Flourish Maritime Shipping vs.
Almanzor unexpired portion of his employment contract, earned wages,
Ponente: Nachura
Date: March 14, 2008
RATIO DECIDENDI: In case of unjust, invalid or
unauthorized termination of overseas employment,
where the term of the employment contract is at least
one year or more, the worker shall be entitled to a
salary of three months for ever year of the unexpired
term, in accord with Section 10 of RA 8042.
QUICK FACTS:.Donato (respondent) was a fisherman
illegally dismissed. The monetary award, which was
increased by the CA, is also questioned by the petitioner.
FACTS:
Name of Petitioner: Flourish Maritime Shipping and Lolita Uy
Name of Respondent: Donato Almanzor (employee)
Facts
49-yo Donato entered into a 2-year employment contract
with petitioner Flourish Maritime Shipping as a fisherman,
with a monthly salary of NT15,8400 including free meals
everyday.
However, when he was deployed to Taipei as part of a crew of
the fishing vessel FV Tsang Cheng 66, he found out that there
were only 5 crew members and that he had to buy food.
Worse, the master of the vessel, gave orders that Donato
couldn’t understand—which caused the master to be enraged
and to hit Donato. Lolita talked to the master of the vessel
and when they were docked at the airport, Donato was told
that he was going to eb repatriated.
When Donato arrived at the Philippines, he reported to
Fluorish Maritime and was declared fit for work. He was
promised that the was going to be redeployed, but it turned
out that it was no longer possible because he was 49 years
old—allegedly no longer fit for work.
Donato filed a complaint for illegal dismissal for the
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners, on the other hand, said that Donato voluntarily
resigned, that he failed to comply with the machinery and
arbitration clause in the employment contract, and that he
failed to discharge the burden of proof of illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter Held that respondents were guilty of
illegal dismissal and entitled to six
months total of salary (NT95,040,000).
NLRC Affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter’s
decision
CA Upheld the decision and Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC, and increased the monetary
award, due to the interpretation of
Section 10 of RA8042.
Section 10, RA 8042 Money Claims. In case of
termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the worker
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement
of his placement fee with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
According to the NLRC and Labor Arbiter, Donato was entitled
to six months because the contract covered a two-year
period and he was dismissed only after 26 days of actual
work. The CA, on the other hand, said that he actually
worked for 26 days, so the unexpired portion of the contract
was actually 1 yr, 11 months, and 4 days. The CA held that
he was entitled to full compensation for 11 months and 4
days of the first year, with a total salary equivalent of 14
months and 4 days.

ISSUE:
WON respondent was illegally dismissed from employment
WON the award of the Court of Appeals was correct
DECISION: The SC partially granted the petition in that the
monetary award should be lessened.
HELD
1. No.
The LA and the NLRC correctly concluded, as affirmed
by the CA, that respondent was not actually
redeployed for work, in violation of their employment
contract. The respondent failed give conclusive
evidence that respondent voluntarily resigned from
employment, that respondent was not physically fit to
perform work due to his old age and that the
employment contract provided a grievance machinery.
Therefore, the termination of respondent’s services
was without valid cause. Further, the Court is not a
trier of facts, and factual issues have been resolved
already by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, as affirmed by
the CA.
2. No.
The correct interpretation of Section 10, RA 802 has
already been resolved in Marsaman Manning Agency,
Inc. vs. NLRC. The provision comes into play only when
the employment contract has a term of at least 1 year
or more. In this case, the contract was for two years,
and the overseas contract worker actually worked for
only 26 days prior to the dismissal. Thus, the three
months’ salary rule applies.
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. &
MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved
Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his
departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a
monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer
by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver on their
promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused
to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to
the Philippines on May.
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12
months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the
time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two
(2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a
Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the
LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue
that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple
Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries
for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that
the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple
Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries
for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of
the subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the
applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional
issue raised by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of
termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed
the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of
US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the
unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause,
petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded
by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a
total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine
months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at
the monthly rate of US$2,590.00
Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the
lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his
12-month employment contract, and not just for a
period of three months?
2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of
the salary basis in the computation of his monetary
award, because these are fixed benefits that have been
stipulated into his contract?
Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine
months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per
month. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with
fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated
alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were
uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions
of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042,
specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
employment contract have since been differently treated in that
their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such
limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains
a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim
of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in
their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or
local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject
clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens
it with a peculiar disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of
property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing
valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being
unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 8042.
2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include
overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard
Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as
the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work
“performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay
is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days
and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for
the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the
computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there is
evidence that he performed work during those periods.
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
FACTS:
 Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is
a recruitment and placement agency. Responding to
an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles,
submitted her application for a quality control job in
Taiwan.
 Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to
sign a oneyear employment contract for a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer
Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee
of P70,000.00 when she signed the employment
contract.
 Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work
as a cutter.
 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on
July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that "she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport." She was
asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."
 Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July
14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover
her plane ticket to Manila.
 Subsequently, Joy filed a complaint with the NLRC
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she
was illegally dismissed. She asked for the return of her
placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation
costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as
moral and exemplary damages. She identified Wacoal
as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign
principal.
 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that
respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply
with the work requirements [of] her foreign
[employer]." The agency also claimed that it did not
ask for a placement fee of P70,000.00. As evidence, it
showed an official receipt bearing the amount
of P20,360.00. Petitioner added that Wacoal's
accreditation with petitioner had already been
transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management
Services, Inc. (Pacific). Thus, petitioner asserts that it
was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.
 Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of
petitioner’s claims against it. It alleged that there was
no employer-employee relationship between
them. Therefore, the claims against it were outside the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Pacific Manpower
argued that the employment contract should first be
presented so that the employer’s contractual
obligations might be identified. It further denied that it
assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts.
 Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s
complaint.
 Joy appealed to the NLRC.
 In a resolution, the NLRC declared that Joy was illegally
dismissed. It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of
proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or
 valid cause belongs to the employer. It found that
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove
that there were just causes for termination. There was
no sufficient proof to show that respondent was
inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply
with company requirements. Furthermore, procedural
due process was not observed in terminating
respondent.
 The Commission denied the agency’s motion for
reconsideration
 Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency caused the filing of a petition for certiorari with
the CA assailing the NLRC’s resolutions.
 The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC with respect
to the finding of illegal dismissal.
 Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON, the CA erred when it affirmed the ruling of the NLRC
finding respondent illegally dismissed.
RULING:
No. CA has validly affirmed the ruling of the NLRC.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that
there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The
employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of
law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose
productivity and quality standards at work. 58 They may also
impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees
comply with these standards. 59 Failure to comply may be a
just cause for their dismissal.60 Certainly, employers cannot
be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is
guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the
employer.61 While the law acknowledges the plight and
vulnerability of workers, it does not "authorize the oppression
or self-destruction of the employer." Management prerogative
is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence. This
prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered
with the employee’s right to security of tenure." 63Workers are
entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
termination. They may not be removed from employment
without a validor just cause as determined by law and
without going through the proper procedure. Security of
tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when
they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With respect to
the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle
of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract
is made) which governs in this jurisdiction. There is no
question that the contract of employment in this case was
perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code,
its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws
affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the
rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign
claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Herein the
Philippines, employment agreements are more than
contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII,
Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to
wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be
terminated for a just or authorized cause and after
compliance with procedural due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of
termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her
work and negligent in her duties 69 may, therefore, constitute
a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if
petitioner was able to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination
is on the employer. "The employer must affirmatively show
rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause." Failure to show that there was valid or just
cause for termination would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was illegal.
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is
valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set
standards of conduct and workmanship against which the
employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and
workmanship must have been communicated tothe
employee; and 3) the communication was made at a
reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance
assessment. This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on
probationary employees, which allow termination ofthe
employee only when there is "just cause or when [the
probationary employee] fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his [or her]
engagement."72
However, we do not see why the application of that ruling
should be limited to probationary employment. That rule is
basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which
are guaranteed to all employees, whether their employment
is probationary or regular. The pre-determined standards that
the employer sets are the bases for determining the
probationary employee’s fitness, propriety, efficiency, and
qualifications as a regular employee. Due process requires
that the probationary employee be informed of such
standards at the time of his or her engagement so he or she
can adjust this or her character or workmanship accordingly.
Proper adjustment to fit the standards upon which the
employee’s qualifications will be evaluated will increase
one’s chances of being positively assessed for regularization
by his or her employer.
Assessing an employee’s work performance does not stop
after regularization. The employer, on a regular basis,
determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient,
based on work standards. Based on that determination, and
after complying with the due process requirements of notice
and hearing, the employer may exercise its management
prerogative of terminating the employee found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to
his or her employer that he or she meets all the standards for
employment. This time, however, the standards to be met
are set for the purpose of retaining employment or
promotion. The employee cannot be expected to meet any
standard of character or workmanship if such standards were
not communicated to him or her. Courts should remain
vigilant on allegations of the employer’s failure to opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due
communicatework standards that would govern one’s process of law was violated.
employment "if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their]
duty to adjudicate." In this case, petitioner merely alleged WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA
that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s is AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas
work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C.
evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired
did not even bother to specify what requirements were not portion of her employment contract at an interest of 6% per
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also
particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency. ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00
salary and pay respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
informed of the standards against which her work efficiency judgment.
and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the
position held by respondent showed that even the matter as
basic as the job title was not clear. The bare allegations of Topic: What constitutes recruitment
petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is
PEOPLE vs. HON. JUDGE DOMINGO PANIS and SERAPIO
just cause for termination. There is no proof that respondent
ABUG
was legally terminated. Respondent’s dismissal less than one
[G.R. Nos. L-58674-77. July 11, 1990.]
year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day show
not only failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the
Ponente: CRUZ, J.:
requirement of the existence of just cause for termination.
They patently show that the employers did not comply with
Nature:
the due process requirement.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the
order of the trial quashing the information in favor of the
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence
private respondent.
to the valid procedure of dismissal. 75 The employer is
required to give the charged employee at least two written
Facts:
notices before termination. One of the written notices must
inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981
or her dismissal. The other notice must "[inform] the
alleging that provate respondent Serapio Abug violated of
employee of the employer’s decision." 78 Aside from the notice
Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code for
requirement, the employee must also be given "an
operating a private fee charging employment agency without
opportunity to be heard." Petitioner failed to comply with the
first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor. Abug filed
twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent started
a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did
working on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was
not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally
terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and
recruiting only one person in each of the four informations.
barely a month from her first workday. She was also
Abug claims that under the proviso in Article 13(b), there
repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her
would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more
termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any
persons are in any manner promised or offered any
finding that she was properly notified and given the
employment for a fee. " The view of the private respondents
is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts
mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or
more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other
hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or
more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to
such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other
acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve even
only one person and are not necessarily for profit.
Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and
finally granted in the Orders of the trial court. Hence a
petition for certiorari was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is correct in his
interpretation of recruitment and placement under Article
13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code.
Ruling:
NO. Neither interpretation is acceptable. For its part,
the petitioner does not explain why dealings with two or
more persons are needed where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but
not when it is done through "canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)
workers.
The provision was intended neither to impose a
condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception
thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption
is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and
placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more
persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or
promise of employment is made in the course of the
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential
ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of
workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article
13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only
one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays
down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in
consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or
more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing
with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of
recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed"
create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a
public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or
property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put them to personal use; in other
words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or
property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed"
should by the same token be given the force of a disputable
presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in
recruitment and placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry
County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should
give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment
and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers
seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-
earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their
dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical
deception at the hands of theirown countrymen.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and
September 17, 1981, are set aside and the four
informations against the private respondent
reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
1. People vs. SADIOSA
Facts: Arsenia Conse went to Bayombong, Nueva Ecija in
early 1992 where she met Cely Navarro, Marcela Manzano,
Erly Tuliao and Benilda Domingo. She enticed the four to
apply for overseas employment informing them that she had
a cousin who could send them to Kuwait as domestic helpers.
Apparently convinced by Arsenia Conse, the four went with
her on 5 February 1992 to Manila. Upon arrival, they
proceeded to Room 210, Diamond Building, Libertad St.,
Pasay City where Arsenia Conse introduced the group to
Delia Sadiosa. The four then applied for work as domestic
helpers. On that occasion, Sadiosa assured the four that she
could dispatch them to Kuwait and forthwith demanded
P8,000.00 from each of them for processing fee and
P1,000.00 for passport (P1,500.00 from Cely Navarro). She
assured the group that she would facilitate the processing of
all the necessary documents needed by them. She further
promised them that upon payment of the required fees, they
would be able to leave for Kuwait immediately. The four did
give Sadiosa the money demanded although on different
dates. The latter issued the corresponding receipts therefor.
Again, she assured them that they could leave for Kuwait on
different dates: Cely Navarro and Erly Tuliao on 17 February
1992 which was rescheduled twice on 19 February 1992 and
on 25 February 1992, and Benilda Domingo and Marcela
Manzano on 17 March 1992 which was moved twice on 24
February 1992 and on 17 March 1992. However, not one of
them was able to leave for Kuwait. When they asked for the
return of their money, Sadiosa refused and ignored their
demand. Consequently, the four filed the complaint for illegal
recruitment against Sadiosa. The information read: "That on
or about and during the period comprise (sic) from January
1992 to March 1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused Delia Sadiosa y Cabenta, well knowing that
she is not a duly licensed job recruiter, by means of false
representations and fraudulent allegations to the effect that
she could secure employment as domestic helpers abroad for
Benilda Sabado y Domingo, Marcela Tabernero y Manzano,
Erly Tuliao y Sabado and Cely Navarro y Manzano, did then
and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously recruit
aforesaid persons and collected from them the amount of
P8,000.00 each, which amount were given to the accused by
the aforesaid complainants upon receipt of which, far from
complying with her obligation aforestated, accused
appropriated for herself the said amount and failed to deploy
complainants abroad. Contrary to law." Upon arraignment,
Sadiosa pleaded "not guilty." The trial court found Sadiosa
guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale defined by Article
38 (b) and penalized under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code,
as amended by Presidential Decree 1920 and 2018, and
sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00. The court also ordered Sadiosa to indemnify
Benilda Sabado y Domingo, the sum of P8,000.00; Marcela
Tabernero y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00; Erly Tuliao y
Sabado, the sum of P8,000.00 and Cely Navarro y Manzano,
the sum of P8,000.00. To pay the costs. Sadiosa appealed.
Issue: Whether the information was sufficient to allege illegal
recruitment, and that said charge will not be confused with
estafa by the facts stated therein.
Held: The information is sufficient where it clearly states the
designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
However, there is no need to specify or refer to the particular
section or subsection of the statute that was violated by the
accused. No law requires that in order that an accused may
be convicted, the specific provision penalizing the act
charged should be mentioned in the information. What
identifies the charge is the actual recital of the facts and not
that designated by the fiscal in the preamble thereof. It is not
even necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of
the accused, nor the effective preparation of his defense,
that the accused be informed of the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged. He must look to the facts
alleged. Herein, the information filed against Sadiosa
sufficiently shows that it is for the crime of illegal recruitment
in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and
penalized in Art. 39 of the same Code although it is
designated as for "illegal recruitment" only. Under the Code,
the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale are as follows: (1) the accused engages in the
recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under
Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34
of the Labor Code; (2) accused has not complied with the
guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an
authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or
overseas; and (3) accused commits the same against three
(3) or more persons, individually or as a group." All these
elements are to be found in the information. It alleges that
Sadiosa, knowing fully well that she was "not a duly licensed
job recruiter," falsely represented that she could "secure
employment as domestic helpers abroad" for the four
complainants.
As such, the purpose of the requirement under Sec. 8, Rule
110 to inform and apprise the accused of the true crime of
which she was charged, has been complied with. The main
purpose of the requirement that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting an offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language is to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged so that he could suitably prepare for his defense.
It is also required so that the trial court could pronounce the
proper judgment. This gives substance to the constitutional
guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Herein, Sadiosa was fully accorded the right to
be informed of the charges against her. The fact that she put
up the defense of having accepted the money only in her
capacity as an officer of the recruitment agency shows that
she fully understood the nature and cause of the accusation
against her.Furthermore, it is incorrect for Sadiosa to
maintain that the information filed against her contained
conflicting and irreconcilable charges of illegal recruitment,
estafa under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
and estafa under the same article but under par. 2 (a)
thereof. While on its face the allegations in the information
may constitute estafa, it merely describes how Sadiosa was
able to consummate the act of illegal recruitment — through
false and fraudulent representation by pretending that she
was a duly-licensed recruiter who could secure employment
for complainants in Kuwait. These allegations in the
information therefore do not render the information defective
or multiplicitous. Sadiosa could have been validly charged
separately with estafa under the same set of facts in the
illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate enough not to
have been so charged. Nevertheless, there is no doubt from a
reading of the information, that it accurately and clearly
avers all of the ingredients that constitute illegal recruitment
in large scale. The prosecutor simply captioned the
information with the generic name of the offense under the
Labor Code — illegal recruitment. Hence, to avoid
misconception and misinterpretation of the information, the
prosecutor should have indicated in its caption, the offense
he had clearly alleged in its body, that the crime charged was
for illegal recruitment in large scale. However, such omission
or lack of skill of the prosecutor who crafted the information
should not deprive the people of the right to prosecute a
crime with so grave a consequence against the economic life
of the aggrieved parties. What is important is that he did
allege in the information the facts sufficient to constitute the
offense of illegal recruitment in large scale.
People of the Philippines vs Rosario Ochoa
GR 173792
Facts :
For a period covering the months of February 1997 up to
April 1998 in Novaliches, Quezon city, Rosario Ochoa
recruited fifteen (15) persons namely : Robert Gubat, Junior
Agustin, Cesar Aquino, Richard Luciano, Fernando Rivera,
Mariano R. Mislang, Helen B. Palogo, Joebert Decolongon,
Corazon S. Austria, Cristopher A. Bermejo, Letecia D.
Londonio, Alma Borromeo, Francisco Pascual, Raymundo A.
Bermejo and Rosemarie A. Bermejo. Ochoa promised them an
employment in Taiwan and Saudi Arabia for a consideration
ranging from Two Thousand Pesos (₱ 2,000.00) to Thirty Two
Thousand Pesos (₱32,000.00). She collected total amount of
One Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (₱124,000.00) as
placement fee. Ochoa received the payments even though
she does not have license or authority to do so.
Ochoa’s promise of employment did not materialize
thus the complainants asked for a refund of their money.
However Ochoa was not able to give back their money hence
they decided to file a case of illegal recruitment in large scale
and estafa against Ochoa.
Ochoa contends that she was employed by AXIL
International Services and Consultant (AXIL) as recruiter on
December 20, 1997. AXIL had a temporary license to recruit
Filipino workers for overseas employment. That she remitted
the money she received to AXIL; however AXIL failed to issue
receipt.
 Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding Ochoa
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa.
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of RTC but
ordered the case to be forwarded to Supreme Court since it
does not have jurisdiction over the case.
Issues :
1. Is Ochoa guilty of illegal recruitment? Illegal recruitment in
large scale?
2. Can Ochoa be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment and estafa?
Held :
1. Yes. It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it
must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct
impression that she had the power or ability to send
complainants abroad for work such that the latter were
convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.
All eight private complainants in this case consistently
declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment
overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit
their resumes, birth certificates and passports, which the
private complainants did. Moreover, Ochoa can also be
convicted for illegal recruitment based on Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042, which clearly provides that any
person, whether or not a licensee or holder of authority may
be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain acts as
enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m). Among such acts is
the “failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment
does not actually take place without the worker’s fault.” In
this case, Ochoa received placement and medical fees from
private complainants and failed to reimburse the private
complainants the amounts they had paid when they were not
able to leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no fault of
their own.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale
if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
2. Yes. A person may be charged and convicted separately of
illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to
the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In this
case, therefore, Ochoa may also be charged and
correspondingly held liable for estafa since all the elements
for the crime are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-
77302, and 98-77303. Ochoa’s deceit was evident in her
false representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar,
and Agustin that she possessed the authority and capability
to send said private complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for
employment as early as one to two weeks from completion of
the requirements, among which were the payment of
placement fees and submission of a medical examination
report.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
498 SCRA 377 (2006)
“Promises or offers for a fee employment” is sufficient to
warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.
Petitioner Rosa C. Rodolfo approached private complainants
Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually and invited
them to apply for overseas employment in Dubai. Rodolfo,
being their neighbor, Ferre and Corpus agreed and went to
the former’s office. The office bore the business
name ―Bayside Manpower Export Specialist‖. In that office,
Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing fee and another
P4,000.00. Likewise, Corpus gave Rodolfo P7,000.00. Rodolfo
then told Ferre and Corpus that they were scheduled to leave
for Dubai. However, private complainants and all the
other applicants were not able to depart on the scheduled
date as their employer allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their
departure was rescheduled, but the result was the same.
Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked, Ferre and
Corpus demanded of Rodolfo to return their money. Except
for the refund of P1,000.00 to Ferre, Rodolfo was not able to
return Ferre’s and Corpus’ money. Ferre, Corpus and three
others then filed a case for illegal recruitment in large scale
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Rodolfo.
The RTC rendered judgement against Rodolfo but in imposing
the penalty, the RTC took note of the fact that while the
information reflected the commission of illegal recruitment in
large scale, only the complaint of two (Ferre and Corpus) of
the five complainants was proven. Rodolfo appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition but
modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. The CA also
dismissed Rodolfo’s Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo is guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale
HELD:
The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which
must concur, are: (1) that the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the
offender undertakes any activity within the meaning
of recruitment and placement under Article 13(b), or any
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code. If another element is present that the
accused commits the act against three or more persons,
individually or as a group, it becomes an
illegal recruitment in a large scale.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines ―recruitment and
placement‖ as ―[a]ny act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not.‖
That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is
no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas Employment
Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, testified that the records of the POEA do not
show that Rodolfo is authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment. A Certification to that effect was in
fact issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing
Division of POEA.
The second element is doubtless also present. The act of
referral, which is included in recruitment, is ―the act of
passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment
after an initial interview of a selected applicant for
employment to a selected employer, placement officer or
bureau.‖ Rodolfo’s admission that she brought private
complainants to the agency whose owner she knows and her
acceptance of fees including those for processing betrays her
guilt.
Rodolfo issued provisional receipts indicating that the
amounts she received from the private complainants were
turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does
not free her from liability. For the act of recruitment may be
―for profit or not.‖ It is sufficient that the accused
―promises or offers for a fee employment‖ to warrant
conviction for illegal recruitment. Parenthetically, why
Rodolfo accepted the payment of fees from the private
complainants when, in light of her claim that she
merely brought them to the agency, she could have advised
them to directly pay the same to the agency, she proferred
no explanation.
On Rodolfo’s reliance on Señoron, true, the Court held that
issuance of receipts for placement fees does not make a case
for illegal recruitment. But it went on to state that it is
―rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority‖ that makes a case for
illegal recruitment.
G.R. No. 197528. September 5, 2012. BRION, J
FACTS:
On March 5, 2008, respondent Vinuya et al. filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the petitioner Pert/CPM and its
President with labor arbiter alleging among others that the
agency deployed them to work as aluminium
fabricator/installer for the agency’s principal ,Modern Metal in
Dubai, United Arab Emirates for a two-year employment
whose contracts were approved by the POEA providing for
nine-hours working day, salary of 1,350 AED with overtime
pay, food allowance, free and suitable housing (four to a
room), free transportation, free laundry and free medical and
dental services. However, on April 2, 2007, Modern Metal
gave respondents, except Era, appointment letters different
from that of originally signed, increasing their employment
terms and reducing their salaries and allowances and
removing certain benefits. Further, the working conditions
were not as promised and they repeatedly complained with
their agency about their predicament but to no avail.
Respondents resigned from their job iting personal/family
problems for their resignation except for Era who mentioned
the real reason which is due to the company policy. After
several weeks, petitioner repatriated the respondent to the
Philippines who shouldered their own airfare except for
Ordovez and Enjambre. The agency countered that the
respondents were not illegally dismissed alleging that the
respondents voluntarily resigned from their employment to
seek a better paying job. The agency furthered alleged that
the respondents even voluntarily signed affidavits of
quitclaim and release. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
finding that the respondent voluntarily resigned from their
job. Respondent appealed to the NLRC which reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and found that the respondents
were illegally dismissed. NLRC also pointed out that the
signing of a different employment contract in Dubai is illegal.
Consequently NLRC ordered the agency and the principal to
pay, jointly and severally the respondents salary, placement
fee, and exemplary damages. The petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC but
modified their judgment adjusting the awards particularly the
payment of their salaries in the light of the Court’s ruling in
Serrano striking down the clause in Section 10, paragraph 5
of the RA8042 which limits the entitlement of illegally
dismissed OFW. The agency again moved for reconsideration
reiterating its earlier argument and questioned the
applicability of the Serrano ruling because it is not yet final
and effective but was denied by the NLRC. Petitioner
appealed with CA which upheld the decision of the NLRC
finding the resignation letter as dubious.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Serrano ruling which declared the subject
Section 10 of RA8042 unconstitutional can be given
retroactive application in the present case Whether or not RA
10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010 restoring the
subject clause inSection 10 of RA 8042 being amendatory in
nature can be applied retroactively
RULING:
The SC held that the Serrano ruling can be given retroactive
application as resolved in Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship’s
Management in the interest of equity and that the Serrano
ruling is an exemption to the doctrine of operative fact.
Moreover, the SC held that the amendment introduced by
R.A. 10022 cannot be given retroactive effect not only
because there is no express declaration of retroactivity of the
law, but because the retroactive application will result in an
impairment of right that had accrued to the respondents by
virtue of the Serrano Ruling. The SC reiterated that all
statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
application, unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them retrospective effect are expressly
declared or are necessarily implied from the language used.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution
were AFFIRMED.