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Abstract— In a block-chain IoT environment, when data or Block chain has been applied to bitcoin and etherium using
device authentication information is put on a block chain, security technologies such as electronic signatures, public keys,
personal information may be leaked through the proof-of-work and hash functions. The bitcoin developed by Satoshi
process or address search. In this paper, we apply Zero- Nakamoto is getting attention, and it is also studying the
Knowledge proof to a smart meter system to prove that a prover utilization method in financial and non-financial areas
without disclosing information such as public key, and we have including virtual currency. In the bitcoin, the block chain is a
studied how to enhance anonymity of block chain for privacy kind of distributed digital book that stores the history of the bit
protection . coin, which is a currency issued periodically[7]. This ledger is
made of cryptographic techniques that can not be counterfeited
Keywords—IoT; Security; Block Chain; Smart Grid
or modulated and is made as a verification step to prevent
forgery and tampering of transactions through transaction
I. INTRODUCTION processes and hash values as shown in Figure 1. for the transfer
The IoT is the abbreviation of the Internet of Things, which of ownership[8].
enables objects to share and control data between objects
because things are connected to the Internet. It is possible to
commit malicious attacks, such as data tampering, or privacy
infringement, while sharing data on objects over the Internet.
This paper introduced a block chain to prevent security
threats such as data counterfeiting, which could occur using
smart meters. Zero-Knowledge proof, a block chain anonymity
enhancement technology, was introduced to prevent security
threats such as personal information infringement through
block inquiry. It was proposed to use smart contracts to prevent
smart meter data forgery and personal information
infringement We suggest.
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through the smart meter is stored together with the usage time, pattern of the user. An attacker is at risk of a second crime,
and in the case of the prosumer, the electric prduction is stored such as theft, because the user can see if the house is empty.
in the smart contract. In the case of an electric car charger, Therefore, in this paper, we propose a method to protect the
when a consumer plugs in a charger, the electricity generated personal information of the proposed system by adding a proof
by the prosumer is consumed, the electricity consumed is of zero knowledge that can prove the information is correct
stored in the contract, and the electricity generated by the without providing information to the verifier.
prosumer is reduced and stored. Through the application, the
general user can search the used electricity quantity and pay the
electricity bill according to the period with call the smart
contract function. The prosumer can search for the electricity
generated and the consumer using the electric car charger can
search the charger to find the amount of electricity that can be
charged and the amount of electricity charged by the vehicle.
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Using the zero knowledge proof authentication protocol, IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
the public key is stored in the block chain without storing the Data collected through smart meters is used for power
original data in the block chain, and the original data is stored
pricing. Therefore, the collected data must be integrity
in the server database. When the proof is completed through
the zero knowledge proof process together with the public key protected to prevent it from being tampered with. For
stored in the block chain, the data is called so that the data can example, a user might want to pay less than the amount of
be prevented from being modulated. It also protects your power user used, so user is likely to tamper with the data. In
privacy because you do not put your original data directly in addition, the power provider is likely to modulate the data to
the block chain. charge more power charges than the user has consumed.
Therefore, it is possible to generate blocks by verifying the
data transmitted by the smart meter and to disperse the ledger
to make data impossible to be modulated and to maintain
integrity.
Also, if the data collected through the smart meter is
scattered and distributed among several people by the block
chain, the malicious attacker can analyze the life pattern of the
user by searching the power consumption over time, and the
attacker can save the time consuming the minimum power
consumption Based on this, the attacker can know whether
user is going out or vacationing. As such, if the data collected
through the smart meter is directly exposed by the block chain,
it may infringe the privacy of the user and damage the
property of the user. In the proposed system, the public key
generated by proving zero knowledge is stored in order to
maintain confidentiality without causing privacy invasion. In
Fig. 8. Block Chain Authentication and Data Protection Proposal System addition, the original data can be stored on the server to
Using Zero Knowledge maintain availability and can be used for electricity pricing or
electricity usage searches.
V. EXPERIMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
As shown in Figure 8, the proposed system consists of
registration and authentication a two-step process and a three
stages of client, server, and block chain. In the block chain, the
registration phase and the authentication phase are
implemented as a non - interactive zero knowledge
verification[19] function using the smart contract. In the
registration step, the data x to be protected by the client is input
to generate a random number g and p, which are prime
numbers, and the data is regarded as a secret key, and a public
key pub is generated. The data x to be protected on the server
and the generated pub are transmitted and the server stores it in
the database. Also, in the block chain, the random values g and
p and the public key pub generated without transmitting the
data x to be protected are transmitted and stored in the block to
complete the registration. When calling the data in the
proposed system, the authentication process is performed.
When the client calls the data x stored in the server, it selects
the public key pub of x stored in the server's database. In the
stored block chain, if the query is made through pub, the
random values g and p stored in the registration step are called.
Through the g and p transmitted from the block chain, the Fig. 9. Data protection transaction results using zero knowledge proof
server generates R1 and w by the non-interactive zero
knowledge proof with low communication burden, and If the data matches the first time it is registered, the
transmits to the block chain. The smart contract in the block verification will indicate success, and if it has been tampered,
chain executes the proof function using the received R1 and w
the verification will report a failure. The transaction does not
and computes the value of R2. Through this, it can be proved
that the value of stored data x in the server can not be display the original data. This allows you to meet data
modulated even if it is not stored directly in the block chain. integrity, confidentiality, and availability..
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VI. CONCULUSION [3] Luan, Shang-Wen, et al. "Development of a smart power meter for AMI
based on ZigBee communication", Power Electronics and Drive
In this paper, we propose smart contract and system using Systems, 2009. PEDS 2009. International Conference on. IEEE, 2009.
Zero-knowledge proof to protect data. IoT data is stored in the [4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
block chain, which can prevent IoT device authentication and Version3.1, CCMB, Setp.2006.
data tampering. Zero-knowledge proof technology is applied to [5] Youngu Lee, A Study for PKI Based Home Network System
prevent third parties from checking the user's original data Authentication and Access Control Protocol, KICS '10-04Vol.35No.4
through block retrieval. The current system of measuring and [6] Kepco, Prosumer Power Trading, http://home.kepco.co.kr
charging the amount of electricity through the smart meter [7] Andreas M, Masteing Bitcoin: Unlocking Digital Cryptocurrencies,
applies a block chain because there are various problems such pp.49-68, O’REILLY, 2015
as forgery and alteration of data and errors in the calculation of [8] Sung-Hoon Lee, Device authentication in Smart Grid System using
charges, and furthermore, Through Smart contracts that have Blockchai, KAIST, 2016.
Zero-knowledge proof can make transactions such as car [9] Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,
2008.
chargers, prosumer power trading convenient and safe.
[10] Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, 1994.
[11] Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart Contracts, 1997.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT [12] The Cointelegraph, A Brief History of Ethereum From Vitalik
This study was conducted as a result of the research result [13] Buterin’s Idea to Release, 2015
of 'Future Creation Science Department' and 'Korea Internet [14] Jean-Jacques Quisquater, How to Explain Zero-Knowledge Protocols to
Promotion Agency' “Master degree program support project of Your Children,1989.
knowledge information engineering department with [15] KETI, Mobius IoT server platform, http://iotocean.com
employment contract type”. [16] Ryan Cheu, An Implementation of Zero Knowledge Authentication,
2014
[17] Eli Ben-Sasson, Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from
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[18] Surae Noether, Review of Ctyptonote White Paper, 2016
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