G.R. No.
L-28014-15 May 29, 1970 employees, particularly of defendant driver; and that the decision convicting the said defendant was not yet
SPOUSES MARCELO LANDINGIN and RACQUEL BOCASAS, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.
SPOUSES PEDRO GARCIA and EUFRACIA LANDINGIN, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.
Gabriel A. Zabala for plaintiffs-appellees.
Vicente M. Erfe Law Office for defendants-appellants.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal on a question of law from the portion of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
ordering the defendants Pangasinan Transportation Co. (PANTRANCO) and Marcelo Oligan to pay the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. D-1468
(L-28014) the sum of P6,500.00, and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1470 (L-28015) the sum of P3,500.00.
The complaints in said Civil Cases Nos. D-1468 and D-1470 were filed by the spouses Marcelo Landingin and
Racquel Bocasas, and the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin, respectively, for damages allegedly
suffered by them in connection with the death of their respective daughter, Leonila Landingin and Estrella
Garcia, due to the alleged negligence of the defendants and/or breach of contract of carriage. In their
complaints, plaintiffs averred, among others, that in the morning of April 20, 1963, their above-mentioned
daughters were among the passengers in the bus driven by defendant Marcelo Oligan and owned and
operated by defendant PANTRANCO on an excursion trip from Dagupan City to Baguio City and back, that the
bus was open on one side and enclosed on the other, in gross violation of the rules of the Public Service
Commission; that defendant PANTRANCO acted with negligence, fraud and bad faith in pretending to have
previously secured a special permit for the trip when in truth it had not done so; that upon reaching an uphill
point at Camp 8, Kennon Road, Baguio City, on the onward trip, defendant driver, through utter lack of
foresight, experience and driving knowledge, caused the bus to stall and stop for a few moments; that
through the said defendant's fault and mishandling, the motor ceased to function, causing the bus to slide
back unchecked; that when the said defendant suddenly swerved and steered the bus toward the
mountainside, Leonila and Estrella, together with several other passengers, were thrown out of the bus
through its open side unto the road, suffering serious injuries as a result of which Leonila and Estrella died at
the hospital and the same day; and that in connection with the incident, defendant driver had been charged
with and convicted of multiple homicide and multiple slight physical injuries on account of the death of
Leonila and Estrella and of the injuries suffered by four others, although it may be said, by way of
parenthesis, that this case is now pending appeal in a higher court. The plaintiffs prayed for awards of moral,
actual and exemplary damages in the total sum of P40,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1468, and in the total sum
of P25,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1470 as well as attorney's fees in the amounts of P5,000.00 and P4,000.00,
respectively.
Defendants filed a joint answer to each of the two complaints alleging, among others, that at the time of the
accident, defendant driver was driving the bus at, the slow speed of about 10 kilometers per hour; that while
the said defendant was steering his bus toward the mountainside after hearing a sound coming from under
the rear end of the bus, Leonila and Estrella recklessly, and in disobedience to his shouted warnings and
advice, jumped out of the bus causing their heads to hit the road or pavement; that the bus was then being
driven with extraordinary care, prudence and diligence; that defendant PANTRANCO observed the care and
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the accident as well as in the selection and supervision of its
final, the same having been appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was still pending.
By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly. On October 17, 1966, the court a quo rendered
its decision therein in which it made the following findings; that upon reaching the fatal spot at Camp 8, a
sudden snapping or breaking of metal below the floor of the bus was heard, and the bus abruptly stopped,
rolling back a few moments later; that as a result, some of the passengers jumped out of the bus, while
others stepped down; that defendant driver maneuvered the bus safely to and against the side of the
mountain where its rear end was made to rest, ensuring the safety of the many passengers still inside the
bus; that while defendant driver as steering the bus towards the mountainside, he advised the passengers
not to jump, but to remain seated; that Leonila and Estrella were not thrown out of the bus, but that they
panicked and jumped out; that the malfunctioning of the motor resulted from the breakage of the cross-joint;
that there was no negligence on the part of either of the defendants; that only the day before, the said cross-
joint was duly inspected and found to be in order; and that defendant PANTRANCO had exercised the
requisite care in the selection and supervision of its employees, including the defendant driver. The court
concluded that "the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about by some extra-
ordinary circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or its employees."
One would wonder why in the face of such factual findings and conclusion of the trial court, the defendants,
instead of the plaintiffs, should come to this Court on appeal. The answer lies in the dispositive portion of the
decision, to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(a) Absolving the defendants from any liability on account of negligence on their part and
therefore dismissing the complaints in these two cases; (b) However, as stated above,
the Court hereby orders the defendant Pantranco to pay to the plaintiffs spouses Marcelo
Tandingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 the amount of P6,500.00; and
the amount of P3,500.00 to the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case
No. D-1470, not in payment of liability because of any negligence on the part of the
defendants but as an expression of sympathy and goodwill. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to what impelled the court below to include item (b) in the dispositive portion of its decision, can be
gathered from the penultimate paragraph of the decision, which reads:
However, there is evidence to the effect that an offer of P8,500.00 in the instant cases
without any admission of fault or negligence had been made by the defendant Pantranco
and that actually in Civil Case No. D-1469 for the death of Pacita Descalso, the other
deceased passenger of the bus in question, the heirs of the decease received P3,000.00
in addition to hospital and medical bills and the coffin of the deceased for the dismissal of
the said case without Pantranco accepting liability. There was as a matter of fact during
the pre-trial of these two cases a continuing offer of settlement on the part of the
defendant Pantranco without accepting any liability for such damages, and the Court
understood that the Pantranco would be willing still to pay said amounts even if these
cases were to be tried on the merits. It is well-known that the defendant Pantranco is
zealous in the preservation of its public relations. In the spirit therefore of the offer of the
defendant Pantranco aforesaid, to assuage the feelings of the herein plaintiffs an award
of P6,500.00 for the spouses Marcelo Landingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-
1468 whose daughter Leonila was, when she died, a third-year Commerce student at the
Far Eastern University, and P3,500.00 for the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia
Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470 whose daughter Estrella was in the fourth year High
at the Dagupan Colleges when she died, is hereby made in their favor. This award is in
addition to what Pantranco might have spent to help the parents of both deceased after
the accident.
1
Defendants-appellants complain that having found them to be absolutely free from fault or negligence, and
having in fact dismissed the complaints against them, the court should not have ordered them to assume any
pecuniary liability. There would be merit in his argument but for the fact that defendant-appellant
PANTRANCO was guilty of breach of contract of carriage. It will be noted that in each of the two complaints it
is averred that two buses including the one in which the two deceased girls were riding, were hired to
transport the excursionist passengers from Dagupan City to Baguio City, and return, and that the said two
passengers did not reach destination safely.

As a common carrier, defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was duty bound to carry its passengers "safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances." (Article 1755, Civil Code.) Did defendant-appellant PANTRANCO measure up
to the degree of care and foresight required it under the circumstances? We think not. The court below found
that the cross-joint of the bus in which the deceased were riding broke, which caused the malfunctioning of
the motor, which in turn resulted in panic among some of the passengers. This is a finding of fact which this
Court may not disturb. We are of the opinion, however, that the lower court's conclusion drawn from that
fact, i.e., that "the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about by some
extraordinary circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or its employees," is in large measure
conjectural and speculative, and was arrived at without due regard to all the circumstances, as required by
Article 1755. In Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil. 660), this Court held that an accident caused by defects in the
automobile is not a caso fortuito. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that "the passenger has
neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use
by the carrier." (Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75.)

When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is at fault or that it acted
negligently (Article 1756). This presumption is only rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that it observed the
"extraordinary diligence" required in Article 1733 and the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" required
in Article 1755 (Article 1756). In the instant case it appears that the court below considered the presumption
rebutted on the strength of defendants-appellants' evidence that only the day before the incident, the
crossjoint in question was duly inspected and found to be in order. It does not appear, however, that the
carrier gave due regard for all the circumstances in connection with the said inspection. The bus in which the
deceased were riding was heavily laden with passengers, and it would be traversing mountainous, circuitous
and ascending roads. Thus the entire bus, including its mechanical parts, would naturally be taxed more
heavily than it would be under ordinary circumstances. The mere fact that the bus was inspected only
recently and found to be in order would not exempt the carrier from liability unless it is shown that the
particular circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered.

In the premises, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaints. The awards made by the court
should be considered in the concept of damages for breach of contracts of carriage.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is modified as indicated
above, and defendant-appellant PANTRANCO is ordered to pay to plaintiffs-appellees the amounts stated in
the judgment appealed from, as damages for breach of contracts, with interest thereon at the legal rate from
the date of the filing of the complaints. Costs against defendant-appellant PANTRANCO.

2
G.R. No. L-10605 June 30, 1958
PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-10606 June 30, 1958
GERMAN NECESITO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Tomas Besa and Federico Agrava for appellants.
Jose W. Diokno for appellees.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
These cases involve ex contractu against the owners and operators of the common carrier known as
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, filed by one passenger, and the heirs of another, who injured as a result of the
fall into a river of the vehicle in which they were riding.
In the morning of January 28, 1964, Severina Garces and her one-year old son, Precillano Necesito, carrying
vegetables, boarded passenger auto truck or bus No. 199 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines at Agno,
Pangasinan. The passenger truck, driven by Francisco Bandonell, then proceeded on its regular run from
Agno to Manila. After passing Mangatarem, Pangasinan truck No. 199 entered a wooden bridge, but the front
wheels swerved to the right; the driver lost control, and after wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck
fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned;
the son, Precillano Necesito, was injured, suffering abrasions and fracture of the left femur. He was brought
to the Provincial Hospital at Dagupan, where the fracture was set but with fragments one centimeter out of
line. The money, wrist watch and cargo of vegetables were lost.
Two actions for damages and attorney's fees totalling over P85,000 having been filed in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac (Cases Nos. 908 and 909) against the carrier, the latter pleaded that the accident was due
to "engine or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the defendants or of the driver
Bandonell.
After joint trial, the Court of First Instance found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad condition
of the road; that the accident was caused by the fracture of the right steering knuckle, which was defective in
that its center or core was not compact but "bubbled and cellulous", a condition that could not be known or
ascertained by the carrier despite the fact that regular thirty-day inspections were made of the steering
knuckle, since the steel exterior was smooth and shiny to the depth of 3/16 of an inch all around; that the
knuckles are designed and manufactured for heavy duty and may last up to ten years; that the knuckle of bus
No. 199 that broke on January 28, 1954, was last inspected on January 5, 1954, and was due to be inspected
again on February 5th. Hence, the trial court, holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous
event, dismissed both actions. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court in view of the amount in controversy.
We are inclined to agree with the trial court that it is not likely that bus No. 199 of the Philippine Rabbit Lines
was driven over the deeply rutted road leading to the bridge at a speed of 50 miles per hour, as testified for
the plaintiffs. Such conduct on the part of the driver would have provoked instant and vehement protest on
the part of the passengers because of the attendant discomfort, and there is no trace of any such complaint
in the records. We are thus forced to assume that the proximate cause of the accident was the reduced
strength of the steering knuckle of the vehicle caused by defects in casting it. While appellants hint that the
broken knuckle exhibited in court was not the real fitting attached to the truck at the time of the accident, the
records they registered no objection on that ground at the trial below. The issue is thus reduced to the
question whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether
the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755,
new Civil Code).
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
the all the circumstances.
It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers' safety. His liability rests upon negligence, his
failure to exercise the "utmost" degree of diligence that the law requires, and by Art. 1756, in case of a
passenger's death or injury the carrier bears the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged
the duty of prudence required. In the American law, where the carrier is held to the same degree of diligence
as under the new Civil Code, the rule on the liability of carriers for defects of equipment is thus expressed:
"The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages
from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever
it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care
which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the
necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent
or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory,
the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability" (10 Am. Jur. 205, s, 1324; see
also Pennsylvania R. Co. vs. Roy, 102 U. S. 451; 20 L. Ed. 141; Southern R. Co. vs. Hussey, 74 ALR 1172; 42
Fed. 2d 70; and Ed Note, 29 ALR 788; Ann. Cas. 1916E 929).
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over the
carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity
whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against
him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not in insurer of the safety
of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at
all discoverable. Thus Hannen, J., in Francis vs. Cockrell, LR 5 Q. B. 184, said:
In the ordinary course of things, the passenger does not know whether the carrier has himself
manufactured the means of carriage, or contracted with someone else for its manufacture. If the
carrier has contracted with someone else the passenger does not usually know who that person is,
and in no case has he any share in the selection. The liability of the manufacturer must depend on
the terms of the contract between him and the carrier, of which the passenger has no knowledge,
and over which he can have no control, while the carrier can introduce what stipulations and take
what securities he may think proper. For injury resulting to the carrier himself by the
manufacturer's want of care, the carrier has a remedy against the manufacturer; but the passenger
has no remedy against the manufacturer for damage arising from a mere breach of contract with
the carrier . . . . Unless, therefore, the presumed intention of the parties be that the passenger
should, in the event of his being injured by the breach of the manufacturer's contract, of which he
has no knowledge, be without remedy, the only way in which effect can be given to a different
intention is by supposing that the carrier is to be responsible to the passenger, and to look for his
indemnity to the person whom he selected and whose breach of contract has caused the mischief.
(29 ALR 789)
And in the leading case of Morgan vs. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 15 LRA (NS) 790, 16 Ann. Cas. 608, the Court,
in holding the carrier responsible for damages caused by the fracture of a car axle, due to a "sand hole" in
the course of moulding the axle, made the following observations.
3
 The carrier, in consideration of certain well-known and highly valuable rights granted to it by the It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of each and every part
public, undertakes certain duties toward the public, among them being to provide itself with of its vehicles before each trip; but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the carrier's obligations toward
suitable and safe cars and vehicles in which carry the traveling public. There is no such duty on the the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the condition and strength of those
manufacturer of the cars. There is no reciprocal legal relation between him and the public in this vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safe of the passengers.
respect. When the carrier elects to have another build its cars, it ought not to be absolved by that
facts from its duty to the public to furnish safe cars. The carrier cannot lessen its responsibility by
As to the damages suffered by the plaintiffs, we agree with appellee that no allowance may be made for
shifting its undertaking to another's shoulders. Its duty to furnish safe cars is side by side with its
moral damages, since under Article 2220 of the new Civil Code, in case of suits for breach of contract, moral
duty to furnish safe track, and to operate them in a safe manner. None of its duties in these
damages are recoverable only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, and there is none in
respects can be sublet so as to relieve it from the full measure primarily exacted of it by law. The
the case before us. As to exemplary damages, the carrier has not acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
carrier selects the manufacturer of its cars, if it does not itself construct them, precisely as it does
oppressive or malevolent manner" to warrant their award. Hence, we believe that for the minor Precillano
those who grade its road, and lay its tracks, and operate its trains. That it does not exercise control
Necesito (G. R. No. L-10605), an indemnity of P5,000 would be adequate for the abrasions and fracture of
over the former is because it elects to place that matter in the hands of the manufacturer, instead
the femur, including medical and hospitalization expenses, there being no evidence that there would be any
of retaining the supervising control itself. The manufacturer should be deemed the agent of the
permanent impairment of his faculties or bodily functions, beyond the lack of anatomical symmetry. As for the
carrier as respects its duty to select the material out of which its cars and locomotive are built, as
death of Severina Garces (G. R. No. L-10606) who was 33 years old, with seven minor children when she
well as in inspecting each step of their construction. If there be tests known to the crafts of car
died, her heirs are obviously entitled to indemnity not only for the incidental loses of property (cash, wrist
builders, or iron moulders, by which such defects might be discovered before the part was
watch and merchandise) worth P394 that she carried at the time of the accident and for the burial expenses
incorporated into the car, then the failure of the manufacturer to make the test will be deemed a
of P490, but also for the loss of her earnings (shown to average P120 a month) and for the deprivation of her
failure by the carrier to make it. This is not a vicarious responsibility. It extends, as the necessity of
protection, guidance and company. In our judgment, an award of P15,000 would be adequate (cf Alcantara
this business demands, the rule of respondeat superior to a situation which falls clearly within its
vs. Surro, 49 Off. Gaz. 2769; 93 Phil., 472).
scope and spirit. Where an injury is inflicted upon a passenger by the breaking or wrecking of a
part of the train on which he is riding, it is presumably the result of negligence at some point by
the carrier. As stated by Judge Story, in Story on Bailments, sec. 601a: "When the injury or damage The low income of the plaintiffs-appellants makes an award for attorney's fees just and equitable (Civil Code,
happens to the passenger by the breaking down or overturning of the coach, or by any other Art. 2208, par. 11). Considering that he two cases filed were tried jointly, a fee of P3,500 would be
accident occurring on the ground, the presumption prima facie is that it occurred by the negligence reasonable.
of the coachmen, and onus probandi is on the proprietors of the coach to establish that there has
been no negligence whatever, and that the damage or injury has been occasioned by inevitable In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendants-appellees are sentenced
casualty, or by some cause which human care and foresight could not prevent; for the law will, in to indemnify the plaintiffs-appellants in the following amounts: P5,000 to Precillano Necesito, and P15,000 to
tenderness to human life and limb, hold the proprietors liable for the slightest negligence, and will the heirs of the deceased Severina Garces, plus P3,500 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
compel them to repel by satisfactory proofs every imputation thereof." When the passenger has Costs against defendants-appellees. So ordered.
proved his injury as the result of a breakage in the car or the wrecking of the train on which he was
being carried, whether the defect was in the particular car in which he was riding or not, the
burden is then cast upon the carrier to show that it was due to a cause or causes which the Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
exercise of the utmost human skill and foresight could not prevent. And the carrier in this
connection must show, if the accident was due to a latent defect in the material or construction of Felix, J., concurs in the result.
the car, that not only could it not have discovered the defect by the exercise of such care, but that
the builders could not by the exercise of the same care have discovered the defect or foreseen the
result. This rule applies the same whether the defective car belonged to the carrier or not. RESOLUTION

In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering knuckle in
question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks developed. It nowhere appears September 11, 1958
that either the manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its REYES, J. B. L., J.:
strength was up to standard, or that it had no hidden flaws would impair that strength. And yet the carrier
must have been aware of the critical importance of the knuckle's resistance; that its failure or breakage would
Defendants-appellees have Submitted a motion asking this Court to reconsider its decision of June 30, 1958,
result in loss of balance and steering control of the bus, with disastrous effects upon the passengers. No
and that the same be modified with respect to (1) its holding the carrier liable for the breakage of the
argument is required to establish that a visual inspection could not directly determine whether the resistance
steering knuckle that caused the autobus No. 199 to overturn, whereby the passengers riding in it were
of this critically important part was not impaired. Nor has it been shown that the weakening of the knuckle
injured; (2) the damages awarded, that appellees argue to be excessive; and (3) the award of attorneys'
was impossible to detect by any known test; on the contrary, there is testimony that it could be detected. We
fees.
are satisfied that the periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle as practiced by the carrier's agents
did not measure up to the required legal standard of "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" — "as far as
human care and foresight can provide", and therefore that the knuckle's failure can not be considered a (1) The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction as established in previous decisions of this Court, cited in our main
fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility (Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657; Son vs. Cebu opinion, is that a carrier is liable to its passengers for damages caused by mechanical defects of the
Autobus Co., 94 Phil., 892.) conveyance. As early as 1924, in Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 659 this Court ruled:

4
 As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else and that of Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab Co., 101 Phil., 523, where the passenger suffered injuries, but
through the negligence of its driver. That is not caso fortuito. did not lose his life.

And in Son vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil., 892, this Court held a common carrier liable in damages to
passenger for injuries cause by an accident due to the breakage of a faulty drag-link spring.
It can be seen that while the courts of the United States are at variance on the question of a carrier's liability
for latent mechanical defects, the rule in this jurisdiction has been consistent in holding the carrier
responsible. This Court has quoted from American and English decisions, not because it felt bound to follow
the same, but merely in approval of the rationale of the rule as expressed therein, since the previous
Philippine cases did not enlarge on the ideas underlying the doctrine established thereby.
The new evidence sought to be introduced do not warrant the grant of a new trial, since the proposed proof
available when the original trial was held. Said evidence is not newly discovered.
(3) In the Cachero case this Court disallowed attorneys' fees to the injured plaintiff because the litigation
arose out of his exaggerated and unreasonable deeds for an indemnity that was out of proportion with the
compensatory damages to which he was solely entitled. But in the present case, plaintiffs' original claims can
not be deemed a priori wholly unreasonable, since they had a right to indemnity for moral damages besides
compensatory ones, and moral damages are not determined by set and invariable bounds.
Neither does the fact that the contract between the passengers and their counsel was on a contingent basis
affect the former's right to counsel fees. As pointed out for appellants, the Court's award is an party and not
to counsel. A litigant who improvidently stipulate higher counsel fees than those to which he is lawfully
entitled, does not for that reason earn the right to a larger indemnity; but, by parity of reasoning, he should
not be deprived of counsel fees if by law he is entitled to recover them.

We find no reason to alter the main decision heretofore rendered. Ultimately, the position taken by this Court
(2) With regard to the indemnity awarded to the child Precilliano Necesito, the injuries suffered by him are
is that a common carrier's contract is not to be regarded as a game of chance wherein the passenger stakes
incapable of accurate pecuniary estimation, particularly because the full effect of the injury is not
his limb and life against the carrier's property and profits.
ascertainable immediately. This uncertainty, however, does not preclude the right to an indemnity, since the
injury is patent and not denied (Civil Code, Art. 2224). The reasons behind this award are expounded by the
Code Commission in its report: Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. So ordered.

There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's
commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show with certainty in terms
of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to
calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without
redress, from the defendant's wrongful act." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 75)

In awarding to the heirs of the deceased Severina Garces an indemnity for the loss of her "guidance,
protection and company," although it is but moral damage, the Court took into account that the case of a
passenger who dies in the course of an accident, due to the carrier's negligence constitutes an exception to
the general rule. While, as pointed out in the main decision, under Article 2220 of the new Civil Code there
can be no recovery of moral damages for a breach of contract in the absence of fraud malice or bad faith, the
case of a violation of the contract of carriage leading to a passenger's death escapes this general rule, in view
of Article 1764 in connection with Article 2206, No. 3 of the new Civil Code.

ART. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title
XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a comman carrier. ART. 2206. . . .

(3) The spouse, legitimate and eligimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

Being a special rule limited to cases of fatal injuries, these articles prevail over the general rule of Art. 2220.
Special provisions control general ones (Lichauco & Co. vs. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138; Sancio vs. Lizarraga, 55 Phil.
601).

It thus appears that under the new Civil Code, in case of accident due to a carrier's negligence, the heirs of a
deceased passenger may recover moral damages, even though a passenger who is injured, but manages to
survive, is not entitled to them. There is, therefore, no conflict between our main decision in the instant case

5
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-46558 : July 31, 1981.]
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS V. SAMSON,
Respondents.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 18, 1977, affirming
with modification the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay in Civil Case No. 1279, entitled “Jesus V.
Samson, plaintiff, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., defendant,” for damages.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff, the following sums: P1988,000.00 as
unearned income or damages; P50,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as
expenses of litigation, or a total of P273,000.00. Costs against the defendant.”
The appellate court modified the above decision, to wit:
“However, Plaintiff-Appellee, who has been deprived of his job since 1954, is entitled to the legal rate
of interest on the P198,000.00 unearned income from the filing of the complaint cranad(Sec. 8, Rule
51, Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, with the modification indicated above, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against defendant-appellant.”
The complaint filed on July 1, 1954 by plaintiff Jesus V. Samson, private respondent herein, averred that on
January 8, 1951, he flew as co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi with stops at Daet, Camarines
Norte and Pili, Camarines Sur, with Captain Delfin Bustamante as commanding pilot of a C-47 plane belonging
to defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc., now the herein petitioner; that on attempting to land the plane at Daet
airport, Captain Delfin Bustamante due to his very slow reaction and poor judgment overshot the airfield and
as a result, notwithstanding the diligent efforts of the plaintiff co-pilot to avert an accident, the airplane
crashlanded beyond the runway; that the jolt caused the head of the plaintiff to hit and break through the thick
front windshield of the airplane causing him severe brain concussion, wounds and abrasions on the forehead
with intense pain and suffering cranad(par. 6, complaint).:onad
The complaint further alleged that instead of giving plaintiff expert and proper medical treatment called for by
the nature and severity of his injuries, defendant simply referred him to a company physician, a general medical
practitioner, who limited the treatment to the exterior injuries without examining the severe brain concussion
of plaintiff cranad(par. 7, complaint); that several days after the accident, defendant Philippine Air Lines called
back the plaintiff to active duty as co-pilot, and inspite of the latter’s repeated request for expert medical
assistance, defendant had not given him anycranad(par. 8, complaint); that as a consequence of the brain
injury sustained by plaintiff from the crash, he had been having periodic dizzy spells and had been suffering
from general debility and nervousness cranad(par. 9, complaint); that defendant airline company instead of
submitting the plaintiff to expert medical treatment, discharged the latter from its employ on December 21,
1953 on grounds of physical disability, thereby causing plaintiff not only to lose his job but to become physically
unfit to continue as aviator due to defendant’s negligence in not giving him the proper medical
attentioncranad(pars. 10-11, complaint). Plaintiff prayed for damages in the amount of P180,000.00
representing his unearned income, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P5,000.00
as expenses, or a total of P255,000.00.
In its answer filed on July 28, 1954, defendant PAL denied the substantial averments in the complaint, alleging
among others, that the accident was due solely and exclusively to inevitable unforeseen circumstances whereby
plaintiff sustained only superficial wounds and minor injuries which were promptly treated by defendant’s
medical personnel cranad(par. 5, answer); that plaintiff did not sustain brain injury or cerebral concussion from
the accident since he passed the annual physical and medical examination given thereafter on April 24, 1951;
that the headaches and dizziness experienced by plaintiff were due to emotional disturbance over his inability
to pass the required up-grading or promotional course given by defendant company cranad(par. 6, answer),
and that, as confirmed by an expert neuro-surgeon, plaintiff was suffering-from neurosis and in view of this
unfitness and disqualification from continuing as a pilot, defendant had to terminate plaintiff’s
employment cranad(pars. 7, 9, answer).
Further, defendant alleged that by the very nature of its business as a common carrier, it is bound to employ
only pilots who are proficient and in good mental, emotional and physical condition; that the pilot, Captain
Delfin Bustamante, was a competent and proficient pilot, and although he was already afflicted with a tumor
of the nasopharynx even before the accident of January 8, 1951, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in passing
upon the fitness of pilots, gave Capt. Bustamante a waiver of physical standards to enable him to retain his
first class airman certificate since the affliction had not in the least affected his proficiency cranad(pars. 16-17,
answer). By way of counterclaim, defendant prayed for P10,000.00 as expenses for the litigation.
On March 25, 1958, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint is essentially a
Workmen’s Compensation claim, stating a cause of action not cognizable within the general jurisdiction of the
court. The Motion to Dismiss was denied in the order of April 14, 1958. After the reception of evidence, the trial
court rendered on January 15, 1973 the decision, the dispositive portion of which has been earlier cited.
The defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals as being contrary to law
and unsupported by the evidence. It raised as errors of the trial court cranad(a) the holding that the damages
allegedly suffered by plaintiff are attributable to the accident of January 8, 1951 which was due to the
negligence of defendant in having allowed Capt. Delfin Bustamante to continue flying despite his alleged slow
reaction and poor judgment; cranad(b) the finding that defendant was negligent in not having given plaintiff
proper and adequate expert medical treatment and assistance for the injuries allegedly sustained in the accident
of January 8, 1951; and cranad(c) in ordering defendant to pay actual or compensatory damages, moral
damages and attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.
On April 18, 1977, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the lower court but
modified the award of damages by imposing legal rate of interest on the P198,000.00 unearned income from
the filing of the complaint, citing Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court.
Its motion for reconsideration of the above judgment having been denied, Philippine Air Lines, Inc. filed this
instant petition for Certiorari on the ground that the decision is not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence, aside from its being replete with findings in the nature of speculation, surmises and conjectures
not borne out by the evidence on record thereby resulting to misapprehension of facts and amounting to a
grave abuse of discretion cranad(p. 7, Petition).
Petitioner raises the fundamental question in the case at bar as follows: Is there a causal connection between
the injuries suffered by private respondent during the accident on 8 January 1951 and the subsequent “periodic
dizzy spells, headache and general debility” of which private respondent complained every now and then, on
the one hand, and such “periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility” allegedly caused by the accident
and private respondent’s eventual discharge from employment, on the other? PAL submits that respondent
court’s award of damages to private respondent is anchored on findings in the nature of speculations, surmises
and conjectures and not borne out by the evidence on record, thereby resulting in a misapprehension of facts
and amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner’s submission is without merit.
As found by the respondent court, the following are the essential facts of the case:
“It appears that plaintiff, a licensee aviator, was employed by defendant a few years prior to January
8, 1951 as a regular co-pilot on a guaranteed basic salary of P750.00 a month. He was assigned to
and/or paired with pilot Delfin Bustamante.
Sometime in December 1950, he complained to defendant through its authorized official about the
slow reaction and poor judgment of pilot Delfin Bustamante. Notwithstanding said complaint,
defendant allowed the pilot to continue flying.
6
 On January 8, 1951, the two manned the regular afternoon flight of defendant’s plane from Manila
to Legaspi, with stops at Daet, Camarines Norte, and Pili, Camarines Sur. Upon making a landing at
Daet, the pilot, with his slow reaction and poor judgment, overshot the airfield and, as a result of
and notwithstanding diligent efforts of plaintiff to avert an accident, the airplane crash-landed beyond
the runway into a mangrove. The jolt and impact caused plaintiff to hit his head upon the front
windshield of the plane thereby causing his brain concussions and wounds on the forehead, with
concomittant intense pain.
Plaintiff was not given proper medical attention and treatment demanded by the nature and severity
of his injuries. Defendant merely referred him to its clinic attended by general practitioners on his
external injuries. His brain injury was never examined, much less treated. On top of that negligence,
defendant recalled plaintiff to active duty as a co-pilot, completely ignoring his plea for expert medical
assistance.
Suffering periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility, plaintiff every now and then complained
to defendant. To make matters worst for plaintiff, defendant discharged him from his employment
on December 21, 1953. In consequence, plaintiff has been beset with additional worries, basically
financial. He is now a liability instead of a provider, of his family.
On July 1, 1954, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages. Defendant vainly sought to dismiss the
complaint after filing an answer. Then, the judgment and this appeal.”
Continuing, the respondent Court of Appeals further held:
“There is no question about the employment of plaintiff by defendant, his age and salary, the
overshooting by pilot Bustamante of the airfield and crashlanding in a mangrove, his hitting his head
on the front windshield of the plane, his intermittent dizzy spells, headache and general debility for
which he was discharged from his employment on December 21, 1953. As the lower court aptly
stated:
‘From the evidence adduced by the parties, the Court finds the following facts to be
uncontroverted: That the plaintiff Jesus V. Samson, on January 8, 1951 and a few years
prior thereto, December 21, 1953, was a duly licensed pilot employed as a regular co-pilot
of the defendant with assignment in its domestic air service in the Philippines; that on
January 8, 1951, the defendant’s airplane met an accident in crashlanding at the Daet
Airport, Camarines Norte by overshooting the runway and reaching the mangroves at the
edge of the landing strip; that the jolt caused plaintiff’s head to hit the front windshield of
the airplane causing him to suffer wounds and abrasion on the forehead; that the
defendant, instead of giving the plaintiff expert and proper medical treatment called for by
the nature and severity of the injuries of the plaintiff, simply referred him to the clinic of
the defendant’s physicians who are only general medical practitioners and not brain
specialists; that the defendant’s physicians limited their treatment to the exterior injuries
on the forehead of the plaintiff and made no examination of the severe concussion of the
brain of the plaintiff; that the Medical Director and Flight Surgeon of the defendant were
not able to definitely determine the cause of the complaint of the plaintiff as to the periodic
attack of dizziness, spells and headache; that due to this laxity of the defendant’s physician
and the continuous suffering of the ailment of the plaintiff complained of, he demanded
for expert medical assistance for his brain injury and to send him to the United States,
which demand was turned down and in effect denied by the defendant; that instead the
defendant referred the plaintiff to a neurologist, Dr. Victor Reyes; that from the time that
said accident occurred on January 21, 1953, he was ordered grounded on several occasions
because of his complaint of dizzy spells and headache; that instead of submitting the
plaintiff to expert medical treatment as demanded by him and denied by the defendant,
he was discharged from its employment on December 21, 1953 on the ground of physical
disability, and that the plaintiff, at the time when the defendant’s plane met the accident,
up to the time he was discharged, was regularly employed as a co-pilot and receiving a
basic salary of P750.00 a month plus extra pay for flying time, and bonuses amounting to
P300.00 a month.’
Even defendant-appellant itself admits as not controverted the following facts which generally admit
what have been stated above as not controverted.
“In the case at bar, the following facts are not the subject of controversy:
‘(1) First, that from July 1950 to 21 December 1953, plaintiff was employed with defendant
company as a first officer or co-pilot and served in that capacity in defendant’s domestic
services.
(2) Second, that on January 1951, plaintiff did fly on defendant’s PI-C 94, as first officer or
co-pilot, with the late Capt. Delfin Bustamante in command as pilot; that while making a
landing at the Daet airport on that date, PI-C 94 did meet an accident as stated above.
(3) Third, that at or about the time of the discharge from defendant company, plaintiff had
complained of “spells of dizziness,” “headaches” and “nervousness”, by reason of which he
was grounded from flight duty. In short, that at that time, or approximately from November
1953 up to the date of his discharge on 21 December 1953, plaintiff was actually physically
unfit to discharge his duties as pilot.
(4) Fourth, that plaintiff’s unfitness for flight duty was properly established after a thorough
medical examination by competent medical experts.’cralaw cranad(pp. 11-12, appellant’s
brief)
hence, there can hardly be an issue, factual, legal or medical.”
Taking exception from “the rest of the essential facts of the case as found by the respondent court” PAL claims
said facts are not fully borne out by the evidence on record and insists that the injuries suffered by private
respondent during the accident on January 8, 1951 were superficial in nature; that the “periodic spells,
headache, and general debility” complaint of every now and then by private respondent subsequent to the Jan.
8, 1951 incident were due to emotional disturbances and that no negligence can be attributed to Capt. Delfin
Bustamante much less to PAL for the occurrence on January 8, 1951, hence PAL cannot be held liable for
damages.
Petitioner claims absence of any causal connection between private respondent’s superficial injuries and his
alleged subsequent “periodic spells, headache and general debility,” pointing out that these subsequent
ailments were found by competent physician, including an expert neuro-surgeon, to be due to emotional
disturbances insights the conclusions of Dr. Trajano V. Bernardo that respondent’s complaints were
“psychosomatic symptoms” on the basis of declarations made by respondent himself, which conclusions are
supported by similar diagnosis made by Drs. Damaceno J. Ago and Villaraza stating that respondent Samson
was suffering from neurosis as well as the report of Dr. Victor Reyes, a neurological specialist, indicating that
the symptoms were probably, most probably due to psychogenic factors and have no organic basis.
In claiming that there is no factual basis for the finding of the respondent court that the crash-landing caused
respondent’s “brain concussion . cra ., with concomittant intense pain, for on the contrary, testimonial evidence
establish the superficiality of the injuries sustained by respondent during the accident of January 8, 1951,”
petitioner quotes portions of the testimony of Dr. Manuel S. Sayas, who declared that he removed the band-
aid on the forehead of respondent and that he found out after removal that the latter had two contussed
superficial wounds over the supra orbiter regions or just above the eyes measuring one centimeter long and
one millimeter deep. He examined and found his blood pressure normal, no discharges from the nose and ears.
Dr. Trajano V. Bernardo also testified that when he examined respondent Samson three days after the accident,
the wound was already healed and found nothing wrong with his ears, nose and throat so that he was declared
fit for duty after the sixth day.
Petitioner goes further. It contends that there is no causal connection between respondent’s superficial injuries
sustained during the accident on January 8, 1951 and plaintiff’s discharge from employment with PAL on
December 21, 1953. According to PAL, it was the repeated recurrence of respondent’s neurasthenic
7
symptoms cranad(dizzy spells, headache, nervousness) which prompted PAL’s Flight Surgeon, Dr. Bernardo, to
recommend that plaintiff be grounded permanently as respondent was “psychologically unfit to resume his
duties as pilot.” PAL concludes that respondent’s eventual discharge from employment with PAL was effected
for absolutely valid reasons, and only after he was thoroughly examined and found unfit to carry out his
responsibilities and duties as a pilot.:onad
We agree with the respondent court in finding that the dizzy spells, headache and general debility of private
respondent Samson was an after-effect of the crash-landing and We find that such holding is supported by
substantial evidence, which We quote from the court’s decision, to wit:
“Defendant would imply that plaintiff suffered only superficial wounds which were treated and not
brain injury. It would, by the opinion of its company doctors, Dr. Bernardo and Dr. Reyes, attribute
the dizzy spells and headache to organic or as phychosomatic, neurasthenic or psychogenic, which
we find outlandishly exaggerated.
That plaintiff’s condition as psychosomatic rather than organic in nature is allegedly confirmed by the
fact that on six cranad(6) separate occasions after the accident he passed the required CAA physical
examination for airman’s certificate. cranad(Exhs. 78, 79, 80, 81, 83 and 92). We noticed, however,
that there were other similar physical examinations conducted by the CAA on the person of plaintiff
the report on which were not presented in evidence. Obviously, only those which suited defendants
cause were hand-picked and offered in evidence.
We hesitate to accept the opinion of the defendant’s two physicians, considering that Dr. Bernardo
admittedly referred to Dr. Reyes because he could not determine the cause of the dizzy spells and
headache and the latter admitted that ‘it is extremely hard to be certain of the cause of his dizzy
spells,’ and suggested a possibility that it ‘was due to postraumatic syndrome, evidently due to the
injuries suffered by the plaintiff in hitting the forehead against the windshield of the plane during the
accident.’ Judgment are not based on possibilities.
The admitted difficulty of defendant’s doctors in determining the cause of the dizzy spells and
headache cannot be a sound basis for finding against the plaintiff and in favor of defendant. Whatever
it might be, the fact is that such dizzy spells, headache and general debility was an after-effect of
the crash-landing. Be it brain injury or psychosomatic, neurasthenic or psychogenic, there is no
gainsaying the fact that it was caused by the crash-landing. As an effect of the cause, not fabricated
or concocted, plaintiff has to be indemnified. The fact is that such effect caused his discharge.
We are prone to believe the testimony of the plaintiff’s doctors.
Dr. Morales, a surgeon, found that blood was coming from plaintiff’s ears and nose. He testified that
plaintiff was suffering from cerebral concussion as a result of traumatic injury to the brain caused by
his head hitting on the windshield of the plane during the crash-landing cranad(Exhibit “G”).
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neurologist and psychiatrist with experience in two hospitals abroad, found
abnormality reflected by the electroencephalogram examination in the frontal area on both sides of
plaintiff’s head cranad(Exhibits “K”, “K-1”).
The opinion of these two specialist renders unnecessary that of plaintiff’s wife who is a physician in
her own right and because of her relation to the plaintiff, her testimony and opinion may not be
discussed here, although her testimony is crystallized by the opinions of Dr. Ador Dionisio, Dr.
Marquez, Dr. Jose O. Chan, Dr. Yambao and Dr. Sandico.
Even the doctors presented by defendant admit vital facts about plaintiff’s brain injury. Dr. Bernardo
admits that due to the incident, the plaintiff continuously complained of his fainting spells, dizziness
and headache everytime he flew as a co-pilot and everytime he went to defendant’s clinic no less
than 25 timescranad(Exhibits “15” to “36”), that he complained of the same to Dr. Reyes; that he
promised to help send plaintiff to the United States for expert medical assistance provided that
whatever finding thereat should not be attributed to the crash-landing incident to which plaintiff did
not agree and that plaintiff was completely ignored by the defendant in his plea for expert medical
assistance. They admitted that they could not determine definitely the cause of the fainting spells,
dizziness and headache, which justifies the demand for expert medical assistance.”
We also find the imputation of gross negligence by respondent court to PAL for having allowed Capt. Delfin
Bustamante to fly on that fateful day of the accident on January 8, 1951 to be correct, and We affirm the same,
duly supported as it is by substantial evidence, clearly established and cited in the decision of said court which
states as follows:
“The pilot was sick. He admittedly had tumor of the nasopharynx cranad(nose). He is now in the
Great Beyond. The spot is very near the brain and the eyes. Tumor on the spot will affect the sinus,
the breathing, the eyes which are very near it. No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one
suffering from the disease.
“. cra . The fact First Pilot Bustamante has a long standing tumor of the Nasopharynx for which
reason he was grounded since November 1947 is admitted in the letter cranad(Exh. 69-A) of Dr.
Bernardo to the Medical Director of the CAA requesting waiver of physical standards. The request for
waiver of physical standards is itself a positive proof that the physical condition of Capt. Bustamante
is short of the standard set by the CAA. The Deputy Administrator of the CAA granted the request
relying on the representation and recommendation made by Dr. Bernardo cranad(See Exh. 69). We
noted, however, that the request cranad(Exh. 69-A) says that ‘it is believed that his continuing to fly
as a co-pilot does not involve any hazard.’cralaw cranad(Italics supplied). Flying as a First Officer
entails a very different responsibility than flying as a mere co-pilot. Defendant requested the CAA to
allow Capt. Bustamante to fly merely as a co-pilot and it is safe to conclude that the CAA approved
the request thus allowing Bustamante to fly only as a co-pilot. For having allowed Bustamante to fly
as a First Officer on January 8, 1951, defendant is guilty of gross negligence and therefore should be
made liable for the resulting accident.
As established by the evidence, the pilot used to get treatments from Dr. Sycangco. He used to complain of
pain in the face more particularly in the nose which caused him to have sleepless nights. Plaintiff’s observation
of the pilot was reported to the Chief Pilot who did nothing about it. Captain Carbonel of the defendant
corroborated plaintiff of this matter. The complaint against the slow reaction of the pilot at least proved the
observation. The observation could be disregarded. The fact that the complaint was not in writing does not
detract anything from the seriousness thereof, considering that a miscalculation would not only cause the death
of the crew but also of the passengers.
One month prior to the crash-landing, when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet, plaintiff warned him that
they were not in the vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao. The plane hit outside the airstrip. In another
instance, the pilot would hit the Mayon Volcano had not plaintiff warned him. These more than prove what
plaintiff had complained of. Disregard thereof by defendant is condemnable.
To bolster the claim that Capt. Bustamante has not suffered from any kind of sickness which hampered his
flying ability, appellant contends that for at least one or more years following the accident of January 8, 1951,
Capt. Bustamante continued to fly for defendant company as a pilot, and did so with great skill and proficiency,
and without any further accident or mishap, citing tsn. pp. 756-765, January 20, 1965. We have painstakingly
perused the records, particularly the transcript of stenographic notes cited, but found nothing therein to
substantiate appellant’s contention. Instead, We discovered that the citation covers the testimony of Dr.
Bernardo on the physical condition of Bustamante and nothing about his skills or proficiency to fly nor on the
mishaps or accidents, matters which are beyond Dr. Bernardo’s competence anyway.
Assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did not affect the pilot in managing the plane, the
evidence shows that the overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the mangrove was caused by the
pilot for which acts the defendant must answer for damages caused thereby. And for this negligence of
defendant’s employee, it is liable cranad(Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308). At least, the law presumes the
employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employees.
Defendant would want to tie plaintiff to the report he signed about the crash-landing. The report was prepared
by his pilot and because the latter pleaded that he had a family too and would have nowhere to go if he lost
8
his job, plaintiff’s compassion would not upturn the truth about the crash-landing. We are for the truth not logic
of any argumentation.
At any rate, it is incorrect to say that the Accident Report cranad(Exh. 12 & 12-A), signed by plaintiff, exculpated
Capt. Bustamante from any fault. We observed that the Report does not categorically state that Capt.
Bustamante was not at fault. It merely relates in chronological sequence what Capt. Bustamante and plaintiff
did from the take-off from Manila to the landing in Daet which resulted in an accident. On the contrary, we may
infer the negligence of Bustamante from the following portion of the Report, to wit:
“. cra . I felt his brakes strong but as we neared the intersection of the NE-SW runway, the brakes
were not as strong and I glanced at the system pressure which indicated 900 lbs. per sq. m.”
It was during the above precise instance that Capt. Bustamante lost his bearing and disposition. Had he
maintained the pressure on the brakes the plane would not have overshot the runway. Verily, Bustamante
displayed slow reaction and poor judgment.cranad(CA decision, pp. 8-12).
This Court is not impressed by, much less can We accept petitioner’s invocation to calibrate once again the
evidence testified to in detail and plucked from the voluminous transcript to support petitioner’s own conclusion.
It is not the task of this Court to discharge the functions of a trier of facts much less to enter into a calibration
of the evidence, notwithstanding petitioner’s wail that the judgment of the respondent court is based entirely
on speculations, surmises and conjectures. We are convinced that respondent court’s judgment is supported
by strong, clear and substantial evidence.:onad
Petitioner is a common carrier engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both,
by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public, as defined in Art. 1732, New Civil
Code. The law is clear in requiring a common carrier to exercise the highest degree of care in the discharge of
its duty and business of carriage and transportation under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code.
These Articles provide:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported
by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, and 1745,
Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles
1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passenger safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733 and 1755.
The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common carriers is for the safety of passengers as well
as for the members of the crew or the complement operating the carrier, the airplane in the case at bar. And
this must be so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will certainly result to the damage, prejudice, nay
injuries and even death to all aboard the plane, passengers and crew members alike.
Now to the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of damages made by the trial court, stating that
“the damages awarded plaintiff by the lower court are in accordance with the facts, law and jurisprudence.”
The court further observed that “defendant-appellant is still fortunate, considering that the unearned income
was reckoned with only up to 1968 and not up to the present as plaintiff-appellee is still living. Whatever
mathematical error defendant-appellant could show by abstract argumentation, the same must be compensated
by such deficiency of the damages awarded to plaintiff-appellee.”
As awarded by the trial court, private respondent was entitled to P198,000.00 as unearned income or
compensatory damages; P50,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as
expenses of litigation, or a total of P273,000.00.
The trial court arrived at the sum of P198,000.00 as unearned income or damages by considering that
respondent Samson “could have continued to work as airline pilot for fifteen more years, he being only 38 years
at the time the services were terminated by the defendant cranad(PAL) and he would have earned P120,000.00
from 1954 to 1963 or a period of ten cranad(10) years at the rate of one thousand per month cranad(P750.00
basic salary plus P300.00 extra pay for extra flying time and bonuses; and considering further that in 1964 the
basic pay of defendant’s pilot was increased to P12,000.00 annually, the plaintiff could have earned from 1964
to 1968 the sum of P60,000.00 in the form of salaries and another P18,000.00 as bonuses and extra pay for
extra flying time at the same rate of P300 a month, or a grand total of P198,000.00 for the entire period. This
claim of the plaintiff for loss or impairment of earning capacity is based on the provision of Article 2205 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that “damages may be recovered for loss or impairment of
earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury.” This provision of law has been construed
and interpreted in the case of Aureliano Ropato, et al. vs. La Mallorca General Partnership, 56 O.G., 7812, which
rules that law allows the recovery of damages for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary
or permanent personal injury.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Decision, CFI, pp. 98-99, Record on Appeal)
The respondent appellate court modified the above award by ordering payment of legal interest on the
P198,000.00 unearned income from the filing of the claim, citing Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner assails the award of the total sum of P198,000.00 as unearned income up to 1968 as being tenuous
because firstly, the trial court’s finding affirmed by the respondent court is allegedly based on pure speculation
and conjecture and secondly, the award of P300.00 a month as extra pay for extra flying time from 1954 to
1968 is likewise speculative. PAL likewise rejects the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 on
the ground that private respondent’s action before the trial court does not fall under any of the cases
enumerated in the law cranad(Art. 2219 of the New Civil Code) for which moral damages are recoverable and
that although private respondent’s action gives the appearance that it is covered under quasi-delict as provided
in Art. 21 of the New Civil Code, the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code expressly
excludes cases where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, as in the case under
consideration, where an employer-employee relationship existed between PAL and private respondent. It is
further argued that private respondent’s action cannot be deemed to be covered by Art. 21, inasmuch as there
is no evidence on record to show that PAL “wilfully cause(d) loss or injury to cranad(private respondent) in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy . cra .” Nor can private respondent’s action be
considered “analogous” to either of the foregoing, for the reasons are obvious that it is
not.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Memorandum of petitioner, pp. 418-421, Records)
Having affirmed the gross negligence of PAL in allowing Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly the plane to Daet on
January 8, 1951 whose slow reaction and poor judgment was the cause of the crash-landing of the plane which
resulted in private respondent Samson hitting his head against the windshield and causing him injuries for
which reason PAL terminated his services and employment as pilot after refusing to provide him with the
necessary medical treatment of respondent’s periodic spells, headache and general debility produced from said
injuries, We must necessarily affirm likewise the award of damages or compensation under the provisions of
Art. 1711 and Art. 1712 of the New Civil Code which provide:
Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death or injuries
to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely
accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course
of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease
caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the
employee’s own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for
compensation. When the employee’s lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall
be equitably reduced.
Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter and the employer shall
be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow-worker’s intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the
death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise
due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiffs fellow-worker.
9
The grant of compensatory damages to the private respondent made by the trial court and affirmed by the
appellate court by computing his basic salary per annum at P750.00 a month as basic salary and P300.00 a
month for extra pay for extra flying time including bonus given in December every year is justified. The correct
computation however should be P750 plus P300 x 12 months = P12,600 per annum x 10 years =
P126,000.00 cranad(not P120,000.00 as computed by the court a quo). The further grant of increase in the
basic pay of the pilots to P12,000 annually for 1964 to 1968 totalling P60,000.00 and another P18,000.00 as
bonuses and extra pay for extra flying time at the same rate of P300.00 a month totals P78,000.00. Adding
P126,000.00 cranad(1964 to 1968 compensation) makes a grand total of P204,000.00 cranad(not P198,000.00
as originally computed).
We also agree with the modification made by the appellate court in ordering payment of legal interest from the
date judicial demand was made by Pilot Samson against PAL with the filing of the complaint in the lower court.
We affirm the ruling of the respondent court which reads:
“Lastly, the defendant-appellant claims that the legal rate of interest on the unearned compensation
should be computed from the date of the judgment in the lower court, not from the filing of the
complaint, citing a case where the issue raised in the Supreme Court was limited to when the
judgment was rendered in the lower court or in the appellate court, which does not mean that it
should not be computed from the filing of the complaint.

As to the grant of moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 We also approve the same. We have noted and Articles 1169, 2209 and 2212 of the Civil Code govern when interest shall be computed. Thereunder
considered the holding of the appellate court in the matter of bad faith on the part of PAL, stated hereunder, interest begins to accrue upon demand, extrajudicial or judicial. A complaint is a judicial
this wise: demand cranad(Cabarroguis vs. Vicente, 107 Phil. 340). Under Article 2212 of the Civil Code, interest
due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be
“None of the essential facts material to the determination of the case have been seriously assailed: silent upon this point.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(CA Resolution, pp. 153-154, Records).
the overshooting of runway and crash-landing into the mangroves; the hitting of plaintiff’s head to
the front windshield of the plane; the oozing of blood out of his ears, nose and mouth; the intermittent The correct amount of compensatory damages upon which legal interest shall accrue from the filing of the
dizzy spells, headaches and general debility thereafter for which he was discharged from his complaint is P204,000.00 as herein computed and not P198,000.00.
employment; the condition of not to attribute the cause of the ailment to the crash-landing imposed WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the appellate court is hereby affirmed with slight
in bad faith for a demanded special medical service abroad; and the resultant brain injury which modification in that the correct amount of compensatory damages is P204,000.00. With costs against petitioner.
defendant’s doctors could not understand nor diagnose.”
SO ORDERED.
xxx
“The act of defendant-appellant in unjustly refusing plaintiff-appellee’s demand for special medical
service abroad for the reason that plaintiff-appellee’s deteriorating physical condition was not due to
the accident violates the provisions of Article 19 of the Civil Code on human relations “to act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(CA
Resolution, pp. 151-152, Records)
We reject the theory of petitioner that private respondent is not entitled to moral damages. Under the facts
found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court and under the law and jurisprudence cited and
applied, the grant of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is proper and justified.
The fact that private respondent suffered physical injuries in the head when the plane crash-landed due to the
negligence of Capt. Bustamante is undeniable. The negligence of the latter is clearly a quasi-delict and therefore
Article 2219, cranad(2) New Civil Code is applicable, justifying the recovery of moral damages.
Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employer-employee relationship between it and
private respondent arising from the contract of employment, private respondent is still entitled to moral
damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice by the appellate court, which finding We hereby affirm,
applying the provisions of Art. 2220, New Civil Code which provides that willful injury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages
are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
The justification in the award of moral damages under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code on Human Relations which
requires that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, as applied by respondent court is also well-
taken and We hereby give Our affirmance thereto.
With respect to the award of attorney’s fees in the sum of P20,000.00 the same is likewise correct. As pointed
out in the decision of the Court of Appeals, “the plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees because he was forced to
litigate in order to enforce his valid claim cranad(Ganaban vs. Bayle, 30 SCRA 365; De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz,
22 SCRA 33; and many others); defendant acted in bad faith in refusing plaintiff’s valid claimcranad(Filipino
Pipe Foundry Corporation vs. Central Bank, 23 SCRA 1044); and plaintiff was dismissed and was forced to go
to court to vindicate his right cranad(Nadura vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., 5 SCRA 879).”

10
G.R. No. 106279 July 14, 1995
SULPICIO LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Twelfth Division) and JACINTA L.
PAMALARAN, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse the Decision
dated April 8, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21919, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, Tagbilaran City, which awarded the claim for damages filed by private
respondent against CBL Timber Corporation (CBL), AGO Lumber Company (ALC), Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (SLI)
and Ernie Santiago (Civil Case No. 2864).
We deny the petition.
I 4. It is CBL and/or ALC which should be held liable for the death of the victim; and,
A contract of carriage was entered into between petitioner and ALC for the transport of the latter's timber
from Pugad, Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
On March 17, 1976, petitioner sent its tugboat "MT Edmund" and barge "Solid VI" to Lianga to pick up ALC's
timber. However, no loading could be made because of the heavy downpour. The next morning, several
stevedores of CBL, who were hired by ALC, boarded the "Solid VI" and opened its storeroom. The stevedores
were warned of the gas and heat generated by the copra stored in the holds of the ship. Not heeding the
warning, a stevedore entered the storeroom and fell unconscious. Two other stevedores followed, one of
whom was Leoncio L. Pamalaran. He also lost consciousness and eventually died of gas poisoning.
Thus, Civil Case No. 2864 for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, Tagbilaran
by Pamalaran's heirs against petitioner CBL, ALC and its manager, Ernie Santiago. The trial court ruled in
favor of plaintiffs, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding a preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs, judgment is hereby
rendered:
Ordering defendants CBL Timber Corporation, AGO Lumber Company, Sulpicio Lines, Inc. and Ernie
Santiago to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally:
1. Actual and compensatory damages of P40,000.00;
2. Moral damages of P50,000.00;
3. Attorney's fees of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit (Rollo, p. 57).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated April 8, 1992 in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 21919, affirmed the
lower court's decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the appealed judgment there being no justifiable reason that
warrants the reversal thereof. Costs against defendant-appellant (Rollo, p. 32).
Not satisfied with the appellate court's decision, petitioner filed this petition.
II
Petitioner raises the following arguments:
1. Pamalaran was never a passenger of petitioner. Therefore, it is not liable as a common carrier;
2. Petitioner and its employees were not negligent in the series of events which led to the death of
Pamalaran;
3. Petitioner is not liable under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code;
5. Petitioner should have been granted its just and valid counterclaims and cross claims.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that although Pamalaran was never a passenger of petitioner, still the
latter is liable as a common carrier for his death. The Court of Appeals relied on Canas v. Dabatos, 8 Court of
Appeals Report 918 (1965). In said case, 13 persons were on board the vessel of defendant not as
passengers but as 'cargadores' of the shipper's goods. They were there with the consent and knowledge of
the owner of the vessel. Despite the absence of a passenger-carrier relationship between them, the appellate
court, just the same, held the patron thereof liable as a common carrier. The appellate court ruled:
There is no debate as to the fact that not one of the thirteen passengers have paid an
amount of money as fare for their conveyance from Hingotanan to Cebu. The undisputed
fact, however, is that all of them were in the boat with the knowledge and consent of the
patron. The eleven passengers, other than Encarnacion and Diosdado were in the boat
because they have helped in loading cargoes in the boat, and "to serve as cargadores of
the cargoes," presumably, in unloading them at the place of destination. For those
services they were permitted to be in the boat and to proceed to their destination in
Cebu. The services rendered were the valuable consideration in exchange for the
transportation fare. "In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each
contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other; . . ." (at p.
925; emphasis supplied).
ALC had a contract of carriage with petitioner. The presence of the stevedores sent by ALC on board the
barge of petitioner was called for by the contract of carriage. For how else would its lumber be transported
unless it is placed on board? And by whom? Of course, the stevedores. Definitely, petitioner could not expect
the shipper itself to load the lumber without the aid of the stevedores. Furthermore, petitioner knew of the
presence and role of the stevedores in its barge and thus consented to their presence. Hence, petitioner was
responsible for their safety while on board the barge.
Petitioner next claims that its employees even warned the stevedores and tried to prevent their entry into the
storeroom. Such argument, again, is demolished by the findings of the Court of Appeals, thus:
11
 . . . . However, appellant failed to prove that its employees were actually trained or given
specific instructions to see to it that the barge is fit and safe not only in transporting
goods but also for people who would be loading the cargo into the bodega of the
barge. It is not enough that appellant's employees have warned the laborers not to enter
the barge after the hatch was opened. Appellant's employees should have been
sufficiently instructed to see to it that the hatch of the barge is not opened by any
unauthorized person and that the hatch is not easily opened by anyone. At the very least,
precautionary measures should have been observed by appellant's employees to see to it
that no one could enter the bodega of the barge until after they have made sure that it is
safe for anyone to enter the same. Failing to exercise due diligence in the supervision of
its employees, the lower court was correct in holding appellant liable for damages (Rollo,
pp. 31-32; Emphasis supplied).

Inasmuch as the findings of the Court of Appeals are merely an affirmance of the findings of the trial court,
which findings are supported by the evidence, we do not find any reason to reverse the same.

There is no quarrel that ALC and CBL are also liable as they were in fact held liable by both the trial and
appellate courts.

Both the counterclaims and cross claims of petitioner are without legal basis. The counterclaims and cross
claims were based on the assumption that the other defendants are the ones solely liable. However,
inasmuch as its solidary liability with the other defendants has clearly been established by both the trial and
the appellate courts, which we find to be in order, we cannot make a different conclusion contrary to that of
the said courts.

Finally, the indemnity for the death of Leoncio L. Pamalaran is increased from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 in
accordance with our ruling in People v. Flores, 237 SCRA 653 (1994).

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
actual and compensatory damages is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

12
 [G.R. No. 161730. January 28, 2005]
JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. MICHAEL ASUNCION and JEANETTE ASUNCION, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse and set aside the October 9, 2002 decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution,[2] which affirmed in toto the June 10, 1997 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 in Civil Case No. 92-3635.[3]
On March 27, 1992, respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board Japan Airlines (JAL)
Flight 742 bound for Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita and an overnight stay at Hotel
Nikko Narita. Upon arrival at Narita, Mrs. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their applications for shore pass
and directed them to the Japanese immigration official.[4] A shore pass is required of a foreigner aboard a vessel
or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood of the port of call for not more than 72 hours.
During their interview, the Japanese immigration official noted that Michael appeared shorter than his
height as indicated in his passport. Because of this inconsistency, respondents were denied shore pass entries
and were brought instead to the Narita Airport Rest House where they were billeted overnight.
The immigration official also handed Mrs. Higuchi a Notice[5] where it was stated that respondents were
to be watched so as not to escape.
Mr. Atsushi Takemoto of the International Service Center (ISC), the agency tasked by Japans Immigration
Department to handle passengers who were denied shore pass entries, brought respondents to the Narita
Airport Rest House where they stayed overnight until their departure the following day for Los Angeles.
Respondents were charged US$400.00 each for their accommodation, security service and meals.
On December 12, 1992, respondents filed a complaint for damages[6] claiming that JAL did not fully
apprise them of their travel requirements and that they were rudely and forcibly detained at Narita Airport.
JAL denied the allegations of respondents. It maintained that the refusal of the Japanese immigration
authorities to issue shore passes to respondents is an act of state which JAL cannot interfere with or prevail
upon. Consequently, it cannot impose upon the immigration authorities that respondents be billeted at Hotel
Nikko instead of the airport resthouse.[7]
On June 10, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendant
JAL to pay plaintiffs as follows:
1. the sum of US$800.00 representing the expenses incurred at the Narita Airport with interest at
12% per annum from March 27, 1992 until the sum is fully paid;
2. the sum of P200,000.00 for each plaintiff as moral damages;
3. the amount of P100,000.00 for each plaintiff as exemplary damages;
4. the amount of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court dismissed JALs counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorneys
fees.
On October 9, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied,[9] JAL now files the instant petition.
The basic issue for resolution is whether JAL is guilty of breach of contract.
Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier such as JAL is bound to carry its passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight
on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect that he be transported
on that flight and on that date and it becomes the carriers obligation to carry him and his luggage safely to the
agreed destination.[10] If the passenger is not so transported or if in the process of transporting he dies or is
injured, the carrier may be held liable for a breach of contract of carriage.[11]
We find that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL has the
duty to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such duty does not
extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could not vouch for the authenticity of
a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a
sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of
carriage entered into by JAL and herein respondents. As such, JAL should not be faulted for the denial of
respondents shore pass applications.
Prior to their departure, respondents were aware that upon arrival in Narita, they must secure shore pass
entries for their overnight stay. Respondents mother, Mrs. Imelda Asuncion, insisted though that Ms. Linda
Villavicencio of JAL assured her that her children would be granted the passes.[12] This assertion was
satisfactorily refuted by Ms. Villavicencios testimony during the cross examination, to wit:
ATTY. GONZAGA:
Q I will show to you Exh. 9 which is the TIM and on page 184 hereof, particularly number 10,
and I quote, Those holding tickets with confirmed seats and other documents for their
onward journey and continuing their journey to a third country provided that they obtain
an indorsement with an application of shore pass or transit pass from the airline ground
personnel before clearing the immigration formality?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did you tell this provision to Mrs. Asuncion?
A Yes, Sir. I did.
Q Are you sure?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did you give a copy?
A No, Sir, I did not give a copy but verbally I explained to her the procedure they have to
undergo when they get to narita airport.
13
 . A: This notice is evidence which shows the decision of immigration authorities. It shows there
Q And you read the contents of this [TIM]?
A No, Sir, I did not read it to her but I explained to her the procedure that each passenger has to
go through before when they get to narita airport before they line up in the immigration
counter.
Q In other words, you told Mrs. Asuncion the responsibility of securing shore passes bears solely
on the passengers only?
A Yes, Sir.
Q That the airline has no responsibility whatsoever with regards (sic) to the application for shore
passes?
A Yes, Sir.[13]
Next, respondents claimed that petitioner breached its contract of carriage when it failed to explain to
the immigration authorities that they had overnight vouchers at the Hotel Nikko Narita. They imputed that JAL
did not exhaust all means to prevent the denial of their shore pass entry applications.
To reiterate, JAL or any of its representatives have no authority to interfere with or influence the
immigration authorities. The most that could be expected of JAL is to endorse respondents applications, which
Mrs. Higuchi did immediately upon their arrival in Narita.
As Mrs. Higuchi stated during her deposition:
ATTY. QUIMBO
Q: Madam Witness, what assistance did you give, if any, to the plaintiffs during this interview?
A: No, I was not present during their interview. I cannot assist.
Q: Why not?
A: It is forbidden for a civilian personnel to interfere with the Immigration agents duties.[14]
Q: During the time that you were in that room and you were given this notice for you to sign, did
you tell the immigration agent that Michael and Jeanette Asuncion should be allowed to
stay at the Hotel Nikko Narita because, as passengers of JAL, and according to the
plaintiff, they had vouchers to stay in that hotel that night?
A: No, I couldnt do so.
Q: Why not?
that the immigration inspector also designated Room 304 of the Narita Airport Resthouse
as the place where the passengers were going to wait for their outbound flight. I cannot
interfere with that decision.[15]
Mrs. Higuchi did all she could to assist the respondents. Upon being notified of the denial of respondents
applications, Mrs. Higuchi immediately made reservations for respondents at the Narita Airport Rest House
which is really more a hotel than a detention house as claimed by respondents.[16]
More importantly, nowhere in respondent Michaels testimony did he state categorically that Mrs. Higuchi
or any other employee of JAL treated them rudely or exhibited improper behavior throughout their stay. We
therefore find JAL not remiss in its obligations as a common carrier.
Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully causes injury to property, or in cases of
breach of contract where the other party acts fraudulently or in bad faith. Exemplary damages are imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good, when the party to a contract acts in wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive or malevolent manner. Attorneys fees are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when
the party to a suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.[17] There being no breach of contract
nor proof that JAL acted in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner, there is no basis for the award of any
form of damages.
Neither should JAL be held liable to reimburse respondents the amount of US$800.00. It has been
sufficiently proven that the amount pertained to ISC, an agency separate and distinct from JAL, in payment for
the accommodations provided to respondents. The payments did not in any manner accrue to the benefit of
JAL.
However, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed JALs counterclaim for litigation expenses,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The action was filed by respondents in utmost good faith and not
manifestly frivolous. Respondents honestly believed that JAL breached its contract. A persons right to litigate
should not be penalized by holding him liable for damages. This is especially true when the filing of the case is
to enforce what he believes to be his rightful claim against another although found to be erroneous.[18]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The October 9, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 57440, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE insofar as the finding of breach on the part of petitioner and the award of damages, attorneys
fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents is concerned. Accordingly, there being no breach of contract
on the part of petitioner, the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and
costs of the suit in favor of respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion, is DELETED for lack of basis. However,
the dismissal for lack of merit of petitioners counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees, is SUSTAINED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
14
G.R. No. L-29462 March 7, 1929
IGNACIO DEL PRADO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO., defendant-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, jr., for appellant.
Vicente Sotto for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Ignacio del Prado to recover damages in
the amount of P50,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of te defendant,
the Manila Electric Company, in the operation of one of its street cars in the City of Manila. Upon hearing the
cause the trial court awarded to the plaintiff the sum of P10,000, as damages, with costs of suit, and the
defendant appealed.
The appellant, the Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City for the conveyance
of passengers; and on the morning of November 18, 1925, one Teodorico Florenciano, as appellant's
motorman, was in charge of car No. 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the
accident being at a point near the intersection of said street and Mendoza Street. After the car had stopped at
its appointed place for taking on and letting off passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course
at a moderate speed under the guidance of the motorman. The car had proceeded only a short distance,
however, when the plaintiff, Ignacio del Prado, ran across the street to catch the car, his approach being
made from the left. The car was of the kind having entrance and exist at either end, and the movement of
the plaintiff was so timed that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the moment when the car was
passing.
The testimony of the plaintiff and of Ciriaco Guevara, one of his witnesses, tends to shows that the plaintiff,
upon approaching the car, raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his desire to board the car, in
response to which the motorman eased up a little, without stopping. Upon this the plaintiff seized, with his
hand, the front perpendicular handspot, at the same time placing his left foot upon the platform. However,
before the plaintiff's position had become secure, and even before his raised right foot had reached the
flatform, the motorman applied the power, with the result that the car gave a slight lurch forward. This
sudden impulse to the car caused the plaintiff's foot to slip, and his hand was jerked loose from the handpost,
He therefore fell to the ground, and his right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car. The next day
the member had to be amputated in the hospital. The witness, Ciriaco Guevara, also stated that, as the
plaintiff started to board the car, he grasped the handpost on either side with both right and left hand. The
latter statement may possibly be incorrect as regards the use of his right hand by the plaintiff, but we are of
the opinion that the finding of the trial court to the effect that the motorman slowed up slightly as the plaintiff
was boarding the car that the plaintiff's fall was due in part at lease to a sudden forward movement at the
moment when the plaintiff put his foot on the platform is supported by the evidence and ought not to be
disturbed by us.
The motorman stated at the trial that he did not see the plaintiff attempting to board the car; that he did not
accelerate the speed of the car as claimed by the plaintiff's witnesses; and that he in fact knew nothing of the
incident until after the plaintiff had been hurt and some one called to him to stop. We are not convinced of
the complete candor of this statement, for we are unable to see how a motorman operating this car could
have failed to see a person boarding the car under the circumstances revealed in this case. It must be
remembered that the front handpost which, as all witness agree, was grasped by the plaintiff in attempting to
board the car, was immediately on the left side of the motorman.
With respect to the legal aspects of the case we may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the
part of a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those
appointed for stoppage. In fact it would be impossible to operate a system of street cars if a company engage
in this business were required to stop any and everywhere to take on people who were too indolent, or who
imagine themselves to be in too great a hurry, to go to the proper places for boarding the cars. Nevertheless,
although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do act that
would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The
premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.
The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and in failure
on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa
contructual) under articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of
passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
The case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), supplies an instance of the violation of this duty
with respect to a passenger who was getting off of a train. In that case the plaintiff stepped off of a moving
train, while it was slowing down in a station, and at the time when it was too dark for him to see clearly
where he was putting his feet. The employees of the company had carelessly left watermelons on the
platform at the place where the plaintiff alighted, with the result that his feet slipped and he fell under the
car, where his right arm badly injured. This court held that the railroad company was liable for breach
positive duty (culpa contractual), and the plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of P2,500 for the loss
of his arm. In the opinion in that case the distinction is clearly drawn between a liability for negligence arising
from breach of contructual duty and that arising articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code (culpa aquiliana).
The distiction between these two sorts of negligence is important in this jurisdiction, for the reason that
where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive obligation, an
employer, or master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, by
providing that he had exercised due degligence to prevent the damage; whereas this defense is not available
if the liability of the master arises from a breach of contrauctual duty (culpa contractual). In the case bfore us
the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the deligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company introduced
testimony showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of this car
in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of
obligation under article 1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions. (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compana
Transatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875, 887; De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light
Co., 40 Phil., 706, 710.)
Another practical difference between liability for negligence arising under 1902 of the Civil Code and liability
arising from negligence in the performance of a positive duty, under article 1101 and related provisions of the
Civil Code, is that, in dealing with the latter form of negligence, the court is given a discretion to mitigate
liability according to the circumstances of the case (art 1103). No such general discretion is given by the Code
in dealing with liability arising under article 1902; although possibly the same end is reached by courts in
dealing with the latter form of liability because of the latitude of the considerations pertinent to cases arising
under this article.
As to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that it should be treated, as in Rakes
vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), as a mitigating circumstance under article 1103 of the Civil
Code. It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the
proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's
motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume
the risk of injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held to
assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will increase his peril by accelerating the
speed of the car before he is planted safely on the platform. Again, the situation before us is one where the
negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the
15
company must be considered the proximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems to be
analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear
chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the
action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party (20 R. C. L., p. 139; Carr vs. Interurban Ry.
Co., 185 Iowa, 872; 171 N. W., 167). The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the
accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

With respect to the effect of this injury upon the plaintiff's earning power, we note that, although he lost his
foot, he is able to use an artificial member without great inconvenience and his earning capacity has probably
not been reduced by more than 30 per centum. In view of the precedents found in our decisions with respect
to the damages that ought to be awarded for the loss of limb, and more particularly Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359); Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768); and Borromeo vs. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil., 165), and in view of all the circumstances connected with the case, we are of
the opinion that the plaintiff will be adequately compensated by an award of P2,500.

It being understood, therefore, that the appealed judgment is modified by reducing the recovery to the sum
of P2,500, the judgment, as thus modified, is affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

This appeal presents a hard case, whichever way it is decided.

I read the entire record in this case before it was submitted to the second division for decision. I was then
theponente. I was then convinced, as I am now, after a re-examination of the record, that the judgment of
the lower court should be revoked for the following reasons:

(a) That the motorman managed the car carefully and with ordinary prudence at the moment the
alleged accident occured;

(b) That the appellee acted with imprudence and lack of due care in attempting to board a street
car while the same was in motion; and

(c) That he contributed to his own injury, without any negligence or malice or imprudence on the
part of the defendant.

There is nothing in the record which even remotely justifies a contribution of damages between the appellee
and the appellant. The appellee should be required to suffer the damages which he himself, through his own
negligence, occasioned, without any negligence, imprudence or malice on the part of the appellant.

Therefore, the judgment of the court a quo should be revoked, and the appellant absolved from all liability
under the complaint.

Johns, J., concur.

16
G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966
LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.
G. E. Yabut, R. Monterey and M.C. Lagman for petitioner.
Ahmed Garcia for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23267-R, holding it liable
for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of his
minor daughter Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:
On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor
daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4½ years old, and Fe, over 2 years old,
boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and
operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At
the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their personal
belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano
Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest
child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which
fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound
therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to the group of
the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get down the
bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left
pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he
returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so
doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was
on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left
under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading,
suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the
conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still
attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again
placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs
had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running
board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in
front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people
beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed,
and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus
in which she rode earlier together with her parents.
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against the defendant
seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral damages and
actual damages sustained as a result thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court
below rendered the judgment in question.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of contract of carriage and
sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child and P400.00 as compensatory damages representing
burial expenses and costs.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach of contract in the
case, for the reason that when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus involved in
the incident and, therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the Court of Appeals
sustained this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty of quasi-delict and held the latter
liable for damages, for the negligence of its driver, in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the
Court of Appeals did not only find the petitioner liable, but increased the damages awarded the plaintiffs-
appellees to P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00 granted by the trial court.
In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding it liable for quasi-
delict, considering that respondents complaint was one for breach of contract, and (2) in raising the award of
damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal from the decision of the lower
court.
Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement holding petitioner liable
for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that although it is true that
respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the
bus at a place designated for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father
had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under
one of the seats of the bus. There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he
returned to the bus for his bayongwhich was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him
and the petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease
where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage
from the car.1 The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the father
to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of
carriage also persisted.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the
passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but
continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all
the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is
considered still a passenger.2 So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by
the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his
brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the
difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues
to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents.3
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when
they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although
the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag
or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It
was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances,
it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person"
required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its
obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus,
nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor
17
gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers
Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they
are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their
contract of carriage.

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be
held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads —

That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter,
was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person on the part of the defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their
daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle.

is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while incompatible with
the other claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of
Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other
or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be resolved and determined.4

The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it was
alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence
and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and
their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that the driver, even
before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running
board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its
employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of
Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable
for the death of the child Raquel Beltran.

The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals, however,
cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues
raised and argued in appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial
court awarding them on P3,000.00 damages for the death of their daughter. Neither does it appear that, as
appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief the inadequacy of the award, or
that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated
as an exception to the general rule.5Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals
committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently, meritorious.1äwphï1.ñët

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing, the petitioner to pay to the
respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the
amount of P400.00 as actual damages. No costs in this instance. So ordered.

18
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR
and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE
BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite,
on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen
passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside
and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from
the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the
left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At
about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one
of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of
the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could,
others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan,
Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the
overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans
from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of
the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck,
including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four
passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the
neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo
with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned
bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape
from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the
ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for
help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in
behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of
First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of
the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs
and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us
because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with
the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon.
There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of
the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of
the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after
zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied
the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to
what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who
were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical
injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38,
pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
19
 chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an furnished the Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased
from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the
physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of
the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to
hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as
they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than
that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is
driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking
back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the
overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence
on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly,
Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the deceased, as
well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX
THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory, moral,
and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal
services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and
not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will
not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of the
passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was
visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of
his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were
already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the
driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and
had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires,
specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as
we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the
driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical
injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case against
him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the
fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or
were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in
that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the
public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice,
20
G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and
GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION, respondents.
Herenio E. Martinez for petitioner.
M.R. Villaluz Law Office for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari, petitioner Aboitiz Shipping Corporation seeks a review of the decision 1 of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1988, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from as modified by the order of October 27, 1982,
is hereby affirmed with the modification that appellant Aboitiz Shipping is hereby ordered
to pay plaintiff-appellees the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana;
actual damages of P9,800.00; P150,000.00 for unearned income; P7,200.00 as support
for deceased's parents; P20,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
and to pay the costs.
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the court a quo and adopted by respondent court, are as
follows: .
The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V
Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for
Manila, having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. 'B'). On May
12, 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein
disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the
pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck
which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said
vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. '2')
between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo
Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of said
vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel.
While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from
said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the
vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said
vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him
between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital
where he later expired three (3) days thereafter, on May 15, 1975, the cause of his death
according to the Death Certificate (Exh. "C") being "hypostatic pneumonia secondary to
traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder" (See also Exh. "B").
For his hospitalization, medical, burial and other miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's wife,
herein plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00 (Exhibits "E", "E-1", to "E-5"). Anacleto Viana
who was only forty (40) years old when he met said fateful accident (Exh. 'E') was in
good health. His average annual income as a farmer or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans
of palay annually. His parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his
death had been recipient of twenty (20) cavans of palay as support or P120.00 monthly.
Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs suffered mental anguish and extreme worry or
moral damages. For the filing of the instant case, they had to hire a lawyer for an agreed
fee of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos. 2
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint 3 for damages against petitioner corporation (Aboitiz, for brevity)
for breach of contract of carriage.
In its answer. 4 Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was
completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation (Pioneer, for short) as the
exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz.
It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held
liable under the fellow-servant rule.
Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-party complaint 5 against Pioneer imputing liability
thereto for Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly caused by the negligence of the crane operator
who was an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and supervision.
Pioneer, in its answer to the third-party complaint, 6 raised the defenses that Aboitiz had no cause of action
against Pioneer considering that Aboitiz is being sued by the Vianas for breach of contract of carriage to
which Pioneer is not a party; that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a good father of a family both in the
selection and supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of damage or injury to anyone
including the victim Anacleto Viana; that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was the direct and proximate
cause of his death; and that the filing of the third-party complaint was premature by reason of the pendency
of the criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence filed against the crane operator, Alejo
Figueroa.
In a decision rendered on April 17, 1980 by the trial court, 7 Aboitiz was ordered to pay the Vianas for
damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the latter paid the
Vianas. The dispositive portion of said decision provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plantiffs:
(1) ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay to plaintiffs the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana P9,800.00 as actual damages; P533,200.00
value of the 10,664 cavans of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan; P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees; F 5,000.00, value of the 100 cavans of palay as support for five (5) years
for deceased (sic) parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana computed at
P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents computed at P120.00 a
month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of the Civil Code; P20,000.00 as moral
damages, and costs; and
(2) ordering the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation to reimburse
defendant and third party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping Corporation the said amounts that it is
ordered to pay to herein plaintiffs.
Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for reconsideration wherein they similarly raised the trial
court's failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with gross negligence despite the overwhelming evidence
21
presented in support thereof. In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to Pioneer's motion, that under the
memorandum of agreement the liability of Pioneer as contractor is automatic for any damages or losses
whatsoever occasioned by and arising from the operation of its arrastre and stevedoring service.
In an order dated October 27, 1982, 8 the trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the Vianas
and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case of negligence against the crane operator which the court a
quo ruled is never presumed, aside from the fact that the memorandum of agreement supposedly refers only
to Pioneer's liability in case of loss or damage to goods handled by it but not in the case of personal injuries,
and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly invoke the fellow-servant rule simply because its liability stems from a
breach of contract of carriage. The dispositive portion of said order reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby modified insofar as third party defendant Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation is concerned rendered in favor of the plaintiffs-,:
(1) Ordering defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of Anacleto Viana; P9,000.00 (sic) as actual damages;
P533,200.00 value of the 10,664 cavans of palay computed at P50.00 per cavan;
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; P5,000.00 value of the 100 cavans of palay as support for
five (5) years for deceased's parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia
Viana,computed at P50.00 per cavan; P7,200.00 as support for deceased's parents
computed at P120.00 a month for five years pursuant to Art. 2206, Par. 2, of the Civil
Code; P20,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; and
(2) Absolving third-party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation for (sic) any liability
for the death of Anacleto Viana the passenger of M/V Antonia owned by defendant third
party plaintiff Aboitiz Shipping Corporation it appearing that the negligence of its crane
operator has not been established therein.
Not satisfied with the modified judgment of the trial court, Aboitiz appealed the same to respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of damages awarded to the
Vianas.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner Aboitiz postulates that respondent court erred:
(A) In holding that the doctrine laid down by this honorable Court in La Mallorca vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. (17 SCRA 739, July 27, 1966) is applicable to the case in the face
of the undisputable fact that the factual situation under the La Mallorca case is radically
different from the facts obtaining in this case;
(B) In holding petitioner liable for damages in the face of the finding of the court a quo
and confirmed by the Honorable respondent court of Appeals that the deceased, Anacleto
Viana was guilty of contributory negligence, which, We respectfully submit contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of his death; specifically the honorable respondent
Court of Appeals failed to apply Art. 1762 of the New Civil Code;
(C) In the alternative assuming the holding of the Honorable respondent Court of
Appears that petitioner may be legally condemned to pay damages to the private
respondents we respectfully submit that it committed a reversible error when it dismissed
petitioner's third party complaint against private respondent Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation instead of compelling the latter to reimburse the petitioner for whatever
damages it may be compelled to pay to the private respondents Vianas. 9
At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals found the victim
Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but holding that it was the negligence of Aboitiz in
prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the
direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
I. Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from the time Anacleto Viana disembarked
from the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes prior to the
operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable e and he consequently ceased to
be a passenger. Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 10 is not
applicable to the case at bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the
port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship will not
ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and
includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure.12 The carrier-passenger
relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his
destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.13
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid case of La Mallorca was enunciated,
to wit:
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease
at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the
carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station
platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his
destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but
before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has
been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to
relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues
to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad company and its
agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was
not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Racquel, the child that she was, must
have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of
the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run,
so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this
instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the
circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the 'utmost
diligence' of a 'very cautious person' required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. ... The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and
they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the
protection under their contract of carriage. 14
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of the
passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time should be made
22
to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its in the present case, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner had inadequately complied with the required degree
business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time of diligence to prevent the accident from happening.
element per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited
case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums around the
premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the
perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of
accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the
visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined
presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.
to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely
venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the passengers of the supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around the unloading area and the guard's admonitions against
vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a entry therein, these were at most insufficient precautions which pale into insignificance if considered vis-a-vis
passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels the gravity of the danger to which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that petitioner was
are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly and actually
bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal
vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" to be
a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of exercised "as far as human care and foresight can provide" which is required by law of common carriers with
comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is respect to their passengers.
inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the
instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise
the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had
extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could definitely have prevented, the
every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its
former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, 19 petitioner has expressly conceded the
passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that petitioner did not present sufficient evidence in support of
its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana was guilty of gross negligence. Petitioner cannot now be
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had already disembarked from the heard to claim otherwise.
vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was taking his cargoes,
the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In consonance with common shipping procedure as to the
No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by respondent court's declaration that there
minimum time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be presumed that the victim
was no negligence on the part of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the trial court's finding
had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already disembarked
to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being absolved of any liability.
an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his
baggage which was possible only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard
procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the alleged gross negligence of the
Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of victim, hence its present contention that the death of the passenger was due to the negligence of the crane
said carrier at the time of his tragic death. operator cannot be sustained both on grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on its present theory.
Even in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards
insofar as its unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have been accepted by the
II. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
third-party complaint only after ten (10) months from the institution of the suit against it. Parenthetically,
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. 15 More particularly, a common carrier
Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the corresponding
is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. 16 Thus, where a passenger
what we have said that no negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, the failure of
dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. 17 This
Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger is the rationale for our finding on its
gives rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the
liability.
existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier
to carry the passenger safely to his destination, 18which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to
safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation subsists. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a passenger's death or injury the operator of SO ORDERED.
the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is incumbent
upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to afford full protection
to the passengers of common carriers which can be carried out only by imposing a stringent statutory
obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this Court has likewise adopted a rigid posture in the application of
the law by exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from common carriers, bearing utmost in mind
the welfare of the passengers who often become hapless victims of indifferent and profit-oriented carriers.
We cannot in reason deny that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining

23
G.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO ZAPATOS, respondents.
Leighton R. Liazon for petitioner.
Balmes L. Ocampo for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review in certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellant Court,1 now Court of Appeals, dated 28 February 1985, in AC-G.R. CV No. 69327 ("Pedro Zapatos v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc.") affirming the decision of the then Court of first Instance, now Regional Trial Court,
declaring Philippine Airlines, Inc., liable in damages for breach of contract.
On 25 November 1976, private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of
carriage2 against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), before the then Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial
Court, of Misamis Occidental, at Ozamiz City. According to him, on 2 August 1976, he was among the twenty-
one (21) passengers of PAL Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City. The routing of this
flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato. While on flight and just about fifteen (15) minutes before landing at
Ozamiz City, the pilot received a radio message that the airport was closed due to heavy rains and inclement
weather and that he should proceed to Cotabato City instead.
Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options to return to
Cebu on flight 560 of the same day and thence to Ozamiz City on 4 August 1975, or take the next flight to
Cebu the following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next available flight to Ozamiz City on 5 August
1975.3 The Station Agent likewise informed them that Flight 560 bound for Manila would make a stop-over at
Cebu to bring some of the diverted passengers; that there were only six (6) seats available as there were
already confirmed passengers for Manila; and, that the basis for priority would be the check-in sequence at
Cebu.
Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not accommodated because he checked-in as passenger
No. 9 on Flight 477. He insisted on being given priority over the confirmed passengers in the accommodation,
but the Station Agent refused private respondent's demand explaining that the latter's predicament was not
due to PAL's own doing but to be a force majeure.4
Private respondent tried to stop the departure of Flight 560 as his personal belongings, including a package
containing a camera which a certain Miwa from Japan asked him to deliver to Mrs. Fe Obid of Gingoog City,
were still on board. His plea fell on deaf ears. PAL then issued to private respondent a free ticket to Iligan
city, which the latter received under protest.5 Private respondent was left at the airport and could not even
hitch a ride in the Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel.6 PAL neither provided private respondent with
transportation from the airport to the city proper nor food and accommodation for his stay in Cotabato City.
The following day, private respondent purchased a PAL ticket to Iligan City. He informed PAL personnel that
he would not use the free ticket because he was filing a case against PAL.7 In Iligan City, private respondent
hired a car from the airport to Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, reaching Ozamiz City by crossing the bay in a
launch.8 His personal effects including the camera, which were valued at P2,000.00 were no longer
recovered.
On 13 January 1977, PAL filed its answer denying that it unjustifiably refused to accommodate private
respondent.9It alleged that there was simply no more seat for private respondent on Flight 560 since there
were only six (6) seats available and the priority of accommodation on Flight 560 was based on the check-in
sequence in Cebu; that the first six (6) priority passengers on Flight 477 chose to take Flight 560; that its
Station Agent explained in a courteous and polite manner to all passengers the reason for PAL's inability to
transport all of them back to Cebu; that the stranded passengers agreed to avail of the options and had their
respective tickets exchanged for their onward trips; that it was
only the private respondent who insisted on being given priority in the accommodation; that pieces of
checked-in baggage and had carried items of the Ozamiz City passengers were removed from the aircraft;
that the reason for their pilot's inability to land at Ozamis City airport was because the runway was wet due
to rains thus posing a threat to the safety of both passengers and aircraft; and, that such reason of force
majeure was a valid justification for the pilot to bypass Ozamiz City and proceed directly to Cotabato City.
On 4 June 1981, the trial court rendered its decision 10
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant Philippine AirLines, Inc. ordering the latter to pay:
(1) As actual damages, the sum of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) representing plaintiff's
expenses for transportation, food and accommodation during his stranded stay at
Cotabato City; the sum of Forty-Eight Pesos (P48.00) representing his flight fare from
Cotabato City to Iligan city; the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) representing
plaintiff's transportation expenses from Iligan City to Ozamiz City; and the sum of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as loss of business opportunities during his stranded stay in
Cotabato City;
(2) As moral damages, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for plaintiff's hurt
feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and unkind and discourteous treatment
perpetrated by defendant's employees during his stay as stranded passenger in Cotabato
City;
(3) As exemplary damages, the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to set a
precedent to the defendant airline that it shall provide means to give comfort and
convenience to stranded passengers;
(4) The sum of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) as attorney's fees;
(5) To pay the costs of this suit.
PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 28 February 1985, finding no reversible error, affirmed the
judgment of the court a quo. 11
PAL then sought recourse to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari 12 upon the following
issues: (1) Can the Court of Appeals render a decision finding petitioner (then defendant-appellant in the
court below) negligent and, consequently, liable for damages on a question of substance which was neither
raised on a question nor proved at the trial? (2) Can the Court of Appeals award actual and moral damages
contrary to the evidence and established jurisprudence? 13
An assiduous examination of the records yields no valid reason for reversal of the judgment on appeal; only a
modification of its disposition.
24
In its petition, PAL vigorously maintains that private respondent's principal cause of action was its alleged
denial of private respondent's demand for priority over the confirmed passengers on Flight 560. Likewise, PAL
points out that the complaint did not impute to PAL neglect in failing to attend to the needs of the diverted
passengers; and, that the question of negligence was not and never put in issue by the pleadings or proved
at the trial.
Contrary to the above arguments, private respondent's amended complaint touched on PAL's indifference and
inattention to his predicament. The pertinent portion of the amended complaint 14 reads:
10. That by virtue of the refusal of the defendant through its agent in Cotabato to
accommodate (sic) and allow the plaintiff to take and board the plane back to Cebu, and
by accomodating (sic) and allowing passengers from Cotabato for Cebu in his stead and
place, thus forcing the plaintiff against his will, to be left and stranded in Cotabato,
exposed to the peril and danger of muslim rebels plundering at the time, the plaintiff, as
a consequence, (have) suffered mental anguish, mental torture, social humiliation,
bismirched reputation and wounded feeling, all amounting to a conservative amount of
thirty thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos.
To substantiate this aspect of apathy, private respondent testified 15
A I did not even notice that I was I think the last passenger or the last person out of the PAL
employees and army personnel that were left there. I did not notice that when I was already
outside of the building after our conversation.
Q What did you do next?
A I banished (sic) because it seems that there was a war not far from the airport. The sound of
guns and the soldiers were plenty.
Q After that what did you do?
A I tried to look for a transportation that could bring me down to the City of Cotabato.
Q Were you able to go there?
A I was at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening more or less and it was a private jeep that I boarded. I
was even questioned why I and who am (sic) I then. Then I explained my side that I am (sic)
stranded passenger. Then they brought me downtown at Cotabato.
Q During your conversation with the Manager were you not offered any vehicle or transportation to
Cotabato airport downtown?
A In fact I told him (Manager) now I am by-passed passenger here which is not my destination
what can you offer me. Then they answered, "it is not my fault. Let us forget that."
Q In other words when the Manager told you that offer was there a vehicle ready?
A Not yet. Not long after that the Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel was passing by going to the
City of Cotabato and I stopped it to take me a ride because there was no more available
transportation but I was not accommodated.
Significantly, PAL did not seem to mind the introduction of evidence which focused on its alleged negligence
in caring for its stranded passengers. Well-settled is the rule in evidence that the protest or objection against
the admission of evidence should be presented at the time the evidence is offered, and that the proper time
to make protest or objection to the admissibility of evidence is when the question is presented to the witness
or at the time the answer thereto is given. 16 There being no objection, such evidence becomes property of
the case and all the parties are amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the
evidence. 17
PAL instead attempted to rebut the aforequoted testimony. In the process, it failed to substantiate its counter
allegation for want of concrete proof 18 —
Atty. Rubin O. Rivera — PAL's counsel:
Q You said PAL refused to help you when you were in Cotabato, is that right?
Private respondent:
A Yes.
Q Did you ask them to help you regarding any offer of transportation or of any other matter asked
of them?
A Yes, he (PAL PERSONNEL) said what is? It is not our fault.
Q Are you not aware that one fellow passenger even claimed that he was given Hotel
accommodation because they have no money?
xxx xxx xxx
A No, sir, that was never offered to me. I said, I tried to stop them but they were already riding
that PAL pick-up jeep, and I was not accommodated.
Having joined in the issue over the alleged lack of care it exhibited towards its passengers, PAL cannot now
turn around and feign surprise at the outcome of the case. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings. 19
With regard to the award of damages affirmed by the appellate court, PAL argues that the same is
unfounded. It asserts that it should not be charged with the task of looking after the passengers' comfort and
convenience because the diversion of the flight was due to a fortuitous event, and that if made liable, an
added burden is given to PAL which is over and beyond its duties under the contract of carriage. It submits
that granting arguendo that negligence exists, PAL cannot be liable in damages in the absence of fraud or
bad faith; that private respondent failed to apprise PAL of the nature of his trip and possible business losses;
and, that private respondent himself is to be blamed for unreasonably refusing to use the free ticket which
PAL issued.
25
The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being imbued with public interest, the law requires common awhile he seemed pacified and thereafter took his ticket (in-lieued (sic) to CBO-IGN, COCON basis),
carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost at the counter in the presence of five other passengers who were waiting for their tickets too. The
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. 20 In Air France rest of the diverted pax had left earlier after being assured their tickets will be ready the following
v. Carrascoso, 21 we held that — day. 24

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual Aforesaid Report being an entry in the course of business is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
relation. And this, because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business Private respondent, apart from his testimony, did not offer any controverting evidence. If indeed PAL omitted
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it to give information about the options available to its diverted passengers, it would have been deluged with
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty . . . . complaints. But, only private respondent complained —
( emphasis supplied).
Atty. Rivera (for PAL)
The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting standard required by
law. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless,
Q I understand from you Mr. Zapatos that at the time you were waiting at Cotabato Airport for the
such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage
decision of PAL, you were not informed of the decision until after the airplane left is that correct?
and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at
bar. What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger
continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier's A Yes.
premises. 22 Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the
comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination. On COURT:
this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim
rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place. As the appellate
court correctly ruled — Q What do you mean by "yes"? You meant you were not informed?

While the failure of plaintiff in the first instance to reach his destination at Ozamis City in A Yes, I was not informed of their decision, that they will only accommodate few passengers.
accordance with the contract of carriage was due to the closure of the airport on account of rain
and inclement weather which was radioed to defendant 15 minutes before landing, it has not been Q Aside from you there were many other stranded passengers?
disputed by defendant airline that Ozamis City has no all-weather airport and has to cancel its flight
to Ozamis City or by-pass it in the event of inclement weather. Knowing this fact, it becomes the
duty of defendant to provide all means of comfort and convenience to its passengers when they A I believed, yes.
would have to be left in a strange place in case of such by-passing. The steps taken by defendant
airline company towards this end has not been put in evidence, especially for those 7 others who Q And you want us to believe that PAL did not explain (to) any of these passengers about the
were not accommodated in the return trip to Cebu, only 6 of the 21 having been so decision regarding those who will board the aircraft back to Cebu?
accommodated. It appears that plaintiff had to leave on the next flight 2 days later. If the cause of
non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it has to be the sole and only cause (Art.
1755 CC., Art. 1733 C.C.) Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common carrier A No, Sir.
to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendant's failure to provide comfort
and convenience to its stranded passengers using extra-ordinary diligence, the cause of non- Q Despite these facts Mr. Zapatos did any of the other passengers complained (sic) regarding that
fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due to something which incident?
defendant airline could have prevented, defendant becomes liable to plaintiff. 23
xxx xxx xxx
While we find PAL remiss in its duty of extending utmost care to private respondent while being stranded in
Cotabato City, there is no sufficient basis to conclude that PAL failed to inform him about his non-
A There were plenty of argument and I was one of those talking about my case.
accommodation on Flight 560, or that it was inattentive to his queries relative thereto.

Q Did you hear anybody complained (sic) that he has not been informed of the decision before the
On 3 August 1975, the Station Agent reported to his Branch Manager in Cotabato City that —
plane left for Cebu?

3. Of the fifteen stranded passengers two pax elected to take F478 on August 05, three pax opted
to take F442 August 03. The remaining ten (10) including subject requested that they be instead
accommodated (sic) on F446 CBO-IGN the following day where they intended to take the surface
transportation to OZC. Mr. Pedro Zapatos had by then been very vocal and boiceterous (sic) at the
counter and we tactfully managed to steer him inside the Station Agent's office. Mr. Pedro Zapatos
then adamantly insisted that all the diverted passengers should have been given priority over the
originating passengers of F560 whether confirmed or otherwise. We explained our policies and after
A No. 25
Admittedly, private respondent's insistence on being given priority in accommodation was unreasonable
considering the fortuitous event and that there was a sequence to be observed in the booking, i.e., in the
order the passengers checked-in at their port of origin. His intransigence in fact was the main cause for his
having to stay at the airport longer than was necessary.
26
 Atty. Rivera:

Q And, you were saying that despite the fact that according to your testimony there were at least
16 passengers who were stranded there in Cotabato airport according to your testimony, and later
you said that there were no other people left there at that time, is that correct?

A Yes, I did not see anyone there around. I think I was the only civilian who was left there.

Q Why is it that it took you long time to leave that place?

A Because I was arguing with the PAL personnel. 26

Anent the plaint that PAL employees were disrespectful and inattentive toward private respondent, the
records are bereft of evidence to support the same. Thus, the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals in this
regard is without basis. 27 On the contrary, private respondent was attended to not only by the personnel of
PAL but also by its Manager." 28

In the light of these findings, we find the award of moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
unreasonably excessive; hence, we reduce the same to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Conformably
herewith, the award of exemplary damages is also reduced to five Thousand Pesos (5,000.00). Moral
damages are not intended to enrich the private respondent. They are awarded only to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action. 29

With regard to the award of actual damages in the amount of P5,000.00 representing private respondent's
alleged business losses occasioned by his stay at Cotabato City, we find the same unwarranted. Private
respondent's testimony that he had a scheduled business "transaction of shark liver oil supposedly to have
been consummated on August 3, 1975 in the morning" and that "since (private respondent) was out for
nearly two weeks I missed to buy about 10 barrels of shark liver oil,"30 are purely speculative. Actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A
court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. 31

WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification however that the award of moral
damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is reduced to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) while the
exemplary damages of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is also reduced to Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00). The award of actual damages in the amount Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) representing
business losses occasioned by private respondent's being stranded in Cotabato City is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

27
G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990
BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and CRESENCIO RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division), RICARDO BETER, SERGIA BETER,
TEOFILO RAUTRAUT and ZOETERA RAUTRAUT, respondents.
Aquino W. Gambe for petitioners.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City dismissing the private respondents' complaint for collection of
"a sum of money" and finding the petitioners solidarily liable for damages in the total amount of One Hundred
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00). The petitioners also question the appellate court's resolution denying
a motion for reconsideration.
On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by Cresencio Rivera was the
situs of a stampede which resulted in the death of passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan
City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger; that about fifteen (15) minutes
later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic
among the passengers; that when the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were
found lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering
from severe injuries which caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran
toward the bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut, private respondents herein (Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter are the parents of Ornominio while
Teofilo Rautraut and Zoetera [should be Zotera] Rautraut are the parents of Narcisa) filed a complaint for
"sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc. its alleged owner Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera.
In their answer, the petitioners denied liability for the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut. They
alleged that ... the driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their respective places of destination
except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the bus without the knowledge and consent,
much less, the fault of the driver and conductor and the defendants in this case; the defendant corporation
had exercised due diligence in the choice of its employees to avoid as much as possible accidents; the
incident on August 1, 1980 was not a traffic accident or vehicular accident; it was an incident or event very
much beyond the control of the defendants; defendants were not parties to the incident complained of as it
was an act of a third party who is not in any way connected with the defendants and of which the latter have
no control and supervision; ..." (Rollo, pp. 112-113).i•t•c-aüsl
After due trial, the trial court issued an order dated August 8, 1985 dismissing the complaint.
Upon appeal however, the trial court's decision was reversed and set aside. The dispositive portion of the
decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
finding the appellees jointly and solidarily liable to pay the plaintiffs-appellants the following
amounts:
1) To the heirs of Ornominio Beter, the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) in
loss of earnings and support, moral damages, straight death indemnity and attorney's fees; and,
2) To the heirs of Narcisa Rautraut, the amount of Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) for
straight death indemnity, moral damages and attorney's fees. Costs against appellees. (Rollo, pp.
71-72)
The petitioners now pose the following questions
What was the proximate cause of the whole incident? Why were the passengers on board the bus
panicked (sic) and why were they shoving one another? Why did Narcisa Rautraut and Ornominio
Beter jump off from the running bus?
The petitioners opine that answers to these questions are material to arrive at "a fair, just and equitable
judgment." (Rollo, p. 5) They claim that the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts and its
conclusion is grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures.
As regards the proximate cause of the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, the petitioners
maintain that it was the act of the passenger who ran amuck and stabbed another passenger of the bus.
They contend that the stabbing incident triggered off the commotion and panic among the passengers who
pushed one another and that presumably out of fear and moved by that human instinct of self-preservation
Beter and Rautraut jumped off the bus while the bus was still running resulting in their untimely death."
(Rollo, p. 6) Under these circumstances, the petitioners asseverate that they were not negligent in the
performance of their duties and that the incident was completely and absolutely attributable to a third person,
the passenger who ran amuck, for without his criminal act, Beter and Rautraut could not have been subjected
to fear and shock which compelled them to jump off the running bus. They argue that they should not be
made liable for damages arising from acts of third persons over whom they have no control or supervision.
Furthermore, the petitioners maintain that the driver of the bus, before, during and after the incident was
driving cautiously giving due regard to traffic rules, laws and regulations. The petitioners also argue that they
are not insurers of their passengers as ruled by the trial court.
The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage. The
applicable provisions of law under the New Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
28
 ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence, from the nature of its business
and for reasons of public policy Bachelor Express, Inc. is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica Española says: 'In a
legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the following
essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen,
it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from
any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. (5) Enciclopedia Juridica
Española, 309)

In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to petitioner
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the
Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which caused their death.
will of the obligor or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. ...
Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. is presumed to
have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with
Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code. The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion
and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other
resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden
Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut on its posture that the death of the
act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure.
said passengers was caused by a third person who was beyond its control and supervision. In effect, the
petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law, states that the
vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by force majeure However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not
or caso fortuito over which the common carrier did not have any control. enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not
negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. Thus, as early as 1912, we ruled:
Article 1174 of the present Civil Code states:
From all the foregoing, it is concluded that the defendant is not liable for the loss and damage of
the goods shipped on the lorcha Pilar by the Chinaman, Ong Bien Sip, inasmuch as such loss and
Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulations, or when
damage were the result of a fortuitous event or force majeure, and there was no negligence or lack
the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
of care and diligence on the part of the defendant company or its agents. (Tan Chiong Sian v.
those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable.
Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. 152 [1912]; Emphasis supplied).

The above-mentioned provision was substantially copied from Article 1105 of the old Civil Code which states"
This principle was reiterated in a more recent case, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court(167 SCRA 379 [1988]), wherein we ruled:
No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were
inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those
... [F]or their defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper the accident must be due to
in which the obligation itself imposes liability.
natural causes and exclusively without human intervention. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657 [1924]), we defined "events" which cannot be foreseen and
Therefore, the next question to be determined is whether or not the petitioner's common carrier observed
which, having been foreseen, are inevitable in the following manner:
extraordinary diligence to safeguard the lives of its passengers.

... The Spanish authorities regard the language employed as an effort to define the term 'caso
In this regard the trial court and the appellate court arrived at conflicting factual findings.
fortuito' and hold that the two expressions are synonymous. (Manresa Comentarios al Codigo Civil
Español, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scaevola, Codigo Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.)
The trial court found the following facts:
The antecedent to Article 1105 is found in Law II, Title 33, Partida 7, which defines caso fortuito as
'occasion que acaese por aventura de que non se puede ante ver. E son estos, derrivamientos de The parties presented conflicting evidence as to how the two deceased Narcisa Rautruat and
casas e fuego que enciende a so ora, e quebrantamiento de navio, fuerca de ladrones' (An event Ornominio Beter met their deaths.
that takes place by incident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of
houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers ...)
However, from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, the Court could not see why the two
deceased could have fallen off the bus when their own witnesses testified that when the
Escriche defines caso fortuito as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be commotion ensued inside the bus, the passengers pushed and shoved each other towards the door
foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion, apparently in order to get off from the bus through the door. But the passengers also could not
insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other occurrences of a similar pass through the door because according to the evidence the door was locked.
nature.

29
 On the other hand, the Court is inclined to give credence to the evidence adduced by the Q What happened after there was a commotion at the rear portion of the bus?
defendants that when the commotion ensued inside the bus, the two deceased panicked and, in
state of shock and fear, they jumped off from the bus by passing through the window.
A When the commotion occurred, I stood up and I noticed that there was a passenger who was
sounded (sic). The conductor panicked because the passengers were shouting 'stop, stop'. The
It is the prevailing rule and settled jurisprudence that transportation companies are not insurers of conductor opened the bus.'
their passengers. The evidence on record does not show that defendants' personnel were negligent
in their duties. The defendants' personnel have every right to accept passengers absent any
(Tsn. p. 3, August 8, 1984).
manifestation of violence or drunkenness. If and when such passengers harm other passengers
without the knowledge of the transportation company's personnel, the latter should not be faulted.
(Rollo, pp. 46-47) Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the deceased passengers jumped from the window
when it was entirely possible for them to have alighted through the door. The lower court's reliance
on the testimony of Pedro Collango, as the conductor and employee of the common carrier, is
A thorough examination of the records, however, show that there are material facts ignored by the trial court
unjustified, in the light of the clear testimony of Leonila Cullano as the sole uninterested eyewitness
which were discussed by the appellate court to arrive at a different conclusion. These circumstances show
of the entire episode. Instead we find Pedro Collango's testimony to be infused by bias and fraught
that the petitioner common carrier was negligent in the provision of safety precautions so that its passengers
with inconsistencies, if not notably unreliable for lack of veracity. On direct examination, he
may be transported safely to their destinations. The appellate court states:
testified:

A critical eye must be accorded the lower court's conclusions of fact in its tersely written ratio
xxx xxx xxx
decidendi. The lower court concluded that the door of the bus was closed; secondly, the
passengers, specifically the two deceased, jumped out of the window. The lower court therefore
concluded that the defendant common carrier is not liable for the death of the said passengers Q So what happened to the passengers inside your bus?
which it implicitly attributed to the unforeseen acts of the unidentified passenger who went amuck.
A Some of the passengers jumped out of the window.
There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that the solitary door of the bus was locked
as to prevent the passengers from passing through. Leonila Cullano, testifying for the defense, COURT:
clearly stated that the conductor opened the door when the passengers were shouting that the bus
stop while they were in a state of panic. Sergia Beter categorically stated that she actually saw her
son fall from the bus as the door was forced open by the force of the onrushing passengers. Q While the bus was in motion?

Pedro Collango, on the other hand, testified that he shut the door after the last passenger had A Yes, your Honor, but the speed was slow because we have just picked up a passenger.
boarded the bus. But he had quite conveniently neglected to say that when the passengers had
panicked, he himself panicked and had gone to open the door. Portions of the testimony of Leonila Atty. Gambe:
Cullano, quoted below, are illuminating:

Q You said that at the time of the incident the bus was running slow because you have just picked
xxx xxx xxx up a passenger. Can you estimate what was your speed at that time?

Q When you said the conductor opened the door, the door at the front or rear portion of the bus? Atty. Calo:

A Front door. No basis, your Honor, he is neither a driver nor a conductor.

Q And these two persons whom you said alighted, where did they pass, the fron(t) door or rear COURT:
door?

Let the witness answer. Estimate only, the conductor experienced.

A Front door.

Witness:
xxx xxx xxx

Not less than 30 to 40 miles.

(Tsn., p. 4, Aug. 8, 1984)

COURT:
xxx xxx xxx

30
 Kilometers or miles?
A Miles.
Atty. Gambe:
Q That is only your estimate by your experience?
A Yes, sir, estimate.
(Tsn., pp. 4-5, Oct. 17, 1983).
At such speed of not less than 30 to 40 miles ..., or about 48 to 65 kilometers per hour, the speed
of the bus could scarcely be considered slow considering that according to Collango himself, the
bus had just come from a full stop after picking a passenger (Tsn, p. 4, Id.) and that the bus was
still on its second or third gear (Tsn., p. 12, Id.).
In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the common carrier, through its employees,
consisted of the lack of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, in exercising vigilance
and utmost care of the safety of its passengers, exemplified by the driver's belated stop and the
reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an appreciably fast speed.
At the same time, the common carrier itself acknowledged, through its administrative officer,
Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to travel and take on passengers and the public
at large, while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading capacity, in
contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
(RA 4136 as amended.) (Rollo, pp. 23-26)
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the
height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it
was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after
people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with
law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in
the law governing common carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves no merit in view
of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to force
majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the
passengers to their destinations as warranted by law. (See Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra).
The petitioners also contend that the private respondents failed to show to the court that they are the
parents of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut respectively and therefore have no legal personality to sue
the petitioners. This argument deserves scant consideration. We find this argument a belated attempt on the
part of the petitioners to avoid liability for the deaths of Beter and Rautraut. The private respondents were
Identified as the parents of the victims by witnesses during the trial and the trial court recognized them as
such. The trial court dismissed the complaint solely on the ground that the petitioners were not negligent.
Finally, the amount of damages awarded to the heirs of Beter and Rautraut by the appellate court is
supported by the evidence. The appellate court stated:
Ornominio Beter was 32 years of age at the time of his death, single, in good health and rendering
support and service to his mother. As far as Narcisa Rautraut is concerned, the only evidence
adduced is to the effect that at her death, she was 23 years of age, in good health and without
visible means of support.
In accordance with Art. 1764 in conjunction with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, and established
jurisprudence, several factors may be considered in determining the award of damages, namely: 1)
life expectancy (considering the state of health of the deceased and the mortality tables are
deemed conclusive) and loss of earning capacity; (2) pecuniary loss, loss of support and service;
and (3) moral and mental suffering (Alcantara, et al. v. Surro, et al., 93 Phil. 470).
In the case of People v. Daniel (No. L-66551, April 25, 1985, 136 SCRA 92, at page 104), the High
Tribunal, reiterating the rule in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (31 SCRA 511), stated
that the amount of loss of earring capacity is based mainly on two factors, namely, (1) the number
of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by the heirs should be fixed.
As the formula adopted in the case of Davila v. Philippine Air Lines, 49 SCRA 497, at the age of 30
one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years based on the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
(2/3 x 80-32).i•t•c-aüsl By taking into account the pace and nature of the life of a carpenter, it is
reasonable to make allowances for these circumstances and reduce the life expectancy of the
deceased Ornominio Beter to 25 years (People v. Daniel, supra). To fix the rate of losses it must be
noted that Art. 2206 refers to gross earnings less necessary living expenses of the deceased, in
other words, only net earnings are to be considered (People v. Daniel, supra; Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, supra).
Applying the foregoing rules with respect to Ornominio Beter, it is both just and reasonable,
considering his social standing and position, to fix the deductible, living and incidental expenses at
the sum of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) a month, or Four Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos
(P4,800.00) annually. As to his income, considering the irregular nature of the work of a daily wage
carpenter which is seasonal, it is safe to assume that he shall have work for twenty (20) days a
month at Twenty Five Pesos (P150,000.00) for twenty five years. Deducting therefrom his
necessary expenses, his heirs would be entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
representing loss of support and service (P150,000.00 less P120,000.00). In addition, his heirs are
entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as straight death indemnity pursuant to Article
2206 (People v. Daniel, supra). For damages for their moral and mental anguish, his heirs are
entitled to the reasonable sum of P10,000.00 as an exception to the general rule against moral
damages in case of breach of contract rule Art. 2200 (Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75). As attorney's
fees, Beter's heirs are entitled to P5,000.00. All in all, the plaintiff-appellants Ricardo and Sergia
Beter as heirs of their son Ornominio are entitled to an indemnity of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00).
In the case of Narcisa Rautraut, her heirs are entitled to a straight death indemnity of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), to moral damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) and Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees, or a total of Forty Five
Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) as total indemnity for her death in the absence of any evidence that
she had visible means of support. (Rollo, pp. 30-31)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision dated May 19, 1988 and the
resolution dated August 1, 1988 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
31
 [G.R. No. 113003. October 17, 1997] fortuito which is completely an extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the defendants who should
ALBERTA YOBIDO and CRESENCIO YOBIDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LENY TUMBOY, be relieved of whatever liability the plaintiffs may have suffered by reason of the explosion pursuant to Article
ARDEE TUMBOY and JASMIN TUMBOY, respondents. 1174[4] of the Civil Code.

DECISION Dissatisfied, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. They ascribed to the lower court the following
errors: (a) finding that the tire blowout was a caso fortuito; (b) failing to hold that the defendants did not
ROMERO, J.: exercise utmost and/or extraordinary diligence required of carriers under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, and (c)
deciding the case contrary to the ruling in Juntilla v. Fontanar,[5] and Necesito v. Paras.[6]
In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the issue is whether or not
On August 23, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision[7] reversing that of the lower court. It
the explosion of a newly installed tire of a passenger vehicle is a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from
held that:
liability for the death of a passenger.
To Our mind, the explosion of the tire is not in itself a fortuitous event. The cause of the blow-out, if due to a
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children named Ardee and Jasmin,
factory defect, improper mounting, excessive tire pressure, is not an unavoidable event. On the other hand,
boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido Liner bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop Road in Km. 17,
there may have been adverse conditions on the road that were unforeseeable and/or inevitable, which could
Sta. Maria, Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around three (3)
make the blow-out a caso fortuito. The fact that the cause of the blow-out was not known does not relieve
feet from the road and struck a tree. The incident resulted in the death of 28-year-old Tito Tumboy and physical
the carrier of liability. Owing to the statutory presumption of negligence against the carrier and its obligation
injuries to other passengers.
to exercise the utmost diligence of very cautious persons to carry the passenger safely as far as human care
On November 21, 1988, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorneys fees was and foresight can provide, it is the burden of the defendants to prove that the cause of the blow-out was a
filed by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver, fortuitous event. It is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the cause of the blow-out is not caso-
before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. When the defendants therein filed their answer to the complaint, fortuito.
they raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito. They also filed a third-party complaint against Philippine
Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. This third-party defendant filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim. Proving that the tire that exploded is a new Goodyear tire is not sufficient to discharge defendants burden. As
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to a stipulation of facts.[1] enunciated in Necesito vs. Paras, the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection
and use of its equipment, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not necessarily relieve the carrier
Upon a finding that the third party defendant was not liable under the insurance contract, the lower court
from liability.
dismissed the third party complaint. No amicable settlement having been arrived at by the parties, trial on the
merits ensued.
Moreover, there is evidence that the bus was moving fast, and the road was wet and rough. The driver could
The plaintiffs asserted that violation of the contract of carriage between them and the defendants was have explained that the blow-out that precipitated the accident that caused the death of Toto Tumboy could
brought about by the drivers failure to exercise the diligence required of the carrier in transporting passengers not have been prevented even if he had exercised due care to avoid the same, but he was not presented as
safely to their place of destination. According to Leny Tumboy, the bus left Mangagoy at 3:00 oclock in the witness.
afternoon. The winding road it traversed was not cemented and was wet due to the rain; it was rough with
crushed rocks. The bus which was full of passengers had cargoes on top. Since it was running fast, she
cautioned the driver to slow down but he merely stared at her through the mirror. At around 3:30 p.m., in The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal as follows:
Trento, she heard something explode and immediately, the bus fell into a ravine. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is set aside and another one entered ordering defendants to
For their part, the defendants tried to establish that the accident was due to a fortuitous event. Abundio pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Tito Tumboy, P30,000.00 in moral damages,
Salce, who was the bus conductor when the incident happened, testified that the 42-seater bus was not full as and P7,000.00 for funeral and burial expenses.
there were only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat. He added that the bus was running
at a speed of 60 to 50 and that it was going slow because of the zigzag road. He affirmed that the left front SO ORDERED.
tire that exploded was a brand new tire that he mounted on the bus on April 21, 1988 or only five (5) days
before the incident. The Yobido Liner secretary, Minerva Fernando, bought the new Goodyear tire from Davao
The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision which was denied on November 4,
Toyo Parts on April 20, 1988 and she was present when it was mounted on the bus by Salce. She stated that
1993 by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition asserting the position that the tire blowout that caused
all driver applicants in Yobido Liner underwent actual driving tests before they were employed. Defendant
the death of Tito Tumboy was a caso fortuito. Petitioners claim further that the Court of Appeals, in ruling
Cresencio Yobido underwent such test and submitted his professional drivers license and clearances from the
contrary to that of the lower court, misapprehended facts and, therefore, its findings of fact cannot be
barangay, the fiscal and the police.
considered final which shall bind this Court. Hence, they pray that this Court review the facts of the case.
On August 29, 1991, the lower court rendered a decision[2] dismissing the action for lack of merit. On the
The Court did re-examine the facts and evidence in this case because of the inapplicability of the
issue of whether or not the tire blowout was a caso fortuito, it found that the falling of the bus to the cliff was
established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on
a result of no other outside factor than the tire blow-out. It held that the ruling in the La Mallorca and Pampanga
appeal by this Court. This general principle is subject to exceptions such as the one present in this case, namely,
Bus Co. v. De Jesus[3] that a tire blowout is a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment
that the lower court and the Court of Appeals arrived at diverse factual findings.[8] However, upon such re-
which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough or rigid check-up before it
examination, we found no reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
took to the road that morning is inapplicable to this case. It reasoned out that in said case, it was found that
the blowout was caused by the established fact that the inner tube of the left front tire was pressed between As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks incidental to the mode of travel
the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel. In this case, however, the he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not bound absolutely
cause of the explosion remains a mystery until at present. As such, the court added, the tire blowout was a caso
32
and at all events to carry them safely and without injury.[9] However, when a passenger is injured or dies while
travelling, the law presumes that the common carrier is negligent. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1755 provides that (a) common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances. Accordingly, in culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This disputable presumption may only be overcome by
evidence that the carrier had observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733,[10] 1755 and 1756
of the Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. [11] Consequently,
the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible
for damages sought by the passenger.[12]
In view of the foregoing, petitioners contention that they should be exempt from liability because the tire
blowout was no more than a fortuitous event that could not have been foreseen, must fail. A fortuitous event
is possessed of the following characteristics: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or
the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will; (b) it must be
impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible
to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting
to the creditor.[13] As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion
of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.[14]
It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the strength of each and every part
of its vehicles before each trip; but we are of the opinion that a due regard for the carriers obligations toward
the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the condition and strength of those
vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safety of the passengers.[18]
Having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for damages. Article 1764[19] in relation to Article 2206[20] of the
Civil Code prescribes the amount of at least three thousand pesos as damages for the death of a
passenger. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award of damages under Article 2206 has been increased to
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).[21]
Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except when bad faith had been
proven. However, the same damages may be recovered when breach of contract of carriage results in the
death of a passenger,[22] as in this case. Exemplary damages, awarded by way of example or correction for the
public good when moral damages are awarded,[23] may likewise be recovered in contractual obligations if the
defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.[24] Because petitioners
failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier, which resulted in the death of Tito
Tumboy, it is deemed to have acted recklessly.[25] As such, private respondents shall be entitled to exemplary
damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification
that petitioners shall, in addition to the monetary awards therein, be liable for the award of exemplary damages
in the amount of P20,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous
event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it
was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the
fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion
that it could not explode within five days use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by
defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the
carrier from liability for damages.[15]

Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous
event alone. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury
resulting from an accident.[16] This Court has had occasion to state:

While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible,
this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show
that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to
compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been
caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded
and speeding at the time of the accident.[17]

It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor, Salce, that the bus was running
at 60-50 kilometers per hour only or within the prescribed lawful speed limit. However, they failed to rebut the
testimony of Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down. These
contradictory facts must, therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in view of the presumption of negligence of
the carrier in the law. Coupled with this is the established condition of the road rough, winding and wet due to
the rain. It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary measures considering
partially dangerous condition of the road. As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of good quality is
not sufficient proof that it was not negligent. Petitioners should have shown that it undertook extraordinary
diligence in the care of its carrier, such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of the vehicles parts. As the
late Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
33