court of Appeals shall affirm the decision or order or
the portions thereof appealed from if the findings ** of
fact in the said decision or order are supported by
substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the conclusions
stated therein are not clearly against the law and
jurisprudence. . .

Under this rule, all that the appellate court has to do, insofar as the
evidence is concerned, is to find out if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. 4 So much so that, the findings of fact of the Court
of Agrarian Relations, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive
on the appellate tribunal. 5
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence,
as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there
is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate
court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial
court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence
is entitled to belief. 6
In the case at bar, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the
petitioner on the basis of the following findings of fact:
There is abundance of undenied evidence that the late
Juan Bagsican, father of the herein plaintiff, during his
lifetime, was a former tenant of a portion of the big tract
of land owned by the late Severo Jonson, defendant's
father.
The Court, after careful examination of the evidence on
record, lends more credence to plaintiff's undisturbed
claim, substantially corroborated by his witness, that he
succeeded and is in continuous possesion and cultivation of
his parents' landholding. This started sometime in 1940,
the year his mother died, who succeeded also as tenant on
the landholding after the death of her spouse, Juan
Bagsican (plaintiff's father) who died earlier than his
mother. After his mother's death, he succeeded and
cultivated the landholding and was able to plant 267 coco
trees, bananas, fruit trees, cassava, etc., but during the
lifetime of his mother, he had however, planted 30 coco
trees. When these trees became fruit bearing in 1948,
which coincidentally was the year the big tract of land was
partitioned among the heirs of the late Severo Jonson,
plaintiff shared the harvest with the defendant Locatedra
Jonson Agot at a 60-50 sharing ratio since he was the one
who planted the coco trees (tsn, pp. 4-8, August 8, 1975;
and tsn, pp. 2-4, August 21, 1975).
The records disclose that after the estate of the late
Severo Jonson was partitioned in 1948, the tenanted
landholding of the herein plaintiff became the share or is
7
now owned by the herein defendant Lecatedra Jonson Agot
which is not denied by the latter, and as testified to by
Felicisima Jonson, brother of the defendant Lecatedra
Jonson Agot (tsn, p. 2, August 21, 1975).
Such quantum of evidence cannot be washed away by a mere denial of the
existence of tenancy relationship as that set up by the private respondents
who claimed that petitioner was never a tenant of theirs in the land folding
in question. The observation and conclusion of the trial court that said
cassava is bereft of merit appeared to be well taken, since the persons
who testified to be tenants on the said landholding, separately described
areas and boundaries different from that admitted by the parties 7 and
more so when their individual description materially differs from each
other. 8 The respondent court also took notice of said deficiency in private
respondent's evidence, but it rationalized its stand on this point in the
following manner:
The supposed discrepancies in the statement of boundaries
are understandable. Various new acquisitions had been
made re: the share of the other heirs. At any rate, this will
indicate that the defense witnesses were not iii collusion
with one another.
Anent private respondent's assertion that it was Julio Lagamon and Brigido
Lagamon, father and son, respectively, who had been tenanting the
landholding in dispute, We find the trial court's finding on the said subject,
which runs thus:
This confirm the belief of the court that these two tenants,
namely: Julio Lagamon and Brigido Lagamon, father and
son, respectively, are tenanting other portions of
defendant's land other than the land in question. This is
buttressed by the fact that Julio Lagamon, father-in-law of
the herein plaintiff became a tenant of the defendant only
sometime in 1949 after the marriage of his daughter to the
herein plaintiff (now petitioner). It could be informed that
this Julio Lagamon came to know of the defendant
Lecatedra Jonson Agot only after this marriage for prior to
this period, he was arriving in Buenavista, Pagadian City
which is located in Zamboanga del Sur. (TSN, p. 38-40,
Hearing of October 24, 1975).
to be likewise supported by the evidence on record and very much in
accord with logic and ordinary human experience.
 8

Finally, with respect to petitioner's motive in filing the instant case, We

quote with approval the court's findings and observations on said issue.
And it runs thus:

The court cannot sustain defendants' view that plaintiff's

motive in filing this case is retaliatory in nature due to the
former's criminal complaint against the latter's son,
because, as so decided in Overo vs. Caret, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 43940-R, October 27, 1971, the plaintiff..... like any
man of ordinary intelligence, would not resort to filing an
action in Court for his reinstatement as a tenant had there
been no justifiable reason therefore. Man is presumed to
take ordinary care of his concerns. Indeed, it would be
contrary to human nature if the herein plaintiff would
venture on an expensive litigation, Poor as they are, and
face the rigors of trial if they have not been done any
wrong. Even if defendants' view were true, the same could
not defeat a right which is protected by law. Besides,
plaintiff has substantially shown that he was indeed
ejected by the herein defendants as testified to by
Felicisima Jonson (TSN, pp. 4-5, August 21, 1975).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment of the

respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that
of the Court of Agrarian Relations is hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs,

SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 142571 May 5, 2006
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONCIO C. ENCISO, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision dated March 20, 2000 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59681 affirming an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141, in its
Civil Case No. 94-005, an action for a sum of money with damages thereat
commenced by the respondent against the herein petitioner, its
Administrator and its Assistant Administrator for Systems and Operations
and Equipment Management.
Succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision are
the following undisputed facts:
Records show that in 1984, defendant-appellant [petitioner] National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) commenced the widening of the Binahaan
River in Brgy. Cansamada, Dagami, Leyte. This project was divided into
small sections costing not more than P50,000.00 each so as not to require
public bidding. However, pre-bidding was nevertheless conducted by NIA
and participated in by different contractors to determine the possible
lowest bid which shall serve as the cost of the project. With this
arrangement, contractors are assigned to work on specific sections without
formal contracts. When the works for the assigned sections are completed
to NIA’s satisfaction, NIA will then prepare the requisite contract and other
pertinent documents so that the contractor can collect payment.
Plaintiff-appellant [respondent] Enciso, doing business as a contractor
under the name LCE Construction, worked on a portion of the river from
"station 16 + 400 to station 16 + 900". His first billing of P227,165.90 was
paid by NIA. However, his second and final billing of P259,154.01 was
denied on the ground that the work done on the right side of the river was
not accomplished. [Words in bracket supplied.]
Respondent finally instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money
with damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Makati City, thereat
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-005 and eventually raffled to Branch 141
thereof. Petitioner and co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss on grounds
9
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and lack of cause of action.
The RTC denied the motion and proceeded to trial.
In a decision dated February 27, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment for
respondent, as plaintiff, holding petitioner, as defendant, liable, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant National
Irrigation Administration to pay plaintiff the sum of P259,154.01 with legal
rate of interest of 12% per annum effective on 1 August 1985 until fully
paid; P50,000.00, as and for attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties went up to the Court of Appeals (CA). For its part, petitioner
contended that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss and
thereafter holding it liable to respondent. On the other hand, respondent
interposed that the trial court erred in failing to hold petitioner’s co-
defendants personally liable for damages and in adjudging petitioner NIA
solely liable based on the face value of the work accomplished in 1985.
The CA, however, found no reversible error in the appealed decision and
affirmed it as follows:1avvphil.net
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision which is
in accord with the evidence and jurisprudential principle on the matter, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Only petitioner NIA came to this Court via this petition for review raising
the following issues for resolution:
the court of appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the regional trial court
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss (annex "c" hereof) which averred,
among other things, that respondent failed to exhaust administrative
remedies available to him under the law.
the court of appeals erred in declaring that petitioner is liable to
respondent for the alleged work at petitioner’s project though the alleged
assignment was done in violation of existing rules and regulations.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Petitioner raised the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies in
its appeal before the CA, on account of respondent’s failure to file his claim
before the Commission on Audit (COA) prior to instituting a complaint for

collection of sum of money with the RTC. Instead of addressing the
question, however, the CA discussed NIA’s separate and distinct corporate
personality from the government or the State, which is a non-issue. What
the CA failed to rule upon is, given the fact that NIA is a government
entity vested with a separate corporate personality from the State,
whether NIA, being a government entity disbursing public funds or tax-
payers’ money is subject to the jurisdiction of COA such that any claim for
collection of sum of money against it, specially in this instance where it is
not covered by any written contract, must be initially lodged before the
COA.
The issue should have been resolved in the affirmative.
Among the powers vested upon COA as provided for in Section 26,
Presidential Decree No. 1445, are the following:
SECTION 26. General jurisdiction. – The authority and powers of the
Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to
auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general
accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining
thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the
books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and
settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property
received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the
examination, audit, and settlement of all claims of any sort due from or
owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or
controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-
governing boards, commissions, agencies of the Government, and as
herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the
government, those funded by donations through the government, those
required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the
government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the
government. [Emphasis supplied.]
COA, as one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, is
specifically vested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust by the
government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. To
ensure the effective discharge of its functions, COA has been empowered,
subject to the limitations imposed by Article IX(D) of the 1987
Constitution, to define the scope of its audit and examination and establish
the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting
and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.2
10
In the instant case, when determining the regularity of disbursement of
public funds by the petitioner NIA for the alleged services rendered by
respondent in the widening project involving a portion of Binahaan River in
Barangay Cansamada, Dagami, Leyte more specifically, from station 16 +
400 to station 16 + 900 thereof, the accounting and auditing principles,
rules and regulations set by COA must be taken into consideration. In this
light, it is highly doubtful whether respondent may compel petitioner NIA’s
officers to release payment of his claims without any previously approved
contract for the supposed river-widening project in violation of existing
COA rules and regulations, without subjecting said official to administrative
and/or personal liabilities and/or accountabilities.
Be that as it may, for the supposed refusal or failure by the concerned
public officials to act over respondent’s money claim or even the mere
inaction for an unreasonable period, the proper and immediate remedy of
the respondent was to file his claim with the COA, such inaction or refusal
to pay being tantamount to disallowance of the claim. Only after COA has
ruled on the claim, may the injured party invoke judicial intervention by
bringing the matter to this Court on petition for certiorari.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a doctrine of long standing and
courts have clear guidelines on the matter. Paat vs. Court of
Appeals3 wrote:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be
sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s
cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and
legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It
is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give
the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error
and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of
cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual
and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when
there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
 11

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on

the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in
land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

Petitioner had timely raised this ground to dismiss the action before the
RTC, and since there is no showing that respondent’s case falls under any
one of the accepted exceptions, petitioner’s motion to dismiss should have
been granted, forthwith dismissing the case for lack of cause of action.

Anent the second issue, the legality or regularity of petitioner’s payment of

respondent’s claim may be best addressed in a proper case before the
COA, considering that there might be factual matters involved therein,
which is definitely not within the province of the present petition for review
on certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and respondent’s Complaint before the
RTC is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action, with costs against
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

14. G.R. No. 139583 May 31, 2000
CRUSADERS BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISION and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to nullify the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision
of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC, for brevity)
denying petitioner's request for renewal of its temporary permit to operate
DWCD-FM, and recalling its assigned frequency.
Undisputed are the pertinent facts, to wit:
The petitioner, Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. (Crusaders, for
short), was the grantee of Temporary Permit No. BSD-0459-92 to operate
10-KW DWCD-FM at a frequency of 97.9 Mhz.
On July 12, 1994, Mr. Cesar A. Dumlao, Chairman of Crusaders, sent to
the Commission a letter (Exh. "A") requesting permission to stop the
broadcast of DWCD-FM for around a month starting July 12, 1994, so as to
renovate its 20-year old Broadcast Booth and the entire facilities of the
station.
Subsequently, upon application of Crusaders, NTC renewed Temporary
Permit No. BSD-0814-94, dated December 14, 1994, covering the period
from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1996. Again, on December 12,
1996, Crusaders applied for another renewal of its Temporary Permit.
Acting on subject application, the NTC caused the inspection of the radio
station of Crusaders and per report of NTC-National Capital Region, which
conducted such ocular inspection on February 21, 1997, the station of
Crusaders was inoperative. Acting upon such finding, the Broadcast
Service Division of the NTC recommended the cancellation and revocation
of the permit of Crusaders and the recall of its frequency 97.9 Mhz.
Thus, on April 25, 1997 the Commission wrote Chairman Cesar A. Dumlao
of Crusaders, informing the latter of the denial of his application for the
renewal of Crusaders' Temporary Permit.
Crusaders presented a motion for reconsideration, thru its counsel, Atty.
Felino Canal, explaining that Crusaders was not able to resume its
operations because of the institution of Civil Case No. 64739 before the
12
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 163, by Conamor Broadcasting
Corporation (Conamor, for brevity), against Crusaders Broadcasting
System, Inc. and of the issuance of an order of injunction by the said
Court enjoining Crusaders from operating its radio station.
On July 14, 1997, the Commission issued a show-cause Order directing
Crusaders to explain: (1) Why its application for renewal of Temporary
Permit for station DWCD-FM should not be denied; (2) Why its station,
DWCD-FM, should not be ordered closed; and (3) Why its station DWCD-
FM assigned frequency should not be recalled.
On August 5, 1997, Atty. Feline Ganal filed an "Urgent Motion For
Extension" for the filing of Crusaders' answer/explanation. Such motion
was followed by a second "Urgent Motion For Extension", dated August 15,
1997, and a third motion for extension, dated August 22, 1997.
On August 28, 1997, for failure of Crusaders to submit a responsive
pleading, the Commission issued an order declaring Crusaders in default,
and, thereafter, handed down its decision recalling the assigned frequency
of Crusaders.
The following day, or on February 29, 1997, to be precise, Atty. Ganal filed
an Answer, averring that the show-cause order was served upon him and
not upon his client Crusaders and therefore, it was only upon the filing of
its answer that Crusaders should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the Commission. It was further alleged that
Crusaders is a grantee of a congressional franchise (RA No. 8091) but it
could not yet resume its operation because its transmitter was taken by
Conamor by virtue of an order of injunction issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 64739; that it has already applied with
Commission for authority to acquire an additional transmitter; that the
said injunction was already lifted and set aside by the same trial court, in
an Order dated August 27, 1997; that it has mobilized its resources
towards the operation of its radio station and that it has, in fact, made a
test broadcast.
On September 22, 1997, Crusaders filed an "urgent Motion for New Trial
and/or Reconsideration" praying for the lifting of the order of default,
setting aside of the decision, and for the reopening of the case.
After hearing, the Commission granted the motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration and declared the case reopened for reception of evidence
by Crusaders in order to afford it ample opportunity to be heard and to
substantiate its defense as regards the show-cause order issued by the
Commission. The initial evidence presented in support of the motion for
new trial and/or reconsideration was later adopted as Crusaders evidence
in the main case.

Then, the Commission came out with its assailed decision, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Commission
believes and so holds that respondent's request for
renewal of its temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM
should be, as it is, hereby DENIED.
Consequently, respondent's assigned frequency, 97.9 Mhz,
is hereby withdrawn and recalled, the same to be assigned
without reasonable delay to the best qualified applicant.
SO ORDERED.2
Crusaders' next step was to go to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed
its petition for lack of merit.
Undaunted, Crusaders found its way to this Court via the present petition
for review.
It is petitioner's submission that the NTC committed a grave reversible
error in considering as untenable the temporary stoppage of Crusaders'
broadcast. Petitioner insists that were it not for the order of injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, which prohibited it from
broadcasting, and caused the seizure of its transmitter, antenna, and other
equipment, its station could have resumed operations.
Petitioner contends further that had the NTC approved its application,
dated December 12, 1995, for the acquisition of a new transmitter, it could
have re-started to operate DWCD-FM despite the "Court's injunction order.
In short, petitioner maintains that its failure to operate is not unjustified
because the stoppage of its broadcasting was not due to its own fault or
negligence.
It is likewise petitioner's stance that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In upholding the finding of NTC that the "Programming
and Marketing Agreement" with Conamor Broadcasting
Corporation "to be one for a joint venture, which is a
flagrant violation of Radio laws in that it would allow a non-
franchise grantee to operate a public utility;
2. In finding, in general terms, that "the findings of the
respondent NTC are supported by substantial evidence and,
therefore, should be "accorded respect and finality"; and
13
3. In upholding the NTC decision under the so-called
"doctrine of primary jurisdiction."
Crusaders likewise assigned some substantive and procedural errors on
the part of the NTC but the same were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner theorizes that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the
decision of NTC, which denied the renewal of its temporary permit to
operate DWCD-FM and caused the withdrawal of its assigned frequency.
On the other hand, respondent NTC, through the Office of Solicitor General
(OSG), countered that the NTC was justified in denying petitioner's
application for renewal of temporary permit and in recalling its assigned
frequency. Anent the issue of the shifting of burden of proof, it alleges that
the show-cause order dated July 14, 1997 was based on the inspection
reports, dated February 21, 1997 and July 11, 1997, respectively, which
indicated that petitioner failed to rehabilitate its broadcast booth and other
facilities. Consequently, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioner.
Respondent also contends that subject inspection reports need not be
authenticated and identified by competent witnesses, the same being
public documents; citing Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that "Documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.
Indeed, it appears decisively clear that the assailed NTC decision is
anchored on substantial evidence.
The issue at bar may be encapsulated thus: Whether or not the NTC
properly denied the application for renewal of Crusaders' temporary permit
to operate DWCD-FM, and validly ordered the withdrawal of the latter's
assigned frequency.
Sec. 1 of Act No. 38463 reads:
Sec. 1. No person, firm, company, association or corporation shall
construct, install, establish, or operate a radio transmitting station,
or a radio receiving station used for commercial purposes, or a
radio broadcasting station, without having first obtained a
franchise therefor from the Congress of the Philippines: . . .
While Section 3 of the same Act provides:
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications is
hereby empowered, to regulate the construction or

manufacture, possession, control, sale and transfer of radio
transmitters or transceivers (combination transmitter-receiver)
and the establishment, use, the operation of all radio stations
and of all form of radio communications and transmissions
within the Philippines: In addition to the above he shall have
the following specific powers and duties:
(1) He may approve or disapprove any application for
renewal of station or operator
license: Provided, however, That no application for
renewal shall be disapproved without giving the licensee
a hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
It should be noted that by virtue of Executive Order (E.O) No. 546,
creating the Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Transportation and
Communications, the regulation of radio communications is a function
assigned to, and being performed by, the NTC.
Petitioner does not deny and in fact, uses it as the reason for the stoppage
of its broadcast that, it was the filing of the aforementioned civil case
against it (petitioner) which grounded DWCD-FM's broadcasting. It is not
disputed, either, that what prompted Conamor to bring a complaint
against petitioner was the latter's rescission of a "Programming and
Marketing Agreement", which gave Conamor the following rights and
privileges akin to those of an owner, among others, to wit:
(a) The sole discretion to determine and implement whatever
programs are deemed suitable to make the station
competitive;
(b) The full discretion to change the station call letters, name,
slogan or tagline and such other services that bear upon the
station's identity to improve the station's market position;
(c) The acquisition, at its expense, of a new transmitter,
studio, broadcast equipment recording booth, including cost
of construction; and
(d) A share in the net profit at the rate of 65%, leaving only
35% to respondent, when the new facilities of Conamor
became operational. (Exhibits "E-2" and "E-2-a")
It is uncontested as well, that under the said Agreement, Conamor was
free from any claim arising from employer-employee relationship.
14
In order to settle the civil case, Crusaders and Conamor later entered into
a "Compromise Agreement" which superseded the programming and
marketing agreement. The Court approved compromise containing the
following conditions:
1. Upon execution hereof, the parties hereby agree to jointly
operate DWCD-FM at its original office and Broadcasting Station at
No. 209 Dela Paz Street, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila;
2. The parties shall equally share in the expenses as well as in the
profits or losses, as the case may be, while they are jointly
operating the radio station;
3. The plaintiff shall immediately return the radio station's official
transmitter, antenna system and other available equipment of
DWCD-FM from the Strata 200 Building, Emerald Avenue, Pasig
City, Metro Manila to the above Mandaluyong City office of
defendant;
4. The parties further agree that in the event the subject DWCD-
FM would be sold or assigned to a third part, the written consent of
the plaintiff shall be indispensably necessary to give effect and
validity to any such sale, assignment or disposition of the said
radio station;
5. In case of sale, assignment or any disposition of the subject
radio station to any third party, 78.94% of the proceeds thereof
shall go to the defendant (3.57% of which shall be paid to Atty.
Feline Canal a s (sic) his attorney's fees) while the remaining
21.06% shall belong to the plaintiff. (Exhibit "J")
The said compromise agreement speaks for itself. Conamor has been
given the right to operate and manage a radio station despite the clear
mandate of the Radio Law that only holders of a legislative franchise can
do so. Even on this ground alone, Crusaders can be prevented by the NTC
from broadcasting. That the said ground was not reflected in the show-
cause order does not mean that the same cannot be raised thereafter by
the NTC, as it has done in the present case, when it gleaned a basis
therefor during the administrative proceedings, from the evidence
presented by the petitioner itself the substance of the agreement between
petitioner and Conamor. The said findings were not rebutted by petitioner
which kept on harping only on the alleged unfairness of NTC in the
application of its procedures as well as on the existence of the said civil
case against it and on the refusal of NTC to approve its application for the
acquisition of a new transmitter.
 15

On the matter of factual findings by the NTC as to the inoperativeness of
subject radio station, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
said findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence
is such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. As aptly stressed upon and ratiocinated
by the Court of Appeals:
In the main, therefore, the findings of the respondent NTC are
supported by substantial evidence. As to whether or not it should
have adopted a policy of leniency is a matter that is addressed
solely to its discretion.
The Court upholds the primary jurisdiction exercised by the NTC and
quotes with approval the following opinion of the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Moreover, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents this Court
from "arrogating unto itself" the authority to resolve a controversy
which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed of a special
competence. (Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167 [1997]). As
held in Villaflor v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 297 [1997], which
reiterates the rulings in Ismael, Jr. and Co. v. Deputy Executive
Secretary, 90 SCRA 673 [1990] and Concerned Officials of MWSS
v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502 [1995]:

As in the case of other administrative agencies, the technical Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question
matters involved are entrusted to NTC's expertise. In the matter of which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
issuance of licenses to operate radio stations, it is in a better especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
position than the courts to determine to whom such privilege should administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
be granted in order that public interest will be served. As long as its experience and services to determine technical and intricate matters
decisions are supported by substantial evidence, they are entitled to of fact. 5
respect from the courts.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) numbers and the petition for review under consideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
among those administrative agencies discharging specialized No pronouncement as to costs.
functions, in this case, the regulation of the nation's airwaves. As in
the case of other administrative tribunals, its findings of fact will be SO ORDERED.
accorded respect, and on occasion, even finality, by reason of their
acquired expertise on specific matters within their particular
jurisdiction. (Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 269 SCRA 199 [1997];
Malonzo v. Commission on Elections, 269 SCRA 380 [1987] (sic);
Naguiat v. National Labor Relations Commission, 269 SCRA 564
[1997]). The only requirement is that its decisions must be
supported by substantial evidence, which need be neither
overwhelming nor preponderant (Manila Central Line Corporation v.
Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of
Labor, 290 SCRA 690 [1998]).4

Neither can the Court find merit in the submission by petitioner that the
stoppage of its broadcast would not have happened were it not for the
case for injunction filed against it. In the first place, the said case could
not have been instituted had petitioner not entered into a programming
and marketing agreement with Conamor. What is more, it does not dispute
the finding of NTC that it (petitioner) could have resumed broadcasting
had it complied with the Order of RTC-Pasig to observe the formal
requirements for a motion to lift the order of injunction on the basis of a
counterbond. Such a simple step petitioner failed to take, and its failure to
put up a counterbond engendered the stoppage of its operations for three
years and rendered the stoppage of its operation justified.

5. G.R. No. L-107330 December 17, 1993
EDGAR N. RAPISORA, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This petition for certiorari with mandamus seeks to set aside Resolution
No. 92-1214 dated 3 September 1992 1 of the respondent Civil Service
Commission denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
Commission's Resolution No. 92-699 dated 26 May 1992 2 which
disapproved the permanent appointment of petitioner as Provincial Health
Officer I, Integrated Provincial Health Office, Benguet Province. The
dispositive part of Resolution No. 92-699 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission resolves that:
the appointment of Dr. Edgar N. Rapisora as Provincial Health
Officer I, Integrated Provincial Health Office, Benguet be
disapproved; and, the action of Director E. Tadle-Herrera of CSC-
DOH be set aside.3
Petitioner was the Chief of Hospital of the Kalamansig District Hospital in
the Province of Sultan Kudarat, Mindanao, when he learned that the
position of Provincial Health Officer I of Benguet would become vacant. He
forthwith applied for the said position. A committee was created by the
Department of Health to screen applicants for the vacant positions in the
Department including the position applied for by petitioner.
On 5 November 1991, then Secretary of Health, Honorable Alfredo R.A.
Bengzon designated herein petitioner as officer-in-charge of the Office of
the Provincial Health Officer I, Integrated Provincial Health Office of
Benguet. 4Thereafter, he was extended a permanent appointment, by
transfer with promotion, on 24 December 1991. 5Petitioner actually
assumed the duties of the position on 2 January 1992.
When petitioner assumed office as Provincial Health Officer I on 2 January
1992, the new Local Government Code had taken effect on 1 January
1992, for which reason respondent, through Director E. Tadle-Herrera,
CSC-DOH, returned to the Secretary of Health petitioner's appointment
calling the Secretary's attention to Section 463, Chapter 2, Title IV of the
Local Government Code of 1992. 6 Hence, the secretary of Health,
Honorable Antonio O. Periquet who had succeeded Secretary Alfredo R.A.
Bengzon, wrote Benguet Governor Andres R. Bugnosen seeking his
concurrence in the appointment of petitioner and informing the Governor
that the Department of health after a formal screening and evaluation by
its executive committee believed that petitioner was the most appropriate
16
person to assume the position in question. Governor Bugnosen concurred
with petitioner's appointment.7
On 3 April 1992, petitioner's appointment was approved by the Field
Officer of the respondent, Director E. Tadle-Herrera as TEMPORARY,
"(P)ending promulgation of the guidelines on who will be the appointing
authority pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991."8
Petitioner appealed to respondent Commission, seeking reconsideration of
his appointment from temporary to permanent which was the appointment
extended to him by the Secretary of Health. Respondent instead set aside
the action of Director E. Tadle-Herrera and entirely disapproved
petitioner's appointment on the ground that he did not possess a
Certificate/Master in Public Health/Hospital Administration which is the
educational requirement for the position at the time of appointment, in
accordance with DOH qualification standards. Moreover, according to
respondent, the Local Government Code of 1992 already took effect when
petitioner assumed office on 2 January 1992, so that in accordance
therewith, the Provincial Health Officer I should be appointed by the local
chief executive concerned with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Sanggunian, subject to Civil Service Law.
The issues raised in the present petition 9 may be simplified to whether or
not respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion in disapproving petitioner's permanent appointment as
Provincial Health Officer I of Benguet Province.
We find the petition meritorious.
Petitioner was extended a permanent appointment even before the Local
Government Code took effect, after he went through a rigid interview by
the Executive Committee created by the Department of Health to screen
applicants for available positions in the Department. Under DOH
qualification standards for the position of Provincial Health Officer I, the
appointee must meet the following requirements.
Education: Doctor of Medicine with a certificate/Master in Public
Health/Hospital Administration
Experience: 5 years experience in planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating and supervising various public health and medical
activities.
Eligibility: RA 1080 (Physician) 10
True enough, petitioner did not possess a Certificate/Master in Public
Health/Hospital Administration at the time of his appointment. Apparently,
then Health Secretary Bengzon decided that petitioner's other
 17

qualifications, such as, his training and experience in hospital other qualities required for successful performance. It is, thus, the
administration offset or made up for his deficiency in educational QS which provides for the considerations upon which the appointing
requirement. Prior to his appointment to the position in question, authority decides when the levels of education or experience may be
petitioner held the position of Chief of Hospital, Kalamansig District sufficient to offset each other. 11
Hospital, Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat. In addition, while in foreign
employment from 1976 to 1985, he served as officer-in-charge of two (2) As repeatedly ruled by the Court, the Civil Service Commission is not
general hospitals in Nigeria and attended seminars, symposia, workshops, empowered to determine or change the kind of nature of the appointment,
clinical conferences, and trained newly-graduated Nigerian physicians in for it is an essential discretionary power and must be performed by the
general surgery. These training and experience must have been taken into officer on whom its is vested according to his best lights, the only
account by Health Secretary Bengzon when he extended a permanent condition being that the appointee should possess the minimum
appointment to petitioner, which appointment his successors, Honorable qualification required by law. In the case at bench, then Secretary of
Antonio O. Periquet and the incumbent Honorable Juan M. Flavier, also Health, Honorable Alfredo R.A. Bengzon, and his successors, Honorable
recommended for approval by the Civil Service Commission. Antonio O. Periquet and Ho. Juan M. Flavier, believe that petitioner
possesses the necessary qualifications required by law for the position. It
Respondent finds untenable petitioner's contention that his deficiency in is worthy to note that respondent Commission had approved the
educational requirement (Master in Public Health/Hospital Administration) appointment of a former Public Health Officer I in Benguet, Dr. Emilio B.
can be offset by his training and experience. It maintains that petitioner Cadayona, who at the time of his appointment in 1988 did not also
should at least have earned for himself some units or started pursuing possess a Certificate/-Master's degree in Public Health/Hospital
such particular educational requirements as allegedly required by the rule Administration but, like petitioner, was a holder of the Degree of Doctor of
on substitution. Medicine. The Court suggests that respondent look more closely into its
own resolutions and be consistent in resolving the qualifications of
We do not agree. This rule cannot be strictly interpreted as to curtail an appointees.
agency's discretionary power to appoint as long as the appointee
possesses other qualifications required by law. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court sets aside Resolution No.
92-699, dated 26 May 1992, and Resolution No. 92-1214, dated 3
Recently, this Court held: September 1992 of respondent Civil Service Commission, and orders the
respondent Commission to approve petitioner's permanent appointment as
It would be appropriate to state at the outset that when necessary, Provincial Health Officer I, Integrated Provincial Health Office, Benguet
education, experience or training may be used interchangeably to Province.
offset deficiencies (in fact, the CSC issued Memorandum Circular No.
23 series of 1991 expressly allowing the offsetting of deficiencies
SO ORDERED.
except the required eligibility). The necessity exists if the
appointee's training or experience is of such a level that the same
would more than supplement the deficiency in education considering
the demands of the position in question. The converse holds true if
the appointee's deficiency is in the required training or experience.
The decision as to when the conditions give rise to a necessity to
interchange education with experience and vice-versa rests upon the
sound discretion of the appointing authority. This is not to be viewed
as an unbridled license given to the appointing authority to appoint
whomsoever he desires. This is rather a recognition of the fact that
the appointing authority is in the best position to determine the
needs of his department or agency and how to satisfy those needs.
Moreover, it is precisely the province of the QS to provide the gauge
by which the appointing authority shall exercise his discretion. The
QS has been defined in Section 20, PD 807 as expressing the
minimum requirements for a class of position in terms of education,
training and experience, civil service eligibility, physical fitness and
 18

7. G.R. No. 129616 April 17, 2002

2. ANINO, RAMON 1st grade xxx 70

THE GENERAL MANAGER, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA)
and RAMON ANINO, petitioners,
vs.
JULIETA MONSERATE, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This petition for review on
certiorari1seeks to set aside the Decision dated
June 20, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 39670,2 declaring
null and void the Resolution No. 952043 dated March 21, 1995 and
Resolution No. 956640 dated October 24, 1995 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), and ordering the reinstatement of Julieta G. Monserate
as Division Manager II of the Resources Management Division, Ports
Management Office, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Iloilo City.
The facts are:
Julieta Monserate, respondent, started her government service in
1977 as Bookkeeper II in the Port Management Office, PPA, Iloilo
City. Barely a year later, she was promoted to the position of
Cashier II and then as Finance Officer (SG-16) in 1980.3
In the early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a reorganization,
respondent applied for the permanent position of Manager II (SG-19) of
the Resource Management Division, same office. The Comparative Data
Sheet4accomplished by the PPA Reorganization Task Force shows the
ranking of the six (6) aspirants to the said position, thus:
"COMPARATIVE DATA SHEET
OFFICE: PMO ILOILO
DIVISION: RES. MANAGEMENT
DIVISION
POSITION: DIVISION MANAGER
REQUIRED CS ELIG.: CS PROF / RA 1080
3. TEODOSIO, APRIL PD 907 (CPA) xxx 67
4. MORTOLA, DARIO CS Prof. xxx 67
5. ESPINOSA, AMALIK Bar xxx 63.5
6. PERFECTO, RA 1080 xxx 59.5"
BASCOS
On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of the
PPA, appointed5 respondent to the position of Manager II (Resource
Management Division). On even date, respondent assumed office and
discharged the functions thereof. On July 8, 1988, the CSC, through
Guillermo R. Silva (Assistant Director of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA)
approved her appointment.
Meanwhile, on April 18, 1988, petitioner Ramon Anino, who ranked second
to respondent per the Comparative Data Sheet earlier quoted, filed an
appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting against
respondent's appointment. The PPA Appeals Board, in a Resolution6 dated
August 11, 1988, sustained the protest and rendered ineffective
respondent's appointment based on "(1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par.
3;7 (2) CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B;8 and (3) Civil
Service Eligibility." These grounds were not explained or discussed in the
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board upholds the
appointment of Ramon A. Anino as Resources Management
Division Manager of the Port Management Office of Iloilo."
On October 24, 1988, respondent was furnished a copy of PPA Special
Order No. 479-889 (entitled "Creation of the PPA Manager's Pool"), dated
September 28, 1988, issued by the new PPA General Manager, Mr. Rogelio
A. Dayan. That Special Order excluded the name of respondent from the
pool-list and placed instead the name of petitioner as Manager II,
Resource Management Division. In effect, the Special Order implemented
the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board. 1âwphi1.nêt

Aggrieved, respondent filed with the PPA General Manager an

appeal/request for clarification dated November 2, 1988.10 She questioned
CANDIDATES ELIGIBILITY xxx TOTAL her replacement under PPA Special Order No. 479-88, claiming that the
proceedings before the PPA Appeals Board were irregular because (1) she
1. MONSERATE, CS Prof. xxx 79.5 was not notified of the hearing before it; (2) she was not furnished a copy
JULIETA of the August 11, 1988 PPA Appeals Board Resolution or a copy of the

protest filed by petitioner Anino;11 (3) she was not informed of the reasons
behind her replacement; and (4) their Port Manager (in Iloilo City), who
was then an official member of the Board, was not included in the said
proceedings.
On November 8, 1988, pending resolution of her appeal/request for
clarification, respondent received a copy of PPA Special Order No. 492-
8812 dated October 21, 1988, also issued by General Manager Dayan. This
PPA Order officially reassigned her to the position of Administrative Officer
(SG-15) which was petitioner Anino's former position and was lower than
her previous position as Finance Officer (SG 16) before she was appointed
as Division Manager.
Apparently at a loss with the turn of events, coupled by the inaction of PPA
General Manager Dayan on her earlier appeal/request for clarification,
respondent filed on November 25, 1988 a "precautionary appeal"13 with
the CSC. She manifested that as of said date (November 25), she has not
yet been furnished a certified copy of the PPA Appeals Board Resolution.
On January 2, 1989, respondent received a copy of her new appointment
as Administrative Officer dated October 1, 1988.14 It was also during this
time when she learned that PPA General Manager Dayan had just issued
petitioner's appointment dated October 21, 1988 as Manager II in the
Resource Management Division effective February 1, 1988.
On January 16, 1989, respondent filed with the CSC an appeal formally
protesting against petitioner Anino's appointment and at the same time
questioning the propriety of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA
Appeals Board. This appeal remained pending with the CSC for more than
six (6) years despite respondent's requests for early resolution. In the
meantime, she assumed the position of Administrative Officer.
Eventually, the CSC, in its Resolution No. 95-204315 dated March 21, 1995,
dismissed respondent's appeal, thus:
"It is well-established rule that an appointment, although approved
by this Commission, does not become final until the protest filed
against it is decided by the agency or by the Commission.
Although Monserate had already assumed the position of RMD
Manager II, the appointing authority may still withdraw the same if
a protest is seasonably filed. This is covered by Section 19, Rule VI
of the Omnibus Rules implementing EO 292 x x x.
"Monserate's claim that she is more qualified than Anino is not
relevant to the issue before this Commission. In cases of protest
filed or appealed to the Commission, the main question to be
19
resolved is whether or not the appointee meets the qualification
standard. x x x. The Commission will not disturb the choice of the
appointing authority as long as the appointee meets the
qualification prescribed for the position in question."
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the CSC in its Resolution No. 95-6640 dated October 24, 1995.
In due time, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review impleading as respondents the PPA General Manager and petitioner
Anino.
On June 20, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision16 nullifying the
twin Resolutions of the CSC. It ruled that the August 11, 1988 Resolution
of the PPA Appeals Board was not supported by evidence and that the
same was irregularly issued due to lack of proper notice to respondent
with respect to the Board's proceedings. It concluded that her
reassignment from the position of Manager II, Resource Management
Division (SG-19), to the position of Administrative Officer (SG-15) was a
demotion violative of her constitutional right to security of tenure and due
process. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:
"THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring as null and void Resolution Nos. 952043 and 95640
(should be 956640) dated March 21 and October 21, 1988 (should
be October 24, 1995), of the Civil service Commission; and
directing the reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of
Resource Management Division Manager II.
"SO ORDERED."
Thereupon, Ramon Anino and the PPA General Manager filed on August
14, 1997 the present petition. On November 30, 1997, petitioner Anino
retired from the government service.17
Petitioners ascribe to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUISLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT MONSERATE WAS DEMOTED FROM RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT DIVISION MANAGER TO ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICER, THUS VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALIGNING
ITSELF WITH THE WELL-NIGH RULE THAT RESPONDENT
MONSERATE'S APPOINTMENT AS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
DIVISION MANAGER, ALTHOUGH APPROVED BY CSC, DOES NOT

BECOME FINAL UNTIL THE PROTEST FILED AGAINST HER IS
FAVORABLY DECIDED IN HER FAVOR BY THE AGENCY OR THE
CSC.
III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF
JUDGMENT IN IGNORING THAT IN CASES OF PROTEST FILED OR
APPEALED TO THE CSC, THE MAIN QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED IS
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPOINTEE MEETS THE QUALIFICATION
STANDARD.18
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not there was due process
when respondent was replaced by petitioner Anino from her position as
Manager II, Resource Management Division, and demoted as
Administrative Officer.
Petitioners vehemently aver that respondent was never demoted since
demotion, being in the nature of administrative penalty, presupposes a
conviction in an administrative case. Here, respondent was not charged of
any administrative case. Rather, she was displaced from her position as an
"aftermath of the PPA reorganization, authorized by law, the
implementation of which having been carried out with utmost good faith."
Furthermore, the said displacement was just the necessary effect of the
August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board which sustained
petitioner Anino's timely protest against respondent's appointment.
Petitioners theorize that the appointment of respondent as Resource
Management Division Manager did not become final until the protest filed
against her was favorably decided in her favor by the CSC. In support of
this contention, they cited Section 19, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), which provides inter alia:
"SEC 19. An appointment, though contested, shall take effect
immediately upon its issuance if the appointee assumes the duties
of the position and the appointee is entitled to receive the salary
attached to the position. However, the appointment, together with
the decision of the department head, shall be submitted to the
Commission for appropriate action within 30 days from the date of
its issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective
thereafter. Likewise, such appointment shall become
ineffective in case the protest is finally resolved against the
protestee, in which case, he shall be reverted to his former
position."
Petitioners also contend that the head of an agency, being the appointing
authority, is the one most knowledgeable to decide who can best perform
the functions of the office. The appointing authority has a wide latitude of
20
choice subject only to the condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. Consequently, "the CSC acted rightly when
it did not interfere in the exercise of discretion by the PPA appointing
authority, there being no evidence of grave abuse of discretion thereof or
violation of the Civil Service Law and Rules."
The petition is unmeritorious.
In the first place, the PPA reorganization in 1988 has nothing to do with
respondent's demotion from the contested position of Manager II,
Resource Management Office (SG-19), to the lower position of
Administrative Officer (SG-15). Antithetically, it was precisely because of
the said reorganization that respondent applied to the higher position of
Division Manager II. In fact, the Comparative Data Sheet accomplished by
the PPA Reorganization Task Force itself shows that respondent ranked No.
1, while petitioner Anino ranked No. 2, from among the six (6) contenders
to the said post. Respondent was eventually issued a permanent
appointment as such Division Manager on February 1, 1988 by then PPA
General Maximo Dumlao, Jr., during which time she actually assumed
office and discharged its functions. This appointment was later approved
on July 8, 1988 by the CSC, through Assistant Director Guillermo R. Silva
of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA.
Clearly, it was only after the reorganization and upon the issuance of the
August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board when respondent
was demoted to the lower position of Administrative Officer. This is further
shown by the following orders and appointments subsequently issued by
then PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan:
1. PPA Special Order No. 479-88 dated September 28, 1988 which
excluded respondent Monserate from the PPA Managers' pool-list;
2. Appointment of respondent, dated October 1, 1988, to the
position of Administrative Officer;
3. PPA Special Order No. 492-88 dated October 21, 1988 which
officially reassigned respondent to the position of Administrative
Officer; and
4. Appointment of petitioner Anino, dated October 21, 1988, to the
position of Manager II, Resource Management Division, effective
February 1, 1988.
Therefore, contrary to petitioners' claim, respondent was demoted, not by
reason of the PPA reorganization in 1988, but due to the PPA Appeals

Board Resolution dated August 11, 1988 sustaining petitioner Anino's
protest against respondent's appointment.
Unfortunately for petitioners, this Court cannot accord validity to the
August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board which "upholds the
appointment of Ramon A. Anino as Resource Management Division
Manager." But how can it uphold his appointment when he was not yet
appointed then? It bears stressing that he was appointed on a much later
date - October 21, 1988, or more than two (2) months after August
11, 1998 when the PPA Appeals Board Resolution was
issued. Stated differently, the PPA Appeals Board could not uphold an
appointment which was not yet existing.
Equally questionable are the grounds for respondent's demotion stated in
the August 11, 1998 Resolution: "(1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3; (2)
CSC MC NO. 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B; and (3) Civil Service
Eligibility." These grounds are incomprehensible for lack of discussion or
explanation by the Board to enable respondent to know the reason for her
demotion.
We uphold the Court of Appeals' finding that the August 11, 1998 PPA
Appeals Board Resolution was void for lack of evidence and proper notice
to respondent. As aptly held by the Appellate Court:
"In the August 11, 1988 Resolution by the PPA Appeals Board
(Ibid., p. 46) upholding the appointment of the private respondent
(Ramon Anino) as Division Manager, the grounds against
petitioner's (Julieta Monserate) appointment were: a) the CSC MC
No. 5, s. 1988, Par 3; b) the CSC MC No. 10, 2. 1986, Par. A, 1.2
and Par. B; and c) Civil service eligibility.
"x x x
"To us, the August 11, 1988 Resolution by the PPA Appeals Board
was not supported by evidence. Of the CSC MC No. 5, the
petitioner had no pending administrative or criminal case at the
time of her appointment as Manager. x x x.
"With respect to the CSC MC No. 10, Par. A (1.2) and Par. B, the
processing, review, evaluation and recommendation of her
appointment as Manager II, passed several committees created by
the PPA. x x x. Moreover, she had a 1.9 average performance
rating compared to the private respondent who only got 2.03. x x
x.
21
"On eligibility, she has a Career Service Professional eligibility
while the private respondent only has a First Grade Civil Service
Eligibility.
"She added that she was not aware of any proceeding on her
demotion as a Division Manager. As a matter of fact, it was only
upon her iniative sometime during the latter part of November,
1988 that she was able to obtain a copy of the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the Appeals Board. The resolution sustained the
private respondent's appointment as Division Manager even if on
August 11, 1988, he was not yet extended any appointment. As a
matter of fact, he was appointed only on October 1, 1988 (should
be October 21, 1988).
"Furthermore, she said that the resolution of the PPA Appeals
Board appears irregular, if not null and void. She was never
notified of any proceeding; she was not furnished either a copy of
the resolution. What she received instead was a Special Order
dated September 29, 1988 already ordering her demotion. She
was not at all given the opportunity of defending herself before the
Appeals Board.
"x x x.
"In the case now before us, the petitioner did not receive or was
not given a copy of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the Appeals
Board. She did not even know that she was demoted until after
she received a copy of the of the Special Order No. 479-88."19
From all indications, it is indubitable that substantial and procedural
irregularities attended respondent's demotion from the position of Manager
II, Resource Management Division, to the lower position of Administrative
Officer. Indeed, her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her
appointment as Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional
rights to security of tenure and due process. In Aquino vs. Civil Service
Commission,20 this Court emphasized that "once an appointment is issued
and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service
under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable,
right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by
the constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation
of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous
notice and hearing."
Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in
the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in
the civil service.21 However, the moment the discretionary power of
appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and
 22

functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by In fine, the rule is that where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer,
the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the emoluments
cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in good faith. This
revocation of respondent's appointment by demoting her. Respondent's rule, however, cannot be applied squarely on the present case in view of
security of tenure guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution [Article IX-B, its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assumed under protest the
Section 2, par. (3)] should not be placed at the mercy of abusive exercise position of Administrative Officer sometime in the latter part of 1988,
of the appointing power.22 which position she currently holds. Since then, she has been receiving the
emoluments, salary and other compensation attached to such office. While
Parenthetically, when the Court of Appeals reinstated respondent to her her assumption to said lower position and her acceptance of the
legitimate post as Manager II in the Resource Management Division, it corresponding emoluments cannot be considered as an abandonment of
merely restored her appointment to the said position to which her right to her claim to her rightful office (Division Manager), she cannot recover full
security of tenure had already attached. To be sure, her position as backwages for the period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She
Manager II never became vacant since her demotion was void. In is entitled only to backpay differentialsfor the period starting from her
this jurisdiction, "an appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of her actual
service is null and void ab initio."23 reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager. Such backpay
differentials pertain to the difference between the salary rates for the
positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid
We now delve on the backwages in favor of respondent.
by petitioner Anino corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed
the contested position up to the time of his retirement on November 30,
The challenged Court of Appeals Decision ordered the reinstatement of 1997.1âwphi1.nêt
respondent without awarding backwages. This matter becomes
controversial because respondent assumed the lower position of
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision of the
Administrative Officer during the pendency of her protest against
Court of Appeals dated June 20, 1997
petitioner Anino's appointment to the contested position. Also, petitioner
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that petitioner Ramon A.
Anino retired from the service on November 30, 1997.
Anino is ordered to pay respondent Julieta Monserate backpay differentials
pertaining to the period from the time he wrongfully assumed the
In this respect, while petitioner Anino's appointment to the contested contested position of Manager II up to his retirement on November 30,
position is void, as earlier discussed, he is nonetheless considered a de 1997.
facto officer during the period of his incumbency.24 A de facto officer is one
who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions
SO ORDERED.
under color of an appointment or election, even though such appointment
or election may be irregular.25 In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals,26 this Court
ruled that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de
facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his
wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the office
in good faith and under color of title. A de facto officer, not having a good
title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de
jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period of his
wrongful tenure. In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive
Secretary,27 this Court allowed a de facto officer to receive emoluments for
actual services rendered but only when there is no de
jure officer, thus:

"x x x in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto

officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate action recover
the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office."

8. G.R. No. L-23258 July 1, 1967
ROBERTO R. MONROY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE DEL ROSARIO, respondent.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal,
when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as
representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was
filed with the Commission on Elections. Three days later, or on September
18, 1961, petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy.
The Commission on Elections, per resolution,1 approved the withdrawal.
But on September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-
mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory
that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate
of candidacy in question.
Upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, held in the suit for
injunction instituted by petitioner against respondents that (a) the former
had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy
was filed on September 15, 1961; (b) respondent del Rosario became
municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such on September
21, 1961; (c) petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries
to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to
the time he can reassume said office; and (d) petitioner must pay
respondent P1,000.00 as moral damages.1äwphï1.ñët
This judgment was, on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals,
affirmed in toto except for the award of moral damages which was
eliminated. The same Court reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner's filing a
motion to reconsider. Hence, this petition for certiorari to review the ruling
of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner first argues that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals
had done what they had no jurisdiction to do — review a resolution of the
Commission on Elections. The submission is without merit.
The Constitution empowers the Commission on Elections to
x x x decide, save those involving the right to vote,
all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and
the appointment of election inspectors and of other election
officials x x x . 2 (Emphasis supplied)
23
And the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on these
administrative questions are reviewable only by the Supreme Court.3 Since
the powers of the Commission are limited to matters connected with the
"conduct of elections," necessarily its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
are likewise limited to controversies connected with the "conduct of
elections." This phrase covers all the administrative process of preparing
and operating the election machinery so that the people could exercise
their right to vote at the given time.4 All questions and controversies that
may arise therefrom are to be resolved exclusively by the Commission,
subject to review only by the Supreme Court.
However, in this case there appears to be no decision, order or ruling of
the Commission on any administrative question or controversy. There was
no dispute before the Commission. Respondent never contested the filing
of petitioner's certificate of candidacy. Neither has he disputed before that
body the withdrawal thereof. And even if there was a controversy before
the Commission, the same did not and could not possibly have anything to
do with the conduct of elections. What the parties are actually
controverting is whether or not petitioner was still the municipal mayor
after September 15, 1961. This purely legal dispute has absolutely no
bearing or effect on the conduct of the elections for the seat of
Congressman for the first district of Rizal. The election can go on
irrespective of whether petitioner is considered resigned from his position
of municipal mayor or not. The only interest and for that matter,
jurisdiction, of the Commission on Elections in this regard is to know who
are the running candidates for the forthcoming elections, for that affects
the conduct of election. So when petitioner withdrew the certificate
announcing his candidacy for Congressman, as far as the Commission
could be concerned, petitioner was no longer interested in running for that
seat. The matter of his having forfeited his present position and the
possible legal effect thereon by the withdrawal of his certificate was
completely out of the picture. Hence, that purely legal question properly
fell within the cognizance of the courts.
Now the withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner
to his former position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code providing that —
Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an
office, other then the one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing
of his certificate of candidacy,"
makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing
of the certificate of for another office. Only the moment and act of filing
are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever
and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted
 24

official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
in Castro v. Gatuslao, 98 Phil, 94, 196:
x x x The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of
filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into
account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon
future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable since the
vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy x x x . (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner's contention that the certificate of candidacy was filed without
his knowledge and consent and, hence, the Commission's approval of its
withdrawal invalidated such certificate for all legal purposes, is untenable.
It nowhere appears that the Commission's resolution expressly invalidated
the certificate. The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent
legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be
subsequently withdrawn. Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals expressly found as a fact that the certificate in question was
filed with petitioner's knowledge and consent. And since the nature of the
remedy taken by petitioner before Us would allow a discussion of purely
legal questions only, such fact is deemed conceded.5
Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals likewise
erred in affirming a lower court judgment requiring petitioner to pay
respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages the salaries he was
allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of
petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor. In support of this he relies
solely upon Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil. 724, holding that a senator who had
been proclaimed and had assumed office but was later on ousted in an
election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of
senator, and can retain the emoluments received even as against the
successful protestant. Petitioner's factual premise is the appellate court's
finding that he was a de facto officer when he continued occupying the
office of mayor after September 15, 1961.
by the incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to that office by the vice-
mayor because of the operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code. The
established precedent invoked in the Rodriguez case can not therefore be
applied in this case.
It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a public
office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter
during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the
office in good faith and under color of title"6 that applies in the present
case. The resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to
the de facto officer who did actual work is recognized; but it is far more
cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not
for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the
protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts
of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful
officers.7 The question of compensation involves different principles and
concepts however. Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is
decisive. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his
risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount
of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the
public office.8
Wherefore, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is,
as it is hereby, affirmed in toto. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

However, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Rodriguez case is
not applicable here for absence of factual and legal similarities. The
Rodriguez case involved a senator who had been proclaimed as duly
elected, assumed the office and was subsequently ousted as a result of an
election contest. These peculiar facts called for the application of an
established precedent in this jurisdiction that the candidate duly
proclaimed must assume office notwithstanding a protest filed against him
and can retain the compensation paid during his incumbency. But the case
at bar does not involve a proclaimed elective official who will
be ousted because of an election contest. The present case for injunction
and quo warranto involves the forfeiture of the office of municipal mayor