MISSING CASES
@Mau De Chavez
1. Leung vs Strong
2. Standard vs Jaranilla
3. Davao vs Castillo
4. Berkenkotter vs Cu-Unjieng
@Allisson Lindayag
17. Bacharach (64 phil 681)
19. US vs Carlos (21 SCRA 553)
5. 9 SCRA 631, No L-18456 November 30, 1963
Ponente: PAREDES, J.
Setting: Bo. San Roque, Tarlac, Tarlac
Facts: Rufino G. Pineda and his mother Juana Gonzales (married
to Gregorio Pineda), borrowed from plaintiff Conrado P. Navarro.
As security,y defendants executed deed of real estate mortgage his
two-story residential house, having a floor area of 912 square
meters, erected on a lot belonging to Atty. Vicente Castro and his
one motor truck. Because of failure to pay, plaintiff filed a complaint
for foreclosure of the mortgage and for damages.
Issue: Whether the subject property belonging to another is
considered movable property
Held: Yes. Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to
another person, it may be the subject-matter of a chattel mortgage
as personal or movable property if so stipulated in the document of
mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for foreclosure, the
validity of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of the
parties to the contract of mortgage.
6. Lavarro vs. Labitoria, 54 Phil. 788, No. 32030 July 2, 1980
Ponente: OSTRAND, J. Lavarro vs. Labitoria
Setting: Barrio of Mangilag, municipality of Candelaria,
Province of Tayabas.
In 1916 a tract of coconut land was registered in favor of Sofia and
the defendants in the present action. Subsequently, in the same
year, the herein defendants brought an action for the partition of
the land with its improvements. The action was finally terminated in
1927 and S was awarded 68,877 square meters of land and 850
coconut palms as her share. Shortly afterwards, the present action
was brought by Sofia and her two daughters to recover
compensation for improvements consisting of coconut palms and
alleged to have been planted by Sofia and her first husband.
Issue: Whether the coconut land is property of the persons to whom
the land is adjudicated.
Held: Yes. Trees and plants annexed to the land are parts thereof
and unless rights or interests in such trees or plants are claimed in
the registration proceedings by others, they become the property
of the persons to whom the land is adjudicated. By timely
proceedings in equity, matters of that character, if fraudulent, may
sometimes be corrected, , but in the present case, the plaintiffs
Apolonia and Isabel Alcantara did not prosecute their alleged rights
until eleven years after the registration of the property, and it is
obvious that whatever rights they may have had are now lost by
prescription.
7. Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc., 103 Phil. 98,
No. L-10817-18 February 28, 1958
Ponente: FELIX, J.
Setting: Balayan, Batangas
López delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of
the Plaza Theatre. Due to failure of Vicente Orosa and corporation
to pay the lumber, Lopez filed before a complaint praying that
defendants be sentenced to pay him jointly and severally the sum
of P41,771.35, with legal interest from the filing of the action; that
in case defendants fail to pay the same, that the building and the
land covered by OCT No. O-391 owned by the corporation be sold
at public auction and the proceeds thereof be applied to said
indebtedness.
Issue: Whether the land can be made subject to the said
materialman's lien.
Held: No. Materialman's lien attaches merely to the immovable
property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was
incurred and in the case at bar, the lien in favor of appellant for the
unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building
attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the
obligor. Thus, the interest of the mortgagee over the land is
superior to and cannot be made subject to the said materialman's
lien.
8. Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. vs. Wearever Textile
Mills, Inc., 122 SCRA 296, No. L-58469 May 16, 1983
Ponente: DE CASTRO, J.
Setting: Rizal
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation, the private respondent
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., discounted and assigned several
receivables with the former under a Receivable Purchase
Agreement. To secure the collection of the receivables assigned,
private respondent executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw
materials inventory as well as a machinery described as an Artos
Aero Dryer Stentering Range.
Upon private respondent’s default, petitioner filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgage to it. The CA
held that machinery in suit cannot be the subject of replevin, much
less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real property pursuant to
Article 415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the
ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from
respondents plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor.
Issue: Whether subject machinery permanently attached to the
ground the machinery is to be considered as personal property
Held: Yes. Examining the records of the instant case, We find no
logical justification to exclude and rule out, as the appellate court
did, the present case from the application of the abovequoted
pronouncement. If a house of strong materials, like what was
involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as
personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage
thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no
innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely
no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and
becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be
likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so
agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel
mortgage.
9. Board of Assessment Appeals v. MERALCO [G.R. No. L-
15334. January 31, 1964.]
Facts: On 20 October 1902, the Philippine Commission enacted
Act 484 which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a
franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric street
railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of
Manila and its suburbs to the person or persons making the most
favorable bid. Charles M. Swift was awarded the said franchise on
March 1903, the terms and conditions of which were embodied in
Ordinance 44 approved on 24 March 1903. Meralco became the
transferee and owner of the franchise. Meralco’s electric power is
generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls,
Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric
transmission wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said
City. These electric transmission wires which carry high voltage
current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers
constructed by respondent at intervals, from its hydroelectric plant
in the province of Laguna to the City of Manila. Meralco has
constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land
belonging to it. On 15 November 1955, City Assessor of Quezon
City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under
Tax Declaration 31992 and 15549. After denying Meralco’s petition
to cancel these declarations an appeal was taken by Meralco to the
Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which required
Meralco to pay the amount of P11,651.86 as real property tax on
the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956. Meralco paid the
amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of
Tax Appeals which rendered a decision on 29 December 1958,
ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the City
Treasurer of Quezon City to refund to Meralco the sum of
P11,651.86. The motion for reconsideration having been denied,
on 22 April 1959, the petition for review was filed.
Issue: Whether or not the steel towers of an electric company
constitute real property for the purposes of real property tax.
Held: The steel towers of an electric company don’t constitute real
property for the purposes of real property tax. Steel towers are not
immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of Article 415. The
steel towers or supports do not come within the objects mentioned
in paragraph 1, because they do not constitute buildings or
constructions adhered to the soil. They are not constructions
analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per description,
given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached
to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed
could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place. They
cannot be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to
an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without
breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to
which they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports
consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of
bolts, which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and
reassembled by screwing the same. These steel towers or supports
do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries or
receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if they were, they
are not intended for industry or works on the land. Petitioner is not
engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel
supports or towers are constructed. The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision appealed from, with costs against the petitioners.
10. MINDANAO BUS COMPANY V. CITY ASSESSOR AND
TREASURER
6 SCRA 197
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in a public utility business, solely
engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks,
over its authorized lines in Mindanao. It owns a main office and
branch offices. To be found in their offices are machineries and
equipment, which were assessed by the City Assessor as real
properties.
ISSUE: Are Machineries and Equipment Real Properties?
HELD: Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of
law must first be essential and principal elements of an industry or
works without which such industry or works would be unable to
function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was
established. We may here distinguish those movables, which are
essential and principal elements of an industry, from those which
may not be so considered immobilized by destination because
they are merely incidental, not essential and principal.
In the case at bar, the tools and equipment in question are by their
nature not essential and principal elements of petitioner’s business
of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are
merely incidentals.
11. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS (114 SCRA 273)
FACTS: Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel
plates wielded and assembled on the spot. Their bot toms
rest on a foundation consisted of compacted earth, sand pad as
immediate layer, and asphalt stratum as top layer. The tanks
merely sit on its foundation. The municipal treasurer of Batangas
made an assessment for realty tax on the two tanks, based on the
report of the Board of
Assessors. MERALCO wished to oppose this assessment as they
averred that the tanks are not real properties.
ISSUE: Are the Tanks Real Properties?
HELD: While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the
land, they ma y nevertheless be considered as improvements
in the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil
industry. For purposes of taxation, the term real property may
include things, which should generally be considered as personal
property. it is familiar phenomenon to see things classified as
real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle
may be considered as personal property.
12. CALTEX PHILS. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS (114 SCRA 296)
FACTS: The City Assessor characterized the items in gas stations
of petitioner as taxable realty. These items included underground
tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline
pumps, computing pumps, etc. These items are not owned by
the lessor of the land wherein the equipment are installed.
Upon expiration of the lease agreement, the equipment should be
returned in good condition.
ISSUE: whether the gas station equipment and machinery
permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station and pavement
should be subject to the realty tax?
HELD: Yes. The equipment and machinery as appurtenances to
the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex and which fixtures
are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them
the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached
and fixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein,
are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
13. ENGUET CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL BOARD
OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS OF ZAMBALES, PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF
ZAMBALES, PROVINCE OF ZAMBALES, and MUNICIPALITY
OF SAN MARCELINO, respondents.
[January 29, 1993, G.R. No. 106041]
Facts:
On 1985, Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed the
said properties in issue as taxable improvements. The assessment
was appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province
of Zambales. However, the appeal was dismissed mainly on the
ground of the petitioner's failure to pay the realty taxes that fell due
during the pendency of the appeal.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, one of the herein respondents. In its decision
dated March 22, 1990, the Board reversed the dismissal of the
appeal but, agreed that the tailings dam and the lands submerged
thereunder shall be subject to realty tax.
For purposes of taxation the dam is considered as real
property as it comes within the object mentioned in Article 415 of
the New Civil Code, It is a construction adhered to the soil which
cannot be separated or detached without breaking the material or
causing destruction on the land upon which it is attached. The
immovable nature of the dam as an improvement which determines
its character as real property, hence taxable under Section 38 of
the Real Property Tax Code.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the tailings dam is subject to realty tax?
2. Whether or not it be considered as immovable property?
HELD:
Yes, it is subject to realty tax and it is considered an
immovable property.
The petitioner does not dispute that the tailings dam may be
considered realty within the meaning of Article 415. It insists,
however, that the dam cannot be subjected to realty tax as a
separate and independent property because it does not constitute
an "assessable improvement" on the mine although a considerable
sum may have been spent in constructing and maintaining it.
The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of
"real property" and simply says that the realty tax is imposed on
"real property, such as lands, buildings, machinery and other
improvements affixed or attached to real property." In the absence
of such a definition, applying Article 415 of the Civil Code, which
states that the following are considered immovables: Section No. 1
Lands, buildings and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
Section no. 3 Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object.
Even without the tailings dam, the petitioner's mining
operation can still be carried out because the primary function of
the dam is merely to receive and retain the wastes and water
coming from the mine. There is no allegation that the water coming
from the dam is the sole source of water for the mining operation
so as to make the dam an integral part of the mine. In fact, as a
result of the construction of the dam, the petitioner can now
impound and recycle water without having to spend for the building
of a water reservoir.
And as the petitioner itself points out, even if the petitioner's
mine is shut down or ceases operation, the dam may still be used
for irrigation of the surrounding areas.
From the definitions and the cases cited in relation to this
case, it would appear that whether a structure constitutes an
improvement so as to partake of the status of realty would depend
upon the degree of permanence intended in its construction and
use, The expression "permanent" as applied to an improvement
does not imply that the improvement must be used perpetually but
only until the purpose to which the principal realty is devoted has
been accomplished. It is sufficient that the improvement is intended
to remain as long as the land to which it is annexed is still used for
the said purpose.
The Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the
definition of an "improvement" because it is permanent in character
and it enhances both the value and utility of petitioner's mine.
Moreover, the immovable nature of the dam defines its character
as real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code and thus makes
it taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.
Hence, petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
14. SIBAL v. VALDEZ
50 PHIL 512
FACTS: The Deputy Sheriff, through a writ of execution, attached
the personal properties of Sibal, including the sugar cane in
question in the 7 parcels of land described in a complaint. The
personal properties were then sold in public auction, including the
sugar canes. Included also in those attached were real properties
wherein 8 out of the 11 parcels of land, house and camarin were
bought by Valdez through the public auction. He also bought the
sugar cane in question.
ISSUE: WON the sugarcane in question is a personal or real
property.
HELD:Sugarcane is under real property as ungathered products.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana provided that standing crops are
considered as part of the land to which they are attached but the
immovability provided for is only one in abstract. The existence of
a right on the growing crop is mobilization by anticipation, a
gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad
the right acquired therein.
-A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the
immovable. It belongs to the lessee and may be sold by him.
-Act 1508 (Chattel Mortgage Law) recognize growing crops as
personal property.
– Crops whether growing or ready to be harvested, when produced
by annual cultivation, is not part of realty.
⁃ Paragraph 2 of Art. 334 of the Civil Code has been modified
by Sec. 450 of Code of Civil Procedure and Act no. 1508 in
the sense that for purposes of attachment and execution
and Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products have the
nature of personal property.
⁃
15. INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER V.
RAMIREZ (GR 18700, 26 September 1922)
FACTS:
The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was
mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. on 10 March 1919, and
registered in due time in the registry of property, while another
mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919
and registered also in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the
trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to
preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage
by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.
ISSUE:
Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property
RULING: Yes.
1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to
the nature of the property mortgaged which is one-half interest in
the business, such interest is a personal property capable of
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties
in articles 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of
mortgage. All personal property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act
1508.)
2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description
contained in the document is sufficient. The law (sec. 7, Act 1508)
requires only a description of the mortgaged property shall be such
as to enable the parties to the mortgage, or any other person, after
reasonable inquiry and investigation, to identify the same. In the
case at bar, “his half interest in the drug business known as Antigua
Botica Ramirez, located at Calle Real Nos. 123 and 125, District of
Intramuros, Manila Philippine Islands" is sufficient.
1. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to
mortgage property in possession Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of
the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as
neither the debtor, nor himself, is in possession of the
property mortgaged, which is, and since the registration of
the mortgage has been, legally in possession of the surety
company
2. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon
property - In no way can the mortgage executed be given
effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question; as
there was a mere stipulation about personal security during
said date, but not a mortgage upon property, and much less
upon the property in question.
16. CHUA GUAN v. SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA
62 PHIL 472(1935)
TOPIC: Collateral Transfers
PONENTE: Butte, J.
FACTS
1. On June 18, 1931, Gonzalo H. Co Toco, the owner of 5,894
shares of the capital stock of Samahang Magsasaka Inc.
represented by 9 certificates having a par value of P5 per share
mortgaged said shares to Chua Chiu to guarantee the payment of
a debt of P20,000 due on or before 19 June 1932.
2. The said certificates of stock were delivered with the mortgage
to the mortgagee, Chua Chiu. The said mortgage was duly
registered in the office of the registered of deeds of Manila on 23
June 1931, and in the office of the said corporation on 30
September 1931.
3. On 28 November 1931, Chua Chiu assigned all his right and
interest in said mortgage to the Chua Guan and the assignment in
the office of the register of deeds in the City of Manila on 28
December 1931, and in the office of the said corporation on 4
January 1932.
4. Co Toco defaulted in the payment of said debt at maturity and
Chua Guan foreclosed said mortgage and delivered the certificates
of stock and copies of the mortgage and assignment to the sheriff
of the City of Manila in order to sell the said shares at public
auction. The sheriff auctioned said shares on 22 December 1932,
and the plaintiff having been the highest bidder for the sum of
P14,390, the sheriff executed in his favor a certificate of sale of
said shares.
5. The plaintiff tendered the certificates of stock standing in the
name of Co Toco to the proper officers of the corporation for
cancellation and demanded that they issue new certificates in the
name of Chua Guan. The officers (the individual defendants)
refused and still refuse to issue said new shares in the name of
Chua Guan.
6. An action for writ of mandamus was filed with the CFI Nueva
Ecija, praying that the defendants transfer the said 5,894 shares of
stock to the plaintiff by cancelling the old certificates and issuing
new ones in their stead.
7. The parties entered into a stipulation in which the defendants
admitted all of the allegations of the complaint and the plaintiff
admitted all of the special defenses in the answer of the
defendants, and on this stipulation they submitted the case for
decision.
8. As special defense, the defendants refused to cancel said
certificates (Co Toco’s) and to issue new ones in the name of Chua
Guan because prior to the date of the latter’s demand (4 February
1933), 9 attachments had been issued and served and noted on
the books of the corporation against Co Toco’s shares and Chua
Guan objected to having these attachments noted on the new
certificates which he demanded.
9. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from,
holding that the attaching creditors are entitled to priority over the
defectively registered mortgage of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of said chattel mortgage in the
registry of chattel mortgages in the office of the register of deeds of
Manila, under date of July 23,1931, give constructive notice to the
said attaching creditors.
HELD:
YES. The attaching creditors are entitled to priority over the
defectively registered mortgage of the appellant.
RATIO:
1. Section 4 of Act No. 1508 provides two ways for executing a valid
chattel mortgage which shall be effective against third persons:
a. The possession of the property mortgage must be delivered
to and retained by the mortgagee
b. Without such delivery, the mortgage must be recorded in
the proper office or offices of the register or registers of
deeds.
2. As to the proper place of registration of such a mortgage. -
Section 4 provides that in such a case the mortgage resides at the
time of making the same or, if he is a non-resident, in the province
in which the property is situated; and it also provides that if the
property is situated in a different province from that in which the
mortgagor resides the mortgage shall be recorded both in the
province of the mortgagor's residence and in the province where
the property is situated.
3. With respect to a chattel mortgage of shares of stock of a
corporation - Registration in the province of the owner's domicile
should be sufficient, those who lend on such security would be
confronted with the practical difficulty of being compelled not only
to search the records of every province in which the mortgagor
might have been domiciled but also every province in which a
chattel mortgage by any former owner of such shares might be
registered. It was not the intention of the legislature to put this
almost prohibitive impediment upon the hypothecation of shares of
stock in view of the great volume of business that is done on the
faith of the pledge of shares of stock as collateral.
4. It is a general rule that for purposes of execution, attachment
and garnishment, it is not the domicile of the owner of a certificate
but the domicile of the corporation which is decisive.
5. The only safe way to accomplish the hypothecation of share of
stock of a Philippine corporation is for the creditor to insist on the
assignment and delivery of the certificate and to obtain the transfer
of the legal title to him on the books of the corporation by the
cancellation of the certificate and the issuance of a new one to him.
6. To the debtor, this may be unsatisfactory because it leaves the
creditor as the ostensible owner of the shares and the debtor is
forced to rely upon the honesty and solvency of the creditor. The
mere possession and retention of the debtor's certificate by the
creditor gives some security to the creditor against an attempted
voluntary transfer by the debtor, provided the by-laws of the
corporation expressly enact that transfers may be made only upon
the surrender of the certificate.
6. Section 35 of the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) - shares of
stock "may be transferred by delivery of the certificate endorsed by
the owner or his attorney in fact or other person legally authorized
to make the transfer." The use of the verb "may" does not exclude
the possibility that a transfer may be made in a different manner,
thus leaving the creditor in an insecure position even though he
has the certificate in his possession. Moreover, the shares still
standing in the name of the debtor on the books of the corporation
will be liable to seizure by attachment or levy on execution at the
instance of other creditors
7. Loans upon stock securities should be facilitated in order to
foster economic development. The transfer by endorsement and
delivery of a certificate with intention to pledge the shares covered
thereby should be sufficient to give legal effect to that intention and
to consummate the juristic act without necessity for registration.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
1. It is a general rule that for purposes of execution,
attachment and garnishment, it is not the domicile of the
owner of a certificate but the domicile of the corporation
which is decisive.
2. Loans upon stock securities should be facilitated in order to
foster economic development. The transfer by
endorsement and delivery of a certificate with intention to
pledge the shares covered thereby should be sufficient to
give legal effect to that intention and to consummate the
juristic act without necessity for registration.
18. G.R. No. L-16218
ANTONIA BICERRA, DOMINGO BICERRA, BERNARDO
BICERRA, CAYETANO BICERRA, LINDA BICERRA,
PIO BICERRA and EUFRICINA BICERRA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
TOMASA TENEZA and BENJAMIN BARBOSA, defendants-
appellees
Ponente:Justice Makalintal
Date: November 29, 1962
Place: Lagangilang, Abra
Facts:
The appellants (bicerra) were the owners of the house,
worth P200.00 built on land owned by them situated in the said
municipality Lagangilang. In January 1957, appellees(teneza &
barbosa) forcibly demolished the house and claimed to be the
owners. Such resulted to dismantling of the materials of the house
and were placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant of the place
as a result of appellate's(teneza & barbosa) refusal to restore the
house or to deliver the material appellants(bicerra.
Upon such appellants (bicerra) filed a complaint for they
have suffered actual damages. In such complaint the relief prayed
for is that "the plaintiffs be declared the owners of the house in
question and/or the materials that resulted in its dismantling and
that the defendants (teneza & barbosa) to be ordered to pay the
sum of P200.00, plus P600.00 as damages, the costs."
However, the Court of First Instance of Abra dismissed the
complaint filed upon the motion of (teneza & barbosa) defendants-
appellate on the ground that the action was within the exclude and
original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of
Lagangilang, of the same province. Hence, appellants(bicerra) filed
an appeal.
Issues:
Whether the action involves title to real property and
therefore is cognizable by the Court of First and whether it pertains
to the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court.
Ruling:

The order appealed from is affirmed. The dismissal of the
complaint was proper. A house is classified as immovable property
by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415,
par. 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true regardless of the
fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different
owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases
to exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise
ceases.
20. G.R. No. 161107
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City
Mayor of Marikina City, JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her
capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the City Engineer,
and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of
Marikina City, vs.ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST.
SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY -MARIKINA, INC.,
Ponente: Jose Catral Mendoza (associate Justice)
Date : March 12, 2013
Place: Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
Facts:
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring
a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in Marikina Heights and
covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located
within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters
of the Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and
the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property is
enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30)
years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings,
facilities, and other improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina.
On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina
City 192, enacted Ordinance No. entitled “Regulating the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina.”
In 1995 and 1998, 2175 2006 Ordinance Nos. and were enacted to
amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five
(5) meter parking area allowance located between the front
monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions
Section 7. Transitory Provision. Real property owners whose
existing
fences and walls do not conform to the specifications herein are
allowed adequate period of time from the passage of this
Ordinance
within which to conform, as follows:
(1) Residential houses – eight (8) years
(2) Commercial establishments – five (5) years
(3) Industrial establishments – three (3) years
(4) Educational institutions – five (5) years8
(public and privately owned)
Upon such ordinance the respondents filed petition for prohibition
with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina, Branch
273. They argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of
jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such
contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and that
demolishing their fence and constructing it six (6) meters back
would result in the loss of at least 1,808.34 square meters and
permanent loss of their beneficial use.
The implementation of the ordinance on their property would be
tantamount to an appropriation of property without due process of
law; goal of the provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality
did not exist. Petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue of which,
they could restrain property rights for the protection of public safety,
health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general
prosperity petitioners.
Ruling of the RTC
Grant the petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition
commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing
or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents’ property
and held petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or
implementing Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994.
RTC agreed with the respondents that the order of the petitioners
to demolish the fence at the SSC property in Marikina and to move
it back six (6) meters would amount to an appropriation of property
which could only be done through the exercise of eminent domain.
It held that the petitioners could not take the respondents’ property
under the guise of police power to evade the payment of just
compensation.
The petitioners’ contention that the parking space was for the
benefit of the students and patrons of SSA-Marikina is immaterial
for the respondents were already providing for sufficient parking in
compliance with the standards found that. While the 80% see-thru
fence requirement could run counter to the respondents’ right to
privacy.
Ordinance No. 192, as amended, provided for retroactive
application. It held, however, that such retroactive effect should not
impair the respondents’ vested substantive rights over the
perimeter walls, which would be destroyed by the demolition of the
walls and the seizure of the strips of land.
Ruling of the CA
CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision did not justify the exercise of police power, as it did not
only seek to regulate, but also involved the taking of the
respondents’ property without due process of law. It, thus, ruled
that the assailed ordinance could not be upheld as valid as it clearly
invaded the personal and property
rights of the respondents and “for being unreasonable, and undue
restraint of trade.
The CA also shot down the argument that the five-meter setback
provision for parking was a legal easement, the use and ownership
of which would remain with, and inure to, the benefit of the
respondents for whom the easement was primarily intended. It
found that the real intent of the setback provision was to make the
parking space free for use by the public, considering that such
would cease to be for the exclusive use of the school and its
students as it would be situated outside school premises and
beyond the school administration’s control.
Upon such petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the
December 1, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issues: Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in
declaring that city ordinance no. 192, Series of 1994 is not a valid
exercise of police power but an exercise of the city of the power of
eminent domain and such implementation is violative of Due
Process clause
SUPREME COURT EN BANC
RULING:
The petitioners must show the reasonable relation between the
purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The court used rational relationship test to determine whether there
is a valid exercise of police power. (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Upon such the court held that the petitioners lack
concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and
a violation of the due process clause.
They may contend that the ultimate goal of this objective is clearly
the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security.
However, the means employed by the petitioners, is unduly
oppressive to private rights and is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of this purpose. Iit is clear that the petitioners were
acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192
against the respondents. The CA was correct in affirming the
decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition. The petitioners
must permanently desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the
assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 2, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court in SCA Case No. 2000-381-
MK is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is
hereby issued commanding the respondents to permanently desist
from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance
No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on the petitioners' property
in question located in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
21. Serg’s v. PCI Leasing
Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing G.R. No. 137705. August
22, 2000
FACTS:
PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money, with
an application for a writ of replevin.
Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and
deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days
and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery,
with word that he would return for other machineries.
Petitioner (Serg’s Products) filed a motion for special protective
order to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the properties
were still personal and therefore can still be subjected to seizure
and writ of replevin.
Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were
immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code.
Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries
In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the
Petitioner, the appellate court, Citing the Agreement of the parties,
held that the subject machines were personal property, and that
they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled
that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the true intention of the contracting parties."
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by
virtue of immobilization.
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory
were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because
they were in fact real property.
Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs
of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only.
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery,
receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ
of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their
own land.They were essential and principal elements of their
chocolate-making industry.Hence, although each of them was
movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become
“immobilized by destination because they are essential and
principal elements in the industry.”
However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real
property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such
stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming
otherwise.Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is
ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact
found therein.
Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides “The
PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal
property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof
may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or
attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real
property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what
is permanent.”
The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects
of the Writ of Replevin
22. G.R. No. 168557, February 16, 2007
FELS Energy, Inc.
vs Province of Batangas and the Office of the Provincial
Assessor of Batangas
Ponente: Callejo, Sr.
Facts:
January 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy
over MW diesel engine power barges in Batangas for a period of 5
years. Subsequently, Polar assigned its rights under the agreement
to FELS. NPC initially opposed.
August 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes
on the barges. FELS referred the matter to NPC reminding it of its
obligation under the agreement to pay the real estate taxes. NPC
sought for reconsideration of the decision but the motion was
denied.
NPC filed a petition to the Local Board Assessment Appeals. The
provincial Assessor averred that the barges were real property for
the purpose of taxation. LBAA still denied the petition filed by NPC
and ordered FELS to pay the taxes.
LBAA Ruling: power plant facilities are considered real property
because they are installed at a specific location with a character of
permanency. The owner of the barges-FELS is a private
corporation-is the one being taxed, not NPC. The agreement will
not justify the exemption of FELS.
FELS then appealed to Central BAA. CBAA rendered s decision
finding the power barges exempt from real property tax.
CBAA Ruling: the power barges belong to NPC since they are
actually used by it. FELS appealed before the CA but was denied
as well.
Held:
YES. The CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property and are
thus subject to real property tax. This is also the inevitable
conclusion, considering that G.R. No. 165113 was dismissed for
failure to sufficiently show any reversible error. Tax assessments
by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith,
with the taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise. Besides,
factual findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired
expertise in their field, are generally binding and conclusive upon
the Court; we will not assume to interfere with the sensible exercise
of the judgment of men especially trained in appraising property.
Where the judicial mind is left in doubt, it is a sound policy to leave
the assessment undisturbed. We find no reason to depart from this
rule in this case.
Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that
“docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their
nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or
coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are
categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the
nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner
for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on
a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said
industry or work.
Petitioners maintain nevertheless that the power barges are
exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160
because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by
petitioner NPC, a government- owned and controlled corporation
engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of electric
power.
We affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the
taxable properties is petitioner FELS, which in fine, is the entity
being taxed by the local government. As stipulated under Section
2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement:
“OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power
Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery and equipment on
the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which have
been supplied by it at its own cost. POLAR shall operate, manage
and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel
of NAPOCOR into electricity.”
It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment
of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A.
No. 7160. Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be
actually, directly and exclusively used by the government owned or
controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS still cannot
find solace.
23. Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076 (January 13, 2009) Case
Digest
Personal Property
Facts:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a
complaint for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
against Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) for stealing its business. PLDT
alleged that Baynet offered phone cards to people in Japan to call
their friends and relatives in the Philippines using PLDT's facilities
and equipment.
Issue:
Whether or not the PLDT's business of providing
telecommunication services is a personal property under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No, PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is
not a personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Personal property under the Revised Penal Code covers both
tangible and intangible properties but must be considered with the
word "take" in the law. There is "taking" of personal property, and
theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires
possession of personal property even if for a short time; or if such
property is under the dominion and control of the thief. The
statutory definition of "taking" clearly indicates that not all personal
properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is
that only movable properties, which have physical or material
existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper
subjects of theft. Movable properties under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code should be distinguished from the rights or
interest to which they relate to. While the rights or interests are
properties, they are not considered personal properties under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
PLDT's business is intangible and cannot be taken by another and
not the proper subjects of theft because they are without form or
substance.
24. Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic
August 6, 2017Light
G.R. No. 179987
Facts:
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for
original registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and
his predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive
and continuous possession of the said land for more than 30 years.
Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by
his great-grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966,
one of the sons became the administrator of the properties which
the son of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties
therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be
alienable and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the
case of Republic v Hebierto.
Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be
allowed
Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we
would need to dissect them. The case settles down the correct
interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b)
vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites,
while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not
repeal the other.
It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and
disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be
registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is
Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case
where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original
registration. Thus:
The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is
satisfied when at the time of the application, the land is already
classified as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents
fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption
of the right nugatory and the provision inoperative, aggravated by
the fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an independent
state.
The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence,
the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is
true, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix
of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New
Civil Code.
It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the
commerce of men and the patrimonial property of the State can be
subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion
when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and
only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia,
there is a positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands
to be such.
Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a
positive act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and
disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired
through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented
was 1948. No other substantive evidence was presented.
Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared
as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence
that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422
of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Petition Denied.