EN BANC

RE: LETTER OF JUDGE A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC

AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 37,
APPEALING FOR JUDICIAL
CLEMENCY.
Present :
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
September 19, 2007

x-------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In a letter dated July 18, 2007, Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of
Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, informed the Court
that he is an applicant for judgeship in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court
branches in Metro Manila. In connection therewith, he was interviewed by the
Judicial and Bar Council on July 10, 2007. He was told to seek judicial clemency
due to the fact that he was once fined P20,000 for not hearing a motion for
demolition. He claims that this lapse happened only once as a result of oversight.
He requests judicial clemency and, in particular, that he be allowed to again be
nominated to one of the vacant branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila or
in any of the cities where [his] application [is being] considered.

In a subsequent letter,[1] Judge Diaz stated that he has been the presiding
judge of Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City since March
1, 1995. He expressed deep remorse for the lapse for which he was held
administratively liable in Alvarez v. Diaz.[2] He confessed that [t]he stain of the
penalty has taught [him] a bitter lesson and promised to avoid the commission of
the same or similar acts. He submitted himself to the judicious discretion of this
Court for whatever action the Court may take on his plea for judicial clemency.

In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when
he granted the following motions: (1) a motion for execution which was fatally
defective for lack of notice to the defendant and (2) a motion for demolition
without notice and hearing. His action on the motion for demolition also made
him liable for grave abuse of authority.[3] He was fined P20,000.[4]

Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides:
SEC. 5. Disqualification. The following are disqualified from being
nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman:

1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;

2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals;
and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an
administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a
fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted
judicial clemency. [5] (emphasis supplied)
 Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated
for appointment to any judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial
clemency is granted.

Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has
come down hard[6] and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the
judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial
conduct.[7] This is because a judge is the visible representation of the law and of
justice.[8] He must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of
a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official
duties but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.[9] His
character must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny because
the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system.[10]

Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be

balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will
grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a
showing of potential and promise are indispensable.[11]

In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision

over all courts and all personnel thereof,[12] the Court lays down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.[13] These shall include

but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding
 of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct
will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty[14] to
ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving
him a chance to redeem himself.[15]
4. There must be a showing of promise[16] (such as intellectual aptitude,
learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant
skills), as well as potential for public service.[17]
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.

In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past
malfeasance. He humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three
years have elapsed since the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure
that he has learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in
the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the institution. Thus, the
Court may now open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for him.

Accordingly, the letter dated July 18, 2007 of Judge Augustus C. Diaz is
hereby NOTED. His request for judicial clemency is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A, QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

[1]
Dated August 28, 2007.
[2]
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1283, 03 March 2004, 424 SCRA 213.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id.
[5]
The disqualification in the second clause of Section 5, Rule 4(3) of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council
applicable to those found guilty in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of
more than P10,000 means that the person was found guilty of at least a less serious charge. Under
Section 11(B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a less serious charge is penalized with either suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months or a fine
of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. The disqualification does not apply to someone found
guilty of a light charge because under Section 11(B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court the maximum
penalty imposable in such a case shall not exceed P10,000.
[6]
Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-90-447, 16 December 1994, 239 SCRA 268.
[7]
Junio v. Rivera, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-91-565, 05 October 2005, 472 SCRA 69.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., supra.
[12]
Section 6, Article VIII, CONSTITUTION.
[13]
Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., supra. See also Junio v. Rivera, Jr., supra.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

LIGAYA MANIAGO, A.C. No. 7472

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, March 30, 2010

Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007

filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for
engaging in the practice of law despite having been suspended by the Court.
 Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata,
a Japanese national, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City,
Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 699-2002.The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with office
address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. Complainant then learned from
the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the
Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in
court. Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case (Civil Case No. 355-
0-2005) and another case (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata
before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his
counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the
practice of law for her flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful
order of the Supreme Court.

In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her
client, Miyata. She, however, denied that she was under suspension when she
appeared as his counsel in the cases.

Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against

her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the
penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon
receipt of the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a
Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court
that she was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she
actually did.

A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting

Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on
March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist from practicing law and revoking
her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive
was rather questionable, respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in
due deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for
Clarification with the Supreme Court on account of Judge Farrales letters to all
courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in Zambales, which gave the
impression that Atty. De Diosis not yet allowed to resume her practice of law and
that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is revoked. Acting on
the said motion, the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise:

A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) Respondents

Urgent Motion for Clarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that the Court
declare her to have served her six (6) months (sic) suspension and her
resumption of law practice on 17 November 2001 onwards as proper
is NOTED.

Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty.
Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her
recommencement of law practice on 17 November 2001 as PROPER pursuant
to the Resolution dated 30 January 2002.

Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of

complainant Maniago, during which she allegedly practiced law, she was neither
suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The complaint, she added,
was baseless and malicious, and should be dismissed outright.
In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter
to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the complainant to file a
supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of Atty.
De Dios and the particular courts where respondent appeared as counsel in the
following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-2005;
and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.

In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit

in the vernacular, which reads:

2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the Philippines vs.

Hiroshi Miyata ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula
April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach ang Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional
Trial Court[,] Olongapo City.

3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty.

de Dios noong October 10, 2005, nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula sa
Branch 73, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153
 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong September 26, 2005 at hanggang
ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.

4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox Copy ng

Minutes of the Session ng Subic Municipal Trial Court na kung saan ay nag[-
]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case No. 042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo,
plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido noong December 14, 2001.

5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de Dios, x x x

-

5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17,
2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil
Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1)
araw pa lamang mula magsimula ang kanyang suspension
noon[g] May 16, 2001.

5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001
entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma. Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and
Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang
(2) araw mula magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong
May 16, 2001.

5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit

executed by Carolina C. Bautista noong May 16, 2001, (b)
Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at
(c) isang Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May
16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na ito ay ginawa noong
nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16,
2001.

6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay sa mga

nakasaad base sa aking personal na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak ko
upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty. de Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat
ni Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na may
petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty. de Dios na nagsimula ang
kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.

A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there

were no new matters raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that the
opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as contained in her letter
dated 12 February 2007, cannot supersede the Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of
this Honorable Court. According to her, the resolution should be the final nail to
the coffin of this case.
 On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the
Courts consideration.

The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her

affidavit was the OBCs reply to an inquiry made by the Office of the Court
Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De Dios.[1] Therein, the OBC made it
clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic, following the
pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises,
Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo
de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de
Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which states:

The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would
have satisfactorily shown his compliance with the Courts resolution is a caveat
that his suspension could thereby extend for more than six months. The lifting
of a lawyers suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in
the Courts decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the
end of the period is necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice
of his profession.[2]

Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s)
of his compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the
practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after
evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a
resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the
practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was
overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her
practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing through
the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives
from the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on
the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice
of law.

The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.

 It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere
privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme
Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.[3] Whenever
it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also
the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him
the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.[4] However,
as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at
the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and
right to exercise his profession unreasonably.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the

following guidelines be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order
suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from
the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the
penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is

immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration
thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final
and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent
shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of
the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from
the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the
period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local

Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where
 respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where
he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of

respondents compliance with the order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the

lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On official leave)

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice


On official leave.

Acting Chief Justice in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno per Special Order No. 826 dated March 16, 2010.
[1]
Letter signed by Atty. James D.V. Navarrete Assistant, Officer-in-Charge, Legal Office, Office of the Court
Administrator.
[2]
See A.C. No. 3066, entitled J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. Eduardo de Vera, et al.,
and A.C. No. 4438, entitled Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al.; Memorandum dated
November 14, 2008 addressed to Justice Consuelo Yares-Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division.

[3]
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May
9, 2005, 458 SCRA 209, 216.
[4]
Hernandez v. Go, A.C. No. 1526, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 1, 9.