G.R. No.

L-30452 September 30, 1982

MERCURY DRUG CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
NARDO DAYAO, ET AL., respondents,

Caparas & Ilagan for petitioner.

Gerardo P. Cabo Chan and Elias Banzali for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated March 30, 1968 in
Case No. 1926-V and the Resolution of the Court en banc dated July 6, 1968 denying two separate motions for
reconsideration filed by petitioners and respondents.

The factual background of Case No. 1926-V is summarized by the respondent Court of Industrial Relations as
follows:

This is a verified petition dated March 17, 1964 which was subsequently amended on July 31,
1964 filed by Nardo Dayao and 70 others against Mercury Drug Co., Inc., and/or Mariano Que,
President & General Manager, and Mercury Drug Co., Inc., Employees Association praying, with
respect to respondent corporation and its president and general manager: 1) payment of their
unpaid back wages for work done on Sundays and legal holidays plus 25c/c additional
compensation from date of their employment up to June 30, 1962; 2) payment of extra
compensation on work done at night; 3) reinstatement of Januario Referente and Oscar Echalar to
their former positions with back salaries; and, as against the respondent union, for its
disestablishment and the refund of all monies it had collected from petitioners.

In separate motions, respondent management and respondent union move to dismiss, the first on
the ground that:

I. The petition states no cause of action.

II. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the claims of petitioners Januario Referente
and Oscar Echalar.

III. There is another action pending between the same parties, namely, Mercury Drug Co., Inc.,
and/or Mariano Que and Nardo Dayao.

while on the other hand, the second alleges that this Court has no jurisdiction over the acts complained of against the
respondent union.

For reasons stated in the Order dated March 24, 1965, two Court resolved the motions to dismiss,
as follows:

1. Ground No. 1 of management's motion to dismiss was denied for lack of merit.

2. Its second ground was found meritorious and, accordingly Januario Referente and Oscar
Echalar were dropped as party petitioners in this case.

3. The third ground was denied, holding that there still exists the employer- employee relationship
between Nardo Dayao and the management.

4. With respect to the fourth ground, the Court held that on the basis of section 7-A of C.A. No.
444, as amended by R.A. No. 1993, 'it can be safely said that,

counting backward the three (3) year prescriptive period from the date of the filing of the instant
petition - March 20, 1964 - all-of petitioners' claims have not yet prescribed.'

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 5. In so far as respondent union's motion is concerned, the Court held that 'petitioners' cause of
action against the respondent Association should be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of
the same as an unfair labor practice case.'

Only the respondent management moved to reconsider the Order of March 24, 1965 but the same
was denied by the Court en banc in a resolution dated August 26, 1965. Respondent submitted an
answer to the amended petition which was subsequently amended on January 6, 1966, containing
some admissions and some denials of the material averments of the amended petition. By way of
affirmative and special defenses,, respondents alleged that petitioners have no cause of action
against Mariano Que because their employer respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc., an existing
corporation which has a separate and distinct personality from its incorporators stockholders
and/or officer, that the company being a service enterprise is excluded from the coverage of the
Eight Hour Labor Law, as amended; that no court has the power to set wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment to the extent of disregarding an agreement
thereon between the respondent company and the petitioners, and of fixing night differential
wages; that the petitioners were fully paid for services rendered under the terms and conditions of
the individual contracts of employment; that the petition having been verified by only three of the
petitioners without showing that the others authorized the inclusion of their names as petitioners
does not confer jurisdiction to this Court; that there is no employer-employee relationship between
management and petitioner Nardo Dayao and that his claim has been released and/or barred by
another action and that petitioners' claims accuring before March 20, 1961 have prescribed."
(Annex "P", pp. 110-112, rollo).

After hearing on the merits, the respondent court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the March 30,
1968 decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves that:

1. The claim of the petitioners for payment of back wages correspoding to the first four hours
work rendered on every other Sunday and first four hours on legal holidays should be denied for
lack of merit.

2. Respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc.. is hereby ordered to pay the sixty- nine (69)
petitioners:

(a) An additional sum equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular

salaries for services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays during the period
from March 20. 1961 up to June 30, 1962; and

(b) Another additional sum or premium equivalent to 25% of their respective

basic or regular salaries for nighttime services rendered from March 20, 1961 up
to June 30, 1962.

3. Petitioners' petition to convert them to monthly employees should be, as it is hereby, denied for
lack of merit.

4. Respondent Mariano Que, being an officer and acted only as an agent in behalf of the
respondent corporation, should be absolved from the money claims of herein petitioners whose
employer, according to the pleadings and evidence, is the Mercury Drug Company,, Inc.

To expedite the computation of the money award, the Chief Court Examiner or his authorized
representative is hereby directed to proceed to the office of the respondent corporation at Bambang
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the latter to make available to said employee its records, like time
records, payrolls and other pertinent papers, and compute the money claims awarded in this
decision and, upon the completion thereof, to submit his report as soon as possible for further
disposition of the Court.

Not satisfied with the decision, the respondents filed a motion for its reconsideration. The motion for
reconsideration, was however, denied by the Court en banc in its Resolution dated July 6, 1968.

Petitioner Mercury Drug Company, Inc., assigned the following errors in this petition:

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 RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN DECLARING THE CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT,
EXHIBITS "A" AND "B", NULL AND VOID AS BEING CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
AND IN SUSTAINING, ACCORDINGLY, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS FOR 25%
SUNDAY AND LEGAL HOLIDAY PREMIUMS BECAUSE SUCH DECLARATION AND
AWARD ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THUS INFRINGING
UPON THE CARDINAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER; AND ALSO BECAUSE THE
VALIDITY OF SAID t CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT HAS NOT BEEN RAISED.

II

RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN SUSTAINING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS FOR

NIGHTTIME WORK PREMIUMS NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE DECLARED POLICY ON
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FREEDOM EX. PRESSED IN REPUBLIC ACT 875 AND THE
EXPRESS PROHIBITION IN SECTION 7 OF SAID STATUTE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF
THE WAIVER OF SAID CLAIMS AND THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THEREON.

III

RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN MAKING AWARDS IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS WHO NEITHER GAVE EVIDENCE NOR EVEN APPEARED TO SHOW
THEIR INTEREST.

Three issues are discussed by the petitioner in its first assignment of error. The first issue refers to its allegation that
the respondent Court erred in declaring the contracts of employment null and void and contrary to law. This
allegation is premised upon the following finding of the respondent court:

But the Court finds merit in the claim for the payment of additional compensation for work done
on Sundays and holidays. While an employer may compel his employees to perform service on
such days, the law nevertheless imposes upon him the obligation to pay his employees at least
25% additional of their basic or regular salaries.

No person, firm or corporation, business establishment or place of center of

labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal
holidays unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of
his regular remuneration: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That this prohibition shall
not apply to public utilities performing some public service such as supplying
gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportation or
communication. (Section 4, C. A. No. 444) (Emphasis supplied)

Although a service enterprise, respondent company's employees are within the coverage of C. A.
No. 444, as amended known as the Eight Hour Labor Law, for they do not fall within the category
or class of employees or laborers excluded from its provisions. (Section 2, Ibid.)

The Court is not impressed by the argument that under the contracts of employment the petitioners
are not entitled to such claim for the reason that the same are contrary to law. Payment of extra or
additional pay for services rendered during Sundays and legal holidays is mandated by law. Even
assuming that the petitioners had agreed to work on Sundays and legal holidays without any
further consideration than their monthly salaries, they are not barred nevertheless from claiming
what is due them, because such agreement is contrary to public policy and is declared nun and
void by law.

Any agreement or contract between employer and the laborer or employee contrary to the
provisions of this Act shall be null and void ab initio.

Under the cited statutory provision, the petitioners are justified to receive additional amount
equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular salaries for work done on Sundays and legal
holidays for the period from March 20, 1961 to June 30, 1962. (Decision, pp. 119-120, rollo)

From a perusal of the foregoing statements of the respondent court, it can be seen readily that the petitioner-
company based its arguments in its first assignment of error on the wrong premise. The contracts of employment
signed by the private respondents are on a standard form, an example of which is that of private respondent Nardo
Dayao quoted hereunder:

Mercury Drug Co., Inc. 1580 Bambang, Manila

October 30, 1959

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 Mr. Nardo Dayao
1015 Sta. Catalina
Rizal Ave., Exten.

Dear Mr. Dayao:

You are hereby appointed as Checker, in the Checking Department of MERCURY DRUG CO.,
INC., effective July 1, 1959 and you shall receive an annual compensation the amount of Two
Thousand four hundred pesos only (P2,400.00), that includes the additional compensation for
work on Sundays and legal holidays.

Your firm being a Service Enterprise, you will be required to perform work every day in a year as
follows:

8 Hours work on regular days and-all special Holidays that may be declared but with the 25%
additional compensation;

4 Hours work on every other Sundays of the month;

For any work performed in excess of the hours as above mentioned, you shall be paid 25 % additional compensation
per hour.

This appointment may be terminated without notice for cause and without cause upon thirty days written notice.

This supersedes your appointment of July 1, 1959.

Very truly yours,

MERCURY DRUG CO., INC.

(Sgd.) MARIANO QUE General Manager

ACCEPTED WITH FULL CONFORMITY:

(Sgd.) NARDO DAYAO

(EXH. "A" and "l ")
(Decision, pp. 114-115, rollo)

These contracts were not declared by the respondent court null and void in their entirety. The respondent court, on
the basis of the conflicting evidence presented by the parties, in effect: 1) rejected the theory of the petitioner
company that the 25% additional compensation claimed by the private respondents for the four-hour work they
rendered during Sundays and legal holidays provided in their contracts of employment were covered by the private
respondents' respective monthly salaries; 2) gave credence to private respondents', (Nardo Dayao, Ernesto Talampas
and Josias Federico) testimonies that the 25% additional compensation was not included in the private respondents'
respective monthly salaries and 3) ruled that any agreement in a contract of employment which would exclude the
25% additional compensation for work done during Sundays and holidays is null and void as mandated by law.

On the second issue, the petitioner-company reiterated its stand that under the,- respective contracts of employment
of the private respondents, the subject 25 % additional compensation had already been included in the latter's
respective monthly salaries. This contention is based on the testimony of its lone witness, Mr. Jacinto Concepcion
and pertinent exhibits. Thus:

Exhibit A shows that for the period of October 30, 1960, the annual compensation of private
respondent Nardo Dayao, including the additional compensation for the work he renders during
the first four (4) hours on every other Sunday and on the eight (8) Legal Holidays at the time was
P2,400.00 or P200.00 per month. These amounts did not represent basic salary only, but they
represented the basic daily wage of Nardo Dayao considered to be in the amount of P7.36 x 305
ordinary working days at the time or in the total amount of P2,144.80. So plus the amount of
P156.40 which is the equivalent of the Sunday and Legal Holiday rate at P9.20 basic rate of P7.36
plus 25% thereof or P1.84) x 17, the latter figure representing 13 Sundays and 4 Legal Holidays of
8 hours each. ...

xxx xxx xxx

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 That the required minimum 25% Sunday and Legal Holiday additional compensation was paid to
and received by the employees for the work they rendered on every other Sunday and on the eight
Legal Holidays for the period October, 1959 to June 30, 1962 is further corroborated by Exhibits
5, 6, 8, 9 and 9-A and the testimony of Mr. Jacinto Concepcion thereon. (Brief for the Petitioner,
pp. 24, 27).

The aforesaid computations were not given credence by the respondent court. In fact the same computations were
not even mentioned in the court's decision which shows that the court found such computations incredible. The
computations, supposedly patterned after the WAS Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 of the Department Labor
demonstrated in Exhibits "6", "7", "8", "9", and "9-A", miserably failed to show the exact and correct annual salary
as stated in the respective contracts of employment of the respondent employees. The figures arrived at in each case
did not tally with the annual salaries on to the employees' contracts of employment, the difference varying from
P1.20 to as much as P14.40 always against the interest of the employees. The petitioner's defense consists of
mathematical computations made after the filing of the case in order to explain a clear attempt to make its
employees work without the extra compensation provided by law on Sundays and legal holidays.

In not giving weight to the evidence of the petitioner company, the respondent court sustained the private
respondents' evidence to the effect that their 25% additional compensation for work done on Sundays and Legal
Holidays were not included in their respective monthly salaries. The private respondents presented evidence through
the testimonies of Nardo Dayao, Ernesto Talampas, and Josias Federico who are themselves among the employees
who filed the case for unfair labor practice in the respondent court and are private respondents herein. The
petitioner- company's contention that the respondent court's conclusion on the issue of the 25% additional
compensation for work done on Sundays and legal holidays during the first four hours that the private respondents
had to work under their respective contracts of employment was not supported by substantial evidence is, therefore,
unfounded. Much less do We find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court in its
interpretation of the employment contract's provision on salaries. In view of the controlling doctrine that a grave
abuse of discretion must be shown in order to warrant our disturbing the findings of the respondent court, the
reversal of the court's endings on this matter is unwarranted. (Sanchez vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 27 SCRA
490).

The last issue raised in the first assignment of error refers to a procedural matter. The petitioner-company contends
that ,-the question as to whether or not the contracts of employment were null and void was not put in issue, hence,
the respondent court pursuant to the Rules of Court should have refrained from ruling that such contracts of
employment were null and void. In this connection We restate our finding that the respondent court did not declare
the contracts of employment null and void in their entirety. Only the objectionable features violative of law were
nullified. But even granting that the Court of Industrial Relations declared the contracts of employment wholly void,
it could do so notwithstanding the procedural objection. In Sanchez u. Court of Industrial Relations, supra, this
Court speaking through then Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, stated:

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the statutory mandate that respondent Court in the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in the exercise of any
of its duties or power is to act 'according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence' informing its mind 'in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' Again, this
Court has invariably accorded the most hospitable scope to the breadth and amplitude with which
such provision is couched. So it has been from the earliest case decided in 1939 to a 1967
decision.

Two issues are raised in the second assignment of error by the petitioner-company. The first
hinges on the jurisdiction of the respondent court to award additional compensation for nighttime
work. Petitioner wants Us to re- examine Our rulings on the question of nighttime work. It
contends that the respondent court has no jurisdiction to award additional compensation for
nighttime work because of the declared policy on freedom of collective bargaining expressed in
Republic Act 875 and the express prohibition in Section 7 of the said statute. A re- examination of
the decisions on nighttime pay differential was the focus of attention in Rheem of the Philippines,
Inc. et al., v. Ferrer, et al (19 SCRA 130). The earliest cases cited by the petitioner-
company, Naric v. Naric Workers Union L-12075, - May 29, 1959 and Philippine Engineers'
Syndicate u. Bautista, L-16440, February 29, 196.4, were discussed lengthily. Thus -

xxx xxx xxx

2. On the claim for night differentials, no extended discussion is necessary. To be read as

controlling here is Philippine Engineers' Syndicate, Inc. vs. Hon. Jose S. Bautista, et al., L-16440,
February 29, 1964, where this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, declared —

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 Only one issue is raised: whether or not upon the enactment of Republic Act
875, the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for
regular night work. Petitioner says that this Act reduced the jurisdiction of
respondent court and limited it to specific cases which this Court has defined as:
... (1) when the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the
national interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial court (Sec.
10, Republic Act 875); (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under
the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602); (3) when it involves hours of
employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444) and (4)
when it involves an unfair labor practice [Sec. 5(a), Republic Act 8751', [Paflu,
et al. vs. Tan, et al., 52 Off. Gaz, No. 13, 5836].

Petitioner insists that respondents' case falls in none of these categories because
as held in two previous cases, night work is not overtime but regular work; and
that respondent court's authority to try the case cannot be implied from its
general jurisdiction and broad powers' under Commonwealth Act 103 because
Republic Act 875 precisely curbed such powers limiting them to certain specific
litigations, beyond which it is not permitted to act.

We believe petitioner to be in error. Its position collides with our ruling in the Naric case [National
Rice & Corn Corp. (NARIC) vs. NARIC Workers' Union, et al., G.R. No. L-12075, May 29,
1959] where we held;

While it is true that this Court made the above comment in the aforementioned
case, it does not intend to convey the Idea that work done at night cannot also be
an overtime work. The comment only served to emphasize that the demand
which the Shell Company made upon its laborers is not merely overtime work
but night work and so there was need to differentiate night work from daytime
work. In fact, the company contended that there was no law that required the
payment of additional compensation for night work unlike an overtime work
which is covered by Commonwealth Act No. 444 (Eight Hour Labor Law). And
this Court in that case said that while there was no law actually requiring
payment of additional compensation for night work, the industrial court has the
power to determine the wages that night workers should receive under
Commonwealth Act No. 103, and so it justified the additional compensation in
the Shell case for 'hygienic, medical, moral, cultural and sociological reasons.

xxx xxx xxx

True, in Paflu, et al. vs. Tan, et al., supra, and in a series of cases thereafter, We held that the broad powers
conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR may have been curtailed by Republic Act 875 which limited them
to the four categories therein expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes via
the collective bargaining process; but We find no cogent reason for concluding that a suit of this nature for extra
compensation for night work falls outside the domain of the industrial court. Withal, the record does not show that
the employer-employee relation between the 64 respondents and the petitioner had ceased.

After the passage of Republic Act 875, this Court has not only upheld the industrial court's assumption of
jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay [Chua Workers Union (NLU) vs. City Automotive
Co., et al., G.R. No. L- 11655, April 29, 1959; Prisco vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-13806, May 23, 1960] or for
payment of additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work [Nassco vs.
Almin, et al., G.R. No. L9055, November 28, 1958; Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Felipe Guevara, et al.,
G.R. No. L-8738, May 31, 1957] but has also supported such court's ruling that work performed at night should be
paid more than work done at daytime, and that if that work is done beyond the worker's regular hours of duty, he
should also be paid additional compensation for overtime work. [Naric vs. Naric Workers' Union. et al., G. R No. L-
12075, May 29, 1959, citing Shell Co. vs. National Labor Union, 81 Phil. 315]. Besides, to hold that this case for
extra compensation now falls beyond the powers of the industrial court to decide, would amount to a further
curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the
prejudice of labor.' [Luis Recato Dy, et al v-9. CIR, G.R. No. L-17788, May 25,1962]"

The petitioner-company's arguments on the respondent court's alleged lack of jurisdiction over additional
compensation for work done at night by the respondents is without merit.

The other issue raised in the second assignment of error is premised on the petitioner-company's contention that the
respondent court's ruling on the additional compensation for nighttime work is not supported by substantial
evidence.

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This contention is untenable. Pertinent portions of the respondent court's decision read:

xxx xxx xxx

There is no serious disagreement between the petitioners and respondent management on the facts
recited above. The variance in the evidence is only with respect to the money claims. Witnesses
for petitioners declared they worked on regular days and on every other Sunday and also during all
holidays; that for services rendered on Sundays and holidays they were not paid for the first four
(4) hours and what they only received was the overtime compensation corresponding to the
number of hours after or in excess of the first four hours; and that such payment is being indicated
in the overtime pay for work done in excess of eight hours on regular working days. It is also
claimed that their nighttime services could well be seen on their respective daily time records.
.. (Emphasis supplied) (p.116, rollo)

The respondent court's ruling on additional compensation for work done at night is, therefore, not without evidence.
Moreover, the petitioner-company did not deny that the private respondents rendered nighttime work. In fact, no
additional evidence was necessary to prove that the private respondents were entitled to additional compensation for
whether or not they were entitled to the same is a question of law which the respondent court answered correctly.
The "waiver rule" is not applicable in the case at bar. Additional compensation for nighttime work is founded on
public policy, hence the same cannot be waived. (Article 6, Civil Code). On this matter, We believe that the
respondent court acted according to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and should be sustained.

The third assignment of error is likewise without merit. The fact that only three of the private respondents testified
in court does not adversely affect the interests of the other respondents in the case. The ruling in Dimayuga V. Court
of Industrial Relations (G.R. No. L-0213, May 27, 1957) has been abandoned in later rulings of this Court. In
Philippine Land Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) vs. Sy Indong Company Rice And Corn Mill (11 SCRA 277) We
had occasion to re-examine the ruling in Dimayuga We stated:

The latter reversed the decision of the trial Judge as regards the reinstatement with backwages of
... upon the theory that this is not a class suit; that, consequently, it is necessary and imperative
that they should personally testify and prove the charges in the complaint', and that, having failed
to do so, the decision of the trial Judge in their favor is untenable under the rule laid down in
Dimayuga vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-0213 (May 27,1957).

We do not share the view taken in the resolution appealed from. As the trial Judge correctly said,
in Ms dissent from said resolution,:

xxx xxx xxx

In the case of Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra, this Court stated:

To the reproach against the challenged order in the brief of petitioners in view of only two of the
seven claimants testifying, a statement by this Court in Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. OSCO Workers
Fraternity Labor Union would suffice by way of refutation. Thus: "This Court fully agrees with
the respondent that quality and not quantity of witnesses should be the primordial consideration in
the appraisal of evidence.' Barely eight days later, in another decision, the above statement was
given concrete expression. Thus: 'The bases of the awards were not only the respective affidavits
of the claimants but the testimonies of 24 witnesses (because 6 were not given credence by the
court below) who Identified the said 239 claimants. The contention of petitions on this point is
therefore unfounded Moveover in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) v. Sy Indong
company Rice & Corn Mill, this Court, through the present Chief Justice rejected as untenable the
theory of the Court of Industrial Relations concerning the imperative needs of all the claimants to
testify personality and prove their charges in the complaint. As tersely put: 'We do not share the
view taken in the resolution appealed from.

The petitioner's contention that its employees fully understood what they signed when they entered into the contracts
of employment and that they should be bound by their voluntary commitments is anachronistic in this time and age.

The Mercury Drug Co., Inc., maintains a chain of drugstores that are open every day of the week and, for some
stores, up to very late at night because of the nature of the pharmaceutical retail business. The respondents knew that
they had to work Sundays and holidays and at night, not as exceptions to the rule but as part of the regular course of
employment. Presented with contracts setting their compensation on an annual basis with an express waiver of extra
compensation for work on Sundays and holidays, the workers did not have much choice. The private respondents
were at a disadvantage insofar as the contractual relationship was concerned. Workers in our country do not have the
luxury or freedom of declining job openings or filing resignations even when some terms and conditions of

7
employment are not only onerous and inequitous but illegal. It is precisely because of this situation that the framers
of the Constitution embodied the provisions on social justice (Section 6, Article 11) and protection to labor (Section
9, Article I I) in the Declaration of Principles And State Policies.

It is pursuant to these constitutional mandates that the courts are ever vigilant to protect the rights of workers who
are placed in contractually disadvantageous positions and who sign waivers or provisions contrary to law and public
policy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The decision and resolution appealed from are affirmed with costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

8
G.R. No. 123520 June 26, 1998

NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR (HK) DISTRIBUTION, LTD., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (4TH DIVISION) and EDGAR PHILIP C.
SANTOS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The main issues to be resolved in his petition for certiorari are: First, who has the burden of providing a claim for
night shift differential pay, the worker who claims not to have been paid night shift differentials, or the employer in
custody of pertinent documents which would prove the fact of payment of the same? Second, were the requirements
of due process substantially complied with in dismissing the worker?

Petitioner National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. (NSC for brevity), a foreign corporation licensed to do
business in the Philippines, manufactures and assembles electronic parts for export with principal office at the
Mactan Export Processing Zone, Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City. Private respondent Edgar Philip C. Santos was employed
by NSC as a technician in its Special Products Group with a monthly salary of P5,501.00 assigned to the graveyard
shift starting at ten o' clock in the evening until six o' clock in the morning.

On 8 January 1993 Santos did not report for work on his shift. He resumed his duties as night shift Technician
Support only on 9 January 1993. However, at the end of his shift the following morning, he made two (2) entries in
his daily time record (DTR) to make it appear that he worked on both the 8th and 9th of January 1993.

His immediate supervisor, Mr. Joel Limsiaco, unknown to private respondent Santos, received the report that there
was no technician in the graveyard shift of 8 January 1993. Thus, Limsiaco checked the DTRs and found out that
Santos indeed did not report for work on 8 January. But when he checked Santos' DTR again in the morning of 9
January 1993 he found the entry made by Santos for the day before.

Informal investigations were conducted by management. Santos was required in a memorandum to explain in
writing within 48 hours from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for dishonesty,
falsifying daily time record (DTR) and violation of company rules and regulations. 1 On 11 January 1993 Santos
submitted his written explanation alleging that he was ill on the day he was absent. As regards the entry on 8
January, he alleged that it was merely due to oversight or carelessness on his part. 2

Finding Santos' explanation unsatisfactory, NSC dismissed him on 14 January 1993 on the ground of
falsification of his DTR, which act was inimical to the company and constituted dishonesty and serious
misconduct. 3

Thus, on 20 January 1993, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of back wages,
premium pay for holidays and rest days, night shift differential pay, allowances, separation pay, moral
damages and attorney's fees.

Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante found that Santos was dismissed on legal grounds although he was
not afforded due process, hence, NSC was ordered to indemnify him P1,000.00. The Labor Arbiter likewise
ordered the payment of P19,801.47 representing Santos' unpaid night shift differentials. 4

NSC appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In its Decision of 29 September 1995 the
NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter holding that his conclusions were sufficiently supported by the evidence
and therefore must be respected by the appellate tribunal because the hearing officer was in a unique position
to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to judge their credibility. 5

NSC imputes grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC in affirming the Labor Arbiter's award of night shift
differentials and P1,000.00 indemnity for alleged violation of due process. It contends that the question of
non-payment of night shift differentials was never raised as an issue nor pursued and proved by Santos in the
proceeding before the Labor Arbiter; that Santos was already paid his night shift differentials, and any
further payment to him would amount to unjust enrichment; and, that the P1,000.00 indemnity is totally
unjustified as he was afforded ample opportunity to be heard.

We now resolve. A perusal of Santos' position paper filed before the Labor Arbiter reveals that the question
of non-payment of night shift differentials was specifically raised as an issue in the proceedings below which
was never abandoned by Santos as erroneously claimed by NSC thus —

9
 ISSUES

1. Did respondent National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution Ltd. illegally dismiss

complainant Edgar Philip Santos?

2. Is complainant Edgar Philip Santos entitled to recover unpaid salary, holiday pay, night
shift differential, allowances, separation pay, retirement benefits and moral damages? 6

And, in his prayer, Santos sought to be afforded the reliefs prayed for in his complaint. 7

The fact that Santos neglected to substantiate his claim for night shift differentials is not prejudicial to his
cause. After all, the burden of proving payment rests on petitioner NSC. Santos' allegation of non-payment of
this benefit, to which he is by law entitled, is a negative allegation which need not be supported by evidence
unless it is an essential part of his cause of action. It must be noted that his main cause of action is his illegal
dismissal, and the claim for night shift differential is but an incident of the protest against such dismissal.
Thus, the burden of proving that payment of such benefit has been made rests upon the party who will suffer
if no evidence at all is presented by either party. 8 Moreover, in Jimerez v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 9 we declared —

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the
plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant
to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the
burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.

For sure, private respondent cannot adequately prove the fact of non-payment of night shift differentials
since the pertinent employee files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents — which will
show that private respondent rendered night shift work; the time he rendered services; and, the amounts
owed as night shift differentials — are not in his possession but in the custody and absolute control of
petitioner.

Private respondent has been in petitioner's employ for five (5) years — starting 13 January 1988 when he was
hired to 14 January 1993 when his services were terminated — and petitioner never denied that private
respondent rendered night shift work. In fact, it even presented some documents purporting to prove that
private respondent was assigned to work on the night shift.

By choosing not to fully and completely disclose information to prove that it had paid all the night shift
differentials due to private respondent, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof. Consequently, no
grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the NLRC for sustaining the Labor Arbiter when it ruled thus —

It is not disputed that complainant was regularly assigned to a night shift (10:00 P.M. to 7:00
A.M.). Under Section 2, Rule II, Book Three of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code,
complainant is entitled to an additional benefit of not less ten percent (10%) of his regular
wage for each hour of work performed. The record is bereft of evidence that respondent has
paid complainant this benefit. The best evidence for respondent corporation would have
been the payrolls, vouchers, daily time records and the like which under Sections 6, 7, 8, 11
and 12, Rule X, Book III of the Implementing Rules it is obliged to keep. Its failure gives rise
to the presumption that either it does not have them or if it does, their presentation is
prejudicial to its cause.

We rule therefore that complainant should be awarded a night shift differential but limited
to there (3) years considering the prescriptive period of money claims. 10

On the issue of due process, we agree with petitioner that Santos was accorded full opportunity to be heard
before he was dismissed.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side. 11 In the instant case, petitioner furnished private respondent notice as to
the particular acts which constituted the ground for his dismissal. By requiring him to submit a written
explanation within 48 hours from receipt of the notice, the company gave him the opportunity to be heard in
his defense. Private respondent availed of this chance by submitting a written explanation. Furthermore,
investigations on the incident were actually conducted on 9 January 1993 and 11 January 1993. Mr. Reynaldo
Gandionco, petitioner's witness, testified:

Q: I reform my question. Was there an investigation conducted on the

complainant regarding the alleged falsification of DTR?

10
 A: Yes, ma'am, there was.

Q: Who was present during the alleged investigation? I am referring to the

first investigation?

A: The first investigation we were many. We were Daryll Go, Joel

Limsiaco, Edgar Philip Santos and me.

Q: When was the first investigation conducted?

A: On the night of January 9, 1993.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: During the second investigation, who were present?

A: We were: Daryll Go, Edgar Philip Santos and me.

Q: And when was the second investigation conducted?

A: It was on January 11, 1993 in the afternoon. 12

Finally, private respondent was notified on 14 January 1993 of the management's decision to terminate his
services.

Thus, it is clear the minimum requirements of due process have been fulfilled by petitioner.

That the investigations conducted by petitioner may not be considered formal or recorded hearings or
investigations is immaterial. A formal or trial type hearing is not all times and in all instances essential to due
process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. 13 It is deemed sufficient for the employer to follow the
natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment. 14

WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED. The NLRC Decision of 29 September 1995 is AFFIRMED subject to
the modification that the award of P1,000.00 as indemnity is DELETED in accordance with the foregoing
discussion.

SO ORDERED.

11
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146073. January 13, 2003]

JERRY E. ACEDERA, ANTONIO PARILLA, AND OTHERS LISTED IN ANNEX A,[1] petitioners-appellants,
vs. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. (ICTSI), NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

For consideration is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter denying
herein petitioners-appellants Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners-appellants Jerry Acedera, et al. are employees of herein private respondent International Container
Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) and are officers/members of Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union-
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. Local Chapter (APCWU-ICTSI), a labor organization duly registered
as a local affiliate of the Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union (APCWU).
When ICTSI started its operations in 1988, it determined the rate of pay of its employees by using 304 days, the
number of days of work of the employees in a year, as divisor. [2]
On September 28, 1990, ICTSI entered into its first Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with APCWU with
a term of five years effective until September 28, 1995. [3] The CBA was renegotiated and thereafter renewed through
a second CBA that took effect on September 29, 1995, effective for another five years. [4] Both CBAs contained an
identically-worded provision on hours and days of work reading:

Article IX

Regular Hours of Work and Days of Labor

Section 1. The regular working days in a week shall be five (5) days on any day from Monday to Sunday, as may be
scheduled by the COMPANY, upon seven (7) days prior notice unless any of this day is declared a special
holiday.[5] (Underscoring omitted)

In accordance with the above-quoted provision of the CBA, the employees work week was reduced to five days
or a total of 250 days a year. ICTSI, however, continued using the 304-day divisor in computing the wages of the
employees.[6]
On November 10, 1990, the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board (RTWPB) in the National Capital
Region decreed a P17.00 daily wage increase for all workers and employees receiving P125.00 per day or lower in
the National Capital Region.[7] The then president of APCWU, together with some union members, thus requested the
ICTSIs Human Resource Department/Personnel Manager to compute the actual monthly increase in the employees
wages by multiplying the RTWPB mandated increase by 365 days and dividing the product by 12 months. [8]
Heeding the proposal and following the implementation of the new wage order, ICTSI stopped using 304 days
as divisor and started using 365 days in determining the daily wage of its employees and other consequential
compensation, even if the employees work week consisted of only five days as agreed upon in the CBA. [9]
In early 1997, ICTSI went on a retrenchment program and laid off its on-call employees.[10] This prompted the
APCWU-ICTSI to file a notice of strike which included as cause of action not only the retrenchment of the employees
but also ICTSIs use of 365 days as divisor in the computation of wages. [11] The dispute respecting the retrenchment
was resolved by a compromise settlement[12] while that respecting the computation of wages was referred to the Labor
Arbiter.[13]
On February 26, 1997, APCWU, on behalf of its members and other employees similarly situated, filed with the
Labor Arbiter a complaint against ICTSI which was dismissed for APCWUs failure to file its position paper.[14] Upon
the demand of herein petitioners-appellants, APCWU filed a motion to revive the case which was granted. APCWU
thereupon filed its position paper on August 22, 1997. [15]
On December 8, 1997, petitioners-appellants filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint-in-Intervention with
Motion to Intervene.[16] In the petition at bar, they justified their move to intervene in this wise:

12
[S]hould the union succeed in prosecuting the case and in getting a favorable reward it is actually they that would
benefit from the decision. On the other hand, should the union fail to prove its case, or to prosecute the case
diligently, the individual workers or members of the union would suffer great and immeasurable loss. [t]hey wanted
to insure by their intervention that the case would thereafter be prosecuted with all due diligence and would not
again be dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the union. [17]

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered declaring that the correct divisor in computing the daily wage and other
labor standard benefits of the employees of respondent ICTSI who are members of complainant Union as well as the
other employees similarly situated is two hundred fifty (250) days such that said respondent is hereby ordered to pay
the employees concerned the differentials representing the underpayment of said salaries and other benefits
reckoned three (3) years back from February 26, 1997, the date of filing of this complaint or computed from
February 27 1994 until paid, but for purposes of appeal, the salary differentials are temporarily computed for one
year in the amount of Four Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Forty Pesos (P468,040.00). [18]

In the same decision, the Labor Arbiter denied petitioners-appellants Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for
Intervention upon a finding that they are already well represented by APCWU. [19]
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed APCWUs complaint for lack of
merit.[20] The denial of petitioners-appellants intervention was, however, affirmed.[21]
Unsatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, APCWU filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
while petitioners-appellants filed theirs with this Court which referred the petition[22] to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed APCWUs petition on the following grounds: failure to allege when its motion
for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was filed, failure to attach the necessary appendices to the petition, and
failure to file its motion for extension to file its petition within the reglementary period.[23]
As for petitioners-appellants petition for certiorari, it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

It is clear from the records that herein petitioners, claiming to be employees of respondent ICTSI, are already well
represented by its employees union, APCWU, in the petition before this Court (CA-G.R. SP. No. 53266) although
the same has been dismissed. The present petition is, therefore a superfluity that deserves to be
dismissed. Furthermore, only Acedera signed the Certificate of non-forum shopping. On this score alone, this
petition should likewise be dismissed. We find that the same has no merit considering that herein petitioners have
not presented any meritorious argument that would justify the reversal of the Decision of the NLRC.

Article IX of the CBA provides:

REGULAR HOURS OF WORK AND DAYS OF LABOR

Section 1. The regular working days in a week shall be five (5) days on any day from Monday to Sunday, as may be
scheduled by the COMPANY, upon seven (7) days prior notice unless any of this day is declared a special holiday.

This provision categorically states the required number of working days an employee is expected to work for a
week. It does not, however, indicate the manner in which an employees salary is to be computed. In fact, nothing in
the CBA makes any referral to any divisor which should be the basis for determining the salary. The NLRC,
therefore, correctly ruled that xxx the absence of any express or specific provision in the CBA that 250 days should
be used as divisor altogether makes the position of the Union untenable.

xxx

Considering that herein petitioners themselves requested that 365 days be used as the divisor in computing their
wage increase and later did not raise or object to the same during the negotiations of the new CBA, they are clearly
estopped to now complain of such computation only because they no longer benefit from it. Indeed, the 365 divisor
for the past seven (7) years has already become practice and law between the company and its
employees.[24] (Emphasis supplied)

xxx

Hence, the present petition of petitioners-appellants who fault the Court of Appeals as follows:
I

13
. . . IN REJECTING THE CBA OF THE PARTIES AS THE SOURCE OF THE DIVISOR TO DETERMINE THE
WORKERS DAILY RATE TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE APPLICABLE LANDMARK DECISIONS OF
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE MATTER.

II

. . . [IN] DISREGARD[ING] APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED

THAT THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE ALREADY IN ESTOPPEL.

III

. . . IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS HAVE NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN

AND PURSUE THIS CASE AND THAT THEIR INTERVENTION IS A SUPERFLUITY.

IV

. . . IN HOLDING, ALTHOUGH MERELY AS AN OBITER DICTUM, THAT ONLY PETITIONER JERRY

ACEDERA SIGNED THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING.[25]

The third assigned error respecting petitioners-appellants right to intervene shall first be passed upon, it being
determinative of their right to raise the other assigned errors.
Petitioners-appellants anchor their right to intervene on Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1
of which reads:

Section 1. Who may intervene.- A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors right may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.

They stress that they have complied with the requisites for intervention because (1) they are the ones who stand
to gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of any judgment that may be rendered in this case, (2) no undue
delay or prejudice would result from their intervention since their Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion
for Intervention was filed while the Labor Arbiter was still hearing the case and before any decision thereon was
rendered, and (3) it was not possible for them to file a separate case as they would be guilty of forum shopping because
the only forum available for them was the Labor Arbiter. [26]
Petitioners-appellants, however, failed to consider, in addition to the rule on intervention, the rule on
representation, thusly:

Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.- Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed
to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. . . [27](Emphasis supplied)

A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members under Article 242(a) of the Labor Code
which provides that a union may act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This
authority includes the power to represent its members for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the CBA. That
APCWU acted in a representative capacity for and in behalf of its Union members and other employees similarly
situated, the title of the case filed by it at the Labor Arbiters Office so expressly states.
While a party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to intervene in a case,
ordinarily, a person whose interests are already represented will not be permitted to do the same [28] except when there
is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative will not act in good faith for the protection of all interests
represented by him.[29]
Petitioners-appellants cite the dismissal of the case filed by ICTSI, first by the Labor Arbiter, and later by the
Court of Appeals.[30] The dismissal of the case does not, however, by itself show the existence of fraud or collusion or
a lack of good faith on the part of APCWU. There must be clear and convincing evidence of fraud or collusion or lack
of good faith independently of the dismissal. This, petitioners-appellants failed to proffer.
Petitioners-appellants likewise express their fear that APCWU would not prosecute the case diligently because
of its sweetheart relationship with ICTSI.[31] There is nothing on record, however, to support this alleged relationship
which allegation surfaces as a mere afterthought because it was never raised early on. It was raised only in petitioners-
appellants reply to ICTSIs comment in the petition at bar, the last pleading submitted to this Court, which was filed

14
on June 20, 2001 or more than 42 months after petitioners-appellants filed their Complaint-in-Intervention with
Motion to Intervene with the Labor Arbiter.
To reiterate, for a member of a class to be permitted to intervene in a representative action, fraud or collusion or
lack of good faith on the part of the representative must be proven. It must be based on facts borne on record. Mere
assertions, as what petitioners-appellants proffer, do not suffice.
The foregoing discussion leaves it unnecessary to discuss the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

15
G.R. No. L-4616

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition by the Manila Railraod Company for a review by writ of certiorari of a decision of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) dated October 14, 1950, involving several issues and different demands of
employees and laborers of the Manila Railroad Company, belonging to a labor union, one of the respondents herein.
Only those portions of the decision questioned and appealed from, will be considered and they will be discussed and
decided separately.

1. CLAIM OF THE HEIRS OF TOMAS GUTIERREZ

Tomas Gutierrez, a former employee of the petitioner-appellant died sometime in April, 1945. After his death, his
heirs filed a claim with the CIR for the money equivalent of his unused vacation and sick leave. The claim was
granted by the respondent court, and the petitioner now questions the propriety and legality of the grant on the
ground that the CIR had no jurisdiction to pass upon said claim for the reason that it involved only a money claim
and not a labor dispute, so, the action should have been brought in an ordinary courts and that furthermore, this grant
was in violation of Sec. 286 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that accumulated vacation and sick
leave shall be forfeited upon separation from the service.

As regards the matter of jurisdiction, when the claim for the money equivalent of the vacation and sick leave of
Tomas Gutierrez was denied by the Railroad company with whom it was first filed, and the claimants were
dissatisfied with the denial, it became a labor dispute cognizable by the CIR. Furthermore, in the case of Leyte Land
Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Leyte Farmers-Laborers Union, 45 O.G. 4862, this Tribunal has already ruled that the
Court of industrial Relations has authority to grant employees and laborers vacation and sick leave with pay. In other
words, the subject-matter of vacation and sick leave or the demand for payment of the money equivalent thereof
comes within the jurisdiction of that court.

As to the propriety or legality of the grant, it would appear that the claim was based not so much on Sec. 286 of the
Administrative Code, but rather upon a circular (Exhibit "I") issued by the Manager of the Railroad company
relative to the "grant of monetary aid to former employees and/or to the latter's dependents, who could not be
reinstated on account of illness or death." Besides, according to the findings of the respondent court "it was a long-
standing policy of the railroad company to pay vacation and sick leave duly acquired by its employees and laborers
effective upon separation from the service" and it said that that acquired right should be transmitted to the heirs in
case of death. Moreover, Sec. 286 of the Administrative Code relied upon by petitioner has been amended by
Republic Act No, 611 which suppresses that part relating to forfeiture of accrued vacation and sick leave upon
separation from the service. Instead, the amendment provides for payment thereof upon separation from the service
thru no fault of the employee.

This portion of the decision appealed from is therefore affirmed.

2. CLAIM OF PEDRO DE LA CRUZ

Pedro de la Cruz was the incoming freight clerk of the Company in Naga, Camarines Sur on April 11, 1947. On that
date, one Yu Eng Siong secured a waybill for 200 sacks of flour; a little later, he secured another waybill for another
shipment of 200 sacks of flour, all to be shipped to Naga. Of the 400 sacks of flour only 200 passed thru the office
of Pedro de la Cruz before delivery to the consignee. The other 200 sacks of flour were delivered to the consignee
without passing thru his office as they should. However, for both consignments or shipments, payment for the
freight was made by the consignee, so that the Company suffered no loss. For this alleged irregularity, Pedro de la
Cruz was suspended from August 28, 1947 until December 5, 1947. He filed a claim for his salary corresponding to
the period of suspension and respondent court granted it. The company on appeal now questions the grant on the
theory that Pedro de la Cruz was negligent, and so his suspension was a merited punishment, and that furthermore,
the fact that the company suffered no financial loss should not be considered in the disciplinary action taken by it.

In support of its action in granting the claim, the CIR in its decision says that the suspension of Pedro de la Cruz was
the result of a misunderstanding; that Pedro was not to blame for the irregularity because the reason why the other
shipment of 200 sacks of flour did not pass thru his office was because the station laborers in his office immediately
delivered the flour to the consignee without his knowledge and consent.

This declaration and finding of the trial court weighs heavily in favor of his innocence. Moreover, according to
Exhibit "O", a "memo for the Actg. Managing Director of the Railroad Co., Mr. Jose Libunao, Superintendent of
Transportation, who would appear to have made some investigation of the case, believed that there exist no prima
facie evidence to sustain the charge that he is responsible for the apparent loss of 200 sacks of flour covered by and
so Superintendent Libunao recommended that Pedro be recalled to the service and that his temporary suspension be
regarded as leave with pay.

We find this portion of the decision appealed from, ordering the railroad company to pay the salary of De la Cruz
during the whole period of his suspension warranted, but that as recommended by the Superintendent of

16
Transportation, the period of suspension be considered as leave with pay. With this modification, this part of the
decision of the lower court is affirmed.

3. CLAIMS OF TOMAS MENDOZA, ALFREDO RAGAS, NESTOR SALAZAR and DEMETRIO AGONCILLO

In the month of September, 1947 Tomas Mendoza was working as assistant mechanic, Demetrio Agoncillo as
mechanic, and Nestor Salazar and Alfredo Ragas as tiremen, for the Manila Railroad Co. in the Caloocan electrical
shop and garage of the Luzon Bus Line, a subsidiary of the Railroad company, were deposited among others one
power generator valued at P200.00 belonging to the Superintendent of the Luzon Bus Line, one box containing
carpenter tools belonging to Bonifacio Flores, valued at P250.00 and one battery belonging to a jeep assigned for the
use of the purchasing agent, costing P40.00. The power generator was loaned to the Company and was being used in
the garage. At about 8:45 p.m. on September 14, 1947, Agoncillo drove bus No. 39 out of the garage with Salazar
and Ragas inside the bus, presumably to test its brakes. Tomas Mendoza was then near the entrance or gate of the
garage working on the stop light of bus No. 38. As was the custom, Patrolman or guard Velasquez of the Company
stopped bus 39 at the gate to inspect and search it with the use of his flashlight. As he was beginning or about to
begin his inspection Mendoza approached and asked him to accompany him to go to another part of the garage to
investigate a noise supposedly coming from there. Pat, Velasquez acceding to his suggestion or request, left bus 39
but warned the occupants Including the driver not to leave until he returned and made his inspection. In the company
of Mendoza, Pat, Velasquez went to the place indicated but found nothing. When he returned to the gate to make his
inspection he found that bus 39 had already left, in violation of his instructions. The following morning the power
generator, the box of carpenter tools and the jeep battery, were found missing. For the loss of these articles
Mendoza, Ragas, Salazar and Agoncillo after due investigation were held responsible. Tomas Mendoza as the
mastermind was summarily dismissed on October 27, 1947, while Ragas, Salazar and Agoncillo were fined P80.00,
P81.00 and P20.00, respectively, Mendoza later asked the CIR to order the Company to pay him his salary from the
time he was dismissed on October 27, 1947 until August 21, 1948 when he was re-employed as temporary riveter
and Salazar, Agoncillo and Ragas petitioned the same Court to order the refund of their fines. The Court of
Industrial Relations in its decision appealed from held that there was no evidence under which to hold these four
men responsible for the loss of the articles in question because nobody saw them steal said articles and so granted
their demands.

After a careful review of the record of the case particularly that referring to this point, we agree with the petitioner
that the respondent Court of Industrial Relations not only erred in arriving at its conclusion that these four
employees of the company should not be held responsible for the loss of the properties in question, but that it
committed a grave abuse of discretion in disregarding and ignoring completely the various investigations conducted
by the company over the loss of said properties, investigations and re-investigations made at the request of said four
men and wherein they were represented by counsel. There is no allegation or claim that these investigations were not
conducted properly or that the finding and decision of the company was illegal or arbitrary. Mr. Sergio Bayan,
General Manager of the Railroad company at the time, prepared a long and elaborate report based on the
investigations conducted by the company and there is every reason to believe as claimed by him that there was
connivance between Mendoza and the three other employees who removed and carried away the generator,
carpenter tools and battery from the garage by using the bus No. 39. According to Manager Bayan, because the
garage was surrounded by a wall on three sides and the only exit was the gate, it was next to impossible to remove
the articles stolen, particularly the power generator except thru the gate and by means of a vehicle; that said articles
must have been loaded in bus No. 39 that night, and that to prevent their being discovered by the guard or
patrolman, Mendoza through an artifice, distracted the attention of the guard by taking him away from the gate by
asking him to investigate a noise on one of the corners of the garage, and that during his absence and despite his
instructions to the contrary, the bus was driven away. According to Manager Bayan, in an effort to accord more
favorable consideration Mendoza, he investigated his background and his past conduct in relation to his employment
in the Company so that if it should turn out that he had a good character and had been loyal to the Company and
observed exemplary behaviour, his highly suspicious conduct with regard to the loss of the articles in question might
be overlooked. It turned out, however, that in the past, articles and properties of the company had been disappearing,
and that the circumstances surrounding their loss pointed to Mendoza as the one most likely to have taken them
away; and that furthermore, after the dismissal of Mendoza on October 27, 1947, the loss of articles and properties
from the premises of the company ceased.

In support of its finding that Mendoza was not responsible for the loss of the generator, carpenter tools and jeep
battery, the CIR said that the Corporate Counsel, convinced of the innocence of Mendoza, did not file any criminal
action or any administrative charges. This is hardly correct. The reason said Corporate Counsel did not file any
criminal charge against Mendoza was not because he was convinced that Mendoza was innocent but because in his
opinion there was not sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction. This appears in his letter to the General
Manager, Exhibit K. As to the filing of administrative charges, it was not he who files administrative charges but the
officials of the company. In fact, said administrative action was taken. Several investigations were conducted
resulting in the dismissal of Mendoza and the fining of his companions. To secure conviction in a criminal case,
guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In an administrative case, that degree of proof is not necessary.
The CIR in exonerating Mendoza and his companions said that no one saw them steal the articles lost. But
sometimes, even in criminal cases, circumstantial evidence is competent, even sufficient. This is more so in
administrative cases. When a company after due and fair investigation is convinced that an employee is dishonest
and disloyal and it has lost confidence in him, said company may not be compelled to retain him in its employ.

17
(Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Zulueta et al., 69 Phil. 485)

According to Manager Bayan, because of his entreaties, Mendoza was re-employed as a temporary riveter, as an act
of generosity on the part of the company, not because it was convinced that he was innocent, or that he deserved to
be exonerated. As to Ragas, Salazar and Agoncillo, what we have already said about Mendoza, applies to them and
we agree with the result of the administrative action taken by the Company against them. For the foregoing reasons,
this part of the decision appealed from ordering the company to pay Mendoza his salary from October 27, 1947 to
August 21, 1948 and to refund the fines of P80.00, P81.00 and P20.00 imposed on Ragas, Salazar and Agoncillo,
respectively, is reversed.

4. CLAIMS OF ELIODORO BICIERRO, IRINEO ARAGON, FERNANDO BALINGUIT, AND MARCELO

HERMOSURA

In the month of August, 1947, Bicierro was a checker, Aragon a night clerk, Ballnguit, a receiving clerk and
Hermosura, a relief clerk, of the Railroad company. On August 3, 1947, a piano shipped from Ligao, Albay thru the
Manila Railroad Co. was received at the Manila station. It arrived in good condition and was received by Bicierro as
checker. The piano was covered by a crate. Pursuant to the practice of the company and under the supervision of
Bicierro, the crate was raised and removed and the piano was unloaded by the porters and the crate later replaced.
When the owner came to claim the piano, he found it damaged, two legs and a small portion of one side having been
destroyed. Said owner filed a complaint with the company and the corresponding investigation was conducted
resulting in Bicierro, Aragon, Balinguit and Hermosura being fined P100.00 each. From the evidence the respondent
court found that only Bicierro may be held liable for the damage to the piano because he was the one present when it
arrived and when it was unloaded, the damage evidently having occurred in the process of unloading; that the three
other men should not be held responsible because they had nothing to do with the unloading and in fact arrived at
the office and commenced work after the piano had been unloaded; and that their only fault if any, was their failure
to report the damage, but they claim that they did not notice it. We agree with the respondent Court in holding only
Bicierro responsible for the damage, approving the fine imposed upon him and ordering the refund of the fines
imposed on Aragon, Balinguit and Hermosura. Tills part of the decision appealed from is therefore affirmed.

5. THE CLAIMS OF DOMICIANO NODADO AND FRANCISCO GARCIA

Nodado and Garcia worked as auditors of the Company, As such they filed claims for overtime pay for services
rendered from March 1st to August 15, 1947 for Nodado, and from January 1st to August 15, 1947 for Garcia. These
claims were turned down by the Company on the ground that the overtime services were rendered in violation of the
rules and regulations of the company as well as the circular issued to the effect that before overtime work may be
performed with pay, the approval of the corresponding department head should be secured. The respondent CIR
correctly found that the circular referred to was issued and promulgated after the overtime work had been rendered
by Nodado and Garcia. Furthermore, it has been shown that it was necessary for the two men to work overtime in
order to audit all the passenger trains assigned to them, sometimes working from 4:20 in the morning until 8:45 in
the evening in order to follow the schedule, and that they had been instructed to do so by their immediate superior,
District Auditor P. Meneses. Under the circumstances the respondent Court was justified in ordering the 6ompany to
pay for this overtime work in the amounts of 863.58 and 648.09 to Nodado and Garcia, respectively.

6. THE CLAIM OF FELIX BASILIO

Felix Basilio was employed as storekeeper in Baguio by the Benguet Auto Line, a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad
Co. His claim for overtime work was denied by the Company but it was approved by the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations. There is no dispute as to Basilio having performed overtime work which benefited the
Company. At the time he rendered said service the Company was in that particular line short-handed and Basilio had
to do the work of several men. His chief Mr. Casiano Rivera, Superintendent of the Benguet Auto Line, asked him
to render said service and later Mr. Rivera recommended that payment of this overtime be made. Said
recommendation was approved by Mr. Sergio Bayan, General Manager of the Railroad company. It was also
approved by Mr. Rabaya, the corresponding department head. To us, it is therefore clear that the order of the
industrial court on the company to pay Basilio for this overtime work was fully justified. For this reason, this portion
of the decision is hereby affirmed.

7. CLAIM OF SANTOS UMALI

Umali worked as a conductor on the Luzon Bus Line, a subsidiary of the Company. In connection with his work as
conductor he had to make long trips from Manila to Laguna and Tayabas and to perform his duties, he had to work
sometimes more than eight hours a day. For this overtime work he rendered from February 2, 1947 to June 30, 1949,
he claims P127.65. The Company refused to pay for this overtime work on the ground that it was rendered in
violation of Circular No. 251 requiring previous authority from the corresponding department head and that it was
not supported by supporting papers. We agree with the respondent Court that the overtime work was actually
performed by Umali despite the non-conformity of the Company's timekeeper. Umali presented bis corresponding
slips to support his claim. The trial court believed him. As conductor he had to perform his duties during the trip and
if said trip lasted more than eight hours because of unavoidable delays, engine or tire trouble, etc., he could not just
quit work upon the expiration of the 8-hour period unless there was a substitute ready to take his place. Under the

18
circumstances, and because of the small amount involved, we have no hesitation in affirming as we hereby affirm
this part of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.

8. DEMAND OF THE ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES FOR PERMANENT APPOINTMENTS

To work on specific projects of the Railroad Company such as the rehabilitation of motor cars, trailers and passenger
coaches which were damaged during the war, laborers were employed on a temporary basis. They were given to
understand that their employment would cease upon termination of the project upon which they were working. Some
of these projects lasted over a year. However, some of these temporary employees because the project upon which
they were working terminated or because work thereon had to stop for lack of materials and for other reasons, were
assigned to another work directly connected with the promotion of the business of the Company, All these
employees demanded that they be made permanent after rendering six months service. The respondent Court in a
majority opinion granted the demand and directed the Company to appoint permanently all employees who have
rendered at least six months continuous and efficient service for ordinary laborers and twelve months for skilled
laborers, provided that the service rendered was loyal and efficient. The Company is appealing from this part of the
decision.

The record of the case fully supports the stand taken by Judge Juan L. Lanting in his dissent from the majority or
rather from the majority resolution in banc denying the company's motion for reconsideration. It turns out that this
same demand for permanent appointment of additional employees had already been presented and considered by the
Court of Industrial Relations in case No. 270-V, Demand No. 11 between the same parties. The original decision of
the trial court on that point dated February 10, 1950, reads thus:

"In the case at bar, it is admitted by respondent Company that some of the workers have been assigned to
departments other than their original assignments a mute evidence that the Company intends to retain them as such
permanent employees. Insofar as these workers are concerned, therefore, the Court finds them no longer as
temporary employees but as permanent workers. With respect to the rest if really the company has no more work for
them, they may be dismissed, considering that they are just temporary workers."
The above ruling was clarified in a subsequent order of the same court dated September 8, 1950, reading as follows:

"That the so-called 'additional employees' who worked on definite projects such as rehabilitation of motor cars,
motor car trailers, and passenger couches which were damaged during the war, and who were retained and
transferred to departments other than their original assignments but directly connected with promotion of its regular
business, become permanent employees six (6) months after such retentions and transfers: but those who were
retained in their original assignments in the rehabilitation projects regardless of the length of service remained to be
temporary. Those of the latter category, the temporary employees, are 'the rest' referred to in the decision."
As Judge Lanting points out, the previous decision, both original and as clarified, is wholly inconsistent with the
present decision on this point in that the first decision which has already become final distinguishes between
temporary employees who have been re-assigned to other work more or less permanent in nature and those
employees who remained in their original assignment or on projects of a temporary character. In the present decision
the distinction is ignored regardless of the kind of work tn which the employees were assigned, whether temporary
or permanent and despite the fact that in the temporary projects the employees were given to understand that their
employment would cease upon completion of the project. The decision in case No. 270-V between the same parties
dated February 10, 1950, clarified by the order of September 8, 1950, besides being more, reasonable and fair, has
become final and should stand. For this reason, this part of the decision appealed from ordering the company to give
permanent appointment to all temporary employees who rendered at least six months for ordinary laborers and
twelve months for skilled laborers is reversed.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby disposed of in the manner above stated and ruled
upon in detail. No costs.

19
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

ABDULJUAHID R. PIGCAULAN,⃰ G.R. No. 173648

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,⃰ ⃰ and
SECURITY and CREDIT VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
INVESTIGATION, INC. and/or
RENE AMBY REYES , Promulgated:
Respondents. January 16, 2012
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is not for an employee to prove non-payment of benefits to which he is entitled by law. Rather, it is on the employer that the
burden of proving payment of these claims rests.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the February 24, 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 85515, which granted the petition for certiorarifiled therewith, set aside the March 23, 2004[3] and June 14,
2004[4] Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and dismissed the complaint filed by Oliver R. Canoy
(Canoy) and petitioner Abduljuahid R. Pigcaulan (Pigcaulan) against respondent Security and Credit Investigation, Inc. (SCII) and
its General Manager, respondent Rene Amby Reyes.Likewise assailed is the June 28, 2006 Resolution[5] denying Canoys and
Pigcaulans Motion for Reconsideration.[6]

Factual Antecedents

Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were assigned to SCIIs different clients. Subsequently,
however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints[7] for underpayment of salaries and non-payment
of overtime, holiday, rest day, service incentive leave and 13th month pays. These complaints were later on consolidated as they
involved the same causes of action.

Canoy and Pigcaulan, in support of their claim, submitted their respective daily time records reflecting the number of hours served
and their wages for the same. They likewise presented itemized lists of their claims for the corresponding periods served.

Respondents, however, maintained that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid their just salaries and other benefits under the
law; that the salaries they received were above the statutory minimum wage and the rates provided by the Philippine Association
of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO) for security guards; that their holiday pay were already included in the
computation of their monthly salaries; that they were paid additional premium of 30% in addition to their basic salary whenever
they were required to work on Sundays and 200% of their salary for work done on holidays; and, that Canoy and Pigcaulan were

20
paid the corresponding 13th month pay for the years 1998 and 1999. In support thereof, copies of payroll listings[8] and lists of
employees who received their 13th month pay for the periods December 1997 to November 1998 and December 1998 to November
1999[9] were presented. In addition, respondents contended that Canoys and Pigcaulans monetary claims should only be limited to
the past three years of employment pursuant to the rule on prescription of claims.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Giving credence to the itemized computations and representative daily time records submitted by Canoy and Pigcaulan, Labor
Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion awarded them their monetary claims in his Decision[10] dated June 6, 2002. The Labor Arbiter held
that the payroll listings presented by the respondents did not prove that Canoy and Pigcaulan were duly paid as same were not
signed by the latter or by any SCII officer. The 13th month payroll was, however, acknowledged as sufficient proof of payment, for
it bears Canoys and Pigcaulans signatures. Thus, without indicating any detailed computation of the judgment award, the Labor
Arbiter ordered the payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and proportionate 13thmonth pay for the
year 2000 in favor of Canoy and Pigcaulan, viz:

WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainants: 1) their salary
differentials in the amount of P166,849.60 for Oliver Canoy and P121,765.44 for Abduljuahid Pigcaulan; 2)
the sum of P3,075.20 for Canoy and P2,449.71 for Pigcaulan for service incentive leave pay and; [3]) the sum
of P1,481.85 for Canoy and P1,065.35 for Pigcaulan as proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000. The
rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of sufficient basis to make an award.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Respondents appealed to the NLRC. They alleged that there was no basis
for the awards made because aside from the self-serving itemized computations, no representative daily time record was presented
by Canoy and Pigcaulan. On the contrary, respondents asserted that the payroll listings they submitted should have been given
more probative value. To strengthen their cause, they attached to their Memorandum on Appeal payrolls[12] bearing the individual
signatures of Canoy and Pigcaulan to show that the latter have received their salaries, as well as copies of transmittal letters[13] to
the bank to show that the salaries reflected in the payrolls were directly deposited to the ATM accounts of SCIIs employees.

The NLRC, however, in a Resolution[14] dated March 23, 2004, dismissed the appeal and held that the evidence show
underpayment of salaries as well as non-payment of service incentive leave benefit. Accordingly, the Labor Arbiters Decision was
sustained. The motion for reconsideration thereto was likewise dismissed by the NLRC in a Resolution[15] dated June 14, 2004.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In respondents petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction[16] before the CA, they attributed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that Canoy and Pigcaulan
are entitled to salary differentials, service incentive leave pay and proportionate 13th month pay and in arriving at amounts without
providing sufficient bases therefor.

The CA, in its Decision[17] dated February 24, 2006, set aside the rulings of

21
both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC after noting that there were no factual and legal bases mentioned in the questioned rulings
to support the conclusions made. Consequently, it dismissed all the monetary claims of Canoy and Pigcaulan on the following
rationale:

First. The Labor Arbiter disregarded the NLRC rule that, in cases involving money awards and at all events,
as far as practicable, the decision shall embody the detailed and full amount awarded.

Second. The Labor Arbiter found that the payrolls submitted by SCII have no probative value for being
unsigned by Canoy, when, in fact, said payrolls, particularly the payrolls from 1998 to 1999 indicate the
individual signatures of Canoy.

Third. The Labor Arbiter did not state in his decision the substance of the evidence adduced by Pigcaulan and
Canoy as well as the laws or jurisprudence that would show that the two are indeed entitled to the salary
differential and incentive leave pays.

Fourth. The Labor Arbiter held Reyes liable together with SCII for the payment of the claimed salaries and
benefits despite the absence of proof that Reyes deliberately or maliciously designed to evade SCIIs alleged
financial obligation; hence the Labor Arbiter ignored that SCII has a corporate personality separate and distinct
from Reyes. To justify solidary liability, there must be an allegation and showing that the officers of the
corporation deliberately or maliciously designed to evade the financial obligation of the corporation.[18]

Canoy and Pigcaulan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but same was denied by the CA in a Resolution[19] dated June 28, 2006.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues

The petition ascribes upon the CA the following errors:

I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the complaint on mere alleged failure of
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to observe the prescribed form of decision, instead of remanding the case for
reformation of the decision to include the desired detailed computation.

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it [made] complainants suffer the consequences of
the alleged non-observance by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC of the prescribed forms of decisions considering
that they have complied with all needful acts required to support their claims.

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the complaint allegedly due to absence
of legal and factual [bases] despite attendance of substantial evidence in the records.[20]

It is well to note that while the caption of the petition reflects both the names of Canoy and Pigcaulan as petitioners, it
appears from its body that it is being filed solely by Pigcaulan. In fact, the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
was executed by Pigcaulan alone.

In his Petition, Pigcaulan submits that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are not strictly bound by the rules. And even so,
the rules do not mandate that a detailed computation of how the amount awarded was arrived at should be embodied in the
decision. Instead, a statement of the nature or a description of the amount awarded and the specific figure of the same will
suffice. Besides, his and Canoys claims were supported by substantial evidence in the form of the handwritten detailed
computations which the Labor Arbiter termed as representative daily time records, showing that they were not properly
compensated for work rendered. Thus, the CA should have remanded the case instead of outrightly dismissing it.

22
 In their Comment,[21] respondents point out that since it was only Pigcaulan who filed the petition, the CA Decision has
already become final and binding upon Canoy. As to Pigcaulans arguments, respondents submit that they were able to present
sufficient evidence to prove payment of just salaries and benefits, which bits of evidence were unfortunately ignored by the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC. Fittingly, the CA reconsidered these pieces of evidence and properly appreciated them. Hence, it was
correct in dismissing the claims for failure of Canoy and Pigcaulan to discharge their burden to disprove payment.

Pigcaulan, this time joined by Canoy, asserts in his Reply[22] that his filing of the present petition redounds likewise to
Canoys benefit since their complaints were consolidated below.As such, they maintain that any kind of disposition made in favor
or against either of them would inevitably apply to the other. Hence, the institution of the petition solely by Pigcaulan does not
render the assailed Decision final as to Canoy. Nonetheless, in said reply they appended Canoys affidavit[23] where he verified
under oath the contents and allegations of the petition filed by Pigcaulan and also attested to the authenticity of its annexes. Canoy,
however, failed to certify that he had not filed any action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. He likewise
explains in said affidavit that his absence during the preparation and filing of the petition was caused by severe financial distress
and his failure to inform anyone of his whereabouts.

Our Ruling

The assailed CA Decision is considered final as to Canoy.

We have examined the petition and find that same was filed by Pigcaulan solely on his own behalf. This is very clear from the
petitions prefatory which is phrased as follows:

COMES NOW Petitioner Abduljuahid R. Pigcaulan, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court x x
x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Also, under the heading Parties, only Pigcaulan is mentioned as petitioner and consistent with this, the body of the petition refers
only to a petitioner and never in its plural form petitioners. Aside from the fact that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping attached to the petition was executed by Pigcaulan alone, it was plainly and particularly indicated under the name of the
lawyer who prepared the same, Atty. Josefel P. Grageda, that he is the Counsel for Petitioner Adbuljuahid Pigcaulan only. In view
of these, there is therefore, no doubt, that the petition was brought only on behalf of Pigcaulan. Since no appeal from the CA
Decision was brought by Canoy, same has already become final and executory as to him.

Canoy cannot now simply incorporate in his affidavit a verification of the contents and allegations of the petition as he is not one
of the petitioners therein. Suffice it to state that it would have been different had the said petition been filed in behalf of both Canoy
and Pigcaulan. In such a case, subsequent submission of a verification may be allowed as non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein does not necessarily render the pleading, or the petition as in this case, fatally defective.[24] The court may order its
submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may
be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. Further, a verification is deemed substantially complied
with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.[25] However, even if it were so, we
note that Canoy still failed to submit or at least incorporate in his affidavit a certificate of non-forum shopping.

The filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory so much so

23
that non-compliance could only be tolerated by special circumstances and compelling reasons.[26] This Court has held that when
there are several petitioners, all of them must execute and sign the certification against forum shopping; otherwise, those who did
not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.[27] True, we held that in some cases, execution by only one of the petitioners on
behalf of the other petitioners constitutes substantial compliance with the rule on the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping
on the ground of common interest or common cause of action or defense.[28] We, however, find that common interest is not present
in the instant petition. To recall, Canoys and Pigcaulans complaints were consolidated because they both sought the same reliefs
against the same respondents. This does not, however, mean that they share a common interest or defense. The evidence required
to substantiate their claims may not be the same. A particular evidence which could sustain Canoys action may not effectively
serve as sufficient to support Pigcaulans claim.

Besides, assuming that the petition is also filed on his behalf, Canoy failed to show any reasonable cause for his failure
to join Pigcaulan to personally sign the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. It is his duty, as a litigant, to be prudent in pursuing
his claims against SCII, especially so, if he was indeed suffering from financial distress. However, Canoy failed to advance any
justifiable reason why he did not inform anyone of his whereabouts when he knows that he has a pending case against his former
employer. Sadly, his lack of prudence and diligence cannot merit the courts consideration or sympathy. It must be emphasized at
this point that procedural rules should not be ignored simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys
substantial rights. The Rules of Court should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons.[29]
Having declared the present petition as solely filed by Pigcaulan, this Court shall consider the subsequent pleadings,
although apparently filed under his and Canoys name, as solely filed by the former.

There was no substantial evidence to support the grant of overtime

pay.

The Labor Arbiter ordered reimbursement of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay for the
year 2000 in favor of Canoy and Pigcaulan. The Labor Arbiter relied heavily on the itemized computations they submitted which
he considered as representative daily time records to substantiate the award of salary differentials. The NLRC then sustained the
award on the ground that there was substantial evidence of underpayment of salaries and benefits.

We find that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in this regard. The handwritten itemized computations are self-serving,
unreliable and unsubstantial evidence to sustain the grant of salary differentials, particularly overtime pay. Unsigned and
unauthenticated as they are, there is no way of verifying the truth of the handwritten entries stated therein. Written only in pieces
of paper and solely prepared by Canoy and Pigcaulan, these representative daily time records, as termed by the Labor Arbiter, can
hardly be considered as competent evidence to be used as basis to prove that the two were underpaid of their salaries. We find
nothing in the records which could substantially support Pigcaulans contention that he had rendered service beyond eight hours to
entitle him to overtime pay and during Sundays to entitle him to restday pay. Hence, in the absence of any concrete proof that
additional service beyond the normal working hours and days had indeed been rendered, we cannot affirm the grant of overtime
pay to Pigcaulan.

Pigcaulan is entitled to holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and

proportionate 13th month pay for year 2000.

However, with respect to the award for holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay and 13th month pay, we affirm and rule that Pigcaulan is entitled to these benefits.
Article 94 of the Labor Code provides that:

24
 ART. 94. RIGHT TO HOLIDAY PAY. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during
regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;

xxxx

While Article 95 of the Labor Code provides:

ART. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE. (a) Every employee who has rendered at
least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive of five days with pay.

xxxx

Under the Labor Code, Pigcaulan is entitled to his regular rate on holidays even if he does not work.[30] Likewise, express
provision of the law entitles him to service incentive leave benefit for he rendered service for more than a year already. Furthermore,
under Presidential Decree No. 851,[31] he should be paid his 13th month pay. As employer, SCII has the burden of proving that it
has paid these benefits to its employees.[32]

SCII presented payroll listings and transmittal letters to the bank to show that Canoy and Pigcaulan received their salaries
as well as benefits which it claimed are already integrated in the employees monthly salaries. However, the documents presented
do not prove SCIIs allegation. SCII failed to show any other concrete proof by means of records, pertinent files or similar
documents reflecting that the specific claims have been paid. With respect to 13th month pay, SCII presented proof that this benefit
was paid but only for the years 1998 and 1999. To repeat, the burden of proving payment of these monetary claims rests on SCII,
being the employer. It is a rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even when the plaintiff alleges non-
payment, still the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment.[33] Since SCII failed to provide convincing proof that it has already settled the claims, Pigcaulan should be paid his holiday
pay, service incentive leave benefits and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000.

The CA erred in dismissing the claims instead of remanding the case

to the Labor Arbiter for a detailed computation of the judgment award.

Indeed, the Labor Arbiter failed to provide sufficient basis for the monetary
awards granted. Such failure, however, should not result in prejudice to the substantial rights of the party. While we disallow the
grant of overtime pay and restday pay in favor of Pigcaulan, he is nevertheless entitled, as a matter of right, to his holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay for year 2000. Hence, the CA is not correct in dismissing Pigcaulans claims in its
entirety.

Consistent with the rule that all money claims arising from an employer-employee relationship shall be filed within three years
from the time the cause of action accrued,[34] Pigcaulan can only demand the amounts due him for the period within three years
preceding the filing of the complaint in 2000. Furthermore, since the records are insufficient to use as bases to properly compute
Pigcaulans claims, the case should be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for a detailed computation of the monetary benefits due to
him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

25
February 24, 2006 and Resolution dated June 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85515
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Abduljuahid R. Pigcaulan is hereby declared ENTITLED to holiday pay and
service incentive leave pay for the years 1997-2000 and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000.

The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings to determine the exact amount and to make a detailed
computation of the monetary benefits due Abduljuahid R. Pigcaulan which Security and Credit Investigation Inc. should pay
without delay.

26
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39387 June 29, 1982

PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SUGAR WORKERS ASSOCIATION, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petitioner Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. seeks the reversal of the order dated June 6, 1974 of
respondent Court of Industrial Relations awarding to respondent Sugar Workers Association's (Union) counsel
attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the judgment in CIR Case No. 4264- ULP and ordering the lower court's
Examining Division to compute the wage and fringe benefits differentials due the 28 individual workers who did not
execute quitclaims as well as attorney's fees corresponding to 20% of the benefits due to 53 workers who entered
into agreements waiving their rights and benefits under the decision dated December 4, 1972 in the aforecited case;
also, the setting aside of the CIR resolution of September 3, 1974 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the questioned order (pp. 15 & 57, rec.).

For a better appreciation of this case, certain prefatory facts must be recalled. Sometime in February, 1956, the
workers' affiliates of respondent Union staged a strike against petitioner company. This labor dispute was certified
by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations which was docketed as Case No. 13-IPA. After six years, the
said Court issued an order on November 8, 1962 directing petitioner company to reinstate the members of
respondent union. On March 12, 1963 some 88 union members were thus reinstated by petitioner. However,
petitioner discriminated against the reemployed workers with respect to wage rates, off-season pay, cost of living
allowance, milling bonus and Christmas bonus by depriving them of aforesaid benefits or by granting to some
members benefits lesser than those given to members of the Pasudeco Workers Union, another labor group in the
service of petitioner. By reason of such denial and/or grant of lower benefits to respondent's members because of
their union affiliation and union activities, respondent filed with the CIR a complaint dated September 10, 1964 for
unfair labor practice against petitioner which case was docketed as Case No. 4264-ULP.

On December 4, 1972, the CIR handed down a decision adjudging herein petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice
acts as charged and finding the same to have been committed, and thereby directing petitioner to cease and desist
from further committing the said unfair labor practice acts and directing petitioner to pay wage differentials to
certain workers and fringe benefits as would be found due and payable to them and to readmitted seasonal and
casual members of respondent union totalling 88 with the exception of 7 workers.

In a resolution dated May 28, 1973, the CIR denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of aforesaid decision
filed on December 14, 1972. Petitioner appealed the above decision and resolution to this Court on June 15, 1973
praying in its petition for the nullification of said decision and motion for being contrary to law, and for the rendition
of a new judgment dismissing CIR Case No. 4264-ULP.

This Court, in its resolution of July 31, 1973, denied the said petition for review (docketed as G.R. No. L-36994) for
lack of merit. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration of aforesaid denial which was denied on October 4, 1973 for
lack of merit. Said resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thus became final and executory on October
12, 1973.

With the finality of the December 4, 1972 decision having been settled, respondent Union filed with the CIR a
motion for computation of final judgment and a petition for attorney's lien both dated October 17, 1973 (pp. 47 &
50, rec.).

Petitioner company filed its answer to motion for computation of final judgment and the petition for attorney's lien
under date of November 20, 1973 (p. 52, rec.).

The CIR, acting on the aforesaid motions of respondent Union, issued its order of June 6, 1974 approving and
granting to respondent's counsel, Atty. Ignacio Lacsina, attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the total amount of final
judgment or whatever recovery or settlement is made and directing its Examining Division to compute the wage and
fringe benefits differentials due the 28 individual workers who did not waive or quitclaim their rights established by
the decision of December 4, 1972 as well as the attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the total wage and fringe

27
benefits differentials due the fifty-three (53) individual workers who executed agreements with the company
waiving and quitclaiming their rights, benefits and privileges under the aforesaid decision (pp. 15 & 57, rec.).

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of aforecited order on June 26, 1974 and on July 5, 1974, the arguments
supporting said motion for reconsideration followed (pp. 63 & 65, rec.).

Respondent Union then filed its motion to strike out the motion for reconsideration dated July 23, 1974 (p. 72, rec.).
In a resolution of September 3, 1974, respondent lower court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Thus, this appeal from the subject order and resolution of the CIR.

Petitioner alleges the following assignment of errors:

1. The Court of Industrial Relations erred in awarding attorney's fees to the union's counsel equivalent to 20% of the
total amount of final judgment or whatever recovery or settlement is made thereunder; because, aside from being
inequitable, exorbitant, excessive and unconscionable, the same is without legal basis.

2. The Court of Industrial Relations erred in ordering the Chief of its examining division or his duly authorized
representative to examine the payrolls, vouchers, books of account and other pertinent documents of petitioner, and
to compute the wage and fringe-benefits differentials allegedly due the members of respondent Union because such
examination and computation have become academic.

3. The Court of Industrial Relations erred in not denying or dismissing the two motions filed by respondent union on
October 18, 1973 praying therein that the union's counsel be awarded attorney's fees and that an order be issued
directing the examining division of the court to compute the wage and fringe benefits differentials allegedly due the
members of the union under the decision of December 4, 1972.

Respondents, however, contend that —

1. The issue of quitclaims is now res judicata;

2. The CIR finding that 81 members of respondent union are entitled to adjudged benefits is no
longer alterable after decision has become final;

3. The CIR power to adjust unfair labor practices is unaffected by individual settlements;

4. The rights of labor are unwaivable; quitclaims null and void; and

5. The question regarding alleged unreasonableness of award of attorney's fees, not raised before
Court a quo, is barred on appeal.

After a careful evaluation of the petitioners' and respondents' pleadings, this Court, finds the allegations of petitioner
to be without merit.

On the first assignment of error, paragraph (a), the petitioner failed to raise the issue before the trial court. This
Court notes that petitioner's answer to the motion for computation of final judgment and to petition for attorney's
lien filed by the respondent in the trial court did not raise the foregoing issue. It is a well-settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised on appeal. Otherwise, there will be no end to
litigations thus defeating the ends of justice.

Nevertheless, this Court finds the allegations to be devoid of merit. Petitioner's contention that there is no basis for
respondent's petition for attorney's lien filed with the trial court containing allegations relative to attorney's fees as
agreed upon between him and his client, the complainant Sugar Workers' Association, is untenable. The written
conformity of the President of said Sugar Workers Association on behalf thereof confirms the existence of such an
agreement on attorney's fees and constitutes an irrefutable evidence of such agreement. The trial court, therefore,
had sufficient evidence upon which it based its decision. The petitioner did not contest the allegations contained in
the respondent's petition for attorney's lien before the trial court. This constitutes an implied admission thereof.
Moreover, it is evident from the tenor of the trial court's order issued on June 6, 1974 that the said court carefully
evaluated the respondent's petition for attorney's lien and even reduced the percentage from 25 IC to 20 %.

On the first assignment of error, paragraph (b), this Court likewise finds the same to be without merit. This issue
has already been resolved by this Court when the petitioner filed its first petition for certiorari (G.R. No. L- 36994)
seeking nullification of the trial court's judgment on the same issue. Petitioner's allegations were rejected by this
Court in said case. It may not now be repeated and raised on appeal before this Court, the same being res judicata.

28
Be that as it may, the allegations of petitioner to the effect that by reason of the quitclaims there is nothing upon
which the attorney's lien attaches, is not valid. This Court finds the quitclaims not valid. Firstly, said quitclaims were
secured on December 27, 1972 by petitioner after it lost its case in the lower court when the latter promulgated its
decision on the case on December 4, 1972. Obviously in its desire to deny what is due the sugar workers concerned
and frustrate the decision of the lower court awarding benefits to them, it used its moral ascendancy as employer
over said workers to secure said quitclaims. Predicated on said quitclaims, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before this Court but the same was denied by the Court on July 31, 1973 and October 4, 1973. Petitioner now has
the audacity to return before this Court still invoking said quitclaims, which We again reject.

Secondly, while rights may be waived, the same must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law (Art. 6, New Civil Code). The quitclaim
agreements contain the following provisions in paragraph I 1, No. 3, thereof:

3. Nothing herein stipulated shall be construed as an admission and/or recognition by the Party of
The Second Part of its failure refusal and/or omission as employer, to faithfully comply with the
pertinent laws, rules and regulations and/or agreements, nor its liability therefor and thereunder.

Needless to state, the foregoing provisions are contrary to law, It exempts the petitioner from any legal liability. The
above- quoted provision renders the quitclaim agreements void ab initio in their entirety since they obligated the
workers concerned to forego their benefits, while at the same time, exempted the petitioner from any liability that it
may choose to reject. This runs counter to Article 22 of the New Civil Code which provides that no one shall be
unjustly enriched at the expense of another.

Thirdly, the alleged quitclaim agreements are contrary to public policy. Once a civil action is filed in court, the cause
of action may not be the subject of compromise unless the same is by leave of the court concerned. Otherwise, this
will render the entire judicial system irrelevant to the prejudice of the national interest. Parties to litigations cannot
be allowed to trifle with the judicial system by coming to court and later on agreeing to a compromise without the
knowledge and approval of the court. This converts the judiciary into a mere tool of party-litigants who act
according to their whims and caprices. This is more so when the court has already rendered its decision on the issues
submitted.

In the case at bar, the lower court has already rendered a decision on the issues presented before the alleged
quitclaims agreements were made. The quitclaim agreements were secured by petitioner while it filed a petition for
certiorari before this Court for a review of the lower court's decision. The quiclaim agreements taken together with
the petitioner's petition for certiorari of the trial court's decision clearly and unmistakably shows the bad faith of the
petitioner and its outright refusal to comply with its legal obligations. And now it has the temerity to attempt to use
this Court as its instrument for the purpose.

This Court rejects the contention of petitioner to the effect that the lien of an attorney on the judgment or decree for
the payment of money and the preference thereof which he has secured in favor of his client takes legal effect only
from and after, but not before notice of said lien has been entered in the record and served on the adverse party,
citing the cases of Menzi and Co. vs. Bastida (63 Phil. 16) and Macondray & Co. vs. Jose (66 Phil. 590) in support
thereof.

This Court finds the petitioner's contentions and citations applicable only when the case has already been decided
with finality. In the case at bar, the original case was decided with finality only after this Court denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of this Court's denial of its petition for certiorari on the lower court's decision.

This Court is appalled by the attempt of petitioner to mislead it by alleging that the lower court recognized the
validity and effectivity of the 53 individual agreements when it declared allegedly that "rights may be waived. " The
records show that the lower court qualified its statement to the effect that the waiver must not be contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
citing Article 6 of the New Civil Code. This attempt by petitioner casts a serious doubt on the integrity and good
faith not only of the petitioner but also of its counsel.

This Court rejects the allegation of petitioner to the effect that the 53 agreements gave substance to the policy of the
Industrial Peace Act of encouraging the parties to make all reasonable efforts to settle their differences by mutual
agreement, citing the case of Filomena Dionela, et al. vs. CIR, et al. (L-18334, August 31, 1963).

Petitioner's contention and the case cited in support thereof apply only where there is good faith on the part of the
party litigants. In the case at bar, petitioner acted with evident bad faith and malice. Petitioner secured the 53
quitclaim agreements individually with the 53 sugar workers without the intervention of respondent's lawyer who
was representing them before the lower court. This subterfuge is tantamount to a sabotage of the interest of
respondent association. Needless to say, the means employed by petitioner in dealing with the workers individually,
instead of collectively through respondent and its counsel, violates good morals as they undermine the unity of
respondent union and fuels industrial disputes, contrary to the declared policy in the Industrial Peace Act.

29
This Court likewise rejects petitioner's allegation that the 53 quitclaim agreements were in the nature of a
compromise citing the case of Republic vs. Estenzo, et al., (L-24656, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 122) and
Articles 2028 and 2040 of the New Civil Code.

Petitioner's allegations and citations apply only to compromises between the party-litigants done in good faith. In the
case at bar, there was no compromise between the petitioner and the respondent Sugar Workers Association. In
respect of the 53 quitclaims, these are not compromise agreements between the petitioner and respondent union.
They are separate documents of renunciation of individual rights. Compromise involves the mutual renunciation of
rights by both parties on a parity basis. The quitclaims, however, bind the workers to renounce their rights while the
petitioner not only does not renounce anything but also acquires exemption from any legal liability in connection
therewith.

On the First Assignment of Error, Paragraph (c), the petitioner anchors his allegations on the technical procedural
requirements of Section 37, Rule 138 of the New Rules of Court. This Court, however, finds petitioner's allegation
without merit. Said provision of the Rules of Court is meant to protect the interest of an attorney's client and the
adverse party by seeing to it that they are given the opportunity to contest the creation of the attorney's lien. It will
be noted from the records that the client Sugar Workers Union was not only notified but also affixed its conformity
to the respondents' motion for attorney's lien. With respect to the adverse party, the petitioner in this case, said
adverse party's interest was amply protected by the lower court when the latter admitted petitioner's answer to
respondent's motion for computation of final judgment and to respondent's counsel's petition for attorney's lien.
Petitioner did not raise the aforesaid technicality in its answer before the lower court. It cannot now raise it for the
first time on appeal.

On the First Assignment of Error, Paragraph (d), this Court finds petitioner's allegations to the effect that the
attorney's fees awarded are inequitable, exorbitant, excessive and unconscionable, citing in the process the case of
Meralco Workers' Union vs. Gaerlan (32 SCRA 419), completely without basis nor merit.

Again, petitioner did not raise this issue in the lower court. It cannot now raise said issue for the first time on appeal
before this Court. Nevertheless, petitioner has failed to prove any of its allegations. Hence, this Court finds the same
worthless. The Meralco case does not apply in this case for the reason that the facts and circusmtances are entirely
different.

On the Second Assignment of Error, this Court finds petitioner's allegation to the effect that the lower court erred in
ordering the computation of judgment on the ground that by reason of the quitclaim agreements the computation of
judgment has become academic, to be without merit and grossly inane.

The allegations of petitioner are premised on its previous allegations regarding the quitclaims. This Court has earlier
stated that the quitclaim agreements are void ab initio. The lower court was correct in directing the computation of
judgment, there being a basis therefor.

On the Third Assignment of Error, this Court likewise finds petitioner's allegations which are based on its
allegations in support of the first and second assignments of errors, without merit, as heretofore discussed.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED AND RESPONDENT CIR (NOW THE NLRC) IS
HEREBY DIRECTED TO IMPLEMENT ITS ORDER DATED JUNE 6,1974.

COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

SO ORDERED.

30
 G.R. No. 207286, July 29, 2015

DELA ROSA LINER, INC. AND/OR ROSAURO DELA ROSA, SR. AND NORA DELA
ROSA, Petitioners, v. CALIXTO B. BORELA AND ESTELO A. AMARILLE, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is Dela Rosa Liner, et al.'s petition for review on certiorari1 which seeks to annul the March 8, 2013
decision2 and May 21, 2013 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 128188.

The Antecedents

The facts as set out in the CA decision are summarized below.

On September 23, 2011, respondents Calixto Borela, bus driver, and Estelo Amarille, conductor, filed separate
complaints4 (later consolidated) against petitioners Dela Rosa Liner, Inc., a public transport company, Rosauro Dela
Rosa, Sr., and Nora Dela Rosa, for underpayment/non-payment of salaries, holiday pay, overtime pay, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, sick leave and vacation leave, night shift differential, illegal deductions, and
violation of Wage Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16.

In a motion dated October 26, 2011, the petitioners asked the labor arbiter to dismiss the case for forum shopping.
They alleged that on September 28, 2011, the CA 13th Division disposed of a similar case between the parties (CA-
G.R. SP No. 118038) after they entered into a compromise agreement5 which covered all claims and causes of
action they had against each other in relation to the respondents' employment.

The respondents opposed the motion, contending that the causes of action in the present case are different from the
causes of action settled in the case the petitioners cited.

The Rulings on Compulsory Arbitration

Labor Arbiter (LA) Danna A. Castillon, in an order6 dated November 24, 2011, upheld the petitioners' position and
dismissed the complaint on grounds of forum shopping. Respondents appealed the LA's ruling. On July 31, 2012,
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) 1st Division granted the appeal,7 reversed LA Castillon's
dismissal order, and reinstated the complaint.

The NLRC held that the respondents could not have committed forum shopping as there was no identity of causes of
action between the two cases. The first complaint, the NLRC pointed out, charged the petitioners with illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice; while the second complaint was based on the petitioners' alleged
nonpayment/underpayment of their salaries and monetary benefits, and violation of several wage orders.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their motion, prompting them to file with the CA a
petition for certiorari, for alleged grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC in: (1) holding that the respondents did not
commit forum shopping when they filed the second complaint; and (2) disregarding respondents' quitclaim in
relation to the compromise agreement in the first complaint.

The CA Decision

In its decision under review, the CA 15th Division denied the petition; it found no grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC ruling that the respondents did not commit forum shopping when they filed their second complaint. The
NLRC likewise held that neither was the case barred by res judicata arising from the CA judgment in the first case.

The appeals court explained that the first case involved the issues of whether respondents had been illegally
dismissed and whether petitioners should be liable for unfair labor practice. The labor arbiter 8dismissed the first
complaint for lack of merit in his decision of November 6, 2008.

On the respondents' appeal against the LA ruling in this first case, the NLRC 6th Division rendered a decision on
March 25, 2010, reversing the dismissal of the complaint. It awarded respondents back wages (P442,550.00 for
Borela and P215,775.00 for Amarille), damages (P10,000.00 each in moral and exemplary damages for Borela), and
moral and exemplary damages (P25,000.00 each for Amarille), plus 10% attorney's fees for each of
them.9chanrobleslaw

On the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the NLRC ruling in the first complaint, however, the NLRC
vacated its decision, and in its resolution of September 30, 2010, issued a new ruling that followed the LA's ruling,
with modification. It awarded the respondents financial assistance of P10,000.00 each, in consideration of their long
years of service to the company.

31
The respondents sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 118038). Thereafter,
the parties settled the case (involving the first complaint) amicably through the compromise agreement 10 adverted to
earlier. Under the terms of this agreement, "(t)he parties has (sic) agreed to terminate the case now pending before
the Court of Appeals and that both parties further agree that no further action based on the same grounds be
brought against each other, and this Agreement applies to all claims and damages or losses either party may have
against each other whether those damages or losses are known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen."

Based on this agreement, Borela and Amarille received from respondents P350,000.00 and P150,000.00,
respectively, and executed a quitclaim. Consequently, the CA 13th Division rendered judgment in accordance with
the compromise agreement and ordered an entry of judgment which was issued on September 28, 2011. In this
manner, the parties resolved the first case.

To go back to the present case CA-G.R. SP No. 128188, which arose from the second complaint the respondents
subsequently filed), the CA 15th Division upheld the NLRC's (1st Division) decision and ruled out the presence of
forum shopping and res judicata as bars to the respondents' subsequent money claims against the petitioners. The
petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of May 21, 2013.

The Petition

The petitioners now ask the Court to nullify the CA judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 128188 (arising from the second
complaint), contending that the appellate court erred in upholding the NLRC ruling that there was no forum
shopping nor res judicata that would bar the second complaint. They submit that private respondents should be
penalized and be dealt with more severely, knowing fully well that the same action had been settled and they both
received a considerable amount for the settlement.11chanrobleslaw

The Respondents' Position

In their Comment12 filed on September 4, 2013, the respondents pray for the denial of the petition for having been
filed out of time and for lack of merit.

They argue that the petition should not prosper as it was belatedly filed. They claim that according to the petitioners'
counsel herself, her law firm received a copy of the CA resolution of May 21, 2013, denying their motion for
reconsideration on May 28, 2013, and giving them until June 12, 2013, to file the petition. The petition, they point
out, was notarized only on June 13, 2013, which means that it was filed only on that day, or beyond the 15-day filing
period.

On the substantive aspect of the case, respondents contend that their second complaint involved two causes of
action: (1) their claim for sick leave, vacation leave, and 13th-month pay under the collective bargaining agreement
of the company; and (2) the petitioners' noncompliance with wage orders since the year 2000 until the present.

They quote the NLRC's (1st Division) decision of July 31, 2012, 13 almost in its entirety, to support their position that
they did not commit forum shopping in the filing of the second complaint and that they should be heard on their
money claims against the petitioners.

The Court's Ruling

The procedural issue

We find the petition for review on certiorari timely filed pursuant to Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court.14chanrobleslaw

The last day for filing of the petition, as respondents claim, fell on June 12, 2013, Independence Day, a legal
holiday. In Reiner Pacific International Shipping, et al., v. Captain Francisco B. Guevarra, et al.,15the Court
explained that under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, as clarified by A.M. 00-2-14 SC (in relation to the
filing of pleadings in courts), when the last day on which a pleading is due falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
holiday, the filing of the pleading on the next working day is deemed on time. The filing of the petition therefore on
June 13, 2013, a working day, fully complied with the rules.

The merits of the case

The CA 15th Division committed no reversible error when it affirmed the NLRC ruling that the second complaint is
not barred by the rule on forum shopping nor by the principle of res judicata. In other words, no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the NLRC when it reinstated the second complaint.

Contrary to the petitioners' submission, respondents' second complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 128188), a money claim, is
not a "similar case" to the first complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 118038). Thus, the filing of the second complaint did
not constitute forum shopping and the judgment in the first case is not a res judicata ruling that bars the second

32
complaint.

As the CA aptly cited, the elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties; (2) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration.16chanrobleslaw

We concur with the C A that forum shopping and res judicata are not applicable in the present case. There is no
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and the judgment rendered in the previous action will not amount
to res judicata in the action now under consideration.

There is also no identity of causes of action in the first complaint and in the second complaint. In Yap v. Chua,17 we
held that the test to determine whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence would
support both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the
same facts or evidence would support both actions, then they are considered the same; a judgment in the first case
would be a bar to the subsequent action.

Under the circumstances of the case before us, sufficient basis exists for the NLRC's and CA's conclusions that there
is no identity of causes of action between the respondents' two complaints against the petitioners. The first complaint
involved illegal dismissal/suspension, unfair labor practice with prayer for damages and attorney's fees; while the
second complaint (the subject of the present appeal) involves claims for labor standards benefits � the petitioners'
alleged violation of Wage Orders Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16; nonpayment of respondents' sick and vacation leave pays,
13th-month pay, service incentive leave benefit, overtime pay, and night shift differential.

As the CA correctly held, the same facts or evidence would not support both actions. To put it simply, the facts or
the evidence that would determine whether respondents were illegally dismissed, illegally suspended, or had been
the subject of an unfair labor practice act by the petitioners are not the same facts or evidence that would support the
charge of non-compliance with labor standards benefits and several wage orders. We thus cannot find a basis for
petitioners' claim that "the same action had been settled x x x."18chanrobleslaw

Neither are we persuaded by petitioners' argument that "The Compromise Agreement covered all claims and causes
of action that the parties may have against each other in relation to the private respondents' employment."19 The
compromise agreement had been concluded to terminate the illegal dismissal and unfair labor case then pending
before the CA. While the parties agreed that no further action shall be brought by the parties against each other, they
pointedly stated that they referred to actions on the same grounds. The phrase same grounds can only refer to the
grounds raised in the first complaint and not to any other grounds.

We likewise cannot accept the compromise agreement's application "to all claims and damages or losses either
party may have against each other whether those damages or losses are known or unknown, foreseen or
unforeseen."20chanrobleslaw

This coverage is too sweeping and effectively excludes any claims by the respondents against the petitioners,
including those that by law and jurisprudence cannot be waived without appropriate consideration such as
nonpayment or underpayment of overtime pay and wages.

In Pampanga Sugar Development, Co., Inc., v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.,21 the Court reminded the parties
that while rights may be waived, the waiver must not be contrary to law, public policy, morals, or good customs; or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 22 In labor law, respondents' claim for 13th-month pay,
overtime pay, and statutory wages (under Wages Orders 13, 14, 15 and 16), among others, cannot simply
be generally waived as they are granted for workers' protection and welfare; it takes more than a general waiver to
give up workers' rights to these legal entitlements.

Lastly, the petitioners' insinuation, that the respondents are not and should not be entitled to anything more, because
they had already "received a considerable amount for the settlement" 23 (P350,000.00 for Borela and P150,000.00 for
Amarille), should be placed and understood in its proper context.

We note that in the illegal dismissal case where the compromise agreement took place, the NLRC 6th Division
(acting on the appeal from the LA's ruling) awarded Borela P442,550.00 in backwages; P20,000.00 in moral and
exemplary damages, plus 10% attorney's fees; and to Amarille P215,775.00 in back wages and P50,000.00 in moral
and exemplary damages, plus 10% attorney's fees.24chanrobleslaw

Although the NLRC reconsidered these awards and eventually granted financial assistance of P10,000.00 each to
Borela and Amarille,25 it is reasonable to regard the amounts they received as a fair compromise in the settlement of
the first complaint in relation with the initial NLRC award, indicated above, before its reconsideration. To be sure,
the parties, especially the respondents, could not have considered the P10,000.00 financial assistance or their labor
standards claims, particularly the alleged violation of the wage orders, as a factor in their effort to settle the case
amicably. The compromise agreement, it should be emphasized, was executed on September 8, 2011, 26 while the
labor standards complaint was filed only on September 23, 2011. 27chanrobleslaw

33
For the reasons discussed above, we find the petition without merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

34
 [G.R. No. 115755. December 4, 2000]

IMELDA B. DAMASCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANILA

GLASS SUPPLY and BONIFACIO K. SIA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 116101. December 4, 2000]

BONIFACIO K. SIA and MANILA GLASS SUPPLY, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER DOMINADOR B. SALUDARES, DEPUTY SHERIFF
ANTONIO T. DATU and IMELDA B. DAMASCO, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

These two petitions for certiorari seek to annul the decision promulgated by public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) on March 21, 1994 in NLRC CA No. L-001159, and its resolution dated May 11,
1994, which denied petitioners respective motions for reconsideration.
Ms. Imelda Damasco is the petitioner in G.R. No. 115755 and private respondent in G.R. No. 116101. She was
a regular sales clerk in Manila Glass Supply in Olongapo City.
Manila Glass Supply is private respondent in G.R. No. 115755 and petitioner in G.R. No. 116101. It is a sole
proprietorship engaged in the sale of glass with main store in Olongapo City and branch in Metro Manila. Bonifacio
K. Sia is private respondent in G.R. No. 115755 and petitioner in G.R. No. 116101. He is the owner of Manila Glass
Supply.
The factual background of this case as summarized by the labor arbiter is as follows:

That she [Damasco] was employed by respondents [Manila Glass Supply and Bonifacio K. Sia] as Sales Clerk on
January 30, 1992, receiving lately a daily wage of P140.00; that as sales clerk, she was ordered to do almost all the
works related to the glass business of respondents including the cutting, sales and delivery of glass as well as
balancing, accounting and checking of capital and profits every end of the month; that she was made to work from
8:30 in the morning up to 9:30 in the evening continuously from Monday to Sunday without having been paid
overtime pay, rest day pay and holiday pay; that during the period of her employment, she was not paid any 13th
month pay as well as five (5) days service incentive leave pay; that on August 28, 1992 at around 7:00 oclock in the
evening, while she was working, respondent Bonifacio Sia called her up and told her to finish all her works that
night, but she told respondent that she would not be able to finish them all because it was already late; that she then
left respondents room but respondent called her again and asked her why she could not finish what she was told to
do, to which complainant [Damasco] answered that it was already late and there were still a lot of things to do; that
respondent asked her what she was doing since he (respondent) left for Manila, to which complainant told him that
she was attending to the sales, to the field and to other things relative to the business of respondent, to which
respondent got mad at her; that respondent asked complainant why she was not teaching her two (2) other co-
workers on what to do, and she answered she would not do it anymore because if the other co-workers should
commit mistakes in accounting, she was the first one to be lambasted by respondent and even required to share in
paying the shortages; that when respondent heard this, he picked up and swiped an ashtray in front of complainant
and it broke, after which, he threw some notebooks at complainant who began to tremble in fear and her whole body
shook; respondent ordered her to go out of the room, lambasted her again and told her that he (respondent)does not
want to see her face anymore (ayaw ko nang makita ang pagmumukha mo rito); that after respondent had left,
complainant again trembled and she could not prevent herself from crying, her co-workers applied alcohol on her
because her body was cold, given water to drink and after about an hour, complainant decided not to finish her work
anymore because she felt weak; that one of his co-workers, Alma, brought her home and since then, she did not
report for work anymore because she developed a phobia of respondent

Disputing the claim of complainant, respondents maintain as follows: That sometime in the late part of August 1992,
complainant was instructed by respondent to report for work in their store in Metro Manila as there is a necessity for
her detail thereat for reasons that the employees there are new and do not have the experience and know-how in
running the store specifically with regards (sic) to the sale of glass; that complainant manifested her objection to
such detail for reasons that her husband is working in Olongapo City and she does not want to work in Manila; that
thereafter, complainant did not report for work in the respondents store in Olongapo City, so respondent sent some
of his employees to the house of complainant but were told that she is sick and cannot report for work; that
sometime in the first week of January 1993, respondent received a copy of the instant complaint filed by
complainant; that immediately, respondent thru counsel sent a letter to complainant directing her to report for work

35
on January 13, 1993 at its store in Olongapo City; that complainant ignored the letter despite receipt thereof, hence,
on January 15, 1993, respondent again sent complainant another letter directing her to report for work on January
22, 1993 but just the same, complainant failed and refused to report for work; that it is not true as claimed by
complainant that respondent shouted at her and swiped an ashtray from the table and threw at her some
notebooks. [1]

On December 7, 1992, Damasco filed before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando,
Pampanga, a complaint against Bonifacio Sia and Manila Glass Supply (jointly referred hereafter as Sia for easy
reference). In the one-page complaint form of the NLRC, Damasco indicated that she is suing her employer for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay.[2] However, in her complaint affidavit and position paper filed later before
the labor arbiter, Damasco additionally charged her employer with non-payment of 13th month pay, service incentive
leave pay, holiday pay and night shift differential.[3]
On September 2, 1993, the labor arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Ms. Damasco. The labor official declared
that Sia has not shown any just or authorized cause in terminating the services of Damasco, except for wild, generalized
and self-serving statements that Damasco committed serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders
in connection with her work. The labor arbiter also ruled that Damasco is entitled to 13th month pay, service incentive
leave pay, holiday pay, overtime pay, and disposed of the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the complainant and against
respondents, ordering the latter, as follows:

1.To pay the total sum of P112,570.32 representing unpaid 13th month pay, holiday pay, overtime and premiums
pay, five (5) days service incentive leave pay, backwages and separation pay of complainant;

2.To pay attorneys fees in the sum of P11,257.00 which is ten (10%) percent of the award; and

3.All other claims or issues, for want of substantial evidence, are hereby DISMISSED.

SO DECIDED.[4]

On appeal, the NLRC upheld the labor arbiters finding that Damasco was illegally dismissed but modified the
labor officials judgment, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of September 2, 1993, is hereby MODIFIED. Respondents are directed to
pay complainant the following:

I. Backwages .. P43,680.00

II. Separation Pay 36,400.00

III. 13th month pay . 10,920.00

IV. Service Incentive Leave Pay 2,100.00

V. Holiday Pay .. 4,200.00

VI. Attorneys fees .. 1,722.00

--------------

T O T A L ----- P99,022.00

SO ORDERED.[5]

Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied.

On July 4, 1994, the NLRC issued an entry of judgment stating that the aforesaid judgment of the labor tribunal
has become final and executory.
On July 7, 1994, the labor arbiter, upon motion of Damasco, issued a writ of execution. In compliance therewith,
public respondent deputy sheriff issued the next day a notice of garnishment addressed to Far East Bank and Trust
Company, Olongapo City, against all credits and deposits of Bonifacio Sia and/or Manila Glass Supply maintained in
said bank, sufficient to cover the monetary award in favor of Damasco. [6]
In her petition, Damasco alleged that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion:

36
IN DELETING THE AWARD FOR OVERTIME PAY AND REDUCING THE ATTORNEYS FEES IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER.[7]

In his memorandum, Sia raised the following issues for resolution, thus:
A

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT LABOR ARBITER SALUDARES DEPRIVED

PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND THUS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISRCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN AFFIRMING, ALBEIT WITH
MODIFICATIONS, THE LABOR ARBITERS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID DECISION. [8]

In our view, the crucial issue for resolution is whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the decision of the labor arbiter which held that Damasco was illegally dismissed from her job.
On August 1, 1994, we decided to consolidate the two petitions inasmuch as they involve the same parties and
intertwined issues. Likewise, we issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, enjoining the parties concerned from implementing the subject writ of execution and
notice of garnishment dated July 7 and 8, 1994, which were respectively issued by the labor arbiter and deputy sheriff
of NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch III, San Fernando, Pampanga. [9]
We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The
certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct. [10] The certification of
non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the
part of petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions. [11]
But, the Court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice
involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties.[12] Moreover, we must stress that technical rules
of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.[13]
Sia contends that he was deprived of his right to due process as the labor arbiter failed to conduct a hearing for
the reception of evidence. He also claims that the labor arbiters finding that Damasco was illegally dismissed is not
supported by substantial evidence. On the contrary, Sia insists, Damasco abandoned her work as she refused to be
detailed at her employers store in Metro Manila.
Sias contentions are bereft of merit. His words cannot hide the oppressive acts obviously directed to deprive Ms.
Damasco of her employment and erode her dignity as a worker.
It is now axiomatic that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply an opportunity to
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [14] A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which is satisfied
where parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. [15]
As noted by the Solicitor General and petitioner Damasco, the labor arbiter set the case several times for
preliminary conference but the parties failed to reached an amicable settlement.[16] The labor arbiter then ordered the
parties to submit their position papers. In compliance therewith, the parties submitted position papers where they set
out and argued the factual as well as the legal bases of their position. Damasco filed her position paper, computation
of money claims and affidavit. For his part, Sia filed his position paper and affidavit. Damasco, in turn, filed her
affidavit in reply to the affidavit of Sia. After both parties had filed their replies, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution as the labor arbiter did not find it necessary to conduct a trial-type hearing. Note that the filing of position
papers and supporting documents fulfills the requirements of due process.[17] Further, it is within the discretion of the
labor arbiter to determine if there is a need for a hearing.[18] Thus, we cannot subscribe to Sias posturing that the labor
arbiter gravely abused its discretion when he dispensed with the hearing to receive further evidence.[19]
Moreover, Sia was given additional opportunity to argue his case on appeal before the NLRC in a memorandum
and motion for reconsideration which pleadings were likewise considered by that labor agency in the course of
resolving the case. Sia cannot thereafter interpose lack of due process since he was given sufficient time and ample
chances to be heard in the present case. Consequently, the alleged defect in the proceedings in the labor arbiter, if
there be any, should be deemed cured.[20] All told, Sias due process argument must fail.
On Sias assertion that the labor arbiters finding is not supported by ample evidence, suffice it to state that judicial
review of labor cases does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor arbiter and
NLRC based their determinations.[21] Moreover, this Court does not review supposed errors in the decision of the
NLRC which raise factual issues because findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded not
only respect but even finality aside from the consideration that this Court is not a trier of facts. [22] In any case, in our

37
view, the labor arbiter used every reasonable means to ascertain the facts by giving the parties ample opportunity to
present evidence. It is worth stressing that in controversies between a worker and her employer doubts reasonably
arising from evidence or in the interpretation of agreements should be resolved in the formers favor. [23] Thus, the labor
arbiter had reasonable ground to sustain the version of Ms. Damasco on how she was unceremoniously dismissed
from her job. Furthermore, Sia did not quite succeed to convince theNLRC to rule otherwise. Finally, the mere fact
that the worker seeks reinstatement and backpay directly rebuts the employers bare claim of abandonment by the
worker of his employment.
Thus, going now to the specific issue of abandonment, we find no merit in Sias allegation that Ms. Damasco
abandoned her job. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
second element as the more determinative factor when manifested by some overt acts.[24] Abandoning ones job means
the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment and the burden of proof is on the
employer to show a clear and deliberate intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment.
In this case, there are no overt acts established by Sia from which we can infer the clear intention of Damasco to
desist from employment. Sias letters dated January 7 and 15, 1993, for Damasco to report for work deserve scant
consideration. Note that those orders were made four months after Damasco was told not to show herself again in the
store, and after Sia had received a copy of Damascos complaint for illegal dismissal. It is indeed highly incredible for
an employer to require his employee without an approved leave to report to work only after four months of absence.
If at all, the charge of abandonment is disingenuous to say the least. Moreover, as noted by the NLRC, it was unlikely
that Damasco had abandoned her job for no reason at all considering the hardship of the times. In addition, if Damasco
had truly forsaken her job, she would not have bothered to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against her employer
and prayed for reinstatement. An employee who forthwith took steps to protect her layoff could not by any logic be
said to have abandoned her work.[25]
As to Sias allegation that Ms. Damasco committed serious misconduct or willful disobedience of lawful order in
connection with her work, we find no tenable support. Even if Sia directed her to be assigned at his store in Metro
Manila, her act of refusing to be detailed in Metro Manila could hardly be characterized a willful or intentional
disobedience of her employers order. It was Sias order that appears to us whimsical if not vindictive. Reassignment to
Metro Manila is prejudicial to Ms. Damasco, as she and her family are residing in Olongapo City. This would entail
separation from her family and additional expenses on her part for transportation and food. Damascos reassignment
order was unreasonable, considering the attendant circumstances. [26]
In sum, we conclude there is no valid and just cause to terminate the employment of Ms. Damasco. The NLRC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in upholding the finding of the labor arbiter that Ms. Damascos dismissal was not
for cause.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges as well as to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.[27]
However, in our view, the circumstances obtaining in this case do not warrant the reinstatement of Ms. Damasco.
Antagonism caused a severe strain in the relationship between her and her employer. A more equitable disposition
would be an award of separation pay equivalent to one (1) months pay for every year of service with the employer.[28]
Now, as regards Ms. Damascos contention that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in deleting the
award for overtime pay for lack of factual basis, we find the same impressed with merit. We note that Sia has admitted
in his pleadings that Damascos work starts at 8:30 in the morning and ends up at 6:30 in the evening daily, except
holidays and Sundays. However, Sia claims that Damascos basic salary of P140.00 a day is more than enough to cover
the one hour excess work which is the compensation they allegedly agreed upon. [29]
Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same
case are conclusive, no further evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless previously
shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. [30] In view of Sias formal
admission that Ms. Damasco worked beyond eight hours daily, the latter is entitled to overtime compensation. No
further proof is required. Sia already admitted she worked an extra hour daily. Thus, public respondent gravely erred
in deleting the award of overtime pay to Ms. Damasco on the pretext that the claim has no factual basis.
Still, even assuming that Damasco received a wage which is higher than the minimum provided by law, it does
not follow that any additional compensation due her can be offset by her pay in excess of the minimum, in the absence
of an express agreement to that effect. Moreover, such arrangement, if there be any, must appear in the manner required
by law on how overtime compensation must be determined. For it is necessary to have a clear and definite delineation
between an employees regular and overtime compensation to thwart violation of the labor standards provision of the
Labor Code.[31]
With regard to the award of attorneys fees the ten percent (10%) attorneys fees is provided for in Article 111 of
the Labor Code. Considering the circumstances of this case, said award is in order.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 115755, the petition is GRANTED. The judgment of the Labor Arbiter in favor of
petitioner Imelda B. Damasco dated September 2, 1993 is REINSTATED in full. In G.R. No. 116101, the petition of

38
Bonifacio K. Sia and Manila Glass Supply is DISSMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners Bonifacio K.
Sia and Manila Glass Supply.
SO ORDERED.

39