People vs.

Catantan
Facts :
At 3:00 o’clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan, Jr., 18,
were fishing in the sea around 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly,
another boat caught up with them. They were later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan
and Jose Ursal alias “Bimbo”.
They boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and pointed his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan
struck Eugene on the left cheek bone and ordered him and Juan, Jr. to “dapa.” They hogtied Eugene
and covered him up with tarpaulin, stepped on him and ordered Juan to ferry them to Daan
Tabogon using their pump boat. However, as they went farther out into the open sea the engine
stopped running. And as they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. This was
operated by Juanito and its engine was new. Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the
boat cautioning them not to say anything.
On a pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded Juanito’s pumpboat. And ordered hinto
take them to Mungaz. Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and
harvest his catch, but Catalan threatened to kill him. As Ursal was transferring to the
Juanito’s pumpboat, the Pilapil brothers got the chance to escape. The Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias “Bimbo”
guilty of violating of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law
of 1974. They were charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Of the duo only Emiliano
Catantan appealed. He contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts
proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy
under PD No. 532.
Issue:
Whether or not Emiliano Catalan violated PD No. 532 or Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law?
Held:
The court held that there was no reversible error in the decision appealed. They convicted
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and
sentenced him accordingly to reclusion perpetua. The costs against accused-appellant. There was
piracy, not grave coercion, where, as part of the act of seizing their boat, the occupants of the vessel
were forced to go elsewhere other than their place of destination. Grave coercion as penalized in
Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the concept of piracy. While it
may be true that Eugene and Juan, Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of
destination, such compulsion was part of the act of seizing their boat. Pilapil brothers are mere
fisher folk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in seawaters. To impede the livelihood of
small fishermen would be to deprive them of their very survival, and the likes of the accused within
the purview of P.D. No. 532 are the obstacle to the“economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people.”
People vs. Puno (Crim1)

Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts:

 January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the
personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's
bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC
 He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place
 When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got
into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
 After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man,
accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
 Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get
money" from her
 Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
 But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
 The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs.
Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000
 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
 Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his
mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga
 According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other
side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress
had blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured
when she jumped out of the car
 The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that
according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs.
Sarmiento to step out of the car
o He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that
his employer had gotten a ride
o He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running
across the highway

Issue:

1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD
No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding:

1. No.
 2. No.

Ratio:

1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured

prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other
than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation.
o For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent
of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
o In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in
the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders
o This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our
country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of
outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway
robbery)
o PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated
by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined
or particular victim
o The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was
casually operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable
to the case
o This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2

months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay
Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline,
and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates including the accused
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and completely
took over the vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes
were unloaded transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong San
Hiong. Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the Philippines.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the accused were charged with qualified
piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters). They were
subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal. Meanwhile accused
Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice
when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine
waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to
convict, and sentence.

ISSUE:

WON the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the Philippine
waters and territory?

RULING:

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must
be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the
pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On
the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the
law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement
of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is
likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent
to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of
nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532,
piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And
such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the
vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the
pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence,
the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a
violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People
v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the
law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world
(People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

Buebos and Buebos v. People G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008
FACTS:

Adelina Borbe was in her house watching over her sick child. She heard some nose, got up and
saw the petitioners congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her
hut on fire. Instead of helping her, petitioners fled.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or for arson of an inhabited house which merits a
penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

Petitioners should be liable for simple arson. The nature of destructive arson is distinguished from
simple arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the offender. In the present case, the act
committed by the petitioners neither appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of
perversity and viciousness.
People of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand Baluntong G.R. No. 182061 March 15, 2010
Facts:
Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete destruction
of the saidhouse and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious
physical injuries on Joshua Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The Trial Court found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. He is sentenced
to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court but in light of the passage of R.A. 9346, it reduced the sentence from death to reclusion
perpetua.
Issue: Were the courts correct in charging the accused the complex crime of double murder and
frustrated murder?
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered
findingappellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson
under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
no eligibility for parole and other civil damages modified.In determining the offense committed
by appellant, People v. Maingan teaches: In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to
determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated ± whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the male factor:(a) if the main
objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion
of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;(b) if, on the other hand,
the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is
resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly,(c) if
the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so,
but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct
crimes committed homicide/murder and arson. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, Amending
the Law on Arson,´ reads:Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal
to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: (2) Any
inhabited house or dwelling;
The Court finds that there is no showing that appellant’s main objective was to kill Celerina and
her housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal. Absent any
concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot
beheld liable for double murder with frustrated murder. Celerina was outside the house at the time
it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons. While the above-
quoted Information charged appellant with Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, appellant may
be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248(3)
of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act.As reflected above, as it was
not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crimewould only be
arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson.When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
theoffense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death is imposed when death results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, the
penalty should be reclusion perpetua.

People vs. Cedenio GR. No. 93485

Facts:
On November 26, 1986, Dorio residence was gutted with fire. Five members of the family, then
occupying the house were burned to death. The five bodies retrieved were those of Mario Hilario
Dorio, with wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost
severed, Mario Dorio with wounds on the leg and left nipple, Nicanora Tabanao with a wound in
the stomach and infant Dioscora with no wounds at all but charred to the bone.

Two witnesses testified that the three appellants namely, Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe
Antipolo were seen running out of the burning house, holding bolos stained with blood.

Another witness testified that Pedro Cedenio borrowed from him a bolo on the night of November
26, and the following morning, the bolo was returned to him with a bloodstain on the handle. The
accused Pedro Cedinio, also told him “do not worry, if this incident reaches the court, I will answer
(for) everything”

The trial court found the accused-appelants guilty of Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and
penalized under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant should be charged by a complex crime of arson with murder.

Rulings:
No. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites Groizard-

…when the fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in the house and that
the objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code
declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely
adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other
words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the
main objective is the burning of a building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime
of arson.

From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were hacked and stabbed to death,
appellants set the house afire to hide their gruesome act. Thus, the appellant are guilty of a separate
crime of four counts of murder and arson. And not the complex crime of arson with murder.